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*Subject:* The rise of self-judging essential security interest clauses in
international investment agreements (Columbia FDI Perspective No 188)


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*Columbia FDI Perspectives*
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues
No. 188  December 5, 2016
Editor-in-Chief: Karl P. Sauvant ([log in to unmask])
Managing Editor: Daniel Allman ([log in to unmask])
*The rise of self-judging essential security interest clauses *
*in international investment agreements*
<http://columbia.us6.list-manage.com/track/click?u=ab15cc1d53&id=f05f035b24&e=a657baec7e>
by
Karl P. Sauvant and Mevelyn Ong,
with Katherine Lama and Thor Petersen * <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn1>

A network of bilateral treaties and other international investment
agreements (IIAs) has constructed a predictable and enforceable
international investment regime.

Since 1992, however, the protections offered by this regime have
potentially been limited by the inclusion in IIAs of self-judging essential
security interest (ESI) clauses. These clauses expressly allow a government
to take measures—unilaterally—that “it considers necessary”[1]
<#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn2> to evade treaty obligations.

This *Perspective *presents a study of 1,861 IIAs concluded by 90 countries
before early 2016.[2] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn3> The study sought to
identify the geographic and temporal spread of self-judging ESI clauses in
IIAs and trends in drafting styles. It found 222 IIAs containing
self-judging ESI clauses, with the United States (US) being the first to
introduce them. The US, Canada and Japan remain the leading users, followed
by a growing number of Asian and Latin American countries.

While the number of self-judging ESI clauses is small compared to the total
number of IIAs, the proportion of IIAs with such clauses concluded in a
given year has increased from negligible in 2000 to over 60% of IIAs
concluded in 2015. (See charts in the online version of this *Perspective*.)
By early 2016, at least 134 countries, accounting for 99% of world outward
FDI flows and stock, were bound by such clauses.

Self-judging ESI clauses can be classified along two dimensions:

*Scope*


   - “Broad clauses” (127 IIAs) refer to “essential security interests”
   without further definition or limitation, giving governments wide
   discretion to determine what constitutes their ESI. For example: “Nothing
   in this Agreement … preclude[s] a Party from applying measures that it
   considers necessary for … the protection of its own [ESI].”[3]
   <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn4>
   - “Narrow clauses” (95 IIAs) limit self-judgment to specific subjects,
   typically related to furnishing certain information, but also to matters
   such as war or other emergencies. Occasionally, narrow clauses incorporate,
   by reference, or replicate, GATT art. XXI and/or GATS art. XIV bis.


*Strength*


   - “Very strong clauses” (15 IIAs) include a footnote prescribing that
   arbitral tribunals must respect a government’s determination of its ESI:
   “For greater certainty, if a Party invokes [ESI] … the tribunal or panel
   hearing the matter shall find that the exception applies.”[4]
   <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn5>
   - “Strong clauses” (190 IIAs) state simply that they are self-judging.
   - “Conditional clauses” (17 IIAs) subject self-judgment to a requirement
   that measures are not applied, for example, in an arbitrary or
   unjustifiably discriminatory manner, or so as to avoid treaty obligations.
   [5] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn6> This leaves the door open for
   arbitral review[6] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn7> (which can be
   explicitly required[7] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn8>), especially when
   treaties require reasons for invoking the exception.


The most far-reaching clauses, conferring maximum discretion on governments
to determine their own compliance with treaty obligations, are “broad” and
“very strong.” Ten IIAs containing such clauses were identified, followed
by 102 with broad/strong clauses and 88 with narrow/strong clauses.

Except perhaps when clauses are “very strong,” most self-judging clauses
could arguably be challenged on the basis of “good faith.”[8]
<#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn9> Nonetheless, arbitral tribunals must give
great deference to the judgment of governments.[9]
<#m_-4354323527801753566__ftn10>

Overall, the proliferation of self-judging ESI clauses makes IIA
protections uncertain, subordinating treaty disciplines to governments’
self-restraint. They are likely to spread further, as governments seek to
protect ESI concerns and regulatory sovereignty, and could extend beyond
security to cover financial and other regulation. Broad/strong self-judging
ESI clauses are quite sweeping, creating the risk of abuses by governments.

Abuses could perhaps be limited by more narrow definitions of “essential
security interests” and clearer delineations of when exceptions can be
invoked (for example, limiting them solely to national security concerns,
and/or expressly providing that they cannot apply to broader interests and
economic issues); explicitly stipulating “good-faith” requirements;
incorporating a last-resort condition; requiring notification or prior
reasons given to a joint committee; and/or providing for consultations with
treaty counterparties before invoking an ESI clause. Ultimately, however,
the clauses remain self-judging.

Although the trend described in this *Perspective *might be part of the
much-needed rebalancing of the investment regime toward greater rights for
governments, care must be taken not to undermine the rule of international
investment law in the process.

------------------------------
* <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref1> Karl P. Sauvant ([log in to unmask])
is Resident Senior Fellow, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
Columbia University; Mevelyn Ong ([log in to unmask]) is a graduate of
the Masters of Law (LL.M.) 2016 degree program at Columbia Law School;
Katherine Lama ([log in to unmask]) is a graduate of the Master in Public
Administration (MPA) 2016 degree program at Columbia’s School of
International and Public Affairs; Thor Petersen ([log in to unmask]) is a
J.D. candidate at Columbia Law School. The details of the study’s
methodology, contained in a “Methodology Note,” are available on request
from Karl P. Sauvant. The authors are grateful to Louis-Alexis Bret, Pakwan
Chuensuwankul, Katerina Florou, Camilla Gambarini, Jo En Low, Amanda
Jiménez Pintón, Shawn Lim, and Carl Lundeholm for their research assistance
during various stages of the project, to a great number of colleagues and
officials of governments and investment promotion agencies for specific
help, and to Manfred Schekulin and Stephan Schill for their comments. The
authors are also grateful to Mark Kantor, Michael W. Reisman and Kenneth
Vandevelde for their helpful peer reviews. *The views expressed by the
authors of this Perspective do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
Columbia University or its partners and supporters. Columbia FDI
Perspectives (ISSN 2158-3579) is a peer-reviewed series.*
[1] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref2> Or similar formulations establishing
subjective self-judgment.
[2] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref3> The review drew on various databases
and direct contacts with countries, but not all countries and IIAs were
reviewed.
[3] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref4> US-Australia FTA, art. 22.2(b).
[4] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref5> *See*, *e.g.*, US-Peru FTA, art.
22.2. Whereas the US discontinued use of such a footnote since 2007, other
countries have not.
[5] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref6> *See*, *e.g.*, Korea-Japan BIT, art.
16.
[6] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref7> *See*, *e.g.*, Japan-Mozambique BIT,
art. 18.
[7] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref8> *See*, *e.g.*, China-Peru FTA, art.
141.
[8] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref9> *See*, *e.g.*, Kenneth Vandevelde,
“Of politics and markets: the shifting ideology of the BITs,” *International
Tax & Business Lawyer*, vol. 11 (1993), at p. 159; Stephan Schill and Robyn
Briese, “‘If the state considers’: self-judging clauses in international
dispute settlement,” *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, vol. 13
(2009), pp. 61-140.
[9] <#m_-4354323527801753566__ftnref10> Tribunals in investor-state
arbitrations have not yet considered self-judging ESI clauses. The effect
of self-judging provisions in other legal instruments (e.g., ICJ Statute,
art. 36(2)) remains uncertain. *See*,* also*, *Interhandel (Switzerland v.
US)* [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6 (Judgment)*.*
*The material in this Perspective may be reprinted if accompanied by the
following acknowledgment: “Karl P. Sauvant, Mevelyn Ong,* *Katherine Lama,
and Thor Petersen, ‘The rise of self-judging essential security interest
clauses in international investment agreements,’ Columbia FDI Perspectives,
No. 188, December 5, 2016. Reprinted with permission from the Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment (www.ccsi.columbia.edu
<http://www.ccsi.columbia.edu>).” A copy should kindly be sent to the
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment at [log in to unmask]
<[log in to unmask]>. *

For further information, including information regarding submission to the
*Perspectives*, please contact: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
Daniel Allman, [log in to unmask]

   - No. 187, Jan Knoerich, “Why some advanced economy firms prefer to be
   taken over by Chinese acquirers,” November 21, 2016.
   - No. 186, Jose Guimon, “From export processing to knowledge processing:
   upgrading the FDI promotion toolkit,” November 7, 2016.
   - No. 185, Frank J. Garcia, “Investment treaties are about justice,”
   October 24, 2016.

*All previous FDI Perspectives are available at
**http://ccsi.columbia.edu/publications/columbia-fdi-perspectives/
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/publications/columbia-fdi-perspectives/>**. *
Karl P. Sauvant, Ph.D.
Resident Senior Fellow
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Columbia Law School - Earth Institute
Ph: (212) 854-0689 <%28212%29%20854-0689>
Fax: (212) 854-7946 <%28212%29%20854-7946>
*Copyright © 2016 Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), All
rights reserved.*
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