Content-Type: text/html
Moving to the center
Moving to the center:
Press Coverage of Candidates' Ideological
Cleavage in a Campaign
by
Tien-tsung Lee
Doctoral Student
School of Journalism and Communication
1275 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
and
Anthony Y.H. Fung
Doctoral Student
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Mailing Addresses:
Tien-tsung Lee
P.O. Box 3548
Eugene, OR 97403
Phone: (541) 346-5849
E-mail: [log in to unmask]
Anthony Y. H. Fung
Department of Journalism and Communication
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, NT
Hong Kong
E-mail: [log in to unmask]
Paper Presented at the Mass Communication & Society Division
AEJMC 1997 Annual Convention
July 30-Aug. 2, Chicago
Moving to the center:
Press Coverage of Candidates' Ideological
Cleavage in a Campaign
Abstract
Many political studies conclude that the ideological center is the winning
position in elections. Considering the difference between Democrats, Republicans
and the general population, candidates should compete for their partisan centers
to win the primaries, then move to the center to win the general election. With
empirical data, this paper tests whether there are indeed three ideological
centers, and whether the press coverage of the 1996 presidential election
supports the moving-to-the-center hypothesis.
Moving to the center:
Press Coverage of Candidates' Ideological
Cleavage in a Campaign
Introduction
A common strategy for winning elections, as suggested by an influential
political model (Downs, 1957), is to stay in the middle-of-the-road on policy
issues or to be a so-called "centrist." This Downsian model theorizes that the
distribution of voters' ideology is a normal distribution, which means that most
voters are moderate instead of liberal or conservative. As a result, a centrist
candidate can appeal to the majority and receive more votes. This model has
received support from both theoretical and empirical studies.
A logical follow-up question is, considering the difference between the primary
and general elections, does the ideological center stay the same? In other
words, is the ideological center within a party the same as the center of the
whole population? If not, then the candidates should compete for the partisan
centers first and the general center later. Thus, there should be an ideological
center-leaning cleavage over time in a race.
Intuitively, the best way to study candidates' ideological shift is to examine
their position papers and speeches. However, the importance of the mass media as
sources of political information has been increasing. We are in an era when most
voters essentially obtain all their information about candidates through the
mass media. Therefore, it can be argued that candidates' ideological positions
only exist (and matter to voters) when they are reported by the media.
In addition, it is common perception that the two major U.S. parties, the
Democrats and Republicans, differ ideologically, one on the left (liberal) and
the other on the right (conservative), while the general population (including
Democrats, Republicans and independents) is in the middle. Many take this for
granted without questioning. It is beneficial to examine whether conventional
wisdom or stereotypes differ from reality.
This paper has three goals: 1) to test whether the partisan centers differ from
the population center; 2) to examine whether the media agree that there is a
center-seeking movement among candidates during a campaign; and 3) if the media
support the existence of such movement, how the media cover such ideological
cleavage. In short, the current study is to investigate the center-moving
mechanism in media coverage of elections.
The 1996 presidential race was used for this study because of the importance
and highly publicized nature of such campaigns. This election provides an ideal
opportunity to answer the questions about Democratic and Republican candidates'
ideological movement over time.
Literature Review
The center-seeking and moving-to-the-center mechanism
A dominant political theory by Downs (1957), whose origin can be traced back to
Hotelling (1929) and Blacks (1958), suggests that in a bi-partisan democracy,
both parties compete for the ideological center to maximize votes.
This theory has received support from numerous studies, both theoretical
(e.g., Davis & Hinich, 1966; Davis, Hinich & Ordeshook, 1970; Coleman, 1971;
Shepsle, 1972; Page, 1978; Enelow & Hinich, 1981, 1982, 1984; Hinich & Munger,
1994) and empirical (e.g., Page, 1978; Lee, 1995; Lee & Fung, 1995A, B). The
consensus of these studies is that candidates who occupy the ideological center
are likely to win.
However, all the research mentioned above used a "snap shot" approach and did
not consider candidates' position shift over time in a campaign. As suggested by
Lee (1995) and Lee and Fung (1995B), additional investigation of the
candidate-cleavage hypothesis (whether candidates move their ideological
positions over time) is worthwhile.
If candidates of general elections compete for the center in order to win, this
should also occur in primaries. In other words, theoretically, candidates should
first compete for the center in their own party primaries to win nomination,
then compete again for the center in the general elections (Coleman, 1971, 1972;
Page, 1978). The centers of primaries and the general elections should be
different, considering the variance between parties and the general public. We
can picture a Republican center on the right, Democratic center on the left, and
a general public's center in the middle of the other two. Between primaries and
the general election, the partisan nominees should move from the partisan
centers to the general public's center of the ideological spectrum.
This argument was supported by a political analyst who stated that running
"idea-based" campaigns were primary-based strategies. For general elections,
"the dominant characteristic is the move to the center in an attempt to appeal
to the independent voters" (Lehigh & Phillips, 1994).
Page provided mixed statements on candidates' movement. On the one hand, he
argued that candidates tended to be consistent. On the other hand, he offered
examples of candidates shifting (1978).[1] In addition, Morton (1993) concluded
in her experimental study that candidates tended to converge toward centrist
positions. Coleman developed theoretical arguments and mathematical formulas to
explain the dynamic of position shift between the primary and the general
election (1971, 1972).
There are more speculations on this subject. For example, Newman (1994) used
marketing concepts to explain political campaigns. His theoretical two-stage
center-seeking argument, a political marketing model, supports the movement
hypothesis. According to him, when a campaign moved from one stage to another,
"the segments that are targeted" changed. Consequently, the "candidate
positioning" would move (11-12).
Although Newman did not specify that candidates would change stands on
particular issues, his theory suggested that candidates may shift ideological
positions on issues between different stages (e.g., primaries and the general
election) of a campaign. It seems that a number of scholars agree with the
possibility of a movement on the ideological spectrum.
By contrast, Page argued that shifts in issue stands would alienate candidates'
early supporters, without convincing the new constituencies to whom they were
trying to appeal. He also suggested that "trimming" or "waffling" would lead to
negative evaluations of their personal characteristics (1978: 150). Similarly,
some prestigious journalists also stated that "doing or saying something
inconsistent with past words or deeds invites negative press coverage"
(Jamieson, 1992).
Based on the studies cited above, it may be hypothesized that candidates move
toward the center from the time of the primaries to the general election.
Coleman's two-stage hypothesis was theoretical (1971, 1972); and Page's
empirical evidence was gathered years ago (1978). Also, we need to consider the
increasing power of media in elections. Therefore, the ideology-cleavage or
moving-to-the-center hypothesis (partisan candidates move their ideological
positions from the two sides to the center in the course of a campaign) is due
for a test with more recent information reported by the media. Since it is
journalists' nature to seek anything new and unusual, a candidate's change of
issue stands (if any) is likely to be reported.
The media as a major source of political information
After viewing the center-cleavage hypothesis above, it is necessary to discuss
why it is appropriate to study candidates' mediated ideological positions
revealed in the media instead of their "real" policy stands (e.g., position
papers and speeches).
The mass media in recent decades have become a major source of information for
the voters in election campaigns (Khan, 1993; West, 1993). Graber described the
role of the media in recent campaigns as "powerful and growing all the time"
(1989: 227). The media appear to be important in the process of shaping voters'
impression of candidates' ideological positions.
Of the various media forms, news appears to play the most significant role.
News, as stated by media sociologists (e.g., Tuchman, 1978), is a "window on the
world," and reality for many is constructed by the media. Nimmo and Combs
suggested that political realities are in fact mediated illusions (1983). In
this sense, news has also become the most important source of information for
voters to perceive the ideological positions of the candidates.
In modern politics, most people do not have direct access to candidates,
especially those in higher races. What voters learn "is not the real campaign
but the media's version of it" (Patterson, 1980: 9). Thus, it can be suggested
that no matter how far away the candidates' "real" positions are from what is
shown in the media, only the mediated positions count. A good analogy of this
situation is a cartoon in which a boy asking his father: "Dad, if a tree falls
in the forest, and the media aren't there to cover it, has the tree really
fallen?" (Noelle-Neumann, 1993.)
An explanation for the increasing power of media in election is that, according
to Nelson (1993), Patterson (1980) and Wattenberg (1994), the function of other
message outlets such as party organizations has been on the decline.
Research questions
The center-cleavage theory is based on the assumption that the ideological
centers in the primaries are different from the center of the general election
(meaning there are three centers). Therefore, the first research question is:
Q1: Do the partisan centers in the primaries differ from the population center
in the general election?
Since this study argues that the media have become an essential source of
political information, to study the ideology-cleavage theory, we need to
investigate whether the media agree that there is such a phenomenon.
Q2: Do the news media agree that there is a center-seeking movement among
candidates over time during a campaign?
If we find evidence of the media's support of such a phenomenon (saying that it
does exist), does media coverage reflect such movement?
Q3: If the media support the existence of a center-seeking movement, does the
media's coverage substantiate such an ideological cleavage?
Method
The NES (National Election Studies), a data set widely used in U.S. political
studies (Flanigan & Zingale, 1991), helped answer the first question. The NES
data identified survey respondents' party affiliation on a 7-point scale (strong
Democrats, weak Democrats, Independents leaning toward Democrats, Independents,
Independents leaning toward Republicans, weak Republicans, and strong
Republicans). Respondents identified as apolitical, members of minor parties, or
refused to answer (which accounted for a very small percentage) were treated as
missing.
The first two and last two categories were re-coded into two groups: Democrats
and Republicans; and Independents were disregarded in our analysis of partisan
centers. However, all three groups (seven categories) were included in the
analysis of the population center.
Using Demarcates and Republicans as the independent variable, a t-test was
performed on respondents' self-reported ideology (from extremely liberal to
extremely conservative) and each of eight ideological issues that were measured
on a 7- or 5-point scale. These issues are: women's status, defense spending,
governmental involvement in employment and standard of living, aid to Blacks,
the balance between governmental service and spending, who (the government or
private sector) should provide health insurance, preferential hiring of Blacks,
and the death penalty. All these issue scales reflect a left-right or
liberal-conservative spectrum.[2] A Pearson's correlation test, as well as
Cronbach's alpha, were run (the ideological label against all 8 issues) to test
the consistency between these scales.
Also, the partisan means were compared with the population's means on issues
and ideological label to examine whether the three means are different. The
operationalization of ideological or issue center is the mean score of a scale.
This study focuses on the most recent race of the most important kind in the
United States, the 1996 presidential election. However, since the 1996 NES data
were not available yet, the current study used the most recent NES set, the 1994
NES data (N=1795).
To answer the second and third questions, the Nexis/Lexis on-line data were
utilized. We did keyword searches (of the entire text of articles) to identify
and download magazine, newspaper and wire services articles, as well as
broadcast news transcripts, that deal with both Clinton's and Dole's ideology or
issue stands in the 1996 presidential campaign. Examples of keywords include the
names of both candidates, "election," "primary," "presidential," "center,"
"middle-of-the-road," "centrist," "ideological," "ideology," "extremist,"
"extreme," "left," "right," "cleavage," "move," and "movement." The study period
was from pre-primaries (late 1995) to October 1996. Only articles that are from
well known media outlets (following the "prestige press" concept by Stempel &
Windhauser, 1984) and clearly related to both candidates' ideology were
selected. A total of 46 articles were identified and downloaded.
After printing out the selected articles, in-depth readings were performed,
following the principles of qualitative textual analysis. Recurring themes and
patterns in these articles were identified, recorded and treated as evidence
(Berger, 1991; Lindlof, 1995).
To avoid repetition, only a portion of the downloaded articles was quoted as
evidence in our qualitative findings, which is common among qualitative
analyses. Such study's focus is the authority and richness of the data, rather
than systematic or random sampling. Since our question is whether the media say
that something exists, if a few authoritative news sources say so and no sources
state otherwise, the answer is likely a "yes."
We did not find it necessary to conduct a quantitative analysis for the
following reasons. First, the variety of media outlets (e.g., the New York
Times, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, Denver Post, Time,
U.S. News & World Report) in our sample appear to be representative of the
mainstream print media in the U.S. Thus, we argue that the selected articles are
sufficient to answer the second research question about media in general.
Second, the third research question requires a qualitative historical type of
analysis to produce the "entire picture" of a developing narrative.
Findings
Q1: Do the partisan centers in the primaries differ from the population center
in the general election?
The answer to the first research question about ideological centers (among the
Democrats, Republicans and the general population) was based on the analyses of
the NES data.
We compared the centers (or mean scores) among the Democrats, Republicans and
the general population. As expected, on all the issues and the ideological
label, the Democratic center falls on the left of the population center, while
the Republican center on the right (see Table 1). This supports the general
perception of the distribution of partisan ideology. In other words, the
partisan centers appear to differ from the population center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1 about here
---------------------------------------------------------------------
It should be noted that this study assumes that issue positions manifest
ideology. To defend this assumption, we tested the correlation between
ideological label and issue positions in the NES data. The 7-point ideological
scale was positively correlated to all eight issue scales (and all the
correlations are statistically significant). The Cronbach's alpha of these 9
scales (ideology and 8 issues) is .75. (See Table 2).
Looking at Tables 1 and 2 together supports the conceptualization of using
these NES scales to measure people's ideological distribution. Our analyses
confirm the conventional wisdom that Democrats are on the left and Republicans
on the right, in terms of the ideological label and issue positions. Thus
logically it is acceptable to treat the mean scores of these issues (and the
ideological label) as the centers of ideology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2 about here
---------------------------------------------------------------------
To strengthen this argument, t-tests were performed to examine whether the two
parties really differ ideologically. Again, as expected, Democrats and
Republicans differ on all issues as well as the ideological label. The t-values
ranged from 2.28 to 18.86. All the p-values were statistically significant (only
one p-value is .023; all others are .000). (See Table 3.) This suggests that the
ideological centers of both parties do differ. Thus, the answer to the first
research question is yes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3 about here
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Q2: Do the news media agree that there is a center-seeking movement among
candidates over time during a campaign?
The news media agree that candidates (namely, Bob Dole and Bill Clinton) did
shift ideologically (as reflected on issue stands) to the center.
Toward the end of primaries, a Boston Globe story reported that Dole was 'being
pushed both by party moderates and by senior advisers to move to the middle to
win the general election" (1 May, 1996). Both the Washington Post (19 May, 1996)
and Dallas Morning News (14 July, 1996) reported that former President Nixon
once advised Dole to "run to the right in the primaries, but to the center in
the general election."
Dole was not the only candidate who played the moving game. The National
Journal analyzed the dynamic between both candidates' movement to the center (4
May, 1996). Both the Denver Post (1 Sept., 1996) and U.S. News and World Report
(9 Sept., 1996) report that the Democrats and Clinton have "been turned back
toward the center." A Reuters World Service story's headline reads: "Clinton's
move to center frustrated Dole" (20 May, 1996). The same story argued that
Clinton's move started right after the 1994 Republican victory. A San Diego
Union-Tribute story also stated that Clinton has had a "strong move to the
center over the past two years" (1 Sept., 1996).
After Clinton's "dramatic move to the center" (Chicago Tribune, 30 August,
1996), both candidates had been "campaigning as similar centrists" (CNN
Moneyline, 4 Sept., 1996). However, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution stated
that Clinton "was able to move more quickly and more credibly to the center"
than his opponent (9 October, 1996). This may have been a reason that Clinton
had been leading in the polls.
All the stories cited above indicate that the news media generally agree that
both candidates moved ideologically during the campaign.
Q3: If the media support the existence of a center-seeking movement, does the
media's coverage substantiate such an ideological cleavage?
Concurrent with the two-stage theory (primary and general elections have
different centers for candidates to compete for), Dole was reportedly competing
for the center in his own party early in the campaign (Los Angeles Times, 8
March, 1996). In other words, he had to cater to the right to win the Republican
primaries. According to the Boston Globe, Dole was "trumpeting his conservative
credentials to stop Patrick J. Buchanan" (2 April, 1996). For example, to win
support from conservatives during the primary stage, Dole wrote to the National
Rifle Association to indicate his intention to repeal the "ill-conceived gun ban
passed as part of President Clinton's crime bill." He verbalized his strong
opposition to gun control (Los Angeles Times, 10 July, 1996; New York Times, 26
Dec., 1995).
After winning the primaries, Dole started his move to the center. In early
July, he abandoned his bid to repeal the assault weapons ban (Boston Globe, 10
July, 1996; Time, 22 July, 1996). He also proposed adding a "declaration of
tolerance" on abortion in the party platform (Los Angeles Times, 10 July, 1996;
Gannett New Service, 24 July, 1996). Furthermore, he was interested in having
the pro-choice Colin Powell as his running mate despite the strong opposition
from the conservative wings in his party (Washington Post, 19 May, 1996). Also,
he invited a pro-choice politician, Susan Molinari, to be a keynote speaker at
the Republican convention (Gannett News Service, 24 July, 1996).
However, Dole's effort was less than successful. His party, as well as the
convention, was dominated by religious conservatives (especially those with an
"anti-abortion passion") who have kept Dole "from reaching to voters in the
center" (New York Times, 10 March, 1996; Dallas Morning News, 14 July, 1996;
Gannett News Service, 24 July, 1996). Also, Republican leaders and legislators
have strongly pressured Dole not to move to the center (Boston Globe, 1 May,
1996; Time, 22 July, 1996).
On the other hand, Clinton's move to the center was more successful. Facing no
opposition in the primary, he started his move early. In his State of the Union
address in early 1996, Clinton stated that he wanted to shrink the government,
foster 'the growth of the post-industrial communications and high-tech economy,"
and took an anti-illegal immigration stance (Sacramento Bee, 28, Jan., 1996). He
also adopted policies that are traditionally conservative, including proposals
on school uniforms and V chips (a device to block violent TV programs), and even
signed a welfare reform bill (Chicago Tribune, 28 August, 1996; Time, 22 July, 2
Sept., 9 Sept., 1996).
Clinton's movement to the center, according to a U.S. News and World Report
article (26 Aug., 1996), arguably started in November 1994 when the Republicans
won the election. Since then, the article reports, Clinton "has carefully led
his party toward the center." His right-leaning move obviously paid off. In
September 1996 he received the endorsement from the nation's largest police
organization (New York Times, 16 Sept., 1996). In October he was endorsed by a
large group of small business leaders (San Francisco Chronicle, 8 Oct., 1996).
Such endorsements are rare for Democratic candidates because usually they tend
to be perceived as being soft on crime and anti-business.
The stories cited above illustrate how media coverage has detailed both
candidates' movement to the ideological center. They were more than a simple
statement that there was an ideological center. These stories described how the
candidates have changed their positions and moved between partisan and
population centers.
Discussion
This study provides empirical evidence (in this case, quantitative data) to
support the under-tested conventional wisdom that the Democrats and Republicans
differ ideologically, while the general public's ideology falls between the two
parties. Thus, logically, partisan candidates would compete for the centers
within their own parties in the primaries, then move to the population center to
win the general election.
Our other findings suggest that the media support the concept of ideology
cleavage among candidates. Also, based on press coverage, candidates tend to
believe that moving to the center is a desirable strategy to win elections. In
addition, This paper illustrates how media coverage substantiates such
ideological shift.
Please note that this study takes what the media report as political reality.
In other words, this is based on the assumption that voters rely on the news
media for political information, and vote accordingly. Testing this assumption
would be an ideal topic for other research.
Future studies should address the weakness of the present research. First, more
sources of political information, including television broadcast news and
political adverting, can be included. Second, the conceptualization of "center"
can be further investigated.
The present study includes mainly the print media for three reasons. First, the
full text of newspaper and magazine articles was easier to obtain. Second, the
print media are more likely to report candidates' issue stance in details than
TV news shows. Third, the transcripts of TV newscast are mostly summaries rather
than verbatim records. Researchers interested in the median might want to tape
the news shows for analysis.
As for the definition of the center, this study treats the mean scores of issue
stands (measured by a 5- or 7-point scale) as the center. Only both ends of a
scale were defined by examples or statements (see Appendix). Survey respondents
have to self-report their positions on the scale. For most issues, the center
(mean) is close to the center of the scale (See Table 1).
The NES study has been conducted for decades, thus the validity and reliability
of the scales should be of little question. However, an improved way to measure
the ideological center should be an interesting challenge for future research.
Table 1
Partisans' and population's means on issues
Dem. Population Rep. Scale
Ideological label 3.72 4.45 5.22 7-point
Women's status 2.34 2.45 2.59 7
Defense spending 3.36 3.69 4.22 7
Job/standard of living 3.74 4.36 5.09 7
Aid to Blacks 4.18 4.72 5.25 7
Service vs. spending 3.79 4.29 4.94 7
Health insurance 3.29 4.02 5.08 7
Preferential hiring 3.95 4.27 4.59 5
Death penalty 3.74 4.08 4.37 5
Table 2
Correlations between ideological label and issue stands
Ideology
Women .2577
(N=1343)
p= .000
Defense .3112
(N=1353)
p= .000
Job .3124
(N=1353)
p= .000
Blacks .3194
(N=1343)
p= .000
Service .3715
(N=1315)
p= .000
Insurance .3794
(N=1347)
p= .000
Hiring .1993
(N=1342)
p= .000
Death .2395
(N=1358)
p= .000
Reliability Coefficients 9 items (Ideology and 8 issues)
Alpha = .7550 Standardized item alpha = .7544
Table 3
Partisan differences on issues
Dem. Rep. t-value p.
(mean) (mean)
(std. dev.) (std. dev.)
(N) (N)
Ideological label 3.72 5.22 18.85 .000
(1.31) (1.09)
(453) (475)
Women's status 2.34 2.59 2.28 .023
(2.34) (2.59)
(555) (509)
Defense spending 3.36 4.22 10.20 .000
(1.46) (1.27)
(549) (519)
Job/std of living 3.74 5.09 13.18 .000
(1.77) (1.57)
(559) (520)
Aid to Blacks 4.18 5.25 10.91 .000
(1.79) (1.40)
(555) (523)
Service /spending 3.79 4.94 12.33 .000
(1.51) (1.47)
(512) (508)
Health insurance 3.29 5.08 16.11 .000
(1.89) (1.72)
(545) (517)
Prefer. hiring 3.95 4.59 8.85 .000
(1.42) ( .87)
(577) (523)
Death penalty 3.74 4.37 7.67 .000
(1.55) (1.10)
(588) (527)
References
Berger, Arthur A. (1991). Media Analysis Techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Black, Duncan (1958). The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge (UK):
Cambridge Univ. Press. Coleman, James S.
(1971). Internal processes governing party positions in elections. Public
Choice, 11, 35-60. ________________
(1972). The positions of political parties in elections. In Richard G. Niemi &
Herbert F. Weisberg (Eds.), Probability models of collection decision-making.
Columbus, OH: Merrill. Davis, Otto A. & Hinich,
Melvin J. (1966). A mathematical model of policy formation in a Democratic
society. In Joseph L. Bernd (Ed.). Mathematical application in political
science II (pp.175-205). Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press.
______________________________ & Ordeshook, Peter C. (1970). An expository
development of a mathematical model of the electoral process. American
Political Science Review, 64, 426-448. Downs,
Anthony. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Enelow, James M., & Hinich, Melvin J. (1981). A new approach to voter
uncertainty in the Downsian spatial model. Political Science, 25,
481-493. _________________________________ (1982).
Ideology, issues, and the spatial theory of elections. American Political
Science Review, 76, 493-501. _________________________________ (1984).
Probabilistic voting and the importance of centrist ideologies in democratic
elections. Journal of Politics, 46, 459-478.
Flanigan, William H. & Zingale, Nancy H. (1991). Political behavior of the
American electorate (7th ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly
Press. Graber, Doris A.
(1989). Mass media and American politics (3rd ed.). Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press. Hinich, Melvin, J.
& Munger, Michael C. (1994). Ideology and the theory of political choice. Ann
Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
Hotelling, Harold (March, 1929). Stability in competition. Economic Journal,
39, 41-57. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall (1992). Dirty politics:
deception, distraction, and democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Khan, Kim Fridkin (1993). Gender differences in campaign messages: the
political advertisements of men and women candidates for U.S. senate.
Political Research Quarterly, 43, 481-502. Lee,
Tien-tsung (1995). The center-seeking mechanism in press coverage: a study of
14 gubernatorial and senatorial campaigns in 1994. Unpublished M.A. thesis.
University of Minnesota.
______________ & Fung, Y. H. Anthony (1995A). The Center-seeking mechanism in
press coverage: A study of six gubernatorial and senatorial election campaigns
in 1990. Paper presented at the 1995 International Communication Association
Conference Political Communication Division, Albuquerque, NM, May 1995.
__________________________________ (1995B). Was the 1994 election a right- wing
victory? An analysis of press coverage of 14 campaigns. Paper presented at the
1995 Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Convention,
Mass Communication and Society Division, Washington, DC, Aug. 1995
Lehigh, Scot & Phillips, Frank (Sept. 20, 1994). Hoped-for futures begin or end
today. Boston Globe. p. B1. Lindlof,
Thomas R. (1995). Qualitative Communication Research Methods. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage. Morton, Rebecca B.
(1993). Incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform
divergence. American Political Science Review, 87, 382-392.
Nelson, Michael (1993). Conclusion: Some things old, some things new. In
Michael Nelson (Ed.). The Election of 1992. (pp. 183- 192). Washington, D.C.:
CQ Press.
Newman, Bruce I. (1994). The marketing of the president: political marketing as
campaign strategy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Nimmo, Dan & Combs, James E. (1983). Mediated political realities. New York:
Longman.
Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (1993). The spiral of silence (2nd. ed.). Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press.
Page, Benjamin I. (1978). Choices and echoes in presidential elections.
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Patterson,
Thomas E. (1980). The mass media election: How Americans choose their
president. New York: Praeger.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1972). The strategy of ambiguity: Uncertainty and
electoral competition. American Political Science Review, 66, 555-568.
Stempel III, Guido H., & Windhauser, J. W. (1984). The prestige press revisited:
Coverage of the 1980 presidential campaign. Journalism Quarterly, 61,
49-55.
Tuchman, Gaye (1978). Making news: a study in the construction of reality. New
York: The Free Press.
Wattenberg, Martin P. (1994). The decline of American political parties:
1952- 1992. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
West, Darrell, M (1993). Air wars: Television advertising in election
campaigns, 1952-1992. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
Appendix
NES Issue Questions
Equal role for women
Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel
that women should have an equal role with men in running business industry, and
government. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others
feel that a woman's place is in the home. Suppose these people are at the other
end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in
between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this
scale, or haven't you thought much about this? <"Don't know," "N/A" or "Haven't
thought much" were counted as missing in the present study.>
1. Women and men should have an equal role
7. A women's place is in the home
Defense Spending
Q: Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Others
feel that defense spending should be greatly increased.
1. Greatly decrease defense spending
7. Greatly increase defense spending
Job/Standard and Living
Q: Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every
person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government
should just let each person get ahead on their own.
1. Government see to a job and good standard of living
7. Government let each person get ahead on own
Aid to Blacks
Q: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort
to improve the social and economic positions of blacks. Others feel that the
government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should
help themselves.
1. Government should help blacks.
7. Blacks should help themselves.
Services/Spending
Q: Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas
such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it
is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means
an increase in spending.
1. Govt. should provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot
7. Govt. should provide many more services; increase spending a lot
Federal Health Insurance
Q: There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs.
Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover
all medical and hospital expenses for everyone. Others feel that all medical
expenses should be paid by individuals, and through private insurance plans like
Blue Cross or other company paid plans.
1. Government insurance plan
7. Private insurance plan.
Degree of Favor/Opposition to Preferential Hiring of Blacks
Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given
preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring
and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't
earned. What about your opinion-- are you for or against preferential hiring and
promotion of blacks? (5-point scale)
1. For
5. Against
Strength of Favor/Opposition to the Death Penalty
Do you favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder strongly or not
strongly? Do you oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder
strongly or not strongly? (5-point scale)
1. Strongly favor
3. Depends
5. Strongly oppose
[1] According to Page (1978), in the 1968 presidential campaign both Nixon and
Humphrey changed stands on 7% (8 out of 122) of the issues.
[2] In the original NES data, a couple of issue scales followed a right-to-left
distribution. For example, on the issue of death penalty, 1 is "strongly favor"
and 5 is "strongly oppose." To fit the left-to-right or liberal-to-conservative
distribution, these scales were reversely re-coded.