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Television and political alienation in Japan



Shinichi Saito
Department of Communication
Tokyo Woman's Christian University
2-6-1 Zempukuji, Suginami-ku,
Tokyo, Japan, 167-8585
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Paper presented at the Mass Communication & Society Division of
  the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
annual meeting at San Antonio, August 10-August 13, 2005

Abstract
Putnam's time displacement hypothesis and Robinson's videomalaise 
hypothesis have not received sufficient supporting evidence from 
studies undertaken in the United States and a number of European 
countries. However, it remains unknown whether television causes 
similar demobilization effects in Japan. Therefore, this study 
examined whether television cultivates political alienation in Japan. 
To address this issue, this study was based on the assumption that 
effects resulting from television content and use of the medium per 
se combine in a complex manner to produce political alienation. Past 
research has indicated that Japanese political alienation is 
comprised of three dimensions: political apathy, political 
inefficacy, and political cynicism. Data from a survey conducted in 
Tokyo revealed that frequent viewers were more likely to be 
politically apathetic and feel politically inefficacious than were 
infrequent viewers. Among viewers who did not watch the news on NHK 
(public television), television viewing was also related to political 
cynicism. We examine the implications of our findings and provide 
some directions for future research.

Television and political alienation in Japan
In many democratic societies, including Japan, political apathy, 
disaffection, distrust, and indifference are common among the general 
public, especially the younger generation. This sort of negative 
political consciousness (negative attitudes or feelings toward 
politics) can only have a negative effect on democracy. Some 
researchers argue that along with various other factors embedded in 
political systems, mass media, especially television, play a crucial 
role in promoting or intensifying political apathy or cynicism (e.g., 
Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Ootake, 2003; Patterson, 1993, Putnam, 
1995, Robinson, 1976, Taniguchi, 2002).
Condemnation of mass media as a negative force against democracy can 
be traced back to Lazarsfeld and Merton's (1948/1971) idea of 
narcotizing dysfunction. These authors argued that mass media allow 
the general public to be in touch with the world, but that mass media 
"may elicit only a superficial concern with the problems of society, 
and this superficiality often cloaks mass apathy" (p. 565). According 
to them, the audience "comes to mistake knowing about problems of the 
day for doing something about them" (italics original) and "quite 
apart from intent, increasing dosages of mass communications may be 
inadvertently transforming the energies of men from active 
participation into passive knowledge" (p. 566). Concerning 
narcotizing dysfunction, Wright (1986) wrote that "the individual, 
overwhelmed by matters brought to his or her attention by mass 
communication, escapes to private concerns over which there seems to 
be more control" (p. 18). In other words, too much information from 
mass media may lead an audience to privatization, which in turn may 
lead to individual apathy about civic activity.
Although it was not well documented in their work, the process (or 
underlying mechanism) by which media induce mass apathy and inertia 
may include at least three components: time displacement of civic 
activities owing to media use, privatization resulting from 
information overload, and misperception of passive knowledge about 
public issues as active social participation. These processes may 
take place at the same time as media use, regardless of the content's 
quality or type. Thus, narcotizing dysfunction could be regarded as a 
social consequence that is brought about by the use of media per se, 
rather than by media content.1 If this is the case, this negative 
social consequence should be more clearly demonstrated among frequent 
media users than among infrequent users.
When Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948/1971) published their theory, radio 
and newspapers were the dominant mass media. With the addition of 
television in modern times, narcotizing dysfunction seems to have 
become more and more prevalent. It may be one of the most significant 
unintended influences of mass communication. In the past, however, 
authors have discussed narcotizing dysfunction in the absence of 
empirical testing, partly because it was under-theorized and 
oversimplified, and partly because functional analysis has been 
widely unpopular since the early 1970s (Bryant and Miron, 2004). 
Although not directly referring to the term 'narcotizing 
dysfunction', some researchers have investigated an issue similar to 
that set out by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948/1971) half a century ago. 
For example, Putnam (1995) has argued that television has led to a 
decline in social capital in the United States. He noted that "TV 
watching comes at the expense of nearly every social activity outside 
the home, especially social gatherings and informal conversations" 
(pp. 678-679), and claimed that television has, therefore, privatized 
our leisure time. Although the theme under discussion is the decline 
of social capital, and does not refer directly to negative political 
consciousness, Putnam's 'time displacement hypothesis' (Moy, 
Scheufele and Holbert, 1999) can be considered an important extension 
of the concept of narcotizing dysfunction.
Mutz (1998) pointed out that Putnam's arguments are "clearly within 
the mass society tradition; mass media are conceptualized as 
displacing close-knit interpersonal networks and thus producing an 
alienated public" (p. 267). Moy et al. (1999) conducted an empirical 
examination of Putnam's time displacement hypothesis, namely, that 
"the time one spends watching television should be related negatively 
to civic capital" (Moy et al., 1999, p. 31). Their results supported 
the hypothesis that television has a negative impact on civic 
capital, but they found that the relation is not mediated by 
perceptions of time pressure. They concluded that "television 
undermines civic engagement. However, blaming television for taking 
time away from other activities is not warranted. Therefore, our 
research calls for a modified time displacement hypothesis" (p. 40). 
A number of researchers have provided unsupported evidence for the 
time displacement hypothesis (e.g., Norris, 1996); however, Putnam's 
thesis deserves further investigation, above all in countries other 
than the United States.
It is important to note that the mechanism hypothesized by Lazarsfeld 
and Merton (1948/1971) and Putnam (1995) does not provide a complete 
picture of how media induce political apathy or cynicism. With regard 
to this issue, Norris (1996) pointed out that "we do not know whether 
the public is affected by the simple amount of television viewing, as 
Putnam (1995) claims, or whether the contents of what people watch is 
equally important" (p. 475). Obviously, television content also plays 
an important role in cultivating political alienation among viewers.
Among studies that have addressed the issue of the impact of media 
content on political alienation, Robinson's (1976) study, which set 
out the "videomalaise hypothesis", is clearly one of the earliest and 
most influential studies to date. He argued that growing political 
discontent and a decline in feelings of political efficacy can be 
linked to the media, particularly television. Robinson demonstrated 
that exposure to TV news about politics was related to political 
inefficacy, distrust, and cynicism. Robinson listed several factors 
that may lead to videomalaise, including unmotivated television news 
viewing, the high credibility attributed to the television networks 
by the audience, the interpretive character of television news 
coverage, the emphasis on the negative and on conflict and violence 
in television news, and the anti-institutional theme of network news programs.
However, follow-up studies on the videomalaise hypothesis by other 
scholars have shown mixed findings, partly because of their "diverse 
conceptualizations, research designs and indicators" (Holtz-Bacha, 
1990, p. 74). Several studies have been conducted in the US, but few 
provided evidence supporting the hypothesis (see Bennet, Rhine, 
Flickinger & Bennet, 1999; Norris, 2000). Bowen, Stamm and Clark 
(2000) suggested that the videomalaise hypothesis was subject to a 
number of contingencies that limit its generality. Some European 
studies have revealed that, while the viewing of commercial TV news 
and entertainment programs has a negative effect on political 
engagement, viewing TV news on a public channel has a positive effect 
(e.g., Holtz-Bacha, 1990; Hooghe, 2002; Aarts & Semetko, 2003).
Cappella and Jamieson's (1997) "spiral of cynicism" argument can be 
regarded as a variant (or extention) of the videomalaise hypothesis. 
 From the perspective of media-framing effects (see Scheufele, 1999 
for a comprehensive review), Cappella and Jamieson hypothesized that 
the media undermine political trust and participation. They divided 
styles of news reporting about political campaigns into two types: 
issue frame and strategic frame. The former emphasizes "policy 
issues, problems, and solutions" and the latter focuses on "candidate 
strategy, win-or-lose aspects of the campaign, and politicians' 
selfish interests" (Rhee, 1997, p. 30). Using experimental studies, 
Cappella and Jamieson (1997) demonstrated that news coverage using a 
strategic frame leads audiences to political cynicism. They also 
provided a thoughtful explanation, from a social cognition 
perspective, of the underlying mechanisms of this type of media 
framing effect (See also Rhee, 1997).
In Japan, Taniguchi (2002) expanded on the work of Cappella and 
Jamieson (1997), examining the relationship between viewing specific 
news programs and political cynicism. Taniguchi's content analysis of 
two major nightly news programs (NHK's News 10 and TV Asashi's News 
Station) categorized 76.3% of News Station news items as using a 
strategic frame and 15.3% as using an issue frame (8.5% were 
categorized as other); corresponding figures for News 10 were 55.6%, 
40.3%, and 4.2% respectively. Based on panel data along with the 
content analysis, Taniguchi concluded that News Station relied on a 
strategic frame and depicted politicians in a more negative context; 
this tended to lead viewers to political cynicism. This negative 
influence was not observed in News 10 newscasts.
Unlike Lazarsfeld and Merton's narcotizing dysfunction or Putnam's 
time displacement hypothesis, Robinson's videomalaise hypothesis and 
Cappella and Jamieson's media-framing effects hypothesis directly 
deal with the impact of media content, rather than the consequences 
of media per se. Thus, their theoretical foundations or conceptual 
frameworks differ from those of Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948/1971) and 
Putnam (1995). Since the question of whether media content or the use 
of media per se plays a greater role in inducing political apathy or 
cynicism remains unsolved, this study assumes that both media content 
and the use of media per se combine in a complex manner to have an 
impact on viewers' political consciousness.

Recent trends in television news and information programs in Japan
Recently, there has been worldwide criticism of television news and 
information programs. Researchers have coined the terms 'newszak' 
(Franklin, 1997) and 'tabloid news (or tabloidization)' (Grabe, Zhou, 
Lang and Bolls, 2000; Hayashi, 1999; Langer, 1998) to refer to mainly 
entertainment-oriented news programs, and have examined the possible 
negative impacts that these programs may have on an audience.
In Japan, television news programs have dramatically changed since 
the mid-1980s. News Station, first aired in 19852, was the first to 
change the way in which news was reported. Since then, other 
television stations have also revised their news programs. 
Consequently, there has been a so-called 'news war', in which news 
coverage (mostly programs on commercial stations) has become 
increasingly sensational and entertainment-oriented (Hagiwara, 2001; 
Ootake , 2003; Takase, 1999).3
Hagiwara (2001) conducted a content analysis to examine how 
television news programs tend to be entertainment-oriented. He 
focused on two aspects: news content and news format. His analysis 
showed that 'soft' news (e.g., sports, lifestyle, or culture) 
occupied on average about half of the total broadcasting time. He 
also found that a variety of attention-catching techniques such as 
bridge sounds, computer graphics, charts, BGM, sound effects, or 
unnecessary telops were excessively used in news programs on 
commercial stations. (He termed these 'excessive stage effects'.) 
According to Hagiwara, the tendency of news programs to be 
entertainment-oriented has accelerated in recent years.
Such entertainment-oriented tendencies can be observed not only 
during regular news programs but also during weekly information 
programs such as TBS's Sunday Morning or TV Asahi's Sunday Project 
(these are often termed 'political talk shows'; see Inaba, 2003). 
Ootake (2003) argued that while entertainment-oriented news programs 
and political talk shows certainly contribute to enhancement of 
political interest and a better understanding of complicated social 
issues among the general public, the programs simultaneously foster a 
tendency to regard politics as a form of entertainment. Ootake (2003) 
further charged that these television programs have manufactured 
political spectators who are similar to sports spectators.
In addition, several weekly 'infotainment' programs hosted by 
comedians are aired in Japan; these deal with mainly political 
issues, and often turn political issues into comedy. Although they 
may help the audience, especially the younger generation, to learn 
about recent political issues, the way in which politics is presented 
in these programs could also have a negative impact.
This study examines whether television cultivates a negative 
political consciousness in Japan. In this study, we do not rely on a 
single theoretical model. As mentioned above, this study is based on 
the assumption that both media content and the use of media per se 
play significant roles, which interact in a complex manner, to induce 
political alienation. Robinson's (1976) videomalaise hypothesis was 
the most influential study with respect to the present undertaking. 
Applying this hypothesis to the impact of entertainment-oriented news 
and infotainment programs, we hypothesized that more frequent viewers 
of television are more likely to be politically cynical or to have a 
sense of political inefficacy. It seems plausible to suppose that 
frequent viewers can become so engrossed in being informed, and so 
mesmerized by entertainment-oriented programs dealing with political 
matters, that they equate being an informed citizen with being an 
active citizen, and subsequently become apathetic or cynical toward politics.

The concept of 'political alienation'
So far we have used the terms political apathy, cynicism, distrust or 
indifference rather loosely when referring to negative attitudes 
toward or feelings about politics. Some researchers in the US have 
attempted to clarify the conceptual foundations of these similar 
concepts, often used as synonyms. For example, analyzing the National 
Election Study (NES) data on political alienation, Chen (1992) 
concluded that political alienation consists of four dimensions: (1) 
normlessness or distrust, (2) powerlessness or inefficacy, (3) 
meaninglessness, and (4) apathy. Similarly, Austin and Pinkleton 
(1995) described four components of a model of political 
disaffection: (1) cynicism, (2) apathy, (3) negativism, and  (4) 
third-person perceptions. Austin and Pinkleton summarized several 
concepts relating to negative political attitudes and feelings (e.g., 
apathy or cynicism) and created a questionnaire to measure them 
(Austin and Pinkleton, 1995; Pinkleton and Austin, 2004).
In Japan, reviewing relevant literature about negative political 
consciousness, Yamada (1990; 1994) suggested using the term 
'political alienation' in a generic way to cover various concepts 
about negative attitudes toward or feelings about politics. Political 
alienation may be defined as "alienated feelings from politics among 
members of mass democratic society" (Yamada, 1994, p. 92). Yamada 
(1994) constructed a scale consisting of nine items to measure 
political alienation among Japanese citizens. His research indicated 
that Japanese political alienation is comprised of three dimensions: 
political apathy, political inefficacy, and political cynicism (or 
distrust). Because of differences in the political culture and 
climate of Japan and the United States, this study used the scale 
proposed by Yamada (1994).
With regard to political inefficacy, Bandura (1986) introduced the 
idea of self-efficacy, which influences self-regulation. According to 
Fiske and Taylor (1992), "Self-efficacy beliefs are conceptualized as 
highly specific control-related beliefs which concern one's ability 
to perform a particular outcome. The stronger one's perceived 
self-efficacy, the more one will exert effort and persist at a task" 
(p. 198). Applied to political communication, political efficacy is 
defined as "the feeling that an individual citizen can have an impact 
on the political process" (Tan, 1981, p. 136). Three items in 
Yamada's scale apply to political efficacy; more specifically, the 
items measure political inefficacy. Austin and Pinkleton (1995) found 
that apathy and cynicism toward politics were negatively correlated 
to political efficacy. These researchers regarded political efficacy 
as a mediating variable between political disaffection and voting 
behavior (i.e., disaffection such as cynicism and apathy precede 
inefficacy). Yamada (1994), however, proposed the opposite 
relationship, namely, that people become politically apathetic 
because they feel politically inefficacious. Arguments about causal 
relationships among apathy, cynicism, and efficacy are, however, 
beyond the scope of this article. For the sake of convenience, here 
we deal with these three elements independently.

Hypotheses
As mentioned earlier, this study is based on the assumption that 
effects resulting from both television content and use of the medium 
per se combine in a complex manner to produce political alienation. 
Although both Putnam's time displacement hypothesis and Robinson's 
videomalaise hypothesis have not necessarily gained supporting 
evidence from studies conducted in the United States and a number of 
European countries, the question of whether television causes these 
demobilization effects in other countries, including Japan, remains 
to be answered.
Based on the arguments of a number of prominent Japanese political 
scientists cited earlier (e.g., Ootake, 2003; Taniguchi, 2002; 
Takase, 1999), and previous relevant findings by Hagiwara (2001) and 
Taniguchi (2002), it may be assumed that television fosters political 
apathy, cynicism, and inefficacy among viewers in Japan.
This study uses two measures to indicate television exposure: the 
amount of overall viewing and the amount of television news viewing. 
Both measures could be predictor variables, but which one has more 
power to predict political alienation? Specifically, this study 
formulated the following hypotheses:
H1a: The more time people spend watching television, the more likely 
they are to be politically cynical.
H1b: The more time people spend watching television news programs, 
the more likely they are to be politically cynical.
H2a: The more time people spend watching television, the more likely 
they are to feel politically inefficacious.
H2b: The more time people spend watching television news programs, 
the more likely they are to feel politically inefficacious.
H3a: The more time people spend watching television, the more likely 
they are to be politically apathetic.
H3b: The more time people spend watching television news programs, 
the more likely they are to be politically apathetic.
Although not formally included in these hypotheses, we also pay 
careful attention to possibly different effects created by viewing 
public and commercial TV broadcasting4.

Method
Procedures
To test these hypotheses, a sampling survey was conducted in November 
2003. The sample for this study was drawn from the city of Tokyo. 
Using a two-stage probability sampling method, 1000 people aged 20 or 
above who lived in Tokyo were selected. The sample was chosen using a 
Tokyo poll-book that lists all electorates at least 20 years old. 
Trained interviewers administered questionnaires in person from 
November 15 to December 1, 2003; 619 interviews were completed.
Measures
Political alienation: We used Yamada's scale to measure negative 
attitudes toward or feelings about politics. Respondents expressed 
their level of political alienation by responding to nine 5-point 
Likert-scale items with response categories ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A factor analysis of political 
alienation items using varimax rotation indicated that the scale 
consisted of three dimensions suggested by Yamada (See Table 1).
Political cynicism consisted of three items: "we cannot trust what 
politicians say"; "dietmen/women do not consider the electorate"; and 
"politicians devote themselves to corruption or factions rather than 
to planning or carrying out policy". We combined these three items 
into a scale (hereafter termed the 'cynicism scale'). The alpha 
coefficient for the cynicism scale was .84. Political inefficacy was 
comprised of the following three items: "political trends are 
determined by power beyond our control"; "our making a fuss about 
politics makes no difference in political reform"; and "it is 
difficult to reflect public opinion in politics". We combined these 
three items into a scale (hereafter termed the 'inefficacy scale'). 
The alpha coefficient for the inefficacy scale was .85. Political 
apathy consisted of three items: "thinking or doing something about 
politics in daily life annoys me"; "it is better to devote myself to 
my own job than to spend my energy on politics"; and "it is wise to 
leave political matters to politicians". We combined these three 
items into a scale (hereafter termed the 'apathy scale'). The alpha 
coefficient for the apathy scale was .72.
Political orientation: The respondents were asked to indicate their 
self-designated political orientation using a five-point scale 
ranging from 1 (conservative) to 5 (liberal). They also indicated how 
interested they were in politics in general using a four-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very much interested) to 4 (not at all interested).
Television viewing: The total amount of television viewed was 
measured by asking respondents to indicate how much time they usually 
spent watching television (M = 177.43, SD = 104.45 per day). The 
amount of television news viewed was measured by asking how much time 
they usually spent watching television news (M = 60.79, SD = 41.51 
per day). Respondents were also asked to indicate whether they 
regularly watched any of 19 specific television programs (Yes = coded 
1; No = coded 0). Of these 19 programs, 12 were daily news programs 
and seven were weekly information programs.
Internet use: Respondents were also asked about whether they accessed 
the Internet using a computer (Yes = coded 1; No = coded 0). Slightly 
more than half the respondents were computer Internet users (52.5%). 
One of the most notable recent trends in Japanese communications is 
an explosive growth in Internet access via cell phone (including 
PHS). The number of cell phone Internet users has rapidly increased 
since the first cell phone Internet service (i-mode service by NTT 
DoCoMo) began in February 1999 (IAJ, 2003; MPHPT, 2003). However, use 
of the Internet via cell phone differs from Internet use via computer 
(Ishii, 2004). In this sample, the number of people accessing the 
Internet only via cell phone was small (n = 52); therefore, we 
focused solely on computer Internet use in subsequent analyses.
Evaluation of news coverage of politics: The respondents were 
required to evaluate how television news report political matters by 
using a four-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree). Four items were evaluated: "there is too much 
sensationalized reporting"; "news reporting on television includes 
too many entertaining elements"; "news reporting on television puts 
too much emphasis on conflicts between political parties"; and "news 
reporting on television is inaccurate and unbalanced". A factor 
analysis indicated that these four items consisted of a single 
construct, and the reliability coefficient was also acceptable (a = 
.83); we therefore combined these four items into a single scale 
(hereafter termed the 'television evaluation scale').
Characteristics of the sample
In the sample, 50.6% of respondents were males and 49.4% were 
females. Respondents ranged in age from 20 to 70 (M = 46.6, SD = 
13.6): 14.5% were 20-29 years old, 19.7% were 30-39, 19.1% were 
40-49, 24.1% were 50-59, 22.6% were 60 or over. Of respondents, 8.4% 
were junior high school graduates, 35.4% were senior high school 
graduates, 22.1% had graduated from junior college (or equivalent), 
31.8% were college students or graduates, and 1.6% had attended 
graduate school (0.3% were categorized as other).

Results
First, we examined relationships between viewing specific television 
programs and scores on the three scales (the cynicism scale, the 
inefficacy scale, and the apathy scale). Although the impact that an 
individual program has on political alienation was not a main concern 
in this study, the data will provide basic information for subsequent 
discussion.
Partial correlation analyses indicated that viewing News 10 on NHK (a 
public station) was negatively correlated to scores on all three 
scales: regular viewers were less likely to be politically apathetic 
(7th order partial r = -.092, p < .05), less likely to be politically 
cynical (7th order partial r = -.098, p < .05), and slightly less 
likely to be politically inefficacious (7th order partial r = -.078, 
p < .10). Regular viewers of TBS's News 23 tended to be slightly less 
politically apathetic (7th order partial r = -.075, p < .10). 
Similarly, regular viewers of Fuji TV's Report 2001 were slightly 
less likely to be politically cynical (7th order partial r = -.094, p 
< .05). We found no significant correlations between scores on the 
three scales with any other programs analyzed in this study (see Appendix A).
To examine the relative predictive power of television viewing on 
political alienation, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis. Predictor variables included age, gender, level of 
education, self-designated political orientation, level of interest 
in politics, evaluation of television news reporting, amount of 
television viewing, and Internet use. Dependent variables were scores 
on each of the three scales. A relatively high correlation was 
observed between the total amount of television viewed and the amount 
of television news viewed (r = .585, p < .001), so we used these two 
measures separately in different regression models: the total amount 
of television viewed was used in Model 1, and the amount of 
television news viewed was used in Model 2. In the first step, we 
entered demographic variables (age, gender, and education). In the 
second step, we added level of interest in politics, self-designated 
political orientation, and the television evaluation scale. In the 
third step, we added television viewing and Internet use.
Table 2 summarizes the results, showing final standardized regression 
coefficients. Results showed that both the total amount of television 
viewed (b = .087, p < .05) and the amount of television news viewed 
(b = .076, p < .10) positively related to the inefficacy scale; thus, 
more frequent viewers were slightly more likely to feel politically 
inefficacious. The total amount of television viewed also positively 
related to the apathy scale (b = .112, p < .01), indicating that 
viewers with more frequent overall use were more likely to be 
politically apathetic. Neither total television viewed nor television 
news viewed showed a significant relationship with the cynicism 
scale. The results, therefore, supported Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 3a, 
but refuted Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 3b.
The data also revealed that Internet use was negatively related to 
the apathy scale, indicating that Internet users were less likely to 
be politically apathetic. In addition, the results showed that 
respondents who regarded themselves as liberal were less likely to 
feel inefficacious and be apathetic than those who considered 
themselves conservative.
Up to this point, the analyses examined respondents as a whole. In 
the next step, we divided respondents into two types: NHK news 
viewers, and non-NHK news viewers. We conducted additional regression 
analyses for each group separately, using the same independent and 
dependent variables.
A cluster analysis of 12 news programs indicated that NHK news 
programs belonged to a different cluster than other news programs of 
five commercial television stations.5 For convenience, we categorized 
those who regularly watched either NHK News 7 or News 10 as NHK news 
viewers (n = 309), and other respondents as non-NHK news viewers (n = 310).
The results of the multiple regression analysis indicated that among 
NHK news viewers, neither total television viewed nor television news 
viewed showed any significant relationships with scores on the 
cynicism, inefficacy, and apathy scales. Internet use, however, was 
negatively related to the apathy scale (b = -.210, p < .001 in both 
Model 1 and Model 2), indicating that respondents who accessed the 
Internet via computer were less likely to be politically apathetic.
In contrast, non-NHK news viewers showed different patterns; we 
examined the results closely (see Table 3). The total amount of 
television viewed was positively related to scores on the cynicism 
scale (b = .101, p < .10), so frequent television viewers were 
slightly more likely to be politically cynical. The amount of 
television news viewed was not, however, significantly related to 
scores on the cynicism scale. Both total television viewing (b = 
.178, p < .01) and television news viewing (b = .164, p < .01) showed 
significant relationships with scores on the inefficacy scale, so 
frequent viewers were more likely to feel politically inefficacious 
than less frequent viewers. Frequent television viewers were more 
likely to be politically apathetic (b = .137, p < .05), but 
television news viewing was not a significant predictor of apathy 
scale scores. The finding that respondents who considered themselves 
liberal were less likely to feel inefficacious and be apathetic also 
applied to non-NHK news viewers. Accordingly, the results supported 
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 2b, and 3a, but among non-NHK news viewers, the 
results refuted Hypotheses 1b and 3b.
As mentioned above, in this study we examined the three elements of 
political alienation (apathy, cynicism, and efficacy) independently. 
To help with future research, however, we should note that we 
attempted to incorporate a model in which cynicism and apathy precede 
inefficacy (Austin and Pinkleton, 1995). We ran another regression 
analysis specifically for non-NHK news viewers, using the inefficacy 
scale as the dependent variable and entering the cynicism and apathy 
scales into an equation as a set of independent variables (others 
were the same independent variables used in the preceding analyses). 
Results indicated that whereas the standardized regression 
coefficient reduced to .102 from .178 in Model 1 and .126 from .164 
in Model 2, the coefficients remained significant (p <. 05), implying 
that the suggested model may not apply to Japan (i.e., cynicism and 
apathy may not precede inefficacy in Japan).

Discussion
Overall, our findings suggest that, even controlling for several 
relevant variables, television viewing is related to political 
alienation, especially among non-NHK news viewers. As this study was 
based on cross-sectional data, a causal relationship cannot be 
established. The results, however, seem to indicate that television 
has a negative influence on viewers' political consciousness. As 
Holtz-Bacha (1990) has noted, "In complex political systems the 
individual citizen has little opportunity for direct political 
experience. Politics is almost exclusively experienced through the 
mass media" (p. 81). Thus, although it is possible that those with 
higher levels of political alienation would be more likely to spend 
more time watching television, the dominant causal direction might be 
reversed6.
The fact that these results were obtained, given the current trends 
in news and information programs toward sensationalism and 
entertainment-orientation, has important implications for future 
television programs. If television, even unintentionally, plays a 
negative role in a democratic system by cultivating political 
alienation among viewers, media researchers and creators should pay 
careful attention to this dysfunction and be aware of television 
programming. It is, of course, also important to pay equal attention 
to the positive influences of television; Norris (2000), for example, 
has claimed that news media exert a positive impact on democracy, but 
more research is needed to examine the net balance between the 
positive and negative influences of television.
It may be argued that the size of the effects observed in this study 
is negligible (e.g., standardized regression coefficients never 
exceeded .20). As Gerbner et al. (1986) have pointed out, however, 
"even light viewers live in the same cultural environments as most 
others, and what they do not get through the tube can be acquired 
indirectly from others who do watch television" (p. 21). The 
differences in political alienation between infrequent and frequent 
users may be small, but even small differences could have 
far-reaching consequences for democracy. When discussing the small 
effect sizes found in many studies, Gerbner and colleagues used the 
metaphor of climate change, namely, that a shift of even a few 
degrees in average temperature can cause significant climate change, 
such as an ice age or global warming; thus, small effects should not 
be ignored (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan and Signorielli, 1986, 1994). The 
same logic could apply to the results of our study.
As already noted, negative influences of television viewing were not 
observed among NHK news viewers, although positive influences were 
equally not observed at the aggregate level. In addition, at the 
individual program level, regular viewers of News 10 showed slightly 
less political alienation, although the cause for this is unknown. 
These findings indicate that NHK (public television) and commercial 
television programs have different effects on political apathy, 
cynicism, and feelings of inefficacy. Future research should clarify 
whether public and commercial broadcasts have different impacts on 
the political consciousness of an audience.
Related to the above-mentioned point, future studies should examine 
which kind of measure has the most power to predict political 
alienation. Measurements to detect the influence of television appear 
to include at least three levels: individual program, genre (e.g., 
news programs in general), and television as a whole.
It is almost impossible to detect the impact that an individual 
program has on political alienation using cross-sectional data, as in 
this study. Moreover, it is improbable that viewers would watch only 
one news program (e.g., NHK's News 10) and avoid watching any others; 
it is more reasonable to assume that average viewers watch a wide 
variety of programs, even though there will be idiosyncratic viewing 
preferences. In reality, the effects of individual programs may 
cancel out (or possibly amplify) each other. An experimental study 
may be one way to detect the impact that a particular program has 
upon viewers. However, even if we were able to conduct experiments to 
determine the independent impact of a specific program, it might not 
be possible to apply the results to reality.
In current television programming, where genre boundaries are blurred 
and entertainment and information elements are becoming increasingly 
blended, it is not an easy task to create a reliable measure for 
identifying the impact of a genre. Using the total television viewed, 
similar to original cultivation analysis (Gerbner and Gross, 1976; 
Gerbner et al., 1986, 1994), was one solution on which this study 
relied. Future research, however, needs to find a better indicator of 
how television induces political alienation.
While this study showed that television viewing is related to 
political alienation in Japan, its underlying mechanism remains 
undisclosed. The sociological explanations suggested by Lazarsfeld 
and Merton (1948/1971) and Putnam (1995) might explain the results, 
in part. However, a cognitive psychological mechanism such as that 
underlying framing effects, as suggested by Cappella and Jamieson 
(1997) and Rhee (1997), may also be at work. It seems that both 
psychological and sociological explanations are necessary for a full 
understanding of the results of our study. Subsequent studies should 
attempt to set out the possible psychological and sociological 
mechanisms of the political alienation induced by television.
In this study, we included Internet use as a predictor variable in 
the analyses and found that it was related to less political apathy 
among NHK news viewers. However, questions about whether the 
relationship is causal or spurious (and if it is causal, in what 
direction) remain unresolved, simply because the data available do 
not allow us to answer them. In future research, we need to pay more 
careful attention to the role of the Internet.
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Footnotes
1. Strictly speaking, narcotizing dysfunction occurs, in part, 
through information conveyed by a medium, and not simply through the 
medium itself. Even so, Lazarsfeld and Merton's (1948/1971) concept 
of narcotizing dysfunction does not pay enough attention to content, 
because it addresses only the amount of information (e.g., 
information overload), rather than the type or quality of information.
2. The program drew high audience ratings and continued until 2004, 
when the main anchor, Hiroshi Kume, resigned.
3. While every news program has unique characteristics, the 
similarities among them are important. To examine inter-media 
consonance (Noelle-Neumann, 1973; Noelle-Neumann and Mathes, 1987), 
Zhang (2000) conducted a content analysis and revealed that, in terms 
of the agenda-setting level and the focusing level, Japanese news 
media showed high inter-media consonance. Inter-media consonance at 
the level of focusing is of particular significance to this study, 
because it is closely related to the concept of media framing. 
Zhang's findings also justify the strategy of using TV news exposure 
at the aggregate level as an independent variable (i.e., the amount 
of TV news viewing).
4. Japan has a dual television broadcasting system that consists of a 
public broadcaster (NHK) and a number of commercial broadcasters. As 
with the traditional BBC model, NHK is independent of both government 
and corporate sponsorship, and relies almost entirely on revenue from 
household reception fees. The commercial broadcasters derive their 
revenue, in the main, from advertising.
5. Hagiwara (2001) also indicated that in terms of news format, news 
on the public station, NHK, should be categorized differently to 
programs on commercial stations.
6. Of course, without panel survey data or experimental data, we 
cannot be certain about the direction of causality. In addition, it 
is plausible that the relationship is reciprocal.
Table 1.
Results of factor analysis (varimax rotation)

Cynicism
Inefficacy
Apathy
We cannot trust what politicians say
.853
.181
.108
Dietmen/women do not consider the electorate
.742
.285
.055
Politicians are devoted to corruption or factions rather than on 
carrying out policy
.697
.192
.067
Political trends are determined by powers beyond our control
.261
.838
.157
Our making a fuss about politics makes no difference in political reform
.194
.739
.260
It is difficult to reflect public opinion in politics
.255
.683
.156
Thinking or doing something about politics in daily life annoys me
.147
.078
.837
It is better to devote myself to my own job than to spend my energy on politics
.196
.241
.625
It is wise to leave political matters to politicians
-.071
.143
.560
Eigenvalue
3.85
1.64
1.20
Variance explained (%)
42.7
18.2
12.4
a
.84
.85
.72


Television and political alienation     2

Table 2.
Results of hierarchical regression analyses: All respondents
Cynicism
Inefficacy
Apathy
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Independent variables
     b
     b
     b
     b
     b
     b
Step 1
   Gender
  .000
  .000
-.071†
-.075†
  .065†
  .046
   Age
  .009
  .004
-.128**
-.132**
-.082*
-.069*
   Education
  .012
  .006
-.072
-.088*
-.026
-.048
Step 2
   Political orientation
  .065
  .063
-.136***
-.139***
-.180***
-.180***
   Interest in politics
  .136**
  .143**
  .190***
  .200***
  .344***
  .339***
   TV news evaluation
  .164***
  .164***
  .006
  .005
  .014
  .010
Step 3
   Internet use
-.039
  -.039
  .016
  .013
-.149***
-.158***
   Total TV viewing
  .037
   ---
  .087*
   ---
  .112**
   ---
   TV news viewing
   ---
  .046
   ---
  .076†
   ---
  .000
Multiple R
  .206**
  .208**
  .328***
  .326***
  .460***
  .448***
R2
  .042
  .043
  .108
  .106
  .211
  .200
R2 increase in Step 3
  .002
  .003
  .007
  .005
  .029
  .018
Note: Table entries are final standardized regression coefficients. 
†p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.
Table 3.
Results of hierarchical regression analyses: Non-NHK news program viewers
Cynicism
Inefficacy
Apathy
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Independent variables
     b
     b
     b
     b
     b
     b
Step 1
   Gender
  .010
  .007
-.077
-.082
  .049
  .032
   Age
-.028
-.034
-.125*
-.136*
-.055
-.052
   Education
  .050
  .036
  .005
-.019
  .019
-.001
Step 2
   Political orientation
  .063
  .063
-.151**
-.151**
-.174***
-.175***
   Interest in politics
  .091
  .111†
  .171**
  .208***
  .403***
  .403***
   TV evaluation
  .165**
  .162**
  .002
-.004
  .053
  .047
Step 3
   Internet use
-.047
-.056
  .104
  .089
-.092
-.111†
   Total TV viewing
  .101†
   ---
  .178**
   ---
  .137*
   ---
   TV news viewing
   ---
  .091
   ---
  .164**
   ---
  .014
Multiple R
  .212†
  .208
  .355***
  .349***
  .496***
  .479***
R2
  .045
  .043
  .126
  .122
  .246
  .229
R2 increase in Step 3
  .012
  .010
  .033
  .029
  .026
  .009
Note: Table entries are final standardized regression coefficients. 
†p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001
Television and political alienation     3

Appendix A. Simple and partial correlation coefficients between each 
program and political inefficacy, cynicism, and apathy scale scores
Upper row = simple r
Lower row = 7th order partial r
Evening news
Inefficacy
Cynicism
Apathy
   News 7 (NHK)
40.2%
   -.050
   -.045
   -.061
    .022
   -.020
   -.012
   News Plus One (NTV)
21.8%
    .007
    .017
    .062
    .009
    .019
    .062
   News Woods (TBS)
23.6%
   -.009
   -.035
    .025
   -.007
   -.030
    .015
   Super News (Fuji TV)
22.8%
    .066
   -.008
    .046
    .045
   -.017
    .045
Nightly news
   News 10 (NHK)
24.7%
   -.139**
   -.102*
   -.098*
   -.092*
   -.098*
   -.071†
   Today's Events (NTV)
26.2%
    .060
    .056
   -.007
    .061
    .063
   -.003
   News 23 (TBS)
37.6%
   -.118**
   -.067†
   -.125**
   -.075†
   -.042
   -.052
   News Station (TV Asahi)
54.9%
   -.007
   -.007
   -.078†
    .032
    .008
   -.026
Weekly information programs
   The Sunday (NTV)
21.3%
    .022
   -.014
   -.014
    .044
   -.005
    .008
   Sunday Morning (TBS)
36.7%
   -.037
   -.001
   -.030
   -.018
   -.005
    .008
   Report 2001 (Fuji TV)
20.4%
   -.088*
   -.111**
   -.058
   -.048
   -.094*
   -.014
   Sunday Project (TV Asahi)
28.1%
   -.135**
   -.082*
   -.210***
   -.028
   -.051
   -.069†
   Broadcaster (TBS)
38.0%
   -.009
   -.059
   -.042
   -.024
   -.044
   -.016
   Takeshi's TV Tackle (TV Asahi)
31.8%
   -.028
   -.028
   -.071†
    .002
   -.017
   -.030
Note: Percentages represent regular viewers of each program. Only 
programs that were watched regularly (at least once a week for daily 
programs and at least once a month for weekly programs) by more than 
20% of respondents were analyzed. Regular viewers were coded 1 and 
non-regular viewers were coded 0.
Seventh-order partial correlations control for gender, age, 
education, political orientation, interest in politics, TV 
evaluation, and Internet use.
†p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001