Content-Type: text/html
American Press Goes to War: The Drive for Patriotism by Mainstream and
Black Newspapers in World War II
A research paper submitted to the AEJMC History Division Kansas City Convention
July 30-August 2, 2003
Removed from the immediate devastation of World War II, the American home
front was uniquely blessed with prosperity. As war production revitalized
the economy, the savings of Americans were estimated to reach a record high
of $40 billion in 1942. To prevent the "loose" dollars from feeding
inflation, the Treasury Department specifically directed the Second War
Loan campaign toward small buyers in order to channel the increased buying
power of the public into bond purchases.[1] In addition to helping the
government finance the war effort, more importantly, the sale of war bonds
and stamps served to raise war consciousness of civilians. To reach every
home with the plea "They Give Their Lives--You Lend Your Money," Treasury
Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. enlisted the help of newspaper publishers
and editors. After a meeting with Morgenthau, representatives of
newspapers and press associations around the country formed the Allied
Newspaper Council to promote the bond campaign. All sections of the press,
including dailies, weeklies, foreign language newspapers, labor and farm
publications, responded with overwhelming support. Even the black press,
despite its criticism of the hypocrisy of war rhetoric, which purported to
secure freedom for all but ignored racism at home, encouraged bond
purchases as an expression of African American loyalty. Black newspapers
in the New York area, for example, held a two-month drive to sell $2
million worth of war bonds.[2]
As the backbone of the drive, the nation's newspapers publicized the
campaign slogan in banner headlines from coast to coast on April 12,
1943. Many papers issued special sections or whole editions dedicated to
the bond drive. In addition to editorial space, the campaign generated
73,938 advertisements in daily and weekly newspapers. Valued at more than
$4.5 million, the publicity was contributed by both advertisers and
publishers.[3] In all, the bond drive, according to the Treasury
Department, enjoyed the largest amount of space devoted to a single service
in the history of American media. In a letter expressing the government's
appreciation, Morgenthau noted "the magnificent help which the press of
America is giving to the war bond campaign."[4]
The contribution of the newspaper industry to the Second War Loan campaign
highlights the role of the press in mobilizing Americans for World War
II. Throughout the war, the journalism profession incorporated patriotic
appeals with news to help the government align Americans' priorities with
war objectives. The significant participation of newspapers in national
mobilization, however, has received little attention from
scholars. Offering only brief discussions of World War II, standard texts
in the field dealt mostly with challenges of reporting the war with its
daunting scope. In their inquiries, journalism historians have focused
mainly on the competition for war front news and the conflict between press
freedom and national security.[5] Other historians, concerned with the
propaganda function of wartime media, have offered studies on most forms of
mass communication including movies,[6] magazines,[7] and advertising,[8]
but not newspapers. This study, therefore, seeks to bring attention to the
press as an important champion of American patriotism in World War II. It
examines wartime issues of four trade journals including Editor &
Publisher, The Guild Reporter, Advertising Age, and Printer's Ink to shed
light on the undercurrents of civic responsibility and business interest
beneath the extensive coverage of home front war effort in both mainstream
newspapers targeting predominantly white readerships and black
newspapers. The analysis of contemporary professional discourses shows
that while the government relied on the expansive reach of print news to
raise civilian morale, the newspaper industry thrived in its promotion of
the war effort to attract readers as well as advertisers.
Industry Stances on Home Front Mobilization
In contrast to the hardship of the Depression years, many Americans
enjoyed higher earnings and standards of living in the war years. To the
chagrin of the government, the newly prosperous home front was apparently
not particularly concerned with the nation's overseas military commitment
to the Allies. Even shortly after General Jonathan Wainwright surrendered
in the Philippines early in May 1942, fewer than 10 percent of civilians
were able to name correctly the much exalted twelve-word credo of the Four
Freedoms.[9] Assessing civilian morale in 1942, a government official
said that Americans were not yet "ankle-deep" into the war effort.[10] The
lack of enthusiastic public support, a prevailing concern of the
administration since the beginning of war, led Treasury officials "to use
bonds to sell the war, rather than vice versa."[11] In its effort to sell
the war to Americans, the government received tremendous support from the
newspaper industry. In May 1942, members of the American Newspaper
Publishers Association made a pledge during their annual meeting to show
President Roosevelt their "individual and unswerving support in this hour
of crisis."[12] The Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, formed in
February 1940, also reiterated full support of the black press at its
annual conference. Later during the year, the American Newspaper Guild
sent a similar message to the president showing the commitment of more than
18,000 newspaper workers.[13] Local chapters of national trade
organizations and state press associations also declared war policies and
implemented war programs to mobilize the industry's resources.[14]
With a strong patriotic sentiment in the news room, if all journalists did
not act as "patriots first and reporters second"[15] in the words of Byron
Price, director of the Office of Censorship, at least many of them embraced
both roles. As reiterated in professional forums such as Editor &
Publisher and the Guild Reporter, the wartime duty of journalists was to
keep the public informed as well as inspired.[16] "The newspaper industry
has a product of its own, too," declared the Newspaper Guild, "It is
citizen morale."[17] Energized by the challenge of national mobilization,
the role of the press in society was reformulated to incorporate the
traditional journalistic obligation of informing the public with a new
sense of civic advocacy. The attempt of Editor & Publisher to develop a
national pool of editorial ideas to help win the war illustrated the dual
responsibilities of the press in wartime society: "U. S. dailies have a
wartime duty to do beyond the printing of news. As leaders and influencers
of the civilian population they are obligated to arouse civilians to the
war's importance; encourage them to buy bonds, save rubber and volunteer
for defense work and in other respects be good citizens, promote civilian
and soldier morale [emphasis included]."[18]
As patriotism became the center of news media's social responsibility in
wartime, publishers, editors, and reporters strove to stimulate patriotic
enthusiasm through the news platform.[19] In addition to extensive
coverage of the war, the New York Times, for example, donated a 1,000-line
space each week to leading advertising agencies for their most effective
appeal to the patriotism of Americans. Even the Chicago Tribune, noted for
its anti-Roosevelt editorial policy, demonstrated tremendous support for
the war effort. During the first year of the war, the paper devoted 14
percent of its editorial content to building civilian morale. Worth more
than $3,300,000 if sold to advertisers, the amount of space represented
more than 70 percent of the total expenditures of general advertising in
the Tribune.[20] Although not as prominent as metropolitan dailies such as
the Times and the Tribune, small-town newspapers, which were more attuned
to local conditions, played an instrumental part in generating interest in
the government's vast war program throughout the country. In the mountain
valley city of Yakima, Washington, for example, the Daily Republic
contributed more than 7,500 inches in editorial space and almost 6,000
inches in advertising space to bond campaigns alone in the first two years
of the war. Other war programs such the Red Cross War Fund and the U. S.
Crop Corps also received extensive coverage in the paper. Publisher W. H.
Robertson said that he hoped to help put the country "on the proper basis
for an all-out war effort," because newspapers, with their reach into the
community, were "better equipped than any other medium for the selling job
necessary to this accomplishment."[21]
Geared toward promoting civilian commitment to every phase of the war
effort, the public service of the newspaper industry blurred lines between
the practice of journalism and the dissemination of propaganda. The
approach of the press to home front mobilization reflected a firm if
somewhat naive conviction in the persuasive power of words shared by many
in the journalism profession as well as in the burgeoning field of
government war information service.[22] The outbreak of war brought a
mushrooming network of government information services to the nation's
capital in 1941. In addition to the expanding public relations units found
in almost every federal and military agency, an assortment of new
organizations such as the Office of Emergency Management and the Office of
Facts and Figures were created to coordinate the dissemination of defense
information.[23] During the fiscal year of 1941, the fledging machinery of
war information cost the government $10 million, with 1,400 journalists,
stenographers, and clerks working in nine federal bureaus to churn out
information on the Army, the Navy, the Treasury, the State Department, and
other war agencies. These media professionals believed that dramatic and
vivid presentation of the country's war effort would eliminate public
apathy, which hampered unified support for the government's war
measures. The press's job, as a 1942 editorial in Editor & Publisher
reiterated, was to "guide public thought to the best of editorial
minds."[24] From military recruitment, sales of war bonds, promotion of
victory gardens, to drives for womanpower, the newspaper industry joined
forces with the government in more than fifty campaigns to build a home
front army of patriotic citizens.[25] As journalism historian Sidney Kobre
noted, the media turned themselves into social instruments to carry out
civic and war objectives. [26] Acknowledging the function of the press in
home front mobilization, Byron Price commented that "the problem of public
morale would be beyond solution in this free country but for the daily
services of newspapers."[27] Republican Representative Charles A. Halleck
from Indiana also hailed the press as "one of our most potent internal
weapons."[28]
The leadership role of the press in building civilian morale not only
gained the appreciation of government officials but also became popular
within the industry as well. To leaders in the field of journalism, the
most controversial issue about the morale boosting function of newspapers
was a conflict between accepting war advertising sponsored directly by the
government and maintaining the independence of the Fourth
Estate. Generally publishers favored the plea of Editor & Publisher for
accepting government advertising while some editors cautioned against the
strings attached, such as increasing government control and loss of public
trust.[29] Overall, only occasionally was criticism registered about the
integrity of the journalism profession as it ventured further into the
quagmire of government propaganda. In the wake of World War I, propaganda
became identified with shameless falsehood and insidious
influence. Because of the war hysteria and exaggerated hope for peace
incited by the work of the Creel Committee, Americans grew particularly
wary of the dissemination of domestic propaganda.[30] The means of mass
manipulation was considered a violation of the principle of democracy as an
exercise of individual free will. It was under the specter of public
distrust that President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9182 on June 13,
1942, to establish the Office of War Information as the government's
propaganda machinery, carefully using the term "war information" to
describe its operation in order to avoid the suspicion of brainwashing the
public.[31]
Savvy leaders in the newspaper industry also tried to steer their
cooperation with the government away from the negative stereotype of war
propaganda. In July 1943, at the invitation of the domestic branch of the
Office of War Information, nine industry leaders formed an advisory
committee presumably to improve the service provided by the agency for the
press. Headed by Roy Roberts, managing editor of the Kansas City Star and
president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the committee,
perhaps anticipating disapproval, insisted that it was interested only in
making war news more accessible to the public. Denying involvement in
helping the government sell the war to Americans, the public statement
conceded nevertheless that the committee's goal to maintain an open flow of
war information also served to raise civilian morale.[32]
The disclaimer did not keep critics from voicing concerns about conflict
of interest. "The propaganda interests of any government in war or peace
are incompatible with the complete freedom of news and of opinion which
editors should maintain," warned Carl W. Ackerman, dean of the graduate
School of Journalism at Columbia University, demanding that Roberts resign
from his OWI position. In response, Roberts defended the work of the
committee, saying that "If the war isn't won there won't be any free press
or independent journalism. That's our first job."[33] Echoing Robert's
position, others in the news industry saw themselves not as agents of
domestic propaganda but as leaders in the fight for the American way of
life--a life built on the principle of free enterprise without which the
business of newspaper publishing could not survive.[34] The pages of a
newspaper represented simply a powerful medium of public education at the
disposal of patriotic journalists to help readers fulfill their civic
responsibilities in wartime society.
In contrast to the mainstream press, whose strategy for mobilization
emphasized the obligations of American citizens, the black press advocated
full rights for minorities in its approach to the war. Despite the
moderate increase in job opportunities, the war intensified, rather than
alleviated, the social predicaments facing African Americans. Widespread
race riots in the crisis period from 1941 through 1943 registered
increasing racial tension and discontent among blacks. Continuing
discrimination both in the military and civilian sectors further affected
their sagging morale. A poll undertaken by the Office of Facts and Figures
in New York City in May 1942 found that only 44 percent of blacks
interviewed felt that their lives had improved since the war and the
majority did not believe that their lives would be better after the war. A
total of 18 percent actually felt that they would be better off under
Japanese rule. [35] Reflecting the general skepticism of African Americans
toward the war effort, James G. Thompson, in a letter to the Pittsburgh
Courier in January 1942, posed the question: "Should I sacrifice to live
'half American'?" He called on blacks to defend the United States abroad
and fight for true democracy at home as well, urging them to "adopt the
double VV for a double victory. The first V for victory over our enemies
from without, the second V for victory over our enemies from within."[36]
The next issue of the Courier initiated the campaign with four Double V
drawings. Other papers quickly adopted the "Double V" platform to foster
positive attitudes toward the war effort while they continued the tradition
of protest in the black press.[37] Denounced by critics as a call for an
immediate racial revolution, the campaign in fact aimed to channel the
growing militancy of blacks into full participation in the war as a
strategy to promote Allied war aims while demanding racial equality in the
United States. Opposing any form of civil resistance, the black press
orchestrated the campaign mainly to motivate African Americans to
contribute to the war effort by connecting their struggle against racism
with the war's ideological commitment to freedom and democracy. The Double
V stance thus allowed the black press to expose discrimination in the
defense program and at the same time cooperate with the government to
mobilize the support of African Americans. Working with various war
agencies such as the War Production Board, the Selective Service, and the
OWI, black publishers sought to convince their readers through the rhetoric
of the Double V policy that blacks, too, had a stake in the outcome of the war.
Industry Concerns with the Bottom Line
The war service of both mainstream and black newspapers was driven not
only by their respective civic commitments but also their common concerns
with the industry's well-being in the uncertain wartime economy. Although
readership peaked during the war years, the enterprise of newspaper
publishing nevertheless faced new challenges such as increasing government
control, competition with other media, mainly the radio, and above all the
specter of decreasing advertising revenues. Promotion of war campaigns
offered an all-around solution to alleviate the pressure to survive and
prosper as a profit-oriented business. Repeatedly urging newspapers to
publicize their contribution to the war effort, Frank Tripp, general
manager of the Gannett newspapers and chairman of the Allied Newspaper
Council and the Bureau of Advertising of the ANPA, told publishers in an
off-record address that "we need it not alone to take our place with
industry and our advertisers who are paying their money to build their own
case, but we need it to crystallize in the minds of the people and the
government that we are having a big hand in the winning of this war. . . .
if we are to emerge from the crisis with the public appreciation and the
honor and the glory which are due the American press."[38] Echoing Tripp's
emphasis on the promotional value of war coverage, Basil L. Walters,
executive editor of the Minneapolis Star-Journal and Tribune, touted the
achievement of the press in gaining "good-will and better understanding of
the value of the newspaper" through war service. At the 1943 conference of
the National Newspaper Promotion Association in New York, he urged all
newspapers to be more aggressive in their war promotion both from the
standpoint of social contribution and "intelligent self-interest."[39]
A genuine desire to contribute to a larger cause no doubt motivated
publishers to promote the war effort, but potential pressure from the
government also presented an important incentive for them to help with the
distribution of propaganda messages. Wartime shortages of material and
labor kept businesses including the newspaper industry under the increasing
authority of the federal government. Publishers, for example, were subject
to the orders of the Selective Service for draft deferments to retain their
employees on the mechanical and editorial staffs; the restrictions of the
Office of Price Administration to provide gas rations for their reporters;
and the regulations of War Production Board to obtain their share of
newsprint and other materials such as zinc, copper, and brass. To
publishers of black newspapers, the power of the government posed an even
more daunting obstacle. Through the war years, FBI investigations and the
threat of sedition charges haunted the black press, which was viewed by the
government as an obstruction to the war effort because of its attack on
racism.[40] Aside from FBI harassment, black publishers faced a particular
hardship under regulations holding their metropolitan weeklies, even those
that were nationally circulated, to the same newsprint quota as much
smaller white country weeklies. They suspected that the government was
using inequitable restrictions to retaliate for their demand for racial
equality in the war effort.[41] In addition to the difficulty of obtaining
necessary trade material, black newspapers struggled also with the lack of
sufficient access in the process of gathering government information. Many
officials simply refused to allow black correspondents in their press
briefings let alone grant them personal interviews.
In order to function as smoothly as possible under such wartime curbs, it
was important for both mainstream and black newspapers to gain the good
will of the government through cooperation in publicizing war
programs.[42] Official recognition of the industry as an essential part of
the war effort often led to benefits for publishers such as exemption from
tightening restrictions on telephone installations in 1942 and expansion of
editorial personnel on the list of "critical occupations" in the manpower
crunch in 1943.[43] The pressure of government surveillance also prompted
outspoken black publishers to show their good faith intentions through
promotion of war aims. In a meeting between Attorney General Francis
Biddle and Chicago Defender publisher John Sengstacke in June 1942, the
government agreed not to indict any black publisher for sedition. In
response, Sengstacke promised that the black press would promote the war
effort if black reporters could gain more access to government press
conferences.[44] Cooperation with the government in raising the morale of
African Americans helped the black press establish itself as an effective
and responsible agent in the promotion of national unity. Furthermore, the
contribution of black newspapers to civilian morale enhanced the political
leverage of their publishers. For instance, in a conference with President
Roosevelt on February 5, 1944, the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association
presented a twenty-one point statement of current and postwar aims of
African Americans. Bringing three months of agitation to an end, the
meeting culminated in the certification of the first black White House
correspondent. Five days later, Harry S. McAlpin, former chief of the
Chicago Defender Washington bureau, attended the president's press
conference as the correspondent of the Atlanta Daily World.[45]
Aside from production difficulties posed by government regulations,
newspapers were threatened by the rise of radio, whose ubiquitous household
presence seemed to encroach on the sphere of influence wielded by the press
as the primary medium of public communication. Claims about war
contribution from the broadcasting industry such as "$100,000,000 Worth of
Talent and Time," "300,000,000 Listeners a Week," and "891 Stations
Broadcast 8,000 Messages a Day,"[46] spurred the newspaper industry on in
the race for the public's attention, trust, and appreciation. Extensive
coverage of the ever changing war directives offered newspapers much-needed
opportunities to boost their popularity by helping readers adjust to
wartime conditions. Through detailed reports of the latest information on
how to save, how to find war jobs, and how to conserve resources, the press
sought to establish an outstanding record of public service by interpreting
the nation's complicated war effort in local terms that affected the
everyday life of Americans.
War publicity was particularly significant to mainstream newspapers
because it enhanced their financial prospect. In the early stage of the
war when manufacturers switched to war production, a gloomy outlook on
advertising haunted the newspaper industry. The advertising field
projected a loss of 80 percent of business in the course of the war due to
the lack of consumers goods to sell as a result of rationing and expanding
war production.[47] In light of the cutback in World War I, which
eventually forced more than 2,300 newspapers into suspension,[48] the
plunging index of advertising activity was particularly devastating to
mainstream newspapers because, unlike black newspapers, they depended on
advertising rather than circulation as the main source of revenue. The
fear of loss in linage was soon offset by the rise in war
advertising.[49] With the blessing of the Treasury ruling that a
"reasonable" advertising expenditure to maintain good will was permissible
as a corporate income tax deduction,[50] businesses continued to advertise
throughout the war years to keep their brand names visible. Those no
longer offering civilian goods, however, could not justify huge expenses on
direct product advertising for tax purposes. Even for companies still
selling to the public, the traditional pitch that encouraged unlimited
consumption was not as viable given the government's concern with inflation
and conserving national resources. Instead both institutional and retail
advertising turned to the patriotic appeal, and sponsoring publicity of war
causes on the home front became a common public relations
strategy. Statements made by President Roosevelt on several occasions
illustrated the government's appreciation of the role of advertising in
financing the publicity of war information. In a message to the 38th
annual convention of the Advertising Federation of America, Roosevelt,
thanking advertisers for reiterating "the desire for liberty and freedom"
in their war effort, reassured the industry its place in wartime economy.[51]
In addition to the need for a fresh promotional angle, the crusade of the
War Advertising Council made tie-ins with war programs popular in
advertising. Representing a united front of advertisers, agencies, and
media, the Council was created to defend the legitimacy of advertising,
which not only appeared to be superfluous in the wartime economy but also
suffered from general public distrust as a result of the consumer
movement.[52] In response, the industry launched an aggressive campaign
to improve its image and to prevent drastic curtailment by the government
through advertising contribution to the war effort.[53] Eager to render
its service available to the government, the Council rallied more than 400
agencies to send the American public "a war message in every
ad."[54] Throughout the war years, advertisers supported every war
objective of the government as the number of campaigns served by the
Council increased from fourteen in 1942 to sixty-two in 1944.[55] As shown
by the $352,650,000 worth of advertising contributed to home front
campaigns in 1943, the advertising industry successfully weathered its
wartime crisis by converting the commercial tool of persuasion into an
important extension of domestic propaganda.[56]
Eager to tap the trend of wartime advertising, the American Newspaper
Publishers Association started its public relations effort early in the war
with a booklet titled "Advertising Goes to War" to showcase the value of
newspaper advertising as "a vital war weapon on the home front."[57] As
the war progressed, the publication grew into a regular series, promoting
newspapers as the ideal medium for the war effort of advertisers, whose
enthusiasm pumped new lifeblood into the nation's press. "It is evident
that a lot of space has been sold in connection with national and community
war efforts," a newspaper advertising executive observed in July 1942, "and
an important new source of advertising has been established."[58] By 1943,
expenditure on war advertising in newspapers had soared to $65 million a
year.[59] Reinvigorating the newspaper industry with a new source of
revenue, the popularity of war themes in advertising exerted a strong, if
not openly acknowledged, influence on the news agenda. Promotion of war
programs generally increased the attention of readers in the war effort and
thereby reinforced the interest of advertisers in the war angle.[60] For
example, touting news coverage as the key to public understanding and
acceptance of food rationing, a trade journal article urged publishers to
capitalize on the rise in readership as a result of increased concern with
the food issue: "If advertisers and agencies are deluged with reminders of
the upward surge of newspapers they may become more sharply aware of the
strength and vitality of the medium."[61]
The constant effort to court war-minded advertisers made coverage of war
programs all the more important as evidence of a high level of editorial
commitment to the war effort. Observance of the National Newspaper Week
highlighted the financial significance of the industry's war
service. Driven by the concern that "newspapers should be sold to the
advertisers, sold to readers, sold to boards of directors, sold to
advertising agencies [emphasis included],"[62] the industry had, since the
war, expanded the event in the first week of October into an annual
publicity blitz geared toward peddling the war contribution of
newspapers. In 1942, publishers launched a gigantic scrap metal collection
campaign and doubled their effort in war bond promotion. The following
year, under the slogan, "Free Press: The Key to Four Freedoms," the program
emphasized the achievements of newspapers in aiding various war campaigns
as a way of "selling the public on the importance of newspaper advertising
as a part of the free enterprise system."[63] Aside from the publicity
initiated by trade organizations, for individual newspapers, an outstanding
record of war service provided the best material for self promotion. From
the Alhambra Post-Advocate in California to the Daily Sentinel in Colorado,
ads and booklets with titles such as "Newspapers Goes All Out for Victory"
and "The Daily Sentinel Goes to War," helped publishers lure advertising
dollars with their editorial promotion of the war effort.[64]
In addition to the general drive to increase the advertising capital of
the industry, the more specific editorial decisions in the newsroom also
reflected the influence of war advertising as the revenue potential of a
war campaign added a new dimension to the assessment of news value. The
intensive news coverage that turned the Victory Garden campaign into a
national movement in the spring of 1943 illustrated the power of
advertising in enticing newspapers to gear their editorial resources toward
lineage prospects. Special food and gardening supplements allowed some
newspaper advertising managers to raise the ratio of ads to news to 50
percent by selling space to businesses that normally did not advertise in
their publications. The revenue draw gave newspapers a great incentive to
promote Victory Gardens both as a community service and a means of
attracting advertisers.[65] To tap the opportunities for institutional
advertising and greater lineage from garden supplies, the Milwaukee
Journal, for example, developed a comprehensive publicity package that
included not only its news columns but also a daily almanac, women's
features, picture layouts, garden club activities, editorials, and comments
from government officials to encourage gardening as a vital aid to the war
effort.[66]
In case the editorial staff did not grasp the advertising advantages of
the campaign, Editor & Publisher suggested that it was up to the
promotional department to bring on the pressure. "We cannot urge too
strongly every salesman reading this piece to immediately bring to the
attention of his editors the importance of frequent news items on Victory
Gardens. There's a lot of lineage to be obtained from immediately starting
to sell every available prospect in our market the idea of running copy on
Victory Gardens."[67] The pursuit for advertising revenue meant that when
newspapers planned their news budgets, they were more inclined to lavish
attention on war programs perceived as suitable vehicles for
advertisements. Programs that were popular with advertisers also commanded
greater editorial support as a result of the vested interest of newspapers
themselves in the success of the war causes of their sponsors, which in
turn added to the prestige of the news institution.[68]
Although black newspapers operated under a different system of financial
support, war service nevertheless influenced their business
prospects. While mainstream newspapers received only about one-third of
their revenues from circulation, black papers made almost all of their
profits from copy sales because of the dearth of support from
advertisers. As one historian observed, "Beyond advertisements about skin
bleachers, hair straighteners, and magic lodestones, the black publisher
was stymied in his effort to gather advertising."[69] The lack of
substantial revenues from advertising made readership satisfaction all the
more important to the black press. Through war service, black newspapers
could better meet the need of the majority of their wartime
readers. According to a 1943 readership survey, 96 percent of black
newspaper readers desired more emphasis in the news on the role of blacks
in the war.[70] War coverage from a minority viewpoint helped black
newspapers increase their circulation as the mainstream media almost all
but completely ignored the contribution of African Americans to the war
effort. As a devoted reader of the Chicago Defender wrote, "Surely I read
the daily papers, magazines, etc., but what do I get out of them? . . . In
other words, the white paper is published for the white man, not for the
American people as a whole. . . . I read the paper (the Defender) from
front to back. This is the one and only way to see what part the Negro is
playing in this struggle for world freedom in civilian and army
life."[71] The racial bias in mainstream news accounts created a market
niche for the black press to provide a chronicle of the lives of blacks in
the war years and to counter the negative stereotypes readers often
encountered in their daily newspapers.[72]
More importantly, the war service of black newspapers allowed them to
address the interest of their readership by rallying the support of African
Americans for the country's war effort without deferring the demand for
equal opportunities both in civilian and military sectors. As historian
Lee Finkle noted, the wartime policy of the black press was "an approach
that sought to encourage mass support for the war aims of the country
attuned to the propaganda needs of the black community."[73] Critics often
charged the black press for what was perceived as a militant stance that
served only to incite its readers but failed to represent the majority of
African Americans. A nationwide survey showed, however, that 84 percent of
the people polled felt that the black press did speak for most
blacks.[74] Had the black press adopted the call to "close ranks" as it
did in World War I,[75] it would not have been able to maintain the trust
of its readership and attract the national attention that boosted many
papers' circulation in the war years. W. E. B. Du Bois, who was faulted
after World War I for the setback in the advancement of blacks because of
his wartime support for a truce in racial struggles, underscored the
business interest of publishers in continuing the protest tradition of the
black press in World War II. "They know in what kind of news Negroes are
interested," he wrote in 1943 in defense of black newspapers that took what
critics perceived as a sensationalist approach to race relations. "If it
(the black press) becomes shrill with resentment and bold in its demands it
is because the surge of feeling in the Negro race demands and applauds this
kind of expression. If a Negro newspaper tried to stem this tide of
feeling it would immediately feel the result in rapidly decreasing
circulation."[76]
The war promotion of the black press reflected primarily its orientation
toward an African American readership. Black publishers nevertheless
shared with white publishers similar interest in pursuing war advertising
as an additional source of revenue. Like the mainstream press, the black
press also benefited from excess profits tax rulings during the war years,
which allowed businesses to continue their advertising campaigns. The
Pittsburgh Courier, the largest black newspaper in the country, for
example, enjoyed increasing attention from national advertisers as the
number of advertisements in the paper rose from 402 in 1941 to 709 in
1944.[77] Even though advertising had less editorial control over the
black press than the mainstream press, when advertisers started buying
space in black newspapers in 1942, publishers generally softened their
criticism to make their publications appear moderate and hence more
attractive to advertisers as a promotional vehicle.[78] Critics in the war
decade noted the increasing influence of advertising on the editorial
content of black newspapers. Thomas Sancton, editor of the New Republic,
for example, wrote in April 1943 that "Negro publishers are apt to be
primarily business men whose interest in race welfare is secondary to their
interest in selling newspapers."[79] Under the pressure of wartime
economy, both mainstream and black newspapers made extensive effort not
only to provide public forums of war information but also to protect their
private capital investments.
Conclusion
The newspaper industry's enthusiasm in promoting war effort on the home
front turned the American press into a central forum of war information
instrumental in the distribution of propaganda for civilian
mobilization. Throughout the war years, the government relied greatly on
the industry's editorial and advertising resources to forge civilian
support for its war measures. Media promotion of war bonds and stamps, for
example, helped "demonstrate to our armed forces, our allies and our
enemies what a voluntary and united effort we can accomplish on the
American home front," said Treasury Secretary Morgenthau.[80] The
patriotic message in pages and pages of information on the war effort that
won the wartime administration's appreciation was all the more effective,
delivered not through a channel owned by the government but a medium
familiar to newspaper readers. Geared toward inspiring Americans'
patriotism, the seemingly simple journalist accounts of war programs were
motivated, however, by the newspaper industry's complicated responses to
changing wartime conditions. Despite some concern with freedom of the
press, most in the journalism profession embraced their civic
responsibility as opinion leaders to help the government build an army
of patriotic citizens on the home front. Although frequently
misunderstood by contemporary critics, black newspapers approached the war
effort with an emphasis on both the civil rights and patriotism of African
Americans. The dedication of both mainstream and black newspapers to war
promotion was also an orchestrated business move in response to the
pressure of increasing government control and the threat of decreasing
advertising revenues. By promoting the war effort, the newspaper industry
cultivated the good will of government officials and strengthened its
financial edge. Through the war decade, newspapers, enjoying a tremendous
lead over other media, claimed a steady share of approximately one-third of
the total advertising expenditure, which rose from nearly $2 billion in
1942 to over $4 billion in 1948.[81] Although black newspapers did not
benefit financially as much from the wartime advertising boon, they
balanced the civil rights agenda with a patriotic spirit to satisfy the
information needs of African American readers and increased the
institutional prestige of the black press in American society. Overall,
the newspaper industry not only weathered but also prospered from wartime
challenges with its investment in the drive for patriotism on the American
home front in World War II.
[1] Walter A. Steigleman, "The Second War Loan Campaign--Its Organization
and Operation," Journalism Quarterly 20: 2 (June 1943): 130.
[2]
"Negro Bond Drive," Editor & Publisher, 24 April 1943, 106.
[3]
Steigleman, 136-38.
[4]
"Newspaper Carriers Sell 50 Million in War Stamps," Chicago Daily
Tribune, 30 September 1942, 31; and "Newspapers Qualify As War Bond
Issuers," New York Times, 19 November 1942, 1.
[5]
See, for example, Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, The Press and America:
An Interpretive History of the Mass Media (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1984), 473-86; Sidney Kobre, Development of American
Journalism (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1969), 684-90;
Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism, A History: 1690-1960 (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1962), 741-802; Richard W. Steele, "News of the 'Good
War': World War II News Management," Journalism Quarterly 62: 4 (Winter
1985): 707-16, 783; Robert W. Desmond, Tides of War: World News Reporting,
1940-1945 (Iowa: Iowa University Press, 1984); Patrick S. Washburn, "FDR
Versus His Own Attorney General: The Struggle over Sedition, 1941-42,"
Journalism Quarterly 62:4 (Winter 1985): 717-24; Theodore F. Koop, Weapon
of Silence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); and Robert L.
Bishop and LaMar S. Mackay, "Mysterious Silence, Lyrical Scream,"
Journalism Monographs 11 (May 1971): 1-39.
[6] The connection between Hollywood and war propaganda has received the
most attention from media scholars. See Melva Joyce Baker, Images of Women
in Film: The War Years, 1941-1945 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press,
1980); Ralph R. Donald, "Hollywood and World War II: Enlisting Feature
Films as Propaganda" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, 1987);
Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, "What to Show the World: The Office
of War Information and Hollywood, 1942-1945," Journal of American History
64 (1977): 87-105, "Blacks, Loyalty, and Motion-Picture Propaganda in World
War II," Journal of American History 73 (September 1986): 383-406,
Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits, and Propaganda Shaped World
War II Movies (New York: The Free Press, 1987); and Michael Renov,
Hollywood's Wartime Woman: Representation and Ideology (Ann Arbor: UMI
Research Press, 1988).
[7] Maureen Honey, Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and
Propaganda during World War II (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts
Press, 1984).
[8] Frank W. Fox, Madison Avenue Goes to War: The Strange Military Career
of American Advertising, 1941-1945 (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University
Press, 1975).
[9] Jerome S. Bruner, "OWI and the American Public," Public Opinion
Quarterly 17:1 (Spring 1943): 129-131.
[10]
Hillier Krieghbaum, "The Office of War Information And Government News
Policy," Journalism Quarterly 19:3 (September 1942): 246; and A. H. Feller,
"OWI on the Home Front," Public Opinion Quarterly 7:1 (Spring 1943): 57.
[11]
John Morton Blum, V Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture during
World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 17.
[12]
"ANPA Talks War," Newsweek, 4 May 1942, 60.
[13]
"Murray Keynotes Guild's Role in Wartime," The Guild Reporter, 4 July
1942, 3; and "Full Program for Wartime Is Approved," The Guild Reporter, 4
July 1942, 1, 13.
[14]
"Guild's War Course Is Charted," The Guild Reporter, 15 January 1942, 1;
"With the Auxiliary: Beat Hitler Week Coming Up," The Guild Reporter, 15
January 1942, 6; "Guild Gives 55,750 for War," The Guild Reporter, 1 May
1942, 1; "Guild Promotes Victory Sales," The Guild Reporter, 15 March 1942,
6; "War Program Is Advanced by Guildsmen," The Guild Reporter, 15 December
1942, 6; "Tennessee Press Meets in Nashville," Editor & Publisher, 11 July
1942, 42; and "Contributed Space," Editor & Publisher, 20 February 1943, 8.
[15]
"Price Says Press Stimulated Morale," Editor & Publisher, 10 October
1942, 10.
[16]
"'Whereas . . . Therefore Be It Resolved . . . ,'" The Guild Reporter, 15
March 1942, 6; "Comics at War," Editor & Publisher, 21 November 1942, 22;
T. S. Irvin, "Wartime Service," Editor & Publisher, 5 December 1942, 36;
"'Typical' Daily's Record Shows Aid to War Effort," Editor & Publisher, 24
July 1943, 37; and "Ad Bureau Release," Editor & Publisher, 31 July 1943, 28.
[17]
"Boston Offers Program for Morale," The Guild Reporter, 15 March 1942, 6.
[18] "Suggest Newspaper Pool of War-Winning Ideas," Editor & Publisher, 4
July 1942, 14.
[19] "Daily Aids U.S.O.," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 42; "N. Y.
Times Gives 1,000-Line Space for War Message," Editor & Publisher, 12
December 1942, 12; "Contributed Space," Editor & Publisher, 20 February
1943, 8; and "Milwaukee Survey Shows Extent of Daily's Aid in War," Editor
& Publisher, 12 June 1943, 52.
[20] "How a Newspaper Contributes to War," Editor & Publisher, 30 January
1943, 24.
[21] "'Typical' Daily's Record," Editor & Publisher, 24 July 1943, 37.
[22] "Fourth Estate," Newsweek, 17 November 1941, 60-61.
[23] For the early development of government information services in
World War II, see Robert L. Bishop and LaMar S. Mackay, "Mysterious
Silence, Lyrical Scream," Journalism Monographs 11 (May 1971): 1-21.
[24] "Comics and the War," Editor & Publisher, 21 November 1942, 22.
[25] Mott, 766.
[26] Kobre, 688.
[27] "Price Says Press Stimulated Morale," Editor & Publisher, 10 October
1942, 10.
[28] San Francisco Chronicle, 5 March 1943, 6.
[29] See "The Press: Bundles for Publishers?" Time, 4 May 1942, 68;
"Government Use of Advertising Proposed to Speed War Effort," Editor &
Publisher, 17 January 1942, 3; "Not a Subsidy," Editor & Publisher, 14
February 1942, 22; "Two State Groups Urge U. S. to Use Paid Advertising,"
Editor & Publisher, 28 February 1942, 8; "A.S.N.E. to Vote on Question of
Government Paid Advertising," Editor & Publisher, 25 April 1942, 17; and
"U. S. Department of Commerce Strongly Urges Use of Paid Space by the
Government," American Press 60:6 (April 1942): 3.
[30] Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War
Information, 1942-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 1-7.
[31] For controversy on the government's operation of domestic
propaganda, see Elmer Davis, "OWI Has a Job," Public Opinion Quarterly 7:1
(Spring 1943): 8-9.
[32] "OWI Newspaper Advisory Group Lists 7 Principles," Editor &
Publisher, 17 July 1943, 12, 22.
[33] "Roy Roberts Refuses to Resign from OWI Group," Editor & Publisher,
17 July 1943, 12.
[34] Explaining to the nation's publishers why it was important for
newspapers to help win the war, the letter from Frank Tripp, chairman of
the Allied Newspaper Council, illustrated the internal rationalization for
the industry's war effort. See Steigleman, 133-34.
[35] Office of Facts and Figures, "The Negro Looks at the War," Report
No. 21, 19 May 1942 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress), cited in
Charles David Lloyd, "American Society and Values in World War II from the
Publications of the Office of War Information" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown
University, 1975), 202-203.
[36] James G. Thompson, "Should I Sacrifice to Live 'Half American'?"
Pittsburgh Courier, 31 January 1942, 3.
[37] For the rise of the Double V campaign in the black press, see
Patrick S. Washburn, "The Pittsburgh Courier's Double V Campaign in 1942."
American Journalism 3:2 (1986): 73-86; and Lee Finkle, Forum for Protest:
The Black Press during World War II (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University
Press, 1975), 108-28.
[38] "Tripp Tells 4-A Press Is Asset in War Effort," Editor & Publisher,
21 November 1942, 11; and Frank Tripp, "Urges Newspapers to Promote Own
Interests," Editor & Publisher, 10 June 1944, 53.
[39] T. S. Irvin, "NNPA Plans Greater Role in Press Drives Aiding War
Effort," Editor & Publisher, 24 April 1943, 19.
[40] For the wartime struggle of the black press for First Amendment
rights, see Patrick S. Washburn, "FDR Versus His Own Attorney General: The
Struggle over Sedition, 1941-42," Journalism Quarterly 62:4 (Winter 1985):
717-24; "J. Edgar Hoover and the Black Press in World War II," Journalism
History 13: 1 (Spring 1986): 26-33; and A Question of Sedition: The Federal
Government's Investigation of the Black Press during World War II (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
[41] John D. Stevens, "From the Back of the Foxhole: Black Correspondents
in World War II," Journalism Monographs 27 (1987): 7; and "Negro Press
Holds Meeting in New York," Editor & Publisher, 24 June 1944, 18.
[42] "Newsprint Unaffected in WPB Program," Editor & Publisher, 11 July
1942, 12; "Not Realistic," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 20; "OWI
Supports Publishers in Protest on Zinc," Editor & Publisher, 15 August
1942, 9; "ASNE Fights For Free Press Against Federal Controls," Editor &
Publisher, 20 February 1943, 7; and Walter E. Schneider, "ANPA Acts to Save
Free Press Threatened by Wartime Curbs," Editor & Publisher, 24 April 1943 9.
[43] "Press Exempt," Editor & Publisher, 12 September 1942, 4; "Manpower
Pinch," Editor & Publisher, 9 January 1943, 22; "News Editors, Photogs
Added to 'Critical List,'" Editor & Publisher, 6 February 1943, 32; and
"Four Newspaper Jobs Remain 'Essential' in New Draft List," Editor &
Publisher, 21 August 1943, 6.
[44] Washburn, "J. Edgar Hoover," 28-29.
[45] "Negroes Ask Right to Press Galleries," Editor & Publisher, 20
November 1943, 20; and "First Negro Newsman Covers White House," Editor &
Publisher, 12 February 1944, 37.
[46] T. S. Irvin, "Paper Should Record Their War Contribution," Editor &
Publisher, 24 July 1943, 30.
[47] L. D. H. Weld, "Advertising during Two World Wars," Printer's Ink,
25 January 1943, 16.
[48] In addition to the lack of advertising support, various repressive
laws also contributed to the demise of some of the newspapers that went out
of business in World War I. "Importance of Advertising," Editor &
Publisher, 11 July 1942, 20; and "Ark. Press Discusses Wartime Problems,"
Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 42.
[49] For the influence of IRS tax rulings on newspaper advertising, see
Edward E. Adams and Rajiv Sekhri, "Daily Newspaper Advertising Trends
During World War II: IRS Tax Rulings and the War Bond Drives," American
Journalism 12 (1995):201-12; and Mary Alice Sentman and Patrick S.
Washburn, "How Excess Profits Tax Brought Ads to Black Newspaper in World
War II," Journalism Quarterly 64 (1987): 769-774, 867.
[50] For example, the Internal Revenue Service said in a statement in
September 1942 that "the bureau realizes that it may be necessary for
taxpayers now engaged in war production to maintain, through advertising,
their trade names and the knowledge of the quality of their products and
good will built up over past years, so that when they return to peace time
production their names and the quality of their products will be known to
the public." See "Necessary Ads Are Allowed in Tax Deduction," Chicago
Daily Tribune, 30 September 1942, 32; "Advertising as Government Sees It,"
Printer's Ink, 9 October 1942, 13-14, 28; and "Wartime Use of Advertising
Acknowledged by Treasury," Advertising Age, 31 August 1942.
[51] See "Advertising in Wartime," Newsweek, 6 July 1942, 49; and Blum,
18-19.
[52] For the wartime struggle of the advertising industry, see "That Was
1942," Printer's Ink, 5 February 1943, 148; "Educators Called for
Curtailing of Ads," Printer's Ink, 8 January 1943, 52; "Advertising in the
War," Time, 22 March 1943, 68; and Frank W. Fox, Madison Avenue Goes to
War: The Strange Military Career of American Advertising, 1941-45 (Provo,
Utah: Brigham University Press, 1975), 49-66.
[53] P. H Erbes, Jr., "Advertising Agencies Are Contributing Many
Thousands of Hours to War Effort," Printer's Ink, 27 November 1942, 60, 62,
64; and "World's Greatest System of Mass Communication Is at Call of U. S.
Government," Printer's Ink, 10 April 1942, 33.
[54] "'War Message in Every Ad' Set Up as Goal of Field," Advertising
Age, 14 June 1943, 8; and "Manual Out to Help Sell War Theme Ads," Editor &
Publisher, 13 May 1944, 58.
[55] "War Theme Ads $302,000,000, Council Reports," Advertising Age, 23
April 1945, 59.
[56]
"Council Reveals Sum Spent on 1943 War Ads," Editor & Publisher, 24 March
1944, 32; and "$352,650,000 of War Ads Placed in 1943," Editor & Publisher,
10 June 1944, 62.
[57] "Ad Bureau Issues War Supplement," Editor & Publisher, 12 September
1942, 16; Dr. Miller McClintock, "Newspaper Advertising Playing Vital Part
in War Effort," Editor & Publisher, 26 September 1942, 7 (NW); "Newspaper
Ads Shown As War Weapon At Home," Editor & Publisher, 7 November 1942, 8;
"Recent War Ads Pictured in Bureau Booklet," Editor & Publisher, 8 January
1944, 16.
[58] "NAEA Survey Finds Retail Ads Best To Offset Linage Losses," Editor
& Publisher, 4 July 1942, 7.
[59] "$16 Million in War Effort Ads In Three Months," Editor & Publisher,
1 January 1944, 32; "$4,255,324 Spent on War Ads in November," Editor &
Publisher, 5 February 1944, 20; and "War Ads in Dailies Running At
$65,000,000," Editor & Publisher, 1 April 1944, 56.
[60] "Importance of Advertising," Editor & Publisher, 11 July 1942, 20;
and L. M. Hughes, "First Year of War Re-emphasizing Vigor of Newspaper
Advertising," Editor & Publisher, 26 December 1942, 4.
[61] T. S. Irvin, "All Newspapers Should Plug Upward Trend," Editor &
Publisher, 19 June 1943, 38.
[62] T. S. Irvin, "Pioneer Spirit Needed to Promote Newspapers," Editor
& Publisher, 12 June 1943, 11.
[63] "Newspaper Week to Show War Service of Press," Editor & Publisher,
19 September 1942, 5; and "Newspaper Week to Be Sparked by War Themes,"
Editor & Publisher, 11 September 1943, 40.
[64] "Newspapers' Share," Editor & Publisher, 31 October 1942, 18; T. S.
Irvin, "Sentinel to War," Editor & Publisher, 20 March 1943, 42; and
"Milwaukee Survey Shows Extent of Daily's Aid in War," Editor & Publisher,
12 June 1943, 52.
[65] "Discuss Victory Garden Promotions," Editor & Publisher, 20 February
1943, 34.
[66] "Milwaukee Journal's Victory Garden Plan," Editor & Publisher, 6
February 1943, 31.
[67]
Frank E. Fehlman, "Ad Opportunities in Victory Gardens," Editor &
Publisher, 20 March 1943, 12.
[68] "Booklet Tells Story of Press' Home Front Job," Editor & Publisher,
29 January 1944, 38.
[69] Henry G. La Brie, "The Black Press: Where to? What Next?" in
Perspective of the Black Press: 1974, ed. La Brie (Kennebunkport, Maine:
Mercer House Press, 1974), 195.
[70] Consuelo Young, "A Study of Reader Attitudes toward the Negro
Press," Journalism Quarterly 21: 2 (June 1944): 149.
[71] "There's a Real Point in This Comment," letter to the editor,
Chicago Defender (City Edition), 3 June 1944, 14.
[72] "Field Urges Greater Recognition of Negroes," Editor & Publisher, 24
June 1944, 8; and "Negro Press Holds Meeting in New York," Editor &
Publisher, 24 June 1944, 18.
[73] Finkle, 128.
[74] Wallace Lee, "Does the Negro Press Speak for Most Negroes?" Negro
Digest (February 1943): 54.
[75] During World War I, black leaders and newspapers, hoping to gain the
appreciation of whites in the struggle against racism, stopped their
protests against discrimination for the sake of national unity. When the
support of blacks failed to translate into postwar improvement in their
status, many attributed the ineffective political strategy to an editorial
titled "Close Ranks" published in July 1918 by W. E. B. Du Bois, who
advocated the full participation of blacks in the war effort. For the
approach of the black press to World War I, see Finkle, 110-111.
[76] W. E. B. Du Bois, "The American Negro Press," part 1, Chicago
Defender (City Edition), 20 February 1943, 15.
[77] In their study on the Pittsburgh Courier, Mary Alice Sentman and
Patrick S. Washburn argued that the excessive profits tax rulings during
the war brought an advertising boom for the black press. The number of
national advertisements in the Courier, however, started to decrease in
1945, and the decline continued in the postwar years. Despite the wartime
increase, national advertising most likely did not become a dependable
source of revenues for publishers until after the war. See Sentman and
Washburn, 769-774, 867.
[78] For the influence of advertising on the Double V campaign, see
Washburn, "The Pittsburgh Courier's Double V Campaign," 83.
[79] Thomas Sancton, " The Negro Press," New Republic (April 26, 1943), 560.
[80] Letter of Secretary Morgenthau to publishers, 2 April 1943, quoted
in Steigleman, 133.
[81]
Mott, 785.