Content-Type: text/html The Role of Media Examples in The Heuristic Process Model of Cultivation Effects Rick W. Busselle, Ph.D. Washington State University Murrow School of Communication Pullman, Washington 99163-2520 Phone: (509) 335-6838 e-mail: [log in to unmask] The Role of Media Examples in The Heuristic Process Model of Cultivation Effects ABSTRACT This study explores the influence of specific examples on judgments. Analysis is carried out in light of The Heuristic Process Model of Cultivation Effects (Shrum, 1996). Ss (197) completed a traditional cultivation survey, and six weeks later were divided into two experimental conditions. Condition 1 performed an exemplar accessibility task measuring the amount of time required to think of an example of an extra-marital affair, a shooting, and an African-American doctor. They then completed a social judgment survey asking about the prevalence of those constructs in society. Condition 2 respondents performed the two tasks in reverse order. Respondents in Condition 2 provided examples marginally more quickly than those in Condition 1. This indicates specific examples (or closely related constructs) are involved in heuristically processed social judgments. This study also explored the sources of respondents' most accessible examples. It found fictional examples of shootings and affairs came predominantly from theater movies, pay-cable, and video rental, not traditional television sources. The Role of Media Examples in The Heuristic Process Model of Cultivation Effects After more than three decades and 300 publications of cultivation1 research (Morgan & Shannahan, 1996) investigators have identified a cognitive process that at least partially explains the relationship between television exposure and social reality judgments. Shrum, et al. refer to this mechanism as "the heuristic process model of cultivation effects" - referred to heretofore as HPMCE (Shrum, 1997b; Shrum, Wyer, & O'Guinn, 1998). The model is especially important because other theoretical explanations for the cultivation relationship have received little empirical support (Hawkins & Pingree; Mares, 1996; Shapiro, 1991; Shrum, 1995). Conversely, Shrum, et al. have published a series of studies presenting data consistent with their model (O'Guinn & Shrum, 1997; Shrum, Wyer, & O'Guinn, 1998; Shrum, 1996). The HPMCE establishes that heuristic processing is partly, possibly largely, responsible for the relationship between viewing and social judgment. However, more research is needed to fully understand the nature of that heuristic process. The present article investigates specifically the role of examples and exemplar accessibility2 in light of the HPMCE. An availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) is at the heart of HPMCE. When individuals make social judgments or estimates, such as those required in a cultivation survey, they often do not systematically consider and evaluate all of the information they possess related to the judgments at hand. Instead, because of lack of motivation, distraction, or time constraints, individuals may use a processing strategy that requires less cognitive effort (for a summary of heuristic processing, see Fiske & Taylor, 1991). When employing an availability heuristic individuals base judgments solely or partly on the ease with which information related to the judgment comes to mind. For example, when asked what percent of marriages end in divorce, a person who easily can think of a divorced friend is more likely to estimate divorce is more prevalent than someone who has difficulty recalling a similar example. According to the HPMCE, "greater frequency and more recency of viewing will cause instances of such things as crime and violence to be more accessible in memory for heavy viewers than for light viewers" (Shrum & O'Guinn, 1993, p. 483; also see, Shrum, 1997, Shrum, Wyer & O'Guinn, 1998). In HPMCE research accessibility has been operationalized as the amount of time required for respondents to answer a social judgment question. Using this measure of information accessibility the researchers have produced convincing empirical evidence. Shrum and O'Guinn (1993) found heavier viewers judged the world to be more violent, war to be more deadly, illegal drug use to be more prevalent, and prostitution more patronized than lighter viewers. More importantly, heavier viewers took less time to make those judgments than lighter viewers. Another study (Shrum, 1996) found judgment speed mediated the relationship between amount of soap opera viewing and judgments about the prevalence of crime and the occupational prevalence of doctors and lawyers. O'Guinn and Shrum (1997) found heavy soap opera viewers made estimates about affluence more quickly than lighter viewers. Again, those who responded more quickly estimated higher percentages. Finally, Shrum, Wyer, and O'Guinn (1998) indicate data to be published demonstrate that forcing respondents to process systematically reduces or eliminates the relationship between television viewing and social judgment. Reportedly, when heuristic processing was prevented the cultivation effect was eliminated. The empirical evidence extant builds a convincing argument that information or accessibility underlies the cultivation relationship. However, thus far little is known about form of the information that is accessed when heuristic processing is used in cultivation judgments. The accessibility of several different types of information has the potential to influence judgments (Sherman & Corty, 1984). The ease with which individuals are able to imagine an event or the ease with which they can retrieve a prior judgment has been shown to influence subsequent social estimates (Shrum, 1996, pp. 49-50; also see, Manis, Shedler, Jonides, Nelson, 1993). In the literature regarding judgments about the traits of individuals (e.g. whether a person is honest or dishonest), there is evidence that both the accessibility of specific examples and the accessibility of abstractions or prototypes influence judgments heuristically (Sherman & Klein, 1994; also see Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p.392). Specific Portrayals and Social Judgment Cultivation theory indicates overall television consumption is responsible for the construction of social reality (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1994). However, others have pointed out the importance of specific portrayals. For example, Greenberg (1988) argued, "critical images may contribute more to impression-formation and image-building than does the sheer frequency of television characters and behaviors that are viewed" (p. 100). Research has supported this perspective empirically by demonstrating the influence of specific portrayals on social judgments immediately following and several days after exposure to experimental stimuli (Gibson & Zillmann, 1994; Tamborinin, Zillmann, & Bryant, 1984). Tamborini, et al. (1984) found exposure to a film portraying unjustified violence and exposure to a crime documentary lead subjects to higher estimates they would be victimized by violence and greater concern about violence in urban areas as compared to the estimates of subjects who watched a control film. Further, the effect of the documentary film stimulus lasted for three days while the effects of the fictional stimulus did not. To demonstrate that the severity of an example influences subsequent social judgments Gibson and Zillmann (1994) manipulated the severity of one specific example contained in a newspaper story. They found even though the actual rate of carjacking incidents was given in each stimulus story, subjects exposed to more severe examples contained within the stimulus stories estimated the incidence of carjackings to be higher. This effect was evident both immediately after and one week after exposure (Gibson & Zillmann, 1994). In both sets of findings describe immediately above a heuristic process is one explanation. Explaining their findings, Tamborini, et al. argued exposure to the fictional violence "primed schemata relevant to crime and victimization that temporarily biased perceptions" (p. 509). The researchers did not specify, nor did the data indicate, what type of relevant constructs may have been primed. Similarly, HPMCE research has provided no direct indication of the type of information that is more accessible among heavy than light viewers. This study attempts to link social judgments with specific examples or exemplars3 through a heuristic process. The rationale is this: If specific examples are involved when individuals make social judgments, those examples should be more accessible after a social judgment is made than before. For instance, if one is asked to estimate the percent of Americans who have extra-marital affairs, and if one bases her estimate on the accessibility of an example of an affair, that exemple should be more accessible after the estimate than before. This logic prompts the following hypothesis. H1: Judgment related examples will be more accessible after judgments are made than before. The HPMCE proposes heavier television viewers have more accessible examples of constructs featured often on television. If exemplar accessibility underlies the HPMCE process the following hypothesis is consistent with the model. H2: For content areas portrayed often in the media, heavy viewers will report more examples from television than light viewers. Previous research also makes it possible to hypothesize about some characteristics of examples that should make them relatively more or less accessible (Higgins & King, 1981). Some of these characteristics are especially relevant to media content. Perceived Realism The extent to which individuals perceive media content as representing the real world has been shown to vary on as many as six dimensions (for reviews, see Busselle, 1995; Potter, 1988). Survey research has demonstrated that the perceived realism of television in general, rather than specific programs or portrayals, may account for more variance in social judgment than television exposure itself (Potter, 1986). Experimental research has demonstrated that the verisimilitude of specific pieces of information impacts on that information's ability to influence judgment. Mares (1996) showed subjects a twenty minute stimulus tape containing both ostensibly "real information," contained in a TV newscast and "fictional information," contained in an advertisement for a movie. She found a positive relationship between mistaking fictional information as real and subsequent social judgments related to that information. She also found the cultivation relationship was mediated by the number of times subjects mistakenly identified fictional information as real: a higher number of fiction to real mistakes was associated with higher cultivation estimates while a higher number of real to fiction mistakes was associated with lower cultivation estimates. One explanation for these findings is that information perceived as real is more accessible in memory, thereby having a greater opportunity to influence judgment. The cognitive processing literature indicates perceived realism of information does indeed influences its accessibility (Gerrig & Prentice, 1991; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Potts, St. Johns & Kirson, 1989). Potts, St. Johns and Kirson (1989) found individuals compartmentalize information they believe to be fictional separately from real-world knowledge. They demonstrated this by having subjects read information that was ostensibly real or fictional. They then primed half of each group to think about either the experimental information or unrelated, real-world information. Subjects from the fictional condition answered questions about the experimental story faster when primed to think about the experimental facts. But subjects in the real information condition answered the same questions faster when primed to think about unrelated, real-world facts, supporting the compartmentalization argument. If individuals recall specific examples when making social judgments, those examples may be real or fictional and may come from the media or the real world. If examples are observed in the media they may be perceived as more or less representative of reality. This leads to the following hypotheses. H3: Real exemplars will be more accessible than fictional exemplars. and H4: Fictional exemplars perceived as more real will be more accessible than those perceived as less real. As described previously, Gibson & Zillmann (1994) found the severity of a provided stimulus example influenced subsequent judgments related to that example. This effect should also occur when examples are recalled from real life experience for the purpose of making social judgments. Thus; H5: More severe examples will be more accessible METHOD Sample and Design. Students (463) from introductory telecommunication courses at a large Midwestern university completed an initial survey containing measures of television exposure, impulsiveness, need for cognition, demographics, and other scales (perceived realism of television, involvement with television, and social desirability). Six to eight weeks later 211 of the initial respondents volunteered for a second ostensibly unrelated experiment. In the second procedure equal numbers of males and females were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In condition 1 respondents completed an exemplar accessibility task and then a social judgment survey on a computer. Condition 2 respondents completed the two tasks in reverse order -- the social judgment survey before the accessibility task. Fourteen respondents were dropped prior to data analysis; five did not understand the task or did not take it seriously. Nine self-identified as having been raised outside the U.S. This left 197 respondents (107 male, 90 female). Ages ranged from 18 to 32 (mean = 20.3 years). Social Judgment Items. Three social judgment questions designed to tap constructs frequently portrayed on television were imbedded among 20 similar items related to a broad range of topics (See Exhibit 1). Respondents answered each question by entering a two-digit response on the numbers pad of a computer keyboard. Respondents answered five practice questions on the computer before beginning the task. _____________________________________________________________________ Exhibit 1 Social Judgment Items 1. "What percent of married Americans have extra-marital affairs?" 2. "What percent of medical doctors are African-American?" 3. "Other than in hunting accidents and war, what percent of Americans are shot with a gun in their lifetime?" Exemplar Category Prompts 1. "A HUSBAND OR WIFE HAVING AN AFFAIR" 2. "AN AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEDICAL DOCTOR" 3. "SOMEONE SHOT WITH A GUN" _____________________________________________________________________ Exemplar Accessibility. Three category prompts were created to match the social judgment questions described above (Exhibit 1). Each category appeared separately on the computer screen. Categories were rotated so that each was presented first, second, and third and equal number of times. Respondents were instructed to press a key as soon as they thought of a specific example of the category on the screen. They were instructed that their example could come from any source, including personal observation, another person, or the media. After pressing the key indicating they had thought of an example they described their example and answered as series of questions about it. Exemplar accessibility was operationalized as the amount of time (in centiseconds) that elapsed between the appearance of the prompt on the screen and the respondent pressing a key to indicate they had thought of an example. Data were collected on a IBM personal computer using a version of MELLAB (1994) software. Respondents practiced on two media related categories before performing the task. They were asked to think of "an actor or actress" and "two cars in a high speed chase." Example Source. Respondents were asked where they observed each example they reported. Sources were categorized as personal observation, interpersonal source, one of twelve media sources, and an other category. Perceived Realism and Seriousness of Exemplar. The researcher read all exemplar characteristic items to each respondent. Response options were one-to-ten scales (See Exhibit 2). A four item scale was used to measure respondents perceived realism of fictional examples. These were selected from nine items. Principal axis factor analysis placed these four items on one factor, with factor loadings of .70 or greater. The four items averaged to form a scale called Exemplar Realism (Mean = 5.8, Alpha = .89). Exemplar Seriousness was measured with two items (see Exhibit 2). These two items were averaged (mean = 7.69). Correlation between them was .82. The seriousness item was not used with the 'African-American doctor' category. ____________________________________________________________________ Exhibit 2 Perceived Realism Items 1. Events like the one you told me about do happen in real life. [People like the person you told me about do exist in real life.]* 2. Incidents [or people] like the one you told me about are quite common in real life. 3. The event [person] you told me about could happen [exist] in real life. 4. Events like the one you told me about happen in real life ALL OF THE TIME. [People like the person you told me about ARE VERY COMMON.] Seriousness Items 1. Compared to most events [people] like this, how serious is the example you gave me? 2. Compared to most events [people] like this, how severe is the example you gave me? * Words, phrases, and sentences in brackets were used for examples of Police Officers or African- American Doctors. ** Responses could range from 1 to 10, where 1 = strongly disagree and 10 = strongly agree. ______________________________________________________________________ Television Measures. Respondents were asked how many hours per week they watched programs in each of 11 categories (e.g. sitcoms, soap operas, crime dramas, etc.). Each category was accompanied by at least two program examples. The 11 categories were summed to create a total television exposure measure (mean = 12.3 hours, range = 0 to 39 hours). RESULTS Before hypothesis tests are reported there is a description of the types of examples and their sources generated by respondents when asked to think of their first example from the three categories. Examples Reported. Real and fictional examples were distributed quite similarly in both conditions. Respondents reported more fictional than real examples in all categories (Table 1). In condition 1 respondents reported 39 real and 50 fictional examples of extra-marital affairs; 26 real and 64 fictional examples of African-American doctors; and 26 real and 62 fictional examples or shootings. In condition 2 they reported 42 real and 50 fictional examples of extra-marital affairs; 22 real and 70 fictional examples of African-American doctors; and 29 real and 60 fictional examples of shootings. _____________________________________________________________________ Table 1: Real and Fictional Examples in Conditions 1 and 2 Condition 1 Condition 2 Example Real Fiction Total Real Fiction Total African-American M.D. 26 64 70 22 70 92 Affair 39 50 89 42 50 92 Shooting 26 62 88 29 60 89 _____________________________________________________________________ Example Sources. The vast majority of real examples of extra-marital affairs originated from personal (14) and interpersonal sources (60). The difference between these two categories is subtle and may not be important. Those who reported personal observation of an affair typically said they learned a friend, relative, or parent was romantically involved with someone other than their spouse, and the respondent had observed them together. Interpersonal sources typically were similar situations, but the respondent had not observed the pair together personally. In the vast majority of cases (74 of 81 times) respondents' first example of a real affair came from interpersonal sources. Conversely, examples of fictional affairs came from the media, and mostly from films, rather than television. Fifty-seven (of 100) fictional examples of affairs came from movies seen in theaters or on television. Thirty-one came from television programs. Of those, 15 came from night-time drama programs; only nine came from afternoon soap operas. The majority (39 of 48) of real examples of African-American doctors originated in personal experience. The majority of fictional examples came from television dramas (82 of 134) and situation comedies (36 of 134). The most commonly identified African-American doctor named as a first example was the Dr. Benton character from the TV program ER. The second most popular fictional example was the Cliff Huxtable character from the TV show Cosby. Third most common was the cartoon doctor on the TV show, The Simpsons. Interpersonal experience accounted for the majority of real examples of shootings (26 of 55). Most of these respondents knew of someone directly or indirectly who had been shot with a gun. In one of the shooting examples personally observed, a female was shot by her brother with a BB gun. In the other four cases the respondent was neither a victim or assailant. Rather she or he was at a party where someone was shot, observed the aftermath of a shooting, or heard shots fired but did not see the event. Fictional examples of shootings originated overwhelmingly in movies seen at theaters (50 of 122) and in rented movies or on pay cable television (43 of 122). Only 26 (of 122) fictional examples originated from television programs. ______________________________________________________________________ Table 2: Sources of Real and Fictional Examples Affair Afr.-Am. Doctor Shooting Source Real Fiction Real Fiction Real Fiction Personal Experience 14 0 39 0 5 0 Interpersonal 60 1 1 1 26 0 Local News 1 0 0 0 9 0 National News 0 0 3 0 1 0 Reality / Talk 4 0 1 0 5 0 Newspaper / Magazine 1 0 1 0 1 0 TV Drama Program 0 15 0 82 0 17 Situation Comedy 0 4 0 36 0 3 Soap Opera 0 9 0 5 0 1 Other TV 0 4 0 2 0 3 Movie / Theater 0 13 0 3 1 50 Movie / VCR Pay Cable 0 36 0 2 1 43 Movie / Basic TV 0 8 0 1 0 2 Novel 0 2 1 2 0 1 Other 1 7 2 0 6 2 Totals 81 100 48 134 55 122 ________________________________________________________________________________ __ Hypothesis Tests Outliers. Two types of outliers were of concern in this study. First, extremely quick exemplar response times were likely to be produced when respondents "jumped the gun" and pressed the response key before they had an example in mind. Second, extremely slow response times were likely to be produced when respondents did not attend fully to the task or when they evaluated several examples before reporting one. In order to minimize these sources of error, the quickest and slowest 10-percent of responses were eliminated from each comparison group (Cameron & Frieske, 1994, pp. 159-160). For example, the fastest and slowest 10-percent of response times were removed from examples of African-American doctors in condition 1 and the fastest and slowest 10-percent of response times were removed from African-American doctor examples in condition 2 for comparisons between conditions. This procedure was carried out for each comparison analysis. Hypothesis 1: Judgment related examples will be more accessible after judgments are made than before. Respondents in Condition 2 - where the exemplar accessibility task followed the social judgment questionnaire - reported examples from all three categories more quickly than respondents in Condition 1. However, only the difference in accessibility of African-American doctors was statistically significant. In condition 1 respondents took an average of 1.06 seconds longer to report examples of African-American doctors (t = 2.502, df = 145, p < .02); 1.06 seconds longer to report examples of extra-marital affairs (t = 1.351, df = 141, ns); and .37 seconds longer to report examples of shootings (t = .591, df = 138, ns). These results offer tentative support of Hypothesis 1. In no case were judgment related examples less accessible after judgments were made. _____________________________________________________________________ Table 3: Accessibility of Examples in Conditions 1 and 2 Example Condition 1 (n) Condition 2 (n) Afr.-Am. Doctor 562(73) 456(74) 2.502 145 .013 Affair 824(71) 718(72) 1.351 141 .179 Shooting 649(69) 612(71) .591 138 .556 _____________________________________________________________________ Hypothesis 2: For content areas portrayed often in the media, heavy viewers will report more examples from television than light viewers. Hypothesis 2 was tested by comparing the frequency of fictional to real examples among light and heavy television viewers using a median (11 hours) split (Table 4). It was also tested by comparing the frequency of examples from different sources reported by heavy and light viewers (Table 4b). Respondents reporting watching less than 11 hours of television a week were defined as light viewers. Though a trend in the correct direction of a few percentage points was observed, there were no statistically significant differences in the distributions of real and fictional examples between heavy and light viewers for any of the three examples (Table 4). The second comparison looked at the sources of examples, which were divided into interpersonal, television, film, and other media sources (Table 4b). When compared to light viewers, there was a tendency for heavy television viewers to report more examples from television and fewer from real life or movies. However, this difference was not statistically significant. Therefore data provide no empirical support for Hypothesis 2. _____________________________________________________________________ Table 4: Percent of Real and Fictional Examples in Conditions 1 and 2 Light Viewers Heavy Viewers Example Real (%) Fictional (%) Real (%) Fictional (%) Affair 40 (46%) 47 (54%) 41 (44%) 53 (56%) African-American M.D. 25 (28) 63 (72) 23 (24) 71 (76) Shooting 29 (33) 59 (67) 26 (29) 63 (71) Total 94 (36) 169 (64) 90 (32) 187 (68) Table 4b: Sources of Examples Among Heavy and Light Viewers Source Light Viewers Heavy Viewers Personal / Interpersonal 75 (33%) 72 (30%) Television (including TV movies) 97 (42) 120 (50) Film (Theater, VCR, Pay-Cable) 45 (20) 37 (15) Other 14 (6) 12 (5) _____________________________________________________________________ Hypothesis 3: Real examples will be more accessible than fictional examples. Hypothesis 3 was tested by comparing the response times of real and fictional examples for each of the three example categories. Again quickest and slowest 10-percent of response times were eliminated from each comparison group. Real examples of affairs and shootings were reported more quickly than their fictional counterparts (Table 5). However the opposite was true of African-American doctor examples. Real examples of affairs were reported an average of 3.7 seconds faster (t = -3.931, df = 141, p < .001). Real examples of shootings were reported an average of 1.04 seconds faster, though the difference was not statistically significant. Conversely, real examples of African-American doctors were reported 2.82 seconds slower than fictional examples (t = 5.680, df = 145, p< .001). _____________________________________________________________________ Table 5: Accessibility of Real and Fictional Examples Example Real (n) Fiction (n) Affair 609(64) 979(79) -3.931 141 .000 Afr.-Am. Doctor 725(42) 443(105) 5.680 145 .000 Shooting 567(45) 671(96) -1.518 139 .131 _____________________________________________________________________ Hypothesis 4: Fictional examples perceived as more real will be more accessible than those perceived as less real. This analysis includes fictional examples only. Zero-order correlations between exemplar accessibility and the perceived realism of examples were computed for all three examples in Condition 1 and Condition 2 separately. The results indicate only one statistically significant correlation to support Hypothesis 4. In condition 2 fictional shootings perceived as more realistic took less time to access as predicted (r = -.35, n = 48, p < .05). The remaining three correlations related to shootings and African-American doctors also were in the predicted direction but did not reach statistically significance. The correlations between perceived realism of affairs and the accessibility of those measures did not support Hypothesis 4. _____________________________________________________________________ Table 6: Zero-order Correlations between Perceived Realism of Fictional Examples and Exemplar Accessibility Condition 1 Condition 2 Example Accessibility r (n) r (n) Affair .16 (37) .02 (38) Afr.-Am. Doctor -.15 (51) -.08 (58) Shooting -.08 (48) -.351(48) 1 P < .05 _____________________________________________________________________ Hypothesis 5: More severe examples will be more accessible. To test Hypothesis 5 correlations between exemplar accessibility and perceived severity of examples were computed. A trend was evident in Condition 1 suggesting severity was negatively correlated as expected. However the relationships did not reach statistical significance (Affairs; r = -. 18, n = 69, ns; Shootings; r = -.10, n = 59, ns). In Condition 2 both of these correlations were near zero (r = -.04 and r = -.03, respectively). DISCUSSION The data presented in this study provide mixed evidence regarding the role of exemplar accessibility in the heuristic processing of cultivation judgments. As predicted by the HPMCE, specific examples were slightly more accessible after social judgments were made than before. While only one comparison was statistically significant, the other two were in the predicted direction. This suggests either specific examples are accessed in the judgment process or constructs closely related to these examples are accessed. For instance, a prototype to which an example is integral may be accessed priming the specific example. Either case is consistent with the HPMCE and refutes questions of spuriousness in observed relationships between judgment response time and social judgments. If faster judgments were due to some third variable, such as intelligence or impulsiveness, there would be no reason for judgments to influence exemplar accessibility. Examination of the sources of examples is also informative. The examples reported by respondents are their most accessible, which should be an indication of importance to the individual. If television examples play an important role in the social judgment process, one would expect a greater proportion of real examples to originate from news and fictional examples to originate from entertainment television. However, a large majority of fictional examples of both affairs and shootings came from film. This may reflect different kinds of viewing experiences and levels of involvement. While viewers may observe many examples of violence and relational discord on television, they were more likely to recall examples from theater, pay-cable or rented video. If memorable examples are a reflection of involvement, these media experiences may have a greater potential to influence social judgments and social perception. This observation points to a weakness of the present study: theater attendance, pay-cable viewing, and video rental were not measured. Research into the influences of media, both from a heuristic processing perspective and from other approaches, should pay particular attention to the role of media fare outside traditional television programming. Further, the public often laments the prevalence of violence on prime-time television. However these data warrant speculation that it is not prime-time and day-time viewing that have the greatest viewer impact. The observation that film viewing is responsible for more memorable examples also has implications for generalizing from laboratory settings to television exposure. Given the captive nature and presumably higher involvement extant in laboratory settings, research in which subjects are shown experimental stimuli may be more akin to a movie going or video rental experience than to everyday television grazing. It should be emphasized that fictional examples of African-American doctors originated primarily from television and are counter to many of the points made above. There are several possible explanations for this difference. First, television characters may be more memorable than television events because viewers observe characters weekly, but specific events only once. That is, the same character appears in every episode, but a shooting appears only one time, excluding re-runs. Second, these data simply may reflect the content of films. Popular movies frequently portray shootings and affairs, but rarely portray African-American doctors. One contribution of this study is the employment of naturally occurring and specific media examples in the study of the social reality construction. This methodology has the potential to fill a gap between survey research focused on general exposure patterns and experimental research using artificial stimuli. A second, related contribution is the use of exemplar accessibility methodology. This tool may prove useful for investigating the impact of specific media content. However, more refinement of this measurement technique is necessary, as well as more borrowing from cognitive psychology and its methodologies. One important limitation to this study is its use of a college student sample. A more diverse sample has two obvious advantages. First generalizations are limited to college students who are unique in both their viewing levels and content choices. Further the lack of variance in viewing amount inherent in college student samples attenuates many observed relationships. 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Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232. 1 I will follow Shrum's (1995) convention of using the term cultivation to refer to any investigation of relationships between television exposure and social judgment. 2 Gibson & Zillmann (1994) distinguish between the terms accessibility and availability. "Information, although available in memory, is not equally accessible" (p. 605). In this paper availability is a dichotomy; information is either available or not. Information that is available may be more or less accessible. Accessibility is therefore viewed as a continuous variable. 3 An exemplar is defined as a cognitive representation of an object, incident or behavior that is similar to the current target judgment (Smith & Zarate, 1992). Media Examples and Social Judgment 25