Content-Type: text/html Global Triadization-- GLOBAL TRIADIZATION A theoretical framework for global communication research By Shelton A. Gunaratne Mass Communications Department Minnesota State University Moorhead 1104 Seventh Ave. S. Moorhead, MN 56563 Tel. (218) 236-4035 Fax (218) 236-2168 E-mail: [log in to unmask] Shelton Gunaratne is a professor of mass communications at Minnesota State University Moorhead. He is the editor and principal author of the Handbook of the Media in Asia (Sage, 2000). He started his career as a journalist at the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd in 1962 and earned a doctorate in mass communications from the University of Minnesota in 1972. Over the past 30 years, he has taught journalism in Malaysia, Australia and the United States. Note: The author presented this paper at the annual convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, DC, Aug. 5-8, 2001. GLOBAL TRIADIZATION A theoretical framework for global communication research Abstract / A macro theory that recognizes the world's three competing center-clusters and their respective hinterlands offers a realistic framework for global communication research. This study has used recent data on world trade, computers, Internet hosts and high-tech exports to map the triadization of the world in the Information Age. The original dependency theory and world-system theory perspectives emphasized the hierarchical linking of national societies to the capitalist world-economy in a center-periphery structure. The proposed global-triadization formulation looks at the center-periphery structure in terms of a capitalist world-economy dominated by three competing center economic clusters, each of which has a dependent hinterland comprising peripheral economic clusters. These clusters may not necessarily be geographically contiguous. Strong-weak relationships may exist within each center-cluster, as well as within each periphery-cluster, with one center-cluster occupyin g a hegemonic role. The rudimentary Information-Society Power Index, constructed for this study, can guide the researcher to test an abundance of hypotheses on the pattern of global communication and information flow with particular attention to source, message, channel, and receiver. Keywords / Computer-power, high-tech manufacturing, Information Society Power Index, triadization, world system. [MS: 13,000 words] The Digital Revolution has reinforced the notion of the global village (McLuhan & Fiore, 1968; Mumford, 1975) or the global metropolis (Fortner, 1993). The recognition of the process of globalization has drawn attention to the shortcomings of the theories that scholars have so far used to study global communication-a concept that is distinct from but often confused with inter-national communication. The "developmentalism" notion of the Parsonian structural-functionalist modernization paradigm, which presumed that nation-states changed in parallel lines from tradition to modernity, influenced the work of many inter-national communication researchers until the mid-1970s. Researchers also have paid attention to other communication phenomena associated with globalization-transborder data flows, cultural imperialism, media events, global network organizations, etc.-though many of those "studies have generally failed to take a global perspective" (Monge, 1998, p. 143). Changes in the g lobal power structure, attributable primarily to the ongoing globalization process fanned by the Digital Revolution, require us to reformulate and refine relevant aspects of these approaches. The purpose of this essay is to develop a theoretical framework for global communication research based on a reformulation of the world system perspective. Gunaratne (2001a) has broadly explained the potential for testing global-communication hypotheses within the five components of Frank's interpretation of the world system[1] (Frank & Gills, 1993): the world system itself; the process of capital accumulation as the motor force of (world system) history; the core-periphery structure in and of the world system; the alternation between hegemony and rivalry; and the long and short economic cycles of alternating ascending phases and descending phases. Several excellent overviews of the literature spawned by the world-systems perspective already exist (e.g., Wallerstein, 1979; Shannon, 1989; Axford, 1995; Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995; Frank, 1998). Therefore, this essay will focus primarily on the more recent literature on the subject. Literature Review The structure of the basic argument of the world-systems perspective, according to Goldfrank (2000), is that capitalism is a world-economy comprising "core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral productive regions integrated by market mechanisms which are in turn distorted by the stronger of the competing states, none of which is strong enough to control the entire economy" (p. 178). Wallerstein's (1974) formulation of this perspective was a synthesis of continental historicism, Third World radicalism, and Marxism. Wallerstein borrowed the core-periphery concept from the dependency theory (see Gunaratne & Conteh, 1988) formulated in the 1950s by Paul Baran (1957)-and later elaborated by the likes of Samir Amin, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Theotonio dos Santos, Arghiri Emmanuel, Andre Gunder Frank, Anibal Quijano, and Dudley Seers-and added the concept of the semi-periphery. The world-systems theory is a socio-historical approach that sees the world "as developed and underdeveloped states, or zones, the interaction of which, through unequal exchange processes, produces a global core-periphery division of labor" (Bergesen, 1990, p. 67). It uses totalities as units of analysis to describe social change. It postulates the capitalist world-economy as the basic unit of analysis. Trade and exchange constitute the primary social mechanism that integrates the global system. Bergesen criticizes the world-system theory, as well as the international-relations theory in political science, because "both begin with the individualist assumption that we begin with an aggregate of states and then move toward international order, rather than the collectivist assumption that we begin with an international order and only then derive the presence of states and national economies" (p. 68). Bergesen says that the world-systems approach should "place culture and power at the heart of the analysis and replace the individualism implied in the idea of a division of labor, unequal or not" (p. 80). Bergesen's suggestion confirms the need for global-communication research to emphasize the global framework rather than the atomistic nation states. The structural-functionalist modernization paradigm, which owed much to Talcott Parsons and his followers, occupied the center-stage of social science inquiry, including inter-national communication research, until the mid-1970s. This is when Wallerstein's (1974) world-systems perspective forced social scientists to re-conceptualize their approach. The developmental or modernization paradigm had de-emphasized the hierarchical location of states in a center-periphery world structure wherein the winners were the few who accrued the benefits of unequal exchange. The clash of the two paradigms shifted attention from the nation state to the world system as the relevant unit of analysis. Employment of this broader analytical unit helped explain not only the historic North-South inequality but also the rise of the newly industrialized countries. However, Schramm and Lerner (1976), two of the pre-eminent communication scholars at the time, failed to assess the significance of the world-sy stem perspective's epistemological challenge when they edited their book on re-thinking communication and change. Many contemporary developmental-communication scholars (e.g., Shah, 1996) also continue to exclude the world system perspective, while a few (e.g., Servaes, 1999) have attempted to incorporate it. In general, this perspective has not yet received adequate attention in most discussions on communication theory as a field (e.g., Craig, 1999; Baran & Davis, 2000). Monge (1998) laments that only a "small fraction of communication scholars" have adopted a global perspective (p. 143). This fraction includes Barnett and his colleagues (e.g., Barnett, 2001; Barnett & Choi, 1995; Barnett, Jacobson, Choi, & Sun-Miller, 1996; Barnett, Salisbury, Kim, & Langhorne, 1999; Choi & Ahn, 1996, 1994; Fuentes-Bautista, 1999; Kim & Barnett, 1996; Sun & Barnett, 1994). McMichael (2000) points out that over the last three decades the study of development has undergone several reformulations: "from basic needs, through participation in the world market, globalization, to local sustainability" (p. 668). The world-systems perspective saw development as a systemic process, "where core-periphery relations were the real development dynamic and core states were outcomes, rather than units, of development" (p. 669). McMichael contends that the accelerated compression of time and space in the current era of "financialization" has helped transform nation states into global states, a phenomenon synonymous with the decomposition of wage-labor as a social institution. This interpretation provides a challenge to researchers engaged in the study of communication and development, as well as the global flow of information. Teivainen (2000) argues that to face the political and theoretical challenges of the futures of the world system, scholars must redraw the mod ernist map of political space (i.e., the territorialist and single-perspectival conception of social space) used by the traditional world-systems approach. He says: "To rely on the meaning of 'politics' as something that necessarily deals with state governments is becoming increasingly restrictive in our transnationalizing world" (p. 706). The identification of transnationalization within the core-periphery structure offers another challenge. Sklair (1999) asserts that the process of globalization has made it difficult to study many contemporary problems at the level of nation states, that is, in terms of each country and its inter-national relations. Instead, researchers need to conceptualize such problems in terms of global processes. However, Sklair points out the clear need to establish a distinction between the inter-national and the global. He categorizes globalization studies into four research clusters: the world-systems approach, the global culture approach, the global society approach, and the global capitalism approach. He argues that the global capitalism approach is the most productive for theory and research in globalization. (Frank's world system model may well fit into this category because it analyses historical developments by linking global capitalism-the motor force of the world-economy-to the beginning of history.) Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches, Sklair observes (p. 158): ù The world-systems model tends to be economistic (minimizing the importance of political and cultural factors), but as globalization is often interpreted in terms of economic actors and economic institutions, this does seem to be a realistic approach. ù The globalization of culture model, on the other hand, tends to be culturalist (minimizing economic factors), but as much of the criticism of globalization comes from those who focus on the negative effects of homogenizing mass media and marketing on local and indigenous cultures, the culturalist approach has many adherents. ù The world society model tends to be both optimistic and all-inclusive, an excellent combination for the production of world-views, but less satisfactory for social science research programs. ù The global capitalism model, by prioritizing the global capitalist system and paying less attention to other global forces, runs the risk of appearing one-sided. However, the question remains: how important is that "one side" (global capitalism)? Chase-Dunn (1999), who discusses the trajectories of several types of globalization over the last 100 years within the world-systems perspective, contends that a lag exists between economic and political/cultural globalization. He observes that the latter needs to catch up if we were to convert the "casino capitalism" into a more humane, democratic, balanced, and sustainable world society. Chase-Dunn's observation offers yet another challenge to global-communication researchers to study this phenomenon. Volkmer (1999) has called for the "reformulation or reformatting of existing concepts of international communication" to develop a new theory of global communication that would encompass the "various global movements in shaping the diverse, and _ continuously diversifying global communication processes" (p. 2). Gunaratne (2000, 2001b) has asserted that the "New Global Age" requires more refined global (or macro-level) theories to dissect the reality of the world as an interconnected unit. Chang, Lau, and Hao (2000) have attempted to incorporate various theoretical approaches in inter-national communication research into the world-systems perspective. Although micro-level and mid-range theories have their uses, a clear need exists to use and refine macro-level theories in the age of globalization. The process of globalization has pushed the world's most competitive countries into more powerful economic groupings in the quest for greater capital accumulation in the new informational economy. Although the Digital Revolution has further consolidated those entrenched in power and weakened those in the periphery, it has also, as Castells (1996) points out, enabled a cluster of nations in the Asian Pacific to emerge as a powerful player in the global economy. The categorization of nations per se into a center-periphery dichotomy may not be adequate in the light of the emergence of clusters of nations as powerful economic units, as well as of the emergence of powerful "digital orchards" within peripheral nations. As already documented, contemporary scholars have gone well beyond the ideas of Braudel (1967) and Wallerstein (1974) who broached the idea that a world economy-an economy wherein capital accumulation proceeded throughout the world-prevailed in the West since at least the 16th century.[2] Wallerstein (1979) argued that capitalism as "a system oriented to capital accumulation per se" (p. 272) began in the 16th century. The coexistence of three antinomies-economy/polity, supply/demand, and capital/labor-defined the dynamics of the capitalist system. Economy was a world structure while political activity came within state structures. World supply was a function of market-oriented "individual" production decisions while world demand was a function of "socially" determined allocations of income. Capital accumulation occurred through appropriating surplus produced by labor while the role of labor in production diminished with greater capital accumulation. A principal outcome of these an timonies was "unequal exchange," the redistribution of surplus value from the periphery to the core (p. 373). Frank and Gills (1993) discarded the Eurocentric approach of the world-systems theory and adopted a humanocentric approach to socio-historical analysis arguing that a world economy has been in existence for 5,000 years. Frank (1998) used his "globological" perspective (i.e., working from the whole world inward) to document that Asia-particularly China and India, not Europe, "held center stage [of the world economy] for most of early modern history" (p. xv)-about A.D. 1400-1800. He claimed that the Eurocentrism of Marx, Weber, Toynbee, Polanyi, Braudel, Wallerstein, and most other contemporary social theorists was "really ideological" and "anti-historical/scientific" (p. xv). He lamented, "What is still most amiss among contemporary historians and social scientists is a holistic perspective" (p. 33). Castells (1996) pointed out a significant distinction between a world economy and a global economy, stating that the latter signified "an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale" (p. 92). Triadization: Louch, Hargittai and Centeno (1999) draw our attention to three dominant interpretations of the process of global interdependence: interdependent globalization (the universal model), civilizations and empires (the clustered model), and hegemonic globalization (the hegemonic model). The universal model presumes a generic and system-wide increase in reciprocal ties between countries. This has been the largely accepted assumption behind much of the discussion of increasing inter-connection. The clustered model presumes an increasing concentration of communication within clusters of countries united by a common cultural heritage[3] or congruent to ex-imperial links, historical flows of trade, and contemporary financial flows. This perspective recognizes clustering around the three major powers-the United States, the European Union, and Japan. The hegemonic model presumes the increasing centrality of a small core of rich countries, perhaps dominated by a single power. This view sees globalization as merely an acceleration of the concentration of resources and influence in European and North American clusters with some limited East Asian additions. Global communication research stands to gain by assessing all three of these models and their various permutations. Louch, Hargittai, and Centeno (1999), who tested international telephone traffic from 1983 to 1995 as a measure of "globalization," found little evidence to support the universal model. Their standardized data showed that the propensity to call had remained remarkably stable over the selected period. However, they found a clear hierarchy of telephone contact mostly concentrated in the wealthiest countries with poorer countries being either marginalized or linked asymmetrically to a cluster of the wealthiest. They also found that the United States had consolidated itself as the "center" with the further weakening of Europe's relative position. These findings, in our view, justify a new formulation combining the characteristics of the clustered and the hegemonic models. In an earlier study, Barnett and Salisbury (1996) traced changes in the international telecommunications network from 1978 to 1992 to examine the process of globalization. Consistent with the world-systems perspective, they found that relations among the nations in the international communication network remained relatively stable over this period in spite of changes in the transition into an information-based economy. Their findings were similar to those of Smith and White (1992), who also found the underlying core-periphery dimension in the world commodity trade flows. At the center were the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; at the periphery were the less-developed countries in Latin America and Africa; and between these two groups were nations generally classified as semiperipheral. This global power configuration, which some scholars identify as "triadization" (Thussu, 2000, p. 77), offers a most tempting meta-theoretical basis for global communication analysis. Mattel art (1996/2000) also identified the construction of the large free-trade economic blocs around the triad powers-North America, East Asia, and the European Union-as "a major change that has contributed to the creation of new divisions in the world" (p. 98). Bergesen and Sonnett (2001), who analyzed the Global 500, found a very clear three-way split between Asia (29 percent of the firms), Europe (34 percent), and the United States (33 percent), "suggesting a tripartite geopolitical division of the world economy" (p. 1603). Earlier, Galtung and Vincent (1992) had gone to the extent of demarcating the mainly Buddhist-Confucian countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia as a separate world with Japan at the top, and the Four Tigers-South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore-in the second tier. The triadization concept also ties in with the socio-historical analysis of Frank (1998) who points out that "the globe-encompassing world economy/system did not have a single center but at mo st a hierarchy of centers" even though a single-centered structure of center-periphery relations prevailed "on intraregional and perhaps on some interregional bases" (p. 328). Frank (1998) also disputes the existence of "semiperipheries" in Wallerstein's sense. However, some network analysts have disputed the presumed triadization. Barnett and colleagues, who have conducted several international studies on selected aspects of communication-monetary, telecommunication, transportation, and trade flows (Barnett, Salisbury, Kim, & Langhorne, 1999; Salisbury & Barnett, 1999; Barnett, Choi, & Sun-Miller, 1996; Choi & Ahn, 1996; Barnett & Choi, 1995), news flows (Kim & Barnett, 1996), and telephone networks (Sun & Barnett, 1994)-have concluded that overwhelming empirical findings do not support a triadic world system but a tightly connected group centered on the G-7 countries. Straussfogel (1997), a geographer, on the other hand, describes "the modern world-system as a hierarchically organized complex social structure [comprising] multiple layers of nested and overlapping, cooperating and competing subsystems linked through a variety of types of nonlinear relations" (p. 123). She has proposed the merging of Prigogine's theory of dissipative s tructures (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) with world-system theory to derive a framework that is able to account for a large number of spatial and temporal events throughout the history of capitalism. Castells (1996), a sociologist, explained that the new global economy was the outcome of the "interaction between the rise of informationalism and capitalist restructuring" (p. 145). Its characteristics, he said, were interdependence, asymmetry, regionalization, increasing diversification within each region, selective inclusiveness, exclusionary segmentation, and variable geometry (p. 106). Furthermore, he asserted that the architecture of the global economy reflected "an asymmetrically interdependent world," a triad area comprising three major economic regions: North America, with Latin America as its hinterland-even though MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) exported more to Europe than to North America, and Chile exported increasingly to Asian Pacific; Western Europe, with Eastern Europe, Russia and South Mediterranean as its hinterland; Japan and the Asian Pacific (plus Australia and New Zealand), with the rest of Asia, including the Middle East, as its hinterl and. Castells placed the Russian Pacific, Eastern Siberia and Kazakhstan also in this hinterland. He called Africa the marginalized region even though South Africa could be the magnet for the region's resurgence. Castells (1996) wrote: Around this triangle of wealth, power, and technology, the rest of the world becomes organized in a hierarchical and asymmetrically interdependent web, as different countries and regions compete to attract capital, human skills, and technology to their shores (p. 101). This "regionalized global economy," Castells (1996) explained, was the result of "the complex interaction between historically rooted political institutions and increasingly globalized economic agents" (p. 102). However, this was not a "planetary economy" because its actual operation and structure concerned only segments of economic structures, countries, and regions, in proportions that varied "according to the particular position of a country or region in the international division of labor" (p. 102). Furthermore, the newest international division of labor was built around four parts in the global/informational economy: producers of high value, based in informational labor; producers of high volume, based on lower-cost labor; producers of raw materials, based on natural endowments; and redundant producers (or devalued labor). These positions, Castells said, did not coincide with countries. They were organized in networks and flows, using the technological infrastructure of the i nformational economy. The products of the new technology industries were information-processing devices or information processing itself (p. 67) Castells (1996) castigated the world-systems theory as "simplistic" because it made little analytical sense to compartmentalize the deeply asymmetric global economy into a center, a semiperiphery, and a periphery. He argued that the world has several "centers" and several "peripheries" characterizing the "so internally diversified" North and South (p. 108). Despite Castells' criticism, a triadized configuration of the global center-periphery structure provides a more realistic framework on which to base communication research. In a recent study of 38 countries, Wu (2000) reported trade volume as the leading predictor in international news coverage. In the light of this finding, the "triadization" model offers a framework to test hypotheses on the news flow within and among the three center-clusters and their respective hinterlands. Fortner (1993) and Hugill (1999) are among those who have examined communication phenomena within a global theoretical framework. Fortner used Innis' (1950) empire-and-communications model, which distinguished between Type 1 durable (or heavy) communication media that allowed cultures to control time, and Type 2 ephemeral (or portable) communication systems that allowed cultures to control space. Hugill looked at the geopolitics and technologies of the respective communication systems of Britain, imperial Germany and the United States as they struggled for hegemony. He applied the world-systems perspective but confined himself to the "capitalist world-system only as it has developed over the past 150 years" (p. 16). Eurocentrism, as well as his implication of capitalism as the superior "ism," differentiates Hugill from Frank and Gills, who use capitalism in a neutral sense-as the motor force of capital accumulation affecting the world as a single unit. Despite his bias, Hugill mak es a useful assertion: that "in the period of multipolarity we are now entering" (p. 18), the chosen communication strategy of regional power groupings-e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and Japan-led Asia-will determine their ability to achieve hegemony. This observation further supports the notion of "triadization." Castells (1996), as already mentioned, describes the "architecture and geometry of the informational/global economy" (p. 145) as an asymmetrically interdependent phenomenon organized around three major regions-Europe (EU and the European economies affiliated with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), North America (or NAFTA) and the Asian Pacific (Japan and the "China Circle"). He identifies the G-7 countries as "the core of the system" because they accounted for 90.5 percent of high-technology manufacturing in the world (in 1990), and also held 80.4 percent of global computing power. Furthermore, he says that an economic hinterland has sprung up around each of the three major regions with Africa increasingly marginalized in the global economy. Combining these observations of Castells and Hugill, we can use their triadization framework to empirically observe the information and communication flow among and within the three center-clusters and their respective economic hinterlands. High-technology manufacturing and computing power may serve as the criteria for measuring competitive capital accumulation under informational capitalism. The nerve center of this form of capitalism is the "global financial networks, and their networks of management," which constitute "the actual collective capitalist" (Castells, 1998, p. 363). Informational capitalism is what Tehranian (1999) calls "informatic imperialism," which, in his view, is bifurcating the globe into the "high-tech and high-growth centers" and the "disintegrating peripheries" (p. 26). Gunaratne (2001a) wrote: Where high-technology production and computing power are likely to determine competitive capital accumulation, as well as the concomitant phenomena of hegemony-riva lry and alternating economic cycles, a development approach must recognize the realities of the world/global system. Communication researchers should address this issue to help policy makers stall the proliferation of "disintegrating peripheries." Triadization Model: The foregoing review leads us to consider the following essentials for formulating a macro-model for researching aspects related to the global information and communication order. ù Because totalities should be our units of analysis, we should begin with the "collectivist" world system (the capitalist world-economy-in effect, the modern informational economy) as our basic unit of analysis, and only then derive the presence of the "atomistic" states (Bergesen, 1990). ù The world system has three center-clusters (Bergesen & Sonnett, 2001; Castells, 1996; Mattelart, 1996/2000; Smith & White, 1993) one of which occupies the role of the hegemon (Louch, Hargittai & Centeno, 1999) while continuously competing with the other two to maintain its hegemony (Hugill, 1999). (Such competition goes hand-in-hand with cooperation in the self-interest of each center-cluster as evident in G-7 summits.) ù Each center-cluster has a dependent hinterland of periphery-clusters (Castells, 1996), and our subordinate unit of analysis should be these clusters of global states, which have so transformed from nation states as a result of ongoing transnationalization, as well as "financialization" in the informational economy (Bergesen, 1990; McMichael, 2000; Teivainen, 2000). ù These characteristics have made it difficult to study many contemporary problems, which are entangled in global processes, at the level of nation states (Sklair, 1999). However, within this structure, we should analyze the phenomena of culture and power (Bergesen, 1990), political and cultural effects (Sklair, 1999; Chase-Dunn, 1999), transnationalization (Teivainen, 2000), financialization (McMichael, 2000), etc. The analyses of many of these phenomena (e.g., Islamic fundamentalism, cultural imperialism, resurgence of nationalism, financial crises, etc.) must invariably go beyond the nation-state. Any formulation of the world-system structure must also accommodate the presence and impact of supranational units, such as the WTO, the United Nations and its agencies, transnational corporations larger economically than many states, as well as other regional associations of nations (e.g., ASEAN, MERCOSUR, etc.). They exist alongside the triadized center-periphery clusters as support and control mechanisms of the global capitalist economy. Network Model: Whereas the triadization model is based on attributes of the units comprising the world system, the network model is based on relationships among those units. Hargittai and Centeno (2001) extol the virtues of applying network theory and methods to define "the underlying pattern of the literally millions of sets of ties across the globe" (p. 1552). They say network analysis enables precise and concrete means to map the relationships among regions, states, cities or even smaller units. They argue that the two-dimensional perspective reflected in the core-periphery structure based on attributes has become irrelevant "in an N-dimensional reality," where N represents the number of forms of international reactions. Categorization by attributes, they point out, may miss the "critical dynamics of global cliques" (p. 1551). Within this scheme, the core units are those that emerge as central to these global cliques. However, Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) say the contention th at "network measures are superior to attribute measures has been argued but not demonstrated. The question of method of operationalization is always confounded with the question of the substantive content of the measures" (p. 398). More recently, several researchers (Barnett, 2001; Kick & Davis, 2001; Sacks, Ventresca, & Uzzi, 2001; Smith & Timberlake, 2001; Townsend, 2001, Van Rossem, 1996) have followed the earlier work of pioneer network analysts to explore the dynamics of the world-system. Their analyses, accomplished through advanced statistical techniques, have yielded varying core-periphery structures depending on the variables measured. However, the United States and the top G-7 countries in Europe consistently appear as the core though Japan's appearance is inconsistent. For instance, Barnett's study of the current structure of international telecommunications based on its pattern of usage over time since the late 1970s gave Japan the 10th rank behind the other G-7 countries, as well as Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain. Barnett also placed Sri Lanka (a Buddhist country, which he curiously identified with the regional group of Islamic nations) ahead of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea-the East Asian Tigers that consistently moved "toward the core during the 1980s" (p. 1649). Smith and Timberlake (2001), who studied the hierarchy of world cities based on the international flow of population by air travel, placed Hong Kong and Singapore ahead of Tokyo in 1997 while asserting that the "key cities in Western Europe and North America have continuously maintained their position as central nodes" (p. 1675) even though six or seven East Asian cities had achieved a remarkable rise in importance. Townsend (2001), on the other hand, found in the global structure of the Internet "a shift in the geography of telecommunications networks and the emergence of a network of network cities" (p. 1697). Kick and Davis (2001), who conducted a multiple-network analysis of eight types of transnational transactions (trade flows, bilateral economic aid and assistance treaties, bilateral transportation and communication treaties, bilateral sociocultural treaties, bilateral administrative and diplomatic treaties, political conflicts, armament transfers, and military conflicts ) for 130 countries during 1970-1975, derived a modified world-system structure: core, semicore (capitalist/socialist), semiperiphery, and periphery. Kick and Davis concluded that the "core of Western industrial nations," including Japan, dominated the world-system across all the networks (p. 1566). No Asian-Pacific country flitted the capitalist semicore although China fitted the socialist semicore. They, however, fitted 12 Asian-Pacific countries, including the East Asian Tigers, in the semiperiphery. Van Rossem (1996), in his role-equivalence model of the world system based on the density of five networks-imports, exports, diplomatic ties, arms trade, and troops, placed highly developed small economies like Iceland, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in the second-tier periphery, concluding that "the best proxy for world system role is absolute size of the economy" (p. 524). An integrated model? The network model's power to analyze relationships among units constituting the world-system is a clear advantage over linear models based on attributes of those units. However, before plunging headlong into embracing network theory that will perforce limit world-system research to those adept in advanced statistical techniques, one must also be aware of its potential pitfalls, which we shall take up in the discussion section of this essay. We take the view that research based on attributes, as well as relations, would serve to validate or discard the findings derived from each method. For instance, if one were to treat the European Union as a single unit thereby omitting intra-union telephone calls from the international category, or by omitting intra-union trade from the international trade category, or by omitting intra-union air traffic from the international air-traffic category, how would the outcome of each network analysis change? Would such an approac h help lessen Eurocentrism, a byproduct of imperialism so well reflected in Kipling's notorious ballad of East and West, and make world system analysis more humanocentric? (After all, geographically speaking, Europe is only a peninsula jutting out of the vast Asian continent.) Yet another poser: Would the application of network theory to ascertain the relations between the three macro-units in the attribute-based triadization model produce new insights? Concepts and Method Getting back to the triadization model, this study postulated the transition of the world system into the informational era by grafting the two variables computing power and high-technology manufacturing into the trade and exchange mechanism that, according to world system theorists, determined the center-periphery structure of global states/clusters. Castells (1996) identified these two as the crucial variables associated with the dominance of the center-clusters in the modern informational economy. Computing power is a prerequisite for high-technology manufacturing. The ability to compete in high-technology exports, then, determines the center-clusters, as well as the hegemon within them. This study constructed an Informational Society Power Index by combining the two variables, i.e., computing power and high-technology exports, to ascertain the relative dominance of each of the three center-clusters that "triadization" proponents deem to exist. Computing power: Glaeser (1997) defined the computing power of a country in terms of million instructions per second (mips) per 1,000 people. However, data on mips do not exist for most countries. Therefore, this study settled on two indicators that could generate a reasonable estimate of computing power: the number of personal computers and the number of Internet hosts. Because global states/clusters can enhance their competitive edge in trade and exchange (e.g., e-commerce) through the global web of computer networks (Gereffi, 2001), the number of Internet hosts reflects an important facet of computing power. By combining these two sets of data through an allocation of weights this study derived a reasonably valid Computer Power Index. ITU (1999) data show that the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) own 74.3 percent of the world's total number of personal computers. To derive the number of Internet hosts, this study combined two sets of data: the October 2000 Netsizer estimates for 60 countries (www.netsizer.com) and the July 2000 Internet domain survey of the Internet Software Consortium (www.isc.org). It used the ISC data only for the countries not included in the Netsizer list because the latter allocates the three-letter generic Top Level Domains or gTLDs (e.g., com, net, org, edu, gov, mil) to countries on the basis of estimated registrations whereas the ISC does not. These data also show that the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) account for 87.8 percent of the world's Internet hosts.[4] Thus this study allocated a weight of 46 percent [(74.3 (162.1) ( 100] to personal computers and a weight of 54 percent [(87.8 ö 162.1) ( 100] to Internet hosts and added the two results to derive the Computer Power Index. The denominator of these two equations is the sum of the percentages of the top 10 in each variable (74.3 + 87.8 = 162.1).(Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, and Minitab were used for the calculations.) High technology exports: This study used the 1998 high-technology exports data from the World Bank (1999), which defines such exports as "goods produced by industries (based on U.S. industry classifications) that rank among a country's Top 10 in terms of R&D expenditures" (p. 317). In simpler terms, high technology exports are products with high R&D intensity. They include aerospace products, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery (World Bank, 2000, p. 307).[5] National Science Board (2000) says that high-technology industries are important to nations because such industries are associated with (a) innovation, (b) high value-added production and success in foreign markets, and (c) spillover effects that benefit other commercial sectors by generating new products and processes. Data for the 1990s show an increased emphasis on high-technology manufactures among the major industrial countries. In 1997, production by U.S. high-technology industry accounted for nearly 32 percent of world high-technology production, and exports by U.S. high-technology industries accounted for 18.1 percent of world high-technology exports. Japan was second, accounting for 9.1 percent of exports, followed by the United Kingdom with 8 .3 percent (NSB, 2000). Because the World Bank excluded the data for Taiwan, an important high-tech product exporter, this study estimated the data by deriving the average for the East Asia region. The data show that the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) accounted for 71.1 percent of the world's high-tech exports in 1998. Informational Society Power Index: This study constructed the ISPI by allocating appropriate weights to the Computing Power Index and the High-Tech Exports Index and, then, combining the two results. It allocated a weight of 53 percent to the CPI [(78.1 (149.2) ( 100] because the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) accounted for 78.1 percent of this index; and it allocated a weight of 47 percent to the HTEI [(71.1 (149.2) ( 100] based on the same reasoning. Thus the ISPI, just like its two derivate indexes, gives each global state/cluster a score out of 100 that reflects its power position in the triadized center-periphery structure. Reliability and validity: Considering the conclusion of Van Rossem (1996) that the absolute size of the economy was the best proxy for world system role, we did a regression analysis of the component variables of the ISPI vis-…-vis the GNP of each economy for which relevant data were available. Our analysis yielded the following equations: R2= 82% for GNP v high technology exports (using 1999 data for 92 economies); R2=82% for GNP v number of Internet hosts (using 2001 data for 136 economies); and R2=96% for GNP v number of PCs (using 2000 data for 116 economies). Thus, we can surmise that all three variables have high reliability, as well as construct validity, because they are significantly anchored to the GNP. The weights we allocated to each of these variables-the percentage share of the top 10 economies-to construct the ISPI are quite justifiable, though somewhat arbitrary, because of the remarkable dominance of these few economies over each of the three attributes. [6] Findings The exports-data attribute supported the "triadization" concept. (Statistical advice we received confirmed that tests of significance would make little sense because the data covered the universe.) The 1996-1999 world merchandise trade data (Table 1) provided evidence to back the notion of three center-clusters and four dependent periphery-clusters, which Castells (1996) refers to as hinterlands. The process of capital accumulation in the global material economy has generated a scenario where world trade is predominantly concentrated in the three centers: Western Europe (42 percent), Asia (22 percent) and North America (20 percent) in that order. In general, most of the Asian continent, including the Middle East, appears to be the hinterland of the Asian-Pacific center-Japan and a half-dozen rising economies.[7] (Almost one-half of Asia's export trade is within Asia, and almost one-half of Middle East exports go to Asia.) The Central-Eastern Europe/NIS region appears to be the hi nterland of the Western-Europe center. Because of Africa's heavy dependence on Europe for its meager world trade, Africa also belongs to Europe's hinterland. (More than one-half of the exports from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, as well as more than one-half of the exports of Africa, go to Western Europe.) Finally, Latin America, including the Caribbean, appears to be the hinterland of the North-America center. (More than one-half of the exports from Latin America go to North America.). The Triad: This study defined the North-America center as the NAFTA cluster of global states, the Western-Europe center as the EU cluster of global states, and the Asian-Pacific center as the cluster of eight global states that topped the region's Information Society Power Index (i.e., Japan, Singapore, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Australia). These three center-clusters scored 91.2 out of the maximum possible 100 on the ISPI, thereby showing their remarkable dominance over their hinterlands (Table 2). NAFTA was the hegemon of the center-clusters with a score of 42. The EU, with a score of 26.6, was slightly ahead of the Asian-Pacific center with 22.6. Figure 1 illustrates the relative size of the three center-clusters in relation to the ISPI, as well as their relative positions on the two derivate indexes-the CPI and the HTEI. NAFTA Center: Within the hegemon cluster, the United States stands out as the super global state with an ISPI score of 38. Canada and Mexico have relatively little power within the cluster (Table 3 and Figure 2). Because the United States beats the ISPI score of each of the other center-clusters, its influence on the entire world system becomes crystal clear. EU Center: Three global states stand out in the EU cluster: Germany and the United Kingdom hold the lead, with France closely behind. The Netherlands and Italy occupy the middle between the Big Three and the other 10 global states of the cluster (Table 4 and Figure 3). Asian-Pacific Center: Compared with the other two, the Asian-Pacific center-cluster is geographically not contiguous. Japan leads it with an ISPI score of 8.6 followed by Singapore (Table 5 and Figure 4). Except for Japan, South Korea and Australia, the other global states of this center-cluster do not belong to the OECD-the world's club of the rich. New Zealand, an OECD member, is not included in this cluster. Hong Kong also is not included although one could justify its inclusion as part of China. Unlike the other two center-clusters, the Asia-Pacific center-cluster is neither an economic union nor a free-trade association. OECD: The traditional world-system perspective would most likely see the 30 member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as the units comprising the world's center and the semiperiphery. The Group of Seven (G-7), the world's super-rich countries, would be the center, and the remainder the semiperiphery. Our analysis shows that the OECD cluster accounts for 83.3 percent of the ISPI (Table 6). Geographical Breakdowns: Table 7 shows the power rankings, in descending order, of each of the traditionally recognized main geographical regions. The Americas head the list followed by Western Europe, Asia-Pacific, East/Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, Middle East, and Africa. It also shows the power rankings of the sub-regions comprising each major region. Nested within each sub-region are the power rankings of each of its principal global states. The data in this table can assist the researchers who may want to redefine center-clusters and periphery-clusters. Discussion Although the world merchandise trade data help us identify the clusters comprising the global triad, they do not help us correctly identify the hegemon of these three center-clusters. With 42 percent of the world trade concentrated in Western Europe, one could mistakenly identify the EU center-cluster as the hegemon. (IMF data for 1997 show that 60.6 percent of EU exports went to other EU countries, 8.7 percent to NAFTA, and 7.5 percent to Asian-Pacific core. See Table 1 for the three-year average for Western Europe.) However, the Information Society Power Index, which highlights the two main resources that presumably engender power inequalities among states, enables one to identify the actual hegemon.[8] In Wallerstein's parlance, a new world-economy, which Castells calls an informational economy, has replaced the old world-economy. In our formulation of the world system, the three center-clusters would include many, though not all, of the global states that Wallerstein placed in the semiperiphery. Thus prosperous small global states too have become part of the center. This perspective differs from that of Van Rossem (1996), who placed highly developed small economies in the second-tier periphery in his role-equivalence model of the world system. However, he allowed that global states could "gain prominence in the world system through cooperation and regional alliances that pool their resources" (p. 524). Adhering to Bergesen (1990), we began with the international order and only then derived the presence of states and national economies. Our starting point was the global trade flow pattern, which enabled us to determine the regional clusters that dominated the world economy/system. (However, our configuration was based on the pattern of exports, not imports, because exports represent the competition for world capital accumulation. The relational data derived from network analysis would reflect both exports and imports but with inadequate attention to the magnitude of trade.) Then we hypothesized the factors-computing power and high-technology manufacturing-that enabled these clusters to compete successfully in the global informational economy. Thereafter, we looked at the pattern of distribution of the world totality of computing power and high-tech exports to construct a power index for each center-cluster and its constituent member states. Our approach of using attributes for analysis is consistent with that of historical social science that g ave birth to the world-systems theory. As pointed out earlier, adherents of network theory, including Barnett et al. (1999), assert that the proper approach to the analysis of structural theory uses relational data such as the frequency of communication among social systems or nation states. However, network analysis also suffers from major drawbacks. First, the lack of global data sets makes it an impractical method to uncover the historical center-periphery structure of the world economy going back at least to the beginning of the European Age (Wallerstein, 1974) or the Asian Age (Frank, 1998). Smith and Timberlake (2001) confess "the lack of data on the flows between any units of a network means that relational analysis can never adequately capture its multiplex structure in totality" (p. 1662), and the nature of network analysis made "missing data particularly problematic" (p. 1661). Second, in the absence of solid and unbiased data sets encompassing all global units, network analysis based on partial data will r aise questions on validity in spite of statistically derived results on connectedness, centrality, and integrativeness. Although some good network data on commodity trade flows are available, Smith and Timberlake lament the "absolute dearth of relational data on all social phenomena" (p. 1661), i.e., compilations of networks of interactions or flows between global units. In relation to tracing communication networks, Smith and Timberlake point out that although sampling the volume of telephone calls, telex messages, faxes, telegraph, and mail is possible in principle, telephone companies "would probably be reluctant to share such information because of the possible implications for their competitive positions in the industry" (p. 1663). Third, the dearth of data available for network analysis forces researchers to operationalize research concepts to suit the availability of data thereby raising further questions on validity.[9] For instance, Kim and Barnett (1996) used the country reports of international newspapers and periodicals trade data-a very narrow category based on self-reporting-to define news flows. Again, Barnett et al. (1999) used data from a U.S.-based credit card corporation to measure global monetary flows that gave an incomplete picture of international transactions related to Japan in particular. This study has hypothesized that the power structure of the Information Society, to a large extent, is dependent on computing power and high-technology manufacturing. However, one should be conscious that these two variables, in turn, are the consequence of a cluster of antecedent variables, such as those included in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2000)-the real per capita income, literacy, education, and life expectancy. The emphasis placed on research and development is also a supremely important factor. The Computer Power Index constructed for this study needs further validation through a comparison with mips (million instructions per second) when such data become available for most global clusters. Furthermore, the reliability of the CPI also depends on the accuracy of the estimates of the number of personal computers and Internet hosts. This study's High Technology Exports Index also needs refinement based on a "more comprehensive notion of high technology" (Chabot, c. 1996). This study provides the following world system perspective: The modern world-economy comprises three competing center-clusters, each of which has a dependent hinterland of periphery-clusters. The relative power of the three center-clusters is unequal. Among them is a hegemon cluster led by a global state that has more power on the world system than any other. The relative power of the global states within the center-clusters, as well as those within the periphery-clusters, is also unequal. If one were to presume that the global information and communication flow follows the pattern of this triadized center-hinterland structure, this reformulated world system perspective offers a rich theoretical framework for conducting global communication research. Barnett and colleagues, as noted earlier, say their network analyses do not show a triadic configuration as postulated by Castells (1996), Mattelart (1996/2000), and others. Barnett and Choi (1995), however, say they found three groupings of a different kind: a Spanish-language based group that included Spain and Latin America; an English-language based group that included East and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada; and a group comprising continental Europe, excluding France and Spain. The Barnett team's Choi and Ahn (1996) confirmed the centrality of the G-7 countries in Europe but found no evidence (Choi & Ahn, 1994) of the centrality of Japan in the Pacific Basin community. They placed Hong Kong, as the center of information flow in East Asia. Although WTO data on world trade (Table 1) clearly indicate the triadic domination of the world economy, Barnett et al. (1999) provide no explanation for this discrepancy. They assert: When comparing the international monetary, telecommunications and trade networks, the overall results suggest these three networks are quite similar. NEGOPY results suggest that these networks share similar core, peripheral, semi-peripheral and marginal countries. _ In spite of all the recent ideological criticisms of the world system theory _, these research findings support the theory. _ The consistent regional patterns of organization in the three networks suggest a further anomaly in the world system theory, i.e., factors other than economic ones determine the structure of the world system. These include geographical and cultural factors. (Barnett et al., 1999, p. 43) Barnett and Choi (1995) and Barnett and Salisbury (1996), however, did find regional clusters for telecommunication flows, as well as for international telephone use. Barnett et al. (1999) admitted that these were "somewhat at odds with world system theory" (p. 42). They said that one explanation could be that the world system may be divided into regional groupings even though "recent research has failed to confirm this finding for international trade" (p. 42). Thus these researchers concede that the world system theory needs some refinement as suggested in this essay. The present study sees the three center-clusters-NAFTA, EU, and Asia-Pacific-as the most evident structure of the contemporary world-economy. Starting from this totality, network analysis could trace relations within each cluster and among the three clusters and their hinterlands in relation to better-conceptualized research problems. Network analysis could provide new insights if it were to analyze the EU as a sing le economic unit rather than as 15 separate political units thereby reducing the current Eurocentric bias. Each of the three center-clusters can be analyzed similarly. A crucial need is to answer the question: What is international communication; and should there be a distinction between mass communication and other forms of communication such as travel, tourism and migration? . Multiple-network analysis encompassing a variety of communication variables would be the most beneficial though the most difficult to do. If the triadization concept were to be incongruent with the pattern of world communication, that may indicate the need to separate the world communication or language order from the world economic order. The work of Barnett and colleagues in the communication field need further confirmation (for validity and reliability) using all pertinent research approaches. Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) say "some excellent work has attempted empirically to measure the placement of states in the core/periphery hierarchy" (p. 397) using a number of research tools. The essential requirement is to move the research focus away from the atom (i.e., the nation-state) to the whole (i.e., the world system). Thus the analysis of global communication should move in descending order from the world-economy to the center-clusters and their respective hinterlands, i.e., the periphery-clusters, and only then to the global-states within each of the clusters. Researchers could redefine the center-clusters or the periphery-clusters to achieve the desired accuracy. For instance, they could expand the EU cluster (ISPI = 26.613) into a Western Europe cluster (ISPI = 28.025) by adding Western Europe's OECD states exc luded from the European Union: Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. The arrows in Figure 1 indicate the potential interrelationships between and among the various clusters. The bold double arrow-lines show the hypothetical higher information and communication flow between and among the three competing center-clusters. The thin double arrow-lines show the hypothetical higher information and communication flow between each center-cluster and its hinterland. The broken double arrow-lines show the hypothetical lower information and communication flow between hinterlands and external center-clusters. This model presumes a very low flow among the hinterlands themselves. Within this framework, researchers can test hypotheses covering all five elements in Lasswell's (1948) transmission model: Who (Source) says what (Message) to whom (Receiver) through what medium (Channel) with what effect (Impact). Here are two examples of plausible hypotheses related to source-message-receiver elements: ù Information and communication flow within each center-cluster and its respective hinterland would be greater than the flow across competing center-hinterland configurations.[10] ù Information and communication flow from the hegemon center-cluster to each of the other two center-clusters would be greater than the flow from the remaining center-cluster. The flow to the hegemon center-cluster from the other two center-clusters favors the one that has the higher ISPI score (i.e., EU cluster). An example of a medium-related hypothesis would be: ù Mass media density in each of the center-hinterland configurations, as well as in its component global-states, generally follows the pattern of its respective ISPI score. The proposed model also provides a challenge to researchers who are engaged in mapping press freedom in the world (e.g., Van Belle, 2000; Weaver, Buddenbaum & Fair, 1985). The structural-functionalist modernization paradigm, which presumed that nation-states changed in parallel lines from tradition to modernity, placed media participation, with accompanying press freedom, as another facet of development. Thus it placed press freedom outside the context of the world system. Freedom House, for instance, measures press freedom using four criteria solely internal to a state: laws and regulations, political pressures and controls, economic influences, and repressive action (Sussman, 2000). Our model requires linking the notion of press freedom to global forces, such as the ability of center-clusters to flood the periphery-clusters with a barrage of information-communication notwithstanding the domestic restrictions within a state. So conceived, the measurement of press freedom should i nclude the accessibility of information from non-domestic sources.[11] Moreover, if we were to presume the libertarian concept-"a free flow of information unimpeded by any intervention by any nation" (Hachten, 1999, p.21)-as the best expression of press freedom, then, research must also address the issue of global press freedom vis-…-vis the vast volume of government-sponsored global news flow (e.g., Voice of America, Radio Moscow, Radio France Internationale, etc.). As noted in the literature review, the world system perspective also provides a challenge to developmental-communication researchers to look into the global links that limit or facilitate a nation's competitive edge in capital accumulation. The concept of developmental communication, as well as that of developmental journalism, which is predicated on the modernization paradigm, requires a thorough re-examination. Elevating the quality of journalism globally, and in the periphery-clusters in particular, may serve a much more useful purpose than a restricted brand of developmental journalism that hardly commands an audience. Although the world system perspective is solidly based on economics, its strength depends on its ability to provide a testing ground of hypotheses associated with all other social sciences. Wallerstein (1979) maintains that history and the social sciences-anthropology, economics, geography, political science, and sociology-are just "one subject matter" that one may call "historical social science" (p. ix); and that the world-systems theory is a by-product of the application of historical social science. If economic criteria are implicitly integral to all social sciences, then the present study's theoretical approach should be eminently suitable for culture-and communication research as well. Frank and Gills (1993) assert that the world system theory accommodates scholarship in a variety of disciplines. Anthropologists (Kearney, 1995) and geographers (Straussfogel, 1997) are among the social scientists who have attempted to integrate it into their fields. Relating the world-systems theory to international communication, anthropologist Kearney (1995) points out the three successive dominant paradigms in the field: the communication and development model, the cultural imperialism model, and the cultural pluralism model, "which is still exploring the dynamics of media in a world in which the distinction between centers and peripheries has largely dissolved with respect to media production and consumption" (p. 555). Global communication researchers stand to gain by adopting the world system theory to examine this issue and much more. 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Old hierarchies or new networks of centrality? The global geography of the Internet content market. American Behavioral Scientist, 44, 1679-1696. Table 1 Regional pattern of world merchandise exports (based on annual average for 1996-1999) World Western Europe Asia North America Latin America C/E Europe/ Baltic/CIS Middle East Africa Origin 1996-1999 Average of Exports ($ Billions) Percentage of exports (shown along the rows) Destination World 5331.75 42.1% 22.2% 20.0% 5.4% 4.1% 2.7% 2.2% Western Europe 2322.69 68.5% 8.4% 8.7% 2.4% 5.3% 2.6% 2.6% Asia 1344.57 17.5% 48.5% 24.8% 2.6% 1.1% 2.7% 1.5% North America 890.44 19.1% 23.4% 37.4% 15.2% 0.9% 2.6% 1.3% Latin America 278.20 14.3% 7.4% 54.9% 19.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% C/E Europe/Baltic/CIS 216.74 50.7% 7.4% 4.1% 1.7% 31.8% 2.1% 1.2% Middle East 163.62 20.9% 45.6% 12.8% 1.6% 0.8% 7.8% 4.1% Africa 115.96 52.5% 13.9% 15.4% 2.7% 1.2% 1.5% 9.1% Rows show origin; columns show destination. Boldface numbers highlight exports within each region. Boldface italics highlight exports from periphery clusters to center-clusters. Source: WTO Annual Report 1999 and 2000 (based on Table A7) Table 2 Global Centers Computer Power Index High-tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index NAFTA Center 57.4769 24.5170 41.9858 EU Center 18.3091 35.9777 26.6134 Asian-Pacific Center 13.3023 33.1271 22.6200 Total 89.0883 93.6218 91.2191 Table 3 NAFTA-Center Countries Computer Power Index High-tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index United States 53.6910 19.7682 37.7473 Canada 3.0831 2.5175 2.8172 Mexico 0.7028 2.2314 1.4212 Sub-total 57.4769 24.5170 41.9858 Table 4 EU-Center Countries Computer Power Index High-tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index Germany 4.1885 7.3775 5.6873 United Kingdom 3.6339 7.4658 5.4349 France 2.1544 6.2754 4.0913 Netherlands 1.3734 4.0973 2.6537 Italy 2.3314 1.9766 2.1646 Ireland 0.1997 2.7732 1.4092 Sweden 0.9500 1.5896 1.2506 Belgium 0.6005 1.2873 0.9233 Spain 0.9080 0.6526 0.7880 Finland 0.6479 0.9409 0.7856 Austria 0.4852 0.6807 0.5771 Denmark 0.4768 0.6346 0.5510 Portugal 0.1796 0.0940 0.1394 Greece 0.1516 0.0489 0.1033 Luxembourg 0.0280 0.0832* 0.0540 Sub-total 18.3091 35.9777 26.6134 * Estimated Table 5 Asia-Pacific Center Countries Computer Power Index High-tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index Japan 6.5504 10.9770 8.6309 Singapore 0.3179 6.3449 3.1506 Korea, South 1.2767 3.5420 2.3414 China 1.8865 2.6995 2.2686 Taiwan 1.0570 3.5538* 2.2305 Malaysia 0.2158 3.6389 1.8247 Philippines 0.1630 2.1898 1.1156 Australia 1.8349 0.1811 1.0576 Sub-total 13.3023 33.1270 22.6200 * Estimated Table 6 OECD Countries Computer Power Index High-tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index United States 53.6910 19.7682 37.7473 Japan 6.5504 10.9770 8.6309 Germany 4.1885 7.3775 5.6873 United Kingdom 3.6339 7.4658 5.4349 France 2.1544 6.2754 4.0913 Canada 3.0831 2.5175 2.8172 Netherlands 1.3734 4.0973 2.6537 Korea, South 1.2767 3.5420 2.3414 Italy 2.3314 1.9766 2.1646 Mexico 0.7028 2.2314 1.4212 Ireland 0.1997 2.7732 1.4092 Sweden 0.9500 1.5896 1.2506 Australia 1.8349 0.1811 1.0576 Switzerland 0.6388 1.3933 0.9934 Belgium 0.6005 1.2873 0.9233 Spain 0.9080 0.6526 0.7880 Finland 0.6479 0.9409 0.7856 Austria 0.4852 0.6807 0.5771 Denmark 0.4768 0.6346 0.5510 Norway 0.5251 0.2188 0.3811 Hungary 0.1679 0.4507 0.3008 Poland 0.4589 0.0792 0.2805 Czech Republic 0.2037 0.2294 0.2158 Turkey 0.3595 0.0515 0.2148 New Zealand 0.3342 0.0546 0.2028 Portugal 0.1796 0.0940 0.1394 Greece 0.1516 0.0489 0.1033 Luxembourg 0.0280 0.0832 0.0539 Slovak Republic 0.0659 0.0335 0.0507 Iceland 0.0325 0.0425* 0.0372 Grand Total 88.2347 77.7483 83.3061 * Estimated Table 7 Region Sub-region Country Computer Power Index High-tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index Americas 59.5676 24.9745 43.3088 North 57.4769 24.5170 41.9858 United States 53.6910 19.7682 37.7473 Canada 3.0831 2.5175 2.8172 Mexico 0.7028 2.2314 1.4212 South 1.9876 0.4187 1.2502 Brazil 1.0081 0.2958 0.6733 Argentina 0.3241 0.0569 0.1985 Colombia 0.1915 0.0351 0.1180 Chile 0.1531 0.0107 0.0861 Venezuela 0.1362 0.0091 0.0765 Peru 0.0637 0.0041 0.0357 Uruguay 0.0593 0.0025 0.0326 Ecuador 0.0308 0.0023 0.0174 Bolivia 0.0126 0.0017 0.0075 Paraguay 0.0081 0.0005 0.0045 Central 0.0754 0.0382 0.0579 Costa Rica 0.0235 0.0256 0.0245 Guatemala 0.0147 0.0069 0.0110 El Salvador 0.0124 0.0052 0.0090 Panama 0.0123 0.0000 0.0065 Honduras 0.0072 0.0002 0.0039 Nicaragua 0.0053 0.0002 0.0029 Caribbean 0.0276 0.0006 0.0149 Jamaica 0.0134 0.0001 0.0072 Cuba 0.0097 0.0000 0.0052 Dominican Republic 0.0039 0.0002 0.0022 Puerto Rico 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 Haiti 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 Western Europe 19.4450 37.5066 27.9339 Big Five 13.2162 23.7480 18.1661 Germany 4.1885 7.3775 5.6873 United Kingdom 3.6339 7.4658 5.4349 France 2.1544 6.2754 4.0913 Italy 2.3314 1.9766 2.1646 Spain 0.9080 0.6526 0.7880 Smaller Countries 3.6290 10.3748 6.7995 Netherlands 1.3734 4.0973 2.6537 Ireland 0.1997 2.7732 1.4092 Switzerland 0.6388 1.3933 0.9934 Belgium 0.6005 1.2873 0.9233 Austria 0.4852 0.6807 0.5771 Portugal 0.1796 0.0940 0.1394 Greece 0.1516 0.0489 0.1033 Nordic 2.5998 3.3839 2.9683 Sweden 0.9500 1.5896 1.2506 Finland 0.6479 0.9409 0.7856 Denmark 0.4768 0.6346 0.5510 Norway 0.5251 0.2188 0.3811 Asia-Pacific 15.1259 35.5903 24.7441 East Asia 11.2112 21.3226 15.9636 Japan 6.5504 10.9770 8.6309 Korea, South 1.2767 3.5420 2.3414 China 1.8865 2.6995 2.2686 Taiwan 1.0570 3.5538 2.2305 Hong Kong 0.4384 0.5503 0.4910 Mongolia 0.0021 0.0000 0.0011 South East Asia 1.2206 13.8784 7.1698 Singapore 0.3179 6.3449 3.1506 Malaysia 0.2158 3.6389 1.8247 Philippines 0.1630 2.1898 1.1156 Thailand 0.1982 1.4592 0.7909 Indonesia 0.2335 0.2455 0.2391 Vietnam 0.0832 0.0000 0.0441 Myanmar 0.0059 0.0000 0.0032 Cambodia 0.0017 0.0000 0.0009 Laos 0.0014 0.0000 0.0008 Oceania 2.1693 0.2357 1.2605 Australia 1.8349 0.1811 1.0576 New Zealand 0.3342 0.0546 0.2028 Papua New Guinea 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 South Asia 0.5247 0.1536 0.3503 India 0.4162 0.1522 0.2921 Pakistan 0.0719 0.0010 0.0386 Bangladesh 0.0154 0.0003 0.0084 Sri Lanka 0.0136 0.0000 0.0072 Nepal 0.0076 0.0000 0.0040 East-Central Europe/NIS 2.2061 1.2506 1.7570 East Central 0.8964 0.7928 0.8477 Hungary 0.1679 0.4507 0.3008 Poland 0.4589 0.0792 0.2805 Czech Republic 0.2037 0.2294 0.2158 Slovak Republic 0.0659 0.0335 0.0507 NIS 1.0310 0.3579 0.7147 Russia 0.7959 0.2836 0.5552 Ukraine 0.1129 0.0000 0.0598 Estonia 0.0456 0.0200 0.0336 Lithuania 0.0330 0.0082 0.0213 Latvia 0.0295 0.0049 0.0179 Belarus 0.0006 0.0236 0.0114 Kazakhstan 0.0023 0.0119 0.0068 Moldova 0.0053 0.0013 0.0034 Kyrgyzstan 0.0016 0.0036 0.0025 Armenia 0.0031 0.0007 0.0020 Georgia 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 Turkmenistan 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 Azerbaijan 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 Uzbekistan 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 Tajikistan 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 Southeast 0.2786 0.1000 0.1946 Slovenia 0.0732 0.0413 0.0582 Romania 0.0866 0.0136 0.0522 Croatia 0.0459 0.0308 0.0388 Bulgaria 0.0353 0.0129 0.0248 Yugoslavia 0.0338 0.0000 0.0179 Albania 0.0024 0.0001 0.0013 Macedonia 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 Middle East 1.4990 0.5569 1.0562 West Asia 1.4990 0.5569 1.0562 Israel 0.3014 0.4921 0.3910 Iran 0.4163 0.0000 0.2206 Turkey 0.3595 0.0515 0.2148 United Arab Emirates 0.1769 0.0000 0.0938 Saudi Arabia 0.1444 0.0045 0.0787 Kuwait 0.0298 0.0010 0.0163 Syria 0.0273 0.0000 0.0145 Lebanon 0.0205 0.0000 0.0109 Oman 0.0081 0.0076 0.0079 Jordan 0.0111 0.0000 0.0059 Yemen 0.0036 0.0000 0.0019 Iraq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Africa 0.8109 0.1289 0.4904 Southern Africa 0.4717 0.1105 0.3019 South Africa 0.4017 0.1069 0.2631 Zimbabwe 0.0195 0.0015 0.0111 Mauritius 0.0148 0.0017 0.0087 Zambia 0.0082 0.0000 0.0043 Namibia 0.0078 0.0000 0.0041 Botswana 0.0072 0.0000 0.0038 Mozambique 0.0060 0.0002 0.0033 Madagascar 0.0039 0.0001 0.0021 Angola 0.0014 0.0000 0.0008 Malawi 0.0012 0.0000 0.0006 Lesotho 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 North Africa 0.1668 0.0139 0.0949 Egypt 0.0919 0.0002 0.0488 Morocco 0.0362 0.0010 0.0197 Tunisia 0.0173 0.0120 0.0148 Algeria 0.0214 0.0006 0.0116 Libya 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 West Africa 0.1275 0.0022 0.0686 Nigeria 0.0832 0.0000 0.0441 Senegal 0.0169 0.0000 0.0090 Ghana 0.0060 0.0000 0.0032 Cameroon 0.0048 0.0002 0.0026 Togo 0.0042 0.0000 0.0022 Guinea 0.0036 0.0000 0.0019 Gabon 0.0014 0.0020 0.0017 Mauritania 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 Mali 0.0013 0.0000 0.0007 Chad 0.0012 0.0000 0.0006 Benin 0.0011 0.0000 0.0006 Gambia 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 Central African Republic 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 Niger 0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 Sierra Leone 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Guinea-Bissau 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 East Africa 0.0450 0.0023 0.0249 Kenya 0.0170 0.0023 0.0101 Sudan 0.0083 0.0000 0.0044 Tanzania 0.0074 0.0000 0.0039 Uganda 0.0066 0.0000 0.0035 Ethiopia 0.0054 0.0000 0.0029 Rwanda 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 Eritrea 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Burundi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Grand Total 98.65 100 99.29 [1] Differences exist between Wallerstein's modern world-systems (plural and hyphenated) perspective and Frank's world system (singular and unhyphenated) perspective. Frank (2000) points out that his formulation is humanocentric and global whereas Wallerstein's is highly Eurocentric. Wallerstein (1979) has traced two world-systems up to now: world-empires (unified political systems that have existed since the Neolithic Revolution, e.g., Byzantium, China, Egypt, Rome, feudal Europe, feudal Japan), and world-economies (marked by a single division of labor but no overarching political structure). This essay retains world-systems, as well as world system, to express distinct intents. [2] Hier (2001) claims that the initial architect of the world-system perspective was Oliver Cox, who produced a trilogy of volumes on capitalism in 1959, 1962, and 1964 tracing the roots of the capitalist system to medieval Venice. [3] This model includes Huntington's (1996) concept of a world system of competing civilizations. Research related to this concept is scheduled to appear in a forthcoming issue of American Behavioral Scientist, which has already released a special issue devoted to mapping globalization (Hargittai & Centeno, 2001). Huntington foresees a "clash of civilizations" with the greatest threat coming from Islam and then China. Frank (1998) dismisses such concepts as "divisive ideological diatribes _ [that] have their intellectual roots in ignorance or denial of a single global history" (p. 359). [4] The top 10 countries shared 82.7 percent of the 1999 total of Internet domains, with Japan occupying the ninth rank (Zook, 2001). However, Japan occupied the second rank in the share of Internet hosts (www.netsizer.com). [5] World Bank (1999, p. 317) identifies high-tech exports, in technical terms, as "commodities in the SITS Revision 2, Sections 5-9 (chemicals and related products, _ manufactures, manufactured articles, machinery and transport equipment, and other manufactured articles and goods not elsewhere classified), excluding Division 68 (nonferrous metals)." OECD identifies four industries as high technology, based on their high R&D intensities: (a) aerospace, (b) computers and office machinery, (c) electronics-communications, and (d) pharmaceuticals. [6] DeVellis (1991) says, "Scale reliability is the proportion of variance attributable to the true score of the latent variable" (p. 24). He clarifies that construct validity is "directly concerned with the theoretical relationship of a variable _ to other variables" (p. 46). As for weights, one could argue that no empirical way exists to determine weights although structural equation (or path) modeling could generate an infinity of statistically acceptable weights. Wainer and Thissen (1976) say "increased robustness can be obtained through the use of equal regression weights without severe loss in accuracy" (p. 9). The weights we have allocated are very close to equal weights. [7] A reader of this manuscript, however, disputed this configuration on the basis of the frequency of telephone calls from the one region to the other. He wrote: "For 1997, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE do not have an East Asian country among the top 20 nations that they call. But the United States and United Kingdom are among the top 10." Considering that 46 percent of Middle East's trade is with Asia (World Trade Organization, 1999), this may mean that the trading partners are not using telephone communication alone for trade transactions because of language problems. Middle East also has considerable trade connections with Western Europe (21 percent) and North America (13 percent). Trade data for 1997 clearly show that Japan was the No. 1 market for exports from Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE (International Monetary Fund, 1998). Telephone communication data may well be a reflection of the international language order that has elevated English as the global language, and also of the Middle Eastern diaspora in the EU and the NAFTA center-clusters. [8] If one were to add up the exports and imports within the 50 states comprising the United States, just as in the case of the 15 components of the European Union, the result would also pinpoint the actual hegemon by smoothening the "inflated" share of world merchandise trade credited to the latter. [9] Van Rossem (1996) says, "The development of better measures of world system role is made difficult not only by the conceptual confusion, but also by the poor quality and limited availability of international data" (p. 525). [10] The aforementioned reader also pointed out that Fuentes-Bautista (1999) had examined trade and telecommunication flows in the Americas and found that trade blocs did not have an impact on regional communication, although they did effect trade. The study showed one group centered on the United States. This too points out to the need for more research by different researchers. It also suggests a need to differentiate between communication and mass communication with more widely acceptable operational definitions. [11] The MacBride Report (1980) attempted to place press freedom in a global context. It affirmed everyone's right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers, as articulated in Article 19 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Note that this right belongs to the individual, not the media institutions.) The report also drew attention to the 1952 Convention on the International Right of Correction (Recommendation 48).