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哥伦比亚大学国际直接投资展望中文版都可以在我们的网站查看:
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/columbia-fdi-perspectives
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*Columbia FDI Perspectives*
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues
Editor-in-Chief: Karl P. Sauvant ([log in to unmask])
Managing Editor: Chioma Menankiti ([log in to unmask])

*The Columbia FDI Perspectives are a forum for public debate. The views
expressed by the authors do not reflect the opinions of CCSI or our
partners and supporters.*

No. 376   February 5, 2024
*Investors’ obligations under IIAs: toward a practical solution*
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by
Kraijakr Thiratayakinant*
<#m_-5140547140038864603_m_8220050736221567730__edn1>

A key feature of international investment agreements (IIAs) is their
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. As ISDS has been
successfully utilized by foreign investors, some of the public’s opinion of
this mechanism has soured and resulted in something of a legitimacy crisis.
This is caused, in part, by the asymmetric nature of IIAs whereby home and
host states agree on each other’s obligation to protect their respective
investors—while the investors, as third parties to these agreements,
undertake few, if any, obligations.

States have put more emphasis on policy and their right to regulate, as
reflected in recent IIAs. Moreover, UNCITRAL’s Working Group III
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has been working to improve ISDS procedurally. Although these efforts
address the legitimacy crisis to some extent, they do not directly tackle
the asymmetry in IIAs. To do so requires the imposition and enforcement of
obligations against investors, to rectify the imbalance.

What kinds of obligation can be imposed on investors under IIAs? Most
common are provisions on compliance with domestic laws and regulations and
those related to corporate social responsibility (CSR), responsible
business conduct (RBC) and human rights. Provisions on compliance with
domestic laws and regulations are often found in the preamble or a
stand-alone provision in IIAs; this approach is generally acceptable and
linked to the “clean hands” principle
<https://columbia.us6.list-manage.com/track/click?u=ab15cc1d53&id=e80311d723&e=dd153d6a25>.
On the other hand, provisions related to CSR, RBC or human rights, if they
exist, are most commonly formulated in the form of “best effort” clauses
that usually provide that investors “should” or “shall endeavor” to promote
such concepts. How these “soft” obligations are enforced through ISDS is
unclear.

Both kinds of obligations can be enforced through three methods. The first
is to link investors’ access to arbitration to their compliance with legal
rules and standards, whether in domestic or international law. The second
and third methods allow countries and affected individuals to enforce legal
rules and standards directly against investors through arbitration
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.

The latter two methods require a significant reimagining of the current
ISDS legal infrastructure—which is not plausible anytime soon: even with
regard to states, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
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provides limited scope for imposing obligations on a third state.
Accordingly, it would be much more complex to directly enforce an IIA
obligation through arbitration against third-party investors, whose legal
standing under international law is at best problematic, and whose consent
to arbitration is not necessarily guaranteed. By contrast, the first method
is more practical and readily implementable under the current system.

As the main beneficiaries, investors are granted the right to initiate ISDS
proceedings under IIAs, although they did not negotiate the provisions
therein. This feature is rather unique to IIAs. Setting conditions that
must be met by investors before they can access arbitration aligns with
this unique feature, and investors would have the incentive to comply.

In fact, similar conditions already exist in IIAs. For example, Article
9.21 of the CPTPP
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requires investors to give consent in writing to arbitration in accordance
with the procedures set out therein and to include certain information in
notices of arbitration. Failing to do so would render arbitration
inaccessible. Consequently, an IIA obligation to comply with domestic laws
and regulations, such as those on environment and anti-corruption, can be
implemented in the same manner, albeit involving potentially more complex
and lengthy proceedings to verify compliance. In addition, states could
explicitly include a provision that obligates ISDS tribunals to take into
account non-compliance with such an obligation when calculating damages,
something akin to contributory fault.

Where domestic laws and regulations of host states are clear on investors’
obligations, it is simpler to enforce compliance as a prerequisite to
arbitration under IIAs since the corresponding IIA obligations can be
linked to them, through the first method discussed above. However, where an
IIA obligation only makes references to CSR, RBC or human rights more
generally, or only in international law, investors will find it more
difficult to comply and ISDS tribunals may not be willing to enforce the
obligation. Consequently, states should incorporate—and elaborate—these
concepts into their respective domestic legal systems vis-à-vis investors
and their investments, to give a stronger legal basis for when IIA
provisions refer, and link them, to investors’ access to arbitration. For
example, states could make it compulsory under their legal systems for
foreign companies investing in mining projects to comply with human rights
legislation or human rights conventions to which they are a party.

Until the time when it is widely acceptable to directly enforce IIA
obligations against investors through arbitration, linking arbitration
access to compliance with investors’ obligations is the most practical way
to deal with the asymmetry in IIAs.

------------------------------
* <#m_-5140547140038864603_m_8220050736221567730__ednref1> Kraijakr
Thiratayakinant ([log in to unmask]) is Head of International Agreements
Sub-division at Department of International Economic Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Thailand. The opinion expressed here is solely his own
and does not reflect the position of the Royal Thai Government. The author
wishes to thank Lukas Stifter, Gus Van Harten and Don Wallace for their
helpful peer reviews.
*The material in this Perspective may be reprinted if accompanied by the
following acknowledgment: “Kraijakr Thiratayakinant,** ‘**Investors’
obligations under IIAs: toward a practical solution,**’ Columbia FDI
Perspectives, No. 376, February 5, 2024. Reprinted with permission from the
Columbia Center on Sustainable **Investment (*http://ccsi.columbia.edu
<https://columbia.us6.list-manage.com/track/click?u=ab15cc1d53&id=e0e6bf366e&e=dd153d6a25>*).”
A copy should kindly be sent to the Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment at *[log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>
For further information, including information regarding submission to the
*Perspectives*, please contact: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
Chioma Menankiti, [log in to unmask]

*Most recent Columbia FDI Perspectives*
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   - No. 375, Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘The global corporate minimum tax and MNE
   home countries
   <https://columbia.us6.list-manage.com/track/click?u=ab15cc1d53&id=05edc73aae&e=dd153d6a25>
   ,’* Columbia FDI Perspectives*, January 22, 2024
   - No. 374, Catharine Titi, ‘Why public policy exceptions have not
   delivered and how to make them more effective
   <https://columbia.us6.list-manage.com/track/click?u=ab15cc1d53&id=6c57996466&e=dd153d6a25>,’
   *Columbia FDI Perspectives*, January 8, 2024
   - No. 373, Bamituni Etomi Abamu, ‘Reducing the reliance on global value
   chains by strengthening backward linkages
   <https://columbia.us6.list-manage.com/track/click?u=ab15cc1d53&id=c015b3c077&e=dd153d6a25>,’
   *Columbia FDI Perspectives*, December 26, 2023

*All previous FDI Perspectives are available at
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/columbia-fdi-perspectives
<https://columbia.us6.list-manage.com/track/click?u=ab15cc1d53&id=2959f5f448&e=dd153d6a25>*
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*Other relevant CCSI news and announcements**:*

   - *Applications are now open* for our virtual 2024 Executive Training
   Program on Sustainable Investments in Agriculture
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   which will be held from *May 7-17*. The interdisciplinary program
   explores challenges and solutions for advancing sustainable investments in
   agriculture. It includes asynchronous and synchronous components, including
   short and interactive live sessions dedicated to engagement with course
   lecturers and participants from around the world. Applications will be
   considered on a rolling basis until March 15, 2024. *For more
   information, and to apply, visit our website
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   - *Apply by April 30th* for our virtual 2024 Executive Training on
   Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development
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   to be held *June 3-14. *The two-week training emphasizes the
   interdisciplinary nature of resource-based development. By working through
   case studies and with practitioners and experts in the field, participants
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   of the extractive industries in their country. *For more information,
   and to apply, visit our website
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Karl P. Sauvant, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Columbia Law School - Columbia Climate School
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*Senior Fellow*
*Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment*
Columbia Law School, Columbia University
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