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Prestige Press Coverage of Sino-American Relations
From the Cold War's Demise to the Post-Cold War Period:
Reagan's Final Years to the Clinton Administration
1985 to 1993
Introduction
Throughout most of the Cold War, many scholars argued that the media left
Sino-American policy up to each Cold War administration and its experts (Chang,
1986, 1993). Such scholars argue that the press, instead of performing its
watchdog function of critiquing each administration's China policy and
objectives, simply played the role of government "guard dog" (Donohue, Tichenor
& Olien, 1995). Since throughout the Cold War world peace and much economic
prosperity have hinged on Chinese stability and cooperative Sino-American
relations, professional journalists argue that such international relationships
have been too important to leave to government experts (Heuvel, 1993; Hadar,
1994). Although scholars tend to agree that during the Cold War news coverage
generally lacked government-independent characteristics, the few available
research articles focusing on news coverage during and after the Cold War's
break up indicate significant government-independent characteristics (Cheng,
1993; Huang, 1994; Goodman, 1994).
With the Cold War's demise came the first evidence that a more independent
press might rise from the rubble. This evidence was discovered in studies
focusing on press coverage of the spring 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic
uprisings and resulting government crackdown (Cheng, 1993; Wang, 1992). Cheng
and Wang found that press coverage of Tiananmen Square was predominantly
government-independent. The 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic movement, combined
with the dramatic collapse of many communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe,
helped set off strong democratic waves that toppled the Berlin Wall and the
former Soviet Union and marked the beginning of the end of the global Cold War
(Cherrington, 1991; Horvat and Szanto, 1993).
Ever since the Cold War's break up many media professionals have been claiming
that post-Cold War news coverage possesses more government-independent
characteristics than its Cold War counterpart (Hadar, 1994; Heuvel, 1993). These
media professionals describe a brave new world emerging from the rubble of
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communism, a new, freer world that has been unraveling so quickly that the
government and press are
simultaneously grappling to make sense of it all. Many media professionals also
argue that the press is rising to the occasion by forging ahead with its own
coverage of this new political existence. They claim that unlike their
traditional Cold War predecessors, who often relied too heavily on the
government's paradigm of the world, these new era journalists are making up
their own minds about American relations with other countries and covering the
news accordingly.
Although the view that post-Cold War journalists are more self-reliant and less
government dependent than their traditional Cold War predecessors is widely
supported among media professionals, after an exhaustive literature review this
researcher only found one empirical study partially supporting this claim. This
study just happens to be Sino-American related and deals with the 1989 Tiananmen
Square ordeal both before and after the government crackdown (Huang, 1994).
In hopes of filling this wide research gap, this study will investigate whether
professional media claims of government-independent post-Cold War coverage is
supported by empirical
research.
Literature Review
Cold War Time Frames
Since the exact timing of when the Cold War ceased to exist is hotly debated in
history, political science and communication scholarly publications, this
researcher was forced to at least temporarily settle this controversy in order
to determine which Sino-American coverage should be considered post-Cold War.
After reviewing more than 100 such articles, this time frame question was
settled by determining the two main time frames that most scholars agreed marked
the Cold War's end and applying them to this study. These scholars argued that
the Cold War officially ended with one of two major events: the destruction of
the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989) or the fall of the Soviet Union (December 8,
1991) and/or Gorbachev's resignation (December 25, 1991) (Rupieper, 1990; Steel,
1992; Zagoria, 1991; Hill, 1993; Garthoff, 1992; Talbott, 1991/92; Marshall,
1992; Mandelbaum, 1990/91; Sullivan, 1992; Lampton, 1991).
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Since the Cold War did not just suddenly end on a given date -- over several
years a string of often turbulent and unpredictable events brought the Cold War
crashing down --, this study will consider the official "end" of the Cold War a
finale of events, not a singular episode. Accordingly, all Sino-American issues
or events occurring from November 10, 1989, to December 24, 1991, will belong to
a transitional period. Only Sino-American press coverage published beginning on
December 26, 1991, up until the present will belong to the post-Cold War period.
According to the above two scenarios, the Cold War began wrapping up as early
as the Berlin Wall's collapse in November of 1989. However, research indicates
that Sino-American press coverage demonstrated government-independent
characteristics at least six months earlier, during the spring 1989 Tiananmen
Square democratic movement and subsequent government crackdown. Since the Cold
War did not begin unraveling overnight, the Tiananmen example of independent
coverage leads to the following question: Does independent Tiananmen Square
coverage before the Cold War's break up represent some type of crisis-related
fluke, or did Sino-American press coverage take on independent characteristics
as early as when the Cold War first began to crumble? If Tiananmen Square and
possibly even earlier coverage is found to be more independent due to a
collapsing Cold War paradigm, this information would help support journalists'
claims that post-Cold War coverage has been more government independent than its
Cold War predecessor's. Accordingly, this study will not only focus directly on
Sino-American transitional and post-Cold War coverage, but on what it will call
Sino-American "Cold War demise" coverage, coverage of Sino-American relations as
early as when the Cold War paradigm first began to unravel. In order not to miss
the first signs of the Cold War's collapse, this study will begin examining
coverage of Sino-American relations when Chang's (1986) premier study of the
Cold War's impact on Sino-American coverage ends, on January 1, 1985, at the
beginning of President Reagan's second term.
The Cold War's Aftermath: Sino-American Coverage
This study will examine the past decade's prestige press coverage of
Sino-American relations from the
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Cold War's demise through the transitional and post-Cold War eras and will
compare it to corresponding government coverage in order to determine the
government's possible impact on press coverage. Accordingly, this study will
update what is considered to be one of the longest running longitudinal analyses
of press coverage of a foreign policy issue: Chang's (1986) renowned study of
prestige press coverage of Sino-American relations during 35 years of the Cold
War era. This present study will then compare the degree of government
independence found in press coverage during the Cold War's collapse through the
post-Cold War era to its Cold War counterpart. In this manner, this study will
shed light on its main inquiry: Is Cold War demise to post-Cold War
Sino-American press coverage more government independent than its Cold War
predecessor?
This researcher expects this study to be the first of its kind to determine
that Sino-American press coverage from the Cold War's demise through the
post-Cold War period was more government independent than its Cold War
predecessor. After all, ever since the global Cold War containment paradigm
began crumbling during the Cold War's demise, each administration has appeared
unable or unwilling to substitute the outdated Cold War paradigm with an
adequate replacement. And, as pre-Cold War Sino-American press coverage
suggests, administrations that are unable or unwilling to provide journalists
with a clear-cut, credible paradigm of foreign relations tend to have a limited
impact on such coverage (Liebovich, 1988; Bibber, 1969). This researcher assumes
that an apparent lack of government direction in helping journalists make sense
of Sino-American relations after the Cold War's collapse has most likely forced
journalists to become more self-reliant, to interpret events for themselves. As
a result, Cold War demise through post-Cold War journalists probably covered
Sino-American relations in a more successful watch-dog, independent fashion than
their Cold War counterparts.
This researcher also expects to find that press coverage was most government
independent during the Cold War's initial demise, second most government
independent during this study's Cold War transitional period and least
government independent during the post-Cold War period. The possibly more
government
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independent coverage during the Cold War's demise and transitional periods could
be largely attributed to the initial shock waves dispersed by the global
community's first recognition of a suddenly approaching new world order. In
addition, post-Cold War coverage may be less government-independent due to much
less dramatic attention to the global Cold War's collapse and especially
positive Clinton administration
press-government relations.
Agenda-Setting Theory
The press and administration attempt to gain each other's attention and
influence each other's views via agenda setting (Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Many
studies have found a consistent correlation between media issue coverage and
subsequent audience issue salience (Kraus and Davis, 1976; McCombs, 1983; Rogers
and Dearing, 1988). The more the media focuses on certain issues, the more
likely they are to transfer priority items from their agenda to other agendas,
such as the public's and government's. In addition, the more the media focuses
on favored topics, the more likely it is to affect its audience's views on such
topics. As McCombs and Shaw (1993) explain:
Bernard Cohen's [1963] classic summation of agenda setting -- the media may
not tell us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us
what to think about -- has been turned inside out. New research exploring the
consequences of agenda setting ... suggest that the media not only tell us what
to think about, but also how to think about it, and, consequently, what to
think" (p. 58).
Stories considered most important by journalists are emphasized by salience
cues. Traditional salience cues are created by the manipulation of design
elements, such as story placement, story length and issue frequency (Baskette,
Sissors & Brooks, 1982). Newspaper readers are not only more likely to read
stories emphasized via salience cues, but are more likely to consider issues
emphasized with salience cues as the day's most important issues (McCombs and
Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 1983; Eyal, Winter & DeGeorge, 1981).
Researchers have found that the following salience cues are accurate
approximations of the importance newspapers assign to given stories and issues:
individual story length and combined story lengths overtime and the number of
times a source, channel or subject is mentioned in each story and over time
(Chang, 1986; Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Researchers have also found that
articles often contain strong underlying contexts
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or conditions and views that can also act as important salience cues. Many of
these less traditional salience cues, contexts or conditions such as crisis,
conflict, deviance, violence or even attitude, are common in international news
coverage in general and Sino-American coverage specifically.
Press vs. Administration: Who Sets Whose Agenda?
The prestige press has long been recognized as an essential component in the
U.S. foreign policy-making process (Nimmo, 1979). However, researchers say it
remains unclear how and to what degree the news media are able to influence
and/or set the government's foreign policy agenda and vice versa (Nimmo, 1979;
Bennett, 1980). While many scholars argue that in the foreign policy arena the
press acts as an "independent agent," it critically assesses and challenges
government policy and yields substantial agenda-setting influence over the
government (e.g., Becker, 1977; Ramaprasad and Riffe, 1987; Lefever, 1974),
other scholars argue the opposite: The press is nothing more than an "agent of
power" that either consciously or subconsciously plays into dominant American
cultural and socio-economic values by supporting government policies and
allowing the government to set its agenda (Altschull, 1985; Gitlin, 1980;
Hallin, 1987; Tuchman, 1974).
In between these two perspectives are many foreign-policy related conceptual
models that attempt to explain how the press affects the government's agenda and
vice versa (e.g., Chang, 1993; Allison, 1971; Berry, 1990; Cioffi-Revilla,
Merritt & Zines, 1987; Cohen, 1963). Of these models, Allison's (1971) model is
perhaps most inclusive. Allison's governmental politics model is based on
Hilsman's (1967) view, illustrated via four concentric circles, that while the
government possesses predominant power in foreign policy making, the press
maintains a less powerful yet significant ad hoc role in the process.
Although Allison fails to explain in his model how successful the press is at
influencing foreign policy makers and vice versa, Cohen (1963), who equates the
agenda-setting influence of journalists and lower level bureaucrats in the
foreign policy-making process, suggests that the press is often quite successful
in this venture. He argues that although the press obviously does not have the
authority to make official foreign
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policy decisions, by focusing government and public attention on aspects of
foreign policy most important, its influence is at times strong enough to set
the government's foreign policy agenda.
Agenda-Setting Literature
Since the President is the country's key foreign policy maker and the State
Department is technically in charge of maintaining foreign policy, the
government possesses the constitutional and inside-knowledge advantage in
influencing foreign policy making. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the
President and State Department often set the press' foreign policy agenda
(Berry, 1990; Nimmo, 1979; Bennett, 1980; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Dumbrell,
1990; Hilsman, 1971; Lin, 1985). However, although the government seems to more
consistently set the press' agenda than vice versa, the press has also
demonstrated its ability to set the government's foreign policy agenda by
criticizing and/or challenging its policies (e.g., Becker, 1977; Ramaprasad and
Riffe, 1987; Lefever, 1974).
The Cold War's Collapse -- Did it Empower the Press?
Once the government's Cold War paradigm began to crumble, did the press become
more resistent to the government's Sino-American agenda-setting influence?
Although more research is needed on this topic, the few studies available on it
hint that it did. Although many researchers claim that Cold War administrations
had been especially successful at setting the agenda for Sino-American policy
coverage (e.g., Chang, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1989), evidence of government agenda
setting in Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War Sino-American press
coverage is limited (Liebovich, 1988; Hohenberg, 1968; Bibber, 1969; Goodman,
1994).
The apparently limited agenda-setting abilities of Cold War demise,
transitional and post-Cold War administrations to influence U.S.-China press
coverage may be best explained by each era's either deteriorating or
non-existent government paradigm of Sino-American relations (Heuvel, 1993). The
absence of a comprehensive, workable strategic framework operating as a
foundation for Sino-American policy may have encouraged journalists to make more
independent assessments of U.S.-China policy. Throughout this
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study, government-independent press coverage is defined as coverage that does
not support and/or reflect Sino-American policy. A lack of support and/or
reflection of Sino-American policy is illustrated by either criticism of
Sino-American policy, limited or non-existent coverage of official Sino-American
statements and/or activities, press coverage portraying or interpreting official
Sino-American policy in a significantly different manner than the government,
and/or press coverage focusing on different issues than the government.
The above literature review suggested the following three research questions:
(1) If Sino-American policy coverage is found to be more government independent
in one Cold War time frame than another, when did more independent press
coverage begin emerging? As early as the Cold War demise period, during the
transitional period or the post-Cold War period?
(2) If Sino-American policy is covered more independently in one Cold War time
frame than another, is this more government-independent press coverage free of
government agenda setting and/or did more government-independent press coverage
influence the government's agenda?
(3) How did the amount and nature of more government-independent press coverage
compare among the Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War eras?
Method
Content analysis was conducted in a predominantly identical manner on two
prestige press newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, and three
publications/records of U.S. administration documents, the Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States and
the U.S. Department of State Bulletin/Dispatch.
All New York Times and Washington Post front-page news, news, features and
editorials focusing on Sino-American relations were included in this study. A
combined total of 1,177 press articles, 647 New York Times and 530 Washington
Post articles, were analyzed. The New York Times and Washington Post were chosen
for this study since they are widely read by policy makers and for their
significant influence on international politics (Cohen, 1963).
All government articles dealing with any aspect of Sino-American relations were
included in this study. A combined total of 399 government articles, 156
presidential articles and 243 State Department articles, were analyzed. The
three government publications were chosen since they consistently covered
American foreign policy throughout the study's time frame, and they represent
the best available historical record of official government foreign policy
issues.
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Newspaper and government articles dealing with Sino-American relations, not
China domestic issues (such as earthquakes and unrelated Chinese domestic
politics), were included in this study. Sino-American relations stories were
defined as those dealing with any aspect of Sino-American affairs or
interactions -- such as diplomatic and defense activities, cultural exchanges
and general relations --, and/or American actions or comments regarding China or
vice versa.
This study covered nearly 10 years of Sino-American relations coverage
beginning on January 1, 1985, with President Reagan's second term of office, and
ending December 31, 1993, after President Clinton's first year of office. This
study picked up where Chang's (1986) Cold War Sino-American press coverage
research left off and it ended with the most up-to-date material available when
data collection took place. As explained in the literature review, this study
examined press and government coverage in three Cold War periods: Cold War
demise (January 1, 1985 to November 8, 1989), transitional (November 10, 1989 to
December 24, 1991) and post-Cold War (December 26, 1991 to December 31, 1993).
In this study, the units of analysis were defined on two levels: via each
newspaper and government article and each month of press and government
analysis.
Newspaper and government articles were analyzed in a nearly identical fashion
for comparison's sake. For example, variables such as source and channel usage,
deviation, violence, crisis, conflict, attitude toward Sino-American relations
and perception of China were analyzed in a similar fashion in order to make news
versus government comparisons possible.
Newspaper and government article variables coded in the same month were
separately aggregated. Means were then calculated for each of these aggregated
variables, and the resulting aggregated means were used to facilitate newspaper
versus government variable comparisons. The monthly time frame was chosen since,
according to many scholars, 30 days is the optimal time frame needed for one
entity to influence the other's agenda (Gilberg, Eyal, McCombs & Nicholas, 1980;
Chang, 1989). Newspaper variables were compared to government variables on a
lagged monthly basis in order to determine whether newspapers set the
government's agenda or vice versa.
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The coding instrument used categories tested by previous research along with
those suggested by the literature review (Chang, 1986). A primary coder and an
independent coder analyzed this study's data. Ten percent of the study's 1,576
articles were coded for reliability test purposes and analyzed via Scott's pi.
Intercoder percent of agreement ranged from 86% to 100% with an average
agreement of 92%, while intracoder percent of agreement ranged from 90% to 100%
with an average agreement of 96%. While the strongest reliability scores were
recorded for variables such as subjects, sources, non-administration attitude,
description of China, conflict and U.S. norms deviance, more moderate but still
strong reliability scores were recorded for variables such as channels, China
status quo deviance, crisis, attitude toward Sino-American relations and
violence.
Data were coded onto scantron sheets and transferred onto computer discs for
SPSS analysis. In order to answer all of this study's research questions, SPSS
analysis ranged in complexity from simple frequency distributions to time series
analysis.
In order to compare means over time, this study's time series analysis
aggregated each variable over a relative time frame, calculated the means for
each aggregated variable and used the resulting aggregated means, representing
newspaper versus government variables, in order to facilitate comparisons over
time. Pearson r-squared statistics and regression analysis were then run on
these aggregated means in order to determine the strength and nature of relative
correlations. Correlations closest to zero are considered weakest, while those
closest to 1 or -1 are considered strongest. Correlations were deemed
statistically significant if they produced a T-value greater than 1.96 or less
than -1.96 and a probability score less than .05.
Since this study operated on the premise that it would take at least one month
before agenda-setting effects took place, a given month of press coverage was
generally compared to the next month's government coverage and vice versa. In
the first scenario if a significant correlation was found between press and
government coverage, the press appeared to set the government's agenda. In the
second scenario a significant correlation would suggest that, vice versa, the
government set the press' agenda. If as a result of either
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scenario no significant correlation was found, then the press did not influence
the government's agenda or vice versa. And finally, if significant correlations
are not normally appearing during the above one-month lagging procedure, but
when identical months of press and government coverage are compared they result
in significant correlations, a third factor, such as breaking international
events, may be setting both the press and government agenda.
Finally, since control of extraneous variables is beyond this study's scope,
causal relationship tests between the variables were exploratory. Accordingly,
interpretations of these findings will be made with caution.
Preliminary Findings
Preliminary content analysis subject findings are briefly discussed in this
section in order to offer a general overview of this data before research
questions are answered.
Subjects
During this nine-year study (1985 to 1993), the prestige press drew attention
to many Sino-American topics, ranging from military affairs to the pro-democracy
Tiananmen Square ordeal. From the Cold War's demise through the post-Cold War
period, Sino-American press coverage predominantly grew steadily, with the
exception of a dramatic upward spike largely due to Tiananmen Square coverage.
This spike in coverage began with the 1988 democratic incidents that led to the
Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement, culminated with the 1989 Tiananmen
Square government crackdown and rapidly dropped during the post-Tiananmen Square
period. However, in the Tiananmen Square aftermath the amount of overall
Sino-American coverage did not rapidly decline to pre-Tiananmen coverage levels.
After the Tiananmen Square government crackdown, most topics, with the exception
of Tiananmen Square itself, were covered more heavily than before the Tiananmen
Square democratic protests began. In addition, coverage of these topics mostly
remained consistently higher after the Tiananmen Square government crackdown
than before it (see figure 1, p. 12).
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During the Tiananmen Square ordeal, all but one major Sino-American subject
received the heaviest coverage: immigration. Immigration issue coverage spiked
up after the Tiananmen Square incident mostly due to Tiananmen Square activists
seeking political asylum in America.
According to agenda-setting theory, topics receiving the heaviest coverage have
not only drawn the most press attention, but have influenced the press to
consider such topics among the most important in Sino-American relations.
Throughout this study the press' most consistently predominant topics, in order
of heaviest to lightest press coverage, consisted of military affairs,
diplomacy, human rights, MFN, economy/business and Tiananmen Square. In
addition, Chinese immigration to America was the heaviest covered topic during
both the transitional and post-Cold War time frames -- especially the latter.
Even though the 1989 Tiananmen Square ordeal was viewed as an extremely
important Sino-American development, in the larger scheme of Sino-American
relations military affairs were most often emphasized by the press from 1985
through 1990, while immigration was most emphasized from 1992 to 1993.
Findings and Discussion
This section reviews each specific research question and its findings.
1) If Sino-American policy coverage is found to be more government independent
in one Cold War time frame than another, when did more independent press
coverage begin emerging? As early as the Cold War demise period, during the
transitional period or the post-Cold War period?
Research question #1 focused on determining during which time frame press
coverage was most government independent. First, it found that press coverage
was most government independent during the Cold War's demise. Cold War demise
press coverage differed from government coverage in a significant manner (a
minimum tau-c of .10 or -.10, a t-score greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and
a probability value less than .05) via all of the following nine variables:
China status quo deviance, U.S. norms deviance, crisis, clarity of conflict,
violence, American non-administration attitude toward U.S-China relations, China
description, economic change (see table 1, p. 14) and story length
(Tau-c=-.38;T=-9.89). Second, it also found that press coverage appears to grow
less independent as time goes on. This significant finding is best
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illustrated by the following two variables: China status quo deviance and China
descriptions. During the Cold War's demise, the press and government demonstrate
the most significant disagreement on the extent to which certain issues
represent a threat to China's status quo and whether they view the Chinese
government in a more positive, negative or neutral light. From the Cold War's
demise through the post-Cold War period the degree of government versus press
disagreement between China status quo and China description significantly
decreases. Since the press and government disagree most on these issues during
the Cold War's demise and disagree least on these issues during the post-Cold
War era, press coverage appears to grow less independent overtime.
As for Cold War demise press coverage being most independent, transitional
coverage being second most independent and post-Cold War coverage being least
independent, the significant differences between press and government
perceptions toward China status quo threats and the Chinese government itself
(measured by the China description variable) support this finding.
For example, during the Cold War demise period 28.1% of press articles
indicated there was a great threat to China's status quo versus 8.3% of
government articles (tau-c=-.26;t=-8.74); compared to 18.5% of press articles to
3.5% of government articles in the transitional period (tau-c=-.10;t=-3.71); and
8% of press articles and zero government articles in the post-Cold War period
(tau-c=-.13;t=-5.42).
In addition, during the Cold War demise period 7% of press articles gave
positive descriptions of China (Chinese government) versus 33% of government
articles (tau-c=.3;t=9); compared to 8% of press articles to 30% of government
articles in the transitional period (tau-c=.18;t=5.51). By the post-Cold War
period, significant relationships between press and government descriptions
disappeared -- 17% of press articles gave positive descriptions of China versus
19.4% of government articles (tau-c=.06;t=1.2).
2) If Sino-American policy is covered more independently in one Cold War time
frame than another, is this more government-independent press coverage free of
government agenda setting and/or did more government-independent press coverage
influence the government's agenda?
Research question #2 dealt with whether the press set the government's agenda
or vice versa. Since
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agenda-setting literature claims it takes one month for one entity to set
another's agenda, this question was answered by using time series analysis to
compare each month of government coverage to press coverage one month later and
vice versa. Throughout this study's Cold War time frames, when press variables
were compared to identical government variables one month later, no significant
relationships resulted. Accordingly, this analysis determined that neither the
press nor the government set each other's agenda during any of this study's Cold
War time frames. However, when government and press coverage were considered
during identical months throughout different Cold War time frames, this coverage
was often significantly correlated. In other words, the government and press not
only appeared to focus on many of the same issues at the same time, but also
covered many of these issues in a similar manner. This finding may suggest that
breaking Sino-American events set both the government and press agenda.
Cold War Demise Period
Although during the Cold War demise era neither the government nor the press
set each other's agenda, in many instances the two entities' opinions and
stances were significantly and positively correlated. In other words, the
government and press not only seemed to emphasize Sino-American coverage during
the same monthly time frames, they also tended to focus on many of the same
issues at the same time. This finding was determined by comparing government and
press coverage variables during identical months. Examples of these significant
results are represented by the following five variables: democratic mentions
(r-squared=.714;t=13.53); Tiananmen Square coverage (r-squared =.774;t=16.63);
amount of paragraphs (r-squared= .297;t=5.18); amount of articles
(r-squared=.31;t=4.64) and human rights coverage (r-squared=.149;t=3.11). All of
the above relationships were deemed statistically significant due to t-scores
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 and p-values less than .05.
Simply put, the press and government tended to emphasize, during the same
monthly time frames, the following: democratic mentions, Tiananmen Square
coverage, human rights coverage and overall Sino-American coverage (according to
the amount of paragraphs and amount of articles variables). Although this
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study was not set up to determine which, if any, third party set both the
government's and press' agenda, these results suggest that breaking
Sino-American news may have set both the press and government agendas.
Transitional Coverage
The press' tendency to maintain some degree of independence from government
influence by side-stepping government agenda setting was also evident during the
transitional era. As in the Cold War demise period, transitional period press
coverage did not appear to influence the government's agenda or vice versa.
However, as was also indicated in the Cold War demise period, that did not mean
that the press and government never shared similar views and stances during the
transitional period. On the contrary, examples of shared, similar perspectives
are demonstrated by significant correlations demonstrated by the following two
variables: amount of Tiananmen Square coverage and China description,
specifically the tendency to describe the Chinese government in a negative
fashion. When press and government coverage during this time frame were compared
on an identical month-by-month basis, the press' and government's respective
focus on Tiananmen coverage was strongly correlated (r-squared=.774;t=3.71). In
addition, every negative press description of the Chinese government was
accompanied by .39 of a negative government description (r-squared=.29;t=2.68).
In other words, for approximately every two and one-quarter times the press
described the Chinese government in a negative fashion, the government followed
suit once.
3) How did the amount and nature of more government-independent press coverage
compare among the Cold War demise, transitional and post-Cold War eras?
While research question #1 found that press coverage was most government
independent during the Cold War's demise, second most government independent
during the transitional period and least government independent during the
post-Cold War period, research question #3 acknowledges that even though some
Cold War time frames were more government independent than others, after the
Cold War began to collapse all Cold War time frames possessed some degree of
government-independent coverage. Accordingly, research question #3 tried to
discover, via time series analysis and cross-tabulations, more about the amount
and nature of government-independent coverage by placing it in the context of
general news coverage being played up
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Cold War Demise Coverage
For example, during the Cold War demise period the press tended to emphasize
human rights issues and the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and ordeal
(see table 2, p. 19). According to agenda-setting theory the press emphasizes
issues that are high on its agenda of priorities. Accordingly, during the Cold
War demise period the press seemed especially concerned with these issues. This
finding is not surprising since the press tends to view human rights abuses and
Tiananmen Square as especially important concerns. In addition, since during the
Cold War's demise the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and crackdown took
place -- on top of the more ordinary, common Sino-American human rights issues,
such as forced abortion and Chinese government crackdowns on Tibet -- there were
perhaps more human rights abuse issues to cover during this time frame than in
other in this study.
The finding that Cold War demise coverage concentrated on human rights issues
and Tiananmen Square coverage is illustrated in the attached time series model
(see table 2, p. 19). This significant finding is extremely strong (R-squared
=.862). However, before the relevance of this finding for more
government-independent Cold War demise coverage is discussed, the time series
model itself should be understood.
In this model, number of press articles, the dependent variable, was regressed
on each of the following independent variables: human rights coverage, violence
coverage, Tiananmen Square coverage, MFN coverage and U.S. norms deviance
coverage. As a result, it was found that these variables explain 86% of the
variation in the number of articles written across Cold War periods. This
finding also indicated that the press' interest in these topics and type of
coverage varied during different Cold War periods. In other
words, 86% of the time when press coverage of these variables increased during
specific Cold War periods, the overall amount of general Sino-American press
coverage also increased during the same Cold War periods. Since none of the five
variables prompted increased general coverage during all three Cold War
periods, the attached model illustrates specifically which variables during
which Cold War period/s tended to
Prestige Press Coverage
do so. In this model, all five variables are represented via Cold War period,
and those Cold War periods in which each variable prompted increased overall
coverage are starred and include betas and p-values. While the R-squared
statistic measured the strength of the combined variables' impact on the amount
of overall coverage, beta statistics are stated for each variable during the
Cold War period/s in which the variable had a significant impact on overall
coverage. The beta statistic measured the impact of each independent variable on
the dependent variable. The beta statistic is defined as how many standard
deviations the dependent variable moves for one standard deviation change in the
independent variable. The p-value determines statistical significance if it is
less than .05, if there is less than five chances in 100 that the given results
occurred by chance. Although the model's five variables did not prompt increased
general coverage during all Cold War time frames, the monthly means of the
amount of stories dealing with each variable within each Cold War period are
given in order to describe each variable's amount of story coverage over time.
According to this time series model, Cold War demise coverage not only
concentrated on human rights and Tiananmen Square coverage, but when such issues
arose, Sino-American press coverage increased. Accordingly, it is reasonable to
conclude that during this time period the press was especially concerned with
covering these Sino-American topics.
How do such press concerns during the Cold War demise period shed light on more
independent coverage during this time frame? The press' special concern with
human rights and Tiananmen Square seem to have driven its more
government-independent coverage during the Cold War's demise. In question #1,
nine variables illustrated the press' tendency during the Cold War's demise to
cover the news in a more government-independent fashion. Six of these variables
were covered in a predominantly negative fashion: China status quo deviance,
U.S. norms deviance, crisis, clarity of conflict, violence and American
non-administration attitudes toward Sino-American relations. In addition,
Tiananmen Square coverage was covered in an especially negative fashion. Views
toward China and Sino-American relations were much more negative during the
Tiananmen Square incident.
Prestige Press Coverage
Predominantly negative views toward China regarding Tiananmen were supported
by the following variables: conflict (Tau-c=.11;T=7.41); media attitude
(Tau-c=-.19;T=-8.22), description (Tau-c=-.17;T=-7.58), China status quo
deviance (Tau-c=.2;T=7.69), U.S. norms deviance (Tau-c=.15;T=6.13) and crisis
(Tau-c=.23;T=8.88).
Since the press' more government-independent coverage of Sino-American
relations during this time frame echoes the press' special concern with human
rights abuses and Tiananmen Square, it seems that more independent press
coverage was driven by respectable press concerns.
Transitional Coverage
Transitional coverage did share its Cold War predecessor's concern for human
rights. In addition, transitional coverage was concerned with U.S. norms
deviance issues and the Most Favored Nation (MFN) controversy (see table 2, p.
19). Since the Tiananmen Square incident evokes all of the above transitional
era concerns, and the negative impact of the Tiananmen Square ordeal was at
least mentioned in most transitional stories, Tiananmen Square also seemed to
remain a major concern for China reporters. For example, the Tiananmen Square
ordeal was extremely inconsistent with U.S. norms, it represented a serious
human rights abuse and it was one of the main reasons that Congress and many
Americans fought feverishly, yet unsuccessfully, with President Bush to revoke
China's MFN status.
How do such press concerns during the transitional period shed light on
government-independent coverage during this time frame? The press' special
concern with U.S. norms deviance, human rights and MFN coverage seem to have
driven its more government-independent coverage during the transitional period.
This independent press coverage, described in research question #1, was
illustrated by coverage of the following two variables in a predominantly
negative fashion: China status quo deviance and descriptions of China. After
all, a press interested in issues that deviate from U.S. norms should also be
interested in issues that threaten China's status quo since they are often
related. For example, the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement and crackdown
both strongly deviated from U.S. norms and threatened the Chinese
Prestige Press Coverage
status quo by endangering the Chinese government's stability. In addition,
general and MFN-related human rights concerns often led to negative coverage of
the Chinese government during the transitional era.
As was the case with press coverage during the Cold War's demise, transitional
coverage seemed based on both newsworthy and respectable journalistic concerns.
In addition, in both time frames Sino-American coverage tended to be
predominantly negative.
Post-Cold War Coverage
Post-Cold War coverage, unlike its Cold War demise and transitional
predecessors, did not emphasize Tiananmen Square or U.S. norms deviance
coverage. However, post-Cold War journalists, like their transitional
predecessors, did concern themselves with MFN coverage (see table 2, p. 19). In
addition, post-Cold War press coverage tended to emphasize economic matters.
Since during the post-Cold War period Sino-American trade was booming, and
journalists tend to share basic American business values, it is not surprising
that journalists became more concerned with business-related issues.
At first glance it may seem as if post-Cold War journalists did not share their
Cold War demise and transitional predecessors' concerns about topics such as the
Tiananmen Square ordeal, human rights abuses and issues that deviate from U.S.
norms and threaten the Chinese status quo. But since by the beginning of the
post-Cold War era much debate over the Tiananmen Square issue had died down and
human rights abuses were less prevalent than during the Cold War demise or
transitional periods, the post-Cold War press should not have been expected to
focus on concerns that were not as prevalent during the post-Cold War time
frame. After all, the fact that the press seemed most concerned with the MFN
issue during the post-Cold War era suggests that the press remained dedicated to
human rights issues. Although the MFN issue is predominantly economic, the
re-occurring controversy over renewing it in light of China's human rights
record makes it a strong human rights issue as well.
Did such press concerns during the post-Cold War period shed light on more
government-independent coverage during this time frame? Research question #1
found that post-Cold War press articles covered
Prestige Press Coverage
Chinese status quo deviance in a statistically different manner than the
government (tau-c=-.13;t=-5.42). Since the connection between post-Cold War
reporters' concerns with economic and human rights issues and Chinese status quo
deviance is not clear, these concerns did not appear to shed additional light on
the post-Cold War era's limited government-independent coverage.
However, post-Cold War period journalists' economic concerns do help describe
post-Cold War coverage and its often limited government independence. For
example, economic development is an area where journalists have expressed more
positive attitudes toward U.S.-China relations than in other topics. However, in
covering this technical subject journalists tend to rely on official sources
and, in so doing, do not necessarily use more unofficial sources and channels.
Since Sino-American relations experienced much less controversy during the
post-Cold War era than in this study's previous two Cold War time frames, and
the press seems to agree more with President Clinton's Sino-American policies
than with either administration from these time frames, the post-Cold War press
appears much less government independent than its Cold War demise and post-Cold
War counterparts.
The finding that the post-Cold War press has a tendency to cover economic
development with a positive attitude is based on the following statistically
significant cross-tab results. When economic change is covered, 54.2% of the
time press attitudes toward Sino-American relations are positive, versus 19.2%
positive coverage when economic change is not covered (tau-c=.24;t=4.26).
Accordingly, in the post-Cold War era the press seems optimistic about the
prospects of economic change. However, this does not mean that more
government-independent economic coverage is a result of this concern. Since
economic change is a technical subject, journalists rely less on unofficial
channels for information on this subject and more on official channels and
sources. When economic change is covered, the most unofficial channels (5 or
more) are used 6% of the time versus 12% of the time when economic change is not
covered (tau-c=-.10;t=-1.96).
Finally, it would be misleading to conclude that since this study only found
limited evidence of post-
Prestige Press Coverage
Cold War government-independent press coverage that post-Cold War Sino-American
coverage was covered in an inferior manner compared to its Cold War demise and
transitional predecessors. This study's post-Cold War era contained much less
dramatic events than during either the Cold War demise or transitional eras.
Accordingly, this study's limited post-Cold War events did not seem to give the
post-Cold War press an equal opportunity to challenge government policy, let
alone to establish much of a government-independent streak. Until post-Cold War
journalists covering Sino-American relations are faced with more challenging
issues, it remains to be seen just how government independent post-Cold War
coverage may become. In the meanwhile, the post-Cold War press' concern with
economic and human rights issues seems both professional and respectable.
Conclusions
This study's results can be summarized with two major findings. First, during
the Cold War's collapse and post-Cold War years the press covered Sino-American
policy in a more government-independent manner than its Cold War predecessor.
And second, the press covered Sino-American relations during the Cold War's
collapse and post-Cold War years in a culturally biased yet responsible,
watch-dog fashion.
This study's findings can also be interpreted on a broader scale, one that
places this study into context with current, related communication literature.
Accordingly, this study sheds additional light on the following two topics: the
Cold War's collapse and Sino-American reporting and the amount of time necessary
for the government to impact the press' agenda and vice versa.
The Cold War's Collapse and Sino-American Reporting
Did the Cold War's collapse affect the independence level of Sino-American
reporting?
This study suggests that it did. After all, Cold War collapse through post-Cold
War coverage was more government independent than its Cold War predecessor.
How did the Cold War's collapse lead to more independent coverage? As explained
throughout this study's theory section, once the Cold War began to crumble
and government administrations failed or were
Prestige Press Coverage
unwilling to substitute the Cold War paradigm with an adequate replacement, the
press was forced to become
less complacent. The Cold War's collapse seemed to act as the press' wake-up
call. As the Cold War crumbled, the press seemed to begin realizing that the
government was not doing an adequate job of developing Sino-American relations
and making it understandable to the American public. Accordingly, in order for
the press to fulfill its double duty of keeping the government on track and
informing the public, it was forced to become more self-reliant, more actively
involved in digging up Sino-American news and emphasizing its own views and the
views of others on the meaning of Sino-American relations. Cold War time frames
clearly had an impact on Sino-American coverage. In addition, this study
suggests that a third factor/factors, such as real-life indicators, also
influenced Sino-American coverage.
The Time Gap: Its Impact on Agenda Setting
Although much print journalism research suggests a one-month time frame is
optimal for agenda setting to take place, the advent of the Internet, e-mail and
instantaneous satellite hook-ups between the government and the press seem to
question these previous findings. In today's computer-friendly, interactive
world, a reporter needs nothing more than a computer, modem and telephone line
to contact government leaders anywhere in the world at a moment's notice.
Accordingly, if reporters and government officials are e-mailing each other on a
daily basis, if the computer revolution is leading to substantially increased
government and press communications, is it still safe to conclude that it takes
an entire month for the government to influence the press' agenda and vice
versa?
In this present study when government Sino-American coverage was compared to
Sino-
American press coverage one month later and vice versa, the government did not
appear to influence the press' Sino-American agenda and vice versa. In addition,
this study also found that when government and press coverage were compared
during identical monthly time frames, when no lagged comparisons took place, the
government and press often covered Sino-American relations in a similar fashion.
Accordingly, although comparing government to press coverage one month later and
vice versa does not result in evidence of agenda
Prestige Press Coverage
setting, the fact that the government and press are often taking similar
approaches to Sino-American relations during identical time frames suggests that
both entities are experiencing agenda setting at the same time, whether it is
the result of influencing each other's agenda on a quicker than monthly basis
and/or the result of one or more third party influences on both entities'
agendas. Third party influences might include real-world incidents affecting
Sino-American relations such as the Tiananmen Square ordeal, third party
influences that focus both the government's and press' attention on breaking
Sino-American events at the same time.
For example, during the Clinton administration press coverage was least
government independent, government and press Sino-American agendas and attitudes
appeared most similar. This increased similarity between government and press
Sino-American views may have been partially due to increased government and
press usage of e-mail and the Internet during this time frame. Perhaps less
formal, increased computer contact may have at least partially led to improved,
more friendly reporter-government relations and thus increased agreement between
both entities on Sino-American policy. In addition, the fact that Sino-American
economic growth tended to be highlighted by the press in a positive fashion
throughout most of Clinton's post-Cold War era, a great turn-around from the
predominantly negative press coverage of Sino-American relations during the Bush
administration, suggests that both government and press contacts with the
Chinese
government were much more frequent and friendly during Clinton's administration
than Bush's. Accordingly, friendlier press and government relations with the
Chinese government may have made both entities susceptible to possible Chinese
government agenda-setting influence. For example, when the Chinese government
introduces a trade initiative or decision that would lead to increased and/or
improved Sino-American trade, both the U.S. government and press may be more
willing to consider such actions at face value than to search for ulterior
motives.
In addition, when the U.S. government and press both view real-life indicators
as having a positive effect on Sino-American relations, such as Chinese
government decisions to increase Sino-American trade, their agendas may be more
easily, more quickly set by each other and the Chinese government due to
Prestige Press Coverage
friendlier relations not only with each other, but the Chinese government as
well. After all, increased friendliness may lead to less agenda-setting
resistance. Accordingly, during the Clinton administration the U.S. government,
press and Chinese government, partially as a result of new technologies and
substantially improved, positive Sino-American trade, may have all influenced
each other's agenda within a much quicker time frame than a month. As a result,
since a shorter than one month agenda-setting time frame would not have been
detected in this study, it is possible that the agenda-setting influence of
either the U.S. press or government may have been overlooked.
This study contributes to the literature by suggesting that the amount of time
in which it takes for the government to set the press' agenda and vice versa
needs to be re-examined and updated to include the possibility of the impact of
new technologies on the agenda-setting process. In addition, this study also
suggests that in order to understand the true nature of how the government
influences the press' agenda and vice versa, confounding entities such as third
party contributors, real-life indicators such as the Chinese government's latest
Sino-American initiatives, should be considered.
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Prestige Press Coverage of Sino-American Relations
From the Cold War's Demise to the Post-Cold War Period:
Reagan's Final Years to the Clinton Administration
1985 to 1993
Dr. Robyn S. Goodman
Robyn Goodman is an assistant professor at Alfred University and a graduate
of Michigan State University's Mass Media Ph.D. program.
Please send submission inquiries and information to me at:
5 Valley View Court Apt# H5
Geneseo, NY 14454
Phone/fax: (716) 243-4813
E-mail: [log in to unmask]
ABSTRACT
PRESTIGE PRESS COVERAGE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
FROM THE COLD WAR'S DEMISE TO THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD:
REAGAN'S FINAL YEAR TO THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
1985-1993
This study examined whether Sino-American news coverage was more government
independent after the Cold War's collapse than during the Cold War proper.
Content analysis of 1,177 New York Times and Washington Post articles and 399
government articles were compared via descriptive statistics and time series
analysis. The study concluded that Sino-American press coverage from the Cold
War's demise through the post-Cold War era was more government independent than
its Cold War predecessor.
Code Book
Prestige Press Coverage of Sino-American Relations
1. CODER -- your first name box (in box closest to middle name box)-- (1 column)
Coder A = A
Coder B = B
2. ARTICLE SECTION -- middle name box (1 column)
Blank = no article section (government documents, etc.)
A = 1
B = 2
C = 3
D = 4
E = 5
F = 6
Y = unclear
3. PAGE - Double box #1 & #5 (4 columns)
Blank = no page number
0001 = 1
0002 = 2
9998 = unclear
9999 = non-applicable
4. COLUMN -- line 1
Blank = no column (government documents, etc.)
Column 1 = 1
Column 2 = 2
Column 3 = 3
Column 4 = 4
Column 5 = 5 or higher
5. DATE --PID box (6 columns, start at far left column)
1. Month = 2 columns (01: January - 12: December)
2. Day = 2 columns (01 - 31)
3. Year = 2 columns (85 - 93)
6. STORY NUMBER ID# -- PID box after date (2 columns)
01 = 1
02 = 2
03 = 3
7. RELIABILITY #I (for reliability test) -- Section number box (3 columns)
If article has a reliability number in red ink on its upper right-hand
corner, code the number in an identical fashion in this box, for example:
700=700
701= 701
800= 800
801= 801
8. RELIABILITY #II (for reliability test) -- Form box (2 columns)
If article has a reliability number, underneath this number will be a
designator 2a or 2b.
2a= article included in main data set and reliability test
2b= article for reliability test only (won't also be included in main data)
4d= non-applicable
9. RELIABILITY #III-- SERIAL ID# (for reliability test) - triple box 13 (3
columns)
Every reliability test article has an original serial number marked as such
in blank in on the top middle of each article.
001=1
002=2
003=3
10. STORY LENGTH - Triple box 14 (3 columns)
001 = 1
002 = 2
999 = unclear
11. TYPE OF ARTICLE - line 2 (one row)
1. New York Times
2. Washington Post
3. Presidential documents/ papers
4. State Department Bulletin
12. TYPE OF COVERAGE FOR NEWSPAPERS -- lines 3 and 4 (two rows)
11. Front page
12. Editorial
13. News
13. TYPE OF COVERAGE FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS -- lines 5 and 6 (two rows)
11. Interviews/ Conversations/ Questions and answers
12. Press releases/ Statements (written or oral)
13. Speeches/ Addresses
14. News conferences/ Briefings
15. Embassy briefing
21. Pentagon briefing
22. State Department briefing
23. White House briefing
24. Congressional briefing
25. Messages to Congress/ Congressional related hearings
35. unclear
41. none of the above
42. non-applicable
14. SOURCES
1st SOURCE -- double boxes 2&6 (3 columns)
2nd SOURCE -- double boxes 6&10 (3 columns)
3rd SOURCE -- double boxes 3&7 (3 columns)
4th SOURCE -- double boxes 7&11 (3 columns)
5th SOURCE -- double boxes 4&8 (3 columns)
6th SOURCE -- double boxes 8&12 (3 columns)
Blank = no source
001. President
002. Presidential Advisers/Spokespersons
003. Vice President
004. National Security Adviser/Staff
005. Other White House/Administration (unspecified)
-----
006. Secretary of State
007. State Department/Organizations/Staff
008. U.S. Ambassadors/Diplomats/Embassies/families
009. Other State Department
010. Defense Department/Military
011. Commerce Department/Treasury/Trade/Customs
012. American Justice Department/Courts/Judges
013. FBI
014. CIA
126. INS (Immigration and naturalization service)
127. Police department/costal border control
130. U.S.-China international agreement
015. Other Government Departments
---
016. U.S./America (vague reference)
017. U.S./American government/U.S. officials (vague reference)
---
018. Senate (including state and national senates, senators and staff
members)
019. House (including state and national House representatives/house
congressmen and staff members)
020. Congress/Congressmen/Congresswomen (Only code "congress" when
senate and/or House distinctions cannot be made. Congress would
then include state and national congressmen,
congresses and staff members.)
021. American academicians/researchers/students
022. American businesses/corporations (and related groups)
023. American lawyers
024. American labors/unions
025. American celebrities/producers/actors/U.S.-China exchange staff,
etc.
026. Other American
civilians/groups/organizations/ religious leader (non-government)
027. American presidential candidates
028. Former American presidents/officials
131. President elect
132. American Mass media
995. Other (clear, but not listed here.)
999. Unclear
15. NUMBER OF GRAPHS SOURCES MENTIONED IN
1st SOURCE -- lines 7-8 (two rows)
2nd SOURCE -- lines 9-10 (two rows)
3rd SOURCE -- lines 11-12 (two rows)
4th SOURCE -- lines 13-14 (two rows)
5th SOURCE -- lines 15-16 (two rows)
6th SOURCE -- lines 17-18 (two rows)
16. CHANNELS
1st CHANNEL -- lines 19 - 21 (3 rows)
2nd CHANNEL -- lines 23 - 25 (3 rows)
3rd CHANNEL -- lines 26 - 28 (3 rows)
Blank = no channel
111. Administration Press releases/ Statements (written or oral)
112. Administration News conferences/ Briefings
431. Presidential memo
113. Embassy briefing
114. Pentagon briefing
115. White House briefing
255. CIA briefing
345. Treasury briefing
121. Congressional briefing
122. Administration Speeches/ Addresses
123. Congressional Messages/ Hearings/ Debates/ Statements/Letters, etc.
124. State Department briefing
125. Administration other
321. American civilian letter/reports
322. American civilian news letters
323. American non-government news conferences
324. American media
325. American civilian other
554. Other
555. Unclear
17. AMOUNT OF GRAPHS CONTAINING INFORMATION COMING FROM A
PARTICULAR CHANNEL
1st CHANNEL -- lines 29-30 (two rows)
2nd CHANNEL -- lines 31-32 (two rows)
3rd CHANNEL -- lines 33-34 (two rows)
See Chart 1 for two-line counting. Abbreviated version below:
Blank = none
1 = 11
2 = 12
54 = 24 or more
55 = unclear
18. MAIN SUBJECT -- triple box 15 (3 columns)
001. Government and Diplomacy
002. Politics
003. Human Rights
004. Military/ Defense
005. Economics/Trade/ Business
006. Education
007. Media/Media Censorship
008. Culture/ Cultural Exchanges/ Arts/ Music/ Books
009. Religion
010. Science and Technology/ Medicine
011. Nature Preservation
012. Sports
013. Tourism
014. Personality Profiles/ Biographies/ Obituaries
015. Crime/Terrorism/Drug Trafficking
016. Immigration
017. MFN
018. Tiananmen Square
995. Other (clear, but not listed here.)
999. Unclear
19. DEVIATION I (China status Quo) - line 35 (one row)
Blank = non-applicable
1. Not at all threatening
2. Somewhat threatening
3. Dangerous to status quo
4. Extremely dangerous to status quo
5. Unclear
20. DEVIATION II (U.S. Norms) - line 36 (one row)
Blank = non-applicable
1. Would not have broken any U.S. norms
2. Would have somewhat violated U.S. norms
3. Would have violated existing U.S. norms
4. Would have seriously broken U.S. norms
5. Unclear
21. CONCRETE - line 37 (one row)
Blank = non-applicable
1. Yes
2. No
3. Other
4. Unclear
22. CONFLICT - line 38 (one row)
Blank = non-applicable
1. Yes
2. No
4. Other
5. Unclear
23. CRISIS - line 39 (one row)
Blank = non-applicable
1. No crisis
2. Slight/ limited crisis
3. Crisis
4. Severe crisis
5. Unclear
24. VIOLENCE - line 40 (one row)
Blank = non-applicable
1. Yes
2. No
4. Other
5. Unclear
25. AMERICAN NON-ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. GOVERNMENT CHINA
STAND -- line 41 (one row)
Blank = no American non-administration attitude
1. Unsupportive
2. Qualified unsupportive
3. Neutral/ balanced
4. Qualified supportive
5. Supportive
26. AMERICAN DESCRIPTIONS OF MAINLAND CHINA -- line 42 (one row)
Blank = non-applicable
1. Negative
2. Qualified negative
3. Neutral/balanced
4. Qualified positive
5. Positive
27. AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S.- CHINA RELATIONS -- line 43 (one row)
Blank = non-applicable
1 = Unfavorable
2 = Qualified unfavorable
3 = Neutral/balanced
4 = Qualified favorable
5 = Favorable
28. IF ANY FORM OF THE WORD "DEMOCRACY" IS MENTIONED, HOW MANY MENTION
THIS TERM?
See Chart 1 for two-line counting. Abbreviated version
below:
Blank = none
1 = 11
2 = 12
54 = 24 or more
55 = unclear
Two-column counting
blank=no mention
1 mention = 11
2 mentions =12
3 mentions =13
4 =14
5 =15
6 =21
7 =22
8 =23
9 =24
10 =25
11 =31
12 =32
13 =33
14 =34
15 =35
16 =41
17 =42
18 =43
19 =44
20 =45
21 =51
22 =52
23 =53
24 or more =54
Unclear =55
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