In 2003 affirmative-action policies in higher education dodged a
bullet when a sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the use of race in
admissions at the University of Michigan Law School in Grutter v. Bollinger.But
a second bullet is now headed straight toward the heart of race-based
preferences. The projectile is not likely to kill affirmative action outright
but rather significantly change its nature. In the future, such programs are
likely to place much greater emphasis on socioeconomic status and reduce the
role of race. Fresh research suggests that this new balance would make eminent
sense.
The 5-4 Grutter decision supporting affirmative
action included a caveat that colleges and universities could use race only if
they could not create sufficient racial diversity using race-neutral means.
Justice Anthony Kennedy—now the swing justice on a more conservative
court—dissented in Grutter, saying the Court should
"force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral
alternatives," rather than being satisfied by
Opponents of affirmative action see in Kennedy's dissent a large
bull's-eye and have shrewdly brought a case challenging affirmative action at
the
When Grutter gave
the green light to consider race, however,
If the Fisher case ends up in front of the Supreme Court, it seems
likely that Justice Kennedy will join conservatives in striking down the use of
race at Austin —but he might also leave the door open a crack for a diminished
use of race at universities where race-neutral plans don't work to produce
sufficient racial diversity. That compromise is, in essence, the same one
Kennedy employed in the court's 2007 decision nixing racial-integration plans
at the elementary- and secondary-school level in
A Supreme Court ruling effectively encouraging universities to use
a lot of race-neutral considerations and a little bit of race (only if
absolutely necessary) would essentially reverse the weights of current
affirmative-action programs. Today many researchers find that selective
universities give big preferences based on race and small or no preferences
based on socioeconomic status. Thomas J. Espenshade, a professor of sociology
at
New research by Carnevale and Jeff Strohl, however, suggests a
shift to a program of affirmative action based primarily on socioeconomic
status, but including race, would have strong empirical grounding. The roots of
Carnevale's new research reach back to the 1990s, when he was a vice president
at the Educational Testing Service and began work on a project quantifying
racial and economic disadvantages students face. Carnevale hoped to find a way
to identify "strivers," those talented, disadvantaged students who
beat the odds and score far better on the SAT than expected, given the
obstacles that stand in their way. The notion of identifying and admitting
strivers proved unpopular among university leaders, who didn't want to have
more outside pressure to admit low-income students, and the College Board
killed the project. Most universities preferred, as Walter Benn Michaels has
acidly observed, to focus on "what color skin the rich kids should
have."
Carnevale and Strohl have now updated and revised the strivers
idea for a forthcoming Century Foundation volume that I edited entitled Rewarding Strivers: Helping
Low-Income Students Succeed in College. The authors
find that the most economically and racially disadvantaged applicant is
expected to score an astounding 784 points lower on the combined math and
verbal SAT than the most advantaged student. While the average student is
expected to score 1054, the most advantaged student is expected to score 1328
and the least advantaged student 544. That 784-point gap accounts for a
remarkable 65.3 percent of the 1200-point possible score range on the math and
verbal SAT (400-1600 points). In other words, it's as if, in a 100-yard dash,
advantaged kids start off 65 yards ahead of disadvantaged kids when the gun
goes off.
It is significant that, of those 784 points, only 56 are based on
race per se (being black as opposed to white). The vast majority of the
obstacles are socioeconomic in nature. For example, having a father who is a
laborer as opposed to a physician costs an applicant 48 points on average.
Attending a school where 90 percent of classmates are low-income predicts an
SAT 38 points lower than one where no peers receive subsidized lunch. And
having a parent who is a high-school dropout, as opposed to highly educated,
costs 43 points.
Carnevale and Strohl believe that universities should use both
race and class in admissions. The 56 points are meaningful, they say, and there
appear to be interaction effects between race and class, though the data set
employed was too small to establish the extent of interaction. At the same
time, the authors acknowledge that using a more robust measure of wealth (net
worth) than they had available to them might in fact eliminate the predictive
value of race per se altogether. (Their wealth variable was limited in scope.)
The relatively small role of race in the findings should not be
read to suggest that racism and discrimination are things of the past but
rather that economic criteria can often capture continuing discrimination.
Racial discrimination in the employment sector is reflected in lower earnings
for black families. Likewise, pervasive discrimination in the housing market is
reflected in the fact that black and Latino students are much more likely to
live in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty than are white students of
similar income.
Carnevale and Strohl do not advocate mechanically adding SAT
points to the raw scores of disadvantaged applicants. They draw a distinction
between "deservedness" and "readiness," pointing out that
the most disadvantaged student who scores 700 on the combined SAT will not
perform at the level of the most advantaged student who scores 784 points
higher, and the lower-scoring student would most likely
fail at a selective college. But the authors do suggest that universities
consider how far a student has come, as well as what her raw scores are.
The evidence implies that far more strivers could be admitted to
selective institutions than are admitted now. Their earlier research found that
under a pure merit-based system, combined with socioeconomic affirmative
action, the bottom half of the socioeconomic distribution could raise its
representation at selective institutions from 10 percent to 38 percent, while
still allowing universities to have the same graduation rates as they do now.
Of course, admitting strivers would cost much more money, both to
enroll the students and to help them persist to graduation. Another chapter
in Rewarding
Strivers—by the former New York Times education
editor Edward B. Fiske—finds that the
A Supreme Court ruling curtailing the use of race and effectively
pushing universities in the direction of class-based affirmative action could
create an interesting political space to increase financial aid. Conservatives
have embraced President Obama's statement that his own daughters, as privileged
African-Americans, don't deserve affirmative action and that poor white
students do. It is possible, but by no means certain, that the two sides could
come together in the future around more financial aid, reduced reliance on
race, and a new, more vibrant form of class-based affirmative action.