Polity and Identity: Scotland's Struggle for
Cultural Independence and the Lesson of Quebec
Douglas Bicket
2nd Year MA Student
University of Washington School of Communications
Box 353740, Seattle, WA 98102
Phone: (206) 543-1823 (w)
(206) 523-7825 (h)
e-mail: [log in to unmask]
March 31, 1997
Submitted as an Entry for the
Qualitative Studies Division of AEJMC
Abstract:
This paper comparatively examines the positions of the arts and mass media in
Scotland and Quebec. It argues that, in spite of marginally increased funding
for domestic cultural industries in recent years, Scotland's separate cultural
identity remains under threat in the absence of an independent, or at least
substantially autonomous, Scottish polity. The example of Quebec shows that
strong political and cultural institutions are needed to preserve small cultures
under threat from hegemonizing external forces.
Polity and Identity: Scotland's Struggle for Cultural Independence and the
Lesson of Quebec
_
Polity and Identity: Scotland's Struggle for
Cultural Independence and the Lesson of Quebec
Introduction
Believe it or not, the peoples of Scotland and Quebec have much in common, and
in many ways the experiences of the two nations over the past 200-plus years
bear a close resemblance to each other. This statement might seem a little
strange to the uninitiated reader. The Scots and the Quebecers might seem at
first sight to have little in common; after all, they inhabit different
continents, speak different languages, and have developed largely in isolation
from each other. Yet Quebec's and Scotland's cultural positions do show some
striking similarities, as we shall see. Bearing this in mind, the cultural
development of both peoples over the past two centuries should be instructive in
determining the cultural impact of external political and economic events on
small nations that maintain less than full sovereignty. The purpose of this
paper is to examine these similarities, and see what conclusions can be drawn
from a comparative examination of the two cultures.
The key to such a study is a review of these two peoples' cultural positions
and how they have managed to defend their indigenous cultures from outside
hegemonic forces and promote them to themselves and others. The point of this
paper, then, is to outline the links between indigenous cultural institutions
and cultural development. The central hypothesis is that strong, well-funded,
cultural institutions, whether they be part of or independent of the government,
promote such development, while weak or externally controlled institutions
inevitably weaken or undermine the culture. Quebec has developed strong
political or constitutional institutions to act as a bulwark against encroaching
cultural domination; Scotland's ability to develop such institutions has been
much less successful, and for this reason its culture is under greater threat
than that of Quebec.
Theoretical Framework
Since this paper examines the relationship between Scottish and Qu b cois
national identity and representations of that identity, it will touch on matters
of hegemony and ideology, and examine issues of image and national identity. A
critical approach will used that will include discussion of these and other
issues, including cultural homogenization. Some clarification of the origins
and use of these terms, and my use of them in this context, is called for.
It could be argued that every so-called 'nation' has constructed for itself a
sense of national identity, built up partly on its observations and stereotypes
of both its own people and of other nations. Nationalism itself is somewhat
tricky to define. Benedict Anderson's description of nationalism has been
widely referred to: "[A nation] is an imagined political community D and
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the
members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
an image of their community." It is a community, he goes on, because it is
"conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship."[1] This is a useful definition,
although to my mind the best working appraisal of this slippery concept comes
from historian Eric Hobsbawm who, for the purposes of his work, "assumes no a
priori definition of what constitutes a nation. As an initial working assumption
any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members
of a 'nation,' will be treated as such."[2]
Although hard to grasp in theory, nationalism's potential power is great, and,
where it poses conceptions of nationhood within and beneath the level of the
nation-state, its existence poses a serious threat to that state as currently
conceived.
In the context of this essay, I shall distinguish between Quebec, the
predominantly French Canadian entity, and the rest of Canada, which is mostly
English-speaking. Similarly, my references to Scotland and the Scots are
intended to distinguish that entity from the rest of the United Kingdom, and in
particular England. I use 'British' primarily to describe and refer to the
British state and its political establishment D a primarily English (not
Scottish, Irish, or Welsh) construction nurtured and promulgated by English
political and social institutions, and the main conduit for British
socio-political discourses.
The modern British state is a fascinating, yet anachronistic, entity. Tom
Nairn writes about the appropriation of state power in Britain by an English
"self-regulating elite group" which established a firm hold over England and,
later, Britain and its empire. It is this group which holds power over the
decaying yet still-intact state to this day, he argues.[3] The modern British
state also provides a good example of a political entity dominated by what
Althusser describes as 'ideological state apparatuses' D the political system,
the churches, the schools, the family, the legal system, the system of mass
communication, and cultural activities like the arts and sports D instead of the
more blatant "repressive state apparatus" of police, the armed forces, the
prisons, and so on.[4]
Ideology, defined broadly in Marxist terms as a "false consciousness" within
a system of beliefs, is also useful for the purposes of this paper.[5] It is
defined here as the broad structure governing societal control. As far as
'hegemony' D the willing acceptance of one social group's dominance and control
by another and the dominating group's main vehicle of control D is concerned,
the concept can be seen in terms of the more complex view of social structure,
elaborated for the analysis of popular culture, developed in recent years within
the Gramscian tradition and articulated by theorists such as Stuart Hall.[6]
However, an understanding of the more fundamental use of the term is also
important. While it is difficult to find an adequate definition for hegemony,
Todd Gitlin gives a sense of how the concept works:
[H]egemony is a ruling class's (or alliance's) domination of
subordinate classes and groups through the elaboration and penetration of
ideology (ideas and assumptions) into their common sense and everyday
practice; it is the systematic (but not necessarily or even usually
deliberate) engineering of mass consent to the established order. No hard
and fast line can be drawn between the mechanisms of hegemony and the
mechanisms of coercion. . . . In any given society, hegemony and coercion
are interwoven.[7]
Hegemony relies on the use of specific discourses and stereotypes to maintain
control over conceptions of national identity D a discussion I will not be able
to proceed far with in this paper, but which should be recognized nevertheless.
In this essay I will also talk about cultural homogenization, which I define as
the attempt by one national group to dominate and eventually extinguish the
culture of another, and replace it with its own. Within the narrow terms of
this paper, and for reasons I shall explain later, I shall use hegemony and
homogenization more or less interchangeably.
This is essentially a comparative study between two nations. Studies of this
sort D defined by Edelstein as studies that compare two or more nations with
respect to a common activity or variable[8] D have become increasingly popular
in recent years. Gurevitch and Blumler, surveying the field of political
communication in 1989, "see comparative analysis as indispensable [authors'
emphasis], in the sense that without it certain very important questions and
phenomena of political communication will simply not be addressed."[9] What
holds for political communication holds equally for critical and cultural
studies.
There are important conceptual and methodological advantages of comparative
over single-nation-based research, a number of which are listed by Gurevitch and
Blumler. One reason given, which seems particularly appropriate to this study,
is that such research "can serve as an effective antidote to unwitting
parochialism. It not only makes us aware of other systems, it can help us to
understand our own better by placing its characteristic features and practices
against those of others."[10]
Also relevant to this particular topic is the 'families of nations' concept,
which recognizes that certain groups of countries share important national
attributes based on language, history, and/or geography. This is a concept that
has been resurrected in academic circles in recent years. For much of the middle
part of this century this approach was neglected in academia, in favor of a
search for "underlying macro-structural determinants that shaped politics and
policy, irrespective of national context."[11] But in recent years an approach
based on families of nations has been resurrected, and
suggests that some of the more important policy similarities between
groups of nations and their differences from other groups [my emphasis] may
be attributable as much as history and to culture and their transmission
and
diffusion amongst nations as to the immediate impact of the economic,
political and social variables that figure almost exclusively in the
contemporary public policy literature.[12]
Despite the cultural and historical differences (which are reviewed below)
between the two nations under examination, it appears to me that their broadly
similar developmental circumstances, particularly in relation to their larger
and more powerful hegemonizing neighbors, provides a very useful common factor
for comparative purposes.
Cultural Similarities and Differences
Some of the main similarities between these two stateless nations are worth
reviewing at this point. While both Scotland and Quebec have long been
overshadowed by larger cultural entities (England in Scotland's case, English
Canada in Quebec's), both are, in their own ways, 'nations' which were once
independent of their current political masters. Both societies retain strong
folk traditions and a strong collective memory of their distinctiveness. Both
retain in their collective memories a sense of nostalgia for their
pre-industrial rural societies and a strong attachment to their past.[13] Both
cultures were for many years affected D and to an extent defined D by a powerful
and repressive religion (Calvinism in Scotland's case, and Roman Catholicism in
Quebec's). Both have had their linguistic heritage undermined by their dominant
partners in the past, almost terminally so in Scotland's case. In fact, both
have had their very existence as separate cultural entities threatened by
external cultural domination; yet both have managed to retain or develop
cultural forms or institutions to defend their separate identities. It is just
that Quebec has been much more successful in this endeavor.
Having pointed out the similarities, there are some important differences
which have to be kept in mind as well. Scotland (or at any rate its unelected
ruling class) entered into union with England of its own free will, while Quebec
was conquered. Scotland supposedly prospered from its union, at least for a
time, while Quebec was humbled by conquest and floundered. Scotland became a
center for intellectual thought in the 18th century with the Enlightenment, and
for industry in the 19th century with the Industrial Revolution; neither of
these developments troubled Quebec. While much of Scotland industrialized and
modernized, most of Quebec remained backward and rural. Scots were accorded
equal opportunity to reach the highest positions within British institutions,
and many did, whereas French Canadians were for many years effectively excluded
from the top echelons of English Canadian life. Yet perversely, for much of the
recent past, Scotland's economy stagnated while Quebec's economy D with the
onset of la revolution tranquille D boomed, changing the province from "a rural,
Catholic, agricultural society with one of the highest birth rates in the world
to an urban, secular, industrial society with one of the lowest."[14]
On balance, however, the similarities between the two seem to outweigh the
differences. Lockerbie refers to the way that these conditions have produced
striking similarities between the Scottish and Qu b cois 'national character:'
both are "naturally dionysiac, warm, extrovert and life loving, but split by the
force of historical constraints into the polar opposites: severe, withdrawn and
introverted."[15] If this indeed describes the two national characters
accurately, then some further investigation is needed to understand why this is
so.
At the heart of any discussion of representation and nationhood is a question of
identity. Both Scots and Quebecers see their identities primarily in terms of a
national grouping with minority status within a larger political unit. In
Quebec's case, this national identity rests on separate cultural institutions,
such as the church, law, and education, a separate language and heritage, and,
crucially, a semi-autonomous provincial government. Scots, having been largely
deprived of their own languages, must base their sense of national identity on
their separate heritage and a small but crucial number of cultural institutions
(basically the same first three mentioned above in relation to Quebec) plus a
small number of other cultural indicators, which will be discussed later. Both
see their identities as being under continual threat from their dominant
partners. Crucially, however, Quebec's provincial assembly enables the
Quebecers to articulate and defend their sense of national identity in the
political sphere; Scotland, without such a body, cannot do this.
Quebec and Canada
Canadians D or at least those who are not of French-Canadian extraction D have
long struggled for a sense of nationhood, finding a unified sense of
self-identity more in matters of practicality than of the heart. As one
commentator puts it, Canadians
lack a language that is uniquely our own, a long history, folklore, or
myths. I'd say one thing we have counted on in their place is a set of
socially constructed institutions: the railroad, the CBC, our network of
social programs, maybe the post office. These are real, not mythical
entities, but they serve a reassuring function. They not only deliver TV
shows, pension cheques, or the mail D they give us the sense of a cohesive
society.[16]
While Canada as a whole, and many of its English-speaking inhabitants in
particular, have found it hard to create for themselves a strong, unifying sense
of identity, no such problem has existed for the French Canadians, who have for
centuries resisted assimilation with the Anglophone majority of Canada. Their
separate language and a measure of geographic isolation have greatly helped them
in this endeavor. The Quebec legislature, riding the wave of la revolution
tranquille, argued for and eventually secured the "distinct society" clause for
itself, albeit only as part of the stalled Meech Lake debacle that has yet to be
resolved in Canada (see below).
While the separation of French and English identities in Canada goes back
centuries, the process of polarization between the two communities has, if
anything, intensified in recent times. The past 30 years in particular have seen
the radicalization of Quebec politics, with the rise to power of the Parti
Qu b cois, committed to eventual independence from Canada and the protection of
the French-Canadian language and culture.[17]
One reason for Quebec's relative strength has been Canada's relative weakness
since the union. Canada, perceived as a strong federation, has in practice been
a relatively weak federal union for most of its history, within which strong and
assertive provinces have been engaged in a continuous struggle to move the
balance of constitutional power in their favor. Quebec has been in the forefront
of this movement, although in recent years it has been joined by other
provinces, particularly British Columbia in the West. Nevertheless, the desire
for political strength at the federal level, first expounded by the framers of
the British North America Act, the country's first de facto Constitution[18]_,
has remained strong among the central government establishment, resulting in a
source of tension between Ottawa and the provinces that has still not been
resolved.[19]_
At the provincial level, Quebec's retention of a strong political assembly has
also enabled it to protect its separate culture more assiduously. One
consequence of this in recent years has been greater political protection for
the French language and for other integral cultural institutions, both within
Quebec and across Canada.[20]_ Heavier funding has been appropriated for more
recent vehicles for the transmission of cultural forms, such as film and
broadcasting (see later).
The role of French-Canadian culture, and the production and transmission of
that culture, has become a matter of great importance to Quebecers. As
Lockerbie states, "In many ways culture has taken over from religion as the
institution which expresses Quebec's distinctiveness within Canada and binds it
together as a homogeneous society."[21]_ Nevertheless, it seems that the level
of authority that the Quebec government has gained for itself (at least as great
as that of the German L nder, say, and far greater than that of Scotland) has
not sated its continuing appetite for still greater autonomy, or even
independence D a point emphasized by columnist Allan Fotherington in Macleans
magazine following the narrow defeat of the Quebec referendum for independence
in October 1995.[22]_
The intervening year-and-a-half since that defeat has done little to lessen
the underlying concerns of the Quebec people about their place in a federal
Canadian state. This is hardly surprising, given the lack of movement in
constitutional reform in this decade.
In terms of broader constitutional change, developments in Canada have
effectively stalled pending a resolution of the constitutional changes proposed
in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords.[23]_ Since the patriation of the
constitution from Britain in 1982, the federal government and the 10 provinces
-- most notably Quebec have been completely unable to agree on a set of new
constitutional arrangements to guide Canada into the future. In fact, the
wrangling over the new constitution which reached its peak in the popular vote
against the Charlottetown Accord in 1992 seems only to have further divided
Canadians, not brought them together. According to Saywell, "[Charlottetown]
was indeed a selfish calculation of profit and loss: too much or too little for
the aboriginals, Quebec, the West, women, the left or the right, Ottawa or the
provinces."[24]_ In this frozen constitutional morass, there was little room
for maneuver left between the federal government and Quebec.
The federal bureaucracy, for its part, has in recent years focused its
energies on federal spending cuts and retrenchment rather than developing
strategies for Quebec inclusion. For the moment, Ottawa has offered Quebec the
constitutional status quo and little else. In the absence of any significant
federal efforts to effect constitutional change designed to address the concerns
of the Quebec people, it is difficult to see how many of these concerns can be
dissipated.
Scotland and the United Kingdom
Despite the unitary nature of the British state, Scotland's social and
institutional developments, for reasons of history and culture, have managed to
retain a measure of independence from London. This independence is reflected in
the Scottish people themselves, who generally see themselves as being Scottish
first, as well as D and often instead of D British,[25]_ and who continue to
cherish their separate Scottish identity and institutions.
In politics, most of the Scottish electorate has tended to choose British
political parties, and particularly the Labour Party, over the Scottish National
Party, currently the only major political entity advocating outright
independence for Scotland. However, the political scene in Scotland remains
radically different from the rest of the UK, despite the absence of a Scottish
assembly.[26]_
In spite of the constantly expressed desire for some form of constitutional
reform for Scotland, most dramatically with the inauguration of the Scottish
Constitutional Convention in 1989,[27]_ little has changed since the appointment
of a Secretary of State for Scotland and the creation of a Scottish Office in
the 19th century (see below). In the meantime, powerful political, economic,
social, and cultural forces emanating from England threaten to undermine further
Scotland's independent culture. Scotland, a country with, for the most part, a
shared language and close geographical links with England, has found it harder
to resist assimilation with the English D a situation exacerbated by the
development of improved communications and the rise of the London-based and
English-dominated mass media in Britain.
Another important source of cultural distinctiveness that should not be
ignored is Scotland's linguistic heritage. This is an issue that will be
addressed more fully later in this paper.
Although the assault on Scottish culture has been long and continuous, a
number of important factors have combined to help retain a strong sense of
separate national identity within the Scottish nation.
While possessing neither a government nor a parliament of its own,
[Scotland] has a strong constitutional identity and a large number of
political and social institutions. The Act of Union . . . laid down that
Scotland would retain for all time certain key institutions such as the
Scottish legal system, the Presbyterian Church . . . the Scottish
educational system, and the 'Royal Burghs' [local authorities]. These
became
the transmitters of Scottish national identity from one generation to the
next.[28]_.
Like the French-speaking Quebecers, Scots have long resisted assimilation by a
more powerful external culture. Unlike Quebecers, however, they have developed
relatively few governmental or bureaucratic institutions to facilitate this
defense. This result is largely a function of the nature of the modern British
state.
Oddly, perhaps, and in sharp contrast to Canada, the United Kingdom has
developed for itself a near-unique D and inflexible D set of constitutional
arrangements with regard to its constituent nations. As currently constituted,
the United Kingdom is a powerful and heavily centralized unitary state, within
which Scotland and Wales (and, under its own very different circumstances,
Northern Ireland) must struggle for continued recognition as de facto separate
entities. In the legislative domain, Scotland retains a marginally greater
degree of autonomy than does Wales, thanks to the Scottish Grand Committee, an
assembly of Scottish MPs that meets at regular intervals to debate Scottish
legislation. Because of Scotland's separate legal system and status under the
Treaty of Union, most Westminster bills must be amended or reconsidered before
taking effect north of the border.[29]_
The British civil service as a whole remains very centralized functionally,
even if some of its minor functions have been dispersed from London in recent
years. Within the context of this centralized bureaucracy, the last significant
constitutional revision to Scotland's position in the UK was in the 1880s, with
the creation of the Scottish Office.[30]_ This move was significant in that it
created a distinctive entity within the British civil service that catered
solely to Scottish interests. The Scottish Office is headed by a secretary of
state, a position which has enjoyed full cabinet status since the 1920s.[31]_
The Scottish Office, as now constituted, is structured along the lines of a
standard British department. The secretary of state, the ministerial
representative of the government, is responsible to parliament for the
activities of the department. Based in Edinburgh, he is served by a principal
private secretary plus over 10,000 civil servants.[32]_ One significant way in
which the Scottish Office differs from its English counterparts is that its
responsibility extends to a large array of areas that in England is dealt with
by a number of separate departments: agriculture and fisheries, home and health,
and education, to name a few.[33]_
The main weakness of the Scottish Office, in terms of its perceived legitimacy
in the eyes of the Scottish populace, is its tight links with the party in power
in Westminster. The entity is in no way independent of the dominant UK
government. The secretary of state, as a government cabinet minister and member
of the ruling party, must follow and publicly support the policies of his/her
party, no matter how unpopular these policies may be in Scotland. This becomes
a serious problem when the party in control of Westminster has relatively little
political support in Scotland. This has in fact been the case since 1979, with
a right-wing Conservative government in London promoting, through the Scottish
Office, policies that are deeply unpopular in Scotland D where, consistently,
fewer than one in five voters have expressed support for the Conservative
Government.[34]_
Cultural Homogenization of Small Nations
Closely related to the question of national identity D the other side of the
coin, in this case D is the question of cultural homogenization, or
hegemonization, of one people by a greater power. Gramscian conceptions of
hegemony can be adapted to the attempts by outside powers to subdue small
nations, since these attempts invariably involve the coopting of the smaller
nations' ruling elites into the dominant power structure.[35]_ Nevertheless,
since I am concentrating on national rather than class groupings, I prefer to
use the term cultural homogenization to describe the process of one nation's
subjugation of another's culture, albeit with the implied consent of important
segments of the subjugated people. This is basically what has been attempted in
the case of Scotland and, with less success, in Quebec.
Both Scotland and Quebec are of course parts of larger political units:
respectively, the United Kingdom and the federal state of Canada. Despite a
shared heritage and constitutional commonality, these two political units are in
many important ways quite dissimilar. As indicated earlier, the United Kingdom
is a powerful unitary state, within which Scotland must struggle for continued
recognition as a separately defined entity; Canada, meanwhile, remains a
relatively weak federal union. While the British state, based on the power and
stability of England, has been strong enough to fend off other encroaching
European and world powers for most of its history, Canada has always been
overshadowed, economically and culturally, by external powers, namely France,
Britain, and the United States. The cultural and geopolitical weaknesses felt
by the Canadian state have severely limited its ability to maintain hegemonic
control over its peoples. They also have allowed Quebec, a relatively strong
sub-unit within the federation, to be increasingly assertive in its claims for
cultural and political autonomy.
Scotland's struggles to maintain a separate identity from England have of
necessity intensified in recent years. Much has been heard about the
'Englishing' of traditional Scottish institutions like law and education, for
example. Being in a weaker constitutional position than Quebec D with no
separate assembly with autonomous tax-raising powers, for example D the Scots
have found it much harder to legislate for and fund projects aimed at preserving
that country's separate identity. Caught within the much more powerful
hegemonic forces of the English polity, without a substantial political or even
linguistic buffer to offer protection, Scotland's culture has been left
significantly more exposed to outside forces than has Quebec's.
Scotland and Quebec both rely on limited constitutional guarantees to
safeguard their separate cultural institutions. But a number of factors have
given Quebecers significantly greater protection from hegemonic control in
comparison to the Scots. The first is population. Quebecers comprise 25
percent of the Canadian population, whereas Scots make up less than 10 percent
of the UK population. Second, Quebec's large, culturally distinctive population
has been translated, in political terms, into a powerful political force D the
Bloc Qu b cois D fighting for Quebec's interests at the federal level.[36]_
Scotland, despite being slightly overrepresented in the British House of
Commons, still retains only 72 of parliament's 650 seats. Furthermore, most of
these seats are held by representatives of British parties committed to some
sort of continued constitutional link to the UK.[37]_ Third, Quebec's retention
of a strong provincial assembly has enabled it to protect its separate culture
more assiduously than in the case of Scotland.
Another important factor that must be considered is the central role of
language in relation to cultural homogenization. French Quebec has for
centuries resisted incorporation with the Anglophone majority of Canada. Their
separate language and a measure of geographic isolation greatly helped them in
this endeavor. Scotland, with its more intimate geographical links with
England, has, over the centuries, seen its native languages almost terminally
undermined.
As Lockerbie points out, "Both Scots and Qu b cois identities are bound up
with forms of language which deviate from those used by their dominant
partners."[38]_ In Scotland's case, the Scots language has long been
subordinate to the socially dominant speech of the English South-East, and the
resulting self-doubt and sense of inferiority on the part of Scots using the
native tongue has long been a feature of the Scottish social condition.
In terms of perceived cultural and linguistic inferiority, we can observe a
broadly similar process in Quebec if we shift the ground a little and follow
Lemire's argument that, in cultural terms, Quebec can be compared with France as
well as the rest of Canada.[39]_ Colloquial Qu b cois French, separated by
nearly 250 years of isolation from the mother country, has become almost as
different from metropolitan French as modern Scots is from standard English.
The traditional reaction of the French has been to look down on the
French-Canadian tongue as a debased dialect.[40]_ Thus, Quebecers have
historically suffered a double dose of discrimination: economically and socially
from English Canada, and linguistically and culturally from mother France.
Quebec's linguistic relationship with metropolitan French was therefore once
very similar to that between the Scots and English languages. In this context,
it is interesting to note that one of the results of la revolution tranquille
has been a "wave of self-affirmation" among Quebecers and a renewed
self-confidence in the use of French D and in particular Qu b cois French D in
Quebec culture and the arts.[41]_
The continuing role of the Scots tongue in Scotland should not be
underestimated. It is impossible to survey the Scottish cultural scene without
acknowledging the impact of both Scotland's long-suppressed native languages,
Scots[42]_ and Gaelic. Although, for over two centuries, Scotland has seen a
steady erosion in the popular and written use of both these languages in favor
of Standard English as promulgated through almost all the media in both England
and Scotland through to the present day, their influences on the arts remain
strong; many of the country's greatest writers, from Robert Burns to Sorley
MacLean, Hugh MacDiarmid to James Kelman, have been strongly influenced by one
or both of them.
Nevertheless, despite the best efforts of MacDiarmid, William Laughton Lorimer
(who completed a long-overdue translation of the New Testament into Scots in
1983), and various Burns appreciation societies, there has been no substantial
popular renaissance in the use of Scots.[43]_ Indeed, the improvement of
communications within the United Kingdom D centralized as they are on London D
has had a significant effect in standardizing language and, to an extent,
culture throughout Britain. This is perhaps most visibly demonstrated by the
existence of the BBC in Scotland, often cited as the media organization that
most closely mirrors Scotland's unfavorable constitutional position vis-a-vis
the rest of the UK.[44]_ The result of this development has been the
imposition of cultural codes by London on Scotland, and the relegation of many
aspects of genuine Scottish culture to the background.[45]_
In Quebec's case, most of the factors mentioned above have been influential in
strengthening Qu b cois culture and the arts, and reducing the homogenizing
influences of the Canadian state. In Scotland's case, these same variables
have, over a longer period of time, worked against the maintenance of a viable
separate culture. While a distinctively Scottish identity still exists in the
arts and among the people, it remains under threat as long as these
aforementioned variables remain unchanged.
Cultural Production and Transmission
Both Quebec and Scotland have seen upsurges in their cultural production in
recent years. In Quebec's case, the renaissance of cultural production roughly
coincided with la revolution tranquille in the 1960s, which resulted in a
sympathetic political structure for the promotion of Qu b cois culture.
Significantly, given the greater homogenizing influences of the British state
already alluded to, Scotland's own cultural renaissance from the late 1970s on
has also managed to gain some momentum, although under more severely restricted
circumstances.
Both Quebec and Scotland have seen strong innovations in their theater. Many
companies, like Le Theatre Parminou and Le Grand Cirque Ordinaire in Quebec, and
7:84 and Wildcat in Scotland, have revolutionized theater by articulating a
political message in a working class rather than a bourgeois medium.[46]_
However, it is the spheres of film and broadcasting that are most important for
our discussion of modern national culture.
Film production and broadcasting in both Quebec and Scotland initially
developed in the context of the wider political state, i.e., Canada and the
United Kingdom. However, it is interesting to see just how effectively the
Quebecers and even, to a much more limited extent, the Scots have managed to
adapt these state-wide developments to their own 'national' needs. The ability
of both these nations to fund and promote their own cultural production has
depended heavily on a number of institutional factors, as we shall see.
Undoubtedly Quebec has been the more successful of the two in promoting its
culture through the newer media. Film has probably been the most important
medium for Quebec in this respect. Lefebvre puts the beginning of an
essentially Qu b cois cinema at 1956, when the federal National Film Board of
Canada moved its offices and production facilities from Ottawa to Montreal.[47]_
This led to the creation of a French-language section, which was to provide the
basis for much innovative film-making by young Quebec directors such as Claude
Jutra and Michel Brault. Of especial importance was the Qu b cois documentary
genre, which revolutionized the way that French-Canadian people saw themselves:
they "were shown more truthfully to themselves and to others, with their real
problems and their real strengths. They achieved through representation the
dignity of ordinariness and self-respect."[48]_ In contrast, the Scottish
documentary, long starved of funds and reliant on corporate largesse, has never
managed to have such a powerful impact on Scottish identity and representation.
Apart from the NFB, Quebec directors have received generous funding D for both
documentaries and feature films D from Telefilm Canada (formerly the Canadian
Film Development Corporation) and from Quebec's own film institute, the Societe
Generale des Industries Culturelles (SOGIC). Through this institute, and
through its vigorous support for continued federal financing, the Quebec
government now helps to fund around 30 feature films a year, [49]_ and directly
funds cultural production to the tune of $10.9 million every year; additionally,
other government assistance such as a tax-credit program, is estimated to pump
an additional $30 million into Quebec film production annually.[50]_ Overall
film production in Quebec reached $240 million in 1994, with homegrown Quebec
films accounting for $148 million of that total.[51]_ Despite some cutbacks in
federal support in the early 1990s, particularly through Telefilm Canada, Quebec
cultural production still remains an enormous D and very profitable D
enterprise. As one writer in Variety put it, "Producers here feel the
almost-limitless appetite for indigenous fare gives the Quebec industry a
stronger, more secure bases than [other Canadian] regions dependent on U.S.
shoots."[52]_
Television has received less direct support from the Quebec government,
although French-language production continues to be publicly funded through the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. However, television production in Quebec
also remains profitable, thanks again to Quebecers' fondness for the home-grown
product. "Whereas the top ten TV shows in English Canada for the 18 to 49 age
group were all American-made . . . the top ten shows in French Canada are,
without exception, made right here in Quebec."[53]_
The situation in Scotland vis-a-vis the film and broadcast media has been less
promising. Film financing, for example, is pitifully low; the only publicly
funded body for the medium is the Scottish Film Production Fund (SFPF), with
only limited funds D 80,000 per year in 1992[54]_ D at its disposal. This may
help to explain why Scotland produces, on average, fewer than two feature films
per year.[55]_
Meanwhile, radio and television broadcasting is held firmly within the
structures and institutions of the British media D particularly in the public
sector through the BBC. Opportunities for Scottish radio and television
production are growing slowly, but are still small in relation to that of
England;[56]_ consequently, the vast majority of television production on
Scottish screens comes from England and overseas. This becomes plainly obvious
when one considers that the production output of Yorkshire Television alone for
ITV, the national Independent Television network, eclipses that of all Scottish
producers D BBC Scotland, Scottish Television, Grampian Television, and 60
independent production companies D for all four UK terrestrial channels.[57]_
Only the Scottish press among the mass media has retained any measure of
institutional distinction from England, as will be shown below.
Scotland has, however, recently had some limited success in securing some
cultural devolution from London: for example, the creation of a separately
funded Scottish Arts Council; the recent 9 million appropriation for Gaelic
broadcasting[58]_; and, in the wider political sphere, the securing of a
separate funding body for Scottish universities. Scottish film and television
fiction production certainly has become more prolific and visible over the past
10 to 15 years, allowing D for perhaps the first time D home-grown product to
match or exceed external representations of Scotland.[59]_ Dramas like Tutti
Frutti[60]_, Local Hero[61]_, The Bogie Man[62]_, Take The High Road [63]_, and
Taggart D and even comedies such as Rab C. Nesbitt D become central vehicles
for promoting Scotland's national and cultural distinctiveness. It seems that
while the London government is still unwilling to countenance any form of
political or constitutional separation, it is willing to move towards a slightly
greater measure of cultural devolution. However, this cultural devolution is
very limited and remains tightly controlled within the confines of the British
state. While figures for overall funding of film and broadcasting in Scotland
are difficult to obtain, such funding is almost certainly dwarfed by the figures
cited above in relation to Quebec. Considering the roughly similar size of the
two population D Quebec's 8 million people to Scotland's 5 million D the
disparity is obvious and disquieting. Funding for Scottish cultural production,
in spite of the recent small increases, remains a serious problem. Full
institutional independence for Scottish cultural production remains a distant
prospect.
Newspapers and Representation
In terms of homogenization and representation in politics, it is also worth
taking a look at the press setups in Scotland and Quebec. This is particularly
useful because the major press institutions in both countries are purely
commercial entities, required to survive in an open market without government
subsidies or overt government interference. In addition, most of the titles
surveyed are owned by conglomerations owned or controlled by external business
concerns. The content and form of these media should, when compared with their
English and English Canadian counterparts, offer some indication about how
Scottish and Qu b cois culture is being promulgated in the private, commercial
sphere in these countries.
As part of this study I carried out a very limited survey of the major
Scottish and Qu b cois titles. While not intended in any way to be a
quantitative or scientific analysis, this review does reveal some interesting
comparative points about the two nations' major newspapers.
The main Scottish daily titles are the Herald, the Scotsman, the Daily Record,
the Aberdeen Press and Journal and the Dundee Courier. In Scotland, while the
Press and Journal and the Courier serve a purely local function in their
respective cities, the Herald, the Scotsman, and the Record portray themselves
as 'national' papers; in Quebec, the major big-city dailies are Montreal's Le
Journal de Montreal, La Presse, and the Gazette (in English); and Quebec City's
Le Soleil and Le Journal de Quebec.[64]_
There are some differences in form between the major Scottish and Quebec
quality titles. Quebec broadsheets are usually 'sectionalized' D following the
American pattern D to a greater extent than their Scottish counterparts. (This
is true even of the French-language titles, many of which are similar in form to
their English-language counterparts in Canada and the US). Canadian tabloids
are similar in form to their Scottish counterparts. However in Quebec both
tabloids and broadsheets operate as advertising platforms to an even greater
degree than in Scotland.
News selection in the Press and Journal and the Courier is heavily slanted
towards their local regions, with less attention paid to Scottish, British, and
international news. The Herald and the Scotsman cover Scottish affairs more
comprehensively, though still with a strong orientation toward the heavily
populated central belt of Scotland. Both papers cover British political and
economic affairs quite comprehensively, but from a largely British rather than a
Scottish perspective. The main focus on other 'hard' news, however D
particularly in relation to crime, social trends, local politics and cultural
affairs D remains firmly on Scotland. This bias towards Scottish news, and in
particular central belt news, in the nonpolitical sphere is even more pronounced
in the Record, which, in common with its English popular counterparts, keeps
political and economic news to a minimum.
In Canada, the Canadian Press, or La Presse Canadienne, (CP/PC) dominates
domestic news production outside Quebec to such an extent that it is doubtful
whether most Canadian papers could survive without it.[65]_ However, the news
agenda appears strongly weighted toward the English-Canadian central provinces,
and particularly Ontario. For this reason, many Quebec papers avoid the
service.
Quebec broadsheets such as the Montreal Gazette are of a roughly similar
standard to the Herald or the Scotsman. Their news agendas are fairly
conservative, concentrating on political and economic affairs. Although they
contain some news from around Canada and abroad, the news agendas are largely
dominated by local, city, and Quebec provincial affairs D especially in the
first 'main' section of the paper. Most of these qualities do retain some
correspondents outside their home city, usually including one or two abroad, but
budget restrictions keep their numbers limited. For the most part, news stories
from outside the province come either from news services D CP within Canada, AP,
UPI and Reuters from without D or from foreign newspapers for international
stories.
French-language broadsheets, such as La Presse and Le Devoir, also tend to
follow this pattern, although to a much greater extent. News from other parts
of Canada receive very little attention in Quebec's papers. International news
agendas are even more strongly influenced by the wire services, since the
smaller-circulation Quebec papers are even more ill-equipped to afford expensive
foreign staff than their larger English-language counterparts. Interestingly,
the selection of foreign stories shows a stronger bias towards France and other
Francophone countries, and much greater use is made of AFP (Agence France
Presse), particularly by Le Devoir.
Quebec tabloids, such as Le Journal de Montreal, are broadly similar to the
Scottish Daily Record. Unlike the broadsheets, local, national and
international news are all mixed together. Again, however, the news agenda is
dominated by local news, and most news outside the local area again comes from
CP or the foreign wire services.
In terms of quantity, foreign news is usually restricted to one full page per
day in the two 'national' quality Scottish dailies, in addition to whatever
prominent international stories are reserved for the front page and/or the
commentary and editorial columns. Foreign coverage in the Record is even more
scant, and is usually restricted to stories which have a direct bearing on the
UK or, more rarely, on Scotland alone.
A similar situation in respect of international news exists in most of the
Quebec papers. Most broadsheets will have a small 'World News' section full of
wire service reports from AFP or, less commonly, CP, AP, and Reuters. Foreign
news in the tabloids is usually scattered throughout the papers' news pages,
although often part of one page will be devoted to a 'Foreign Digest' section.
In sum, the news agendas in both the Scottish and Qu b cois press follow
strong patterns of political power and social convention. In Scotland, with its
inevitable orientation towards London politics, the agenda shows a bias towards
British political and economic events. As Meech and Kilborn point out, "as long
as London continues to be the focus of a highly centralized political and
administrative system, these would-be [Scottish] national newspapers lack a
decisive editorial function: the reporting of a Scottish parliament in
Edinburgh."[66]_ With no central Scottish political entity to report on, the
Scottish news agenda becomes fragmented and localized D following the social
conventions of a 'nation' which has always had wide and distinctive regional
variations.
In Quebec's case, the opposite conditions hold true: in the political sphere,
news and current affairs tend to concentrate on the local and provincial level.
Provincial identities are strong across Canada and have powerful sub-national
political systems to promulgate their aspirations. This situation is even more
true of Quebec, where the province's social, linguistic, and cultural
orientation is in part tilted away from English Canada and toward La
Francophonie. The result is that there is very little room in the news agenda
for intra-Canadian news in any of the Quebec titles. The Quebec press provides
an essentially Qu b cois, as opposed to a Canadian, view of Quebec. The
Scottish press does likewise with Scotland, except in the crucial political
sphere, where much of its reporting is of necessity fed through the conduit of
Westminster politics. In international terms, the Quebec press sees the world
largely through Francophone lens, not the Canadian or Anglo-American press
services upon which Scotland's press relies.
Conclusion
Quebec's and Scotland's cultural positions have much in common, due to a
similar sequence of historical factors and to the fact that their cultures are
both under constant threat from a powerful external force. However, because
Scotland does not have strong political or constitutional institutions to act as
a bulwark against encroaching cultural domination and homogenization, its
culture is under greater threat than that of Quebec, which promotes and protects
its unique culture, is willing to pay for it, and is able to coerce the federal
entity to do likewise.
Overall then, in recent years Quebec has had more success than Scotland in
protecting and consolidating its language and culture. As Lockerbie states, "In
many ways culture has taken over from religion as the institution which
expresses Quebec's distinctiveness within Canada and binds it together as a
homogeneous society."[67]_ The same could perhaps be said of Scotland.
However, the powerful political, economic, social, and cultural forces emanating
from England threaten to undermine further Scotland's independent culture. In
spite of marginally increased funding for native cultural industries in recent
years, Scotland's separate cultural identity will remain under threat in the
absence of an essentially independent Scottish polity. Such a polity would at
least ensure domestic support of key cultural institutions that are presently
controlled at the national level. This would apply in particular to the
broadcasters, all of which are presently controlled by London.
Of course, a completely independent Scottish nation-state is not the only
prerequisite to cultural independence. Sub-state groups and nations can
maintain their separate identity and culture if they are able to secure cultural
autonomy for themselves. The example of Quebec has shown that culture and
identity in small societies can be protected by such strong, determined, and
relatively autonomous institutions when that culture is threatened by a
dominating and hegemonizing external society. These institutions do not
necessarily have to owned within the sub-state unit Telefilm Canada and the
CBC are not owned by Quebec interests, for example but a substantial portion
of their funding and their cultural production must be controlled by the
sub-state unit. This is the case with Quebec vis-a-vis a number of federal
cultural production entities, and it should be the minimum goal for any future
Scottish political assembly.
Although Quebec has a number of advantages (covered earlier in this paper) in
its dealings with Canada, its experience clearly could be adapted to Scottish
conditions. The lesson of Quebec is one that Scotland will have to learn if it
is to retain its separate cultural identity D whether within the United Kingdom
or as an independent member of the European Union D in future years.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, Benedict R. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism. London; New York: Verso, 1991.
Brendan, Kelly. "Two Provinces Show Biz: Franco Fare Spurs Quebec Production
Rally." Variety, 18 December, 1995, 18.
Campbell, Colin. Governments Under Stress: Political Executives and Key
Bureaucrats in Washington, London and Ottawa. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto
Press, 1993.
The Canadian Encyclopedia. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1988.
Castles, Francis. G., ed. Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in
Western Democracies. Aldershot; Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Co, 1993.
"The CIA World Factbook" [cited 29 March 1997]. Available from
http://physig.ph.kcl.ac.uk/ local/cia/1994/45.html#Government.
Cornford, James. "Towards a Constitutional Equation." In National
Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom, ed. B. Crick. Oxford;
Cambridge: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd., 1991.
Ferrier, James. "The Quebec Media." Advertising Age (supplement: Quebec
advertising), November 22, 1993, Q8-12.
Fiske, John. Introduction to Communication Studies. London; New York:
Routledge, 1991.
Fotherington, Allan. "An Epic Struggle that Will Never End." Macleans, 6
November, 1995.
Gitlin, Todd. The Whole World is Watching. Berkeley: U of California Press,
1980.
"Government of Canada Primary Internet Site" [cited 29 March 1997].
Available from http://Canada.GC.CA/canadiana/faitc/fa15.html.
Gurevitch M. and J. Blumler. "Comparative Research: The Extending Frontier."
In Swanson and Nimmo (eds), New Directions in Political Communication: A
Resource Book. Books on Demand, 1990.
Hall, Stuart. "Culture, The Media, and the 'Ideological Effect.'" In Curran,
Gurevitch, and Woollacot, Mass Communication and Society. Beverly Hills:
Sage, 1979.
Heady, Ferrel. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. New York:
Dekker, 1996.
Hobsbawm, E.J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Jeffrey, Charlie. 1996. "Towards a 'Third Level' in Europe? The German
L nder in the European Union." Political Studies, XLIV, 253-266.
Keating, Michael, and Arthur Midwinter. The Government of Scotland.
Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1982.
Kellas, James G. The Scottish Political System. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1984.
Landes, Ronald G. The Canadian Polity: A Comparative Perspective.
Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1991.
Lefebvre, Jean-Pierre and Susan Barrowclough. The Quebec Connection. London:
British Film Institute, 1981.
Lemire, Maurice. "The Universal and the Particular in Cultural Identity", in
Image and Identity: Theatre and Cinema in Quebec and Scotland, ed. I.
Lockerbie. University of Stirling, 1987.
Lipset, Seymour Martin.Continental Divide: the Values and Institutions of
the United States and Canada. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Lockerbie, Ian, "Scotland and Quebec", in Image and Identity: Theatre and
Cinema in Quebec and Scotland, ed. I. Lockerbie. University of Stirling,
1987.
Lockerbie, Ian, ed. "Quebec Cinema: an Introduction." In Image and Identity:
Theatre and Cinema in Quebec and Scotland, ed. I. Lockerbie. University of
Stirling, 1987.
Macdonald, Gus, "Fiction Friction", in From Limelight to Satellite, ed.
Eddie Dicks (Scottish Film Council/British Film Institute, 1990)
Marquand, David. 1991. In National Identities: The Constitution of the
United Kingdom, ed. B. Crick. Oxford; Cambridge: The Political Quarterly
Publishing Co. Ltd.
McClure, J. Derrick, A.J. Aitken, and John Thomas Low, The Scots Language:
Planning For Modern Usage. Edinburgh: The Ramsay Head Press, 1980.
McCreadie, Robert. "Scottish Identity and the Constitution." In National
Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom, ed. B. Crick. Oxford;
Cambridge: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co., 1991.
McCrum, Robert, William Cran, and Robert MacNeil. The Story of English. New
York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1986.
McPhail, Thomas L. and Brenda M. McPhail. Communication: The Canadian
Experience. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990.
Meech, Peter and Richard Kilborn, "Media and Identity in a Stateless
Nation: the Case of Scotland", Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 14, 1992.
Nairn, Tom. The Breakup of Britain. London: NLB, 1977.
Salutin, Rick. 1995. "A Plea for Canada." Macleans, July 1, 40.
Saywell, John. 1994. Canada: Pathways to the Present. Toronto: Stoddart.
"The Scottish National Party Web Site" [cited 27 March 1997]. Available
from http://www.snp.org.uk/ snpeople/mps/.
"Soft-Soaping the Gaels." The Economist, Nov. 14, 1992.
"SOGIC Gets Credit for Backing Productions." Variety, 30 August, 1993, 24.
Thompson, John B. Ideology and Modern Culture : Critical Social Theory In
the Era Of Mass Communication. Cambridge: Polity, 1990.
Veronneau, Pierre, "Quebec documentary in perspective", in Image and
Identity: Theatre and Cinema in Quebec and Scotland, ed. I. Lockerbie
(University of Stirling, 1987a)
FOR ENTRY TO CRITICAL STUDIES IN MASS COMMUNICATION, OR JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION
JAN. 1997
BUT FIRST . . .
POSSIBLE PAPER FOR:
QUALITATIVE STUDIES DIVISION of AEJMC,
The Qualitative Studies Division invites submission of original research papers
that are interdisciplinary in focus and theoretically grounded. We welcome a
wide range of approaches, methodologies and perspectives including, but not
limited to, cultural studies, historical studies,
feminist scholarship, news analysis, political economy, literary analysis,
qualitative methodologies, philosophy of communication ethics, and media
criticism. Preferred length of 7,500 words, approximately 25 pages.
Papers that do not meet the uniform guidelines or are postmarked after April 1,
1997, will not be accepted.
Send papers to
Ana C. Garner, Department of Journalism, Marquette University,
P.O. Box 1381, Milwaukee WI 53201-1881
(414) 288-7383, e-mail: <[log in to unmask] >
FOR FULL DETAILS OF 1997 AEJMC CONVENTION UNIFORM CALL FOR PAPERS, SEE END OF
THIS PAPER!!!
Polity and Identity: Scotland's and Quebec's Struggle for
Cultural Recognition
Abstract (MUST BE 75 WORDS OR LESS!!!: ORIGINAL ABSTRACT AT END OF DOCUMENT.)
The Qualitative Studies Division invites submission of original research papers
that are interdisciplinary in focus and theoretically grounded. We welcome a
wide range of approaches, methodologies and perspectivesincluding, but not
limited to, cultural s tudies, historical studies,
feminist scholarship, news analysis, political economy, literary analysis,
qualitative methodologies, philosophy of communication ethics, and media
criticism. Preferred length of 7,500 words, approximately 25 pages.
Papers that do not meet the uniform guidelines or are postmarked after April 1,
1997, will not be accepted.
Send papers to Ana C. Garner, Department of
Journalism, Marquette University, P.O. Box 1381, Milwaukee WI 53201-1881,
(414) 288-7383, e-mail: <[log in to unmask] >
1997 AEJMC CONVENTION UNIFORM CALL FOR PAPERS[68]_
The programming groups within the Council of Divisions of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication invite submission
of original research papers to be considered for presentation at the annual
AEJNIC Convention, July 30-Aug. 2, 1997, in Chicago, IL.Specific requirements
for each competition- including limits on paper length-are spelled out in the
listing of groups and research chairs that appears below.
Unless otherwise specified) the following uniform call will apply to all
competitions:
1. Submit the paper to the research chair of a group appropriate to the
paper's topic.
2. Send the paper by first class or priority mail, postmarked no later
than April 1, 1997. Acceptance by an overnight delivery service by the deadline
is acceptable.
E-mail and fax submissions are not acceptable.
3. Include an abstract of no more than 75 words.
4. Identify the paper's author(s) on the title page only and include the
mailing address, telephone number and, if available, e-mail address of the
author to whom inquiries about the submission should be addressed. The title
should be printed on the firs t page of the text and
on running heads on each page of text, as well as on the title page.
5. Send the appropriate division or interest group research chair six
typed or computer-printed copies of the paper.
If you prepare your paper on a personal computer, you are also required to
include a Macintosh or IBM compatible computer disk (3-1/2 inch preferred)
containing the
paper in digital form. The disk file(s) should be in one or more of the
following file formats: plain text (ASCII), Adobe Acrobat PDF, MacWrite,
Microsoft Word, Rich Text Format (RTF), WordPerfect, or WriteNow. Plain text is
preferred.
6. Sign the accompanying reproduction permission form and enclose it with the
paper submission. Exceptions from the disk requirements may be granted by the
research chair of the division or interest group to which the paper is being
submitted. Contact each directly.
7. Papers are accepted for peer review on the understanding that they
are not already under review for other conventions and that they have been
submitted to only one AEJMC group for evaluation. Papers accepted for the AEJMC
convention should not have been presented to other conventions or published in
scholarly or trade journals prior to presentation at theconvention.
8. Student papers compete on an equal footing in open paper competitions
unless otherwise specified by the individual division or interest group.
Individual group specifications are appended to this uniform call.
9. At least one author of an accepted faculty paper must attend the
convention to present the paper. If student authors cannot be present, they must
make arrangements for the paper to be presented.
10. By May 15 authors will be advised whether their paper has been
accepted and will receive a copy of the reviewer's comments.
11. Authors who wish to have a revised, rather than the original,
version of their paper distributed must submit two paper copies and, for papers
produced on computer, one disk copy of :he revised paper with a signed
reproduction permission form to AEJMC, University of South Carolina, LeConte
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later than June 15.
12. Authors must provide photocopies of their paper for distribution in
the paper sales room at the convention. Authors who submit a copy of the paper
on disk must provide
20 photocopies; others must provide 40 copies. Authors may bring copies with
them to the convention, mail them to the convention site or make arrangements to
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being explored.
14. Authors retain copyright in their papers and are free to submit them
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15. Further, the AEJMC Executive Committee approved the following
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copyright and that on-line availability of papers does not constitute a bar
subsequent publication in official AEJMC publications. Authors retain copyright
until they sign a formal agreement with a journal."
Original Abstract (NEW ABSTRACT MUST BE 75 WORDS OR LESS!!!:)
Scotland's and Quebec's cultural positions have much in common, due to a
similar sequence of historical factors and to the fact that their cultures are
both under constant threat from a powerful external force. However, because
Scotland has not developed strong political or constitutional institutions to
act as a bulwark against encroaching cultural domination, its culture is under
greater threat than that of Quebec, which promotes and protects its unique
culture and is willing to pay for it. Powerful political, economic, social, and
cultural forces emanating from England threaten to undermine further Scotland's
cultural independence. This paper looks at the positions of the arts and the
mass media in both Scotland and Quebec. It argues that, in spite of the
marginally increased funding for native cultural industries in recent years,
Scotland's separate cultural identity will remain under threat in the absence of
an independent Scottish polity. The example of Quebec shows that culture and
identity in small societies can only be protected by strong and determined
institutions when that culture is threatened by a dominating alien society.
Expanded Abstract:
Quebec's and Scotland's cultural positions have much in common, due to
a similar sequence of historical factors and to the fact that their
cultures
are both under constant threat from powerful external forces. However,
because Scotland has not developed strong political or constitutional
institutions to act as a bulwark against encroaching cultural domination,
its culture is under greater threat than that of Quebec, which promotes and
protects its unique culture and is willing to pay for it. Powerful poli
tical, economic, social, and cultural forces emanating from England
continually threaten to undermine Scotland's cultural independence; the
same
case can be made reagrding US and English-Canadian influences on Quebec.
This paper looks at the positions of the arts and the mass media in both
Scotland and Quebec. Its examination of the development of both cultures
is
instructive in determining the cultural impact of external political and
economic events on small nations that maintain less than full sovereignty.
A contrast is drawn between the political positions of the two nations and
the state of their cultural industries. The paper argues that, in spite of
the marginally increased funding for native cultural industries in recent
years, Scotland's separate cultural identity will remain under threat in
the
absence of an essentially independent Scottish polity. The example of
Quebec shows that culture and identity in small societies can only be
protected by strong and determined institutions when that culture is
threatened by a dominating alien society.
[1] Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (London; New York: Verso, 1991), 6.
[2] Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 6.
[3] Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism (London:
NLB, 1981), 28.
[4] John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture : Critical Social Theory In
the Era Of Mass Communication (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 92.
[5] John Fiske, Introduction to Communication Studies (London; New York:
Routledge, 1991), 172.
[6] Stuart Hall, "Culture, The Media, and the 'Ideological Effect,'" Curran,
Gurevitch, and Woollacot, Mass Communication and Society (Beverly Hills: Sage,
1979).
[7] Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: U of California Press,
1980), 253.
[8] Alex Edelstein, Comparative Communication Research (Sage Publications,
Beverly Hills, 1982), 14.
[9] M. Gurevitch and J. Blumler, "Comparative Research: The Extending
frontier," in Swanson and Nimmo (eds), New Directions in Political
Communication: A Resource Book (Books on Demand, 1990), 305.
[10] Gurevitch and Blumler, 305.
[11] Francis. G. Castles, ed., Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy
in Western Democracies (Aldershot; Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1993),
xiv.
[12] Castles, xiv.
[13] Ian Lockerbie, "Scotland and Quebec," in Image and Identity: Theatre and
Cinema in Quebec and Scotland, ed., I. Lockerbie (Stirling: Univ. of Stirling
Press, 1987), 6.
[14] Jean-Pierre Lefebvre and Susan Barrowclough, The Quebec Connection
(London: British Film Institute, 1981), 6.
[15] Lockerbie, "Scotland and Quebec," 11.
[16] Rick Salutin, "A Plea for Canada." Macleans, July 1 1995, 40.
[17] John Saywell, Canada: Pathways to the Present (Toronto: Stoddart, 1994),
95.
[18] _ As part of the process of patriation of the Candian Constitution, the
1867 British North America Act, an act of the British parliament, became the
Constitution Act of 1982. See Ronald G. Landes, The Canadian Polity: A
Comparative Perspective (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1991).
[19] _ Saywell, 75.
[20] _ For example, the federal government has in recent years attempted to
adopt a more pluralist approach to federal public administration, recognizing de
facto the existence of a distinct culture in Quebec. This sensitivity to Quebec
affairs, part of a conscious attempt to head off demands for Quebec
independence, first manifested itself in a number of ways under the prime
ministership of Pierre Trudeau, who "believed that if French Canadians could
feel at home everywhere in Canada the separatist appeal would be less
attractive. [Trudeau] passed the Official Languages Act, which made French and
English the official languages of Canada, equal in status throughout the federal
government" See Saywell, 93.
[21] _ Lockerbie, "Scotland and Quebec," 14.
[22] _ Allan Fotherington, "An Epic Struggle that Will Never End," Macleans, 6
November, 1995.
[23] _ The 1987 Meech Lake Accord sought to bring Quebec back into the
constitutional mainstream by meeting five conditions set out by Quebec. The
conditions centred on a provincial participation in the appointment of Supreme
Court judges and senators, the Constitution's amending formula, increased powers
for the provinces in immigration matters, some reduction in federal spending
powers, and a constitutional declaration that Quebec is a "distinct society."
However, the Meech Lake Accord was not implemented because it did not obtain the
legislative consent of all provinces and the federal government, as required
under the 1982 amending formula. In 1991-92, another round of constitutional
reform was initiated, leading to the Charlottetown Agreement. This agreement
provided for a reformed Senate and changes to the division of legislative powers
between the federal and provincial governments. It also recognized Quebec as a
distinct society. The agreement, however, was rejected by Canadians in a
national referendum held on October 26, 1992. See "Government of Canada Primary
Internet Site" [cited 30 March 1997], available from
http://Canada.GC.CA/canadiana/ faitc/fa15.html.
[24] _ Saywell, 110
[25] _ Meech and Kilborn quote an independent survey carried out for Scottish
Television in 1988, in which 39 percent of Scots described themselves as
"Scottish, not British," and an additional 30 percent regarded themselves as
"more Scottish than British." It is important to note the difference between
'English' and 'British in this regard. As the authors note, if there remains an
equivocation about their British identity, "[n]o such equivocation exists among
Scots as regards Scottish and English national identity (a distinction
frequently lost on foreigners)." See Peter Meech and Richard Kilborn, "Media
and Identity in a Stateless Nation: the Case of Scotland," Media, Culture and
Society, Vol. 14, 1992, 246.
[26] _ As James Cornford notes, in recent years fewer than one in five Scottish
voters have consistently expressed support for the Conservative Government,
which typically has retained the support of approximately 45 percent of all
British voters at general elections since 1979 enough to retain an absolute
majority in the House of Commons under the first-past-the-post voting system.
In sharp contrast to England, the Conservative Party's popular support in
Scotland has been matched or exceeded by the Scottish National Party and the
Liberal Democrats. See James Cornford, "Towards a Constitutional Equation," in
National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom, ed., B. Crick
(Oxford; Cambridge: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd., 1991), p.161.
[27] _ Robert McCreadie, "Scottish Identity and the Constitution" in National
Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom, ed. B. Crick (Oxford;
Cambridge: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co., 1991), 50.
[28] _ James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1984), 2.
[29] _ Kellas, 25.
[30] _ Michael Keating and Arthur Midwinter, The Government of Scotland
(Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1982), 14. Note that similar constitutional
arrangements were developed for Wales at the same time.
[31] _ Kellas, 30.
[32] _ Kellas, 63.
[33] _ Keating and Midwinter, 17.
[34] _ Cornford, 161.
[35] _ This is more or less what happened vis-a-vis Scotland's political and
aristocratic elites in 1707 (the year of the Treaty of Union). Under slightly
different circumstances, the same thing occured in Quebec after 1789, when
"French-speaking Canada, whose leaders were mostly Roman Catholic clerics, also
sought to isolate itself from the anticlerical, democratic values of the French
revolution" as well as the democratic influences of the United States. In both
cases the ruling elites saw an opportunity to maintain their power and influence
within the new regimes of Great Britain and British Canada respectively. See
Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: the Values and Institutions of the
United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990), 9; and Tom Nairn, The
Breakup of Britain (London: NLB, 1977).
[36] _ Such is the level of support for the Quebec separatist movement that,
following the near-extinction of the parliamentary Progressive Conservative
Party in the October 1993 general election, the Bloc Qu_b_cois became the
official opposition party in the Canadian parliament, second only to the ruling
Liberals. See "Government of Canada Primary Internet Site" [cited 29 March
1997], available from http://Canada.GC.CA/canadiana/faitc/fa15.html. Also see
"The CIA World Factbook" [cited 29 March 1997], available from
http://physig.ph.kcl.ac.uk/local/cia/1994/45.html#Government.
[37] _ The Scottish National Party, the only political party committed to
Scottish independence, hold only four of Scotland's 72 parliamentary seats at
the time of writing (just prior to the May 1 General Election). This is despite
the fact that they consistently gain the support of up to 25 percent of Scottish
voters. What is more, were the SNP to win a narrow majority of Scottish seats
at the next election, they would still control less than six percent of all the
seats at Westminster. In contrast, the Bloc Quebecois's tally of 54 seats
currently gives it control of more than 18 percent of the 295 seats in the
Canadian House. See "The Scottish National Party Web Site" [cited 27 March
1997], available from http://www.snp.org.uk/ snpeople/mps/. Also see "The CIA
World Factbook" [cited 29 March 1997], available from
http://physig.ph.kcl.ac.uk/local/cia/ 1994/45.html#Government.
[38] _ Lockerbie, "Scotland and Quebec," 9.
[39] _ Maurice Lemire, "The Universal and the Particular in Cultural Identity,"
in Image and Identity: Theatre and Cinema in Quebec and Scotland, ed. I.
Lockerbie. University of Stirling, 1987.
[40] _ Lemire, 130.
[41] _ Lockerbie, "Scotland and Quebec," 10.
[42] _ The question of whether Scots is truly a distinct language from English,
as opposed to merely a dialect of the latter, is one that has long exercised
scholars' brains. Scots shares common roots with English in the Anglo-Saxon
tongues brought over with Britain's Germanic invaders in the 7th century AD.
The dialects subsequently parted, and developed separately for centuries until a
number of factors began to undermine the use of Scots in Scotland from the 17th
century on. Nevertheless, Scots retains its own written form, and its
acceptance as a separate language continues among a significant proportion of
Scots, even those who do not speak the language. For a fuller explanation of
this subject, see J. Derrick McClure, A.J. Aitken, and John Thomas Low, The
Scots Language: Planning For Modern Usage. (Edinburgh: The Ramsay Head Press,
1980).
[43] _ For a good introduction to the place of the Scots language in Scotland
and the world, see Robert McCrum, William Cran, and Robert MacNeil, The Story of
English (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1986).
[44] _ Meech and Kilborn, 245.
[45] _ Lemire, 132.
[46] _ Lockerbie, "Scotland and Quebec," 12.
[47] _ Lefebvre, 8.
[48] _ Ian Lockerbie, "Quebec Cinema: an Introduction," in Image and Identity:
Theatre and Cinema in Quebec and Scotland, ed. I. Lockerbie (University of
Stirling, 1987), 81.
[49] _ The Canadian Encyclopedia (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1988).
[50] _ "SOGIC Gets Credit for Backing Productions," Variety, 30 August, 1993,
24.
[51] _ Kelly Brendan, "Two Provinces Show Biz: Franco fare Spurs Quebec
Production Rally," Variety, 18 December, 1995, 45.
[52] _ Brendan, 45.
[53] _ James Ferrier, "The Quebec Media," Advertising Age (supplement: Quebec
advertising), November 22, 1993, Q8.
[54] _ Meech and Kilborn, 253.
[55] _ Meech and Kilborn, 253.
[56] _ Gus Macdonald, "Fiction Friction," in From Limelight to Satellite, ed.
Eddie Dicks. Scottish Film Council/British Film Institute, 1990.
[57] _ Macdonald, 195.
[58] _ "Soft-Soaping the Gaels," The Economist, Nov. 14, 1992, 70.
[59] _ John Caughie, "Scottish Television: What Would It Look Like?" In Scotch
Reels, ed. C. McArthur, 1982.
[60] _ A BBC Scotland Production from 1987, Tutti Frutti was adapted from the
stage play of the same name by the playwright, John Byrne. It starred Robbie
Coltrane and Emma Thomson.
[61] _ Local Hero, a rare international success for Scottish filmmaking, was
directed by Bill Forsyth. Released in 1983, this story of a young American oil
executive's attempts to buy up land for an oil refinery in coastal Scotland
featured Peter Riegert, Burt Lancaster, Denis Lawson, and Peter Capaldi.
[62] _ Produced by Paul Pender for BBC Scotland in 1990, The Bogie Man was a
Christmas special that placed Robbie Coltrane in the lead role of a mental
institution escapee at loose among Glasgow's underworld.
[63] _ Scottish Television's long-running soap opera, Take The High Road, deals
with the residents of a small fictional Highland village called Glendarroch.
(Shades of Brigadoon, perhaps?)
[64] _ Ferrier, Q8.
[65] _ Thomas L. McPhail and Brenda M. McPhail. Communication: The Canadian
Experience (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), 100.
[66] _ Meech and Kilborn, 56.
[67] _ Lockerbie, 14.
[68] _
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