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The State, Market and TV Regulation in China:
A Managerial Perspective of Decentralization and Depolicitization
Tsan-Kuo Chang
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
201 Murphy Hall
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Office: (612) 626-7754
Fax: (612) 626-8251
E-mail: [log in to unmask]
Yanru Chen
School of Communication Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Paper submit to the Radio-Television Journalism Division at the 1999 annual
convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 4-7, 1999.
Send correspondence to Tsan-Kuo Chang at the above address.
Tsan-Kuo Chang is an associate professor in the School of Journalism and Mass
Communication at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities. Yanru Chen is a
doctoral candidate in the School of Communication Studies at the Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore.
The State, Market and TV Regulation in China:
A Managerial Perspective of Decentralization and Depolicitization
In a news broadcast of Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to the newsroom of
the People's DailyDthe mouthpiece of the Communist Party in ChinaDon September
26, 1996, China Central Television (CCTV), the only national television network,
quoted Jiang as saying that as part of the life of the Communist Party,
journalism was tied closely to the destiny of both the nation and the party
(Straits Times, September 27, 1996, p. 26). Indicating that the authority over
the news media was in the hands of the party and the people, Jiang urged Chinese
journalists to obey the party's leadership and seek the truth. CCTV devoted 10
minutes of its half-hour news program to Jiang's visit and his speech,
signifying the importance of the presidential words and deeds. Notwithstanding
the content, this lengthy report clearly underscored the hierarchical
relationship between the state and television in China.
Within the managerial perspective (Alford & Friedland, 1985; Mosco, 1988),
the purpose of this paper is to examine the interplay between the state and the
market in TV regulation against the backdrop of the fast changing Chinese social
structure and processes. This perspective suggests that, as the structure of
Chinese society and state becomes more complex, the imperative of efficient and
effective management calls for greater specific knowledge, bureaucratic capacity
and managerial skills that depend mostly on a rational division of labor at the
organizational level. In the realm of mass communication, decentralization has
thus created a structural change in the traditional rigid command system,
leading to the fragmentation of the central authority or emergence of multiple
centers (e.g., Wang & Chang, 1996). As such, state regulation and control over
the form and content of mass media require a more formal-legal mechanism to
oversee their general practices, particularly television because of its access
to the vast population and increasing influences in the Chinese society.
The advent of television in China started in 1958, when some trial
broadcasts became available in parts of the country. By the mid-1980s, it was
relatively ubiquitous and institutionalized, with a noticeable degree of
penetration into the population (Jiang, 1995; Yu, 1990). Before it reached the
fledgling stage of development, the expansion of TV was frequently disrupted by
a series of political and social turmoil, including the disastrous Cultural
Revolution from 1966 through 1976. The 10-year calamitous destruction of human
spirit and infrastructure all but paralyzed the entire national economy and
rendered the sphere of media culture and mass entertainment pale, sterile, and
impoverished. Under such circumstances, the state exercised, either in the name
of the government or the party, a brute tight grip over every aspect of the
social life and its presentation and interpretation in the mass media. In the
planned economic system with a distrust of any hint of capitalism, there was no
media market to speak of.
The revival of China's market economy and its openness to the outside world
since 1978 have triggered a major increase and fast expansion in the Chinese TV
industry (e.g., Hong, 1998). In 1978, other than 35 TV stations serving the
provinces, special administrative regions and municipalities, most cities had no
TV stations of their own. Two decades later, the number of TV stations jumped
nearly 90 percent to 3,125, with 982 regular TV stations, 1,202 cable stations
and 941 educational stations (World Journal, November 7, 1998, p. C7).
According to a CCTV survey, the Chinese people owned 317 million TV sets and
watched TV for an average of two hours and 11 minutes per day in 1996 (World
Journal, October 6, 1998, p. C7). Moreover, TV has reached almost 1.1 billion
of the population and ranked as the primary source for news in China (World
Journal, November 7, 1998, p. C7). In addition to CCTV, Shanghai Satellite TV
has established 24-hour channels to broadcast news, business, sports, movies,
social education and youth programs, and other variety shows around the clock
(World Journal, September 30, 1998, p. A8). It also provides its programs to
more than 600 cable stations in other cities (World Journal, March 5, 1999, p.
C7). With the maturation and rapid penetration of the TV market in China comes
American A. C. Nielsen Media Research. By the end of 1999, the Nielsen Co. is
expected to set up its ratings services in 10 major cities, covering 60 percent
of the Chinese domestic TV market (World Journal, December 22, 1998, p. A8).
The market is here to stay.
More importantly, except for a few national organizations, such as the
People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV, the state has terminated its
financial subsidy to the mass media, leaving them to scramble on their own for
survival. To stay in the business, from the coastal to inland regions, mass
media in China now have a market to compete and an audience to attract. What
counts most is advertising revenues and commercial opportunities. To help
secure the market and to forge vertical and horizontal alliance in the media
industries, several newspaper groups have been formed nationwide (World Journal,
March 7, 1998, p. A8; World Journal, July 9, 1998, p. A8), creating a
quasi-competitive environment where the bottom line is often at odds with the
party line (e.g., Zhao, 1998). Market competition, no matter how imperfect in
China, brings challenges to the established order and threatens to change the
existing mass media landscape.
Amid all the flurry and flux, CCTV remains the most authoritative station
in news and investigative reporting in China. Its Xinwen Lianbo (National
Network News) is the only game nationwide. It is most watched not only by the
general public, but also by high school female students (World Journal, January
8, 1999, p. A8). Its Jiaodian Fangtan (Focal Point) program Da news magazine
modeled on the CBS 60 MinutesDcommanded a daily viewership of about 300 million,
including the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji (World Journal, January 20, 1999, p.
A7). In June 1998, CCTV surprised the Chinese and Western observers by carrying
a live broadcast of the news conference between President Jiang and President
Clinton during the latter's visit to China, in which the two leaders exchanged
strong statements concerning human rights issues and the controversial 1989
Tiananmen Square incident.
For the first time in Chinese history, viewers in China were treated to an
unedited and freely aired public discussion of sensitive issues by a Chinese
leader, not to mention a high level international debate between the world's
superpower and its most populous nation . Probably encouraged by the positive
response to the unprecedented move, within two weeks CCTV again transmitted a
live coverage of a court trial in Beijing to the national audience. Although
the case itselfDcopyrights infringementDwas neither new nor sensational, its
direct broadcast was hailed as a major breakthrough in both Chinese court
proceedings and journalistic practices (World Journal, July 8, 1998, p. A8).
Chinese radio did not lag behind. In February 1999, the music channel of the
Beijing People's Radio Station broadcast live the 41st Grammy Award from Los
Angeles, becoming the first Chinese radio station to do so. The presence of a
Chinese team from Beijing stirred some excitement among their counterparts at
the Grammy Award (World Journal, February 25, 1999, p. A8).
Although these cases are the exception, not the norm, in Chinese media
practices, there should be little doubt that, at the national media level, the
boundary of television and radio content structure is undoubtedly being pushed
further. Albeit in an experimental fashion, the demonstration effect trickles
down. Among the huge number of TV stations at the provincial, municipal and
local levels, decentralization and depoliticization mean a higher degree of
freedom for content variation and more room for direct appeal to the audience
needs. For example, Fuzhou TV station and Fuzhou People's Intermediate Court in
the southern Fujian province decided in March 1999 to start a weekly live
broadcast of the court's proceedings so that the court's activities can be
placed "under people's surveillance" (World Journal, March 13, 1999, p. A9). In
fact, the Supreme People's Court has urged various lower courts to open up their
proceedings to journalists for reporting, recording and live broadcasting,
including foreign correspondents (World Journal, March 11, 1999, p. A7).
In the face of a quantitative increase in content and a qualitative change
in form in the world of Chinese television since the reforms in the late 1970s,
state regulation of TV has therefore increasingly become a compelling and
complex task. No longer could the central authority rely, by default, on the
strict and absolute command structure under the highly centralized social and
economic system during Mao Zedong's rule to harness TV. After all, when the
ideology of supreme Communism gave way to the market mechanism of Capitalism,
even in the disguise of socialist market economy, the Chinese social structure
cannot remain unchanged or unchanging. In the post-Mao era, the booming and
blossomed TV industry, with all its technical and economic rationality, has
produced a huge insatiable market driven not only by its internal logic, but
also by external forces unleashed through political pragmatism (e.g., Wang &
Chang, 1996). It is a phenomenon that, by design, dictates a systematic
national supervision. If history is any guide, the state will control the
evolving media market in China with laws, regulations, rules, and provisions as
it sees fit or when the situation calls for.
A historical analysis through relevant government documents shows that
broadcasting regulation in China began in 1955 when the State Council first
issued "Regulations on Management of Local People's Radio Stations" (Gan, 1993).
Since then, no major broadcasting regulations or rules were adopted and
released. The next two decades saw China plagued by numerous social movements
and political struggles. Not until the early 1980s did formal and legal
regulations of Chinese television reappear in response to the rising conflicts
between the state purpose and the market interests (Yu, 1990). When it seemed
that nominal political allegiance could not continue to extract collective
acquiescence in the TV industry, the state turned to regulatory measures that
would be legally binding and systematically enforceable. While allowing
managerial leeways, the state has insisted on curtailing press freedom and
freedom of expression (e.g., World Journal, January 20, 1999, p. A7; World
Journal, January 22, 1999, p. A1). A departure point is the changing official
conceptualization of television in China.
Evolution of the Official Conception of TV in China
As a result of the economic reforms and external openness since 1978, TV in
China has become a vibrant industry with its various programs viewed as
commodities by domestic and foreign business interests. Like its counterparts
in other countries, Chinese TV ranks ahead of newspapers, ad agencies, and radio
among the advertising vehicles. Because of the growing market demand, the
advertising rate has continued to soar over the years. In 1993, for example,
both TV and other major media charged their advertising fees by a significant
increase. In the case of CCTV, the rate rose a whopping 127 percent. Compared
to foreign TV imports, the domestic production is much more expensive. It costs
50,000 to 60,000 yuan to produce one episode of Chinese TV dramas, while one
episode of foreign imports can be bought for only 2,000 yuan (e.g., Guo, 1994;
Zheng, 1998).
Thanks to the evolving conception of television and the disparity of cost
between domestic and foreign TV production, growing concerns have been raised
among official, academic and media circles regarding the proper role and
functions of TV in the Chinese society. In a changing time when multiple value
clashes are present and manifest, it is argued (e.g., Liu, 1998), TV in China
has yet to examine its cultural role and adjust its position in mediating
between conflicting values and realities. Considering the state ownership of
all forms of mass media, such adjustment, of course, implies some kind of
arrangement at the managerial level within media organizations without altering
the fundamental socio-political configuration at the national level. It
requires administrative and procedural solutions by the technocrats and managers
to make sure Chinese TV does not veer beyond the boundaries of official
parameters.
Unlike Western conceptualization, regulations of television in China are
essentially rooted in political and ideological determinationsDfunctional
prerequisites of party propaganda and public mobilization in social movements
(e.g., Zhang, 1992), not necessarily in technical necessity and resource
considerations, such as scarcity of spectrums. As part of the mass media
system, control of TV in terms of state ownership and party leadership is
clearly stipulated in the Chinese constitution (e.g., Wong, 1990). The
supremacy of the party-state domination and guidance over the mass media is not
to be questioned or challenged (e.g., Plafker, 1999). Under the encompassing
constitutional umbrella that determines the overall control structure and
conceptual framework, however, the past two decades have witnessed China taking
more rational-legal procedures to regulate the media industry in general and
television in particular. It represents an epistemological move from doctrinal
authority to pragmatic rationality.
Following the end of the anarchical and chaotic Cultural Revolution and as
China embarked on a new reform movement, there have been various executive,
legislative and practical attempts that seek to bring the spirit and practices
of Chinese television more in line with China's contemporary economic commitment
and open-door policy. Although no legal framework has been established that
would essentially shift the hierarchical structure of media-state relationship
to a check and balance equation, there have been changes that appear to result
from philosophical reorientation and practical consideration. The most notable
example is certainly the live broadcast on CCTV of the Clinton-Jiang joint press
conference mentioned earlier. Whether this particular case serves as a
harbinger of things to come for a more spontaneous and less inaccessible TV
remains to be seen. The extent to which TV regulations in China may be loosened
still depends on the rules that are defined and delimited by the powers that be.
There is little sign that press freedom in the Western sense is likely to emerge
soon.
Media regulation in China is often justified on the basis of official
conception that historically has underscored the potential power of the media to
influence the public. As a medium that has reached nearly 88 percent of China's
total population (World Journal, January 30, 1998, p. A6), television obviously
occupies a significant part in the Chinese socio-political structure. How the
Chinese authority positions TV as an institution in relation to the state and
the market through various control and regulations should serve as a useful
indication of its social location. In the West, the broadcasting media have
been looked at from a variety of perspectives, with television being
conceptualized as a commodity, an instrument, or a public service (Merrill,
1983). For different reasons, China places its television on somewhat similar
dimensions, but varies its emphasis according to the specific historical context
and the prevalence of current philosophical conception and managerial needs.
Traditionally, the Chinese media had been bound by the authoritarian, if
not totalitarian, Communist ideological prerequisites with little regard to the
market conditions. In recent years of economic reform, with cautious gradation,
China has come to define itself as a developing nation, and the sociological
conception of the Chinese media system now follows that of a development model
(Chen, 1998). Technologically, TV as a fast developing medium could outpace the
change and adaptation of traditional official conceptions of the mass media.
Following the changes in political and economic spheres in China, the
conventional view of a propaganda and persuasion model of the Chinese mass media
should thus be re-examined, if not abandoned (e.g., Chang, Chen and Zhang,
1993). Yu (1989) argued that the advanced technology has led to the rapid
expansion and penetration of TV in China in the 1980s, to some extent exceeding
the boundaries set for other media. As such, legal and non-legal state
regulations of TV may fall behind the economic, technical and professional
advancement of the medium. Chinese TV's participation in the 1989 Tiananmen
Square movement, at least its practitioners' involvement, was a case in point
(e.g., Lee, 1990).
The transformation of form and content of mass media in China might have
created a public space where the state and market forces would have to negotiate
and re-articulate the processes and structure of television in the Chinese
society (e.g., Zhang, 1993; Zhao, 1998). Legal justification and regulative
mechanism over television provide the authority the necessary means to do so.
Both can be traced to the traditional conceptions of China's media system. It
has been well documented that China's ideological structure and media
organizations were historically intertwined (e.g., Gan, 1993; Liu, 1971; Yu,
1963). A classic view about China's pre-TV decades is that the structure of the
media was integrated with the configuration of the state's governance, and that
the media content also tended to be products of state dictation (e.g., Liu,
1971). As an instrument of the Party and the government, the paramount tasks of
the media were to propagate state policies, educate the masses, and mobilize
them for national development (Bishop, 1989; Hong, 1998). Although students of
Chinese politics still see the media as an integral part of the state apparatus
(Jiang, 1995), some nuances have been found in the state-media relationship that
deviate from the past when the Party was concurrently the owner, the manager,
and the practitioner (e.g., Chu, 1994). While unwilling to relinquish the state
ownership, the Chinese central authority has allowed media practitioners some
managerial freedom to run the daily operations so long as they do not challenge
its leadership.
The inception of reform after the resolution by the Party's Central Committee
in late 1978 to shift the focus of national energy from the class struggle to
economic construction stimulated the growth of the media market and a rising
expectation among the audiences. The structural differentiation and subsequent
progress inevitably resulted in a parallel outlook on the relationship among the
state, the media and the burgeoning market. Hao and Huang (1996) indicated that
instead of the traditional model of media operation solely at the dictate of the
Party, the broadcast media now wield greater autonomy, but are caught between
two masters in the process of commercialization: the Party command and the mass
audience desire. A commonsensical understanding is that the command from the
top echelon of leadership rarely, if ever, coincides with the demands of the
audiences at the grassroots level. At the heart of the issue is the official
conceptualization and social trajectory of TV in China.
The growth of TV in China differs largely from that in the developed countries.
For example, the United States offered an affluent and leisurely ground for the
growth of TV in its formative as well as mature decades. In China, TV as a
medium apparently prospered in parallel to the nation's economic development.
This path suggests that since its maturing years in the past two decades
(1978-1998) Chinese TV has been partly an instrument of socio-economic
development and progress. China as a nation in reform bestowed upon the new
medium a special public interest and official character (e.g., Lee, 1994). As
television continues to reach wider and farther in the Chinese society both in
terms of its form and content, how to harness its potential power and influences
within the larger political landscape naturally becomes a central concern at the
national level. Ideological and historical reasons aside, the technological
sophistication and commercial orientation of television requires systematic
management, from both within and without the industry itself.
A thorough search through related and relevant materials suggests that most, if
not all, of the rules and regulations of TV in China were either direct or
indirect responses from the government to its fast development and vast
expansion. At a higher and more abstract level, these rules and regulations,
mostly issued by the Ministry of Radio, Film and TV (MRFT), reflected not only
the changing philosophy and conception of the medium, but also the government's
desire and effort to formalize and legalize its jurisdiction over the procedural
and substantive matters involving the production, distribution and programming
of Chinese television. MRFT was established in 1982 to oversee the broadcasting
operations in the country. From 1984 through 1996, a total of major 62
regulations were issued by MRFT and other agencies to regulate TV (see Table 1).
Historically, conceptions of the nature, attributes, and perceived possible
influences the media content might have on the public have been monopolized by
the central government (e.g., Zhang, 1993). The increasing economic
independence of the media, especially China Central TV (Jiang, 1995), however,
does not necessarily presuppose the media's editorial independence. In the
words of the Vice Minister of MRFT, TV as a modern mass medium is capable of
strong subtle influence on the culture and value of the nation and people, to
the extent of affecting the stability of the society (Radio and Television,
October 19, 1993). Accordingly, regarding the administrative sanction on
operation by stations at the grassroots level, MRFT often emphasized TV
programs' possible threats to the public morality and proposed that strict
standards be followed in the production and distribution of contents.
Since its founding in 1949, the Chinese government has long believed in the
strong power of the mass media in general and TV in particular. While the
leadership realizes TV can have a negative impact, it also recognizes TV's
potential in linking the government and the people by way of transmitting and
propagating state policies, educating and mobilizing the masses, in addition to
serving the mass need for entertainment. The classic conception of the media's
positive function in terms of "informing, educating, and entertaining," though
not systematically pronounced by the authority, has manifested itself as a
working philosophy in the daily conduct of China's national media. In the wake
of TV's penetration and expansion in society, certain problems follow, such as
the lack of regulation on content and/or programming. In 1986, MRFT set up a
general framework to guide the processes of research, drafting, release, and
implementation of TV regulations.
From the beginning, the role of TV as defined by the government and
perceived by the public carried inherent conflicting ends, however. TV is often
conceptualized concurrently as a technology, a state instrument of propaganda, a
commodity, a mass entertainer, or a mass educator. Under the influences of
regulations, these overlapping and sometimes conflicting roles become
established in both official and popular perceptions and conceptions at
different points in time in China's history. After all, any regulation of a
medium is essentially a process of coordinating between the potentially
conflicting functional roles of a medium and current social practices and policy
commitments. China is no exception. Given the revolutionary origin and its
insistence on the "people's democratic dictatorship," China's legal-rational
system allows, in theory, a centralized media control although in practice it
has become more decentralized and depoliticized as a result of continuing
economic reforms and social transparency (e.g., Straits Times, January 17, 1997,
p. 2).
Legislation and Bureaucracy of TV Regulation
The legislative branch of the Chinese government is the National People's
Congress. It convenes annually to deliberate upon the laws, rules and
regulations drafted and submitted by various departments and agencies of the
government. After approval by the delegates, the legislative outcomes are
submitted to the State Council, the executive branch in charge of national
affairs, for the final approval and promulgation. As the highest authority in
the broadcasting sector, MRFT is required to go through the legal and
administrative procedures before a law/regulation takes effect. It follows its
own internal procedures in overseeing the broadcasting industry within its
jurisdiction. An examination of the process and its products should help shed
light on how the rules and regulations of television are produced and executed
in China. As shown in Table 1, the regulatory work began in the mid-1980s.
On April 15, 1986, MRFT issued the Trial Guiding Orders for Regulatory Work
that covered radio, film, and TV. The orders stipulated the functional
procedures and personnel in research, drafting and approval of the rules and
regulations concerning the operations of the electronic media, including TV. A
special Leadership Team was established to take charge of the examination of
both long-term and annual legislative plans. The team was also to deliberate
upon the regulations prepared by MRFT and to submit them for approval by the
Minister. As for the rules and regulations submitted to the National People's
Congress and in turn the State Council for promulgation, they should also pass
the Team's scrutiny before being submitted to the Minister for the final
approval.
Based on the scope of responsibility and function, the levels of
legislative authority in TV regulation were specified in the following
bureaucratic order: the ministerial Leadership Team, overseeing the drafting of
laws and regulations; the Policy Study Section, in charge of actual research and
drafting; and provincial and municipal units, initiating their own rules and
regulations and submitting them to the Policy Study Section, with the latter's
due participation in decision making. With such a hierarchical structure, the
legal process could be time consuming and wide reaching. The combination of
bureaucratic guidance and overlapping organizational mechanism is a form of
political and managerial control in China that is set up to guarantee the
central government's overall grip of policy determination and implementation.
Since its inception, a wide variety of laws, rules, provisions, and
regulations of TV have been issued by the various sections of MRFT and other
governmental and party agencies, such as the State Council, Ministry of Public
Security, National Management Bureau of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Law
Enforcement, State Education Commission, National Secrecy Bureau, Ministry of
National Security, National Administration of Commerce and Trade, Central
Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, National Archives Bureau, and
Press Publishing Administration. The involvement of security, commerce,
education, and law agencies in TV regulation clearly demonstrates the state's
intent, attempt and authority to lay out the parameters within which television
and its practitioners are to practice their trade in China. It is also obvious
that, although information security and propaganda are of concern, the focus of
TV regulations is less political and ideological, but more managerial and
technical.
As indicated in Table 1, these regulations covered almost every aspect of
TV production, dissemination, reception, and consumption. They varied from
technical to substantive areas, covering such matters as drama production,
security of facilities, advertising, technological innovation, management,
foreign satellite TV, imports of foreign programs, ethics and integrity,
personnel, community antenna, internal auditing, ground reception devices,
network, relay programs, staff training, licenses, secrecy, educational TV,
overseas Chinese TV productions, and local TV in foreign relations. Many were
laws submitted to the State Council for approval and the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress for examination, while others were administrative
statutes submitted to the State Council for promulgation, protocols and
regulations issued by MRFT, and laws and regulations jointly issued by MRFT and
other ministries and/or commissions under the central government.
Regardless of the types, the general principles underlying these processes
of regulations were defined and delimited by the greater policy demands of the
central government. More specifically, the rules and regulations by MRFT are in
accord with the nation's constitution and other statutory laws. Whether
explicitly or implicitly, they also uphold the Communist Party and the central
government as the ultimate authority in TV regulation. That notwithstanding,
the regulatory rationale and extensive coverage are apparently driven by the
conditions of economic reforms and the general direction of the market. It is
evident that the experiences of the economic reforms and the subsequent TV
practices tend to be incorporated into the regulation to serve as references for
future work. The fact that the number of regulatory measures increased over
time suggests that the continuing market growth and the proliferation of
content, both domestic and foreign (e.g., Hong, 1998), have created a dynamic
and competitive TV environment that needs to be policed with a set of ground
rules.
One essential state stipulation is that the market reality is to function
as the pragmatic guide for regulation and no rules are made just for their own
sake, hence disregarding the actual needs and demands of the industry. At the
managerial level, holistic planning and prioritization in TV regulation are
internally observed by the MRFT planners. Externally, they paid close attention
to opinions and ideas from the audiences, experts, and foreign sources for
guidance and consideration. After a few years of trial enforcement, in March
1989, the temporary regulations became crystallized and formalized as executive
orders by MRFT, showing an integrated pattern between the internal structure of
the TV industry and their corresponding levels of administration in the
government. A division of labor sets up the procedural pecking order and the
realm of administrative and legislative duty. Laws governing the overall
operation of the industry, if any, are to be prepared and promulgated by the
National People's Congress Standing Committee; administrative orders regulating
one aspect of the industry, by the State Council; regulations and rules
governing specific aspects of TV, by MRFT or provincial or local government.
MRFT is in charge of five-year regulatory plans to be submitted to the State
Council for approval.
According to the refined stipulations in 1989, the legal procedures in law
making take the following format: resolutions by the National People's Congress,
decisions by the State Council, and recommendations set forth by MRFT and
approved by the State Council. As for rules and regulations, they are
determined by a series of consideration: state policies guiding the broadcasting
industry; state stipulations for laws and regulations; decisions made by the
ministerial meetings, and the need for institutionalization of general
management within the industry. In the whole process, the National People's
Congress Standing Committee retains the authority of interpretation of laws,
while the Policy Study Section of MRFT is in charge of interpretation of rules
and regulations.
Administratively speaking, work meetings and conferences are convened at
all levels from local to national periodically for the higher authority to spell
out the working guidelines regulating TV work. One most recent conference
convening municipal broadcasting authorities and higher in January 1998 saw the
reassertion of broadcasting as an opinion guide/leaders in China's new phase of
market economy era, with a strong emphasis on strengthening the news programs.
With regard to entertainment, a new strategy was recommended to vastly improve
the quality of programs such as TV dramas. It was suggested that above and
beyond regular regulations of TV and other broadcast media, administrative
policies could be given to highlight certain themes to adapt to the larger needs
of propaganda. For example, the then Minister of Radio, Film and Television Sun
Jiazheng called for renewed and concentrated efforts at propagating the policies
promulgated at the Communist Party's 15th National Congress (Sun, 1998). The
extent to which such call for propaganda of Communist policies has been followed
by the broadcasting industry remains to be determined. Over the past years, TV
regulation in China has proceeded on several conceptual and technical
dimensions.
Regulating TV as a Mass Entertainer
Despite the state's conception of TV's role as an instrument of
propaganda, the audiences embraced the medium as a mass entertainer. TV dramas
have been one of the most popular types of content in China. Until the
mid-1980s, the Chinese TV screen was almost "dominated" by imported TV dramas
from Japan and Western countries (e.g., Wang & Chang, 1996). For example,
Garrison's Guerrilla attracted a large number of audiences, especially children
and youngsters (Jiang, 1995). The influence of imported programming alerted the
official censors and regulators, who appealed to the domestic program producers
to "occupy" the primetime slots with TV dramas of China's own making. In the
mid-1980s, when domestic production of TV dramas started to prosper, official
concern with the production of such TV dramas increased at the same time. The
current state of TV drama production in China has been criticized as showing
life styles way ahead of the nation's average living standards (e.g., Zhang,
1995). The content of TV dramas has also been accused of providing an erroneous
sense of spiritual perplexity of the people in excessive material prosperity.
According to some accounts (e.g., Shi, 1998), the reasons are twofold: first,
the nature of the production of TV dramas as a commodity has subtly turned an
original artistic pursuit into a commercial process and second, high-brow
artists and men of letters hesitate to commit their efforts to TV dramas, which
are regarded as part of the popular (and hence vulgar) culture.
Because the economic reform and opening policies have improved the living
conditions of the Chinese people and hence stimulated their demand for pleasure,
programs such as dramas have gradually accentuated the entertainment side of
television. Since the government would not relinquish its hold on TV as a
far-reaching medium for educational and propagandistic purpose, official and
formal regulations of TV drama production became a must in the eyes of the
authority in order to confine non-news programming within permissible and
acceptable limits. TV content hence had to be monitored through prior license
and censorship. On June 1, 1986, Temporary Regulation of TV Drama Production
Permit issued by MRFT went into effect. Three years later, the regulation was
finalized as official administrative orders by MRFT. According to the
stipulations, institutional applicants aspiring to produce TV dramas must first
obtain official permit issued by MRFT or, in cases where the applicant operates
at the local level, provincial Radio Film and TV bureaus were given the
authority to grant such permits.
Under this regulation, TV drama permits were divided into two categories:
long-term permits for five years (in 1989, the provision was later changed to
three years) subject to review and assessment by the granting authority, and
short-term drama-specific shooting permit. The main qualifications for such
permits depend on technical, financial and human resources, including a shooting
team equipped with sufficient funding and competent facility. No individual may
apply for such a permit. The more subtle yet also powerful way of control was
stipulated for the airing stage: all TV stations are to show only those dramas
that had been produced by permit-holders, and previewing and censoring must
precede airing wherever necessary. Financial sponsors from other sectors of the
society are forbidden from exerting any influence on the content of the
programs. As for possible co-operation between domestic and foreign
stations/drama producers, the authority of approval resides with MRFT.
Starting in 1987, even the content of TV programs to be shown exclusively to
foreign tourists at major hotels has been subjugated to official control and
censorship. The economic reform and opening policies have brought many foreign
businessmen and tourists to China. To cater to the rising needs of foreigners
for information and entertainment, major tourist hotels operate closed-circuit
television. According to the regulatory measures issued by the General Office
of the State Council on the management of such TV programs, the task is not
merely a service to foreign guests or overseas Chinese visitors. Rather, the
closed-circuit TV is regarded as a Chinese window on the world and an effective
means of propaganda and is taken seriously as a way to promote China's
international image. To be more specific, the central government considers the
operation of closed-circuit television as a major "political task," with a
strong calculation on how China should be presented to foreigners and overseas
Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
For the closed-circuit television, program suppliers must be video
producers licensed by the national government, such as motion picture companies
and national news agency targeted at foreign audiences. Programs must be
previewed by designated officials to prevent possible inappropriate contents.
Additional program supply should come from taping CCTV programs relevant to the
themes of promoting China's land, people, and culture. The management of
closed-circuit television in tourist hotels is subjected to the authority of the
National Tourism Bureau. Application for permit to operate such services in
hotels must be approved by the Bureau. To keep the screen "clean," other
relatively "minor" rules and regulations on TV programs include a notification
in 1988 against the airing of performances by criminals serving their jail
terms. This regulation stands as a reminder that TV is foremost looked as the
mouthpiece of the Party and the government or an instrument of propaganda. In
China, dissidents, deviants or anyone who violates social norms, laws or state
policies are often removed from media content unless they happen to be useful to
teach others a lesson.
As Chinese TV experiences a rapid growth, imported TV dramas from various
countries start to flood the domestic market on a large scale because the number
of stations around the nation has increased and China has further opened its
door to the outside world. In 1990, MRFT placed explicit constraints on the
airing of imported programs on the grounds that they might threaten or erode
national values or indigenous culture. Six types of contents were endorsed and
encouraged: 1) programs with serious, positive theme featuring progressive
thoughts; 2) entertainment contributing positively to culture and morals; 3)
programs aimed at spreading knowledge about science and technology; 4) accurate
rendition of history revealing laws of progress; 5) programs edifying to the
youth and constructive to their growth; and 6) programs with relatively higher
aesthetic values. Such general and abstract vocabulary certainly leaves room
for different interpretation and potential disagreement among TV stations,
making it possible for the market to navigate through a wide array of choices
sanctioned by the state..
Like those in many other countries, programs with any hints at pornography
or overt violence were prohibited on Chinese TV, though after some editing these
programs could still be broadcast. Several other categories of programs were
strictly banned altogether. These include TV dramas with themes advocating
Western political, religious and cultural values to the extent of threatening
the value integrity of the People's Republic or socialism, romanticizing
colonialism and parodying the seamy side of Third World countries, glorifying
sex and violence and hence potentially harmful to youthful hearts and minds, or
any other drama content that might undermine racial and ethnic harmony or
national sovereignty. These categories are undoubtedly vague and broad, thus
allowing the central authority greater opportunity and power to censor imported
programs whenever it is convenient or desirable to do so.
Most noteworthy is the 1990 order from MRFT that indicated that the airing
of TV dramas must adapt to the larger purpose of Chinese diplomacy and
international disputes. For example, even if a particular foreign TV drama
carried with it all the acceptable contents, it could be banished from airing if
it might do a disservice to the main goal of the nation's diplomacy or the
preferred state of international relations. Given the timing of this
regulation, whether or not it was a response to the 1989 Tiananmen incident in
which China's heavy-handed crackdown on the student democratic movement was
severely criticized by foreign media worldwide is open to debate. This measure
nevertheless demonstrated the connection between non-news TV programs and the
images China hopes to project to the domestic audiences as well as its use of TV
as a tool in foreign relations.
Other types of TV programs that could be imported fell under the
constraints set by MRFT in February 1994 in its Rules for Management of Imported
Programs. Acknowledging such programs as necessary to the nation's spiritual
civilization and cultural exchange, the rules allowed the exchange and purchase
of TV programs between Chinese domestic stations and TV stations in Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macao. Collaboration in shooting and airing was also permitted,
provided that the permit number assigned by MRFT be shown with the program,
which should be aired only within the geographical scope allowed by MRFT; it
must be aired only locally or regionally. Perhaps the most noticeable
stipulation is the quota system: imported programs must not exceed 25 percent of
the total airtime allotted to TV dramas. No more than 15 percent of the prime
time slots (18: 00D22:00) should be given to foreign or overseas programs. In
doing so, MRFT and lower levels of governments attained to an overall control of
the program makeup of each station and the proportion between domestic and
foreign programs. It also demonstrated China's determination to avoid the
pitfalls of international communication in that dependency has become a problem
for many developing and underdeveloped countries.
TV Regulation and the Power of New Technology
Cable TV and satellite TV are among the most recent new technologies in the
Chinese broadcasting industry. In today's medium-size cities with 300,000
population or above, access to two dozen or more TV channels is common,
including local, provincial, and national channels. Such availability and
accessibility are made possible only through cable and satellite technologies.
How does the central government harness their power of rapid expansion and
diffusionDnot only as technologies but also as a powerful source of impact on
the population's social cultural life? According to Wu (1997), Chinese cable TV
entered its phase of substantial development and penetration only in the 1990s.
Until then, it had been widely used in various work units, but little or no
regulation had been issued to put a check on the scope it should cover. As it
was, the development of cable TV was relatively spontaneous.
In November 1990, MRFT issued Temporary Management Measures of Cable TV,
approved by the State Council. By its definition, cable TV included stations
receiving and transmitting TV programs from conventional TV stations and airing
programs of its own making, as well as public antenna receiving and transmitting
programs from conventional TV stations. The measures allowed MRFT the authority
to make overall plans for the development and coverage of cable TV around the
country. To establish and operate a cable TV station, each institutional
applicant must meet seven criteria. Again, individuals are not allowed to
apply. First and foremost, the station must fit into the existing plan for TV
coverage in the local area where the applicant seeks permit for operation. Other
criteria include sufficient specialized talent for the production and management
of a station, adequate funding, technologically competent facility, a reasonably
equipped production/shooting base for programs, transmission facilities
recognized by provincial or higher levels of technical authority, and a
specialized geographical area targeted for airing. If an applicant meets all
these criteria, the application must first pass scrutiny by the relevant
sections of provincial government in charge of radio, TV and film, which in turn
submits it to MRFT. Ministerial approval must precede the granting of license
to the station. The same measures also stipulated that the technical quality of
facilities built into a cable TV station and the programs broadcast by the
station are subject to review and recognition by relevant higher authority,
usually the local government. A special stipulation was leveled against any
program that is anti-state, anti-social, or pornographic, with a perceived
negative impact on the audience.
In April 1991, MRFT followed up on the Temporary Measures with reified
detailed stipulations, further establishing the pivotal principle that the
central government is in general charge of the development of cable TV, even
though cable TV is subject to supervision by the provincial and local
governments. In addition, operation and maintenance fees were to be collected
from users. But again, the most notable regulations concerned actual programs.
What was prohibited of imported TV dramas also applied to cable TV programs.
Each station was required to set aside a special channel for relaying CCTV
programs. News programs produced by the station itself should be no less than
30 minutes per week. To air videos already released, a special permit must be
obtained from the provincial level of broadcast administration. Several
regulations are within the jurisdiction of the provincial leaders in
broadcasting who are to preview and approve programs. Videos to be aired must
bear provincial permit and program suppliers must be those designated and
recognized by the central government. Moreover, programs from foreign sources
including Hong Kong and Taiwan must not take up more than one-third of the total
amount of TV dramas, films, and videos broadcast on cable TV (e.g., Liu, 1994).
The quota system is again designed to ward off foreign competition.
Similar constraints were placed on satellite TV programs from foreign
countries, the reception of which tended to be limited to the professional needs
of institutional recipients in China. In 1990, in the wake of the aftermath of
the June 4 incident, MRFT, the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of
National Security jointly issued an executive order in this area. According to
this order, if satellite TV programs were "pure" in content, covering education,
science, international news, finance, economy and tradeDknowledge that is
necessary to domestic development and progress, they would be looked upon with
approval. However, the right to receive foreign programs via satellite must be
granted by the provincial government, which should scrutinize the technical,
managerial and financial capacity of the applicant, as well as the soundness in
its justification for accessing such programs.
In October 1993, Premier Li Peng endorsed the finalized Regulatory Orders on
the Management of Facilities Receiving Satellite TV Programs. Essentially, the
orders stipulated that the licensing power of the state be exercised on the
production, importing, sales, installment, and usage of such facilities, all to
be produced and sold by enterprises designated by MRFT. No individual was
allowed to install facilities for receiving satellite television. As for
institutions, the orders indicated that the scope of program coverage must be
specified, with state-recognized facility, specialized managerial staff, and a
complete management system. Once approved by municipal/local governments, the
operation must not exceed the geographical scope allowed in the permit. The
orders prevented the showing of foreign TV programs at public locales such as
bus and train stations, harbors, airports, shopping centers, cinemas and
theatres. In other words, foreign TV programs are restricted within
pre-determined areas.
By the end of 1995, cable TV stations directly approved by MRFT numbered 1,200,
with an estimate of more than 30 million users (Wu, 1997). What was more, there
were 980 conventional TV stations around the country, covering more than 80
percent of the population. In the presence of such growth of TV, in 1996, MRFT
established a set of procedures for setting up new radio and TV stations, with
authority of approval firmly in the grip of the central government. These
stations refer to those established by county-level governments or above. As
the procedures indicated, each application aspiring to set up new stations must
be considered in the broader context and fit into the general plan of
distribution, so that around the nation there could be a well-coordinated
development of TV. The central, provincial, municipal, and county governments
were the four levels of planners, each with its own administrative duties in the
chain of command. Provincial governments are the highest authority in charge of
verifying each application, whilst the national government's MRFT grants final
approval and issues license.
Regulating the Prospering TV and Its Multiple Roles
In the midst of TV's expansion, a national network of TV stations covering
various levels and scopes has been formed. But the center-periphery
relationship between stations is still clearly charted. Collaboration between
domestic and foreign stations is cautiously termed and scrutinized on a
case-by-case basis. However, a more important rule is that no domestic
applicant is allowed to collaborate with foreign stations in setting up new
stations in China. Local stations are not allowed to jointly set up stations
across provincial boundaries. But with justification of need and actual
capacity, local stations are allowed to branch out into specialized stations and
add to existing channels or transmit programs via satellites. A recent example
is the Shanghai Satellite TV station mentioned earlier. However, the structure
of application procedures remains rigid and tightly controlled by the central
authority.
In 1994, the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department, together with
MRFT, issued a regulation on the program relationship between CCTV and local TV
stations. The emphasis was clear and forceful that the foremost priority of
local stations was to relay a complete set of programs aired through CCTV
Channel One. CCTV of course is posited as the most important propaganda vehicle
for the nation, especially its Channel one. Collaborations between local and
central stations in producing other programs were encouraged, and the priority
for local network formation and expansion was ranked high, for a distinctly
pronounced reasonDto broaden CCTV coverage of the population through local TV
networks. This requirement makes CCTV newscast the most authoritative source of
news in the nation.
The staffing of grassroots TV stations was also a legislative concern of
MRFT. According to the MRFT regulation in 1990, each radio and TV station in the
rural areas were jointly controlled by local village leaders and relevant
sections of local/county-level governments, though the station might be staffed
with as few as two to three persons mainly to relay the programs from higher
level stations such as CCTV. It follows without surprise, then, that in its
ruling in 1990 MRFT retained within its authority to establish specific
technical criteria for the grassroots level broadcast leaders to examine and
endorse major construction projects, such as a new cable TV station and so on.
This particular regulation unquestionably extends the state's regulatory control
from the national all the way down to the local. The state's power in TV
regulation recognizes no boundaries of the market. On the contrary, the market
shape of the TV industry is mostly drawn by the state in its own chosen
configuration.
Regulating TV's Geopolitical Boundaries
In addition to the prohibition preventing joint endeavor in setting up new
stations across national boundaries, the scope of possible influence of foreign
stations in China is also limited. With the development of domestic TV industry
and the larger policy of opening up the country to the outside world, TV
stations from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan often opt for program production in
Mainland China due to the latter's relatively low cost and greater access to
natural and studio settings. In response to this production demand, MRFT ruled
in 1996 that such undertaking must be first approved by the Ministry. No TV
station is allowed to allot airtime to overseas stations or individuals to show
their programs directly.
Previous analysis of Chinese TV often regards the year 1989 as a watershed
year, thanks much to the intensive involvement and performance of CCTV and other
national media during the world-shocking June 4 incident (e.g., Jiang, 1995).
According to Jiang (1995), for a matter of days the national media seemed all
opened up to the events with candid views, but again in a matter of days control
from the top was tightened, and it reverted to a state more conservative and
constrained than before the incident (Polumbaum, 1990). Considering the
extraordinary social and political contexts surrounding media performance at
that time, however, this part of history in TV regulation can only be looked
upon as reactions to an unplanned event which became so dominant in the media as
to amount to a special situation of the nation. The behavior of the media, once
politicized to the extent of taking sides on issues, can be labeled as
"aprofessional," if not less than professional.
Apart from the juncture in 1989, as early as December 1989, possibly out of
security concerns, MRFT and the National Secrecy Bureau jointly issued a decree
spelling out the boundaries of what information should be withheld from the
broadcast media. Major categories of information with a secret tag included new
high technologies in the electronic media, China's external propaganda policies,
technologies and resources imported through secret channels, state secrets yet
to be disclosed in due course, and China's jamming and monitoring of foreign TV
and radio stations. If the flow of information through the broadcast media
needs to be carefully monitored against the backdrop of national security and
secrecy, then those who use the media are expected to display some professional
awareness of their functional prerequisites.
TV Regulations and Professionalism
As stations multiplied and programs abounded, MRFT increased and tightened
its indirect discipline of stations and control of contentsDnot in a way of
imposing such control but rather, depending on the professionalization of the TV
industry. Now that TV in China has been prospering in a burgeoning economy as a
mass informer and entertainer and a new technology, another attribute of
TVDprograms as a commodityDbecomes increasingly salient in the midst of market
competition and begins to challenge a yet more fundamental dimension of TV as a
profession. Since the market reform took shape and the mass media were required
to sustain their existence through their own means, there have been numerous
reports of questionable journalistic practices and media organizational
wrongdoings over the years (e.g., Zhao, 1998), prompting the central authority
to take measures against the tide. As noted earlier, the definition of the
functional roles of the media often constituted the conceptual basis for TV
regulation.
Although Chinese TV is a vehicle for advertising in the market economy, it
is at the same time a news medium. In the eyes of MRFT, the boundary between
these two roles must not be blurred. In November 1990, MRFT issued
administrative orders reaffirming and regulating the electronic media as the
mouthpiece of the Party and the government. A variety of rules aimed at rooting
out corruption and unethical practices in the media industries were released.
Paid news was to be banned; journalists should in no way accept gift from the
news sources; no financial sponsor was allowed to interfere with the content of
news; and no journalist might invite ads under the pretext of news reporting.
Media advertising had to be designated as a task to a specialized department and
personnel. These rules were in part a response to the general trend with the
news media, which had often run virtual advertisements masqueraded as news.
As noted earlier, making profits and informing the public are two ends that
sometimes conflict with each other in the media industry. When the state and
the market collide in China, professionalism is supposed to enter as a wedge.
The rapid expansion of TV in China coincided with the growth of the nation's
advertising industry. As a result, various problems emerged at all levels, such
as advertisements disguised as news, illegal sponsorship from the commercial
sector for media events in order to gain free or cheap air time, TV reporters
soliciting ads in exchange for journalistic interviews, and local stations
cutting out CCTV ads and replacing them with local ads when relaying CCTV
programs. Facing such rampant disorder and chaotic phenomenon, MRFT and the
National Bureau of Industry and Commerce issued a joint regulation in June 1988
to put a forceful ban on such alarming practices threatening the professional
morale and ethics of the industry. The undisciplined TV competition and
unhealthy market orientation turned out to be part of a larger mass media mayhem
that appeared to be running out of control. In 1993, the Propaganda Department
of the Communist Party and the State Press and Publications Administration
issued a similar joint circular, prohibiting all forms of paid journalism in the
print media (Zhao, 1998)
TV is a relatively new medium in China. The various conceptions of it, as
mentioned above, have yet to find mutual compatibility in operation. One key
step taken by policy makers is to increase the competence of the professionals.
Echoing the nation's second five-year plan to educate the masses with knowledge
of the law, in 1991 all the cadres and staff in the broadcast industry were
mobilized to be educated and to prepare themselves with knowledge about the
legal system, especially certain laws crucial to the TV trade, such as the law
to protect and preserve national secrets and the rules and sanctions governing
the protection of broadcast facilities. Cable TV management and the receiving
of satellite TV were subjugated to administrative regulations. Propagandists
were trained to implement such education at the grassroots levels. In fact, at
every level a leader was designated to fully attend to this education campaign
and a final examination was required to assess the outcome. The highly-promoted
speeches by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping on furthering the reform in
1992 intensified the system-wide education campaign. But after a short while,
it seemed to gradually trail off and vanish from the media.
Within the TV industry, new progress in science and technology has been
increasing rapidly over the years, especially since the late 1980s (Jiang,
1995). In 1992, MRFT issued rules governing the assessment of such progress.
Awards were offered to technological breakthroughs. All regulations, of course,
have to be carried out ultimately by professionals. Whether regulating content,
structure or technology, they all add up to controlling one way or another the
professional mind and behavior. The training of the mind included not only
ideological orientation, but also technical sophistication. The year 1992 was a
watershed for the entire country, highlighted by Deng's speeches. As a direct
response to the call for deepening reform and improving productivity, a new and
full round of on-the-job training in the broadcast industry started in early
1993. During the five years between 1993 and 1997, all the staff members from
high-level managerial and other professional positions down to the grassroots
workers were to have a full grasp of Deng's theory of building socialism with
Chinese characteristics, as well as the occupational knowledge of broadcasting
required of their positions. Station heads were trained by MRFT directly, while
other people at lower levels were trained by broadcasting institutes,
departments and teachers at their corresponding levels (national, provincial, or
local). Beyond 1997, the emphasis of scrutiny would shift to examining the
entry level of knowledge and skills of those aspiring a position in the
industry.
These individual training programs were followed by the regulation of
institutional behaviors of the TV industry, on a relatively macro level. In
1994, when the larger cultural climate was being regulated under the Party and
the State Council, as a general segment of the cultural market, TV products were
no exception. Rules for regulation of TV were to be drawn by MRFT, under the
greater auspices of the Party and the State Council, to scrutinize, censor and
control the content of programs right from the stage of written script before
shooting. Joint production of TV programs with foreign institution or
individuals, along with movies targeted at major international awards, must be
approved by MRFT first. Programs aired by cable TV stations must be stamped
with the permit issued by provincial broadcasting authorities.
Each year witnessed a greater growth in TV coverage of the population. The
last step before airingDthe final scrutiny and censoring of programs within each
stationDbecame crucial. In 1996, MRFT issued a system-wide notification calling
upon radio, TV, and cable TV stations to watch this last step of responsibility
in particular. At a delicate stage of social transformation when the gap of
social inequality was on the rise, themes of broadcast programs were required to
be in line with this general reality of the nation and to cater to the mass
interests with due consideration to possible impact on the youth. Programs
exuding lowly tastes were barred. Pirated programs were to be banned from the
screen as well. Local stations were prohibited from airing news programs
received from foreign satellites.
Implementation of rules and regulations requires frequent review and
assessment. Such a reviewing system had been long awaited for 10 years since
the institutionalization of rules and regulations on broadcasting in mid-1980s.
In July 1996, MRFT issued a set of guidelines on the annual review of TV station
performance. Although ideology was no longer the top priority in TV operation,
the first item on the review check list was this: "Did the station make any
political mistake in broadcasting during the past year?" Other main items of
the list asked questions about transmission of CCTV Channel One program,
channels of acquisition of programs, imported programs, illegal use of satellite
programs, broadcast of educational programs, rental of frequency, channel or
time slots, satisfaction of MRFT standards, and violation of laws, rules and
regulations. If the results are satisfactory, a certificate is granted after
the annual review.
If not, sanctions ranged from minor ones such as "renewal of certificate pending
improvement in performance" to suspending broadcasting to total shutdown of the
station. The formation of the review mechanism, coupled with other regulations,
put the state firmly in charge of the form and content of TV broadcasting
process from the beginning to the very end.
The Sixth Plenum of the 14th Party Congress passed the "Resolution on Building
Socialist Spiritual Civilization" in October 1996. The document smacked of a
tightening control on the broadcast media. Each station was required to preview
programs at three internal levels: specific program manager, department, and
station. Most important programs with a bearing on the government must be
previewed by the broadcast officials in the local government. Live broadcasts
must pass the station head's pre-examination. This stipulation makes the
unprecedented live broadcast of the press conference between President Clinton
and President Jiang more remarkable as it signified the approval of the central
authority for it to take place at the national level. Foreign programs,
including those received via satellites, must be previewed. Major accidents in
broadcasting must be reported to the provincial level broadcast administration
within 48 hours. In another three days, the provincial authority must submit
reports to MRFT on the actions taken.
State vs. Market Power in TV Regulation
There is little doubt that economic reform has brought about many changes in
the relationship between China's TV and the central government. Although
television is gradually maturing into an industry and the world of advertisers
and consumers, because of the imperfect competition in the Chinese media market
the state still wields a due amount of power and control over TV regulation. As
discussed earlier, since 1986, a significant number of laws and regulations have
been issued to monitor the form and content of television at all aspects,
ranging from mundane empirical practices to more ideological issues of its
existence. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the rules and
regulations are all duly observed. On the contrary, like many other laws and
regulations concerning other industries in China, there is no guarantee of full
implementation at the grassroots level. This can be observed in the emphatic
repetition of certain regulations over the years. Such frustration does not
nullify the central government's regulatory efforts, which are mostly reactions
to the changing situations in the market. Several conclusions can be drawn from
the above discussion.
First, economic independence has surely empowered most TV stations to
transgress certain bounds such as the ban on pornography and violence that are
seen most often on cable TV. Decentralization and depoliticization in state
regulation have generally been found in the media market in general. TV is no
exception. When the entire nation has become a market, TV has come to be
conceptualized at once as a mass entertainer and a new technology, in addition
to being an instrument. The institutionalization of commercial Chinese TV and
the outburst of a market-oriented mentality among its practitioners grow, to
some extent, out of the official mold and the state's desire to move forward in
its economic restructuring.
The irony lies in this: the nature of TV technology itself has enabled it
to expand and span across such vast space in two decades, moving beyond the
state's control and into the market of audiences. Yet with the financial
autonomy allowed by the state, TV is willingly subjecting itself to more subtle
control by the state jut to gain greater freedom in programming and other
industrial operations. This points out the structural dilemma facing the entire
media system in China today: until the state transfers the ownership to the
media themselves by relinquishing its control and privatizing the mass media, at
least some of them in a mixed public and private system, the media practitioners
will continue to function as state managers in a struggle to strike a balance
between the pull of market logic and the push of state ideology. But then, to
change the well entrenched state-media hierarchy is to reconfigure the
foundation of the legitimacy of Communist Party and to abandon its strong hold
on the absolute power in China. There is little indication, if any, that this
is going to happen anytime soon. A growing sign is that the state will insist
on exercising its legal and administrative power to hold TV in check.
Second, a large number of rules and regulation are devoted to the macro
operation of TV as a new media technology. When the new technology is eagerly
embraced and the market begins to outgrow its initial boundaries, from the
state's point of view, effective means of management and control must be put in
place. A division of labor and a chain of command are set in motion.
Administratively, although the authority of licensing/granting permits resides
mostly with the central government, local and provincial governments often serve
as gatekeepers in the application/approval procedure. It is revealing that in
terms of defining the role and functions of TV as well as other media, state
leaders often have the final say. Their guidelines may contribute greatly to
the making of rules and regulations. It is a manifestation of the centrality of
the market concerns that can only be best observed at the point closer to
reality.
Third, the state sees TV as an instrument of propaganda and education, at
the same time acknowledging its being a commodity and technology. This dual
conception creates an uneasy tension between TV as a national resource by the
state's virtual monopoly of media ownership and TV as an advertising tool in the
vibrant market economy. TV program producers may see it primarily as a
commodity catering to the public as a mass entertainer, facing an increasingly
picky and demanding audiences and more crucially, facing the challenges from
other new, multimedia technologies. The eyes of the audiences are fixed on the
content of the programs, as well as the types of information and entertainment
they could get. In any market system, whether socialist (as China claims it is)
or capitalist, the laws of demand and supply tend to dictate what comes out of
the process, especially when the market outpaces the state.
Fourth, TV regulations in China operate between disparate state perceptions
and market conceptions of its functional roles. Such disparity is reflected in
the implementation of the rules and regulations. One thing most certain is this
general observation: state policy and new technology allow TV stations to
prosper financially in a market economy; in exchange, the state retains the
authority to define the boundaries of TV's territorial freedom in the market.
Notwithstanding, it remains a regulatory problem (e.g., Zi, 1998) to be solved
that following the current system of management of TV in China, the authority on
personnel, finance, and logistics all resides with the local and provincial
governments, rendering the central government very limited in forceful
regulations of regional and local TV. If the overall economic reform movement
stays on course, at the end, the state may continue to keep control of the
ownership while the market gradually chips away the ability and power of the
central authority to run the media show in its own design on a grand scale.
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Table 1: Major Regulations Issued by the Ministry of Radio, Film and TV and
Other Agencies
Year Number Regulation (Agency)
_____________________________________________________________________________
1984 1 Provisional Measures on Establishment of Radio and Television in
District and County Level (MRFT)
1985 1 Regulations on Prohibition of Profit-making Video Show and
Strengthening the Management of Video Show (Communist
Party
Central Office and State Council)
1986 3 Trial Guiding Orders for Regulatory Work (MRFT)
Temporary Regulations on TV Drama Production Permit (MRFT)
Regulatory Measures on the Management of Closed-Circuit TV in Tourist
Hotels (State Council General Office)
1987 2 Regulations on Protection of Radio and Television Facilities (State
Council)
Notification on Implementing the Regulations on Protection
of Radio and
TV Facilities (MRFT and Ministry of Public Security)
1988 4 Notification on Enhancing Management of TV Advertising (MRFT and
National Management Bureau of Industry and Commerce)
Notification on Prohibiting the Taping and Publishing of
Artistic
Performance by Imprisoned Criminals (MRFT and Ministry
of
Law Enforcement)
Measures for Rewarding Scientific and Technological Progress (MRFT)
Measures for Rewarding Constructive Suggestions for Technological
Improvements (MRFT)
1989 4 Regulatory Measures on Teachers' Education through TV (Ordinance of
the State Education Commission)
Regulations Governing Legislative Actions on Radio, Film and TV
(MRFT)
Regulations on TV Drama Production Permit (MRFT, superceded 1986
Trial Regulation)
Secrecy Regulation and Classification in Radio, Film, and TV Operation
(MRFT and National Secrecy Bureau)
1990 7 Temporary Regulation on Cable TV Management (MRFT)
Regulation on the Management of Ground-Based Reception of
Foreign
Satellite TV (MRFT, Ministry of Public Security and
Ministry of National Security)
Additional Regulation on TV Drama Production Permit (MRFT)
Criteria for Examination of Imported TV Dramas (MRFT)
Regulation on Professional Ethics and Integrity (MRFT)
Regulation on the Examination and Approval of Construction
Projects
within the Industry (MRFT)
Trial Regulation on the Staffing of Village/Township TV
Stations
(MRFT)
Table 1: Major Regulations Issued by the MRFT and Other Agencies (continued)
Year Number Regulation (Agency)
_____________________________________________________________________________
1991 4 The Second Five-Year Plan on Education of Law in the Industry (MRFT)
Trial Regulatory Measures on Cable TV Management (MRFT)
Notification on Regulating Management of Asia One Satellite
Ground
Receiving Device (MRFT, Ministry of National Security
and
Ministry of Public Security)
Notification on Enhancing the Design, Installment and
Examination of
Community Antenna (MRFT)
1992 7 Regulation on the Procedures of Administrative Reconsideration
(MRFT)
Temporary Regulation on the Technical Management and
Maintenance of
Cable TV (MRFT)
Regulation on Internal Auditing (MRFT)
Temporary Regulation on Program Management at Cable TV
Stations
(MRFT)
MRFT Regulation on Management of Scientific and
Technological
Projects (MRFT)
MRFT Regulation on Appraisal of Scientific and
Technological
Achievement (MRFT)
Temporary Managerial Measures on Social Organizations on
Radio, Film
and TV (MRFT)
1993 9 Regulation on Ground Reception of Satellite TV (MRFT)
Regulation on Sales of Satellite TV Ground-Reception Device
(National
Administration of Commerce and Trade)
Temporary Regulation on Recognition of Cable TV Network
Connection
Facilities (MRFT)
Regulation on the Use and Management of Legal Documents in
Administrative Reconsideration (MRFT)
Managerial Measures on Auditing Files (MRFT)
Rules on the Filing Procedures of Auditing Documents on
Radio, Film,
and TV (MRFT)
Measures for Implementing the "Orders on the Transformation
of
Management Mechanism of State-Owned Industrial
Enterprises"
(MRFT)
Notification on Requirement of Local Radio and TV Stations
to Provide
Complete Relay of Programs from CCTV and Central Radio
Station (MRFT and Central Propaganda Department of the
Party)
MRFT 1993-1997 Plan for On-the-Job Training of Staff (MRFT)
Table 1: Major Regulations Issued by the MRFT and Other Agencies (continued)
Year Number Regulation (Agency)
_____________________________________________________________________________
1994 7 Detailed Rules and Regulations on Management of Ground Reception of
Satellite TV Programs (MRFT)
Regulation on Management of Cable TV (MRFT)
Regulatory Measures on the Importing and Airing of Foreign
TV
Programs (MRFT)
Procedures for Management of Radio and TV Propaganda Files
(MRFT
and National Archives Bureau)
Temporary Regulation on Management of Radio and TV Frequency
Licenses (MRFT)
Regulation on Fire Control (MRFT)
Temporary Regulation on Security Work (MRFT)
1995 -
1996 13 Procedures for Management of Appraisal and Approval of Plans to
Establish New Radio and TV Stations (MRFT)
Temporary Regulation on Procedures of Executive Sanctions
(MRFT)
Temporary Measures for Rewarding Maintenance of Radio and
TV
Technologies (MRFT)
Temporary Measures for the Management of Educational TV
Stations and
Relay Stations (MRFT and State Education Commission)
Notification on Enhancing the Supervision of Radio and TV
Production
Teams from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (MRFT)
Notification on Enhancing Supervision of Radio, TV and
Cable TV
Broadcasts (MRFT)
Regulation on Annual Review of Radio and TV Stations (MRFT)
Notification on Implementation of Annual Review of Radio ad
TV
Stations (MRFT)
Additional Notifications on Reprinting of Radio and TV
Program
Forecasts (Press Publishing Administration)
Notification on Ensuring the Broadcasting of Radio and TV
Programs at
Various Levels (MRFT)
Regulation on Management of Radio-Film-TV System in Foreign
Relations at the Local Levels (MRFT)
Notification on Determinedly Outlawing Illegally
Established
Broadcasting Stations/ Networks and Strictly Enforcing
Principles
in Propaganda (Central Propaganda Department and MRFT)
Regulation on Taiwan Journalists' Visits to Mainland (State
Council
Taiwan Affairs Office)
______________________________________________________________________________
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