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CALL FOR PAPERS

Special issue in Journal of International Business Policy on

INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS  IN AN ERA OF DISRUPTIONS

 

Proposal deadline: December 15, 2023

 


Guest editors


Gary Gereffi (Duke University)


Pavida Pananond (Thammasat University)


Fredrik Tell (Uppsala University)


Tony Fang (Stockholm University) 


 


Keywords: industrial policy, global value chains, economic nationalism,
deglobalization, resilience, strategic industries, subsidies, Chips Act,
Inflation Reduction Act, Made in China 2025, sustainable development,
inclusive development.

 

Background

The societal relevance and impact of international business (IB) research to
bridge the gap between theory and practice and to contribute to the
betterment of the world are increasingly emphasized within the IB discipline
(Tung, 2023). From its inception, the Journal of International Business
Policy (JIBP) has sought to encourage scholars in IB and cognate fields to
increase their impact in policymaking circles by connecting IB research to
major contemporary issues (Lundan, 2018; Van Assche, 2018). The global value
chain (GVC) research community is uniquely positioned to pursue and deliver
this impact because it links “the macro- (global), meso- (industry and
country) and micro- (firm and community) levels of analysis” (Gereffi, 2019:
196) and “bridges the firm-specific, private-sector and country-level,
societal divide that has separated the international business and
international economics literatures” (ibid: 195). The GVC approach has
successfully navigated this terrain through its focus on the role of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in global industries, examining how
international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the
development prospects of advanced, emerging and less-developed nations in
the global economy (Gereffi, 2018; 2019).

 

Industrial policy and GVCs

One of the most hotly contested issues in GVC research concerns the varied
roles of the state in the development process (Horner & Alford, 2019). How
states used different policies to direct economic activities has also been
discussed in the literature on industrial policy (see, e.g., Rodrik, 2008;
Harrison & Rodríguez-Clare, 2010; Warwick, 2013). Although the concept can
be traced back to the infant industry arguments of United States (US)
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton in the 18th century and German
economist Friedrich List in the 19th century, industrial policy became
widely debated and deployed in both developing and industrialised economies
in the post-World War II period (Naudé, 2010; Andreoni & Chang, 2019). 

Definitions of industrial policy range from broad to narrow. Drawing upon
his literature review, Warwick (2013: 16) suggests: “Industrial policy is
any type of intervention or government policy that attempts to improve the
business environment or to alter the structure of economic activity toward
sectors, technologies or tasks that are expected to offer better prospects
for economic growth or societal welfare than would occur in the absence of
such intervention.” Industrial policies can be of both “harder”
(price-related) and “softer” (collaboration-oriented) varieties (Harrison &
Rodríguez-Clare, 2010), and they may be targeted horizontally across the
economy or towards designated sectors (Warwick, 2013). 

In the 1960s and 1970s, the state played a large and direct role in the
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) strategies in Latin America,
India, and elsewhere, where the tools of industrial policy included
local-content requirements, mandatory joint-ventures, and export-promotion
schemes to induce MNEs to set up local subsidiaries to make goods in
relatively protected domestic markets (Gereffi, 1994: 215-217). In Asia as
well, the “Five Dragons”, i.e. Japan (Johnson, 1982), South Korea (Amsden,
1989), Taiwan (Wade, 1990), Hong Kong (Chiu, Ho & Lui, 1997) and Singapore
(Cheang, 2022), prospered by adopting their own versions of industrial
policy with an active state role in promoting export-oriented
industrialization (EOI). A combination of ISI and EOI development strategies
has typically been adopted in newly industrializing economies across Latin
America and Asia (Gereffi & Wyman, 1990). 

Although the neoliberal narrative of the 1970s frowned upon an extensive
role of the state in economic management and discredited the use of
industrial policy, the concept resurfaced since the mid-2000s as a response
to the global financial crisis (Wade, 2018; Chang & Andreoni, 2020; Rodrik,
2023). Today, industrial policy is back in mainstream debates largely due to
the growing geopolitical concern of major economic superpowers (Cherif &
Hasanov, 2019). The surge of China to become the leading export economy and
second largest economy in the world (behind only the US) highlights the
importance of balancing the attention given to advanced industrial economies
along with emerging and less developed economies in the Global South (Tung,
2023). In addition, smaller economies in Southeast Asia, like Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand have their own types of developmental state and
economic development patterns (Rasiah, 2021), highlighting the ongoing need
for comparative research on this topic.

 

Current disruptions and the return of industrial policy 

The current era is defined by multiple disruptions and economic slowdowns
caused by the COVID-19 global pandemic (Gereffi, 2020), the manifold
logistical, energy, refugee, and supply consequences of the Ukraine war
(Pisani-Ferry, 2022), the rising wave of economic nationalism, and the
antagonistic rivalry between the United States and China (Tung, Zander, &
Fang, 2023), the world’s two largest economies. In response, governments
around the world have chosen to prioritize or reorient industrial policies
to strengthen strategic global supply chains of their respective nations. In
this era of disruption, we appear to be shifting, at least in part, from a
prosperity-driven to a security-driven development landscape, and in this
special issue we seek a deeper understanding of how GVCs are changing in the
process (Gereffi, 2014; Pananond, Gereffi & Pedersen, 2020; Lee & Gereffi,
2021; Zhan, 2021).

GVC research has shown that “resilience” has different meanings at the firm
level (operational efficiency), for supply chains (governance structures and
strategies of lead firms) and for countries (national security) (Gereffi,
Pananond & Pedersen, 2022). However, the security-driven narrative on
economic resilience may emphasize a country-level focus over other
perspectives. The one-sided interpretation of resilience in response to
home-country geopolitical concerns may result in practices, like reshoring
or divestment, that may not always bode well for firms’ governance and
financial performance (Pedroletti & Ciabuschi, 2023; Pietrobelli & Seri,
2023). 

The renewal of industrial policy adoption in the name of national economic
security may trigger further changes and reconfigurations in global
industries. In the US, the
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-
review-report.pdf> Biden administration has sought to build more resilient
supply chains by strengthening U.S. manufacturing capabilities in strategic
sectors such as semiconductors, batteries for electric vehicles, active
ingredients for essential medicines, and critical minerals used in advanced
electronics and clean energy (White House, 2021). The
<https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europ
e-fit-digital-age/european-industrial-strategy_en> 2020 Industrial Strategy
for Europe (European Commission, 2020) is designed to support the twin
transition to a green and digital economy, making European Union (EU)
industry more competitive globally. Measures aim at enhancing Europe’s
autonomy by fortifying a series of
<https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/37824> “strategic value chains”
including clean and autonomous vehicles, smart health, low-carbon emission
industries, the industrial internet of things, and cybersecurity (European
Commission, 2019; Dür, Eckhardt & Poletti, 2022). More broadly, the US-led
Global North is seeking to build up a “democracy chips” alliance (Reuters,
2022) to reduce their reliance on China (Luo & Van Assche, 2023; Peters,
2022). 

Concurrently, in China, President Xi Jinping’s call to realize the “Chinese
Dream” (i.e., the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation) has fuelled
China’s own quest to become a technological superpower with advanced
manufacturing, electric vehicles, clean energy, and digital technologies
being built up rapidly. The launch of China’s long-term state-sponsored
initiatives such as “Made in China 2025”, the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), and China’s
<https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/wp/fdi/china-dual-circulation-st
rategy-global-economy/> Dual Circulation model (European Union, 2020) are
strategic moves to make China a leader in global high-tech manufacturing and
simultaneously focus on domestic demand and indigenous innovation. The
US-China rivalry is increasing and the challenges for trade and industrial
policies in GVCs are significant (Li et al., 2022). Notwithstanding a
dominant central government and a panoply of state-owned enterprises that
wield enormous influence over the national economy, China’s diversified and
sustained export success in GVCs and its rapid economic growth also reflect
more decentralized and bottom-up policy initiatives at the city and
provincial levels (Gereffi, Bamber, & Fernandez-Stark, 2022).

To combat the resource nationalism related to China’s control of many
rare-earth minerals (e.g., 41% of cobalt, 28% of lithium, 78% of graphite,
and 6% of nickel) and 80% of the processing capacity for these minerals
(Chang & Bradsher, 2023), the US State Department is pushing a “minerals
security partnership” with 13 governments (U.S. Dept. of State, 2022). In
addition, the EU has proposed a “buyers’ club” for critical minerals with G7
countries (Swanson, 2023). The main goals of both proposals are to establish
common (and higher) labor standards for suppliers of critical minerals,
given the poor standards typical in many mineral-rich countries, as well as
to reduce the dependency on China. 

 

Implications of changing configurations of GVCs for IB and industrial policy

Decoupling from China or severing the complex supply chains that tie the two
countries together has been popular in some US policy circles, but would
have major consequences for the reconfiguration of GVCs throughout the world
(Vertinsky et al., 2023; Witt et al., 2023). Given the well-established
difficulties of decoupling from China (Farrell & Newman, 2020; Shih, 2020),
international leaders have begun advocating for an alternative notion of
“de-risking” to deal with a more assertive China (Ciuriak, 2023). European
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen initially introduced the term in a
speech on March 30, 2023: “I believe it is neither viable – nor in Europe’s
interest – to decouple from China. Our relations are not black or white –
and our response cannot be either. This is why we need to focus on de-risk –
and not decouple” (Cave, 2023).

National and regional initiatives all utilize various forms of industrial
policy to remake GVCs (Gereffi & Sturgeon, 2013; Pietrobelli, Rabellotti &
Van Assche, 2021). However, 21st century development strategies require
interactive industrial policy to navigate complex trade and production
linkages in the global economy (Gereffi, Lim & Lee, 2021), unlike earlier
eras when domestic industries were more self-contained (Rodrik, 2023). A
modern industrial and innovation strategy must simultaneously address
several related sets of concerns: global economic competitiveness, national
security, reliable international partnerships, and inclusive and sustainable
economic growth (Sullivan, 2023; Bistline, Mehrote & Wolfram, 2023; Patrucco
et al., 2022). While global challenges like climate change, sustainable
development, and demographic shifts require coordinated action,
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2022-06-21/myth-globa
l-regional-ties-win> regions may offer the best setting to identify
supply-chain trade-offs and conflicts, and negotiate stable global solutions
(O’Neill, 2022).   Thus, a GVC perspective on industrial policy allows us a
broader space to examine its wide-ranging impacts on social and
environmental upgrading progress and the overarching economic goals of
growth and sustainability.

 

Possible Topical Areas of Interest

 

For this special issue, we invite scholars to contribute theoretical and
empirical research that expands or improves current knowledge on the
interaction between industrial policy and GVCs in an era of disruptions.
Submissions may include but are not restricted to the following topics:

 

GVCs as a driver of industrial policy 

*	How do public agendas around industrial policy emerge and evolve in
light of recent patterns of GVC competition?
*	Do geographical chokepoints in GVCs help drive the rise of
industrial policy in strategic sectors? Are industrial policies effective in
addressing such chokepoints?
*	How can cross-sectoral, cross-regional and/or cross-cultural
compositions of GVCs be used to study policy ambitions with respect to
strategic industries? 
*	What are causes, effects and processes associated with the
relocation of supply and industrial policies in emerging economies?
*	What does the move from “prosperity-driven” to “security-driven” in
different national or regional contexts mean for GVCs? 

 

Industrial policy and GVC governance

*	How do specific industrial policy initiatives affect GVC
configurations? Does it differ if they are developed for resilience or
sustainability reasons? 
*	How does industrial policy shape patterns of
offshoring/reshoring/friendshoring? What are main antecedents and
consequences? 
*	How do sanctions (geopolitical, technological, financial, and
trade-related) affect GVC strategy and operations? Can MNEs shirk the
effects by reconfiguring their GVCs? 
*	Is “smart specialization” attainable and desirable in today’s era of
disruptions?
*	What lessons can be drawn from the Covid-19 pandemic for more
sustainable and inclusive GVC governance?
*	Can industrial policies such as the Carbon Border Adjustment
Mechanism reduce carbon leakage through global value chains?

 

Industrial policy and deglobalization

*	Is the deglobalization of GVCs a likely outcome of regional and
national sources of policy change? May this differ across regions?
*	How do MNE strategies interact with global and local policy
landscapes with respect to evolving GVC governance?
*	How does populism affect IB policies in GVCs?
*	Do regional trade agreements strengthen or undermine GVC trade and
investment linkages?  

 

GVC reactions to industrial policy

*	What supplier strategies are effective in coping with the
consequences of policy-driven GVC disruptions and how have these evolved?
*	How do friend-shoring and ally-shoring initiatives affect MNE
strategies and changing industrial policies?
*	What is the proper balance between just-in-time (JIT) and
just-in-case (JIC) business models to stabilize GVCs in the realm of new
industrial policies?

 

Industrial policy and implications on innovation and economic development

*	What are the ramifications of policy-induced technology wars for the
location and rate of innovation activities?
*	How do changes in the industrial policy landscape affect economic
development in emerging or least-developed economies?
*	What are examples, processes and effects of unintended consequences
of policy changes?
*	What is the impact of supply-chain disruptions on the importance of
a multilateral trading system based on WTO rules?
*	How are different views of political and business leaders in the
Global South vs. the Global North on changing GVC configurations expressed
and why?

 


Envisioned impact


The discussion on industrial policy in this special issue should provide
useful and holistic insights for economic policy makers on the consequences
of industrial policy beyond domestic borders. These insights could help
policy makers in the areas of trade and investment promotion, as well as
those involved in foreign relations.  At the same time, such discussion
should also benefit managers of firms whose activities are part of global
value chains across industries, both in advanced and developing economies. 


 


Submission and Review Process


Submitted manuscripts must adhere to the scope, standards, format, and
editorial policy of the Journal of International Business Policy (JIBP). “
<http://www.palgrave.com/gp/journal/42214/authors/aims-scope> Author
Guidelines” and the JIBP Style Guide for Authors must be followed. 

The Special Issue will proceed in two phases. In Phase 1, the four guest
editors will review all submitted proposals. A Proposal should not exceed
2500 words, including graphs, tables, figures, and references. It should
provide (i) the author(s)’ details; (ii) purpose of the study; (iii) the
research question(s) being addressed; (iv) how the piece addresses the core
concepts of the special issue; and (v) the relevance of the study for
scholars and policy professionals; and (vi) the envisioned impact of the
paper.

Contributors with submissions likely to contribute to the SI will be invited
to attend an online idea development workshop prior to submitting their full
papers. These invitations provide no guarantee for publication in the SI.
They serve as indications of our interest in how the full papers can
contribute to the SI. In Phase 2, the submitted papers will go through the
regular JIBP process of submission, peer-review, revision, acceptance, and
JIBP publication. The timeline for submission is as follows:


 


December 15, 2023      Deadline for proposal submission via JIBP’s
<https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jibp> Manuscript Central portal  

February 2024              Idea Development Workshop (virtual)

February 15, 2024        Full paper submission window opens in JIBP’s
<https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jibp> Manuscript Central portal

June 15, 2024               Deadline for submission of full papers via
JIBP’s  <https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jibp> Manuscript Central portal

Autumn 2024               Paper Development Workshop (virtual) 

June 15, 2025               Expected publication of SI (accepted articles
published online)

 

Full paper submissions to the special issue will be reviewed as soon as they
are received – the submission system opens 4 months before the SI deadline.
As papers are accepted, they will be published on the
<https://link.springer.com/journal/42214/online-first> JIBP Online First
page on a rolling basis, irrespective of the timing of the other papers of
the SI, to ensure quick publication process. Published SI papers will all be
part of the same SI electronic collection, but might be published in
different issues.

 

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