Content-Type: text/html Abstract The Role of Private Philanthropic Foundations in Communications Policy Making The paper argues that it is important to study the role of private philanthropic foundations in communications policy making. Foundations' significant access to economic and informational resources makes them central agents in the process of structuration of power relationships in communications policy making. In order to begin to understand this process better, the paper suggests that it would be particularly relevant and useful to analyze the way in which foundations define the "public interest," to study the funding patterns in support of that "public interest" and foundations' ability to communicate their definition formally and informally to relevant decision makers with its implications for policy outcomes. The Role of Private Philanthropic Foundations in Communications Policy Making Katharina Kopp Annenberg School for Communication University of Pennsylvania 3620 Walnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104-6220 215-898 7041 e-mail: [log in to unmask] Summer: 2846 27th Street, NW Washington, DC 20008 202-483 5814 e-mail:[log in to unmask] The Role of Private Philanthropic Foundations in Communications Policy Making Most accounts of the public policy processes do not systematically analyze the substantial role of private philanthropic foundations{1}. In fact, it appears that most in and out of the foundation world are not conscious of the often deliberate political role a significant number of foundations carry out through their trustees, staff and recipients (Colwell, 1993). Particularly, there appears to be little comprehensive research on the role of foundations with regards to communications and information technology. As the debates about the structures and development of communications systems have risen on policy makers' agenda, due to their increasing economic, political and cultural importance (Haight, 1983) a careful analysis of the role of foundations in the decision making process in communications policy is called for. The goal of this paper is to help us understand better the process of communications policy making in the United States by focusing on the role of private philanthropic foundations, an often neglected, nevertheless as the evidence suggests, a critical actor in the public policy process. The common notion of public policy suggests that public policy is what the government does. However, Nadel (1975) and Lindblom (1980), point out that a significant amount of public policy is made "by corporations and other private governments" by directly affecting citizens' lives and "without having to go through formal government authority"(Nadel, 1975:32). While the central role of corporate public policy making in people's lives must be emphasized, the role of third sector institutions, such as private philanthropic foundations must become more of a focus in the analysis of public policy. While privately made public policy by corporations to a large extent affects people's lives directly, foundations' privately made public policy appears to indirectly affect people's lives by significantly shaping the politics of knowledge and thus both private and government policy making. This paper argues that foundations appear to be important actors in the public policy process, which makes the study of foundations and their particular impact on communications policy an important scholarly topic for further investigation. Commonly the analysis of policy making separates the process into its components steps and analyzes each step in turn (Lindblom, 1980). One studies first how policy problems arise and appear on the agenda of government decision makers, then how people formulate issues for action, next how legislative or other action follows, how administrators subsequently implement the policy, and finally at the end of the process, how policy is evaluated (Lindblom, 1980). In such a step-by-step analysis of policy making, one should keep in mind, however, that there are universal issues and phenomena beyond the particular aspects of policy making unique to each step. Most notably, (Lindblom, 1980:4) policy making is an untidy, extremely complex process, a process shaped to different degrees by different actors with different resources which exert control, influence, or power over each other which produce outcomes called "policies." These outcomes are rarely based on analysis, but mostly determined by politics. That "the competition of ideas" which ostensibly characterizes a democracy (Lindblom, 1980) is in fact a "politics of ideas" where competition is unequal, should become more clear when one studies the role of foundations in public policy making. It is the goal of this paper to argue for the importance of assessing the changing meaning of the definition of the "public interest" in information technology policy making by private philanthropic foundations, of tracking and analyzing foundation funding patterns as they relate to communications policy making, of analyzing additional means foundations use to influence the public policy making process such as through informal channels of communication, and eventually of assessing foundations' impact on communications policy outcomes. Conclusions drawn from such a study should help us understand better what the role of foundations as knowledgeable actors in communications policy making has been, specifically the role of foundations in shaping and defining the "public interest" in past struggles over new and evolving information technologies, and should inform our understanding of future communications policy making. The study of the role of foundations in communications policy as opposed to other policy areas is particularly important as it critically adds to our understanding of the interplay between economic and informational or ideological resources, and hence the extension of power and domination in advanced industrial societies. An OTA (1991) report summarizes the importance of communications and thus the importance of communications policy: "The communications infrastructure is both nested in and sustains the larger social system of which it is a part. For communication is the basis for all human interaction and one of the means of establishing and organizing society. Communications is the process by which all social activity is conducted; without it a society could not survive." Beniger (1986) points to the growing importance of information technologies in the information economy and has emphasized the convergence of all information technologies - mass media, telecommunications, and computing - into a single infrastructure of control in the information society. The various message production techniques of information technologies shape the beliefs and behaviors through the quantity and quality of knowledge available to the public (Gerbner, 1984), and indeed also policy actors. Thus, the primary focus on the communications policy process is warranted as its outcome not only affects the struggle over other policy issues, but because more generally, the outcome will determine the negotiation and distribution of economic, political and cultural power. Buxton's (1994) historical account of Rockefeller philanthropy's involvement in early communications research and policy might serve to summarize much of foundations' activities in this field. The Foundation's goal during the 1930s was to find a place for educational radio programming within the primarily commercial framework that had been consolidated under the 1934 Communications Act. Rejecting calls for developing a vigorous and autonomous network of educational broadcasters, it sought instead to transform particular educational broadcasters by drawing on the resources of their commercial counterparts. Rockefeller's efforts and resources were directed toward the private broadcasting sector. Above all, it sought to find ways of convincing private broadcasters that educational programming could have an appeal to their audiences. Buxton concludes that Rockefeller philanthropy was able to deploy social scientific knowledge to redefine the public policy framework, thereby pursuing their private interests more effectively. "While these interests were couched in terms of public service, it was assumed that the public could best be served by a capitalist system of ownership and control" (p. 170). The tendency not to challenge the existing communications structure, (i.e. a market economy), but rather to try to reform it, appears to be a characteristic that describes well foundations subsequent involvement in communications policy. Whether this is indeed so and how foundations' understanding of public policy objectives affected public policy making needs to be investigated. In the late 1960s foundations were not concerned to confront issues of power in society, according to Kramer (1977). The author argues that in the past the major foundations' definition of public needs in the broadcasting area was based on traditional patterns of private philanthropy: foundations were not concerned with the "fundamental premises of power in society as they are reflected in the media"(1977:1325), but they were concerned with support for education and cultural institutions. Where foundations in the 1960s and `70s addressed issues of control and power over and through the media they did so "almost never as a part of a communications program"(1977: 1323), but from programs dealing with social reform or civil rights issues. For reasons that need to be explored in another study, foundations were influenced by some critical shifts in the perception of foundations' roles in society. Subsequently, foundations began to increasingly recognize the relevance of communications policy and became more involved in this field. Thus foundations have gone through a change in their understanding of the issue and its relevance to them. This change in attitude and foundations' subsequent impact on public policy is important to understand. Considering the role of foundations in communications public policy making from an agenda setting perspective, foundations appear to be critical actors. Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) reject the theory that social problems are objective and identifiable societal conditions that have intrinsically harmful effects. They agree with Blumler (1971) who argues instead that a "social problem exists primarily in terms of how it is defined and conceived in society"(p.300). Research on agenda setting and framing suggest that the stage of issue formulation, where foundations appear to be particularly active, as I will show later, is a especially significant stage. According to Hilgartner and Bosk(1988) "which `reality' comes to dominate public discourse has profound implications for the future of the social problem, for the interest groups involved, and for policy" (p.58). Competition among social problems occurs simultaneously on two levels: first, within an issue area, different ways of framing an issue may compete to be accepted as an authoritative version of reality, and secondly, there is competition for public attention between issue areas. The "frame" of an issue suggests what the issue is about, it answers the question, what is the basic source of controversy or concern on this issue (Gamson, 1988). Without distorting or suppressing information, merely by the framing of outcomes and contingencies, decisions can be influenced (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1986). Foundations, I suggest, are involved on both levels of the issue generation process: the framing process is shaped in the way in which foundations identify and define social problems and issues like the "public interest," and in the competition for attention through their allocation of resources, either through their funding decisions or through their ability to communicate the importance of an issue and its particular frame to relevant policy decision makers. In their public arenas model Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) emphasize the importance of the linkages between the different public arenas shaping public agendas and the public policy process. The authors point to the "patterns of interaction among the different arenas...through which activities in each arena are spread throughout the others" and the "networks of operatives who promote and attempt to control particular problems and whose channels of communications crisscross the different arenas"(1988:56). One can suggest that foundations' resources include their ease of access to relevant decision makers (Cobb and Elder, 1983) and ability to communicate and use these communications links to shape the public policy debate. This process is not well understood. A good starting point to understand the role of philanthropic foundations in communications policy making, is an analysis of the process by which foundations define the meaning of the "public interest." The much used, rarely defined and variously interpreted term of the "public interest" has been brought forward in policy debates surrounding various communications technologies and its meaning has changed and evolved over the years. As authors like Polic and Gandy (1993) and Haight(1979) have argued, there has been a significant shift among policy makers in the rationale of how best to serve the common good through communications policy making. This shift has been characterized by a displacement in the 1980s of the public interest standard as expressed in the public trusteeship model for broadcasting by a marketplace standard, characterized by deregulation and the marketplace agency model (Polic and Gandy, 1993). Polic and Gandy (1993) point out that "both public trusteeship model and the marketplace agency model incorporate the idea of the public interest"(p. 226). The public trusteeship model emphasizes the normative ideal of the "public interest" which "strives towards realization of the ultimate goal of the `multiplicity of ideas' that is understood as the true expression of the workings of democracy"(p. 225). The market place agency model of the "public's interest " emphasizes the empirical construct of the interest of a concrete public in real time and space. McQuail (1992) has developed different concepts of the public interest based on a typology by Held (1970) beginning with the preponderance model followed by the common interest model and the unitary model. The different typologies differ on one level as to the specificity of the substance or meaning of the `public interest,' especially the degree to which they emphasize some normative ideal where the public interest are those interests which all members are presumed to have in common (unitary model). Secondly, they differ as to the means of determining the public interest. The preponderance theory, for example, defines the public interest in a majoritarian way, whereas the common interest theory, according to McQuail(1992), refers to experts or tradition rather than to majoritarian decision making as a good means of arriving at the ideal of the `public interest.' Similarly, Entman and Wildman (1992) argue that the communication policy debate can be divided roughly between the "market economics" and "social value" schools of thought. The "market economics" school advocates competition and efficiency and the market mechanism or majoritarian (consumer) decision making. The "social value" school associates problems with the market process and sees governmental intervention as at times beneficial. The social value school represents the "normative ideal" perspective of the "public interest." Both schools, according to Entman and Wildman (1992), espouse diversity, "a metaphorical marketplace of ideas," as a goal of communications policy. Where the difference between the two schools lies is in their frameworks for understanding diversity: product, idea, or access diversity. Whereas the "market economics" school argues that product and similarly access diversity will accomplish idea diversity the "social value" school argues that competition and efficiency will not necessarily perform well with regards to other social objectives. For them product diversity will not yield necessarily sufficient idea diversity. The different interpretations of diversity and how to achieve it reflect the larger policy debate over the meaning and means of achieving the `public interest.' Thus, these different understandings of diversity, might help us identify the shifting definitions of the `public interest' in communications policy making in general. The shift toward a legitimation of the marketplace agency model, eventually equated the public's interest with the interests of the communication industry (Polic and Gandy, 1993). These distinctions made here by Polic and Gandy (1993), McQuail (1992) and Entman and Wildman (1992) help to clarify the different possible meanings of and the struggle over the interpretation of the public interest. The different concepts of the public interest could then be distinguished according to their emphasis on an abstract normative objective, the means of obtaining it (either through the market or through some other mechanism such as the government, an independent body, or some other non-market means of identifying the public interest), and their emphasis as to product or idea diversity. These concepts of the public interest, however, are rather recent and might not be very useful in analyzing the changing definition of the public interest over a longer time period, e.g. since the 1934 Communications Act. A more general approach in addition to the one above might be used in a historical analysis of the public interest definition by foundations. Pointing out the futility of arriving at a relatively specific model of the public interest due in part to the absence of a unitary value system to which one could appeal, McQuail suggests Held's ( 1970) approach to the problem. Held argues that one should think in terms of competing claims: `public interest' claims are normative assertions that something (an action or a goal) is justifiable on grounds of wider benefits, within the terms of a given political system and framework of norms. McQuail (1992) has developed a framework of principles for media assessment based on the study of communications policy debates over the previous decades. It represents the main evaluative ideas which are actually encountered in public debate and in regulations concerning media performance. Most societies recognize a wide range of `communications goods' such as freedom, diversity, education, services to democracy etc. In general, such values are not themselves in dispute, but there can be conflict about their relative precedence and their applicability to particular circumstances. The discussion of media performance is rooted in time and place but largely coincides with the core values of modern Western society. While the particular terms are open to alternative interpretation, it is proposed that these values are: 1. freedom 2. justice/equality 3. order/solidarity These three basic values, McQuail argues, do often come into conflict with each other and an appeal to one may be made in order to counter an appeal to another. How the tension over these values is played out over time by private philanthropic foundations should be the focus of research proposed here. Freedom as a public communication value or principle has often been defined (as in the First Amendment of the US Constitution) in terms of an unrestricted right to publish without prior permission or license and without reprisal, aside from the normal provisions of the law, which apply to all citizens. It is a condition, rather than a criterion of performance, since freedom does not predict any specific performance outcome. Freedom should not only be defined as freedom from the government, but media in general cannot entirely escape controls and demands of other private sector agents: the pragmatic demands as well as normative expectations of their various external partners, especially those of sources, clients (audiences and advertisers), and would-be communicators. Thus, as a condition of media structure, freedom calls not only for the absence of a legally imposed licensing or censorship mechanism, but a degree of independence from the main kinds of pressures and constraints encountered in public life, i.e. in social relations other than with the government. I therefore distinguish between structural conditions, that is the legal freedom to publish, and the operating conditions, the independence from economic and political pressures and relative autonomy for journalists. The condition of a free press or media system, as suggested by McQuail brings with it a series of benefits for society. These benefits include reliability and objectivity of the communications system as no other institution or social agents influences the media's output and as independence is a necessary condition for detachment and truthfulness. Similarly, a free communications system will lead to a robust and uninhibited press with a critical stance that can pursue its watchdog function. A free media will provide access to a diversity of knowledge as it is open to new ideas and able to provide a platform for the expression of opinions, needs and demands. Finally a free media, so its advocates, will lead to innovation and creativity. The three values mentioned above are not entirely mutually exclusive, or rather the benefits expected from them are not. For example, one could argue that freedom promotes participation of citizens in formulating the objective and goals of society and in choosing means for achieving them. At the same time, equality could be argued to promote those objectives. Although one might object that this is somewhat arbitrary, I would categorize participation as essentially a value deriving from the equality variable since participation is only truly possible if all actors are more or less equal in their capacity to participate. Similarly, the issue of diversity could be categorized under freedom or quality. This category, I suggest, can be distinguished in terms of the context it is used in, whether it is derived from freedom or equality as a social value of the communications system and thus should be derived from freedom or equality separately. The value of equality corresponds closely with the idea of justice (equality of rights before the law, fairness of social arrangements). The expression of grievances and processes of justice require adequate channels of communication and the means of publicity. The potential to communicate and to receive communication is a social good which should be universally and equally available. Particularly the democratic process requires the services of public channels of communication as the concept of a democratic citizenship presupposes an informed and participant body of citizens. The value of equality needs to be translated into more specific meanings to be applied to a communications system. Equality requires that no special favor be given to power-holders and that access to media should be given on a fair, if not always an equal, basis to contenders for office and, in general, to oppositional or deviant opinions, perspectives or claims. Equal access for senders to the communications system can be based on the principle of open/equal access, that is equal air time for, e.g. all political contenders; or it could be based on the principle of fair/proportional or `appropriate' allocation of access based on proportional representation of political support or demand. The value of equality also supports policies of universal provision in broadcasting and telecommunications and of sharing out of the costs of basic services. Thus equality calls for an absence of discrimination or bias in the amount and kind of access available to senders or receivers, in spite of economic differences of the citizens, as far as is practical. What is practical then, leads to distinctions within the value of equality in terms of how far one is willing to push that value. Some advocates might support the notion that potentially all citizens can or should be senders, producers, or creators of communication; whereas more conservative advocates of this value might argue that only a limited number of communicators can and should be senders, producers and creators of communication since the more inclusive idea might be considered `impractical.' The value of equality should bring about several socially beneficial consequences. In terms of communication demands, as opposed to supplies, equality promotes access to knowledge, an educated and informed body of citizens or consumers. As all communicators have an equal right to provide communications, express their opinion, needs and preferences publicly and citizens have an equal opportunity to satisfy their demands, access to knowledge and education is facilitated. Benefits also derive from the value of equality in terms of the supply of communications. Equality promotes diversity and choice in terms of various measures: in terms of the kinds of media, the different products; in terms of diversity in function or type of content; in terms of diversity in geographic levels of operation, i.e. on the national, regional, or local community level; in terms of diversity in audiences aimed at and reached(e.g. beyond differentiation by income or age); and in terms of diversity in language, ethnic or cultural identity, politics or ideology. Like freedom, equality also promotes objectivity in media practices. Whereas freedom promotes objectivity since independence is a necessary condition for detachment and truthfulness, equality promotes objectivity as it requires a fair and non-discriminatory attitude to sources and to objects of news reporting, and equal chance to hear and report on those sources and objects. For the purposes of the proposed study here, objectivity should only be counted as part of the value of freedom as it appears to me that it is the emphasis on freedom of the press/media rather than on the equality of all communicators, that is emphasized when talking about the value of objectivity. Also, it is more an attitude, a media practice norm, that produces objectivity and that is more closely associated with ideas of freedom of the press than with notions of equality. Order in the sense of peace and rule of law has usually been regarded as a precondition for a just and civilized society. It can also be regarded as a communication value according to the definition of communication as a means of increasing commonalty and leading to the sharing of outlook and experience. The interdependence and stability of collective life of a society or community, according to McQuail (1992), derive from and depend on communication processes and call for expressions of identity and belonging, as well as involving social control through communication. Order can be referring to cohesion and harmony, but it is normatively ambiguous because of its potential association with control, with hierarchy and subordination of the weak to the powerful. Order or control may refer to a particular level of social organization, and it also may refer to the processes which strengthen or weaken this cohesion of which communication is one aspect. This aspect of order, control or coherence is manifested in communication content and patterns of flow. The central question in distinguishing between these different values is that of whose order, coherence and harmony is promoted, i.e. the perspective, either from above or from below, is central. This distinction corresponds to that between order, in the sense of control, and order in the sense of solidarity and cohesion. It is not easy to keep the various aspects of this value conceptually apart. However, the following categories are suggested for analysis of foundations' definition of the public interest. First, one has to distinguish broadly between the aspects or variables of social organization of the communications system and the symbolic content or culture that the value of order/social control may refer to. With regards to social organization one can distinguish between the top-down perspective of control/compliance and the bottom-up perspective of solidarity/attachment. These two categories are concerned with the question of `whose order' of the communications system is promoted. Here also references to content can be included. For the control/compliance category media performance gives attention to disruption of order, it suggests negative portrayal of conflict, disorder and deviance and support given to institutions of the established order. The category of solidarity/attachment, in terms of media performance, gives attention to failings of the established order (as perceived by more marginal and cultural groups in society) and emphasizes that society is composed of many sub-groups, different bases of identity and interests. It stands against a unitary perspective of a consensual `good' order and links private and local experience with wider social implications. The second variable of symbolic content or culture may refer to hierarchy/quality or authenticity/identity. Here again the question is `whose culture.' The first category refers to a top-down perspective and suggests a hierarchical view of culture. It refers to standards of `high culture,' the dominant, established set of cultural values with traditional criteria of quality. Standards of `high culture' are `certified' by established cultural institutions and professional or expert criteria. Claims pertaining to order may be framed negatively in terms of requirements of limiting the exposure of children or other vulnerable groups to possible moral or cultural `harm.' The category of authenticity/identity in terms of `whose culture?' refers to a bottom-up perspective. It emphasizes alternative values relating to cultural or sub-cultural identity for which aesthetic or technical quality plays no significant role. The three basic communications values outlined here, freedom, equality/justice, order/solidarity, are a starting point for assessing foundations' communications policy values over time. More thinking will be necessary to develop a detailed instrument for analysis that takes the changing values and debates in public policy as well as the changing capacities and opportunities of communications technology into consideration. Since foundations appear to be significant players in the public policy making process, it is important to understand how they have interpreted the term of the public interest and what kinds of projects serving the "public interest" they have funded. Insights into these processes should inform us about the more recent discourse and future developments in communications policy making. The Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony serves as a useful concept and frame in studying the role of foundations in the public policy process. The role of key institutions in the development of culture or public policy and the political significance of that role can only be properly evaluated when considering the relationship of foundations to policy actors. According to Karl and Katz (1987), Gramsci's contribution to Marxist theory was his development of a more finely nuanced theory of civil society and its relationship to the state. Gramsci distinguished within the civil society between the relations of production, which he saw as structural, and social relations, classified as superstructure. The social relations of civil society are the cultural, ideological, and intellectual relations and forces that are embodied in such organizations and institutions as the mass media, the church, and political parties. "Indeed, the philanthropic foundation is an excellent example of an organization Gramsci would have conceived of as embodying the social relations of civil society" (Karl and Katz, 1987:3). The authors continue, "the real success of a particular class' s push for societal predominance occurs when it uses its political, moral, and intellectual leadership to articulate a basic world view that subordinate classes come to adopt. This world view becomes, for Gramsci, the `common sense' of the society. "....It comes to be reflected in the practices, ideologies, and institutions that comprise the dominant value system of the society....one of the chief ways in which the dominant class acts to maintain its hegemony is by forging an elite of intellectuals drawn from the dominant class, but also from subordinate classes." (1987:4). For Gramsci (Graubard, 1987) the dominant class in a society will invariably use its power to articulate views and propagate opinions that keep subordinate classes in line; "the genius of such a class is that it creates institutions, like foundations, to achieve these ends. This is rarely openly acknowledged; it may not even be covertly thought of"(p. VI). With this notion of hegemony Gramsci discarded Marx's notion of a purely coercive conception of class rule, and contributes this insight of an informational or manipulative aspect of the power relationship between classes. As helpful as such an insight might be, in order not to fall into the trap of a functionalist explanation of these processes, it is up to scholars to identify the precise process by which agents acting on behalf of foundations exercise this hegemony through policy discourse and formation. Giddens (Wright, 1989) in his theory of structuration has emphasized the importance of allocative resources (resources involving control over nature) and authoritative resources (resources involving control over social interactions) of knowledgeable actors. The control over any resource can be specified in terms of its extension over time and space. The ability of actors to exercise control depends on their ability to employ allocative and authoritative resources in time and space in power relations. Foundations' quite substantial ability to employ allocative and authoritative resources makes them significant actors in the policy making process. The concept of resources should be helpful in understanding the process by which foundations exercise power in the process of structuration. The process of hegemonic control by foundations might be better understood by considering the role of what Haas (1992) calls the "epistemic community." The author points to the increasing importance of the "knowledge elite" or "epistemic community" in modern societies and in public policy making specifically. The expansion and professionalization of bureaucracies and the growing technical nature of problems and their increasing complexity "have fostered an increase in the deference paid to technical experts and, in particular, to that of scientists"(P. 11). Not only do these epistemic communities help decision makers reduce their uncertainty and help justify still essentially political (as opposed to "rational") decisions, these communities "may succeed in imposing their views and moving toward goals other than those initially envisioned by the decision maker"(p. 16). Epistemic communities may be able to introduce policy alternatives, influence the selection of policies and of building coalitions in support of these policies, according to Haas (1992). If foundations are able to shape the knowledge pool, the values, the definition of the "public interest," for example, of these epistemic communities, then their role in public policy making is considerable. Let me now consider the various ways in which foundations exercise power or influence over the public policy making process. Where possible I will refer specifically to the communications policy making realm and to the implications for the definition of the `public interest.' Foundations have and do play a major role in policy making through their funding of research, organizations and conferences and other means of communicating policy recommendations. The funding of certain ideas over others produces a certain ideological climate and a particular pool of ideational resources from which policy actors can draw. Moreover, foundations create and are part of an intricate network of policy actors which is largely hidden from the public. In these circles policy is discussed and directions are decided often long time before they reach the public policy arenas. Their funding also supports particular types of institutions and political organizations which become significant policy actors shaping policy making and thus extend the foundations reach beyond the confines of their own organizational influence. Foundations' track record and various resources privilege them with considerable authority so that their views and decisions are met by more responsive public policy decision makers, that is relatively to other policy actors. In the subsequent discussion I will show how foundations' significant access to economic and informational resources, i.e. allocative and authoritative resources, makes them central agents in the process of structuration of power relationships in communications policy in particular and in society at large. According to Arnove (1980) the "power of foundations has long resided in their providing necessary seed money for professional advancement and institutional growth, for innovations and research in unchartered and perhaps risky areas where other sources of funding are unavailable. Through funding and promoting research in critical areas foundations exercise decisive influence over the growing edge of knowledge, the problems that are examined and by whom, and the uses to which generated information is put." The author writes that , the Ford Foundation, for example, has been described as the "word's largest investor in new ideas"(1980:5). Whether "new" or not, and "despite the disclaimers of the big foundations that the federal government spends 150 times more than all private foundations and 1,500 times more than the Ford Foundation" (Arnove, 1980:6), foundation assets are, nevertheless, substantial. Arnove (1980:5) quotes Whitaker that in the early 1970s foundations owned nearly 1 percent of the wealth of the United States. Moreover, as Lagemann (1989) points out, due to the "competition" from new private and governmental foundations in the post World War II period, the Carnegie Corporation's assets (and presumably those of other foundations, too) were leveraged to strategically influence public policies which the foundation's key decision makers viewed as essential for establishing an ordered postwar American society. The exercise of resource allocation by foundations, clearly, is a significant aspect in shaping the policy making process. What the funding patterns are and what the impact on policy outcomes might be, is not well understood, however, particularly in communications policy making. Several scholars have scrutinized the historical role foundations have played in the formulation of ideology in the Progressive Period (Slaughter and Silva, 1980), the development of the social sciences (Fisher, 1983) or, for example, the development of the political (Seybold, 1980) and economic (Goodwin, 1989) sciences, specifically, to show some of the real impacts foundations have had in changing the informational and ideological environment in American society. In the Progressive Period philanthropic foundations intervened in the era's "marketplace of ideas, using their vast resources to further those groups who produced and disseminated world views supportive of the status quo, and using the weapons at their disposal to contain and discredit alternative, especially socialistic, ideologies" (Arnove, 1980: 8). Slaughter and Silva (1980) write that foundations were involved in the "production" and "marketing" of ideology. Foundations recruited professors and other professionals in their role as experts who claimed objectivity and value neutrality, representing no constituency other than science, to mediate the idea flow from corporate capital to the public. Both Fisher (1983) and Seybold (1980) provide extensive documentation of the means by which foundations structure a scholarly field in their interest. These include the funding of leading individuals and institutions; the identification, recruitment, and training of promising young scholars; the capturing of key journals in a field as well as the leadership of professional associations; the use of prestigious intermediary agencies, such as the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies. Foundations may eventually recede into the background, as Arnove (1980) points out, "but the seminal influence they exerted is very much manifest in the issues which are examined, the research paradigms and methods that are used, and the center-stage individuals who determine the nature and direction of the field's endeavors" (p. 13). Specifically, according to Fisher (1983), the creation of foundations was part of the societal rationalization process and was a means of both objectifying and distancing philanthropic activities from individual capitalists. As the men at the Rockefeller Foundation believed that the best way to contribute to the improvement of society by maintaining and strengthening the system of capitalist democracy, the foundation developed goals for the development of the social sciences as part of an ideological production aimed at the reproduction of the existing social structure. Tensions between two conceptions of knowledge emerged: professional social scientists were committed to the search for objective knowledge. On the other hand, the ruling class wanted knowledge that would present their position and thereby contribute to stability and social control. In the end, the "commitment to `academic science' and the strengthening of the professionalization process placed the social sciences above reproach. These `new intellectuals' could then become the technical experts who would provide unbiased, objective solutions to social problems" (p.224). According to Seybold (1980) from 1948 to 1961 a "revolution took place in American political science. The traditional institutional approach to the study of politics was replaced by the `new' behavioral science. The long-term decline of political theory and the general disappearance of the notion of the state are for all purposes synonymous with the rise of the `scientific' attitude toward the study of politics"( p. 269). Seybold contends that the Ford Foundation was able to set the tone for research in political science by promoting the behavioral revolution which discouraged "traditional political science, constitutional law, political history, and radical political science research" (p. 274). "As it happens, the research that was encouraged was that of the pluralist and democratic elitists and that which was discouraged was that of the power structure analysis"(p. 275). Following the author's argument, "the foundation's interest in developing sophisticated methods to analyze electoral behavior was linked closely to its efforts to judge the level and form of political protest in the United States and to develop strategies to structure that protest" (p. 298). Thus these authors have shown how in the past foundations have had direct impact in shaping the research agenda. Goodwin (1989) also considers the importance of the funding of ideas, looking specifically at the Ford Foundation's changing role in spreading economic ideas. The author suggests that by the "1950s economics had acquired a highly privileged position with American foundations, which saw the new burgeoning social sciences as likely to provide the answers to many of society's looming problems"(p. 158). Furthermore he argues that "the foundations came to be among the most powerful vectors for the spread of economic ideas - directly themselves, indirectly through the provision of funds to others, and very indirectly by placing their Good Housekeeping Seal on the work of economists"(p. 159). The Ford foundation did much to support the spread of economic ideas in the public policy realm: through a special program concerned with Economic Development and Administration which was established during the 1950s and lasted until the 1970s, the Ford Foundation funded reforms of business schools and schools of public administration to feature applied economics, it assisted empirically based research institutes and funded empirical research. Even though the support of economics by foundations has cooled according to the author, the lasting support of the discipline is likely to have contributed to the rise of the market place standard paradigm and the "success of science over the approach of the `philosopher kings,'"(Miller, Gandy, 1990) in communications policy making as in other policy areas. Miller and Gandy (1990) have shown, for example, that there has been a "clearly identifiable increase in economic publications[in scholarly communications journals] beginning in 1973 and repeated somewhat more dramatically in 1977"(p. 670). The foundation support of economics probably contributed to foundations' changing definition of the "public interest" in communications policy in turn and is likely to have affected which perspectives on the "public interest" were funded and communicated to relevant decision makers. Eventually, taking a degree of response lag between the beginning of foundation support for economics (1950s-70s) and its effect on the public policy decision making community into consideration, these preferences and emphases in foundation funding policies are likely to have had an impact on public policy outcomes. Thus, by shaping the research agenda and thus the ideological climate, foundations also shape the policy making agenda. The processes by which foundations mold a scholarly field influence academics in the way in which they participate and contribute to the policy making process. As Haight (1983) points out, researchers are involved in the communications policy making process in three ways: "first, they are asked to make accurate predictions about the economic consequences of alternative plans for technological developments, in order to inform investment decision. Second, they are asked to make accurate prediction of the social consequences of these plans. Third, their expertise is used by decision-makers as justifications for decisions made" (p. 228). The relationship between foundations and researchers and foundations' shaping of a scholarly field is one part of the politics of knowledge with its significant implications for policy making. An empirical analysis of the changing definition of the "public interest" must pay particular attention to the kinds of research funded, support of other disciplines such as economics and support of professional associations or other influential institutions such as scholarly journals. It is not simply the enormous financial resources that foundations bring to bear in the policy process, but it is also the set of intricate networks, i.e. their resources of "recruited" personnel, which define foundations' resources and which they can mobilize to exercise power. Domhoff (1979) traces foundation influence through the appointment of foundation trustees and staff and foundation created "experts" to high level governmental positions, and to "blue ribbon commissions." Domhoff (1979) identifies four general processes by which elites involve themselves in government at all levels, of which foundations are involved in the second and fourth: 1. special interest process, 2. policy planning process, 3. candidate selection process, 4. ideology process. By funding many of the policy-formation groups that bring together members of the elite and their hired experts and by providing a "setting in which differences on various issues can be thrashed out and the opinions of various experts can be heard" (1974:8) foundations exercise influence in the policy formation process. They are also active agents in the ideology shaping process as attempts are made to convince the public that "this is for all its defects, the best of all possible worlds" (1974:14). Thus, the concept of resources and its impact on the policy making process is not a straight forward one. Resources may be allocated to specific research projects, pilot studies or institutions acting on a certain interpretation of the "public interest," or they may be given to forums where these interpretations could get disseminated. It is perhaps the ability of foundations and their agents to shape the agendas of meetings and other organizations that shapes the overall public policy making agenda long before it reaches the formal stages of decision making. When analyzing financial resource allocation, attention must be paid to the support given to these kinds of channels of influence on policy planning with its implication for the dissemination of ideas and building alliances. Several authors have emphasized the close connection between foundations, the government and corporate America. These networks are likely to influence the thinking of policy makers as well as that of foundation personnel about the "public interest." Colwell (1993) argues that the critical connection in this network are the links that involve trustees whose attitudes, knowledge, values and goals are a critical element in what foundations do, with few exceptions and. The most important influence on funding policies is the board of trustees which "almost exclusively consist of members of the political and economic elite" (p. 11). 57% of the 98 trustees studied were directors of big American corporations. From 40-47% of the trustees of the Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation held high-level governmental positions in the past or at the time of the research. Colwell studied the links amongst foundations, which serve as an informal forum for exchanging information about "good grantees" and unsuccessful projects, and the links between foundations and policy planning organizations. The foundation trustee/policy planning organization trustee links are most critical here. Ten of the 20 foundations in the public policy sample were directly linked to 18 of the 31 recipient organizations studied. 48 foundation trustees were members of the boards of these 18 policy organizations. When Colwell studied the boards of the 31 recipient organizations and their foundation links, she found many of the board members were also foundation board members. It is significant to point out that "this is especially true of the important public policy-formation organizations" (p. 89). 40% or more of the boards of seven important public policy-formation organizations (Brookings Institution, 60%; the Council on Foreign Relations, 56%; the Hoover Institution, 53%; Committee for Economic Development, 47%; American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 40%; the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 43%; Overseas Development Council, 40%) were also members of foundation boards. Although the precise process by which ideas are communicated, disseminated and adopted has not been documented, Colwell concludes that there is an obvious and substantial interrelationship between policy organizations' boards, government organizations and foundation boards. Thus a particular definition of the "public interest" is likely to be influenced by an elite group of trustees, recruited from corporate bodies and thus likely to favor a market place standard of the "public interest." Government agencies and policy planning organizations are likely to be particularly susceptible to the communicated ideas of trustees with links to foundations as they are likely to be dependent on foundation's funding at that time or some time in the future. Jenkins (1989) agrees with Colwell on the importance of foundation networks adding that peer networks make foundations follow established paths and fads and that foundations resort to coordinated or joint grants to diffuse responsibility for risky grants. Larger foundations have more staff to evaluate projects, smaller foundations frequently wait until the larger founders have identified the "responsible" projects. Furthermore, Jenkins (1989) has shown that the take-off in foundation funding of social movements typically lagged behind 3-5 years. Kramer (1977) points out that the four major advocacy groups in communications policy in the 1970s had to "establish track records of enormous proportions before they received any major foundation support"(p. 1323). If this is indeed so, it would be important to analyze how foundations influence each other through their networks in defining and funding the "public interest" in communications policy and at what stages in policy debates and the decision making process which kinds of foundations get involved. In his analysis of the emergence of the "abundance allows for deregulation" rationale accompanying the debate on the rewrite of the 1934 Communications Act between 1969 and 1978, Haight (1979) argues that what is "important to know in understanding the politics of the rewrite is how these ideas were carried forward until they became the main thrust of the rewrite" (p. 245). Through an analysis of various reports and FCC decisions Haight (1979) documents the "progressive abandonment of protections other than marketplace forces to insure diversity in mass communications. While the need to innovate has risen on the agenda, concern for fairness seems to have faded in the light of technology's promise"(p. 253). When Haight (1979) turns to addressing the question why this shift in rationale took place in the various policy formation circles, he considers, apart from the overwhelming corporate interests and the power of a new technological paradigm of abundance, the importance of "private" policy formation groups such as The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation's Commission on Cable Communications, The Conference Board and The Aspen Institute. He points to the importance of their board of directors representing mostly corporate interests, their informal channels for deliberation, and their closeness in culture and personnel with government decision makers. In addition, the author acknowledges, major universities and research institutes contribute expertise to this process of generating policy formulations which precede legislation and hearings. Clearly, foundations enable many of these groups to exist and enable many researchers to conduct their investigations. However, the role of foundations in financing these groups active in communications policy, has not been systematically considered by Haight, but appear to have had significant impact on the interpretation of the "public interest" and on communications policy making in the past. Brown (1988) has also analyzed the reshaping of the debate over broadcast regulation in the United States but went further in identifying the role of foundations in this process. He concludes that the activities of these foundation sponsored organizations such as the Rand Corporation, the Aspen Institute, the Sloan Commission, and university based communication policy research centers, "provided a context in which a relative consensus on specific communications policy issues could be reached before they were inserted into the formal policy-making process. The mechanisms by which this consensus develops include the flow of personnel from project to project and organization to organization, plus the many informal meetings which take place between members of the communications policy community" (p.30). In his analysis Brown (1988) identifies several processes and tools through which this shift toward an emphasis on marketplace solutions in communications policy took place. He suggests that the most significant aspect of the funding by the Ford and Alfred P. Sloan foundations was through the informal meetings around Washington at various conferences and lunch-time seminars. The Ford Foundation funded a publication with a new emphasis on an economic perspective and contracted with the Rand Corporation. Based on Rand's research Ford filed comments with the FCC. Brown points out that the characterization of the Rand research as "independent" and the very different and less favorable reception given to the research from organizations with a direct `economic interest' reveals an important factor which contributes to the power of think thanks and, one needs to add, the power of foundations. The Alfred P. Sloan foundation was also directly, (as opposed to indirect involvement through grantees), involved in this process. The Sloan foundation funded, produced, and promoted the report of the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications. The Markle Foundation, amongst others, was influential in the creation of the Communications and Society Program of the Aspen Institute. The Program could be regarded as being involved in `defining' major policy issues, and how those major issues should be approached and resolved. The Program, funded originally to a large proportion by the Markle foundation, organizes many opportunities for policy actors from business, government and other third sector institutions, to meet informally. Although there are many opportunities in Washington for policy actors to do so, the "ability to create and structure one of those opportunities is not a form of power so insignificant that conventional accounts of communication policy making processes can ignore it," (p.21) Brown contends. Foundations' resources may go beyond their financial assets and channels of communication. Decision makers may have different levels of responsiveness to different policy actors (Cobb and Elder, 1983). I suggest their responsiveness to foundations is particularly high. Policy decision makers may be more open to foundation requests as they hope to bargain with foundation representatives in the process in order to obtain foundation support for other issues dear to them. Some groups are also held in greater esteem by decision makers than others and thus can demand greater access to decision makers. Their authority as legitimate "neutral" actors in public policy making may provide them with greater ease of access or ability to set agendas of policy planning organizations or other policy planning forums. Haas (1992) writes that the professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise of scientists (of whom many are funded by foundations) accord them access to the political system and legitimize or authorize their activities. "Similarly, their claims to knowledge, supported by tests of validity, accord them influence over policy debates and serve as their primary social power resource"(p. 17). Through their promotion of the image of "neutral" policy actor and their proven track records as professionals and experts, foundations and their grantees appear to have better access to decision makers than others. Cobb and Elder (1983) write that the decision maker may be indebted to a particular group or identify herself as a member of a group. The flow of personnel between foundations, think tanks and governmental institutions is relevant here. Thus foundations appear to be in a strong position to promote a particular interpretation of the public interest through their communications channels and their authority as legitimate policy experts alone. The issue of elite group decision making in the democratic process stresses again why it is important to study the role of foundations. Lagemann (1989) is concerned with the role of elites in her discussion of the "politics of knowledge" and the role of private foundations in the American political process. According to her assessment of the Carnegie Corporation, the foundation continues to confront the dilemmas of an elite institution trying to shape public policy, that is the foundation's preference for efficiency over participation, in a sense of expertise over democracy. Expertise could stand in opposition to universal and equal participation in public affairs; it could provide a basis for claims to superordinate rights. And yet, despite this, it was deemed by foundations to be necessary to modern life. The struggle over competing goals of efficiency and equity and the way in which foundations appear to favor efficiency over equity goes to the heart of the democratic process and emphasizes the significant role of foundations as political actors. This apparent preference for efficiency suggests that foundations' interpretation of the public interest definition is more likely to lean towards a marketplace standard in communications policy making. Foundations are also significant actors in the way in which they have supported or created institutions such as think tanks or political organizations, that is in the way in which they have shaped the character and nature of the political landscape. Brown (1991), for example, calls attention to the "substantial core funding"(p. 18) provided by the Markle Foundation to set up the Aspen Institute's communications program. Similarly, Markle and Ford' s funding have been central to, for example, establishing the communications program at the Rand Corporation and other communications programs at universities or at the Brookings Institution. Through policy planning organizations such as these foundations can play important roles in shaping the policy making process and outcomes. Foundations have also had significant impact on existing political organizations, particularly with respect to so called advocacy and "public interest" social movements. According to Judis (1992), the pluralist vision of democracy "vastly overstated the extent to which America's pressure groups represented the general public or were equal in power to each other" (p. 15). Judis asserts that the new advocacy political organizations have almost as narrow an economic base as the old organizations of the 1950s, not the least due to the impact of foundation funding. Jenkins (1989) studied philanthropic funding and found that between 1958-80 less than one percent of total foundation funding went to "social movements" or "advocacy groups" (unfortunately he fails to ever define those terms clearly). Only 17% of the money to social movements went to grassroots organization, the rest went to professional groups. According to Judis (1992) foundations' major impact on these organizations has been structural rather than partisan or narrowly political. Jenkins explains: foundations are political cautious; grass roots organizations lack a clear track record and are more likely to become involved in protests or other activities that might stir criticism; they are more informal and decentralized, lacking the fiscal and management devices that foundations expect from their recipients; professional organizations are more hierarchical in structure and are so more intelligible to foundation boards who typically come from business and academia; the lower likelihood of being connected to the peer networks of foundations also places grass roots organizations at a disadvantage in funding. Therefore, foundations have encouraged professionalization and discouraged militant protest strategies. Nevertheless major foundations were instrumental in the formation of many of these new organizations. Foundation grants made these organizations less dependent upon members and have encouraged professionalization. As a result, new lobbies, research groups, and think tanks that have arisen over the last three decades have not provided an alternative line between citizens and their government. Instead, they have become centralized bureaucracies as remote from the average citizen as the government itself and has increased their susceptibility to foundation influence. Roelofs (1987) suggests that `leadership training' provided by foundations also deradicalized citizen movements in the 1960s and 70s. Thus foundations do not only shape specific policy debates by shaping the politics of knowledge through the available research, but foundation policy tends to favor or weaken certain policy actors by favoring certain forms of political organization over others. Clearly, common notions of the workings of a liberal pluralist democracy in the United States are challenged by assessments like Lagemann's and Judis'. According to these two authors, foundation funding does not only have an impact on political organization, but also more specifically on the kinds of issues organizations have pursued. Foundation preference for specific outcomes steers organizations into short-term projects that are deemed "fundable" but deters development of long-term programs, according to Jenkins (1989). Judis adds that foundations often prefer studies of action to action itself, prefer studies with uncontroversial conclusions that will not call into question their own impartiality. A major calculation for foundations is the likelihood that the projects will generate significant change, thereby rebounding to the credit of the foundation as an effective social change innovator. "The clearer the likelihood of victory , the greater the probability of funding"(Jenkins, 1989:302). This suggests that the more the request for funding is within the confines of the existing political system, that is the more clearly the grantee can demonstrate the likelihood of specific policy changes in terms of reform rather than radical restructuring, the more likely the funding. Jenkins (1989) concludes that "foundations could be seen as political gatekeepers, identifying the leaders and organization that would eventually prevail as the legitimate representatives of new social interests" (p. 311). Therefore, the analysis of the definition of the "public interest" by foundations is important not only in terms of what is and what is not considered a legitimate social problem, but more specifically what kinds of organizations are likely to be supported in pursuit of the "public interest." The kinds of patterns identified by Jenkins and Judis are likely to characterize the framing and funding of the "public interest" in communications policy making. Advocacy groups in communications policy in the 1970s such as the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, Citizens Communications Center, Action for Children's Television and the Media Access Project also have received significant foundation funding, from the most part, however, from small foundations. Of the major foundations, only The Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Family Fund have had significant involvement (Kramer, 1977). Thus foundations play an important role in creating and supporting institutions or through the denial of funding in preventing institutions to emerge. It appears that only a small number of larger foundations, particularly Ford and Markle (Kramer, 1977) played a significant role in this process. Kramer (1977) points to several advocacy organizations in communications policy "that were designed to enhance direct public participation in the media's setting of the national agenda [which] have not been funded" in the 1960s and `70s and soon folded or adjusted their objectives to foundations' conceptions of public needs. Organizations from the "counter ad" movement (PCI - Public Communications Inc., 1971-73) or organizations concerned with the coverage of African Americans and their media needs (Unity House and later BEST - Black Efforts for Soul in Television, 1968-72), according to Kramer were too radical and "did not respond to their [foundations'] own preconceptions of `public need:' the need for educational effort and the need for a `quality' or `cultural' alternative to commercial broadcasting as opposed to the need for redistribution, reallocation, and alteration of decision making, control, and economic power over broadcasting"(p. 1329). The author suggests that foundations' particular definition of a "public interest" guided their funding decisions. The above arguments emphasize the importance and rationale for studying the role of foundations in public policy, particularly communications policy. Foundations' significant access to economic and informational resources, i.e. allocative and authoritative resources, makes them central agents in the process of structuration of power relationships in society. These resources allow foundations to exercise informational control of power relations through their involvement in the politics of knowledge. The politics of knowledge, in turn, in which foundations are involved in through their support of elite and expert institutions and communications activities privileges foundations and their recipients as actors in the public policy process and challenges common notions of liberal democracy where actors supposedly have an equal chance of determining outcomes. This privileged position of foundations in the policy making process, particularly in the issue evolution and definition stage, may in turn enhance foundations' power as the particular kinds of policies supported by foundations appear to privilege and call for further expert knowledge and processes. Of the different policy areas foundations are involved in, analysis of their involvement in communications policy warrants particular attention by scholars. Decisions in this area more so than in others determine the negotiation and distribution of economic, political and cultural power in society at large. To conclude, the paper suggests that understanding the role of private philanthropic foundations in the politics of knowledge will help us understand better the public policy making process and that research in this area is lacking. I have argued that it would be particularly relevant and useful in order to begin to understand this process to analyze the way in which foundations define the "public interest," to study the funding patterns in support of that "public interest" and their ability to communicate this definition formally and informally to relevant decision makers with its implications for policy outcomes. Such a study might focus in depth on only one foundation, the Ford foundation, as the apparently most significant actor in communications policy making in the past. It would study the official documents, such as annual reports, other publications, or official testimony at hearings or conferences, and internal documents as to the changing meaning of the "public interest" over the years. The "public interest" definition would be categorized as to its emphasis on a marketplace standard, product diversity as opposed to idea diversity, and as to the means of arriving at it. Concluding from the above discussion one would expect to find a change in the definition of the "public interest" approaching the market place standard. Moreover, it would need to be analyzed in terms of the above identified three core communications policy values: freedom, equality/justice, and order/solidarity. Furthermore, the study would identify what kinds of research, research organizations and which policy planning organizations, events or forums, or advocacy groups in the communications area received funding for what purposes. Particular attention must be paid to those organizations which received all or a large proportion of their funding from The Ford Foundation. One would be able to study the official documents produced by these organizations. Where possible one should try to identify those organizations which were unsuccessful in obtaining funding and to ascertain why (from the foundation's perspective.) Another important aspect of understanding the role of foundations in communications policy would be to interview staff and trustees of foundations and relevant grantees, as well as policy decision makers. This would aim to explore the informal channels of communication that appear to play such an important role in advancing certain issues and their framing onto the policy making agenda. Developing an organizational chart, with the different links through board of directors and other overlap in personnel should help illuminate this process of informational communications channels better. Particular attention should be paid to formal and informal meetings, their agendas, possible conclusions, and documents or press coverage produced. As many of these kinds of communications go on behind closed doors and are not well documented, this aspect of foundations' role in communications policy making will be particularly difficult to track. - prepare presentatino - prepare typology of values TYPOLOGY OF PUBLIC INTEREST VALUES Freedom - structural conditions - operating conditions - effect on reliability diversity critical stance innovation Equality - access of senders - universal service - broad or narrow definition of producers of content - benefits on demand side access to knowledge, education public expression - benefits on supply side diversity/choice in kinds of media function or type of content diversity in geographic level of operation audience aimed at (not just differentiated by income and age) language, ethnic or cultural identity, politics or ideology Order/Solidarity social organization/relation: control/compliance solidarity/attachment symbolic/cultural content: hierarchy/quality authenticity/identity FOOTNOTES******************************** {1}Philanthropic foundation, as defined by the Foundation Center, an information service affiliated with the Council on Foundations, is a "non-governmental, non-profit organization, with funds and program managed by its own trustees or directors, established to maintain or aid social, educational, charitable, religious, or other activities serving the common welfare" primarily through making grants(Lewis, 1971). 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