Content-Type: text/html Syndicated Service Dependence and a Lack of Commitment to Localism: Scripps Newspapers and Market Subordination Submitted by Edward E. Adams, Brigham Young University Dept. of Communications, HFAC F-366, Provo, UT 84602 [log in to unmask] and Gerald J. Baldasty, University of Washington Syndicated Service Dependence and a Lack of Commitment to Localism: Scripps Newspapers and Market Subordination By 1900, the Scripps newspaper empire was the largest chain in the United States. E.W. Scripps owned ten dailies; six through the Scripps McRae League and four by the West Coast group of Scripps, otherwise known as Pacific Coast Penny Papers.[1] The Scripps McRae League operated papers in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Akron, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Covington, Kentucky. Scripps McRae had previously published two other papers in Buffalo and Chicago, but they closed the same year as their inception. The Pacific Coast Penny Papers operated papers in San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.[2] Besides holding a majority of interest in his empire, he was a minority shareholder in the Scripps-Booth chain, owners of the Detroit News, and a partner in Clover Leaf Newspapers which operated papers in Minneapolis, St. Paul, Des Moines and Duluth. E.W. Scripps's personality has made him the subject of much biographical research. Most of the biographies on Scripps have focused on his philosophies and have emphasized the public service ideals of the papers. The biographies have become legion in the annals of journalism history. The biographies include Gardner's Lusty Scripps, Cochran's E.W. Scripps, McCabe's Damned Old Crank: A Self Portrait of E.W. Scripps, Knight's I Protest: The Disquisitions of E.W. Scripps, and Trimble's Astonishing Mr. Scripps: The Turbulent Life of America's Penny Press Lord. Two books, have recently reached beyond the biographical accounts and looked at his business interests, Scripps, The Divided Dynasty, and Baldasty's Scripps and the Business of Newspapers.[3] Both provide insight to his business philosophies and decisions. Textbooks in journalism history and historical studies have lauded his business prowess and the empire of newspapers he built. Most other academic historical studies have focused on his accomplishments of building a chain.[4] Underlying all of the color of Scripps's personality and the rapid creation and expansion of his newspaper empire, belies a chain that had a high rate of newspaper failures and a predominance of papers operating from a inferior market position. With the exception of the second paper started by E.W. Scripps in Cincinnati, almost all of the remaining papers operated from an inferior market position. Even his flagship paper in Cleveland began to lose ground. This paper examines why the Scripps newspapers operated in a subordinated market position, and how it eventually led to the failure of some newspapers, the merger of other properties, and even the formation of joint operating agreements. This study utilizes the E.W. Scripps papers at Ohio University, the Roy Howard archive at Indiana University, and the Roy Howard papers at the Library of Congress and the Roy Howard Archive and Indiana University to examine the reasons for Scripps papers operating in a subordinated market position. Additionally, several issues of Editor & Publisher were utilized to examine specific markets. This study further employs the use of content analysis to test the assumptions found in historical letters and documents. Competition Newspaper competition was fierce in the early part of the twentieth century. The newspaper agency, N.W. Ayer & Son reported in the American Newspaper Annual that daily newspapers increased in number from 2,190 in 1900 to a peak of 2,457 in 1914, an increase of 267 daily papers in fourteen years. Many communities had multiple papers in the morning and afternoon.[5] Even small towns had two or more papers, large cities had substantially more competitors. By 1909, New York City had eighty-five newspapers with a combined daily circulation of slightly over four million.[6] Although New York represents the extreme in newspaper property numbers, the ratio of newspapers to people was 1 to 1, which was close to the national average of 1 to 1.2 persons.[7] Scripps newspapers in Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and San Diego also faced formidable competition. Publishing papers in these cities brought the Scripps papers in direct competition with renowned publishers Joseph Pulitzer, William Randolph Hearst, Joseph Medill, William Rockhill Nelson, Harrison Gary Otis, Ira C. Copley, and Charles Taft, half-brother to future U.S. President William Howard Taft. Operating papers in these competitive markets had a detrimental effect on Scripps newspapers, subjugating some to a lower market position in circulation and causing other Scripps papers to close operations. Between 1880 and 1926, the year of E.W.'s death, seventeen Scripps papers closed or merged (see Table 1).[8] __________________________________________________________________________ TABLE 1 Scripps Newspapers Closures and Mergers 1880 - 1926 San Diegan 1892 Merged with San Diego Sun San Francisco Report 1900 Closed Chicago Press 1900 Closed after arranging space with Hearst for SM Press Association. Nashville Times 1907 Closed Kansas City World 1907 Closed Oakland Mail 1910 Closed Pueblo Sun 1910 Closed Fresno Tribune 1912 Closed Berkeley Independent 1913 Closed Kentucky Post 1914 Merged with Cincinnati Post Philadelphia News 1914 Closed Chicago Day Book 1917 Closed Norfolk Post 1924 Closed Akron Press & Times 1925 Merged the morning and evening papers Denver Express 1926 Merged immediately after Scripps Howard acquired the Rocky Mountain News in 1926. Memphis Press 1926 Merged immediately after Scripps Howard acquired the Memphis News-Scimitar in 1926. Knoxville News 1926 Merged immediately after Scripps Howard acquired the Knoxville Sentinel in 1926. ____________________________________________________________________________ Rather than close newspapers, the possibility existed to sell a newspapers property to a competitor, but Scripps did not believe in selling his papers. He always wanted to leave open the possibility to return and start another paper in that market. From a modern view the elimination of seventeen papers would send an alarm through the industry. However, these papers were only one of five or six newspapers operating in larger markets and the closures usually warranted only a small mention in the pages of Editor & Publisher. Market position appeared to be of little importance to Scripps. He was far more concerned if the papers were profitable. But, continuing profitability often was tied to the market position.[9] The Scripps newspaper empire was expansive. In 1922, he brought ownership of all the papers which he held a majority interest into a new company -- Scripps Howard. He appointed his son, Robert Scripps, and Roy Howard at the head of the company.[10] Howard immediately became concerned with the subordinated market position of the Scripps papers. After spending eighteen months examining the various situations among the Scripps papers, Howard wrote to E.W., "I feel that the Concern is facing a crisis which necessitates some radical action and some marked departures from present lines of procedure....Taken collectively, our papers are inferior to the best of our afternoon competitors in our various fields....Our news inferiority is so pronounced it off-sets other areas of strength."[11] Howard's analysis was critical. The report stated that Scripps papers were lacking an "aggressive, sustained, and co-ordinated editorial policy", he related. Howard then examined the staff from the papers and called them a "devitalized force," rarely creating novelty or innovations. He saw the general management of the papers in Ohio as having stagnated, with papers in Cleveland, Toledo, and Akron in an "unhealthy" state.[12] Howard's criticism was well founded. Although some of the papers, were still providing revenue, the circulation gaps with competitors was widening. The Akron Press had been running for more than a year with losses. The Des Moines News was labelled by Scripps hierarchy as a "chronic journalistic invalid with malignancy," and the Cleveland Press surrendered first place in the circulation to the Plain Dealer, with the gap narrowing between the Press and Cleveland News. Howard said the El Paso paper was "quite a hopeless cause," and that the Norfolk, Virginia paper was "very sick indeed." Regardless of the status of the papers, Howard concluded his report to Scripps, "I feel that today the Scripps Howard organization is more successful as a producer of profits than as a producer of good quality newspapers....We are now in a position where we can turn profits on or off with a spigot."[13] Howard was right. The papers were in a subordinated market position and yet profits were flowing in. One week after his report to Scripps, Howard received a copy of the chain's projected 1922 financial statement. Of the twenty-one papers in the chain. Eight papers were losing money -- Birmingham, Norfolk, Fort Worth, Knoxville, Washington D.C., Denver, Des Moines, and Sacramento. But their total loss for the year, about $400,000, was easily offset by the profits generated by the remaining twelve papers (see table 2).[14] TABLE 2 1922 Estimated Profit of the Profit-Paying Papers Scripps Howard Newspapers Cleveland $950,000 Cincinnati $430,000 Columbus $245,000 Oklahoma $ 45,000 Toledo $225,000 Evansville $ 30,000 Houston $ 35,000 Memphis $ 50,000 San Diego $ 45,000 Terre Haute $ 7,000 San Francisco $ 90,000 Youngstown $ 60,000 Total $2,212,000 Even though Howard had concerns the chains annual profit statement showed an ending balance of over $1 million in profits. Howard was also critical of the Cleveland Press, even though its profits alone were close to a million dollars. Many of the Scripps papers were losing ground in circulation. The papers held subordinated market positions and were paying healthy profits. By November 1922, Howard repeated with alarm the inferior status of the papers. Even though the chain was making money he foresaw problems. The papers were continuing to make money and were slowly rising in circulation, but not at the rate of competitors. The papers were being "buried" by fast-rising competitors.[15] However, this time Howard identified the dilemma and came up with answers. For ten years the Scripps papers lost circulation, or grew at a rate slower than competitors. Rather than criticize the business and circulation departments, he felt the problem lay with the syndication services of Scripps Howard.[16] The individual paper's dependence on syndicated material from United Press, NEA, Scripps Science Service, and Scripps Alliance Copy helped to develop editors that lacked in initiative and resourcefulness because there was always copy to print. The dependence on syndicated copy coupled with tight local editorial budgets created a situation of papers providing minimal coverage of local issues. Howard reported to Bob Scripps: I am not belittling the quality of copy produced by the United Press, the United News, the NEA, Inc., or the Editorial Board. Most of this copy is excellent. But too much is being spent on it. Too much of it is being produced. The quantity of editorial page matter turned out every day through the medium of NEA and the editorial board is sufficient to blight any local editor's initiative to produce local copy.[17] Howard's insight suggested that the heavy dependence on syndicated copy could be a large factor for running articles outside of the local area. Howard intimated that the lack of coverage on local issues is a reason for the various Scripps newspapers to be in an inferior market position in comparison to competing papers in circulation. One month after Howard's report on the inferior status of Scripps Howard papers, a circulation report by the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) was published in the Editor & Publisher International Yearbook of 1923. The report showed that in almost all markets that Scripps Howard operated a paper, that their property maintained a subordinated position to competing newspapers (see table 3). TABLE 3 Circulation Comparison of Scripps Howard with Competitors -- 1923 The following is a 1923 listing of circulation from the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) listing Scripps Howard newspapers and competing papers. The papers are listed alphabetically by city and papers are ranked in descending order of circulation. The Scripps Howard papers are designated by an asterisk .[18] Akron, Ohio Akron Beacon-Journal 35,788 Akron Press* 21,446 Akron Times 21,416 Baltimore, Maryland Baltimore Sun (M) 119,106 Baltimore News 111,675 Baltimore Sun (E) 110,389 Baltimore American 60,880 Baltimore Post* 44,000^ Birmingham, Alabama Birmingham News 64,632 Birmingham Age-Herald 30,712 Birmingham Post* 20,008 Cincinnati, Ohio Cincinnati Post* 170,671 Cincinnati Times-Star 142,813 Cincinnati Enquirer 73,120 Cincinnati Tribune 52,024 Cleveland, Ohio Cleveland Plain Dealer 192,712 Cleveland Press* 182,548 Cleveland News 155,297 Columbus, Ohio Columbus Citizen* 75,961 Columbus Dispatch 75,116 Ohio State Journal 50,000 Denver, Colorado Denver Post 137,168 Rocky Mountain News 32,734 Denver Times 26,078 Denver Express* 15,900 Des Moines, Iowa Des Moines Register 67,590 Des Moines Capital 60,696 Des Moines Tribune 58,458 Des Moines News* 26,679 El Paso, Texas El Paso Herald 20,172 El Paso Times 16,144 El Paso Post* 6,000^ Evansville, Indiana Evansville Courier 24,668 Evansville Press* 17,381 Evansville Journal 12,900 Ft. Worth, Texas Ft. Worth Star-Telegram 88,749 Ft. Worth Record 28,537 Ft. Worth Press* 9,294 Houston, Texas Houston Chronicle 51,155 Houston Post 47,663 Houston Press* 27,759 Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis News 113,651 Indianapolis Star 96,012 Indianapolis Times* 54,841 Knoxville, Tennessee Knoxville Jour & Trib 30,218 Knoxville Sentinel 26,366 Knoxville News* 9,752 Norfolk, Virginia Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch 39,754 Norfolk Virginian Pilot 35,983 Norfolk Post* 9,111 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma The Daily Oklahoman 58,042 Oklahoma Times 50,571 Oklahoma News* 23,798 Sacramento, California Sacramento Bee 38,333 Sacramento Union 9,877 Sacramento Star* 8,133 San Diego, California San Diego Union 17,644 San Diego Sun* 16,594 San Diego Tribune 14,069 San Francisco, California San Francisco Examiner 150,140 San Francisco Call-Post 90,210 San Francisco Chronicle 88,249 San Francisco Bulletin 68,415 San Francisco News* 52,479 Toledo, Ohio Toledo Blade 129,581 Toledo News-Bee* 81,243 Toledo Times 29,115 Washington D.C. Washington Star 84,863 Washington Times 66,737 Washington Post 61,641 Washington Herald 47,670 Washington News* 40,346 Youngstown, Ohio Youngstown Telegram* 35,610 Youngstown Vindicator 35,127 With the exception of the steadfast Cincinnati paper, the remaining chain's papers were floundering in circulation. Even though the Scripps papers in Columbus and Youngstown were in a dominant position, these papers were losing ground. Even E.W.'s founding flagship paper, the Cleveland Press, had lost the market dominance it once maintained. Syndicated Service Dependence Scripps papers certainly did not have a monopoly on using syndicated copy, but the company did have a history of heavy dependence on copy from outside of the local areas where their newspapers operated. Around the turn of the century, few if any newspapers in the United states filled their columns just with local news. Even if they had staffs large enough to do so, their readers wanted news from the wider world. Much of this non-local news came from telegraph services (such as the Associated Press) or from syndicates.[19] Roy Howard's analysis of the papers in the early and mid-1920's had identified a trend that afflicted Scripps papers for almost two decades. The papers were almost always in a subordinated market position, but had benefitted in the early 1920s from rising circulation throughout the U.S. The Scripps organization was in a good position to establish syndicates and other wire services. The chain had built-in customers with papers operating throughout the United States. The company had already established Scripps McRae Press Association (later known as United Press), Scripps News Association, Scripps Editorial Service, Publishers Press, and Newspaper Enterprise Association (NEA). Scripps papers were not exclusive customers of these services, but they did become the initial users of the products to help launch the various associations and services. United Press and Newspaper Enterprise Association would eventually rise to be strongly competitive services in the areas of news services and syndicated copy. Scripps papers were already well established customers of the wire services. Because of the small staffs, the Scripps newspapers relied on such non-local content more than their rivals did. A comparison of Scripps papers with competing newspapers in San Diego, California, Portland Oregon, and Sacramento, California demonstrates the frequency of local and non-local content between the papers (see table 4). Table 4 Percentage of local, non-local content in three newspaper markets, 1907 local non-local San Diego San Diegan Sun (Scripps) 25.4 74.6 N=1087 San Diego Union 54.1 45.9 N=1896 San Diego Tribune 47.6 52.4 N=1398 Portland Portland Daily News (Scripps) 17.6 82.4 N=1839 Portland Oregon Journal 57.8 42.2 N=2712 Portland Evening Telegram 47.0 53.0 N=3882 Portland Oregonian 42.9 57.1 N=3570 Sacramento Sacramento Star (Scripps) 22.3 77.7 N=1047 Sacramento Bee 34.2 63.8 N=2564 Sacramento Union 38.3 61.7 N=2334 N refers to column inches This non-local content in the Scripps newspapers derived primarily from two sources: the chain's telegraph news service and Newspaper Enterprise Association. The N.E.A., founded in 1902 was the successor of various efforts in the Scripps papers to share content. Ellen Scripps, one of E.W. Scripps' older sisters, began writing a column of "miscellany" when E.W. Scripps started the Cleveland Press in 1878. The column would appear in subsequent Scripps papers. In the late 1880s, E.W. Scripps established a New York editorial bureau that provided short stories and feature articles to all Scripps papers. Not until 1902, however, was the sharing of general interest material systematized through a single source.[20] The Newspaper Enterprise Association provided cartoons, features, editorials, articles, and a wide range of other editorial material for the Scripps newspapers. Scripps said he started the N.E.A. to create a high quality illustrated news service while spreading the costs across all of his newspapers.[21] Scripps believed the key to the N.E.A. was that it would allow his tiny newspapers to compete even with big rivals. He said a newspaper could be started in any market with a small staff (one reporter and one editor) if it relied extensively on the N.E.A. Scripps said, "All of my baby papers by reason of their extreme youth depended almost absolutely for substance editorially on the N.E.A.[22] Scripps even proved he could produce papers with no local staff. E.W. had long considered starting a paper in Dallas. His plans accelerated when he heard plans to launch a newspaper in Dallas from another chain. Scripps caught word of the proposed venture on September 12, 1906. He dispatched two men by train from Kansas City to Dallas on September 14 to start a new paper immediately. En route the two men assembled a four-page Dallas Dispatch. They arrived on September 16 and secured a printer. On September 17, 1906 the paper premiered. It was slapped together in a train between Kansas and Texas. The paper was a "hodge-podge of dated wire dispatches, features, old photos and cartoons, with hardly anything about Texas." But it was printed and distributed in Dallas. The next several issues would continue to consist of copy from outside of Texas as the newly appointed editor and reporter settled in to the city.[23] Scripps ordered his editors to use N.E.A. material, and he suggested N.E.A. account for at least 25 to 35 percent of each issue.[24] In 1906, Robert F. Paine, N.E.A. general manager, said that N.E.A. accounted for more than one-half of the content of the Evansville Press and more "fully three fourths" of the content of the Terre Haute Post.[25] For the Scripps newspapers, the cost of the N.E.A. service was roughly equivalent to the salary they would have paid a seasonal reporter -- $12 to $15 a week.[26] A content analysis of four Scripps newspapers during the first week of their inception indicates that N.E.A. material constituted a average of 59.5 percent of their non-advertising content (see table 5). Table 5 Sources of Non-Advertising Content by Percentages of Scripps Newspapers During the First Week of Publication Pueblo Sun Sacramento Star Tacoma Times Oklahoma News Local News 18.2% 28.4% 19.2% 15.7% News Service 17.6% 19.7% 18.6% 24.3% N.E.A. 64.2% 51.9% 62.2% 59.9% (col. inches) 865.25 2133.75 1654.50 459.00 Several of Scripps's top management and superintendents were concerned about the lack of local news. J.C. Harper, the Scripps McRae attorney and part-owner of papers in Dallas, Oklahoma City, Evansville, and Terre Haute, maintained that the success of the Cleveland and Cincinnati papers during the 18880s was attributable to their local coverage.[27] William Porterfield, a west coast regional manager complained that the Scripps papers in San Francisco, Berkeley, and Fresno had "too little local stuff," and that one issue of the Scripps-owned Berkeley Independent was the "worst local newspaper ever gotten out because of the lack of local news."[28] Although these analysis on early editions of Scripps newspapers, their reliance and dependence on outside copy continued and even soared during World War I. During the war, E.W. came out of his "retirement" to direct the editorial forces in Washington D.C. He ordered his editors to run all copy originating out of the Washington D.C. office.[29] Scripps requested regular copies of all his newspapers to ensure they followed his demands E.W. kept up his end of the bargain by hiring a large staff in the Washington office to produce the copy.[30] Howard's examination of the papers in 1922 revealed that the papers never fully recovered from that dependence. Howard related to Robert Scripps: For seven years our papers have almost without exception been marking time or losing ground in circulation. There have been doubtless many minor contributing factors. The main difficulty, however, has been and is fundamental. It lies in a once benign principle which has gone wrong and become a malignant influence. I refer to the use of syndicated copy in our newspapers. I am convinced we are stunting our circulations and that we are reducing the virility and effectiveness or our papers. Our failure to develop resourceful and effective individual editors has progressed so far as to constitute a menace to our present and future.[31] Howard's criticism was strong, and based on the previously listed content analyses, his assumptions were well-founded. But, he was cautious to recommend any immediate changes. He suggested a study be made of the entire organization to boost the local budgets and personnel. He further suggested an analysis toward "decreasing the bureaucratic administration, and increase the power and authority of individual editors."[32] The correspondence remaining in the Scripps archive and the Howard papers diminishes considerably between 1922 and E.W. Scripps's death in 1926. The correspondence and remaining papers do not reveal whether an actual study was made and there appears to be little discussion by Howard on the matter, but it did appear that there were few personnel changes made. Most editors listed in Howard's month-to-month 1924 reports were virtually unchanged from his 1922 reports.[33] Strategic Recovery It did appear that a new strategy was being developed and implemented in 1922 that would solve the inferior market status without making staff changes. The Scripps chain began acquiring papers for market entry rather than start new ones. Losing papers were closed or merged with dominant-market papers. The strategy was designed to give an edge into market-entry rather than starting at the bottom. Newspapers were acquired in Youngstown, Indianapolis, Baltimore, and Pittsburgh in 1922. A paper in Albuquerque was acquired in 1923. The Norfolk paper was eliminated in 1924 and Scripps Howard began merging with dominant-market papers in 1926. In November 1926, the Scripps Howard-owned Memphis Press purchased the competing afternoon paper, the Memphis News-Scimitar, and almost immediately merged, forming the Memphis Press-Scimitar. That same year two other mergers brought some advantage to the company. The first was a merger of the Scripps Howard-owned Knoxville News with the Knoxville Sentinel, creating the Knoxville News-Sentinel. It immediately became the dominant paper in Knoxville. The other move in came in Denver when the Scripps Howard Express merged with Rocky Mountain News and afternoon Times. The Express and Times merged to form the Evening Times with the Rocky Mountain News as the morning paper. The Evening News was sold to the Denver Post in 1928. Although the acquisition helped gain some ground, the new paper maintained a slightly subordinate position. In 1927, Scripps Howard finally broke into New York; after years of looking at various papers the company acquired the New York Telegram. Although it was also in a subordinated position, Scripps Howard executives cared little, for now they were in the big city.[34] Even though Scripps Howard executives had made strides to improve the profitability of the chain, there were still some losing market papers. A problem that became more pronounced in the early years of the depression. Decreasing revenues during the depression of the 1930s was a challenge to all newspapers, but it was even larger hurdle for the Scripps papers since they held the subordinate market position. Scripps Howard executives implementing a joint operating plan with the dominant market paper.[35] Agreements for joint operation during the 1930s were arranged in Albuquerque (1933), in El Paso (1936), and Evansville, Ill. (1938). Other efforts to form joint agreements in San Diego and Knoxville during this period were unsuccessful. In all instances, Scripps Howard-owned papers were in a subordinate market position in circulation with competitors.[36] Conclusion Roy Howard's critique of the Scripps Newspapers and the analysis of content of selected Scripps Newspapers strongly suggests that Scripps Newspapers lacked local content when compared with competitors. This information would not have surprised even E.W. Scripps. Likely, he would have been pleased. This method of reporting fit in well with establishing low budget papers, and it served in supporting the ancillary Scripps news services. In fact, it worked to help Scripps accomplish a larger vision. Scripps was organizing a network of newspapers and he envisioned that, "The ultimate end and ideal of the plan is to make-up and edit in one office all the matter fit for a national paper that can be published anywhere in the country under any name, without any support and co-operation of a local staff.".[37] For many years the subordinate market position of the newspapers did not seem to bother Scripps. The papers were profitable, at least on a small scale. Reviews of Editor & Publisher Yearbooks suggest that the papers were not only subordinate, but almost always last in the market when compared with other competitors. It is still difficult to determine if the lack of local content was the main reason or only a contributing reason to the subordinated position. Scripps's budgeting methods of allowing papers to financially support themselves with little help from the main office may have made the start-up enterprise difficult. Scripps was also known for taking young men with a lot of initiative, but little experience as editors and business managers.[38] It is possible that these other elements also were a factor in Scripps papers having a subordinated position. However, this paper should go further in helping to develop a potential theoretical base to see if a lack of local content may contribute to lower circulation or a subordinated market position. This assumption would have to be tested historically, since few markets exist with competing papers. However, the findings may have application for other forms of media such as local internet news sites. Endnotes [1] 1.Alfred McClung Lee, The Daily Newspaper in America: The Evolution of A Social Instrument (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1937), 214. [2] Vance Trimble, Scripps-Howard Handbook, (Cincinnati: E.W. Scripps Company, 1981), Appendix I. [3] See Gilson Gardner, Lusty Scripps (New York City: Vanguard Press, 1932); Negley D. Cochran, E.W. Scripps (New York City: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1933); Charles McCabe, Damned Old Crank: A Self Portrait of E.W. Scripps (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951); Oliver Knight, I Protest: The Disquisitions of E.W. Scripps (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); Vance Trimble, The Astonishing Mr. Scripps: The Turbulent Life of America's Penny Press Lord (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1992); Jack Casserly, Scripps, the Divided Dynasty: A History of the First Family of American Journalism, (Donald I Fine, Inc.: New York, 1993); Gerald J. Baldasty, E.W. Scripps and the Business of Newspapers, (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1999). [4] See Clifford Weigle, "The Young Scripps Editor: Keystone to E.W.'s System," Journalism Quarterly 41 (summer 1964): 360-366; and Edward E. Adams, "Scripps Howard's Implementation of Joint Operating Agreements for Market Preservation, 1933-1939," Journalism History, 23/4 (Winter 1998): 165; and Edward E. Adams, "Secret Combinations and Collusive Agreements: The Scripps Newspaper Empire and the Early Roots of Joint Operating Agreements," Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 73/1 (Spring 1996): 205. [5] See N.W. Ayer & Son, American Newspaper Annual: 1880-1909, (Philadelphia: N.W. Ayer & Son, 1910), and N.W. Ayer & Son, American Newspaper Annual and Directory: 1912-1929, (Philadelphia: N.W. Ayer & Son, 1930). [6] Lee, The Daily Newspaper in America, Table XVII [7] Lee, The Daily Newspaper in America, Table XV [8] Compiled from data collected from the E.W. Scripps papers and the Scripps-Howard Handbook. [9] The correspondence from E.W. Scripps rarely ever mentions the relative position of the Scripps papers compared to competitors. Much of the correspondence is on how to be a better paper, and issues dealing with budgets and profits. [10] "Scripps McRae becomes Scripps Howard," Editor & Publisher, November 4, 1922, pp. 3-6. [11] Roy W. Howard to E.W. Scripps, April 29, 1922, subseries 1.1, box 39, folder 7, E.W. Scripps papers. [12] Roy W. Howard to E.W. Scripps, April 29, 1922, subseries 1.1, box 39, folder 7, E.W. Scripps papers. [13] Roy W. Howard to E.W. Scripps, April 29, 1922, subseries 1.1, box 39, folder 7, E.W. Scripps papers. [14] Charles F. Mosher to E.W. Scripps, Bob Scripps, and Roy W. Howard, Financial Report, May 4, 1922, subseries 1.1, box 39, folder 7, E.W. Scripps papers. [15] Roy W. Howard to Robert P. Scripps, December 4, 1922, subseries 3.1, box 56, folder 1, E.W. Scripps papers. [16] Roy W. Howard to Robert P. Scripps, November 1, 1922, subseries 3.1, box 56, folder 1, E.W. Scripps papers. [17] Roy W. Howard to Robert P. Scripps, November 1, 1922, subseries 3.1, box 56, folder 1, E.W. Scripps papers. [18] Source Editor & Publisher and Scripps papers. [19] Lee, The Daily Newspaper in America, 514-518. [20] Robert F. Paine to Editors, June 3, 1902, subseries 3.1, box11, folder 2, E.W. Scripps papers. [21] E.W. Scripps to E.H. Bagby, June 23, 1902, series 2, box 6, Letterbook 10, p. 468, E.W. Scripps papers. [22] E.W. Scripps to Robert F. Paine, August 4, 1903, series 2, box 9, letterbook 13, E.W. Scripps papers. [23] Trimble, The Astonishing Mr. Scripps, 254-255. [24] E.W. Scripps to Paul H. Blades, July 16 and 24, 1902, series 2, box 11, letterbook 2. E.W. Scripps papers. [25] R.F. Paine, Western trip, November 6, 1906, series 3.2, box 15, folder 6. E.W. Scripps papers [26] Gerald J. Baldasty, E.W. Scripps and the Business of Newspapers (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1999):46-47. [27] J.C. Harper to Robert F. Paine, June 15, 1908, subseries 3.1, box 27, folder 3. E.W. Scripps papers. [28] W.H. Porterfield to B.H. Canfield, May 14, 1908, subseries 3.1, box 28, folder 11. E.W. Scripps papers. [29] Trimble, The Astonishing Mr. Scripps, 255-257. [30] Trimble, The Astonishing Mr. Scripps, 260-265. [31] Roy W. Howard to Robert L. Paine, Nov 1, 1922, subseries 3.1, box 56, folder 1. E.W. Scripps papers. [32] Roy W. Howard to Robert L. Paine, Nov 1, 1922, subseries 3.1, box 56, folder 1. E.W. Scripps papers. [33] Compare Roy W. Howard to Robert L. Paine, Nov 1, 1922, subseries 3.1, box 56, folder 1. and Roy W. Howard to Robert L. Paine, Jun 20, 1924, subseries 3.1, box 56, folder 4. E.W. Scripps papers. [34] Vance Trimble, Scripps-Howard Handbook, (Cincinnati: E.W. Scripps Company, 1981): 387. [35] Scripps Howard closed the Oklahoma News, and sold the San Diego Sun, Akron Times-Press, Toledo News-Bee, Terre Haute Post, Youngstown Telegram, and the Baltimore Post. (Scripps Howard Handbook, 3rd ed., [Cincinnati: E.W. Scripps Publishing Company, 1981]: 377-389.) [36] See Edward E. Adams, "Scripps Howard's Implementation of Joint Operating Agreements for Market Preservation, 1933-1939," Journalism History, 23/4 (Winter 1998): 165, and Edward E. Adams, "Secret Combinations and Collusive Agreements: The Scripps Newspaper Empire and the Early Roots of Joint Operating Agreements," Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 73/1 (Spring 1996): 205. [37] E.W. Scripps to Robert F. Paine, August 4, 1903, series 2, box 9, letterbook 13, E.W. Scripps papers. [38] Clifford Weigle, "The Young Scripps Editor: Keystone to E.W.'s System," Journalism Quarterly 41 (summer 1964): 360-366