FCC Policy Considerations in the Development of Advanced Television
FCC Policy Considerations in the
Development of Advanced Television,
1987-1997
by
Scott D. Wiltsee
University of Georgia
Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication
Athens, Georgia 30602
(770) 546-8309
e-mail: [log in to unmask]
FCC Policy Considerations in the
Development of Advanced Television,
1987-1997
Introduction
On November 28, 1995, the Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service
(ACATS) recommended to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) a new digital
television broadcasting standard to replace the analog NTSC (National Television
Standards Committee) system that has been in place since the 1940s. Based on
the recommendations of ACATS, the FCC adopted the standard in December 1996 and
provided eligibility of digital licenses to existing broadcasters in April 1997.
The conditions of the licensing arrangement included a swap of existing spectrum
and the staggered implementation of digital standards, resulting in an
all-digital broadcasting system by 2006.
Much of the discussion surrounding advanced television (ATV) has focused on the
technological innovation involvedD new standards would allow for clearer
pictures and sound, as well as the "interoperability" between television and
computer systems. However, the interest in advanced television and its clearest
format of high-definition television (HDTV) has not been strictly technological.
Since the development of advanced television systems began, a number of wider
political and economic issues have surfacedDall of which have increased the
fervor over ATV.
This analysis examines the history of advanced television in the United States
between 1987 and 1997 and its policy implications. The research attempts to
define some of the key reasons ATV has become a high-priority item for
government officials, broadcasters, and manufacturers. At the same time, it
identifies the major debates that have threatened to block ATV's development.
From this analysis, several key themes have emerged. At various points in the
debate over ATV, supporters have cited the technology's ability to: (1) improve
American competition in the consumer electronics market; (2) bolster
broadcasters' ability to compete with newer media services; (3) allow
broadcasters to maintain specific portions of the electromagnetic spectrum; (4)
improve American employment opportunities; (5) maintain national security; and
(6) develop new sources of governmental revenues. Although each of these
elements alone was insufficient to ensure the successful development of ATV,
taken as a whole they have pushed the technology to the status it currently
enjoys.
Background
Prior to a specific examination of the events leading to the adoption of new
television standards, it is important to define terminology used in this
analysis. Specifically, it is necessary to define "HDTV," because much of the
popular literature does not make a distinction between "high-definition
television" and "advanced television." When the FCC formed ACATS in November
1987, high-definition television was intended as a means to improve on the
existing NTSC analog signal (525 scanning lines, 30 frames per second for 60
fields). At that time, the "high-definition" in HDTV was defined as a scanning
improvement in analog transmission and reception. The possibility of a digital
broadcasting standards did not arise until 1991, after General Instrument had
developed an early version of digital transmission technology.[1]
Since that time, the focus on HDTV has shifted from analog to a digital form of
transmission. The term "DTV," or digital television describes all forms of
digital transmission, including HDTV (high-end scanning formats) and Standard
Definition Television (SDTV), which has picture quality approximately equivalent
to the existing NTSC system.
For the purposes of this analysis, the term "ATV" will be used to describe
advanced television systems both before and after the development of digital
technology. However, it must be noted that much of the literature used here
uses "HDTV" as an interchangeable term for advanced television.
Initial Stages of ATV Policy
The FCC began its inquiry into advanced television in 1987, when it initiated
the rule making proceeding of "Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon
Existing Television Broadcast Service (MM Docket No. 87-268)."[2] In the fall
of 1987, the FCC established ACATS "...to provide recommendations concerning
technical, economic and public policy issues associated with the introduction of
ATV service."[3]
According to one secondary account, there were two key elements at play in the
early stages of advanced television development: (1) electronics manufacturers
and government officials were concerned by the fact that Japan's public
broadcasting network, NHK, had created a high-definition analog system ("Muse");
and (2) the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) wanted to protect a
portion of the ultra-high frequency spectrum from use by Land Mobile (two-way
radio).[4]
Given the political climate at the time, there was a fear that Japan and Europe
would establish firm control over the consumer electronics market. In theory,
the development of ATV in the United States would have allowed American industry
to gain ground on foreign manufacturers. As far as the Land Mobile question was
concerned, some broadcasters viewed any discussion of ATV as a means of stalling
allocation of spectrum space for other purposes. The FCC did in fact delay
consideration of UHF allocation to Land Mobile and created ACATS to study the
issue of ATV, with former FCC chairman Richard Wiley appointed as the head of
the 25-member committee comprised of senior executives from broadcast, cable,
telephone, consumer electronics, computer and entertainment industries.[5]
Early Industry Efforts
After the creation of ACATS, the American Electronic Association (AEA) began
formulating an industry-wide strategy for advanced television. AEA formed the
Task Force on Advanced Television, which produced two influential reports on the
market of ATV products. The first report "...argued that the failure of United
States firms to participate in future markets for HDTV receivers would translate
rather directly into the rapid loss of global production shares for both
semiconductors and (advanced) workstations."[6]
In January 1989, 16 electronics companies explored the possibility of banding
together to develop high-definition television products.[7] The group consisted
primarily of consumer electronics firms, including IBM, Digital Equipment,
Hewlett Packard, Apple, Zenith, Texas Instruments, and Motorola. The purpose of
the possible alliance was to keep the United States competitive with the
Japanese and Europeans, who had begun to dominate the electronics markets,
according to some of the rhetoric put forth at the time. "Getting back into
consumer electronics would also help the American semiconductor industry because
it would provide a huge market for chips."[8]
Within two months, the plan for a consortium had failed, and the development of
ATV during the next several years would take a different direction, as research
and manufacturing groups would form smaller alliances in the development of ATV.
In February 1989, for example, AT&T and Zenith entered into a joint agreement to
develop an ATV system.[9] Another group working on ATV was the Advanced
Television Research Consortium, made up of the David Sarnoff Research Center,
North American Philips Corporation, Thomson Consumer Electronics, NBC, and
Compression Labs, Inc.[10] The Sarnoff Center demonstrated a compatible analog
HDTV system in April 1989.[11]
At the same time, the AEA continued to formulate strategies for ATV
development, including a request for $1.35 billion in government grants, loans,
and credits.[12]
Support (and Opposition) from the Federal Government
Meanwhile, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the
Pentagon's research arm, was seeking proposals from manufacturers for $30
million in research grants. The Pentagon stated that the development of HDTV
was "crucial to national security."[13] The rationale was outlined in a draft
report by a Pentagon advisory group, the High-Definition Systems Task Force,
which "...said that the Pentagon was in danger of becoming totally reliant on
foreign vendors for such systems, posing 'unacceptably high levels of risk to
our national security...."[14]
By June 1989, DARPA had selected five companies (from 80 proposals) to develop
high-definition technology: Newco Inc., Raychem Corporation, Texas Instruments,
Projectavision, Inc., and Photonics Technology, Inc.[15] The companies would
develop products for "battle management, training, and simulation of military
maneuvers."[16] DARPA's grants represented the first federal funds to be spent
on the development of HDTV:
(DARPA deputy director Craig Fields)...decided to push for
greater government leadership in promoting civilian
technologies...Fields became a major spokesman for the need for a
civilian equivalent to DARPA, since he realized that using (DOD)
agencies for the promotion of purely commercial technologies would
not work in the long run. Nevertheless, he felt that DARPA support
for the development of HDTV technologies could be justified on the
basis of their being dual-use technologies (for both military and ci
vilian applications).[17]
Despite DARPA's interest in the technology, the enthusiasm for advanced
television was not widespread in all federal government circles. Little formal
action had been taken by either Congress or the George Bush administration to
support development of the new systems. In March 1989, hearings were held
before the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology in which government
and industry representatives presented testimony about advanced television.[18]
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce, as well as the Senate, also held
hearings on the issue. The concern at each of these hearings, which were
partially called because of AEA's first report,[19] appeared to surround the
fact that the Japanese were already far ahead in developing the technology.[20]
But Congress deferred any official position on advanced television.
The Bush administration remained quiet on the issue, with the exception of
Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher, who "...announced at his nomination
hearings in January 1989 that he would make the promotion of HDTV one of his top
priorities."[21] Part of Mosbacher's strategy included relaxation of antitrust
laws[22] and a change in the capital gains tax[23] to encourage American
development of ATV.
However, a report issued by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in August
1989 questioned the effectiveness of advanced television in restoring
competitiveness to American industry.[24] The report stated that any federal
support for ATV would need to have "...other justifications, like job creation,
national prestige, and scientific advancement."[25]
The CBO report, which also questioned whether consumers would be willing to pay
an estimated $2,000 for television sets, helped to shift the Bush
administration's view of advanced television.[26] "The inner circle of Bush
Administration economic advisers... instructed Secretary Mosbacher to make HDTV
industrial policies a lower priority item on his own agenda, withheld HDTV funds
from DARPA, and in April 1990 fired the acting director of that agency, an
important backer of HDTV policies in the Department of Defense."[27]
The Future of ATV Slowly Takes Shape
Despite these setbacks to ATV, ACATS continued to promote development, and the
FCC began to develop formal policies regarding transmission standards. In March
1990, FCC chairman Alfred Sikes announced the commission would adopt a
"simulcasting" system of spectrum management when ATV was developed.[28] Under
this approach, each broadcaster would transmit high-definition signals on a
second channel while continuing to transmit NTSC signals on its existing
channel. The process would allow the technology to be introduced gradually into
the consumer market. The simulcast approach was chosen over an augmentation
(blended high-definition and low-definition) system, because the latter
"...posed spectrum availability and utilization problems."[29]
At this point, the FCC predicted that a set of formal standards for ATV would
be developed by spring 1993. According to The New York Times, "The FCC has said
that whatever system is adopted, the transition to HDTV will be similar to the
one to color television, in that consumers will not have to throw out existing
television sets."[30]
However, in May of 1990, General Instrument engineers revealed their successful
tests with digital transmission technology.[31] The entrance of digital in the
process was a major factor in shifting focus in the development of ATV. From
this point forward, the FCC's already loose mandate of compatibility would
become even less rigid.
In November 1990, the FCC announced it would conduct tests of rival ATV
systems, beginning in mid-1991.[32] ACATS was directed to test each system at
the Advanced Television Test Center in Alexandria, Virginia and recommend a
single winner from among the applicants. The target date for completion was
Spring 1992, which would allow for a decision by the FCC in June 1993.[33] The
competitors in the tests, which in fact did not begin until July 1991,[34]
included: the Advanced Television Research Consortium; Zenith and AT&T;
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; General Instrument; and NHK, the Japanese
broadcaster that had developed a high-definition analog system tailored for the
American market called Narrow Muse.[35]
Political Issues of ATV Begin to Heat Up
While contestants inside the Advanced Television Test Center sorted out their
technological problems, outside a number of political issues were beginning to
surface. The FCC shifted its date for decision-making to late 1993 because of a
late start in the testing process (caused primarily by a shift to digital by
most of the competitors).[36]
The first major issue surrounding ATV concerned the use of the second
(simulcast) channel. Broadcasters were beginning to ask for flexibility in
their use of the second channel. Despite assurances from FCC chairman Sikes
that the two-channel arrangement would be temporary, some broadcasters were
concerned that simulcasting would simply double the number of channelsDthus
doubling competition.[37]
In April 1992, the FCC outlined a plan to phase out the existing NTSC system
entirely by 2008.[38] After the 15-year transition period of simulcasting (the
FCC still had a target date of 1993 to make a decision on standards), consumers
would be left with the choice of buying new receivers or decoding devices
(neither of which had yet been developed).[39] The FCC's proposal did not give
broadcasters the flexibility to program the second channel with alternative
programming. At the end of the simulcasting period, broadcasters would be
required to return one channel, a fact which was already becoming a hot
issue.[40]
The FCC viewed the shift to high-definition television as a means of ensuring
that broadcasters would "remain competitive."[41] But broadcasters were also
citing concerns over losing money while installing new ATV equipment and
facilities.[42]
A second key issue during this period was the ability of advanced television to
bolster American economic interests. By 1993, additional concerns about the
economic impact of ATV surfaced from the newly-elected Bill Clinton
administration and Congress. In February 1993, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich
wrote a letter to FCC commissioner James Quello asking for an assessment of
ATV's potential employment impact.[43] Each of the competitors at the Test
Center had a connection with foreign economic interestsDeither by direct
ownership by foreign corporations (e.g., the Advanced Television Research
Consortium), foreign subcontractors (e.g., General Instruments), or foreign
manufacturing (e.g., Zenith).[44] This fact was a concern to federal
administrators. Reich's letter stated that the selection of a specific ATV
standard "...should turn, in part, on an assessment of which system would make
the greatest contribution to domestic high-wage employment."[45]
A third major issue that appeared during this period came from computer
manufacturers. Previous discussions of ATV had focused on the new technology as
purely a form of high-quality broadcasting. But a group of computer
companiesDincluding Apple Computer, Digital Equipment Corporation, and IBMDwere
beginning to ask for development of computer-compatible standards.[46]
The debate stemmed from the differences between the display technology of
television receivers and computer monitors. Television sets have used a system
of "interlacing" to scan pictures on the screen, wherein images are placed on
the screen at a rate of 30 frames per second. But only every other line hits
the screen each second, meaning that only half of the image appears at any given
time (the other half appears during the next second, and so on). However, the
computer industry developed a "progressive" scanning method, in which all 60
lines are placed on the screen each second. Computer manufacturers have stated
that interlacing does not work on computers because of the "flicker" that users
can see when sitting too close to the screens.
As the development of ATV began to move into the digital arena, the possibility
for "interoperability" between television receivers and computers became more
feasible. The computer industry took the position that any standards for ATV
would have to employ a progressive scan system in order to encourage this
interoperability. In one interview, ACATS chairman Richard Wiley said, "We're
trying to set a broadcast and cable standard here, and interoperability is an
important criterion...But we're not setting a computer standard, per se."[47]
In a letter to the FCC in May 1993, the Computer Systems Policy Project (a
group of 13 computer companies) threatened to develop a separate standard if the
commission adopted the interlacing technology favored by broadcasters.[48] As
the debate continued to heat up, Wiley said in another interview, "This is not
just about pretty pictures...We are looking for interoperabilityDnot only
between broadcasting and cable, but also with computers. This has applications
in factory automation, medical imaging, and even defense."[49]
While a number of political and economic issues were being debated, the testing
of the rival ATV systems took a new direction. ACATS had determined that none
of the systems were satisfactory as tested but that a series of new tests could
be conducted to account for improvements designed over the two-year period.[50]
The FCC set a deadline of May 21, 1993 for the ATV contestants to form an
alliance or pay $850,000 apiece for the new series of tests.[51]
The day before the deadline, a group of rival contestantsDGI/MIT, Zenith/AT&T,
and Philips/Thomson/NBC/SarnoffDformed the "Grand Alliance" to present a single,
digital ATV system to ACATS for testing.
ACATS Makes Its Recommendations
By November 1995, the Grand Alliance had developed a workable ATV system.
ACATS met for the last time on November 28, 1995 to recommend the Grand Alliance
technologies. In an ACATS press release, chairman Wiley stated:
This is a landmark day for many communications industries and,
especially, for American television viewers...At hand is a quantum
leap in both quality and flexibility that will enhance greatly
television's ability to educate, inform, and entertain us...Equally
significant, the new standard will assure the United States continues
to lead the world in digital television technology, with a highly
interoperable system that will provide tremendous flexibility for
future digital applications in addition to HDTV's stunning pictures
and sound.[52]
ACATS recommended six possible HDTV formats for consideration: 24-, 20-, and
60-frame-per-second progressive scan with a pixel format of 1280 x 720 (number
of active picture elements per line times the number of active lines); 24- and
30-frame 1920 x 1080 progressive scan; and 60-frame 1920 x 1080 interlaced.[53]
At this point, the intent remained high-definition television, although the
ACATS recommendations left open the possibility of implementing lower-definition
digital standards (i.e., SDTV).
The FCC Begins the Formal Decision-making Process
With the testing process completed and the ACATS recommendations made, the task
now fell to Congress and the FCC to adopt formal standards and timetables for
the transition to advanced television.
The FCC called an En Banc hearing on December 12, 1995 to discuss ATV's major
issues. Reed Hundt, FCC chairman, noted in the hearing, "...a group of
brilliant scientists has put a digital genie in the bottle, and that genie can
grant many different wishes."[54] The all-day hearing explored a number of both
new and old issues concerning ATV, including (but not limited to) the
following:[55]
y Auctioning of the second channel. Discussion focused on the opinion
that granting a second channel to existing broadcasters represented a
"giveaway," because auctioning spectrum space to the highest bidder would
represent significant income for the federal government.
y Implementation of SDTV vs. HDTV standards. The issue was raised over
whether standards requiring high-definition programs allowed flexibility
for broadcasters. It was noted that digital technology allowed
broadcasters to transmit multiple programs in standard-definition formats
that would equal or exceed existing NTSC standards.
y Ability of broadcasters to compete in media market. It was stated that
digital standards would need to enhance the ability of over-the-air
broadcasters to compete with other forms of media that did not require FCC
approval to employ digital technology (e.g., cable, DBS, wireless cable,
etc.).
y The willingness of consumers to switch to a new receiver system.
Participants in the hearing raised the issue of whether consumers would be
willing to buy new television sets or converters (and what length of time
would be required for market acceptance).
y Interoperability between television and computers. The ability of
broadcasting standards to be compatible with computer technology remained
a source of debate.
y The cost of implementing new standards. Some discussion focused on the
cost of switching to ATV, not only for consumers but also for broadcasters
who must invest in new transmission equipment.
y FCC content requirements for digital channels. A portion of the
discussion centered around questions regarding treatment of second
channels by the FCC, including public interest requirements and must-carry
rules.
Of course, the FCC made no formal decisions at the hearing, but it took one of
many steps toward federal adoption of advanced television policy.
Second Channel "Giveaway" Takes Center Stage
By 1995, two primary issues began to dominate discussion over advanced
televisionDboth of which concerned the second channel of spectrum space. The
first source of debate stemmed from the ability of signals to be compressed
within a standard six megahertz band. While the analog NTSC signal fills most
of the space within each channel, engineers in the Grand Alliance determined
that digital compression technology would allow for multiple signals to be
broadcast within the available spectrum space (up to six different
channels).[56]
Broadcasters pushed for greater flexibility with regards to the digital
channel.[57] Rather than broadcasting a single high-definition signalDwhich
would effectively fill the 6 MHz channelDthey were entertaining the
possibilities of transmitting multiple SDTV signals within the same space.
FCC chairman Reed Hundt noted in one interview, "Fundamentally, the logic of
flexibility is that broadcasters should be free to regulate the quality of their
pictures as well as their content, according to market demand...."[58] After
several years of focusing specifically on the technological breakthrough of
high-definition television, broadcasters seized the possibilities of the
standard-definition recommendations compiled by ACATS.
The second major issue appearing during this period concerned the possibility
of auctioning the second channel to broadcasters rather than swapping one area
of spectrum space for another. Some Republican members of Congress began to see
the auction of spectrum space for its substantial revenue potential.[59]
The issue moved to the forefront of public debate during the consideration of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a sweeping piece of legislation designed to
effect changes across the entire telecommunications industry. Senate majority
leader Bob Dole, the primary supporter of spectrum auctions, called the channel
swapping arrangement "corporate welfare" and threatened to block the bill
because of this specific issue.[60] Dole said, "Let me get this
straight...America lends broadcasters spectrum so they can increase their profit
margins, but they don't think it's fair to pay rent."[61]
The debate over what was called the "giveaway" of the second channel was a
divisive issue within the Republican ranks of Congress, some of whom pushed the
position that an auction could recover $70 billion, which could be used to lower
the federal budget deficit.[62]
By the end of January 1996, Dole backed away from his insistence for a spectrum
auction as a means of blocking the bill, but he added that the issue needed to
be revisited in a separate bill at some point in the future.[63] Dole also
warned the FCC not to "...short-circuit Congress by issuing licenses or permits
for advanced television before Congress has resolved the spectrum issue."[64]
The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The final version of the bill, as passed in February 1996, omitted any
directives regarding auctioning of spectrum space. The Act provided broad
mandates for the FCC in its implementation of advanced television standards.
Among the key points of the Act that addressed ATV were the following:
y Limit eligibility of the second channel to existing broadcasters. The
FCC "should limit the initial eligibility for such licenses to persons
that, as of the date of such issuance, are licensed to operate a
television broadcast station or hold a permit to construct such a station
(or both)...."[65]
y Allow broadcasters to provide supplemental services (i.e., give them
flexibility to offer multiple SDTV programming). The FCC "shall adopt
regulations that allow the holders of such licenses to offer such
ancillary or supplementary services on designated frequencies as may be
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity."[66]
y Require provision of supplemental services within the technical
transmission standards adopted by the FCC.[67]
y Require the return of the second channel to the FCC at the end of the
transition period.[68]
y Allow the FCC to impose public interest requirements on any new
broadcasting services. "Nothing in this section shall be construed as
relieving a television broadcasting station from its obligation to serve
the public interest, convenience, and necessity. In the Commission's
review of any application for renewal of a broadcast license for a
television station that provides ancillary or supplementary services, the
television licensee shall establish that all of its program services on
the existing or advanced television spectrum are in the public interest."[69]
The Telecommunications Act gave the FCC a considerable amount of flexibility in
deciding how and when digital standards should be implementedDa fact that would
ultimately benefit broadcasters. As Time magazine stated, "The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 gives the broadcasters carte blanche to offer any
programs or services they please, so long as they continue to provide one free
channel with picture quality as high as today's analog signal."[70]
Interoperability and Public Interest Requirements
After passage of the Act, the FCC prepared for the final stretch before
adoption of standards. However, the issue of interlace vs. progressive scan
continued to be a sticking point. Members of the computer industryDincluding
Microsoft, Apple, and CompaqDcontinued to push for a standard that allowed
interoperability (trying to ensure a progressive scan system for digital
television).[71]
In May 1996, the FCC issued a Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making that
tentatively recommended adoption of the ATSC DTV standards developed by ACATS
(which included both interlaced and progressive scan options).[72]
The debate over interoperability was sufficiently intense to give FCC chairman
Hundt doubts over final adoption of standards, despite pressure from
broadcasters and consumer electronics for an FCC decision by August 1996.[73]
"If there isn't an adequate business plan that addresses reaching PC's and using
the power of digital technology, the real tragedy is that no one will be able to
use the spectrum well," said Hundt in one interview.[74]
Hundt was one of the most vocal FCC critics of the advanced television
development process, even stating at one point, "The Grand Alliance was a
creation of the broadcasting industry, the primary purpose of which was to make
sure they could get the spectrum...It's not widely reported that way, but that's
my opinion."[75]
By June 1996, Congress began putting pressure on the FCC to make a final
decision on digital television standards. In a letter from Trent Lott, Newt
Gingrich, and others in Congress, the FCC was urged to "...move forward as
expeditiously as possible..." in lending the second channel to broadcasters and
select a set of standards no later than April 1, 1997.[76] The letter also made
the reminder, "The Commission does not need any additional statutory authority
to proceed with the assignment of digital licenses."[77]
However, Hundt had introduced a new issue into the processDpublic interest
requirements. The Telecommunications Act had left the public interest
requirement relatively vague, and Hundt stated that he wanted broadcasters to
devote at least five percent of air-time on the second channels as public
interest programming (children's education or free candidate time).[78] Other
FCC commissionersDincluding Quello, Ness, and ChongDremained opposed to public
interest requirements.[79]
The FCC Adopts DTV Standards and Procedures
After months of debate on the interoperability issue, a group of industry
representatives (broadcasting, consumer electronics, and computer industries)
worked out an agreement to accept the ATSC standards.[80]
The agreement paved the way for formal FCC adoption of the ATSC digital
standards on December 24, 1996 in its Fourth Report and Order.[81] The
standards encompass 18 different video and audio formats, which can be decoded
by any ATSC DTV receiver.[82]
On April 3, 1997, the FCC addressed a number of the key issues surrounding DTV
in the Fifth Report and Order and adopted a table of DTV allotments in the Sixth
Report and Order. The Fifth Report included a series of formal decisions, as
well as deferment on others. The key decisions included in the report are as
follows:
y Channel size will remain at 6 MHz. "...(W)e continue to believe that
providing 6 MHz channels for ATV purposes 'represents the optimum balance
of broadcast needs and spectrum efficiency.'"[83]
y Initial eligibility for the second channel will be limited to existing
broadcasters. "Following Congress' direction, we determine that initial
eligibility should be limited to those broadcasters who, as of the date of
issuance of the initial licenses, hold a license to operate a television
broadcast station or a permit to construct such a station, or both."[84]
y Simulcast programs are required to have comparable resolution to analog
NTSC programs. "Specifically, broadcasters must provide a free digital
video programming service the resolution of which is comparable to or
better than that of today's service and aired during the same periods that
their analog channel is broadcasting."[85]
y Supplemental programming services will be allowed. "...(W)e will allow
broadcasters flexibility to respond to the demands of their audience by
providing ancillary and supplementary services that do not derogate the
mandated free, over-the-air program service." These include
"...subscription television programming, computer software distribution,
data transmissions, teletext, interactive services, audio signals, and any
other services...."[86]
y Broadcasters are not required to provide minimum amounts of
high-definition programming. "Our decisions today...give broadcasters the
opportunity to provide high definition television programming, but we
decline to impose a requirement that broadcasters provide a minimum amount
of such programming and, instead, leave this decision to the discretion of
licensees."[87]
y No formal decision made on second channel public interest requirements.
"We are not resolving this debate today. Instead, at an appropriate time,
we will issue a Notice to collect and consider all views. As we authorize
digital services, however, broadcast licensees and the public are on
notice that existing public interest requirements continue to apply to all
broadcast licenses."[88]
y FCC adopts staggered requirements for minimum simulcast content. "In
order to help reclaim spectrum at the end of the transition period...we
adopt by the sixth year from the date of adoption of this Report and Order
a requirement of 50% simulcasting of the video programming of the analog
channel on the DTV channel; by the seventh year, a 75% simulcasting
requirement; by the eighth year, a 100% simulcasting requirement, until
the analog channel is terminated and that spectrum returned."[89]
y FCC targets 2006 as date of analog channel return. "While the
Commission has previously considered a 15-year end-point for NTSC service,
...we believe that a target of 2006 for the cessation of analog service is
reasonable."[90]
y No requirement made that digital receivers display both NTSC and ATSC
signals. "We expect that equipment manufacturers will make available to
consumers digital receivers that receive both NTSC and DTV signals.
However, we will not preclude equipment manufacturers from designing
digital receivers that do not receive NTSC signals."[91]
y Allow manufacturers and retailers to provide information to consumers.
"At this early stage of the transition process, we will rely on consumer
electronics manufacturers and retailers to provide the information
necessary for consumers to make informed choices."[92]
Conclusion
The development of advanced television in the United States has been a highly
complex processDfull of political and technological roadblocks. What started as
a means of bolstering competition by the American manufacturing industry grew
into a politically charged source of debate for more than 10 years. And many of
the issues that have surfaced show no signs of disappearing as advanced
television is actually introduced to the American public. When comparing many
of the original reasons for developing advanced television with the end result
of federal policy, there are a number of divergent elements.
First, the possibility of auctioning the second channel to broadcasters was the
source of controversy during the Telecommunications Act of 1996Deven to the
point of almost blocking passage. However, neither Congress nor the FCC
followed through with the auction issue, and the end result is a basic swap of
one channel for another.
Second, over the course of the last ten years, the FCC has backed away from the
initial desire to implement high-definition standards in American broadcasting.
The final policy from the Fifth Report and Order gives broadcasters flexibility
to provide multiple SDTV channels rather than a single HDTV channel. (However,
the flexibility issue was tested in late 1997 when ABC and other broadcasters
announced they would choose the SDTV option over HDTV, at which point some
members of Congress pressured them to provide at least some high-definition
programming.)[93]
Third, the FCC changed its position on the length of time required for the
transition to digital television. In 1990, the commission had expected 15 years
to be an adequate period for the technology to gain market acceptance, but in
the 1997 order it cut the period to eight years.
Fourth, an early concern for FCC policy-makers was the compatibility of new ATV
equipment with existing NTSC equipment. Much of the rhetoric in the late 1980s
and early 1990s mentioned the similarity between this change and the conversion
to color television in the 1950s, when compatibility was maintained between old
and new technology. With the discovery of digital transmission technology, the
FCC backed away from the compatibility requirement. By 1997, the issue of
compatibility appears to become of even less concern, as the Fifth Order does
not even require digital equipment to receive NTSC signals.
Finally, the FCC appeared to be somewhat tentative about its approach to the
second digital channel, inasmuch as it was unwilling to decide on the issue of
public interest requirements.
In summary, the final outcome of ATV-development process is somewhat different
from what policy-makers and industry representatives expected in 1987. And as
the technology is actually implemented over the next several years, the shifts
in FCC policies and political in-fighting will likely continue with even greater
fervor.
References
"Advanced TV Testing Set Amid Tumult on Technology," The New York Times
(November 15, 1990), D1.
"And Now for Something Substantially Different: Digital TV," The New York
Times (July 12, 1992), D22.
"A.T.&T. and Zenith in TV Deal," The New York Times (March 1, 1989), D1.
Brinkley, Joel. Defining Vision: The Battle for the Future of Television
. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1997.
"Broad Support Seen for Incentives on New Technology," The New York Times
(May 5, 1989), D3.
Carbonara, Corey "HDTV: An Historical Perspective," in Lou CasBianca (ed
.), The New TV: A Comprehensive Survey of High Definition Television.
Westport, Conn.: Meckler Publishing, 1992.
Carter, T. Barton, et. al. The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate:
Regulation of Electronic Mass Media. Westbury, New York: The Foundation
Press, Inc., 1996.
"Capitol Hill Fiat on HDTV Isn't the Last Word," The New York Times (July
1, 1996), D1.
"Choice of TV System Shifting Into a Political Brawl on Jobs," The New
York Times (March 14, 1993), D5.
"Congress Asks F.C.C. to Begin Lending Channels for Digital TV
Broadcasting," The New York Times (June 24, 1996), D6.
"Debate over Advanced TV Gives the FCC a Chance to be Assertive," The New
York Times (June 17, 1996), D5.
"Delays Seen in Testing HDTV Plans," The New York Times (March 25, 1992),
D4.
"Dole Frees Communications Bill for Vote," The New York Times (February 1,
1996), D7.
"Dole Steps Up Criticism of Telecommunications Bill," The New York Times
(January 11, 1996), D2.
"Economic Scene," The New York Times (May 20, 1993), D2.
"Electronics Units Study TV Venture," The New York Times (January 13,
1989), D2.
FCC Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service, "Digital HDTV Test
Results," Press Release (November 28, 1995).
FCC Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service, "HDTV System
Recommended to FCC," Press Release (November 28, 1995).
"F.C.C. Proposes Standards for Digital Television," The New York Times
(May 10, 1996), D4.
Federal Communications Commission, "Advanced Television Systems and Their
Impact on Existing Television Service," MM. Docket No. 87-268, En Banc
Hearing (December 12, 1995).
Federal Communications Commission, "Advanced Television Systems and Their
Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service," Fifth Report and
Order, MM Docket No. 87-268 (April 21, 1997).
Federal Communications Commission, "Advanced Television Services and Their
Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service," MM. Docket No.
87-268, Fourth Report and Order (December 24, 1996).
Federal Communications Commission, "Advanced Television Systems and Their
Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service," Sixth Report and
Order, MM Docket No. 87-268 (April 21, 1997).
"Five to Get U.S. Grants for Advanced TV," The New York Times (June 14,
1989), D7.
"Format Emerging for Advanced TV," The New York Times (March 23, 1990), D1.
Hart, Jeffrey "The Politics of HDTV in the United States," Policy Studies
Journal 22 (1994), 213-228.
"High-Definition Television Sets: Is HDTV Worth Waiting For?" Consumer
Reports (March 1997), 52.
"High-Definition TV Hearings," The New York Times (March 23, 1989), D8.
"Industries Agree on U.S. Standards for TV of Future," The New York Times
(November 26, 1996), A1.
Jacobi, Fritz. "High Definition Television: We've Come a Long Way,"
Television Quarterly, 1997.
Lu, Cary. "New Digital-TV Standards Bode Ill," MacWorld 14 (April 1997),
30-32.
"Military Role is Urged for New TV," The New York Times (April 6, 1990),
D13.
"New TV Standard Chosen," The New York Times (March 22, 1990), D2.
Platt, Charles. "The Great HDTV Swindle," Wired (February 1997), 57-60,
186-192.
"Plea is Issued on High-Definition TV," The New York Times (May 21, 1993),
D5.
"Putting the Digital in HDTV," USA Today (November 17, 1997), E21.
"Quest for Sharper TV Likely to Bring More TV Instead," The New York Times
(July 10, 1995), D8.
Ratnesar, Romesh. "A Bandwidth Bonanza," Time 150 (September 1, 1997), 60.
Rice, John (ed.). HDTV: The Politics, Policies, and Economics of
Tomorrow's Television. New York: Union Square Press, 1990.
"Six Systems in Search of Approval as HDTV Moves to the Testing Lab," The
New York Times (August 18, 1991), C7.
Streeter, Thomas. Selling the Air: A Critique of the Policy of
Commercial Broadcasting in the United States. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1996.
"The Uneasy Case for Subsidy of High-Technology Efforts," The New York
Times (August 11, 1989), A1.
"Telecom Bill May Sidestep Sticking Point," The New York Times (January
25, 1996), D8.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 336 (1996).
Tirman, W. Robert. The Elephant and the Blind Men: The Phenomenon of
HDTV and Its Would-be Stakeholders. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Center for Information Policy Research, 1991.
"Top Rivals Agree on Unified System for Advanced TV," The New York Times
(May 25, 1993), A1.
"Transition to HDTV is Outlined," The New York Times (April 10, 1992), D1.
"TV Format is Questioned," The New York Times (August 3, 1989), D14.
"Under Pressure, 2 Broadcasters Decide They Will Now Run HDTV," The New
York Times (September 18, 1997).
Vizard, Frank. "Digital TV: It's in the Signal," Popular Science 25
(November 1997), 86-88.
"Warning to Broadcasters that Renege on Running HDTV," The New York Times
(September 15, 1997).
"U.S. Researchers Show Gains in the Television of the Future," The New
York Times (April 21, 1989), A1.
[1] "Putting the Digital in HDTV," USA Today (November 17, 1997), E21.
[2] Federal Communications Commission, "Advanced Television Services and Their
Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service," Fourth Report and Order
(December 24, 1996), Sec. II, 4.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Joel Brinkley, Defining Vision: The Battle for the Future of Television
(New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1997), 5-31.
[5] Ibid., 30-31.
[6] Jeffrey A. Hart, "The Politics of HDTV in the United States," Policy
Studies Journal 22 (1994), 219.
[7] "Electronics Units Study TV Venture," The New York Times (January 13,
1989), D2.
[8] Ibid.
[9] A.T.&T and Zenith in TV Deal," The New York Times (March 1, 1989), D1.
[10] Hart, 224.
[11] "U.S. Researchers Show Gains in the Television of the Future," The New
York Times (April 21, 1989), A1.
[12] "The Uneasy Case for Subsidy of High-Technology Efforts," The New York
Times (August 11, 1989), A1.
[13] Ibid.
[14] "Military Role is Urged for New TV," The New York Times (April 6, 1990),
D13.
[15] "Five to Get U.S. Grants for Advanced TV," The New York Times (June 14,
1989), D7.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Hart, 221.
[18] "High-Definition TV Hearings," The New York Times (March 23, 1989), D8.
[19] Hart, 221.
[20] "High-Definition TV Hearings," D8.
[21] Hart, 218.
[22] "Broad Support Seen for Incentives on New Technology," The New York Times
(May 5, 1989), D3.
[23] Corey Carbonara, "HDTV: An Historical Perspective," in Lou CasBianca
(ed.), The New TV: A Comprehensive Survey of High Definition Television
(Westport, Conn.: Meckler Publishing, 1992), 21.
[24] "TV Format is Questioned," The New York Times (August 3, 1989), D14.
[25] Ibid.
[26] "The Uneasy Case for Subsidy of High-Technology Efforts," The New York
Times (August 11, 1989), A1.
[27] Hart, 218.
[28] "New TV Standard Chosen," The New York Times (March 22, 1990), D2.
[29] Ibid.
[30] "Format Emerging for Advanced TV," The New York Times (March 23, 1990),
D1.
[31] Brinkley, 140.
[32] "Advanced TV Testing Set Amid Tumult on Technology," The New York Times
(November 15, 1990), D1.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Six Systems in Search of Approval as HDTV Moves to the Testing Lab," The
New York Times (August 18, 1991), C7.
[35] Brinkley, 155.
[36] "Delays Seen in Testing HDTV Plans," The New York Times (March 25, 1992),
D4.
[37] Ibid.
[38] "Transition to HDTV is Outlined," The New York Times (April 10, 1992), D1.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., D5.
[41] Ibid.
[42] "And Now for Something Substantially Different: Digital TV," The New York
Times (July 12, 1992), D22.
[43] "Choice of TV System Shifting Into a Political Brawl on Jobs," The New
York Times (March 14, 1993), D5.
[44] Ibid., A1.
[45] "Economic Scene," The New York Times (May 20, 1993), D2.
[46] "Choice of TV System Shifting Into a Political Brawl on Jobs," D5.
[47] Ibid.
[48] "Plea is Issued on High-Definition TV," The New York Times (May 21, 1993),
D5.
[49] "Top Rivals Agree on Unified System for Advanced TV," The New York Times
(May 25, 1993), A1.
[50] Brinkley, 230.
[51] "Plea is Issued on High-Definition TV," D5.
[52] FCC Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service, "HDTV System
Recommended to FCC," Press Release (November 28, 1995).
[53] FCC Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service, "Digital HDTV Test
Results," Press Release (November 28, 1995).
[54] Federal Communications Commission, "Advanced Television Systems and Their
Impact on Existing Television Service," MM. Docket No. 87-268, En Banc Hearing
(December 12, 1995).
[55] Ibid.
[56] Fritz Jacobi, "High Definition Television: We've Come a Long Way,"
Television Quarterly (1997), 4.
[57] "Quest for Sharper TV Likely to Bring More TV Instead," The New York Times
(July 10, 1995), D8.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] "Dole Steps Up Criticism of Telecommunications Bill," The New York Times
(January 11, 1996), D2.
[61] Ibid.
[62] "Telecom Bill May Sidestep Sticking Point," The New York Times (January
25, 1996), D8.
[63] "Dole Frees Communications Bill for Vote," The New York Times (February 1,
1996), D7.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 336 (a)(1).
[66] Ibid., 47 U.S.C. 336 (a)(2).
[67] Ibid., 47 U.S.C. 336 (b)(1).
[68] Ibid., 47 U.S.C. 336 (c).
[69] Ibid., 47 U.S.C. 336 (d).
[70] Romesh Ratnesar, "A Bandwidth Bonanza," Time 150 (September 1, 1997), 60.
[71] "F.C.C. Proposes Standards for Digital Television," The New York Times
(May 10, 1996), D4.
[72] FCC, "Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service," Fourth Report and Order, MM Docket No. 87-268
(December 24, 1996), paragraph 6.
[73] "Debate over Advanced TV Gives the FCC a Chance to be Assertive," The New
York Times (June 17, 1996), D5.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] "Congress Asks F.C.C. to Begin Lending Channels for Digital TV
Broadcasting," The New York Times (June 24, 1996), D6.
[77] Ibid.
[78] "Capitol Hill Fiat on HDTV Isn't the Last Word," The New York Times (July
1, 1996), D1.
[79] Ibid.
[80] "Industries Agree on U.S. Standards for TV of Future," The New York Times
(November 26, 1996), A1.
[81] Fourth Report and Order, paragraph 1.
[82] Ibid., paragraph 19.
[83] Fifth Report and Order, paragraph 11.
[84] Ibid., paragraph 18.
[85] Ibid., paragraph 28.
[86] Ibid., paragraph 29.
[87] Ibid., paragraph 41.
[88] Ibid., paragraph 50.
[89] Ibid., paragraph 54.
[90] Ibid., paragraph 99.
[91] Ibid., paragraph 113.
[92] Ibid., paragraph 114.
[93] "Under Pressure, 2 Broadcasters Decide They Will Now Run HDTV," The New
York Times (September 18, 1997).
|
