American Press Goes to War: The Drive for Patriotism by Mainstream and Black Newspapers in World War II A research paper submitted to the AEJMC History Division Kansas City Convention July 30-August 2, 2003 Removed from the immediate devastation of World War II, the American home front was uniquely blessed with prosperity. As war production revitalized the economy, the savings of Americans were estimated to reach a record high of $40 billion in 1942. To prevent the "loose" dollars from feeding inflation, the Treasury Department specifically directed the Second War Loan campaign toward small buyers in order to channel the increased buying power of the public into bond purchases.[1] In addition to helping the government finance the war effort, more importantly, the sale of war bonds and stamps served to raise war consciousness of civilians. To reach every home with the plea "They Give Their Lives--You Lend Your Money," Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. enlisted the help of newspaper publishers and editors. After a meeting with Morgenthau, representatives of newspapers and press associations around the country formed the Allied Newspaper Council to promote the bond campaign. All sections of the press, including dailies, weeklies, foreign language newspapers, labor and farm publications, responded with overwhelming support. Even the black press, despite its criticism of the hypocrisy of war rhetoric, which purported to secure freedom for all but ignored racism at home, encouraged bond purchases as an expression of African American loyalty. Black newspapers in the New York area, for example, held a two-month drive to sell $2 million worth of war bonds.[2] As the backbone of the drive, the nation's newspapers publicized the campaign slogan in banner headlines from coast to coast on April 12, 1943. Many papers issued special sections or whole editions dedicated to the bond drive. In addition to editorial space, the campaign generated 73,938 advertisements in daily and weekly newspapers. Valued at more than $4.5 million, the publicity was contributed by both advertisers and publishers.[3] In all, the bond drive, according to the Treasury Department, enjoyed the largest amount of space devoted to a single service in the history of American media. In a letter expressing the government's appreciation, Morgenthau noted "the magnificent help which the press of America is giving to the war bond campaign."[4] The contribution of the newspaper industry to the Second War Loan campaign highlights the role of the press in mobilizing Americans for World War II. Throughout the war, the journalism profession incorporated patriotic appeals with news to help the government align Americans' priorities with war objectives. The significant participation of newspapers in national mobilization, however, has received little attention from scholars. Offering only brief discussions of World War II, standard texts in the field dealt mostly with challenges of reporting the war with its daunting scope. In their inquiries, journalism historians have focused mainly on the competition for war front news and the conflict between press freedom and national security.[5] Other historians, concerned with the propaganda function of wartime media, have offered studies on most forms of mass communication including movies,[6] magazines,[7] and advertising,[8] but not newspapers. This study, therefore, seeks to bring attention to the press as an important champion of American patriotism in World War II. It examines wartime issues of four trade journals including Editor & Publisher, The Guild Reporter, Advertising Age, and Printer's Ink to shed light on the undercurrents of civic responsibility and business interest beneath the extensive coverage of home front war effort in both mainstream newspapers targeting predominantly white readerships and black newspapers. The analysis of contemporary professional discourses shows that while the government relied on the expansive reach of print news to raise civilian morale, the newspaper industry thrived in its promotion of the war effort to attract readers as well as advertisers. Industry Stances on Home Front Mobilization In contrast to the hardship of the Depression years, many Americans enjoyed higher earnings and standards of living in the war years. To the chagrin of the government, the newly prosperous home front was apparently not particularly concerned with the nation's overseas military commitment to the Allies. Even shortly after General Jonathan Wainwright surrendered in the Philippines early in May 1942, fewer than 10 percent of civilians were able to name correctly the much exalted twelve-word credo of the Four Freedoms.[9] Assessing civilian morale in 1942, a government official said that Americans were not yet "ankle-deep" into the war effort.[10] The lack of enthusiastic public support, a prevailing concern of the administration since the beginning of war, led Treasury officials "to use bonds to sell the war, rather than vice versa."[11] In its effort to sell the war to Americans, the government received tremendous support from the newspaper industry. In May 1942, members of the American Newspaper Publishers Association made a pledge during their annual meeting to show President Roosevelt their "individual and unswerving support in this hour of crisis."[12] The Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, formed in February 1940, also reiterated full support of the black press at its annual conference. Later during the year, the American Newspaper Guild sent a similar message to the president showing the commitment of more than 18,000 newspaper workers.[13] Local chapters of national trade organizations and state press associations also declared war policies and implemented war programs to mobilize the industry's resources.[14] With a strong patriotic sentiment in the news room, if all journalists did not act as "patriots first and reporters second"[15] in the words of Byron Price, director of the Office of Censorship, at least many of them embraced both roles. As reiterated in professional forums such as Editor & Publisher and the Guild Reporter, the wartime duty of journalists was to keep the public informed as well as inspired.[16] "The newspaper industry has a product of its own, too," declared the Newspaper Guild, "It is citizen morale."[17] Energized by the challenge of national mobilization, the role of the press in society was reformulated to incorporate the traditional journalistic obligation of informing the public with a new sense of civic advocacy. The attempt of Editor & Publisher to develop a national pool of editorial ideas to help win the war illustrated the dual responsibilities of the press in wartime society: "U. S. dailies have a wartime duty to do beyond the printing of news. As leaders and influencers of the civilian population they are obligated to arouse civilians to the war's importance; encourage them to buy bonds, save rubber and volunteer for defense work and in other respects be good citizens, promote civilian and soldier morale [emphasis included]."[18] As patriotism became the center of news media's social responsibility in wartime, publishers, editors, and reporters strove to stimulate patriotic enthusiasm through the news platform.[19] In addition to extensive coverage of the war, the New York Times, for example, donated a 1,000-line space each week to leading advertising agencies for their most effective appeal to the patriotism of Americans. Even the Chicago Tribune, noted for its anti-Roosevelt editorial policy, demonstrated tremendous support for the war effort. During the first year of the war, the paper devoted 14 percent of its editorial content to building civilian morale. Worth more than $3,300,000 if sold to advertisers, the amount of space represented more than 70 percent of the total expenditures of general advertising in the Tribune.[20] Although not as prominent as metropolitan dailies such as the Times and the Tribune, small-town newspapers, which were more attuned to local conditions, played an instrumental part in generating interest in the government's vast war program throughout the country. In the mountain valley city of Yakima, Washington, for example, the Daily Republic contributed more than 7,500 inches in editorial space and almost 6,000 inches in advertising space to bond campaigns alone in the first two years of the war. Other war programs such the Red Cross War Fund and the U. S. Crop Corps also received extensive coverage in the paper. Publisher W. H. Robertson said that he hoped to help put the country "on the proper basis for an all-out war effort," because newspapers, with their reach into the community, were "better equipped than any other medium for the selling job necessary to this accomplishment."[21] Geared toward promoting civilian commitment to every phase of the war effort, the public service of the newspaper industry blurred lines between the practice of journalism and the dissemination of propaganda. The approach of the press to home front mobilization reflected a firm if somewhat naive conviction in the persuasive power of words shared by many in the journalism profession as well as in the burgeoning field of government war information service.[22] The outbreak of war brought a mushrooming network of government information services to the nation's capital in 1941. In addition to the expanding public relations units found in almost every federal and military agency, an assortment of new organizations such as the Office of Emergency Management and the Office of Facts and Figures were created to coordinate the dissemination of defense information.[23] During the fiscal year of 1941, the fledging machinery of war information cost the government $10 million, with 1,400 journalists, stenographers, and clerks working in nine federal bureaus to churn out information on the Army, the Navy, the Treasury, the State Department, and other war agencies. These media professionals believed that dramatic and vivid presentation of the country's war effort would eliminate public apathy, which hampered unified support for the government's war measures. The press's job, as a 1942 editorial in Editor & Publisher reiterated, was to "guide public thought to the best of editorial minds."[24] From military recruitment, sales of war bonds, promotion of victory gardens, to drives for womanpower, the newspaper industry joined forces with the government in more than fifty campaigns to build a home front army of patriotic citizens.[25] As journalism historian Sidney Kobre noted, the media turned themselves into social instruments to carry out civic and war objectives. [26] Acknowledging the function of the press in home front mobilization, Byron Price commented that "the problem of public morale would be beyond solution in this free country but for the daily services of newspapers."[27] Republican Representative Charles A. Halleck from Indiana also hailed the press as "one of our most potent internal weapons."[28] The leadership role of the press in building civilian morale not only gained the appreciation of government officials but also became popular within the industry as well. To leaders in the field of journalism, the most controversial issue about the morale boosting function of newspapers was a conflict between accepting war advertising sponsored directly by the government and maintaining the independence of the Fourth Estate. Generally publishers favored the plea of Editor & Publisher for accepting government advertising while some editors cautioned against the strings attached, such as increasing government control and loss of public trust.[29] Overall, only occasionally was criticism registered about the integrity of the journalism profession as it ventured further into the quagmire of government propaganda. In the wake of World War I, propaganda became identified with shameless falsehood and insidious influence. Because of the war hysteria and exaggerated hope for peace incited by the work of the Creel Committee, Americans grew particularly wary of the dissemination of domestic propaganda.[30] The means of mass manipulation was considered a violation of the principle of democracy as an exercise of individual free will. It was under the specter of public distrust that President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9182 on June 13, 1942, to establish the Office of War Information as the government's propaganda machinery, carefully using the term "war information" to describe its operation in order to avoid the suspicion of brainwashing the public.[31] Savvy leaders in the newspaper industry also tried to steer their cooperation with the government away from the negative stereotype of war propaganda. In July 1943, at the invitation of the domestic branch of the Office of War Information, nine industry leaders formed an advisory committee presumably to improve the service provided by the agency for the press. Headed by Roy Roberts, managing editor of the Kansas City Star and president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the committee, perhaps anticipating disapproval, insisted that it was interested only in making war news more accessible to the public. Denying involvement in helping the government sell the war to Americans, the public statement conceded nevertheless that the committee's goal to maintain an open flow of war information also served to raise civilian morale.[32] The disclaimer did not keep critics from voicing concerns about conflict of interest. "The propaganda interests of any government in war or peace are incompatible with the complete freedom of news and of opinion which editors should maintain," warned Carl W. Ackerman, dean of the graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, demanding that Roberts resign from his OWI position. In response, Roberts defended the work of the committee, saying that "If the war isn't won there won't be any free press or independent journalism. That's our first job."[33] Echoing Robert's position, others in the news industry saw themselves not as agents of domestic propaganda but as leaders in the fight for the American way of life--a life built on the principle of free enterprise without which the business of newspaper publishing could not survive.[34] The pages of a newspaper represented simply a powerful medium of public education at the disposal of patriotic journalists to help readers fulfill their civic responsibilities in wartime society. In contrast to the mainstream press, whose strategy for mobilization emphasized the obligations of American citizens, the black press advocated full rights for minorities in its approach to the war. Despite the moderate increase in job opportunities, the war intensified, rather than alleviated, the social predicaments facing African Americans. Widespread race riots in the crisis period from 1941 through 1943 registered increasing racial tension and discontent among blacks. Continuing discrimination both in the military and civilian sectors further affected their sagging morale. A poll undertaken by the Office of Facts and Figures in New York City in May 1942 found that only 44 percent of blacks interviewed felt that their lives had improved since the war and the majority did not believe that their lives would be better after the war. A total of 18 percent actually felt that they would be better off under Japanese rule. [35] Reflecting the general skepticism of African Americans toward the war effort, James G. Thompson, in a letter to the Pittsburgh Courier in January 1942, posed the question: "Should I sacrifice to live 'half American'?" He called on blacks to defend the United States abroad and fight for true democracy at home as well, urging them to "adopt the double VV for a double victory. The first V for victory over our enemies from without, the second V for victory over our enemies from within."[36] The next issue of the Courier initiated the campaign with four Double V drawings. Other papers quickly adopted the "Double V" platform to foster positive attitudes toward the war effort while they continued the tradition of protest in the black press.[37] Denounced by critics as a call for an immediate racial revolution, the campaign in fact aimed to channel the growing militancy of blacks into full participation in the war as a strategy to promote Allied war aims while demanding racial equality in the United States. Opposing any form of civil resistance, the black press orchestrated the campaign mainly to motivate African Americans to contribute to the war effort by connecting their struggle against racism with the war's ideological commitment to freedom and democracy. The Double V stance thus allowed the black press to expose discrimination in the defense program and at the same time cooperate with the government to mobilize the support of African Americans. Working with various war agencies such as the War Production Board, the Selective Service, and the OWI, black publishers sought to convince their readers through the rhetoric of the Double V policy that blacks, too, had a stake in the outcome of the war. Industry Concerns with the Bottom Line The war service of both mainstream and black newspapers was driven not only by their respective civic commitments but also their common concerns with the industry's well-being in the uncertain wartime economy. Although readership peaked during the war years, the enterprise of newspaper publishing nevertheless faced new challenges such as increasing government control, competition with other media, mainly the radio, and above all the specter of decreasing advertising revenues. Promotion of war campaigns offered an all-around solution to alleviate the pressure to survive and prosper as a profit-oriented business. Repeatedly urging newspapers to publicize their contribution to the war effort, Frank Tripp, general manager of the Gannett newspapers and chairman of the Allied Newspaper Council and the Bureau of Advertising of the ANPA, told publishers in an off-record address that "we need it not alone to take our place with industry and our advertisers who are paying their money to build their own case, but we need it to crystallize in the minds of the people and the government that we are having a big hand in the winning of this war. . . . if we are to emerge from the crisis with the public appreciation and the honor and the glory which are due the American press."[38] Echoing Tripp's emphasis on the promotional value of war coverage, Basil L. Walters, executive editor of the Minneapolis Star-Journal and Tribune, touted the achievement of the press in gaining "good-will and better understanding of the value of the newspaper" through war service. At the 1943 conference of the National Newspaper Promotion Association in New York, he urged all newspapers to be more aggressive in their war promotion both from the standpoint of social contribution and "intelligent self-interest."[39] A genuine desire to contribute to a larger cause no doubt motivated publishers to promote the war effort, but potential pressure from the government also presented an important incentive for them to help with the distribution of propaganda messages. Wartime shortages of material and labor kept businesses including the newspaper industry under the increasing authority of the federal government. Publishers, for example, were subject to the orders of the Selective Service for draft deferments to retain their employees on the mechanical and editorial staffs; the restrictions of the Office of Price Administration to provide gas rations for their reporters; and the regulations of War Production Board to obtain their share of newsprint and other materials such as zinc, copper, and brass. To publishers of black newspapers, the power of the government posed an even more daunting obstacle. Through the war years, FBI investigations and the threat of sedition charges haunted the black press, which was viewed by the government as an obstruction to the war effort because of its attack on racism.[40] Aside from FBI harassment, black publishers faced a particular hardship under regulations holding their metropolitan weeklies, even those that were nationally circulated, to the same newsprint quota as much smaller white country weeklies. They suspected that the government was using inequitable restrictions to retaliate for their demand for racial equality in the war effort.[41] In addition to the difficulty of obtaining necessary trade material, black newspapers struggled also with the lack of sufficient access in the process of gathering government information. Many officials simply refused to allow black correspondents in their press briefings let alone grant them personal interviews. In order to function as smoothly as possible under such wartime curbs, it was important for both mainstream and black newspapers to gain the good will of the government through cooperation in publicizing war programs.[42] Official recognition of the industry as an essential part of the war effort often led to benefits for publishers such as exemption from tightening restrictions on telephone installations in 1942 and expansion of editorial personnel on the list of "critical occupations" in the manpower crunch in 1943.[43] The pressure of government surveillance also prompted outspoken black publishers to show their good faith intentions through promotion of war aims. In a meeting between Attorney General Francis Biddle and Chicago Defender publisher John Sengstacke in June 1942, the government agreed not to indict any black publisher for sedition. In response, Sengstacke promised that the black press would promote the war effort if black reporters could gain more access to government press conferences.[44] Cooperation with the government in raising the morale of African Americans helped the black press establish itself as an effective and responsible agent in the promotion of national unity. Furthermore, the contribution of black newspapers to civilian morale enhanced the political leverage of their publishers. For instance, in a conference with President Roosevelt on February 5, 1944, the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association presented a twenty-one point statement of current and postwar aims of African Americans. Bringing three months of agitation to an end, the meeting culminated in the certification of the first black White House correspondent. Five days later, Harry S. McAlpin, former chief of the Chicago Defender Washington bureau, attended the president's press conference as the correspondent of the Atlanta Daily World.[45] Aside from production difficulties posed by government regulations, newspapers were threatened by the rise of radio, whose ubiquitous household presence seemed to encroach on the sphere of influence wielded by the press as the primary medium of public communication. Claims about war contribution from the broadcasting industry such as "$100,000,000 Worth of Talent and Time," "300,000,000 Listeners a Week," and "891 Stations Broadcast 8,000 Messages a Day,"[46] spurred the newspaper industry on in the race for the public's attention, trust, and appreciation. Extensive coverage of the ever changing war directives offered newspapers much-needed opportunities to boost their popularity by helping readers adjust to wartime conditions. Through detailed reports of the latest information on how to save, how to find war jobs, and how to conserve resources, the press sought to establish an outstanding record of public service by interpreting the nation's complicated war effort in local terms that affected the everyday life of Americans. War publicity was particularly significant to mainstream newspapers because it enhanced their financial prospect. In the early stage of the war when manufacturers switched to war production, a gloomy outlook on advertising haunted the newspaper industry. The advertising field projected a loss of 80 percent of business in the course of the war due to the lack of consumers goods to sell as a result of rationing and expanding war production.[47] In light of the cutback in World War I, which eventually forced more than 2,300 newspapers into suspension,[48] the plunging index of advertising activity was particularly devastating to mainstream newspapers because, unlike black newspapers, they depended on advertising rather than circulation as the main source of revenue. The fear of loss in linage was soon offset by the rise in war advertising.[49] With the blessing of the Treasury ruling that a "reasonable" advertising expenditure to maintain good will was permissible as a corporate income tax deduction,[50] businesses continued to advertise throughout the war years to keep their brand names visible. Those no longer offering civilian goods, however, could not justify huge expenses on direct product advertising for tax purposes. Even for companies still selling to the public, the traditional pitch that encouraged unlimited consumption was not as viable given the government's concern with inflation and conserving national resources. Instead both institutional and retail advertising turned to the patriotic appeal, and sponsoring publicity of war causes on the home front became a common public relations strategy. Statements made by President Roosevelt on several occasions illustrated the government's appreciation of the role of advertising in financing the publicity of war information. In a message to the 38th annual convention of the Advertising Federation of America, Roosevelt, thanking advertisers for reiterating "the desire for liberty and freedom" in their war effort, reassured the industry its place in wartime economy.[51] In addition to the need for a fresh promotional angle, the crusade of the War Advertising Council made tie-ins with war programs popular in advertising. Representing a united front of advertisers, agencies, and media, the Council was created to defend the legitimacy of advertising, which not only appeared to be superfluous in the wartime economy but also suffered from general public distrust as a result of the consumer movement.[52] In response, the industry launched an aggressive campaign to improve its image and to prevent drastic curtailment by the government through advertising contribution to the war effort.[53] Eager to render its service available to the government, the Council rallied more than 400 agencies to send the American public "a war message in every ad."[54] Throughout the war years, advertisers supported every war objective of the government as the number of campaigns served by the Council increased from fourteen in 1942 to sixty-two in 1944.[55] As shown by the $352,650,000 worth of advertising contributed to home front campaigns in 1943, the advertising industry successfully weathered its wartime crisis by converting the commercial tool of persuasion into an important extension of domestic propaganda.[56] Eager to tap the trend of wartime advertising, the American Newspaper Publishers Association started its public relations effort early in the war with a booklet titled "Advertising Goes to War" to showcase the value of newspaper advertising as "a vital war weapon on the home front."[57] As the war progressed, the publication grew into a regular series, promoting newspapers as the ideal medium for the war effort of advertisers, whose enthusiasm pumped new lifeblood into the nation's press. "It is evident that a lot of space has been sold in connection with national and community war efforts," a newspaper advertising executive observed in July 1942, "and an important new source of advertising has been established."[58] By 1943, expenditure on war advertising in newspapers had soared to $65 million a year.[59] Reinvigorating the newspaper industry with a new source of revenue, the popularity of war themes in advertising exerted a strong, if not openly acknowledged, influence on the news agenda. Promotion of war programs generally increased the attention of readers in the war effort and thereby reinforced the interest of advertisers in the war angle.[60] For example, touting news coverage as the key to public understanding and acceptance of food rationing, a trade journal article urged publishers to capitalize on the rise in readership as a result of increased concern with the food issue: "If advertisers and agencies are deluged with reminders of the upward surge of newspapers they may become more sharply aware of the strength and vitality of the medium."[61] The constant effort to court war-minded advertisers made coverage of war programs all the more important as evidence of a high level of editorial commitment to the war effort. Observance of the National Newspaper Week highlighted the financial significance of the industry's war service. Driven by the concern that "newspapers should be sold to the advertisers, sold to readers, sold to boards of directors, sold to advertising agencies [emphasis included],"[62] the industry had, since the war, expanded the event in the first week of October into an annual publicity blitz geared toward peddling the war contribution of newspapers. In 1942, publishers launched a gigantic scrap metal collection campaign and doubled their effort in war bond promotion. The following year, under the slogan, "Free Press: The Key to Four Freedoms," the program emphasized the achievements of newspapers in aiding various war campaigns as a way of "selling the public on the importance of newspaper advertising as a part of the free enterprise system."[63] Aside from the publicity initiated by trade organizations, for individual newspapers, an outstanding record of war service provided the best material for self promotion. From the Alhambra Post-Advocate in California to the Daily Sentinel in Colorado, ads and booklets with titles such as "Newspapers Goes All Out for Victory" and "The Daily Sentinel Goes to War," helped publishers lure advertising dollars with their editorial promotion of the war effort.[64] In addition to the general drive to increase the advertising capital of the industry, the more specific editorial decisions in the newsroom also reflected the influence of war advertising as the revenue potential of a war campaign added a new dimension to the assessment of news value. The intensive news coverage that turned the Victory Garden campaign into a national movement in the spring of 1943 illustrated the power of advertising in enticing newspapers to gear their editorial resources toward lineage prospects. Special food and gardening supplements allowed some newspaper advertising managers to raise the ratio of ads to news to 50 percent by selling space to businesses that normally did not advertise in their publications. The revenue draw gave newspapers a great incentive to promote Victory Gardens both as a community service and a means of attracting advertisers.[65] To tap the opportunities for institutional advertising and greater lineage from garden supplies, the Milwaukee Journal, for example, developed a comprehensive publicity package that included not only its news columns but also a daily almanac, women's features, picture layouts, garden club activities, editorials, and comments from government officials to encourage gardening as a vital aid to the war effort.[66] In case the editorial staff did not grasp the advertising advantages of the campaign, Editor & Publisher suggested that it was up to the promotional department to bring on the pressure. "We cannot urge too strongly every salesman reading this piece to immediately bring to the attention of his editors the importance of frequent news items on Victory Gardens. There's a lot of lineage to be obtained from immediately starting to sell every available prospect in our market the idea of running copy on Victory Gardens."[67] The pursuit for advertising revenue meant that when newspapers planned their news budgets, they were more inclined to lavish attention on war programs perceived as suitable vehicles for advertisements. Programs that were popular with advertisers also commanded greater editorial support as a result of the vested interest of newspapers themselves in the success of the war causes of their sponsors, which in turn added to the prestige of the news institution.[68] Although black newspapers operated under a different system of financial support, war service nevertheless influenced their business prospects. While mainstream newspapers received only about one-third of their revenues from circulation, black papers made almost all of their profits from copy sales because of the dearth of support from advertisers. As one historian observed, "Beyond advertisements about skin bleachers, hair straighteners, and magic lodestones, the black publisher was stymied in his effort to gather advertising."[69] The lack of substantial revenues from advertising made readership satisfaction all the more important to the black press. Through war service, black newspapers could better meet the need of the majority of their wartime readers. According to a 1943 readership survey, 96 percent of black newspaper readers desired more emphasis in the news on the role of blacks in the war.[70] War coverage from a minority viewpoint helped black newspapers increase their circulation as the mainstream media almost all but completely ignored the contribution of African Americans to the war effort. As a devoted reader of the Chicago Defender wrote, "Surely I read the daily papers, magazines, etc., but what do I get out of them? . . . In other words, the white paper is published for the white man, not for the American people as a whole. . . . I read the paper (the Defender) from front to back. This is the one and only way to see what part the Negro is playing in this struggle for world freedom in civilian and army life."[71] The racial bias in mainstream news accounts created a market niche for the black press to provide a chronicle of the lives of blacks in the war years and to counter the negative stereotypes readers often encountered in their daily newspapers.[72] More importantly, the war service of black newspapers allowed them to address the interest of their readership by rallying the support of African Americans for the country's war effort without deferring the demand for equal opportunities both in civilian and military sectors. As historian Lee Finkle noted, the wartime policy of the black press was "an approach that sought to encourage mass support for the war aims of the country attuned to the propaganda needs of the black community."[73] Critics often charged the black press for what was perceived as a militant stance that served only to incite its readers but failed to represent the majority of African Americans. A nationwide survey showed, however, that 84 percent of the people polled felt that the black press did speak for most blacks.[74] Had the black press adopted the call to "close ranks" as it did in World War I,[75] it would not have been able to maintain the trust of its readership and attract the national attention that boosted many papers' circulation in the war years. W. E. B. Du Bois, who was faulted after World War I for the setback in the advancement of blacks because of his wartime support for a truce in racial struggles, underscored the business interest of publishers in continuing the protest tradition of the black press in World War II. "They know in what kind of news Negroes are interested," he wrote in 1943 in defense of black newspapers that took what critics perceived as a sensationalist approach to race relations. "If it (the black press) becomes shrill with resentment and bold in its demands it is because the surge of feeling in the Negro race demands and applauds this kind of expression. If a Negro newspaper tried to stem this tide of feeling it would immediately feel the result in rapidly decreasing circulation."[76] The war promotion of the black press reflected primarily its orientation toward an African American readership. Black publishers nevertheless shared with white publishers similar interest in pursuing war advertising as an additional source of revenue. Like the mainstream press, the black press also benefited from excess profits tax rulings during the war years, which allowed businesses to continue their advertising campaigns. The Pittsburgh Courier, the largest black newspaper in the country, for example, enjoyed increasing attention from national advertisers as the number of advertisements in the paper rose from 402 in 1941 to 709 in 1944.[77] Even though advertising had less editorial control over the black press than the mainstream press, when advertisers started buying space in black newspapers in 1942, publishers generally softened their criticism to make their publications appear moderate and hence more attractive to advertisers as a promotional vehicle.[78] Critics in the war decade noted the increasing influence of advertising on the editorial content of black newspapers. Thomas Sancton, editor of the New Republic, for example, wrote in April 1943 that "Negro publishers are apt to be primarily business men whose interest in race welfare is secondary to their interest in selling newspapers."[79] Under the pressure of wartime economy, both mainstream and black newspapers made extensive effort not only to provide public forums of war information but also to protect their private capital investments. Conclusion The newspaper industry's enthusiasm in promoting war effort on the home front turned the American press into a central forum of war information instrumental in the distribution of propaganda for civilian mobilization. Throughout the war years, the government relied greatly on the industry's editorial and advertising resources to forge civilian support for its war measures. Media promotion of war bonds and stamps, for example, helped "demonstrate to our armed forces, our allies and our enemies what a voluntary and united effort we can accomplish on the American home front," said Treasury Secretary Morgenthau.[80] The patriotic message in pages and pages of information on the war effort that won the wartime administration's appreciation was all the more effective, delivered not through a channel owned by the government but a medium familiar to newspaper readers. Geared toward inspiring Americans' patriotism, the seemingly simple journalist accounts of war programs were motivated, however, by the newspaper industry's complicated responses to changing wartime conditions. Despite some concern with freedom of the press, most in the journalism profession embraced their civic responsibility as opinion leaders to help the government build an army of patriotic citizens on the home front. Although frequently misunderstood by contemporary critics, black newspapers approached the war effort with an emphasis on both the civil rights and patriotism of African Americans. The dedication of both mainstream and black newspapers to war promotion was also an orchestrated business move in response to the pressure of increasing government control and the threat of decreasing advertising revenues. By promoting the war effort, the newspaper industry cultivated the good will of government officials and strengthened its financial edge. Through the war decade, newspapers, enjoying a tremendous lead over other media, claimed a steady share of approximately one-third of the total advertising expenditure, which rose from nearly $2 billion in 1942 to over $4 billion in 1948.[81] Although black newspapers did not benefit financially as much from the wartime advertising boon, they balanced the civil rights agenda with a patriotic spirit to satisfy the information needs of African American readers and increased the institutional prestige of the black press in American society. Overall, the newspaper industry not only weathered but also prospered from wartime challenges with its investment in the drive for patriotism on the American home front in World War II. [1] Walter A. Steigleman, "The Second War Loan Campaign--Its Organization and Operation," Journalism Quarterly 20: 2 (June 1943): 130. [2] "Negro Bond Drive," Editor & Publisher, 24 April 1943, 106. [3] Steigleman, 136-38. [4] "Newspaper Carriers Sell 50 Million in War Stamps," Chicago Daily Tribune, 30 September 1942, 31; and "Newspapers Qualify As War Bond Issuers," New York Times, 19 November 1942, 1. [5] See, for example, Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 473-86; Sidney Kobre, Development of American Journalism (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1969), 684-90; Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism, A History: 1690-1960 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), 741-802; Richard W. Steele, "News of the 'Good War': World War II News Management," Journalism Quarterly 62: 4 (Winter 1985): 707-16, 783; Robert W. Desmond, Tides of War: World News Reporting, 1940-1945 (Iowa: Iowa University Press, 1984); Patrick S. Washburn, "FDR Versus His Own Attorney General: The Struggle over Sedition, 1941-42," Journalism Quarterly 62:4 (Winter 1985): 717-24; Theodore F. Koop, Weapon of Silence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); and Robert L. Bishop and LaMar S. Mackay, "Mysterious Silence, Lyrical Scream," Journalism Monographs 11 (May 1971): 1-39. [6] The connection between Hollywood and war propaganda has received the most attention from media scholars. See Melva Joyce Baker, Images of Women in Film: The War Years, 1941-1945 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1980); Ralph R. Donald, "Hollywood and World War II: Enlisting Feature Films as Propaganda" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, 1987); Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, "What to Show the World: The Office of War Information and Hollywood, 1942-1945," Journal of American History 64 (1977): 87-105, "Blacks, Loyalty, and Motion-Picture Propaganda in World War II," Journal of American History 73 (September 1986): 383-406, Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits, and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies (New York: The Free Press, 1987); and Michael Renov, Hollywood's Wartime Woman: Representation and Ideology (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1988). [7] Maureen Honey, Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War II (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984). [8] Frank W. Fox, Madison Avenue Goes to War: The Strange Military Career of American Advertising, 1941-1945 (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1975). [9] Jerome S. Bruner, "OWI and the American Public," Public Opinion Quarterly 17:1 (Spring 1943): 129-131. [10] Hillier Krieghbaum, "The Office of War Information And Government News Policy," Journalism Quarterly 19:3 (September 1942): 246; and A. H. Feller, "OWI on the Home Front," Public Opinion Quarterly 7:1 (Spring 1943): 57. [11] John Morton Blum, V Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 17. [12] "ANPA Talks War," Newsweek, 4 May 1942, 60. [13] "Murray Keynotes Guild's Role in Wartime," The Guild Reporter, 4 July 1942, 3; and "Full Program for Wartime Is Approved," The Guild Reporter, 4 July 1942, 1, 13. [14] "Guild's War Course Is Charted," The Guild Reporter, 15 January 1942, 1; "With the Auxiliary: Beat Hitler Week Coming Up," The Guild Reporter, 15 January 1942, 6; "Guild Gives 55,750 for War," The Guild Reporter, 1 May 1942, 1; "Guild Promotes Victory Sales," The Guild Reporter, 15 March 1942, 6; "War Program Is Advanced by Guildsmen," The Guild Reporter, 15 December 1942, 6; "Tennessee Press Meets in Nashville," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 42; and "Contributed Space," Editor & Publisher, 20 February 1943, 8. [15] "Price Says Press Stimulated Morale," Editor & Publisher, 10 October 1942, 10. [16] "'Whereas . . . Therefore Be It Resolved . . . ,'" The Guild Reporter, 15 March 1942, 6; "Comics at War," Editor & Publisher, 21 November 1942, 22; T. S. Irvin, "Wartime Service," Editor & Publisher, 5 December 1942, 36; "'Typical' Daily's Record Shows Aid to War Effort," Editor & Publisher, 24 July 1943, 37; and "Ad Bureau Release," Editor & Publisher, 31 July 1943, 28. [17] "Boston Offers Program for Morale," The Guild Reporter, 15 March 1942, 6. [18] "Suggest Newspaper Pool of War-Winning Ideas," Editor & Publisher, 4 July 1942, 14. [19] "Daily Aids U.S.O.," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 42; "N. Y. Times Gives 1,000-Line Space for War Message," Editor & Publisher, 12 December 1942, 12; "Contributed Space," Editor & Publisher, 20 February 1943, 8; and "Milwaukee Survey Shows Extent of Daily's Aid in War," Editor & Publisher, 12 June 1943, 52. [20] "How a Newspaper Contributes to War," Editor & Publisher, 30 January 1943, 24. [21] "'Typical' Daily's Record," Editor & Publisher, 24 July 1943, 37. [22] "Fourth Estate," Newsweek, 17 November 1941, 60-61. [23] For the early development of government information services in World War II, see Robert L. Bishop and LaMar S. Mackay, "Mysterious Silence, Lyrical Scream," Journalism Monographs 11 (May 1971): 1-21. [24] "Comics and the War," Editor & Publisher, 21 November 1942, 22. [25] Mott, 766. [26] Kobre, 688. [27] "Price Says Press Stimulated Morale," Editor & Publisher, 10 October 1942, 10. [28] San Francisco Chronicle, 5 March 1943, 6. [29] See "The Press: Bundles for Publishers?" Time, 4 May 1942, 68; "Government Use of Advertising Proposed to Speed War Effort," Editor & Publisher, 17 January 1942, 3; "Not a Subsidy," Editor & Publisher, 14 February 1942, 22; "Two State Groups Urge U. S. to Use Paid Advertising," Editor & Publisher, 28 February 1942, 8; "A.S.N.E. to Vote on Question of Government Paid Advertising," Editor & Publisher, 25 April 1942, 17; and "U. S. Department of Commerce Strongly Urges Use of Paid Space by the Government," American Press 60:6 (April 1942): 3. [30] Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 1-7. [31] For controversy on the government's operation of domestic propaganda, see Elmer Davis, "OWI Has a Job," Public Opinion Quarterly 7:1 (Spring 1943): 8-9. [32] "OWI Newspaper Advisory Group Lists 7 Principles," Editor & Publisher, 17 July 1943, 12, 22. [33] "Roy Roberts Refuses to Resign from OWI Group," Editor & Publisher, 17 July 1943, 12. [34] Explaining to the nation's publishers why it was important for newspapers to help win the war, the letter from Frank Tripp, chairman of the Allied Newspaper Council, illustrated the internal rationalization for the industry's war effort. See Steigleman, 133-34. [35] Office of Facts and Figures, "The Negro Looks at the War," Report No. 21, 19 May 1942 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress), cited in Charles David Lloyd, "American Society and Values in World War II from the Publications of the Office of War Information" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1975), 202-203. [36] James G. Thompson, "Should I Sacrifice to Live 'Half American'?" Pittsburgh Courier, 31 January 1942, 3. [37] For the rise of the Double V campaign in the black press, see Patrick S. Washburn, "The Pittsburgh Courier's Double V Campaign in 1942." American Journalism 3:2 (1986): 73-86; and Lee Finkle, Forum for Protest: The Black Press during World War II (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Press, 1975), 108-28. [38] "Tripp Tells 4-A Press Is Asset in War Effort," Editor & Publisher, 21 November 1942, 11; and Frank Tripp, "Urges Newspapers to Promote Own Interests," Editor & Publisher, 10 June 1944, 53. [39] T. S. Irvin, "NNPA Plans Greater Role in Press Drives Aiding War Effort," Editor & Publisher, 24 April 1943, 19. [40] For the wartime struggle of the black press for First Amendment rights, see Patrick S. Washburn, "FDR Versus His Own Attorney General: The Struggle over Sedition, 1941-42," Journalism Quarterly 62:4 (Winter 1985): 717-24; "J. Edgar Hoover and the Black Press in World War II," Journalism History 13: 1 (Spring 1986): 26-33; and A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government's Investigation of the Black Press during World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). [41] John D. Stevens, "From the Back of the Foxhole: Black Correspondents in World War II," Journalism Monographs 27 (1987): 7; and "Negro Press Holds Meeting in New York," Editor & Publisher, 24 June 1944, 18. [42] "Newsprint Unaffected in WPB Program," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 12; "Not Realistic," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 20; "OWI Supports Publishers in Protest on Zinc," Editor & Publisher, 15 August 1942, 9; "ASNE Fights For Free Press Against Federal Controls," Editor & Publisher, 20 February 1943, 7; and Walter E. Schneider, "ANPA Acts to Save Free Press Threatened by Wartime Curbs," Editor & Publisher, 24 April 1943 9. [43] "Press Exempt," Editor & Publisher, 12 September 1942, 4; "Manpower Pinch," Editor & Publisher, 9 January 1943, 22; "News Editors, Photogs Added to 'Critical List,'" Editor & Publisher, 6 February 1943, 32; and "Four Newspaper Jobs Remain 'Essential' in New Draft List," Editor & Publisher, 21 August 1943, 6. [44] Washburn, "J. Edgar Hoover," 28-29. [45] "Negroes Ask Right to Press Galleries," Editor & Publisher, 20 November 1943, 20; and "First Negro Newsman Covers White House," Editor & Publisher, 12 February 1944, 37. [46] T. S. Irvin, "Paper Should Record Their War Contribution," Editor & Publisher, 24 July 1943, 30. [47] L. D. H. Weld, "Advertising during Two World Wars," Printer's Ink, 25 January 1943, 16. [48] In addition to the lack of advertising support, various repressive laws also contributed to the demise of some of the newspapers that went out of business in World War I. "Importance of Advertising," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 20; and "Ark. Press Discusses Wartime Problems," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 42. [49] For the influence of IRS tax rulings on newspaper advertising, see Edward E. Adams and Rajiv Sekhri, "Daily Newspaper Advertising Trends During World War II: IRS Tax Rulings and the War Bond Drives," American Journalism 12 (1995):201-12; and Mary Alice Sentman and Patrick S. Washburn, "How Excess Profits Tax Brought Ads to Black Newspaper in World War II," Journalism Quarterly 64 (1987): 769-774, 867. [50] For example, the Internal Revenue Service said in a statement in September 1942 that "the bureau realizes that it may be necessary for taxpayers now engaged in war production to maintain, through advertising, their trade names and the knowledge of the quality of their products and good will built up over past years, so that when they return to peace time production their names and the quality of their products will be known to the public." See "Necessary Ads Are Allowed in Tax Deduction," Chicago Daily Tribune, 30 September 1942, 32; "Advertising as Government Sees It," Printer's Ink, 9 October 1942, 13-14, 28; and "Wartime Use of Advertising Acknowledged by Treasury," Advertising Age, 31 August 1942. [51] See "Advertising in Wartime," Newsweek, 6 July 1942, 49; and Blum, 18-19. [52] For the wartime struggle of the advertising industry, see "That Was 1942," Printer's Ink, 5 February 1943, 148; "Educators Called for Curtailing of Ads," Printer's Ink, 8 January 1943, 52; "Advertising in the War," Time, 22 March 1943, 68; and Frank W. Fox, Madison Avenue Goes to War: The Strange Military Career of American Advertising, 1941-45 (Provo, Utah: Brigham University Press, 1975), 49-66. [53] P. H Erbes, Jr., "Advertising Agencies Are Contributing Many Thousands of Hours to War Effort," Printer's Ink, 27 November 1942, 60, 62, 64; and "World's Greatest System of Mass Communication Is at Call of U. S. Government," Printer's Ink, 10 April 1942, 33. [54] "'War Message in Every Ad' Set Up as Goal of Field," Advertising Age, 14 June 1943, 8; and "Manual Out to Help Sell War Theme Ads," Editor & Publisher, 13 May 1944, 58. [55] "War Theme Ads $302,000,000, Council Reports," Advertising Age, 23 April 1945, 59. [56] "Council Reveals Sum Spent on 1943 War Ads," Editor & Publisher, 24 March 1944, 32; and "$352,650,000 of War Ads Placed in 1943," Editor & Publisher, 10 June 1944, 62. [57] "Ad Bureau Issues War Supplement," Editor & Publisher, 12 September 1942, 16; Dr. Miller McClintock, "Newspaper Advertising Playing Vital Part in War Effort," Editor & Publisher, 26 September 1942, 7 (NW); "Newspaper Ads Shown As War Weapon At Home," Editor & Publisher, 7 November 1942, 8; "Recent War Ads Pictured in Bureau Booklet," Editor & Publisher, 8 January 1944, 16. [58] "NAEA Survey Finds Retail Ads Best To Offset Linage Losses," Editor & Publisher, 4 July 1942, 7. [59] "$16 Million in War Effort Ads In Three Months," Editor & Publisher, 1 January 1944, 32; "$4,255,324 Spent on War Ads in November," Editor & Publisher, 5 February 1944, 20; and "War Ads in Dailies Running At $65,000,000," Editor & Publisher, 1 April 1944, 56. [60] "Importance of Advertising," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 20; and L. M. Hughes, "First Year of War Re-emphasizing Vigor of Newspaper Advertising," Editor & Publisher, 26 December 1942, 4. [61] T. S. Irvin, "All Newspapers Should Plug Upward Trend," Editor & Publisher, 19 June 1943, 38. [62] T. S. Irvin, "Pioneer Spirit Needed to Promote Newspapers," Editor & Publisher, 12 June 1943, 11. [63] "Newspaper Week to Show War Service of Press," Editor & Publisher, 19 September 1942, 5; and "Newspaper Week to Be Sparked by War Themes," Editor & Publisher, 11 September 1943, 40. [64] "Newspapers' Share," Editor & Publisher, 31 October 1942, 18; T. S. Irvin, "Sentinel to War," Editor & Publisher, 20 March 1943, 42; and "Milwaukee Survey Shows Extent of Daily's Aid in War," Editor & Publisher, 12 June 1943, 52. [65] "Discuss Victory Garden Promotions," Editor & Publisher, 20 February 1943, 34. [66] "Milwaukee Journal's Victory Garden Plan," Editor & Publisher, 6 February 1943, 31. [67] Frank E. Fehlman, "Ad Opportunities in Victory Gardens," Editor & Publisher, 20 March 1943, 12. [68] "Booklet Tells Story of Press' Home Front Job," Editor & Publisher, 29 January 1944, 38. [69] Henry G. La Brie, "The Black Press: Where to? What Next?" in Perspective of the Black Press: 1974, ed. La Brie (Kennebunkport, Maine: Mercer House Press, 1974), 195. [70] Consuelo Young, "A Study of Reader Attitudes toward the Negro Press," Journalism Quarterly 21: 2 (June 1944): 149. [71] "There's a Real Point in This Comment," letter to the editor, Chicago Defender (City Edition), 3 June 1944, 14. [72] "Field Urges Greater Recognition of Negroes," Editor & Publisher, 24 June 1944, 8; and "Negro Press Holds Meeting in New York," Editor & Publisher, 24 June 1944, 18. [73] Finkle, 128. [74] Wallace Lee, "Does the Negro Press Speak for Most Negroes?" Negro Digest (February 1943): 54. [75] During World War I, black leaders and newspapers, hoping to gain the appreciation of whites in the struggle against racism, stopped their protests against discrimination for the sake of national unity. When the support of blacks failed to translate into postwar improvement in their status, many attributed the ineffective political strategy to an editorial titled "Close Ranks" published in July 1918 by W. E. B. Du Bois, who advocated the full participation of blacks in the war effort. For the approach of the black press to World War I, see Finkle, 110-111. [76] W. E. B. Du Bois, "The American Negro Press," part 1, Chicago Defender (City Edition), 20 February 1943, 15. [77] In their study on the Pittsburgh Courier, Mary Alice Sentman and Patrick S. Washburn argued that the excessive profits tax rulings during the war brought an advertising boom for the black press. The number of national advertisements in the Courier, however, started to decrease in 1945, and the decline continued in the postwar years. Despite the wartime increase, national advertising most likely did not become a dependable source of revenues for publishers until after the war. See Sentman and Washburn, 769-774, 867. [78] For the influence of advertising on the Double V campaign, see Washburn, "The Pittsburgh Courier's Double V Campaign," 83. [79] Thomas Sancton, " The Negro Press," New Republic (April 26, 1943), 560. [80] Letter of Secretary Morgenthau to publishers, 2 April 1943, quoted in Steigleman, 133. [81] Mott, 785.