Three American "prestige" newspapers' stand toward the Arab-Israeli conflicts
THREE AMERICAN "PRESTIGE" NEWSPAPERS' STAND TOWARD
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICTS:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF EDITORIALS
Paper Submitted for Consideration of Presentation for the International
Communication Division at AEJMC 1997 Convention
Date: 3.27.1997
by
KHALED M. BATARFI
2830 Miramonti Dr. Eugene, OR 97405
Tel: 541-343-4371
Fax: 541-341-4660
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Three American "prestige" newspapers' stand toward the Arab-Israeli conflicts
It all started after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the British
occupation of Palestine as a result of the First World War. The Palestinians
were suddenly faced with thousands of Jews immigrating from all over the world.
The mass immigration became a threat to the Arabs when Britain promised the Jews
of the world a homeland in Palestine. The Arab resistance and the Jewish
militant groups started their first conflicts as early as the 1930s. Under
pressure from the Zionist movement and as a compensation to the Jews who where
victimized by both the Nazis who oppressed them and the Europeans and Americans
who were reluctant to accommodate them, the Western powers decided to give birth
to the first Jewish state on the Arab land of Palestine. The Palestinians,
therefore, became non-citizens and refugees in their own country, just as the
Jews of Nazi Germany had been. The Palestinians lost their state and land to
people who claim that they lived there, too, four thousand years ago. Other
Arabs fought for their brethren Palestinians and lost in 1948, and Israel became
a reality ever since (Balkhair, 1996).
For the last 50 years, the conflicts in the Middle East have made headlines in
the American press. Ever since 1947, when the United Nations voted to partition
Palestine, conflicts between Israel, Washington's ally, and the Arabs, who
received support from Moscow, have made good copy for the American national
newspapers (Zaremba, 1988).
In U.S. domestic politics, the strong influence of Israel's supporters--their
lobbying and votes--and the oil companies' interests in the area help focus
attention on this small but important part of the world. America has a double
interest in the Middle East. On the one hand, Israel is a natural ally based on
a common European heritage and democratic system. On the other hand, billions of
American dollars are invested in Arab countries (Zaremba, 1988).
There have been eight Arab-Israeli wars and many military skirmishes since
Israel declared statehood in 1948. The wars were fought in 1948, 1956, 1967,
1973, 1982, 1991, 1993 and 1996. There was not much news coverage on the 1948
war. In 1956, France and Britain joined Israel in its attack on Egypt. In 1991,
America had more than 30 countries, including many Arab states and Israel,
standing with it against Iraq (Greenberg, 1993). In 1993 and 1996, Israel
invaded Lebanon for short periods of time, not longer than a few weeks. The
editorial coverage of three major wars fought exclusively between the Arabs and
the Israelis, namely those of 1967, 1973 and 1982 were chosen for this study.
In the late fifties and sixties, the Middle East was split by international
conflicts of various kinds, while at the same time rapidly becoming an object of
competitive struggle between the world superpowers (Ovendale, 1992). Before and
during the 1967 war, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser's propaganda machine
broadcast rhetoric threatening Israel's existence. Language was not simply a way
of communication, but an aesthetic art capable of intoxicating the masses and
rousing them to a state of euphoria (Rubin, 1977). The 1967 Arab-Israeli war
lasted only six days. It broke out on Monday, June 5 and ended with a truce on
June 10.
After their 1967 victory, the Israelis were not in a compromise mood, presuming
the right to dictate peace terms on the strength of their battlefield's victory.
In the other camp, after Nasser's death in 1970, a fundamentally different
successor led Egypt. President Anwar al-Sadat was convinced from the very outset
that there was no future for an alliance with the Soviet Union (Aker, 1985). The
Egyptian economy, he realized, was in need of the petrodollars of the American
allies, the conservative states of the Gulf. His country required financially
strong economic aid of a kind that could only come from the USA, not from the
Soviet Union (Ovendale, 1992). However, in 1973, Egypt, Syria and Iraq were
still relying on Soviet armaments and Israel was relying on United States for
their weapons. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war started in October. After an initial
Israeli setback, the U.S. launched an intensive airlift operation to Israel; it
was used to supply everything from tanks to planes. The Soviet Union also
provided Egypt and Syria with arms supplies by air and sea. The war ended with a
ceasefire (Aker, 1985). While the 1967 war, which was started by Israel, had
been the result of the unchecked escalation of a conflict, the war of October 6,
1973 was a planned strategic act on the part of Egypt, with the participation of
Syria and the financial support of Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf states
(Tibi, 1993).
In June 7, 1982, the Israeli troops invaded Lebanon. The Israeli hard-line Likud
government cited different reasons at different stages for its invasion. At
first, Israel's declared objective was to punish the PLO units in south Lebanon
for their attacks on northern Israel. Then, Israel said it needed to build a
security buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Next, Israel wanted to crush the PLO
in all Lebanon. Israel's fourth goal became the withdrawal of Syrian troops from
the Bekaa valley. And finally, Israel insisted on the deportation of all PLO
Palestinians and the dismantling of their refugee camps in Lebanon. In the
meantime, hundreds of thousands of civilians were driven from their homes, many
were killed and injured, and Lebanese cities and villages were destroyed. In
three years of Israeli invasion, the civilian causalities were so high that no
matter what excuses Israel managed, its image in the American press suffered a
great deal (Bailey, 1990).
Newspapers have great influence on public opinion. Historians, social
scientists, politicians, diplomats and intelligence communities have always
looked at local newspapers for insight into the popular thinking. It is
valuable, therefore, to examine their reports and commentaries on important
events to gauge, detect and expose any possible attitudes and biases (Zaremba,
1988).
In this study, the concern was with the stand of what is known as the "prestige"
newspapers on the Arab-Israeli conflict as reflected on the editorial pages of
three major national American newspapers. All of these papers are
internationally oriented, have large circulations and provide national news
services to other papers. They are influential, well connected to and read by
many U.S. editors, business people and politicians. Their audiences consist of
American political and business elite, such as Wall Street's decision makers and
the two policy-making groups that find press foreign coverage most useful, the
State Department and the U.S. Congress (Sigal, 1973; Rubin, 1977). According to
Rubin, anyone who has ever dealt with the State Department understands how
important the "prestige" press, and particularly The New York Times, is to them.
Foreign diplomats, governments and investors also use the U.S. "prestige" press
extensively to discover signals from the government, reports on developments in
U.S. policy and in American public opinion (Read, 1975).
As the following literature review shows, some parts of the American media,
especially the "prestige" newspapers, have been found to be biased toward Israel
and against the Arabs. We attempted to find out whether such bias could be shown
by a content analysis of editorial stands during three major Arab-Israeli wars.
If so, how far were some of the opinion leaders of this country prepared to go
in their sympathy for Israel? Were the three newspapers' stands toward Israel
firm and universal? In other words, was there any variation in the quantity and
quality of editorial support for Israel over time and across papers?
The findings only reflect the stand of the three newspapers, and do not reflect
the attitudes of the "American press." The study's goal is to provide some
interesting indicators about the editorial policies of three of the largest U.S.
newspapers, which represent the "prestige" press and concern themselves with
foreign policy.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The media, chroniclers of controversy, have in recent years been in the midst of
one of their own. The power of U.S. press and television in shaping the public's
perceptions of its world has variously been hailed, scrutinized, criticized and
questioned. Barry Rubin (1977) contends that there are two main areas of
possible inquiry involved in media coverage of international affairs: relations
between the media and news sources, on the one hand, and between the media and
their readership, on the other. On the former category, the author refers to an
endless debate over whether certain stories or certain angels of reporting
endanger the national security or U.S. policies. He raises a number of
questions: How fairly do the media report the direction of U.S. policy and the
problems and prospects it faces? How accurately do the media report foreign
events? How well do they evaluate and explain national security and national
interests? Are there structural limitations or biases in the media that must be
taken into account when considering their output?
On the relations between the media and their readership, Rubin argued that all
American dailies, including the "prestige" press, and certainly all television
news programs are aimed at a mass audience. In serving such an audience, which
many top news executives believe is not interested in foreign news,
international coverage is considered more and more a luxury. Except for a
handful of top prestige papers, which combine a more sophisticated audience with
a sense of journalistic duty, there has been a decline in the amount of
international news reporting and of the number of foreign correspondents in
recent years.
James Larson (1983) conducted an extensive analysis of U.S. network news
coverage from 1972 to 1981. His findings show clearly that television devotes a
substantial proportion of its news coverage to international issues. Nearly 40
percent of news broadcast on a typical weeknight deals with international
affairs. According to Larson, this is a far higher proportion of international
news than that which is printed in most newspapers. Only newsmagazines such as
Time or Newsweek, or elite newspapers such as The New York Times would carry
proportionately as much international news, he contends. Larson also found that
the television networks gave minimal attention, except in crises, to the Third
World. The developed world, on the other hand, received most of the attention.
Sixteen developed countries, who represent only 14 percent of the world
population, accounted for 35 percent of references, while socialist and
developing countries were correspondingly underreported.
The theme and content of news is the subject of another study. Herbert Gans
(1980) contends that the American media cover foreign news only when it relates
to American interests and issues. According to his study, U.S. allies and
communist countries are the most prominent in foreign news. American policy and
activities abroad and foreign policies and activities affecting American policy
get most attention. Thomas J. Ahern. Jr. (Ahern, 1974) agrees with Gans and
refers to a number of theoretical studies of international news flow. These
studies proposed that the economic, social, political, and geographical
characteristics of nations helped determine the amount of coverage one country
received in the press of another (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Ostagaard 1965; Hester,
1973; Rosengren, 1974). Gans also notes that U.S. coverage of foreign countries
contains more value judgments than would be justifiable in domestic coverage,
especially when covering regimes and officials in the Third World, which
includes the Arab countries.
Issam S. Mousa (1984) contends that contemporary research on the Arab image in
the U.S. press has shown that the Arabs are invariably presented in association
with the Middle East conflict. He content-analyzed the Arab image in The New
York Times since the beginning of modern Arab history, starting with the
downfall of Ottoman control. In his analysis, Mousa examined conflict and
cooperation as underlying themes of the Arab image across nine major categories.
The findings presented a comprehensive view for the development of the Arab
image in the American mind from a pre-1916 romantic image to a more realistic
one at present. He wrote that most Arab relationships were reported to be with
the French, British, Jews, other Arabs and the USA. With the sole exception of
the USA, the sum of these relationships emphasized conflict over other
relationships. Mousa contended that as a function of this emphasis on conflict,
particularly with the French, British and Jews, another distortion might have
developed in the mind of the reader. Arabs were reported in constant conflict
with the European colonial powers (and the Jews for a Western-sponsored state)
prior to 1948. This might have aided in creating a confrontational image of the
Arabs as being anti-West (and possibly anti-modernization). Such an impression
could have been further deepened as some Arab leaders cooperated with Russia
after 1948 and thus were reported as "extreme" or "anti-West."
Even in the more recent history, specifically in the TV era, Jack Shaheen (1984)
finds that what most Americans know about Arabs comes via the evening news. Long
after stereotypes of blacks, Jews, Hispanics, Italians, and Asians have been to
some extent removed from the mainstream media, Arabs are still being cast as
villains. They may be the last major ethnic group to be callously relegated to a
''type'' by Hollywood, editorial cartoonists, spy novelists, journalists, and
advertising copywriters. Over the past 30 years, he says, there has been a
chronicle of negative images, portraying Arabs as backward, ruthless, hapless,
or, more recently, flush with oil wealth, as fabulous spenders, though still
ruthless and backward. Such stereotypes are about as legitimate as those imposed
on other ethnic groups and they are shrugged off with the line, ''Well, there is
a certain element of truth in it," according to Shaheen. Edmund Ghareeb (1983)
supports Shaheen's thesis. He records many examples of bias against and
misrepresentation of the Arabs in editorials and journalistic reporting in the
American press. He interviews editors and journalists and confronts them with
his records of their reporting. The book also contains articles by many
prominent American journalists and writers who testify in support of the
author's theory, as well as articles attempting to explore the reasons for such
slanted views written by Arab-American intellectuals, academics and journalists.
In his survey of leading journalists, S. Robert Lichter (1983) found widespread
support for the proposition that America has a moral obligation to prevent
Israel's destruction. Pro-Israel sentiment within the media elite appears to
extend well beyond the levels of support for Israel found among the general
public, although precise comparisons are impossible. The strength of this
sentiment, he writes, can be explained in part by both the high social status of
these individuals and the large proportion of ethnic Jews among them. Even when
the effects of ethnic composition and social status are held constant, however,
the media elite is characterized by strong support for Israel, Lichter
concluded.
Edward A. Padelford (1979) discusses the role and influence of such press biases
in American foreign policy, with particular attention to the Arab-Israeli
conflict in American politics and public opinion. Media involvement in the
political system as it relates to the Arab-Israeli situation is treated, as are
patterns of coverage, commentary and editorialization, including an
investigation of newspaper objectivity with particular emphasis on foreign news
and Middle East news. The results revealed news on or about Israel was highly
disproportionate. The greatest disproportion occurred in local news stories,
written oftentimes by newsmen or others who had recently visited Israel. These
local stories almost without exception emphasized the positive things about
Israel. There were rarely comparable stories on Arabs.
Marijke Breuning (1983) studied the factors that drive the American media
coverage of the Arab world. He took The New York Times as a case study and
content-analyzed its contents for the period prior to and after the year 1967,
assuming that Arab-USA relations and the Arab media attitudes towards foreign
correspondents differed during the years. The researcher found that the
information the data provide lends support to the idea that issues of importance
to the home country will be reflected in international news as reported back to
that country. Also, American correspondents' interest and access to countries
and information affect the amount and kind of coverage these countries received.
Henry Grunwald, Time Magazine's managing editor agrees:
I think what was wrong with American coverage of the Middle
East in the past was not so much a lack of objectivity, whatever that
means, but really lack of enterprise and imagination. It wasn't so
much that everybody was pro-Israel--although, of course, there was
great sentiment for Israel--but it was that we weren't really
interested enough in the Arab world. There was a vast area of
ignorance. We didn't have enough . . . correspondents in he area.
(Grunwald, 1975, p. 1)
Language was, and remains another barrier, says Barry Rubin (1977). American
journalists who spoke Arabic or Farsi have been quite rare. Another real problem
in contemporary media coverage of the Middle East, he adds, is the failure to
distinguish between what Arab leaders say to Western audiences or correspondents
and what they say at home. Arab leaders are well aware that moderate and
"dovish" statements are more profitable in diplomatic and public relations terms
abroad, while militant and hard-line rhetoric is politically necessary on the
domestic scene.
Gazi Awadallah (1982) investigated the relationship between the American-Arab
relations in the seventies and sixties and the portrayals of the Arabs and
Israelis in the editorials of the major American newspapers during the same
period of time. The study revealed an increasingly higher number of negative
terms or statements for both the Arabs and Israelis. The data also revealed a
definite tendency of the media to pay much more attention to Israel and Israeli
affairs and policies rather than to any other nation in the Middle East. The
data also showed that Israel received fewer favorable evaluations as well as
more unfavorable evaluations after certain events--the destruction of a nuclear
plant in Iraq, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon which led to the bombardment of
Beirut and the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila camps.
Alan Jay Zaremba (1988) studied reactions and postures of different world
newspapers after the outbreak of the 1973 war between the Arabs and the
Israelis. The researcher examined worldwide coverage of this war published in
The New York Times, UK's Times, Japan's Asahy Evening News, Russia's Moscow
News, Singapore's Strait Times and Ghana's Daily Graphic. The examination of the
newspapers reflected considerable diversity in their reporting and stand toward
the Arab and Israelis. While The New York Times was pro Israel in its reporting,
for example, the Moscow News was strongly pro Arab. The study provides a
quantitative and qualitative report of the nature of this diversity.
Mahboub Edmond Hashem (1984) attempted to determine the image and attitudes of
three leading American news magazines toward both the Arabs and the Israelis
during the period of two years before and one year after Israel's invasion of
Lebanon. He content-analyzed editorials and news stories of Newsweek, Time and
U.S. News and World Report between June 1980 and May 1983. He found a shift,
mostly negative, toward the Israelis, and a shift, somewhat positive, toward the
Arabs.
Hypotheses
This researcher will investigate the stand of three American "prestige"
newspapers toward the Arabs and Israel. For this purpose, the following
hypotheses were formulated. All the hypotheses are based on the likelihood that
the papers' editorials on the Middle East will be pro Israel, as previous
studies found. The first hypothesis states that when conflicts erupt between the
Arabs and Israelis, the American "prestige" press sides with Israel against the
Arabs. Previous research suggests that U.S. newspapers take a stand on
Israeli-Arab conflicts in Israel's favor. The second hypothesis states that the
American "prestige" press's bias towards Israel in its conflicts with the Arabs
changes in quality and quantity from one war to another, as previous research
suggests. The third hypothesis states that the American "prestige" press's bias
towards Israel in its conflicts with the Arabs varies in quality and quantity
from one paper to another. Previous research would suggest that different
newspapers would take different stands on Israeli-Arab conflicts.
METHODOLOGY
Population. The focus will be on one area of the media--the press, choosing
three national dailies: The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Los
Angeles Times. All of these are "prestige" newspapers that are internationally
oriented, have large circulations and provide national news services to other
papers.
Units of Analysis and Observation. The units of observation are the editorials
in the chosen newspapers, which were used as the sample for the study because
they provide the best materials for investigating and analyzing attitudes. The
units of analysis are the paragraphs of these editorials. Although editorials
are supposed to make stands on issues, which allows for less objectivity than in
the news, it is still vital to maintain credibility by adhering to the truth and
standing above emotions and self-interests. Therefore, a newspaper's stand, as
expressed in its editorial, should not be biased toward a certain party and
against another at the expense of the truth the paper is supposed to uphold .
The signed articles on the opinion page were not included because they reflect
the writer's opinion and not necessarily the editorial board's stand. The same
goes for cartoons. Editorials have been used extensively in previous studies
that have had similar purposes. Harold Lasswell used editorials in his classic
1941 Revolution and the Developments of International Relations (RADIR) research
(Zaremba, 1988), as did Ithiel De Sola Pool's study (1951) of "prestige"
newspapers.
Coverage Period. No period of any conflict exceeded a month. Therefore, one
month of coverage from the first day each war started was sufficient to evaluate
paper's stand. However, to assure a representative number of samples, in one
instance when few editorials were found in the first month of the 1982 war in
The Los Angeles Times, it was necessary to go on into the next month for extra
articles to complete a minimum of nine stories.
To assure availability of materials and resources, three major wars were
chosen--the Six Day war which began on May 5, 1967, between Israel and its
neighbors Egypt, Jordan and Syria; the Yom Kippur war which started on October
6, 1973, between Israel and Egypt and Syria with the participation of other Arab
countries such as Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and the 1982 Israeli invasion
of Lebanon and its subsequent war with Syria, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Lebanon.
Coding Methodology and Procedures. Coding the latent content for depth and
validity was chosen. There is a quantitative as well as a qualitative dimension
to the analysis. The quantitative dimension is facilitated by the usage of the
content analysis methodology. Content analysis is an objective and systematic
method for analyzing and quantifying media content. It is intended to provide
precise and concise descriptions of what the communication says in terms
appropriate to the purpose or problems involved. Content analysis has been used
previously to measure national attitudes and perspectives with editorials
employed as the sample for the studies (Babbie, 1992).
To facilitate the numeric and quantitative analytical process, a coding sheet
was created. The categories (explained later) were listed atop the sheet and the
coders were asked to fill columns underneath (pro Arab, pro Israel) with the
number of times each category appeared in each paragraph. The numeric evaluation
alone would not reflect the true nature of the statements, as one very strong
attack on one party would not be less in substance than many mild criticisms of
the other. Therefore, a pro-Israel/pro-Arab column was added for qualitative
evaluation by the coder of the paragraph's overall tone in favor of one party or
the other. For example, in Nov. 12, 1973, The New York Times wrote "Now it is
the Israelis, champions of peace negotiations from the start, who seem
apprehensive as the path to the conference room is marked out." The paper's
editors indicated here that Israel had sought peace long before the Arabs. While
the Arabs made their "first specific indication" of peace readiness, the
Israelis had always been "champions of peace negotiations from the start."
This example shows how the presentation of the facts clearly indicates a
newspaper's predilections. For the last column, therefore, the coder will look
into the statements in each paragraph and decide, subjectively, whether these
statements sound neutral or bias toward one party or another.
Each editorial is dated and given a case number. The frequencies and qualitative
evaluation checks are totaled and fed into a statistical computer program to
compute the stand of the newspapers toward each category, and analyze the
variance by the years of conflict under study (1967, 1973, 1982) and by the
newspapers under study (The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times and The
Washington Post).
To test intercoder reliability, the second coder coded the first 10% of the
materials that were coded by the first coder. The Holsti formula resulted in 91%
agreement, which is well above the minimum usually required (80%) to declare the
method fairly reliable.
Coding Categories.
The coders looked for and counted the frequencies of statements from the
following categories in each paragraph of each editorial. Many of these
categories were used by Zaremba (1988). An anti statement of one party was
counted as pro for the other. The total of pro statements determined whether the
newspapers and individual papers were rated as pro Israel, pro Arabs or, if
equal, numerically neutral. The last column was a subjective evaluation of each
paragraph, reflecting the coder judgement on the tone of the paragraph.
Eight categories were examined. They were:
Aggression. An unprovoked attack or warlike act; specifically, the use of armed
forces by a state in violation of its international obligations. This category
also includes physical or economic threats, such as an oil boycott. For example,
if an editorial states that country A exhibits militant behavior against country
B, this is considered a pro country B statement about aggression.
Intransigence. Unjustified stubborn resistance to meet and discuss
possibilities for peace. For example, if an editorial states that country A or
its leaders refuse to discuss a peace initiative or are demanding unreasonable
terms, this is considered a pro country B statement about intransigence.
Peace seeking. The antithesis of intransigence. It refers to genuine
willingness to seek and negotiate for peace. For example, if an editorial states
that country A is willing or seeking to negotiate peace and reach a fair
solution, this is considered a pro country A statement about peace seeking.
Terrorism. Terrorism is characterized by warlike acts directed against
non-combatants (i.e. civilians rather than soldiers). For example, if an
editorial states that country or group A is responsible for the bombardment of a
civilian target in country B, this is considered a pro country B statement about
terrorism.
Land legitimacy. Refers to the perceived ownership or right to occupy the
disputed land. For example, if an editorial states that country A has
sovereignty over certain territory, this is considered a pro country A statement
about land legitimacy.
Action justification. Refers to the perceived legitimacy of actions taken in
the conflict. For example, if an editorial states that country A was right to
take a certain action, this is considered a pro country A statement about action
justification.
Competence. Refers to an appreciation of one party's fitness, skill, strength,
wisdom and credibility. For example, if an editorial praises country A's ability
to achieve a quick victory over the bigger army of country B, this is considered
a pro country A statement about competence.
Incompetence. Refers to a criticism of one party's fitness, skill, strength,
wisdom and credibility. For example, if an editorial characterizes country A as
having a weak economy and is wasting its national income in buying armaments,
this is scored as pro-country B in the incompetence category.
To ensure objectivity, two American coders, a former journalist and a graduate
student, were recruited. The intercoder reliability was calculated using 10% of
the material which was coded by both coders. The coders identified remarks in
the editorials that took sides, such as those that defend one country and depict
the other as the aggressor, or, on a more subtle level, those which express
"understanding" for the motives of one country against the other. Beside the
categorical coding, the coders looked at the tone of the editorial to judge
qualitatively from the opinion and conclusion of the editorial if it is
favorable, against or neutral toward any party.
DISCUSSION
The results showed a general support for all the hypotheses. However, the
support varied across the categories showing strong support in some, failure in
others and moderate support in the rest.
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis states that when conflicts erupt between the Arabs and
Israelis, the American "prestige" press sides with Israel against the Arabs. To
test the validity of this hypothesis, T-tests of paired samples were performed,
where the mean scores of the variables pro Arab and pro Israel of each category
were compared. The results of all categories except peace seeking and land
legitimacy supported the hypothesis. With varying levels of significance, the
pro Israel mean score of each of the six categories and the qualitative
evaluation column was higher than the pro Arab mean score (see TABLE 1).
Judging from the content analysis of the chosen editorials, the American press
portrayed Arabs as aggressive twice as often as Israelis. Arabs were seen as
much more intransigent than Israelis. Only Arabs were reported as terrorists.
Twice as many Israeli actions were justified. Israel's competence was praised
three times more often, while Arab incompetence was pointed out five times more
frequently. Twice as many editorial paragraphs were judged as pro Israel by the
coders. Arabs were seen as equally peace seeking and their right to occupy
disputed land was equally recognized. By being even-handed on the land
legitimacy issue, the American press seemed to recognize that both the Arabs and
the Israelis had rights to disputed lands. For example, an editorial in The Los
Angeles Times stated "Clearly, there is need for a new system of political
accommodation in the area, involving recognition of Israel's statehood and
rights by the Arabs . . ." (The Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1967).
Many editorials showed deep contempt for Arab competence, especially in the
first war of 1967. In this war, the Israelis struck first and managed to destroy
most of the Egyptian air and naval power on the first day. The failure of the
Arab armies to stand up to the smaller but better equipped and trained Israeli
army showed the Arabs as incompetent people who were no equal to the Israeli's
superior power and competence. During the 1973 war, Arabs showed much more
competence and sophistication than in the previous war (Tibi, 1993). This fact
is not reflected in the editorials, which reported Arab competence with a
consistent low frequency. On the other hand, the editorials reported less
frequently about Arab incompetence during 1973, offering a bit more respect.
In the qualitative evaluation, the pro Israel mean score was more than double
the pro Arab. In their subjective evaluation, the coders felt that the editorial
writers' overall sympathy and support went out to the Israelis in the three
wars.
Hypothesis 2
This hypothesis states that the American "prestige" press' bias toward Israel in
its conflicts with the Arabs changed in quality and quantity from one war to
another. To test the validity of this hypothesis, We performed an analysis of
variance of the variables pro Arab and pro Israel for each category for the
years 1967, 1973 and 1982. The results supported the hypothesis in the following
categories: aggression, pro Arab peace seeking, pro Israel terrorism, pro Arab
land legitimacy, pro Israel action justification, pro Israel incompetence and
qualitative evaluation. In contrast to first hypothesis results, the pro Arab
mean score was higher in some years than the pro Israel mean score (see TABLE
2).
In 1967, the pro Israel bias of the American press was visible in all
categories. The pro Israel mean scores were clearly higher than the pro Arab
ones. In 1973, reporting about intransigence, peace seeking and action
justification became even-handed. The pro Israel bias persisted in all other
categories. There were fewer statements about Arab terrorism. The pro Israel
biases in competence and incompetence decreased. More editorial paragraphs were
deemed pro Arab by the coders.
In 1982, Israel was portrayed as aggressive more frequently. While reporting
about peace seeking was even-handed, the Arabs were seen as twice as
intransigent. Arabs were singled out with more than twice as much terrorism as
in 1967. The bias on land legitimacy was dramatically reversed in favor of the
Arabs. The pro Israel bias on action justification came back 2:1, with both mean
scores double those of 1967. The Arabs received no points on competence, while
the Israelis maintained a good score. Reports about Arab incompetence increased
markedly and the Israelis scored better than 3:1. Fewer editorial paragraphs
were deemed biased by the coders, but Israel maintained a 2:1 lead.
The following circumstances might justify or show as unjustified some of the
above shifts in the American press's stand from war to war.
In the first war of 1967, the American relations with Egyptian President Gamal
Abdul Nasser's regime, the main Israeli foe in the Middle East, was at its
worst. At the height of the cold war, Egypt's strong ties with Russia put Egypt
and its leader squarely on the other side. Israel, on the other hand, was
America's best ally in the Middle East. To the American press, Israel
represented the American way and ideals in the midst of an alien, backward and
hostile world (Tibi, 1993). Still, in the year 1967, when the first war erupted,
we cannot explain why Arab aggressive acts were reported to be six times as many
as the Israeli, although Israel started the war and tripled its size by
occupying Arabic lands (Tibi, 1993).
In 1973, Nasser was dead. In his place was a reasonable leader with whom the
West and the pro-West moderate Arab countries could do business. No more was
Egypt threatening the American strategical interests in the Arabian Peninsula
and the Persian Gulf. Also, there was no more Arabic rhetoric that promised to
throw Israel into the sea and spread and support socialism throughout the Arab
world. The new Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat was a moderate and wise leader
who started to build and maintain bridges of reconciliation with his moderate
neighbors, and through them with the USA (Ovendale, 1992). The Arabs accepted
all offers of peace as long as the peace plans guaranteed the return of their
lost lands. Unlike the previous war, Arab official statements were generally
accurate and non-rhetorical (Bailey, 1990). These developments might be one
reason the editorial writers have become less one-sided. Another was that the
American press now had improved access to the area in general and the Arab world
in particular. For the first time, American correspondents were able to report
from Damascus, Beirut, Amman and Cairo with more ease and fewer restrictions.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was a different kind of conflict from
the first two. The political landscape in the Middle East was completely
different. Egypt was now one of America's strongest allies. The
American-brokered peace accords of 1978, which came in the aftermath of the
electrifying Sadat visit to Israel, changed to a great degree the American
press's perception of the Arabs (Tibi 1993).
In 1982, Israel, with its hard-line Likud government, was seen in most
editorials as neither dove nor victim. The Israeli actions in Lebanon not only
caused wide civilian destruction, but also caused one of the worst massacres in
modern history when the Israeli Lebanese allies, with Israel's apparent
approval, murdered every man, woman and child in the Palestinian refugee camps
of Sabra and Shatila (Zaremba, 1988). The American press's access to the
warfield had greatly improved. Tens of correspondents and camera crews were at
hand to record every Israeli bombing and destruction. Arab sources were widely
available this time to give the other side of the story. Although the editors
tried initially to justify the Israeli action as a preemptive strike against the
Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) attacks on northern Israel, the
siege and bombing of Beirut and other Lebanese cities and villages and the high
civilian casualties made it harder and harder to explain and justify the Israeli
actions.
Hypothesis 3
This hypothesis states that the American "prestige" press' bias towards Israel
in its conflicts with the Arabs varies in quality and quantity from one paper to
another. To test the validity of this hypothesis,
We performed an analysis of variance of the variables pro Arab and pro Israel of
each category for the three national newspapers--The Los Angeles Times, The
Washington Post and The New York Times. The results supported the hypothesis in
all categories except pro Arab aggression, pro Israel intransigence, pro Arab
peace seeking, pro Israel terrorism and pro Israel land legitimacy. In these
categories, there were no differences between the papers. The mean scores
reflect the following picture: The New York Times sided with Israel very clearly
in all categories. The Los Angeles Times sided with Israel clearly in all
categories except action justification. The Washington Post was even-handed on
aggression, intransigence and action justification (see TABLE 3).
One reason The New York Times was always pro Israel might be the nature of its
audience. New York City has a sizable Jewish community. It is also a host to a
number of the biggest and most influential Jewish institutions and
organizations. Another speculative reason might be the Jewish ownership of the
paper.
Implications
One should note the positive trend this study shows. Although the bias was
consistent in all papers and conflicts, it did vary in degree among papers and
from one year to another. In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon, the American
press responded with more balanced reporting. This means that circumstances do
affect the papers' stand. Elaborate aggression, like that of 1982, did lessen
the press' bias toward Israel and allowed sharper criticism of its policy and
more sympathy with the Arabs. With more understanding of the issues and better
access to information and resources in the Middle East, future studies may show
even more balanced reporting.
Conclusions
The American media's pro-Israeli stand on the Arab-Israeli conflicts has been
the subject of many studies. Studies reviewed here found the news, reports and
editorials on or about Israel in the American media were highly
disproportionately positive. Many reasons contributed to this bias. In his
survey of leading journalists, S. Robert Lichter (1983) found widespread support
for the proposition that America has a moral obligation to prevent Israel's
destruction. Pro-Israel sentiment within the media elite appears to extend well
beyond the levels of support for Israel found among the general public, although
precise comparisons are impossible. The strength of this sentiment, he writes,
can be explained in part by both the high social status of these individuals and
the large proportion of ethnic Jews among them. In contrast, few Arabs work in
the American media. Even when the effects of ethnic composition and social
status are held constant, however, the media elite is characterized by strong
support for Israel. Also, American correspondents' access to countries and
information affects the amount and kind of coverage these countries received
(Grunwald, 1975; Breuning, 1983). There are many more American correspondents in
Israel than in the whole Arab world. Besides, Israel is much more receptive and
open to the American press than the Arabs. It is much easier for American
reporters to enter Israel and meet with its leaders than it is for them in an
Arab country (Ghareeb, 1983).
Language was and remains another barrier. American journalists who spoke Arabic
have been quite rare. Another real problem in contemporary media coverage of the
Middle East is the failure to distinguish between what Arab leaders say to
Western audiences or correspondents and their hard-line rhetoric that is
politically necessary on the domestic scene (Rubin, 1977). Ghareeb (1983) also
found that Israel's friends in the U.S., unlike the Arabs', have very good
contacts in the media and know how to handle them. When a story that is
unfavorable to Israel is printed, writing campaigns to the editor and other ways
of protest immediately are organized by Jewish organizations, institutions and
individuals. The Arabs, on the other hand, are virtually absent.
The reliance of American newsmen on public officials in their routines of news
gathering might be another reason behind U.S. press support for Israel.
According to Leon Sigal (1973), more news emanates from officials than from any
other source. Most of it passes routinely through formal channels of public
information in the government to reporters. But not all news gathering is
routine. Some non-routine news comes from officials who disclose a pertinent
piece of information to the press on their own initiative. The rest reporters
piece together by exchanging and cross-checking bits of information with their
contacts in the government. This reliance on public officials in news gathering
could influence the press' stand on issues. The administration and State
Department's commitment to Israel's security, for example, may filter down into
a similar stand by the press. The same goes for other issues relating to the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
The data of another study (Awadallah, 1982) revealed a definite tendency of four
major American newspapers to pay much more attention to Israel and Israeli
affairs and policies rather than to any other nation in the Middle East. His
findings indicate that the press considered Israel as playing a role of great
importance in that region for the West. The newspapers considered Israel as the
most important friend, the most powerful ally, and the most similar nation to
the U.S. in the Middle East. This study also found three major American
newspapers siding with Israel in its conflict with the Arabs. The bias varied in
quality and quantity from one conflict to another and from one paper to the
other but was consistent in all the wars and papers under study. While
suggesting reasons, this study, however, does not resolve the issue of cause.
With the help of modern communications and transportation, the American media
access to the Middle East is becoming much easier, faster and affordable. The
Arabs, on the other hand, are becoming more sophisticated in their understanding
and handling of the media. Many American correspondents are finding it much
easier today to access information and resources in a more receptive Arab world.
Now that the Cold War era has ended, Israel's remaining major foes--the Syrians
and Iraqis--are no longer counted in the Russian camp. The Egyptians have long
joined the Western camp after the American-brokered peace accords with Israel in
1978. Also, the usefulness of Israel as an alley in a strategical area threaten
by the Russian influence and invasion is no longer valid (Tibi, 1993). All these
factors could help the American media better understand the issues at stake in
the Middle East. With better understanding, more balanced stands may develop and
prompt more objective reporting.
(TABLE 1) T-Test of Paired Samples
Variables
Mean
SD
T-Value
Significance
Aggression
-7.34
.000
Pro Arab
.104
.370
Pro Israel
.2413
.551
Intransigence
-2.18
.029
Pro Arab
.0376
.220
Pro Israel
.0559
.252
Peace Seeking
-.85
.396
Pro Arab
.0245
.176
Pro Israel
.0297
.170
Terrorism
-5.07
.000
Pro Arab
.0000
.000
Pro Israel
.0236
.158
Land Legitimacy
-1.77
.077
Pro Arab
.0673
.277
Pro Israel
.0857
.301
Action Justification
-2.71
.007
Pro Arab
.0385
.233
Pro Israel
.0664
.263
Competence
-6.21
.000
Pro Arab
.0332
.193
Pro Israel
.1049
.347
Incompetence
-8.86
.000
Pro Arab
.0271
.187
Pro Israel
.1582
.466
Qualitative Evaluation
-24.83
.000
Pro Arab
.4493
.498
Pro Israel
.9196
.272
(TABLE 2) Analysis of Variance By Paper
Variable
Mean 67
Mean 73
Mean 82
F
Significance
Pro Arab Aggression
.03
.07
.47
97.581
.000
Pro Israel Aggression
.18
.27
.37
7.826
.000
Pro Arab Intransigence
.03
.06
.04
1.941
.144
Pro Israel Intransigence
.06
.05
.09
1.717
.180
Pro Arab Peace Seeking
.00
.04
.02
6.211
.002
Pro Israel Peace Seeking
.03
.03
.03
.15
.861
Pro Arab Terrorism
____
____
____
____
____
Pro Israel Terrorism
.02
.01
.05
6.555
.001
Pro Arab Land Legitimacy
.07
.04
.18
13.713
.000
Pro Israel Legitimacy
.11
.08
.05
2.368
.094
Pro Arab Action Justification
.03
.04
.06
1.268
.282
Pro Israel Action Justification
.07
.05
.14
5.492
.004
Pro Arab Competence
.03
.04
.00
1.78
.169
Pro Israel Competence
.12
.09
.09
1.057
.348
Pro Arab Incompetence
.02
.03
.06
2.683
.069
Pro Israel Incompetence
.21
.07
.22
13.078
.000
Pro Arab Qualitative Evaluation
.40
.53
.40
9.968
.000
Pro Israel Qualitative Evaluation
.94
.93
.80
17.175
.000
(TABLE 3) Analysis of Variance By Paper
Variable
Mean LA
Mean WP
Mean NY
F
Significance
Pro Arab Aggression
.07
.10
.12
1.895
.151
Pro Israel Aggression
.26
.13
.28
7.017
.001
Pro Arab Intransigence
.05
.07
.02
3.784
.023
Pro Israel Intransigence
.07
.06
.05
.628
.534
Pro Arab Peace Seeking
.01
.01
.03
1.273
.280
Pro Israel Peace Seeking
.02
.00
.05
5.848
.003
Pro Arab Terrorism
____
____
____
____
____
Pro Israel Terrorism
.02
.03
.02
.39
.677
Pro Arab Land Legitimacy
.05
.04
.10
5.06
.006
Pro Israel Legitimacy
.07
.10
.10
1.059
.347
Pro Arab Action Justification
.03
.09
.02
7.575
.001
Pro Israel Action Justification
.03
.10
.08
6.029
.002
Pro Arab Competence
.01
.03
.04
3.625
.027
Pro Israel Competence
.05
.12
.12
4.6
.010
Pro Arab Incompetence
.01
.05
.03
3.496
.031
Pro Israel Incompetence
.10
.15
.21
5.889
.003
Pro Arab Qualitative Evaluation
.40
.50
.46
3.263
.039
Pro Israel Qualitative Evaluation
.93
.87
.93
5.281
.005
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ABSTRACT
This study explores questions of bias in U.S. "prestige" press in relation to
Mideast conflicts. It content-analyzed the editorials of The Los Angeles Times,
The Washington Post and The New York Times published within a month of three
Arab-Israeli conflicts. Coders looked for statements about aggression,
intransigence, peace seeking, terrorism, land legitimacy, action justification,
competence and incompetence attributed to either party. They also qualitatively
evaluated the paragraphs for bias.
Statistical tests supported all the hypotheses.
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