Content-Type: text/html
AFKN as a U.S. Postwar Propaganda Program: A
Hypothesis
AFKN (American Forces Korea Network) as a U.S. Postwar
Propaganda Program: A Hypothesis
by
Jae-Young Kim
(A Doctoral Student in the School of Journalism
at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale)
Address: 3003 W. Sunset Apt. # 4
Carbondale, IL 62901
Phone: (618) 549-3762
E-mail: [log in to unmask]
AFKN as a U.S. Postwar
Propaganda Program: A Hypothesis _
This study examines the historical implications of American Forces Korea
Network (AFKN) in terms of U.S. postwar information program. It proposes a
hypothesis that AFKN is a cultural propaganda medium extended from U.S.
international policy after World War II.
AFKN is a unique foreign medium that has existed in Korea for almost 50 years.
It is an affiliate of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS),[1]
and the second largest of five networks managed by the Army Broadcasting Service
(ABS).[2] ABS is a congressionally mandated, Field Operating Activity of the
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army.
According to Browne (1982), AFRTS "has a longer history than does the Voice of
America, by three months" (p. 129). On May 26, 1942, the War Department,
recognizing its powerful hold, built a worldwide AFRS to provide American
programs through short-wave for troops overseas, wherever stationed. Since
then, "virtually all United States military installations abroad had AFRTS
outlets" (p. 219).[3]
AFKN began operating in 1950, the first year of the Korean War, and broadcast
its first television program in 1957. AFKN-TV has been broadcasting for 40
years as an information and entertainment medium for 55,000 United States
military personnel, civilian employees, and their dependents. However, as its
signal reaches the entire nation through a sophisticated cable and microwave
system, AFKN has become one of the most popular entertainment media, among
younger Koreans in particular.
Despite the relatively long history and the unusual nature of AFKN, most
broadcast scholars have not the slightest idea of its existence. Research of
AFKN as an unknown medium first needs to be explained -- What is AFKN and how
has it evolved in Korea?
To understand the historical significance of AFKN, it is necessary to examine
the aim of U.S. postwar foreign policy and the activities of U.S. occupation
forces in Korea, that landed in 1945. One of the premises of this study is that
U.S. military forces' occupation of Korea after World War II has had a
significant effect not only on current Korean society but also on the beginning
of AFKN.
By positing AFKN as an extension of U.S. postwar international propaganda
program, this study attempts to contribute to an understanding of American
military broadcasting as a cultural imperialist institution. The concept of
cultural imperialism, in general, refers to the process of cultural dominance
and dependence between nations. The AFKN case is especially significant because
"by law, foreign nationals are not allowed to own and operate news media in
Korea. An exception is the U.S. military-run broadcasting system, AFKN" (Lee,
1982, p. 589).
Research Problem and Questions
The research problem of this study is: to what extent was the establishment of
AFKN related to the U.S. postwar information program? This problem has three
basic research questions and some sub-questions:
1. What was the U.S. occupation forces' policy in Korea
within a context of U.S. postwar planning?
a. What was the aim of U.S. postwar foreign policy?
b. What were the activities of U.S. occupation
forces in Korea?
2. How has AFKN evolved in Korea?
a. How is AFKN operated?
b. What is the programming of AFKN?
3. What were the factors to be AFKN conceived?
a. What was the mission of AFKN?
b. How was the decision made to create AFKN?
Justifications
One of the mass media that is little studied but probably is of great
significance is the American armed forces broadcast service. When researchers
examine the external broadcasting voices of the United States, as Craig (1988)
pointed out, "they invariably dwell upon the traditional services such as the
Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Radio in the American
Sector" (p. 307). Hence, "the role played by U.S. military broadcasting . . .
has been underemphasized" (p. 307).
The works on AFRTS are mostly either the descriptive study, giving historical
accounts of the networks, or the shadow audience research, based on 'cultivation
theory' or 'uses and gratifications model.' Browne (1982) provided a detailed
account of the early years of U.S. armed forces radio station. Barnouw (1968),
Bayless (1968), and Craig (1986; 1988) published descriptive analyses of AFN,
the military's largest and most complex overseas system. While Craig's earlier
article described AFN, its audiences, and the dilemma it faces in trying to
serve military interests without losing credibility, his later one examined
AFN's postwar programming, the military's influence over the network, and the
shadow audience of Europeans who tuned in during the postwar era.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, as stations in Vietnam came under attack
mostly from military staff for censoring the news, Bayless (1969), Moody (1970),
and Moore (1971) dealt with the American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN)-related
issues. Although their works provided the context of establishment of AFRTS,
they did not mention AFKN at all.
Meanwhile, some scholars paid particular attention to the impact of AFKN. Kang
and Morgan (1988) examined the impact of American television programs on Korean
viewers. They, in particular, explored the relationships between exposure to
U.S. programs and conceptions of social reality among 226 college students in
Korea. In the research, they focused on AFKN "because it broadcasts nothing but
U.S. programs and because Korean officials play virtually no role in its
programming" (p. 433).
In the similar vein, Choi (1989) centered on the question, 'who views what on
AFKN-TV for what reasons with what impacts?' in his dissertation. While the
critical framework of media imperialism provided a macro-level perspective for
the study, a few other audience-centered micro-level perspectives provided a
conceptual framework. However, these works on AFKN mostly focused on its
audiences without examining the historical and political meanings of AFKN for
Koreans.
Likewise, although the U.S. Army has been operating a network of powerful
broadcasting station in Korea for more than 45 years, AFKN has received little
attention from the broadcast scholars. Furthermore, even though AFKN as an
external medium has had a significant role in Korean society, no work on this
broadcasting service has been studied from the perspective of cultural
imperialism. This area remains a blind spot in the field of international
communication.
On the other hand, this study mostly relies on the revisionist or New Left
historians in the United States to contextualize the U.S. occupation of Korea in
the postwar construction. Since the late 1950s, the historians have made
efforts to unravel the dynamics between politico-economic interests and public
policy in international affairs, challenging the traditional progressive-liberal
historians, who adopt the official version that the U.S. occupation originally
had a good intention to assist the Korean people in establishing a free state.
McCune's (1950) work can be classified as a representative work from the
libertarian perspective on the U.S. occupation of Korea.
Many revisionist scholars have produced significant works concerning the
history of occupied Korea. Above all, Cumings (1981) is well known for his
monumental work on the history of the U.S. occupation of Korea. He, following
up the process of revolution and counter-revolution in occupied Korea, argued
that the U.S. occupation forces planted the seeds for Korean War by pursuing a
counter-revolutionary policy. Kolko and Kolko (1972) also produced insightful
work concerning the imperialist nature of the U.S. occupation of Korea. Their
work covered U.S. imperialist maneuvers worldwide during the early postwar
period.
Although the revisionist point of view provides a historical framework for this
study, its historians overlooked U.S. occupation forces' activities in the
cultural domains, only concentrating on the intervention of the forces into the
economic and political structures of Korean society. In this respect, both
Cha's (1994) and Youm's (1991) works are worthy of attention.
Cha analyzed the history and origins of a case of cultural imperialism through
examining media control and propaganda activities during the 1945-1948 United
States' occupation of Korea. Meanwhile, Youm, concentrating on press policy of
the U.S. military government, examined how it was evolved in the transitional
era of Korea (1945-1948) and how it had affected the development of the Korean
press.
Nevertheless, they failed to extend their problematics to the creation of AFKN
and to shed light on it from the perspective of U.S. international propaganda
program in the postwar era. It is also a blind spot in the history of
Korean-American relationship. Consequently, this project deals with two parts
of the blind spot: U.S. forces activities in the cultural domains in Korea and
historical implications of AFKN. There is not any comprehensive work connecting
the U.S. postwar plan to the establishment of AFRTS including AFKN. Thus, by
analyzing the historical implications of AFKN in terms of U.S. postwar
propaganda program, this study tries to give a new point of view on this
network.
Finally, I hope this historical work would be constructive for setting up
broadcasting policy in Korea. Many Korean scholars and government officials
insist that AFKN is producing cultural and social side effects in Korean
society. In face of criticisms, AFKN's usage of the VHF-line (regular
over-the-air electric wave) was switched to UHF-line in April, 1996. The
historical analyses from the various points of views will be useful for Korean
broadcasting policy-makers to figure out the future status of AFKN.
U.S. Postwar Activities in Korea
The common theme of revisionist historians starts from the observation that the
aim of the U.S. participation in World War II was to create a free world market
that would guarantee free trade and investment for U.S. business. In the
postwar era, the single element that was affecting U.S. foreign policy was "the
concern over the rival power represented by Communist countries, especially the
Soviet Union" (Freedman, 1974, p. 416). Schonberger (1985), in particular, put
the U.S. postwar aims in Asia rather well:
1) integrating the region into the American-dominated world
capitalist economy; 2) thwarting the power and influence of the
Soviet Union; 3) channeling the revolutions sweeping the European
and former Japanese colonial empires away from communism or, alter
natively, repressing them (p. 140).
To pursue these general goals, the U.S. occupation forces in Korea functioned
as part of the U.S. postwar plan to incorporate Korea into the capitalist world
system under U.S. hegemony. Korea in this process became a testing place for
the Truman Administration's containment policy in the postwar era.[4] The de
facto efforts at containment in Korea were to minimize the Soviet influence by
running counter to the indigenous leftist forces in Korea as well as the Soviet
Union.
From the early days of occupation, U.S. forces tried to control the Korean
media. They confiscated the Seoul Broadcasting station and the other 10 local
stations of Korean Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), which the leftists tried to
take, in less than a month after Korea's liberation from Japan. After that, the
U.S. military government tightened its control of all the media through the
promulgation of military ordinances.
For instance, the U.S. military government enforced the "Broadcasting
Regulation Rule"[5] in 1946, prohibiting stations from broadcasting
unverifiable, defamatory false, and titillating, obscene, or blasphemous
reports. Neither were stations allowed to broadcast advertisements which were
not registered with the military government in compliance with Ordinance 55.
Furthermore, programs to be aired had to obtain prior permission from the
military government. The enactment of the rule, as Kim et al. (1994) pointed
out, resulted in "further restrictions of Korean broadcasting which was already
under strict control of the U.S. Military Government" (p. 42). As a
consequence, it became next to impossible for leftists to broadcast their ideas.
According to G-2 Periodic Report on August 7, 1947, eleven workers at a station
were arrested on August 4, 1947, because they tried to broadcast left-wing
ideas, undermining the radio transmission of programs containing right-wing
propaganda (United States Army Forces in Korea, 1990, p. 6).
In June, 1948, the U.S. military government returned the broadcasting stations
to the Chosun Broadcasting Committee under the Ministry of Information of Korea
and withdrew from Korea. The major role of the stations under the control of
government was centered around the enlightenment of the public and governmental
propaganda. Meanwhile, the stations suffered from a shortage of funds. Two
years later, U.S. forces came back to Korea to fight the Korean War and started
radio broadcasts in the name of AFKN in Seoul.
Institutional History of AFKN
The first military radio stations appeared in Panama and Alaska just prior to
World War II. They started out with a temporary, low-power unauthorized
transmitter, which tried to bring domestic radio fare to soldiers. During the
first days of U.S. participation in the War, a military radio station started on
Bataan and Corregidor in the Philippines. The success of these early radio
stations paved the way for AFRS. In 1942, the armed forces officially
established AFRS with the mission of bringing American programs to U.S. military
locations overseas.
AFKN started radio broadcasts in Seoul in September 1950 as an extension of Far
East Network in Tokyo, Japan, which controlled the first radio stations in
Korea.[6] Lead elements of the network came ashore during the Inchon landing
and set up broadcasting facilities in the old bombed out American embassy in
Seoul. This station signed on October 4, 1950, at 12:41 with a newscast. The
lead story was General Douglas MacArthur's demand for Kim Il-Sung, commander in
chief of the North Korean forces, to surrender.
In the 1950s, AFKN affiliates were recognized by call signs. However, the
network currently settles into fixed locations with the headquarters in Seoul
and affiliates in Pusan, Taegu, Kunsan, Osan, Tongduchon, and Munsan. In
addition, AFKN Camp Humphreys signed on July 4, 1986, establishing greater
service to the Pyongtaek area as its newest affiliate.
Four years after the Korean War and four years ahead of Korea's first state-run
television station, the U.S. forces started their own television broadcasting in
the capital area of Korea on September 15, 1957, using VHF channel 2. AFKN had
relied mostly on the International Telecommunication Satellite (INTELSAT), an
organization that provides a global satellite service, for live broadcasts on an
occasional use basis. The launch of SATNET, the U.S. Department of Defense
Satellite Network, on October 4, 1983, brought about a revolutionary change,
offering "AFKN a privilege of full-time satellite use, uninterrupted and fully
dedicated to the American Armed Forces broadcasting in the Far East and its
viewers" (Choi, 1989, p.22). Today, news, sports, and other time-sensitive
programs are transmitted via three AFRTS satellites, whereas most radio and
television entertainment programs are still sent by mail.
Even though the service AFKN provides is solely intended for military personnel
use, various surveys showed that many Koreans are exposed to the network.[7]
For example, Kim (1985) reported about 65% of the respondents surveyed regularly
watched AFKN-TV during weekdays, and the percentage increased up to 82% during
weekends. Kang and Morgan (1988) also found that about 52% of the Korean
college students watched AFKN-TV for more than an hour a day.
Then, what do Koreans watch on AFKN-TV? The AFRTS Broadcast Center, located on
March Air Reserve Base, Riverside, California, selects and obtains programs for
the worldwide AFRTS system. Its representatives negotiate with program
suppliers to acquire specific shows. Through the generous cooperation of
performing guilds, unions, and federations, tracing back to World War II, each
program distributor supplies its programs to AFRTS at no cost or for a nominal
administrative fee. AFRTS exercises no control over the content of program
material except deleting commercials.[8] Instead of commercials, AFKN-TV
presents Department of Defense internal information, information programs
prepared by military and civilian personnel, and other public service
announcements.
However, the most distinguishing feature of AFKN-TV programming is compelling
proportions of entertainment programs. According to an examination of the March
1990 Korean TV Guide, AFKN-TV aired about 140 hours weekly, of which 110 hours
consisted of entertainment programs. Today, AFKN-TV broadcasts its programs
around the clock everyday. The current programming is characterized by two
major categories: news and entertainment programs. For a week from June 2,
1997, straight news such as CNN Headline News, ABC News, and AFKN News and news
magazines like 60 Minutes, ABC 20/20, and 48 Hours were broadcast. Though, the
entertainment programs such as Guiding Light, General Hospital, Wheel of
Fortune, The Oprah Winfrey Show, Melrose Place, Frasier, ER, Saturday Night
Live, and Late Show with David Letterman overwhelmed the entire programming.[9]
Choi (1989) also concluded that entertainment programs were the most prevalent
forms of AFKN-TV programming by classifying sitcoms, crime-adventures, soaps and
prime-time drama, game shows, music varieties, adult comedies, and a variety of
late night specials on music and movies as entertainment programs (pp. 23-24).
Kim et al. (1994) asserted that "there is no doubt that AFKN-TV provides
entertainment to Koreans" (p. 132).
As a natural consequence, the concern over the negative cultural influence of
AFKN programs on young Koreans was raised by civic groups in Korea. In
particular, these apprehensions "have intensified since the Korean government in
1983 approved the connection of AFKN with SATNET" (Kang and Morgan, 1988, p.
433). It was combined with anti-American feelings brought about in the late
1980s.[10] In addition, the proliferation of local television stations in the
early 1990s leading to overcrowded frequency spectrum forced the U.S. Forces in
Korea and the Ministry of Information and Communication of Korea to agree on the
AFKN-TV channel transfer in 1991. Though the channel conversion into UHF 34 was
originally to have taken place in 1992, technical problems and other related
matters delayed the process until April, 1996. The switch, however, does not
affect the cities of Pusan, Taejon, and Chinhae, where AFKN-TV still occupies
the VHF channel 2.
Making a Hypothesis: AFKN as a Propaganda Medium
In using the term, 'propaganda,' this study, for the most part, relies on the
definition of O'Donnell and Jowett (1989). They, assuming propaganda as a
unique subset of communication composed of information and persuasion,
maintained that the aim of one type of propaganda, informative communication, is
to promote mutual understanding between sender and receiver. Propaganda appears
to be informative, especially when ideas are shared or something is explained.
However, in the process, the sender does not attach great importance to the
well-being of the receiver, because the real purpose of propaganda is not to
promote mutual understanding but rather to advance institutional or partisan
objectives (pp. 59-63).
The U.S. occupation forces' consistent broadcasting control indicates that
they considered broadcasting an essential communication channel not only to
prevent revolutionary groups from having access to it but to familiarize the
Koreans with the American culture. To attain these objectives effectively, the
forces made American staff write the scripts of most radio programs in English
and translated them into Korean to be broadcast. The Radio Subsection of the
KBC, which was confiscated by the U.S. occupation forces in September 1945, also
arranged the Korean-language program of the short-wave Voice of America
(VOA)[11] to be rebroadcast for one half hour every morning beginning in January
1946. About a year later, the programming was moved to an evening time slot to
attract more listeners.[12]
In addition to these direct attempts to instill U.S. official messages into
Koreans, U.S. forces succeeded in making a foundation for diffusing American
culture to Koreans. From the early days, Koreans were barraged with U.S.
popular music through the KBC, because its stations were forced to put U.S.
popular music on the airwaves at least for an hour a day (Cha, 1994, p. 215).
The exposure of Koreans to American culture has been accelerated since the
introduction of AFKN in 1950. As noted earlier, entertainment programs have
overwhelmingly occupied the overall programming of AFKN-TV, provoking some
debates from various walks of life in Korea. The controversy, in general, has
revolved around both potential effects of content on the viewers' psychological
and sociological orientations and the cultural sovereignty issue.[13]
The objections about AFKN-TV programs are classified in three respects. First,
AFKN-TV programming has caused cultural and social problems for the Korean
public, because "entertainment shows which are inappropriately sexual or too
exploitative for Korean tastes make up a large percentage of the programs"
(Chung, 1986, p. 8). Second, as Nam (1978) pointed out, the presence of AFKN
itself has become "a contributing factor toward the Americanization of South
Korean programming" (p. 51). Finally, by being exposed to incessant American
programs, Korean people have grown familiarity with the American way of life.
The last type of impact is the most profound one on Korean society and the most
relevant one to this study. Also, it should be noted that this impact was not
unintended by U.S. forces. The memorandum from President Roosevelt to James L.
Fly, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, on November 16, 1943,
called attention to the importance of postwar international broadcasting by
saying that:
if the principle of freedom to listen is to help in providing
the basis for better understanding between the peoples of the
world, it seems to me important that we lay the proper foundations
now for an effective system of international broadcasting for the
future years (MacMahon, 1945, p. 46).
The U.S. forces' endeavor to transmit American culture was carried out as part
of or in the name of "mutual understanding." These activities can be considered
as part of cultural propaganda in terms of O'Donnell and Jowett's usage. By
forcing Koreans to be familiar with American culture, U.S. forces tried to
create favorable attitudes toward the U.S. and, ultimately, help secure the
support for its policy.
In playing this kind of role, direct international broadcasting including then
AFRS was considered appropriate because of its ability to reach persons in other
countries despite the opposition of their governments. It is identified by the
Special Committee on Communications' approval the following statement prepared
by the Department of State on February 19, 1945: "direct short-wave broadcasts
originating in the United States should be continued after the war on a daily
basis" (MacMahon, 1945, p. 53).
As the statement suggested, U.S. armed forces decided to maintain their
networks after World War II by transforming them to permanent facilities.
According to official documents, AFRTS was established to keep American forces
informed and entertained. On July 4, 1943, while addressing the AFN staff in
London, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said,
A soldier who is well-informed and knows this country's
national goals has good reason for being motivated and that gives
him a fighting edge. It makes him a better soldier
(http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/abs/absman.htm).
General Eisenhower's remark was reflected in AFRTS' statement of purpose as it
was. AFRTS plainly expounded that its mission is to deliver radio and
television programming services which provide "a touch of home" to Department of
Defense personnel and their families serving overseas.[14] The mission of AFKN
is also apparently the same. It is to provide radio and television information
and entertainment for all U.S. military personnel serving in the Republic of
Korea (American Forces Korea Network, 1983). These broad statements describe
the reason for the existence of AFRTS and AFKN.
For this reason, Craig (1986) maintained that AFN, an affiliate of AFRTS, "is
not a propaganda service in the image of Voice of America or Radio Free Europe"
(p. 34). However, it can be easily refuted in that, as discussed above, the
shadow audiences of AFKN are considerably composed of the indigenous people and
U.S. information program in the postwar era intended to make them acquainted
with American way of life. This point, however, does not always imply that
propaganda has been conducted by AFKN in the manner "intended." Rather, AFKN
may unwittingly be contributing to facilitating the reception of American
cultures in many aspects in Korea.
Conclusion: Remaining Issues
It is impossible to understand the actual purpose of the establishment of AFKN
without historical hindsight into U.S. armed forces' activities after World War
II in Korea as well as U.S. postwar information program in general. For this
historical work, this study needed, above all, both official records concerning
the activities of U.S. occupation forces in Korea and proceedings, memoranda,
dictates, and so forth on the creation of AFRTS and AFKN. Most of the records
relating to U.S. occupation after World War II are held at the National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C., and the Washington
National Records Center (WNRC) in Suitland, Maryland.[15] The documents
specifically relevant to this study are scattered in various record groups.
Nevertheless, early records on AFKN are incomplete because there is no official
U.S. military recognition of the network as far as I could find.
This study has flaws because it did not identify and scrutinize relevant
documents enough. Instead, it intended to throw a new perspective on American
military broadcasting networks, especially AFKN, by contextualizing U.S.
international information program in the postwar era and by providing limited
circumstantial evidence. Therefore, future studies on this issue will need to
incorporate germane documents towards placing American military broadcasting as
an extension of U.S. postwar propaganda program.
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[1] Originally established during World War II as the Armed Forces Radio Service
(AFRS), AFRS changed its name to AFRTS with the advent of television. Vietnam
era anti-militarism in the early 1970s brought about change its name again to
the American Forces Radio and Television Service. In 1982, the Pentagon decided
to revert to the name, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. See Craig
(1986), p. 44, n. 4.
[2] Currently, ABS operates four AFRTS broadcast networks: American Forces
Network in Europe (AFN) in Frankfurt, Germany; Southern Command Network (SCN) in
Panama; Central Pacific Network (CPN) in the Marshall Islands; and AFKN. In
addition, the ABS staff directly manages the radio affiliate, Armed Forces Radio
Station (AFRS), at Fort Greely, Alaska.
[3] Today, AFRTS has more than 450 land-based outlets in more than 140 foreign
countries and U.S. territories. In addition, more than 30 U.S. Navy ships at
sea receive AFRTS programming when deployed.
[4] For a detailed discussion of U.S. containment policy in Korea, see Matray
(1983).
[5] For a full description of the articles of this regulation, see Korean Press
Research Institute (1992), p. 359.
[6] On September 27, 1950, the Japan Logistical Command General Order No. 84
officially created the Armed Forces Radio Service Army detachment which evolved
into the present day AFKN. See Army Broadcasting Service's Website
(http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/abs/).
[7] In a similar manner, Head (1972) mentioned that "AFRTS . . . brings
American-style domestic programming within reach of many foreign viewers and
listeners" (p. 17).
[8] U.S. Department of Defense Regulation 5120.20R prohibits commercial
advertising on AFRTS stations.
[9] For the AFKN-TV programming schedule, see Korean TV Guide's Website
(http://www.seoul.co.kr/tvguide/i_t.htm).
[10] See the New York Times article by Kristof (1987).
[11] American overseas broadcasting generally takes two forms: broadcasts
intended for American troops abroad such as AFKN, and the explicit propaganda
efforts of VOA.
[12] See United States Army Forces in Korea, "History of the Department of
Public Information (An Outline)," Held in the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA), Record Group No. 332, Box No. 41.
[13] Debates on these matters had captured the high ground of public concern
with the advent of SATNET in 1983. See the bulk of articles of Korean
newspapers around that year.
[14] See AFRTS-Broadcast Center's Website
(http://www.dodmedia.osd.mil:80/afrts_bc).
[15] While the NARA holds the Modern Military Branch (MMB) and the Diplomatic
Branch (DB), the WNRC holds the General Archives Division (GAD). The records on
Korea in the MMB and the DB emphasize the development of U.S. military and
diplomatic policy toward Korea in the postwar era; in GAD they emphasize the
implementation of that policy. Saunders' (1983) article provided excellent
guidance for the records in the archives relating to Korea from 1945 to 1950.