***with apologies for cross posting*****

The Politicization of Firms
 
1st Workshop on the politicization of firms to be held in Paris 6th & 7th May 2015
 
Theme: “The role of think tanks in institutionalizing the firm as a dominant actor”
 
 
About the OLS workshop
 
This workshop on the politicization of firms aims at discussing and advancing cutting-edge research on important topics in the field by bringing together a small selected group of scholars, who will have the opportunity to interact in depth and share insights in a stimulating and scenic environment.
 
Co-Organizers:
 
-       Sébastien Picard, Toulouse School of Management
-       Véronique Steyer, ISG Paris
-       Xavier Philippe, NEOMA Business School
-       Mar Pérezts, EMLYON Business School
 
Keynote Speakers:
 
We are delighted to receive Professor Christina Garsten (Stockholm University) and Professor Marie-Laure Djelic (ESSEC Business School).
 
Professor Christina Garsten’s speech will summarize her ongoing research on corporate globalization and global governance. More specifically, her speech will focus on how think tanks intervene in global governance.
 
Professor Marie-Laure Djelic’s speech will give an updated overview of her work on the institutionalization of neoliberal think tanks and their role in shaping contemporary political ideology (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492010)
 
 
Call for proposals
 
Research on the political role of firms is not new. We can observe that scholars, especially in political science, have oscillated between the idea that the exercise of power by business is a threat to democracy and the idea that free market economy is a condition for democracy (Coen et al., 2010). The extent and the nature of theoretical contributions vary thus over time and space in response to prevalent ideological frameworks and the state of the economy. Yet, today, despite several attempts (e.g. Coen et al., 2010 and Hart, 2010), we are still lacking a comprehensive “political theory” of the firm.
 
Indeed, although past research made a significant advance to our understanding of firms’ political behaviors, Hart (2010) reminds us that most explanations are in fact already provided by classical theories in organization studies such as the rational actor theory (Baron, 1995; Becker, 1976; Godwin & Seldon, 2002; Hansen et al., 2004; Olson, 1965), the contracts theory (Coase, 1937; Heinz et al., 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kersh, 2002; Williamson, 1971), or the behavioral theory (Cyert & March, 1963; Epstein, 1969; Fligstein, 1990; Martin, 2000; Schuler, 1999; Simon, 1957; Suarez, 2000). In that sense, we could argue that these theories would preclude the need for a political theory.
 
In fact, most studies that search to explain the political actions of firms have essentially relied on the rational economics assumption that firms are a means of maximizing shareholder value. However, an emerging stream of research in organization studies starts to show that political behaviors of firms may go beyond the influence over the state to maximize rents and/or set the advantageous conditions for operating business (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Lowery, 2007). For instance, while Berry (1999) and Vogel (1995) argue that firms may be at the roots of environmental issues, Nyberg et al. (2013) show that some Australian firms have recently “incorporated citizens” to influence the debate over climate change in this country and support or counter carbon regulation. Are we witnessing a shift or an evolution of firms’ role? Would the political behavior of firms be more subtle than influencing for maximizing their bottom lines?
 
Roy Suddaby in a keynote speech at the Glasgow SMS special conference in 2013 argued that between the rational economic and the stakeholder approach of the firm “lies an empirical reality in which the modern firm has quietly adopted many of the core behaviors and attributes that were once attributed to the nation-state. Many of these activities are unrelated to their core economic function. For example, Fortune 500 firms have world-class museums and art collections, and universities that engage in pure research. They have armies and police forces that are often contracted by government providers”. In the face of this reality we could then ask if firms have an institutional role in the sense of organizing control over human affairs. Wouldn’t be the definition of a political act? And if so, would it be a new behavior or was it just hidden in the background?
 
This workshop aims at bringing together a small selected group of scholars to further explore the political role of the firm, based on theoretical and empirical understandings of what firms really do as political and/or institutional actors. We welcome submissions from a variety of disciplines and perspectives. In particular, we are interested in submissions that tackle the political actions of firms from process and practice perspectives, but also by contributions that mobilize theoretical lenses other than rational economics theories. We also encourage submissions that can craft an interdisciplinary conversation and make philosophy, sociology, anthropology, literature etc. come into play in analysis and conceptualizations of the firm as a political actor.
 
In line with our keynotes speakers, we would like for this first workshop on the politicization of the firm to encourage submissions that focus on think tanks and their role in shaping the political environment.  Indeed, if past research has already highlighted the importance of tierce organizations to gain leverage for firms’ agenda (Barley, 2010), they have mostly focused on lobbying activities. However, recent contributions show that think tanks can also be used by firms to both advance their market priorities and their political interests (Garsten & Sörbom, 2014), while still acting as an important vehicle in spreading neoliberal ideology (Djelic, forthcoming).   
 
We also invite papers from a range of theoretical and methodological approaches that explicitly address the politicization of the firms, for example by addressing one of the following issues:
 
-       Papers that explore other determinants that the maximization of shareholders’ value, that lead to a political involvement of firms
-       Papers that examine how the political roles of firms have evolved over long periods of time
-       Papers that offer problematized reviews of the relevant literature fields
-       Papers that offer rich empirical examples of political and/or institutional behaviors of firms, escaping classic referenced types (such as lobbying or influence on politicians)
-       Papers that examine how engaging in new areas (education, arts, defense…) can be a part of firms’ political actions and how this relates to more ‘classic’ strategies
-       Papers that search for the reasons pushing firms to enter into this new areas
-       Papers that explore the social consequences of these new roles undertaken by firms
-       Papers that examine how other types of organization resist or attempt to control this firms’ hegemony
 
This list is by no means exhaustive or limitative. We look forward to reading your ideas and contributions!
 
Submission guidelines
 
We will consider unpublished original work proposals relating to the above topics of interest. International and global perspectives are encouraged. Proposals can be conceptual or empirical, quantitative or qualitative. Published papers or papers that were accepted for publication prior to the submission deadline will not be considered for the conference. We seek to accept a relatively small number of contribution that target top tier academic journals.
 
An abstract of no more than 1,000 words for proposed contribution should be submitted by January 15th, 2015 at the following email: [log in to unmask]. Each submission will be reviewed. Abstract will be evaluated based on the potential contribution to the topic of interest. The submission should contain authors’ names, institutional affiliations, email and postal addresses. Authors will be notified of acceptance or otherwise by February 6th, 2015. Full papers must be submitted by March 30th, 2015.
 
Conference format
 
The program features prominent keynote speakers who will present their research on the topic of interest.
 
Accepted papers will be assigned to interactive sessions. Each author(s) will be given 15 minutes to present the paper. Following the presentations, designated discussants who will have carefully read the papers will present their main comments and provide suggestions for improving the papers and getting them ready for publication. This would be followed by A 10 minutes traditional Q&A. In addition, at the end of the presentation, the chair of the session will also offer an integration of the papers presented in order to open to a 30 minutes general discussion with the audience.
 
Location and accommodation
 
The venue of the workshop is the Chateau de Crécy-la-Chapelle (webpage) in the heart of the little Venise Briarde, 30 minutes from Paris.
 
The Workshop venue is comfortable, beautiful and situated in a typical French castle atmosphere. It will provide an ideal setting for participants to relax and engage in authentic and creative dialogues.
 
We will arrange for each author or for one co-author:
 
-       Networking Luncheons on Wednesday and Thursday
-       Diner reception on Wednesday night
-       A bright room for the night, and breakfast on Thursday morning
 
Transportation remains at the expense of each author but a vehicle from the center of Paris to the accommodation venue will be arranged.
 
Payment facility will be provided for other co-authors willing to join the workshop.
 
References
 
Baron, D. P. (1995). Integrated strategy: market and non market components. California Management Review, Winter, pp. 47-65
Baumgartner, F. R. & Leech, B. L. (1998). Interest niches and policy bandwagons: patterns of interest group involvement in national politics. Journal of Politics
Becker, G. S (1976). The economic approach to human behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Berry, J. (1999). The new liberalism and the rising power of citizen groups. Washington: Brookings Institute
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4, pp. 386-405
Coen, D., Grant, W. & Wilson, G. (2010). Political Science. Perspectives on business and government. In Coen, D., Grant, W. & Wilson, G. (eds) The oxford handbook of business and government (pp. 9-34). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Cyert, R. M. & March, J. G. (1963). Behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall
Djeclic, M.-L. (forthcoming)
Epstein, E. M. (1969). The corporation in American politics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall
Fligstein, N. (1990). The transformation of corporate control. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
Garsten, C. & Sörbom, A. (2014). The Politicization of Corporations: The Case of the World Economic Forum. Paper presented at the 5th LAEMOS conference, Cuba.
Godwin, R. K. & Seldon, B. J. (2002). What corporations really want from government: the public provision of private goods. In Cigler, A. J. & Loomis, B. A. (eds), Interest group politics, pp. 205-224. Washington: CQ Press
Hansen, W. L., Mitchell, N. J. & Drope, J. M. (2004). Collective action, pluralism and the legitimacy tariff. Political Research Quarterly, 57, pp. 421-429
Heinz, J. P. et al. (1993). The hollow core: Private interests in national policy-making. Cambridge: Havard Business Review
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305-360
Kersh, R. T. (2002). Corporate lobbyists as political actors: a view of the field. In Cigler, A. J. & Loomis, B. A. (eds), Interest group, pp. 225-248. Washington: CQ Press
Lowery, D. (2007). Why do organized interests lobby? A multi-goal, multi-level theory of lobbying. Policy, 39, pp. 29-54
Martin, C. J. (2000). Stuck in  Neutral: Business and  the politics of human capital investment policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Nyberg et al. (2013)
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public good and the theory of groups. New York: Harvard University Press
Schuler, D. A. (1999). Corporate political action: rethinking the economic and organizational influence. Business and Politics, 1, 83-97
Simon, H. A (1957). Administrative behavior. New York: MacMillanSuarez, S. L. (2000). Does business learn? Tax breaks, uncertainty and political strategies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Vogel, D. (1995). Trading up: Consumer and environmental regulation in a global economy. Cambridge : Harvard Business Press