Content-Type: text/html Media and the Politics of Citizens' Press Movement in Korea, 1985-1993 Yung-Ho Im Department of Communication Pusan National University, Korea phone: +82-51 510-2109 e-mail: [log in to unmask] Paper submitted to International Communication Division 1995 AEJMC Annual Conference Washington, D.C. Citizens' Press Movement in Korea Media and the Politics of Citizens' Press Movement in Korea, 1985-1993 I. Introduction With the tide of political democratization in the late eighties, new social movements have flourished in various sectors of the Korean society. For instance, "citizens' press movements" have challenged the mainstream media. Those movements represent attempts at the grass root level to reform problems of the press. On the theoretical level, the notions of the civil society and new social movement became hot issues among social theorists in Korea (e.g., Korean Sociological Association & Korean Political Science Association, 1992). However, most literature remained on the abstract level, and failed to examine the concepts empirically in Korean context. This paper traces the trajectory of citizens' press movements and delves into the characteristics of those movements and, more fundamentally, the civil society in Korea. This paper also explores whether the Western notions of the civil society and new social movement are applicable in the historical circumstances of the Korean society. To what extent citizens' press movements in Korea are similar to new social movements? What makes the Korean phenomena distinct from their counterpart in the Western hemisphere? Where do such differences come from? Given the nature of the issue, this paper relies on exemplary historical instances and speculates on their implications. II. The Concepts of the Civil Society and New Social Movement. The unfolding of social movements reflects particular characteristics and problems of the societal structure in which they take place. More specifically, one has to understand citizens' press movements within the structural context of the state, the civil society, and the market with which the press is closely associated. The trilogy of the state, the civil society, and the market has been a useful conceptual framework for analyzing the media. However, those key concepts derive from the historical experience of the European societies, making applications to Korean society theoretically problematic. What complicates the matter further is the fact that some essential concepts have diverse meaning, depending on the context. For instance, the civil society refers often to the realm of the economy or market, while in other context it may also suggest the non-state arena, including the market(Shin, 1991). In this paper, however, I would like to define the civil society as a realm, akin to what Juergen Habermas(1974) calls "the public sphere." In the civil society, the quest for common good or universal values takes place, but neither the institutionalized political action prevails as in the state nor the private-interest seeking as in the market. In the West European societies, the civil society is to a certain extent a historical entity closely associated with the advent of liberalism. The press represents a good historical example of such an area. However, the notion of the civil society is more useful as a "normative" concept than a historical phenomenon. The conceptual trilogy of the market, the civil society, and the state not only provides ways of analysis, but also implies a diagnosis of problems and prescriptions. Consequently, the framework might be infeasible in the circumstances of Korea. For instance, the state and the market represent two major forces, which have undermined the possibility of the media as a potential realm of the civil society or public sphere. Primarily in the European context, John Keane(1991) suggests the market as the primary cause for the disappearing public sphere. Because Korea has rapidly grown up as a capitalist society under a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the civil society, including media, has failed to maintain autonomy from the state and diversity of ideas. With the inception of a legitimate civilian government in 1988, market competition and deregulation, under the rhetoric of "globalization," have emerged to replace the state control as a potentially threatening force to the civil society. However, the problem is not that simple. In Korea the market is not necessarily the primary force that undermines the autonomous, critical, and public nature of the press as a part of the civil society. Despite the end of authoritarian government, the press is still blamed with being extremely conservative and maintaining symbiotic relations with the state. The lack of the tradition of critique and autonomy has plagued the Korean press even after political democratization brought power to the press. The problem might derive from within the press, as well as outside. For instance, in Korea, the press has been not only a commercial business but also a political institution involved in power-distributive process. For instance, many local newspapers fail to represent diverse minority voices, and instead are closely intertwined with the interests of dominant elite groups at the local level. In a sense, the press, large or small, has become a conservative interest group on its own. Although the commercial press system has been prevailing principle, the market mechanism has revealed serious problems of market failure without sustaining the efficiency of competition. For example, daily newspapers, which are purely under the market system, often break rules on the fair business. The business relations between the press and advertisers are also asymmetrical; newspapers often yield their power to draw more subscription and advertising. In sum, the locus of the press in Korea may seem idiosyncratic within the framework of the state-civil society-market trilogy. The structural problems of the Korean press may be somewhat different from the European cases. Consequently, social movements arising from such particular circumstances may well have unique aspects. The notion of new social movement is based on historical experience. In the West, new social movements followed old social movements, after whose issues were incorporated and institutionalized as a part of the political process. In old social movements, marginal social groups within the hierarchy of power attempt to represent their material interests in the polity. Labor movement is a typical example of old social movements. On the other hand, new social movements are in pursuit of universal values, which are excluded in the existing political process. Table 1 shows a general comparison of both types of movements (Offe, 1985, p.832; Scott, 1990, p.19). TABLE 1. Comparison of Old and New Social Movements old new actors socioeconomic groups acting as groups(in the groups' interest) and involved in distributive conflict socioeconomic groups acting not as such, but on behalf of ascriptive collectivities location increasingly within the polity civil society aims political integration, economic rights changes in values and lifestyle, defense of civil society organization formal, hierarchical network, grass roots medium of action political mobilization direct action, cultural innovation Social movements developing within specific circumstances may betray the theoretical typology based on the historical experience of the Western society. This paper attempts to uncover such idiosyncrasies and their implications for cultural politics in Korea. This paper also addresses the question of whether it is possible to regard citizens' press movement as a form of new social movement. III. Characteristics of Citizens' Press Movement 1) Actors Citizens' press movement is a rather ambiguous term, which gained currency in Korea around the turn of the decade. It is a form of press reform movement at the grass root level. But it is distinct from alternative media movement and partisan journalism based on the class politics, in that citizens' press movement, as with new social movements, claims to have its base on non-class coalitions ranging over diverse social groups. The origin of citizens' press movement goes back to the 1960s. In 1964, for example, civilian groups rose to repeal a bill of press ethics council, which the government introduced presumably to control newspapers. However, such intermittent movements developed into more consistent and organized "audience movements" in the 80s. License Fee Boycott Campaign in the mid-eighties was a nation-wide movement against commercialism and biased reporting of the public television, i.e., Korean Broadcasting Station(KBS). After the Council of Women's Organizations initiated a media monitoring group in 1984, many organizations opened similar programs. A few organizations, e.g., the Council of Democratic Press Movements(CDPM) or the Citizens' Group for Audience Movement (CGAM) of YMCA, have specialized in issues regarding media. But citizens' press movements have mostly taken place as subsidiary activities of existing organizations established for other causes. Especially, religious groups, including Protestant, Buddhist, and Catholics, or women's organizations have been instrumental in citizens' press movements. In Korea, religious groups represent a few arenas, which have maintained autonomy even under the authoritarian government. In a sense, religious groups continue the tradition of democratization movement since the 1960s. In the eighties, women's groups have increased in number and have played more central role in citizens' press movements. Another distinctive feature is that most organizations are either nation-wide or concentrate in Seoul, the capitol of Korea. Local organizations in other areas are rare. When major issues broke out, individual organizations combined to form temporarily a broad coalition. Table 2 shows examples of coalitions in citizens' press movements (Koo, 1992, p. 21; Kim, 1991, pp.242-243; CSERW, 1993, pp.72-73; CCFCEC, 1992; ACSNT, 1993, pp.71-72; KFPU Newsletter, Dec. 2, 1991; ASBR press release, Sept. 20, 1993). TABLE 2. Temporary Coalitions in Press Movements Coalitions Participating Organizations Period Christian Movement for License Fee Boycott Protestant churches Jan. 20, 1986-? Joint Commission for License Fee Boycott and Free Press catholic & Protestant churches, opposition party, non-party politicians' group, women's' organizations, CDPM Sept. 15, 1986-? Women's Coalition for License Fee Boycott 17 women's organizations May 15, 1987-? Citizens' Movement for License Fee Boycott catholic and Protestant churches Sept. 20, 1988-? Joint Commission against Obscenity and Violence of Sports Newspaper 17 Christian organizations, Seoul YMCA, catholic youth organization Nov. 9, 1990-December 20, 1990 Anti-payola campaign 3 Christian organizations, YMCA, a women's' organization, CDPM, Korean Media Research Group(KMRG, a critical communication researcher group), National Association of Student Journalists. Nov. 26, 1991 Citizens' Solidarity for Election Reporting Watch (CSERW) CDPM, KNCC Press Commission, KMRG, a women's organization, catholic & Buddhist press committees. Feb. 20, 1991-?; Sept. 4, 1992-Feb. 9, 199 Citizens' Coalition for Fair and Clean Election Campaign (CCFCEC) 57 civil groups including YMCA, Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, YWCA, Korean Association of Trade Unions, National Commission of Farmers' Organizations. first half, 1992 Audience Commission for Say No to Television (ACSNT) 42 organization, including those of women, parents, senior citizens, Christian, catholic, handicapped, and local YMCAs. June 28, 1993-July 10, 1993 Audience Solidarity for Broadcasting Reform (ASBR) 11 organizations, including those of women, Christian, catholic, Buddhist, YMCA, KMRG, CDPM. Sept. 20, 1993-? Until political democratization in 1988, citizens' press movement remained a part of broader social movements for political democratization. For instance, License Fee Boycott Campaign around 1986 proceeded under the leadership of Protestant churches. The organization expanded soon to subsume broad range of social groups, regardless of political lines, such as an opposition party, non-party politicians, various religious groups, and women's organizations. However, a nation-wide political movement turned gradually into a specialized press reform movement after 1987. With the democratization of institutional polity, activists with a career of political struggle joined parties or a newly founded opposition newspaper. Consequently, participants in the press movements began to be de-politicized. As with new social movements in the West, citizens' press movement in Korea seems to be hardly based on class politics. Major actors consist mostly of young women in their twenties and thirties, and students and religious groups still occupy considerable part. For instance, female predominance in press movements might be due to the fact that women have more time for social activities and are in a position to feel sensitively problems of media in relation to their everyday life. But it is also due to the patriarchal structure that has circumscribed career opportunities for well-educated women in Korea. In terms of organizations, citizens' press movements in Korea are quite distinct from the grassroots-network type of new social movements. Intellectuals and celebrities play pivotal role rather than professional activists or well-organized grassroots network, in the process. Press movement organizations in Korea tend be a hierarchy working downward from above. Furthermore, although many organizations emphasize uniqueness of their activities, their issues and political lines are not quite divergent. Nevertheless, attempts to form a broad coalition among diverse groups around crucial issues often broke up at the final stage. The trial to forge the Citizens' Solidarity for Election Reporting Watch in 1992 ended up with separate small coalitions. It is presumably due to the struggle for internal hegemony (Lee, 1992, p.2). Of course, the grassroots nature of new social movements might make it difficult to organize heterogeneous forces on a broad range, but the celebrity-centeredness might have aggravated the potential split. Interpersonal networks or connections among leaders, rather than differences in political orientation, might have been more influential in the specific formation of organizations. 2) Major issues New social movements generally address issues, which are not directly related to class interests of participant groups. In this respect, citizens' press movements in Korea are not quite exceptional. Table 3 shows major issues of citizens' press movements (Kim, 1991, pp.240-249; Constitution of ASBR; ACSNT, 1993, p.66; CSERW, 1993; CCFCEC, 1992; KFPU Newsletter, Dec. 2, 1991.). TABLE 3. Issues of Major Press Movements[1] Movements Instrumental goals Intermediate goals Final goals License Fee Boycott Campaign (1986-88) -to boycott television license fee -to stop biased reporting -to stop advertising in the public television -to stop sensationalism -to stop pro- government attitude -democratization of broadcasting -political democratization Anti-yellow newspaper campaign(1990) -to request sports newspapers to stop obscenity, violence of content -to boycott products of advertisers -to reform sensationalism of newspapers -to restore social responsibility of journalism Anti-payola("chonjie") campaign (1991) -citizens' watch for chonjie -to support good journalists -to stop chonjie-taking practices among journalists -to encourage uncorrupted journalism -to restore autonomy of journalism Citizens' Solidarity for Election Reporting Watch (1992) -to watch and indict bias, distortion, unfairness of election reporting -to encourage fair reporting by the press Citizen's Coalition for Fair and Clean Election Campaign (1992) -to watch election reporting -o encourage fair reporting by the press Turn Off Television Today Campaign (1993) -turn off television for one day -to publicize about problems of television -to exercise pressures on broadcasting companies -to activate audience movements through the experience of coalition -to restore the social responsibility and public status of broadcasting Audience Solidarity for Broadcasting Reform (1993) -to prepare policy alternatives in financing, audience participation, broadcasting laws -to watch for the program quality -to encourage publicness, fairness, autonomy, diversity -to prevent commercialism of the public broadcasting. -to keep commercial broadcasting healthy -to affirm the audience sovereignty The most conspicuous agenda of press movements in the 80s include sensationalism, violence, and biased reporting of the media, especially television. The values underlying these issues may be summarized as "fair reporting," public responsibility of media, and anti-commercialism. In that the critiques underscore the autonomy and social responsibility of the press, they suggest what are close to social responsibility theory. Although anti-commercialist tendency is recurrent in most cases, the market system itself is not denied. In a word, citizens' press movements hardly propose alternative values alien to the status quo. While criticizing the established media, the critiques tend to emphasize reforms within, rather than groping for alternative modes of media. In Korea, the notion of media as a public realm distinct from the market seems to have secured legitimacy among the public, as well as in official discourses on media. Such a notion is distinctive in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon notion of the freedom of the press which is closely related to property rights. In ideological terms, citizens' press movements are not quite aberrant from what the status quo advocates. In a sense, the ideological struggles between both parties have proceeded with recourse to similar discursive resources. Not surprisingly, what has distinguished citizens' movements from the status quo may be virtues and moral legitimacy of actors rather than ideological spectrum. Same issues may have diverse implications, depending on the context. License Fee Boycott campaign took issue of biased reporting and sensationalism of media, but under authoritarian government helped undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, thereby expanding to a political movement. However, after 1988, similar agenda came to have different implications. First, in 1992, two coalitions of citizen's groups initiated campaigns of election reporting watch. These organizations monitored election reporting and made an issue of problematic cases. These campaigns have taken advantage of the legally legitimate space, which has enlarged with the official democratization of the state. This issue indicates that, despite the official claim to the democratization, the infrastructure and political practices of the state still remains considerably undemocratized. Second issue involves a reaction against sensationalism of media. Typical examples include the crusade against obscene and violent content of sports newspaper in 1990, and Turn off Television Today campaign in 1993 (see Kim, 1991; Kim, 1993). These movements remain in the tradition of License Fee Boycott campaign, but unlike their precursors they are mostly de-politicized. These cases reflect everyday-life concerns of the middle-class as media consumers. Except intermittent collective action, most activities consist primarily of monitoring television. The criteria of monitoring emphasize the public responsibility and educational role of media, and tend to be conspicuously moralistic. These campaigns pursue changes in particular programs or practices, without any institutional, structural reforms. Major participants are middle-class women, i.e., the target of consumer product advertising. In some cases, attempts to boycott particular products, which sponsored programs in question, led television stations to cancel or change the target programs. Although new social movements are not necessarily accompanied by visible results, press movements in Korea sometimes led to an immediate response, or even a "surrender," from the mainstream media, be it mostly a symbolic one. Third issue is a "desirable" video culture campaign, such as "Gun-Be-Yeon"(Citizens' Group for a Healthy Video Culture) or Video Shop Owners' Group for Good Video Culture of YMCA. Both represent efforts to keep youths and children from watching obscene and violent videos, and encourage the audience to see wholesome videos. The issues raised by press movements are not deemed as illegitimate even within the official political sphere. Although the commercial system is the major backbone of Korean media, regulatory devices over the market mechanism have already been institutionalized. Especially the broadcasting sector is close to a public system, but except the state and capital, various political forces and civil sectors are virtually excluded from the "public" decision-making process. Political democratization failed to entail substantial changes in the state monopoly over the broadcasting sector. In a sense, press movements in Korea are officially legitimate claims expressed outside the official sphere. While issues of press movements diversified after political democratization, class-wide and nation-wide concerns, as before 1988, have virtually disappeared in major political events. Given the fact that the state secured political legitimacy, it became much less feasible for the government to make a politically disastrous blunder as to provoke public reaction on a national scale. While some movement groups have tried to form nation-wide coalitions in vain, small-scale campaigns based on everyday life concerns of the middle-class got popularity. Citizen's press movements in recent years began to reflect the particular concerns of major participants rather than "universal" values. Consequently, in this context, Kang(1993) argues convincingly that citizens' press movements should make a strategic turn to decentralized movements in various social arenas. Another feature of citizen's press movements is its lack of institutional or structural issues. Press movements have aimed at resolutions of visible short-term conflicts rather than structural contradictions which generate those symptoms. Above all, the myopic tendency of strategic goals might come from inherent limitations of grassroots action. In order to mobilize heterogeneous groups into action, the agenda might well be limited to short-term goals. However, the amateurism of celebrity leaders might be another reason for the ambiguity of directions. This interpretation is consolidated by the fact that citizens' groups failed to have any voice in the major policy making process in broadcasting sectors. In other words, the leadership has succeeded in developing newsworthy events, but failed to develop clear ideological blueprints or alternatives. Another reason might be politically conservative nature of press movement, which rarely goes beyond the given institutional framework. While struggles remained wit hin the ideological and institutional confine of the system, ironically, the impacts of those movements on the system are hard to notice. In sum, citizens' press movements have raised issues and conflicts, which are not based on class interests of specific social strata and may not be resolved within the given polity. They apparently have much in common with new social movements in the West. Nevertheless, press movements in Korea hardly challenge the dominant value system of the status quo. Instead, they make efforts to "normalize" the inherent functions or roles of the state and the market. In a word, the political orientation of citizen's press movements in Korea is moderate conservatism. 3) Medium of action and expression In general, citizens' press movements have employed non-violent, peaceful ways of expression within the legally permitted limit. Citizen's press movements have depended primarily on modes of symbolic action and expression, such as media events. Direct actions, such as boycotting license fee or advertised product,[2] are exceptional cases. Nevertheless, specialized activities, such as legal consulting, election issues, or lobbying to the Legislative, have been rare. Citizens' press movements mostly took advantage of the legal space, instead of challenging it. License Fee Boycott campaign under the authoritarian government got into conflict with the state. But the confrontation has ended with political democratization. It was not uncommon for representatives of movement groups to show up as participants in televised debates, or to join official institutions as representatives of citizen's groups. Their leadership in movements made them a sort of celebrity(or vice versa), and they might provide a potential pool for recruitment to government or political organizations. Despite the active liaison with the polity, it is surprising that movements hardly led to visible institutional reforms. However, press ombudsman established by most major newspapers and broadcasting companies have to be considered as accomplishment of citizen's press movements.[3] For channels of publicity, press movements depended on mainstream media rather than establishing their own. Except the target media, mainstream media have allotted space for reporting developments of movements. Since 1988, newspapers assigned even a fixed page for media, where they had extensive coverage of press movements. For instance, major newspapers reported in detail on License Fee Boycott campaign.[4] In Anti-yellow newspaper campaign, major broadcast networks gave coverage of statements and proceedings(Kim, 1991, pp.245-246). In the West social movements have been deemed hardly newsworthy by major media and consequently attempted to develop "media events" to attract the attention of the mainstream press. On the contrary, mainstream media in Korea, especially those in direct competition with the target media, contributed considerably to press movements. In a sense, citizens' press movements became a big event business through which various groups and celebrities get publicity. This might be one of the reasons why the initiatives of newsworthy celebrities, rather than organized activities, became a major trait of citizens' press movements in Korea. 4) Pros and Cons One of the clues to understanding social movement is who are the pros and cons. Not surprisingly, they might vary depending on what the issues are and how broad the coalition is. Which groups are in direct conflict with press movement groups? The following table shows a few examples of strategic relations of conflict and cooperation in major movements. TABLE 4. Strategic Relations of Cooperation and Conflict Issues Pros Cons License Fee Boycott campaign newspapers; opposition parties; political forces outside the polity the government; broadcasting network; broadcasting advertisers Anti-yellow newspaper campaign broadcasting network; other newspapers sports newspapers; newspaper advertisers Election Watch (CSERW, CCFCEC) opposition parties the ruling party; newspapers; broadcasting networks Turn off Television Today campaign newspapers television networks; television advertisers What is notable is the relation between the state and movement groups. In the License Fee Boycott campaign, the government's lack of political legitimacy led even ideologically moderate movements to direct confrontation with the government. In later instances, however, conflict disappears. The election watch, for instance, could undermine the de facto benefits of the ruling party, but the campaign hardly provoked manifest reaction from the government. Under the civilian government, moreover, the need for reforms made possible the strategic cooperation between press movement groups and the state. In some cases, press movement groups took partial aid from the state. It is also highly suggestive to look at how strategic relations among different movement groups are formed. Because press movements since the 1980s have rarely involved issues controversial among political lines, informal factors have exerted influence in forming coalitions. Above all, interpersonal networks, as well as differences in political orientation, have played considerable role in Korea. For instance, radical groups and unions tend to consider citizens' groups as "middle-class" reformism. Regardless of issues in question, some of citizen's organizations are allergic to groups with the history of political struggles. Such difference in organizational sentiment has often affected even activities on the official level. On-going changes in political situation might trigger potential conflict within the press movements as well. In the eighties, the undifferentiation of issues encouraged heterogeneous social groups to gather under one banner of common cause, which is irrelevant to material interests. However, if issues become more specific in the near future, heterogeneity of political orientation and material interests among movement groups might emerge to the surface. While, as with new social movements, citizens' press movements hardly rely upon class-interests, they reflect the peculiarity and limitations of participating strata. IV. Trade Unionism as New Social Movements? In general, labor movements pursue class-specific interests. However, press labor movements in Korea reveal some features of new social movements. Most trade unions in major Korean media underscore as the primary goal of organizational activities the cause of the freedom of the press, which is similar to what citizen's press movements have pursued. Specifically, not only the monetary concerns but also the issues of "editorial rights"[5] and fair reporting have been central agenda in labor disputes. The view of press labor movement as a form of new social movement is not only a "normative" claim, but also in part a political reality in Korea(for a similar view, Kang, 1993). Even in the market system, historically, the press has been a special realm distinct from other businesses. But the peculiarity of the socio-political context has also influenced the specific trajectory of trade unionism in Korean media. Since the first establishment of press unions in 1987 and the subsequent legalization of the Korean Federation of Press Unions(KFPU), regular channels of negotiation have been established to resolve labor disputes. However, some conflicts went beyond the boundary of the shop floor dispute and expanded to nation-wide concerns. Then, the management-labor conflict turned into a confrontation between a coalition of union/citizens' groups and that of the press and the state. In this case, each side attempts to relate the case to a kind of a "common cause." The following table shows prominent cases, which extended to larger social movements ("Media chronicles" Journalism, Spring-Summer 1990-Winter 1992; KFPU, 1990; 1994). TABLE 5. Labor Disputes Which Became Social Issues. Issues Participant groups Medium of action For a minor misdemeanor, the government fired the president of KBS, who was the first elected by employee voting. The police dispersed and arrested union members, who went on a sit-down strike. (1990.2-5) National Council of Trade Unions; National Council of College Student Organizations; Korean Association of Journalists; Lawyers Group for Democracy; CDPM; Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice, Council of Women's Organizations; National Council of Christian Women, YMCA, Citizen's Group for Consumer Affairs; Federation of White-Collar Unions; Journalism Professors Group, National Federation of Farmers' Organizations, National Federation of Artists, et al demonstration; issued statements; formed a joint organization; protest visit to the prime minister; sit-in strike by other industry unions; public campaign The government proposed an amendment of the Broadcasting Act, in order to introduce a commercial television. (1990.6) KNCC, opposition parties, Faculty Council for Democratization(Jun-Book province), Union of Christian Social Movement(Jun-Book Province), Council of Dismissed Journalists, Journalism Faculty Group, and other journalists' organizations. formed a joint organization; issued statements. In labor negotiations, the management of MBC television network demanded the abolition of major agreements of previous years: the direct election of major officers and joint council for fair broadcasting. The management then terminated negotiations without consent from the union. The labor took this as a threat to the union and went on a strike. Police arrested union members. (1992.8-9). Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, KNCC. Faculty Council for Democratization, National Council of Trade Unions, YMCA, National Union of Women's Organizations, Pharmacist Association for Healthy Society, Journalism Faculty Group, et al formed a joint organization; public hearings on the issue; outdoor assembly; signature campaign; campaign for fund-raising These instances are concerned with broadcasting. It is presumably because there is a general consensus on the status of broadcasting as a "public" resource and a realm independent of the state and market. Not surprisingly, the apparently diverse sources of the above disputes converge on a common concern, i.e., the autonomy of broadcasting from the state. Social groups involved in the protest interpreted the instances as government's strategy for extending influence on the broadcasting sector. Such an interpretation may be attributed to the structural problem of the media system in Korea. Broadcasting in Korea is two-tiered system of the public and commercial networks. Even in commercial broadcasting sector, i.e., MBC, any monopoly by particular capital or social groups is strictly prohibited. In reality, however, the state has seized both the public and private sectors, and other forces have been excluded from the broadcasting sector. In other words, despite the trend to "deregulation," the state power has not diminished in Korea. It is inevitable that such a monopoly may cause social conflicts in major media issues. With a few exceptions, most labor disputes remain within media organizations. But especially in major media, even internal issues tend to focus on "non-economic" issues(see Kang, 1989). This phenomenon, bizarre in labor-management relations, may be attributable to the peculiar circumstances of the Korean media in the 80s. First of all, since the 1980s, the wage level of media employees has been considerably high in comparison to other white-collar jobs. In 1980, the state intervened in the media market and restructured it by force to an artificial structure of oligopoly in broadcasting and national dailies, and regional monopoly in local dailies. The absence of competition drove the industry to rapid growth. The state solicited the management to improve wage levels and fringe benefits of media employees dramatically, to appease their discontent. The material compensation came from the extra-profits, which the monopolization of the industry yielded. It is also discourses regarding the role of media in Korea that prevent labor movements from pursuing monetary concerns. The traditional discourse on journalism has emphasized the "public service" role of journalists. In addition, the memories of "dark" years of the 80s forced press unions to hold fast to recovering "legitimacy" even at the minor sacrifice of material benefits. The taboo on the secularization of press movements is further constrained by the Korean culture, which discourages people from expressing their secular interests in public. Nevertheless, in the long run, mundane interests of workers might have determining impact on labor movements(see Chang, 1992). In Korea, press unions are motivated not only by individual gains of workers but also those of the company as a whole. One may find a few examples even in the short experience of press labor movement. For instance, in April 1990, the Korean Federation of Press Unions decided to go on an industry-wide strike as a protest against the government intrusion into the labor dispute of KBS, but few local unions followed it. In this case, the collective benefits of the company took precedence of private gains of individual workers. In reality, as the romantic enthusiasm for labor movements faded out increasingly, union members began to lose interest in the issues, which have no tangible material substance. In the future, unionism is expected to underscore shop floor concerns, such as improvements of working conditions. Despite internal limitations, press unions will play important role in press movements in Korea. By tradition, the occupational culture of Korean journalists has valued highly fights against the government encroachment of their autonomy. The tradition of heavy government intervention may not discontinue in the near future, and may trigger conflicts with press unions. Besides, press unions inevitably will take strategically important role in struggles for securing civil spheres, which have not grown properly in the presence of the strong state. V. Conclusion Citizens' press movements in Korea, ranging from the mid-80s to early 90s, reveal typical characteristics of new social movements. However, unlike their counterpart in the West, old and new social movements are not clearly distinguished in press movements in Korea. Despite much divergence, both pursue similar goals to a certain extent. At this historical point, press unionism in Korea has much in common with new social movements. For political circumstances in Korea render the differentiation of press movements infeasible. The media in Korea not only show symptoms of the market failure, but also failed to perform the role of the civil society. The media often ignore rules for fair competition or rational business practices; they hardly represent diverse voices of the society as well. The source of problems lies in the state. The media in Korea, especially broadcasting, have claimed to the status of a public realm, but the tradition of strong state has alienated all social groups, except the state and the capital, from the area. Nevertheless, problems of commercial system, such as sensationalism, are to be felt widely. The problem is two-fold: expanding "deregulation"(or commercialization) of media under the highly regulating state. Under the current civilian government, where discourses of "deregulation" and "globalization" prevail, this double-sided problem becomes more conspicuous. The discourse of deregulation in Korea does not imply small government. Although deregulation entails expanding power of the capital, the state is expected to play a still dominant role. In Korea, citizens' press movements represent the voices and complaints of various social groups, which have been resolved neither through the market nor the political process. However, citizens' movements in Korea try to render the system of the status quo function properly, instead of groping for alternative values and blueprints. In a word, their political orientation is basically moderate and conservative. However, even though the scope of citizens' movements widened, their action failed to lead to tangible institutional changes. In a sense, the booming movements in effect might legitimize the civilian government, whose claim to democratic reforms scarcely yielded much visible results. The state in Korea hardly developed institutional framework, through which the voices of the civil society and interest groups are converged into the system. In a word, despite political democratization, the civil society in Korea is extremely fragile, in comparison to the strong state. In spite of the subsistence of the authoritarian state, a nation-wide movement of the last decade is not feasible in the future. The establishment of the civilian government with political legitimacy deprived citizens of interest in issues, which are not directly related to their everyday-life concerns. While issues surrounding the freedom of the press in press union movements is at a low ebb, good video campaigns by YMCA has been successful. Citizens' press movements might shift to decentralized small-scale activities, based on particular concerns of various social groups. Nevertheless, there is still possibility for a class-wide social movement, such as strategic cooperation between press unions and citizens' groups. For struggles against the state, both need the advantages of each other: union maintains an organization with immediate efficacy, and citizens' groups have a better position in securing legitimacy. Citizens' press movement may take advantage of strategic cooperation between citizens' groups and the state established under the civilian government. The state is not a unified whole. Instead, it may be called a "dominant power bloc"(Freiberg, 1985), which consists of heterogeneous interest groups. Within the civilian government who took power through a merger of three major parties, the ruling minority wants to make the most of the press for the internal control of the power bloc. The sect also needs the cooperation of citizens' press movement in order to reform the established media. Although the mainstream media are in symbiotic relations with the dominant class, the market situation of intra and inter-media competition makes them assist citizens' movements in consequence. Insofar as citizens' movements provide the media with newsworthy events, the former may secure channels of publicity. If the movement group takes advantage of strategic ties with the state, it may also expand the legal space within which it may maneuver legitimately. REFERENCES Freiberg, J.W. (1985). "Toward a structural model of state intervention in the mass media: The case of France," Maurice Zeitlin ed. Political Power and Social Theory, vol.5, Greenwich: JAI Press, 141-167. Habermas, J.(1974). "The public sphere: An encyclopedia article(1964)," New German Critique 1(3), 45-48. Keane, J. (1991). The Media and Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Offe, C. (1985). "New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics," Social Research, 52(4), 817-868. Scott, A. (1990). Ideology and the New Social Movements, London: Unwin Hyman. [in Korean] Audience Commission for Say No to Television (1993). Report on Turn Off Television Today Campaign. Chang, Y.H. (1992). "Material base of press union movement and rational choice of actors," Korean Journal of Journalism and Communication Studies, 28, 309-335. Citizens' Coalition for Fair and Clean Election Campaign (1992). Report on Activities: First Half, 1992. Citizens' Solidarity for Election Reporting Watch (1993). Report on Activities in the 14th. Presidential Election. Kang, M.K. (1989). "Press union movements and the democratization of the press," Korean Press Yearbook 1989, Seoul: Korean Press Institute. Kang, S.H. (1993). "Citizens' press movements in the information age," The Korean Society and the Press, 3, 86-132. Kim, K.T. (1989). "Characteristics of media audience movements in Korea: A case study of Licence Fee Boycott Campaign," Unpublished dissertation, Sogang University. Kim. K.T. (1991). "Newspaper readers movement: The case of sports newspaper readers movement," Journalism, 21, 230-251. Kim, K.T. (1993). "Media audience movement: The case of Turn Off Television Today campaign," Newspaper and Broadcasting Monthly, 273, 50-54. Koo, N.H. (1992). "The development and effect of Licence Fee Boycott campaign," Master's Thesis, Chung-book University. Korean Federation of Press Unions (1990). Democratic Press, vol.1. Korean Federation of Press Unions (1994). Democratic Press, vol.2. Korean Sociological Association and Korean Political Science Association eds. (1992). The State and the Civil Society in Korea, Seoul: Hanwool. Lee, J.S. (1992). "Achievement and prospects of election reporting watch campaign," Democratic Press Movement, 10. Shin, K.Y. (1991). "The civil society and social movements," Economy and Society, 12, 13-36. [1] The typology of goals is taken from Kim(1989, p.154). [ 2] Product boycott was pronounced in Licence Fee Boycott campaign and anti-yellow news paper campaign. But it was never put into action. [3] For instanc e, television companies began hours for audience opinions, such as "TV in TV," but in e arly Sunday mornings when few people watch. [4] In the case of T urn Off Television Today campaign, 83 articles appeared in national dailies. ACSNT, 1993, p.86. [5] The notion of "editorial rights" in Korea is concern ed with who are the subject of the freedom of the press. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon culture, journalists have argued that the right should rest with the shop floor journalists, not with owners or executives. The genesis of th is notion is rooted in the public perception of media as public pro perty, and at the same time reflects the public distrust of the media owners and management who have failed to maintain autonomy from the external pressur es in the political "Dark Age."