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Creating a new man, creating a new nation? the media and the making of role
models
Creating A New Man, Creating A New Nation?
The Media and the Making of Role Models
in China's Market Economy Era
Chen Yanru (student)
School of Communication Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore 639798
Telephone: (65) 7995011
Telefax: (65) 7927526
E-mail: [log in to unmask]
Research paper submitted to the International Communication Division of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication for 1997 Annual
Convention in Chicago, Illinois, July 30-August 2.
Creating A New Man, Creating A New Nation?
The Media and the Making of Role Models
in China's Market Economy Era
This study provides an analysis of the process of the making of all three
national role models in the first three years of China's market economy era
(1992-1995), with a focus on the role of the media.
To begin with, a brief introduction to the stories of the three role models
would be illuminating.
A young military man, an ordinary country woman, and a middle-ranking official
of the Chinese Communist Party became the best known national heroes and models
in succession in China between early 1994 and mid-1995. The entire population
was called upon to emulate their examples and internalize their "spirit" and
virtues. Practically all the news media in China organized series of reports on
their deeds and thoughts. Even foreign correspondents from other countries
requested that they be given the opportunity to interview these models or their
relatives.[1]
What was behind all this media clamor about the three? A brief account of their
stories may partially explain the phenomenon. Xu Honggang, 21 years old in 1993,
was on his way back to his army unit from a home visit when he encountered four
men assaulting and robbing a woman on the long-distance bus he was riding. The
woman's husband and the other passengers were too frightened to fight back. Xu
rose to the occasion and braved the armed men, who stabbed him 14 times and
seriously wounded him. Seeing that they were fleeing, Xu tried to catch them
while his wounds were bleeding. Then he fainted. Passers-by and the other
passengers, stimulated by his courage, came to his help. He was sent to a
hospital and given the best cure and care until he recovered. With the
assistance of the people, the bandits were apprehended.[2]
If Xu had made a name for himself by displaying extraordinary courage in the
face of danger, Han Suyun won respect with her long suffering and endurance. For
more than 10 years she alone bore the toil of the field and the burden of her
husband's extended family in order for him to concentrate on his duties in the
army. For that purpose, she concealed her illness from him until it was nearly
too late. As news about her condition spread among her husband's colleagues and
their relatives, they offered her financial help for the operation she needed.
News about this charity in turn reached the news media, whose ensuing reports
aroused reactions from the whole society and a big hospital in Guangzhou, which
accepted her as an in-patient for free medical treatment. By the time she was
healed in late 1994, her name had become a household name.[3]
Kong Fansen was the third model in line, and the one who reportedly had caused
the greatest attention from party and government leaders and strongest reaction
from the mass. To make a long story short, he was dispatched to work in Tibet as
a leader for more than 10 years, where he died in an accident on an inspection
tour late in November 1994. Reporters who had formerly been acquainted with him
dug out the stories of his devotion to the Tibetan people during his service as
the party secretary of a prefecture and gave them ample coverage.[4]
Other people may have at times done what these three did, but the models' claim
to fame lies in the extent to which they had lived up to the highest moral
expectations of the nation--an extent not easily attainable by the ordinary
people. Psychologically, people admire or even worship heroes because the latter
have done what the majority cannot do. The extent can be divided into two types:
rise to an extraordinary occasion or persistence in doing seemingly
insignificant good deeds over a significantly long period of time, especially
under great financial, physical, and spiritual strain, enduring unusual
hardships. Clearly, Xu is of the first type, Han and Kong the second.
The three models differed in their heroic deeds, but the media have
editorialized that they all exemplified certain commonly esteemed traditional
Chinese virtues, especially love for the country and for the people, which
derived new connotations in the new era.[5] For example, an editorial in
People's Daily lauded Han Suyun for her self sacrificial deeds, but abstracted
from such deeds a "spirit of love," not just for her family, for her husband,
but for the army and the nation. It even went on to make the following
statement: "We should not take Han Suyun's story as an isolated case of devotion
out of love. It is not love in a narrow sense of the word. Hers is essentially
love for the nation. It is patriotism acted out in daily life. Further, the fact
that so many people cared for her after reading of her story in the media
indicates that patriotism has magnetic power of cohesion that brings all people
together."[6] In his article endorsing Kong Fansen as a national role model for
all leaders, Hu Jintao, head of the Central Party School, thus wrote: "In the
era of reform and open policy, in a market economy, what is the ultimate value
of an individual and what should be his loftiest pursuit? With his total
devotion to the needs of the people and absolute obedience to the call of the
Party, Kong Fansen answered this question. Creating more such leaders is the
urge of our times, the need of our cause, and the expectation of the people.
Role models have an immense power of influence."[7] Xu Honggang, commended for
his heroic deeds at first by the media, later received "elevated" media
treatment which editorialized his action and those who rescued him in terms of
"patriotism, heroism, and collectivism." The intent of promoting this role model
should be to magnify the theme that "heroes are all for the people, and the
people love heroes."[8]
Historical Flashback--What Are Role Models and What Are Their Roles
Creating models through the media to promote ideologies and values is a
tradition of the CP that dates back to the pre-1949 period.[9] From the
inception of the tradition the media were actively employed by the Party to
promote what some scholars called "exemplars," who would be given the label
"role models" in this study. This practice grew out of the belief that models
have immense power of influence on the other people's behavior. In more
sophisticated terms, the Chinese in general, and those in positions to educate
the people in particular, have always recognized the value of role models as an
effective means of persuasion and education.[10] During the past five decades,
one after another model had been exalted to suit different purposes of the Party
and the state. The one who has received the most persistent media emphasis is
Lei Feng, commended mainly for his loyalty to the Party and to the people. Among
others there were models for government officials, workers, farmers, soldiers,
and intellectuals. Many other models were also reported by the authoritative
news media over time, though they generally did not lead to governmental
endorsement and hence did not achieve renown on a national scale.[11]
The above mentioned are all national role models. In effect there are at any
given point in time millions of models throughout China, in different
professions and work units. The are selected as examplars of good behaviors for
others to emulate. In this sense, the chief function of role models in China, at
an individual level, is to be vehicles of socialization and means of social
control.[12] According to the late Chairman Mao, models play three roles: as
leaders, hardcores, and bridges. They are to act as vanguards or vehicles
through whom new policies are made known to the people. They are to be pace
setters or energizers at the same time, as hardcores. Then they are also the
bridge between the leadership above and the masses below.[13] Burch used
"imitation, inspiration, competition, and emanation" to explain the general
nature of emulation of models on which the leaders rely heavily to secure
compliance with changed values and changing policies.[14]
The making of models who are real life characters is usually part of a
nationwide effort to promote certain values and cultivate positive attitudes
among the people. In this regard it is a unique Chinese practice that has
attracted a very limited amount of focused scholarly attention. Existing
writings on this topic is in fact quite scanty. Western political scientists in
their works made occasional references to the models promoted in the past, but
only as evidence to support their propositions in their academic province.[15]
Occasionally scholars who documented China's radical social changes through
communication would cite role models created by the party and promoted through
the media as an agent of change, i.e. they helped to bring about changes in
other people's thinking and behavior.[16] Another example of study of role
models was incorporated as part of a larger campaign study, in which case the
focus was on the structure and process of mass propaganda campaigns.[17] But all
societies use models in one form or another as part of their socialization
process. They are used to "perpetuate traditional values and to infuse new ones,
to provide social cohesion by establishing a shared body of beliefs, and to
adapt society to new needs and situations."[18] The case at hand thrusts upon us
the challenge to mobilize the masses in the face of new needs and situations.
The current new needs and situations have been thrust upon the Chinese
population with the nationalization of market economy policy in 1992. It has
become commonsense knowledge that making money, rather than working for the
country on a self-sacrificial basis, is the primary goal in many people's lives.
What is the "shared body of beliefs" the national leaders seek to inculcate
through the promotion of these three models? Are the values traditional or new?
Debates have been going on since the 1980s among journalists on whether the
media should still make great efforts to discover and promote positive models in
an era when economic construction is the top priority of the country. Some have
serious doubts as to how influential such models (if there be any) could be on
people's thinking and action. Doubts intensified after the whole country was
plunged into the pursuit of a market economy that began in late 1992.[19] With
such major changes in national policy, accompanied by changes in social values
that have long been incubating, what role can the role models play? Should they
still be made through the media? These questions seem to have been answered to
some extent in the making of these three models.
Given the above described background, the main research questions for this
inquiry should be the following: which factor contributed the most to the choice
of particular models--the will of the party, the effort of the media, or the
expectation of the people? (Who created the models?) Was the creation of models
a reaction to negative trends in the society? What roles did the media play in
the making of models? Finally, are the roles of the models very much the same
today as they were in Mao's era?
Method
To answer the above questions, a descriptive analysis of the process of model
making is in order. Using mainly media coverage as the primary source of data,
the analysis tracks the entire process from the discovery of the potential
models all the way to the point where they became preserved in the nation's
history. A "new" typology for conceptualizing effects of role models will be
offered based on the case analysis. Finally, an overall analysis will abstract
the process to a philosophical level to discuss its dialectical implications.
Five Steps to Fame--Typical Process of the Making of Models
Based on a survey of documentary sources, it can be said with certainty that
none of the currently best known models rose to fame overnight. How were they
exalted from the relative obscurity as potential heroes to the level of
exemplars? Let us then trace the steps leading to their prominence in the media
and among the people.
Discovery--the serious injury, illness or death of a potential hero aroused
attention from those circumstantially related to them, who expressed their
concern or offered help. Then the collective action of the group led to
attention from the media, which started their reporting with an initial focus on
the deeds of the heroes and those related.
In the case of Xu Honggang the soldier, his deeds of "righteous courage" were
reported by Xinhua News Agency on 11 October 1993, soon after his fight with the
bandits. The story was picked up by the Central Broadcasting Station, which
aired a two-part feature called "We Admire this Star" on 28-29 December 1993.
National newspapers for the army, for the youth, for the intellectuals and for
the general audience all ran similar stories on the front page with special
editorials.[20]
With Han Suyun the start was more circuitous. On 17 October 1993, an army
officer in Guangxi province went to a neighboring brigade to visit his good
friend, Han's husband. Upon arrival, he found the soldiers and officers and
their relatives there making donations for Han. After interviewing those people
to ferret out the whole story, he informed the editors of a soldiers' magazine
of what he had learned and was urged to draft the story first. Propagandists in
the military then collaborated in writing a more detailed story for Guangxi
Daily. After several discussions and revisions to amplify the spiritual
dimensions of the story, the newspaper ran the feature called "A Tale of Love"
on 13 November 1993. At the end of the year the report appeared in Yangcheng
Evening News in Guangzhou, which prompted a doctor to request to the chief of
his hospital that the heroine be given free treatment. His request was
immediately granted. During the treatment, more and more people from the whole
society came to lend a helping hand to Han Suyun, and media reports subtly
shifted their emphasis to the medical treatment and featured the theme of mutual
love and help in the Chinese national family. Later, the army and the local
governments jointly conducted in-depth interviews in Han's hometown in Shandong
province to verify her story. The provincial government issued a circular
calling for all to follow her example.[21]
The case of Kong Fansen was slightly different. While he was still living and
working in Tibet, his dedication to his tasks and concern for the well-being of
the people there had already caught the attention of several reporters who were
consciously looking for new models for party members. Feature stories about him
had appeared in provincial newspapers.[22] Reactions were more than expected.
Over 30 young people from different parts of the country who had read the
features wrote to Kong and expressed their willingness to go and work in his
prefecture--the one with the harshest natural conditions in Tibet.[23] Soon
after his death, major dailies in Tibet and Shandong published commemorative
stories written by these reporters who had known him well.
In general, between the initial discovery of the story by the media and the
next step, there was a period of three to four months during which descriptions
of the heroic deeds occupied the center stage. To be fair, a distinct message
for moral exhortation had not yet been abstracted, since ideological directives
had not yet been given by the top leaders. At best we had a "story" here.
Endorsement is the second step of the potential models' rise to fame, usually a
planned process in contrast to the initial step which is at least in part
accidental. It prepares for the formation of a message to be illustrated through
the model.
A pattern is easily identifiable. After the initial reports aroused local
reactions, the top leaders of the army, the government and the party started to
take note of these "heroic stars," through both media news and internal
references submitted by local governments.[24] In early 1994 and early 1995, the
nation's top leaders met Xu Honggang and Han Suyun respectively, lauding them
for their deeds, which were elevated to the level of being exemplary of the
traditional Chinese virtues and reflecting the party's legacy.[25] In so doing
the leaders put their stamp of approval on the heroes. Moreover, the former in
effect prescribed the direction for the media to follow in further promoting the
heroes, i.e. more than merely telling the story, the media should strive to
abstract the heroes' spiritual essence and phrase it in line with the party's
legacy.
All the major news media gave these meetings and evaluations prominent
play, followed by organized reporting in which journalists from several
newspapers took part. They traced the heroes' path of growth by interviewing a
large number of people in their hometowns, their current homes, as well as
neighboring provinces where social reactions were strongest to their
stories.[26]
Although Kong Fansen could not have met the central leaders, he as a potential
model also received their endorsement. On 3 January 1995, Xinhua News Agency
issued a long feature about his dedication to his duties, which was given full
play in People's Daily on the next day. It was soon brought to the attention of
the head of CP's Central Propaganda Department, who considered the story a
moving one and instructed Xinhua to grope deeper into Kong's inner self to
present a bona fide model for all the officials of the market economy era.[27]
Endorsed by the Party, the making of models came into full swing. It was at
this point that the potential models started to become officially acknowledged
ones. Following the directives given by the central leaders, those in direct
charge of the major news media openly prescribed the guidelines for the
reporters: grasp the spiritual essence of the models by interpreting the
motivation for their actions in line with the ideals and values the government
was seeking to promote among the people.[28] For example, regarding the
promotion of Xu Honggang's story, the vice chairmen of the Central Military
Commission of the CP indicated that it was not to be merely another one of those
"brave men's stories." Rather, it needed to be fully contextualized to show the
amiable relationship of mutual care between the army and the people, which had
always been regarded as part of the army's tradition.[29]
Paralleling the launch of full-scale promotional campaign, the relevant
departments of the Party, the government, the Youth League, and the All-China
Women's Federation (in the case of Han Suyun) would issue circulars calling for
people from the whole nation to imitate the models.[30] Disseminated by the
national media, these circulars were a further step towards implementing the top
leaders' directives.
Exaltation is a unique step taken by the media to implement the leaders'
directives by elevating the models to the highest possible level to consciously
inspire a feeling of admiration or even adoration among the audience. To form a
strong message, media reporting made the transition from description of heroic
deeds to abstraction of the motivation behind such deeds into loftier spiritual
terms. These terms reflect strict adherence to the prescription given by the
leaders.
One might wonder why the stories should be interpreted in those prescribed
terms. It would be easier to understand if we view these models against the
social background. During the preceding steps there was no indication that the
models were being promoted to counter the influence of the seamy side of the
society. But even an average citizen can easily understand this hidden motive.
Specifically, Xu Honggang's story happened at a time when the increase in the
size of mobile population was causing serious problems such as crimes that
disrupted the social order. Overall, there were fewer heroes than villains
(heroes being righteously brave men like Xu, villains the bandits with whom he
fought). A recrudescence in crimes committed by road gangs like the ones Xu
encountered had stirred up great fear among the people. Xu's courage, rare at
such a time, seemed all the more valuable. It is also self evident that both the
government and the people believed that if there could be more courageous men
like him, social order would improve.[31] In addition, in the farther background
was the June 4 Incident in 1989 which had tarnished the image of the military
and spoilt the relationship between the army and the people. Xu's case served as
a vivid illustration of how amiably army soldiers and civilians related to each
other, especially in moments of great crisis.
As for Han Suyun, she had by this stage come to be commended for her
sacrificial love for her family, for the army and for the country. The reasoning
ran like this: by shouldering the burden of the family she gave her husband full
support for his work in the army on the national border, and thus contributed
indirectly to national defense. Therefore, her story became known as an
illustration of patriotism. Of course, to outsiders this may well seem a little
far-fetched, but to the Chinese people it is part of the tradition in model
promotion. Han's example, with guided interpretation, fit smartly into the
ongoing larger national campaign for patriotism that had been launched two years
earlier.
Everyone with some knowledge of the widespread corruption among Chinese party
and government officials would readily appreciate the motivation for the
vehement promotion of Kong Fansen as a model for party members. He had been
respected for his honesty and loyalty. Granted that the absolute amount of
attention a person can give to external stimuli is limited in a given period of
time, the positive model, when exalted to a level irresistibly visible to the
whole population, could divert some attention of the people from the corrupt
officials and hence alleviate the rising mass discontent. Moreover, this model
could have been intended for restoring at least perceptually the once close link
between the party and the people.[32]
Exaltation involved the intertwined processes of sublimation and illustration.
Sublimation of the models' virtues into some kind of national spirit enlarged
the distance between the heroes and the worshippers. Since the ultimate purpose
was to mobilize the whole population into action, the models had yet to be
brought back nearer to the people. So in all three cases report tours were used
as a means to achieve this end. [33] Speakers typically included the models
themselves (with the exception of Kong Fansen), grassroots level officials who
were their direct superiors familiar with their deeds, representatives of those
who had been involved in caring for the models when they were injured or ill (in
the cases of Xu and Han), and reporters who had conducted in-depth interviews
with the models. The reports were telecast the first time they were given, and
the programs were rebroadcast by the central, provincial, and local TV stations
for many times. For each of the three models, the number of direct audience who
attended the report meetings exceeded one million. In fact, in Yunnan Province
alone, the report tour for Kong Fansen's story attracted audiences that added up
to one million.[34] The weight of this fact has to be discounted, for according
to the Chinese political ritual, most of that audience could have been organized
by their institutions such as universities and companies, which made attendance
compulsory.
The direct presence of the models among the audience during those report
meetings was intended to make the heroes more real to the ordinary people. Their
personal accounts had a different emphasis from those given by the news media.
The speakers focused more on their personal growth from average people into
models through mundane daily experiences. Understandably, the news media tended
to capture the dramatic moments that occasioned the making of models, who now
spoke of how they had been made in ordinary life over a long period of time. In
the special case of Kong Fansen, his colleagues recalled numerous details
illustrating his persistent ideological integrity, his self-discipline, his care
for others, his work enthusiasm, and above all, his devotion.[35] It should be
noted that all the facts were clearly interpreted in light of the spiritual
principles advocated by the CP.
Popularization is the climax of the promotional campaigns. Based on number
count, this step received the largest amount of presentation in the news media.
Logically, if not followed by many people, a model loses its significance. But
the swiftness with which a large following accumulated after every model, as was
reported by the media, must be interpreted with caution, if not doubt. Only days
after their stories had been publicized, News items were replete with phrases
such as "a wave of enthusiasm to emulate Han Suyun/Kong Fansen/ Xu Honggang
throughout the whole country" and "patriotic sacrifice has become the
societywide fashion of the day." A possibly more accurate expression should be
that there was a wave of enthusiasm in propagating their heroic stories.
Beginning in mid-February 1994, several days after the General Political
Department of the People's Liberation Army issued its circular calling for
imitation of Xu Honggang, more than 10 items of news on topics related to him
appeared in CCTV's primetime newscast within a week. Given the great variety of
issues to be covered in this news program, the number is quite unusual. Almost
all these items consisted mainly of opinions and attitudes expressed by young
people interviewed by TV reporters in the street,[36] university students who
had attended meetings of the report tour,[37] and Xu's fellow soldiers.[38]
Predictably, all the opinions were uniformly supportive of the model soldier's
behavior, with indications of admiration for his courage. The students as shown
interviewed on TV sounded more eloquent in contextualizing Xu's virtue in terms
of how significant it would be to improving the social spiritual environment.
Some reflection on the content of the news led to a troublesome thought: while
the audience members interviewed can be believed to be speaking their mind, none
of them expressed a personal willingness or readiness to emulate the hero. This
contradicted the sweeping generalization in the action news that countless
people were following the hero's example. On a superficial level, imitation
began with admiration, as was reported by CCTV that members of the youthful
"star-chasing tribe" (a label on young admirers of actors and actresses ) were
turning over to admiring this new "star"--a hero of the times.[39]
Xu's behavior had been a reaction to an extraordinary occasion and therefore
most people would find it difficult to mentally or verbally commit to the idea
of following his example. While Han Suyun and Kong Fansen were commended for
their endurance in doing good, which seemed more attainable to some extent by
the ordinary people. According to media news, survey results showed that in
Shandong, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing, Han Suyun was the person "most talked
about" in January 1995.[40] Regrettably, the report did not tell us what were
the interactional settings in which she was talked about. Most likely the
surveyees had been convenient samples in the streets or at some social
institutions. Admiration did not stop here. Thousands of soldiers' wives were
reported to have expressed a strong desire to emulate Han by giving their
husbands full support at home for their service in the army.[41]
Reactions to the story of Kong Fansen were many, but most reports dealt with
immediate actions taken by his admirers. Military college students, cadres at
the central government agencies, among others, were said to be volunteering to
go to work in Tibet. Media news suggested that these actions had been inspired
by organized study sessions as follow-up to viewing of the TV programs.[42]
Report tours usually continued during this stage to cover a better part of the
country. Wherever the report group arrived, a welcome would be given by the
local government. Then every report meeting would receive at least
matter-of-fact coverage from the local and provincial media, which invariably
highlighted reactions from the audience. Meetings attended by large audiences
would be featured in CCTV news, typically with scenes of some listeners whose
facial expressions showed that they had been touched by the stories in some
way. As if following a formula, such news would always conclude with this
sentence: "Everyone present was deeply moved." [43]
At first glance, by this time the message and model combined had displayed some
might in arousing emotional and behavioral reactions. At least some audience
seemed to have been inspired and were imitating the models. But notable is the
fact that they might be doing so under group pressure.
Preservation is the final step that enters the models into the nation's
repository of culture. The audience-perceived psychological proximity or
distance of models--all contribute to or compromise the intended effects. No
doubt, the government had its mind set on mobilizing the masses to take a more
active and self-sacrificial part in the construction of socialist market
economy. This reflects on the enduring role of media propaganda as an instrument
of mobilization in Communist China.[44]
Products of the entertainment media featuring the models might leave a strong
impression on some audience, owing in part to the fact that it is a rare
privilege in China for any real life person who is not a leader to be the
central character of a film or TV series.[45]
Regardless of the effect or the lack of it, both news and entertainment media
contributed to the preservation of the models (who are now symbols) in history.
They are now part of the historical reference for the nation's leaders who at
times of necessity in the future may resort to invoking them as established
examples for the larger population. This fact is easily neglected by most
observers, but it will prove to have far-reaching significance, as is already
evidenced in the periodic invocation of past models by the Party leaders to
combat strains of negative cultural influences in current times.
Since every promotional campaign had to round up at some point, there were
distinct marks to their ending, such as a summaries written by the commentator
of the party organ (according to detailed instructions by CP propaganda heads)
that called for the activities to move into a "more profound, enduring phase."
This is the political signal of conclusion.
The climax of the promotion of Xu Honggang's heroism coincided with the
anniversary of Mao's inscription for the famous late soldier Lei Feng. Top
leaders of the Party, government and military did not miss this opportunity to
give Xu their concluding approval--inscriptions. Jiang Zemin's inscription
followed Mao's wording for Lei Feng, the only difference being that now the name
was Xu Honggang.[46] As for Kong Fansen, so much importance was attached to his
example that Hu Jintao, highest-ranking official in charge of the education of
Party members, wrote an article calling for all to learn from Kong.[47] Upon all
three models the relevant departments of the party and the government conferred
honorary titles.[48] These rituals determined that the models had their
positions established in the nation's political history.
Culturally, activities were more diverse. Dramas, operas, song and dance
parties featuring each of the three models were staged and televised toward the
end of the promotion.[49] Top leaders' attendance at such performances was duly
reported along with their encouraging comments which recaptured the models'
spiritual essence as guide for action for the mass.
Meanwhile, books on the thoughts and deeds of the models, usually written by
organized teams, were promptly published.[50] For Kong Fansen there was even a
large pictorial.[51]
TV documentaries, feature films, and TV drama series were made of every model,
and publicity started long before they were ready to be shown.
DiscussionDAn Idealistic Typology of Possible Effects of Role Models
The effect of almost all media communication to any audience is contingent upon
a wide variety of factors including individual differences and external
environment. It is impractical to think of an ideal effect of communication.
However, to know where the communication process falls short of achieving
intended effects, it would be useful to first set up an ideal framework of
effects against which the actual effects can be examined.
In the last analysis, models are created to foster a new identity of the
average individual in China. This should be seen as part of the attempt to
integrate the nation spiritually with a centripetal force, when the newly
unleashed market force was pulling at the nation in various directions, with
individuals keen on pursuits of mutually conflicting interests. Since 1992,
national leaders had been repeatedly warning the people against the spread of
hedonism, money worship, and extreme individualism. Probably by no coincidence,
the three models' stories were clearly meant to exemplify collectivism,
patriotism, and socialism (party ideology) respectively.
Abiding by the law of the economy of thought, the media can exalt models to
national prominence that assails the attention of nearly everyone, making it
simpler for all to follow a concrete example instead of having to absorb
abstract ideas and convert them into guide for action. The underlying assumption
is that if every individual looks to an exalted figure and uses it as a
mirror/yardstick to reflect on/measure his own behaviors, all the individuals of
a nation would logically be drawn toward the center--achieving in effect some
kind of integration.
This perspective is contrary to the proposition in the Soviet communist theory
of the press that the government would seek to improve man by improving
society.[52] What we have envisioned here is the idea of improving society by
improving man. Certainly, it is an underlying assumption guiding the CCP's
promotion of models, even though in reality it is difficult to draw a clear line
between improving man by improving society and improving society by improving
man. In fact, the improved man can be an agent to improve society.
Theoretically, the effect should be described in three terms: inspiration,
imitation, and integration. Ideally, integration has three connotations: the
models and the spiritual loftiness of the nation become one in identity; the
average individual's new (changed) identity becomes one with that of the
model(s), forming a spiritual union, the national spirit initially reflected
through the models now expressing itself through the average individual; and in
a consummate sense, all individuals, by conforming to the likeness of the
models, share an integrated identity. In simpler words, the process involves
transition from telling about the models' deeds to doing what they did to
internalizing their spirit as part of being.
This conception deviates from the conventional categorization of responses to
social influences (including those from the media)--compliance, internalization,
and identification. Along this continuum the individual's change moves from
outwardly conforming to the wishes of the influencing source to internalizing
the position of the influencing source to willingly identifying with the
influencing source by changing personal beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors.[53]
The current conception presented in this article is justified by the Chinese
political and cultural context, in which people for decades have been socialized
into thinking of influence-induced changes in individuals in terms of words,
deeds, and thoughts. Surely, the conception is not entirely new, and to a
limited extent it is comparable to Burch's typology of "imitation, inspiration,
competition, and emanation."
At this point in such a study one is tempted to ask: what might be the effect
of such mass emulation campaigns? A recent study on the effect of moral
education campaigns after the June 4 incident documented that the once much
emulated national role model, Lei Feng, whose virtues were in part exemplified
in the current three models, has been relegated to the bottom of a list of
"celebrities" ranked by student respondents who were asked to indicate which one
inspired in them the greatest desire for emulation. Reformist intellectuals with
modernized thinking (not free from Western influence), scientists with
international recognition, and rising political leaders popular among the
people...these were better favorites among the young people.[54] Frequent
publications in the Chinese media also provide the general observation that the
traditional type of role models who had once been admired and emulated are no
longer in vogue. Without stretching this evidence too far, we might say that it
points our expectation of effects of role models to a gloomy direction.
Conclusions
The five steps encompassed in the making of national role models might be the
main contribution this study makes to the existing scholarship on role models.
As was stated above, in all societies models are used for educational purposes.
But only in some societies are they held up for organized, mass emulation. China
is a strong illustration of this point. In the pre-reform eras, small group
processes and organizational pressures helped to ensure imitation.
This study has also exceeded the bounds of the conventional way of conceiving
media effects. The typology "inspiration, imitation, integration" provides a new
way to conceive of media effects. Models served as the illustration of the
message the government wished to preach to the people. Whether or not models
would achieve the desired influence depended largely on the other forces pulling
at each individual audience member. Though seemingly oversimplified, this
typology provides a reference for future studies of media effects. But the mere
fact that during the process of model making through the media, a large number
of people, especially the young, were involved in promotional activities,
indicates that the making of models is not without its effect. What remains to
be seen is whether or not under the market economy structure, when people are
accorded the alternatives of not following the line being promoted by the state
government, they would still regard the models in the same way as did their
preceding generations.
As for inspiration, imitation, and internalization as indicators of effect, so
much can be said with assurance: the stories and images of the models did seem
to touch the hearts of many people, but collective imitation of role models was
compulsory and may not be used as the valid indicator of effects.
Internalization of the "spirit" of the models is hard to measure until a later
point in time.
Overall, the Chinese media, the national leaders, and the audience all
participated in the making of role models. Compared with past cases indicated
above, there is not as much domination on the part of the government in the
process. During the Maoist era, role models were created almost entirely by the
party and the government at the will of the top leader to illustrate certain
ideologies to the masses of people who were then coerced into group action to
emulate them.
In the current case, the models more or less presented themselves, though
the larger political and social context did provide the background for them to
make their way into the media. Evidence suggested that at least some journalists
were consciously searching for new role models to replace the past ones to
reflect the national ethos of the current market economy era, and these models
at their potential stage happened upon such a search. On the part of the
government, an effort to combat the excess of individualism and materialism had
been part of its mass education agenda for years, and the models, once presented
by the media, were ordered to be re-packaged to the level of semi-saints who
embodied all the desirable virtues and qualities of collectivism, patriotism,
and socialism. One notable fact is a sense of collectivism was the emphasis in
the promotional messages, as was evidenced in the depiction of the mutually
helpful relationship between members of the military, the party, and civilians
in all three cases.
In other words, the role models were not presented as some towering figures
totally aloof of the other members of the population, but as part of the larger
populace, and were shown as having their fundamental roots and ties in the
masses, which had contributed to their welfare and appreciated their self
sacrifice.
The media's role was more than instrumental in the process of model making.
Without the media, the potential models would not have been brought to the
attention of the national leaders whose sanction determined that the potential
ones should or should not be turned into actual role modelsDand on what scale.
Without the media, the role models would not have been exalted to national
prominence and registered in the minds of the masses. Again, without the media,
the role models, with their stories and the ideological messages they embodied,
would not have been preserved in the nation's cultural repository. Among those
who had accomplished extraordinary deeds, some became national role models while
others did not, partly due to the selection by journalists who were in daily
contact with the masses and who exercised their political discretion in judging
which ones might best illustrate the traits and characteristics of the Chinese
citizen, which the party and the government sought to promote.
At a more abstract level, future studies of the making of new models might
explore further into a dialectical process which has just emerged from the
analysis of this case of limited scope. The process followed the route of model
buildingDglorificationDidentificationDdeificationDskepticismDcynicism. Through
the media, models are made and glorified among the people, who may be
emotionally aroused to varied extents and somewhat identify with the models. In
such exalted positions, the models seem to be deified. Yet the reality of life
accords none of the glorious circumstances or gratification of those surrounding
the role models created by the media, and reality falls far short of the ideals
embodied in the images of the models, who over time and by way of repetitive
propaganda gradually lose the idealistic charm about them. Instead, as is
indicated in the study of how people ranked past models, many are at best
skeptical about these once glorious stars admired by all. At worst, if the
propaganda machinery including the media continuously bombard the population
with such models and cast them in the image of semi deities, the end result may
be total cynicism on the part of the masses. This concern should be addressed in
future studies.
Epilogue
On new year's day, 1996, China Central Television prime time newscast included
the following item: how do the national role models celebrate their Chinese new
year, an occasion for family and fun? Xu Honggang the heroic soldier was shown
on the screen chatting with his fellow soldiers while getting ready for the new
year's eve dinner. Han Suyun was wrapping dumplings with her husband and
daughter. In the household of Kong Fansen, his widowed wife was busy organizing
the family for new year's eve, including the two Tibetan orphans Kong had
fostered before his death. The footage ended with a song sung by the children,
"We all have a family, and China is her name_"
Bringing the exalted role models back to earth, among the ordinary people, in
the nation family?
1. Xiao Ping, "Review of the reporting of hero Xu Honggang," Chinese Journalist
(May 1994), pp. 28-30.
2. "Salute a guardian of the people," People's Daily, 11 January 1994, p. 1.
3. Li Hua, "The story behind Han Suyun's rise to fame," People's Political
Consultation Press, June 1995.
4. Xinhua News Agency, "Kong Fansen--a model for all leaders," 6 April 1995.
5. This observation emerged from a review of all the editorials regarding the
three models respectively in China's leading national newspapers.
6. Xinhua News Agency, 11 January 1995.
7. Xinhua, 11 May 1995.
8. Xiao, op cit.
9. Li Kaiyu, "Exemplars and the Chinese press: emulation and identity in Chinese
Communist politics," in Media Information Australia (May 1994), pp. 84-93.
10. Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (California: Stanford
University Press, 1969), pp. 11-12.
11. Mary Sheridan, "The emulation of heroes," The China Quarterly, 33 (1968),
pp. 47-72.
12. Betty B. Burch, "Models as agents of change in China," in Richard W. Wilson,
ed. Value Change in Chinese Society (Praeger, 1979), pp. 130-131.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Frederic Wakeman, History and Will (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1973).
16. Godwin C. Chu, Radical Change Through Communication in Mao's China
(Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1977).
17. Vincent V. S. King, Propaganda Campaigns in Communist China (Cambridge,
Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966).
18. Burch, "Models," pp.122.
19. A summary of these debates and doubts can be found in an article entitled
"Two generations of reporters on the promotion of models," in Chinese Journalist
(June 1995), pp. 4-6.
20. See People's Liberation Army Daily, 31 December 1993; China Youth Daily, 7
January 1994; Guangming Daily, 9 January 1994; and People's Daily, 11 January
1994.
21. This account is pieced together by the author through a search of all
relevant information in different news reports.
22. Among them a most detailed account was "In Tibet there is such a native of
Shandong" by Wei Wu, in Mass Daily, 17 February 1994.
23. Wei Wu, "Forever remembered--tracing the story of Kong Fansen," Chinese
Journalist (June 1995), pp. 7-8.
24. Li, op cit.
25. China Central Television (CCTV) news, 3 February 1994; 27 January 1995.
26. Li, op cit. Xiao, op cit.
27. He Ping, "Ode to the hero of our times," Chinese Journalist (June 1995), pp.
12-13.
28. Ibid.
29. Xiao, op cit.
30. CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995; 13 February 1994.
31. Local and provincial news media provided a large amount of coverage on the
rise of crimes.
32. This hidden motive was made explicit by a reporter Wang Shiliang in his
article "Seeking a model for public servants," in Chinese Journalist (June
1995), pp. 9-10.
33. CCTV news, 26 February 1994; 4 January 1995; 15 April 1995.
34. CCTV news, 17 May 1995.
35. This summary is the result of viewing the televised reports in comparison
with print media stories.
36. CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
37. CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
38. CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
39. CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11
April 1994.
40. CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
41. CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
42. CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
43. CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
44. C.P. Cell, Revolution at Work: Mobilisation Campaigns in China (New York:
Academic Press, 1977).
45. This observation emerged from interviews with a wide range of people of
different age groups with different socioeconomic status, most of whom remarked
that "if the government wants to make movies and TV series out of these folks,
it really wants them to be remembered."
46. CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
47. CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
48. CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
49. CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11
April 1994.
50. CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
51. CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
52. Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1956).
53. M.C. Kelman, "Processes of opinion change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25
(1961), PP. 57-58.
54. Stanley Rosen, "The effect of post-4 June Re-education campaigns on Chinese
students," The China Quarterly, no. 134 (June 1993), pp. 310-334.
[1] Xiao Ping, "Review of the Reporting of Hero Xu Honggang," Chinese Journalist
(May 1994), pp. 28-30.
[2] "Salute A Guardian of the People," People's Daily, 11 January 1994, p. 1.
[3] Li Hua, "The Story behind Han Suyun's Rise to Fame," People's Political
Consultation Press, June 1995.
[4] Xinhua News Agency, "Kong Fansen--A Model for All Leaders," 6 April 1995.
[5] This observation emerged from a review of all the editorials regarding the
three models respectively in China's leading national newspapers.
[6] Xinhua News Agency, 11 January 1995.
[7] Xinhua News Agency, 11 May 1995.
[8] Xiao, op cit.
[9] Li Kaiyu, "Exemplars and the Chinese Press: Emulation and Identity in
Chinese Communist Politics," in Media Information Australia (May 1994), pp.
84-93.
[10] Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, California: Stanford
University Press, 1969.
[11] Mary Sheridan, "The Emulation of Heroes," The China Quarterly, 33 (1968),
pp.`47-72.
[12] Betty B. Burch, "Models as Agents of Change in China," in Richard W.
Wilson, ed. Value Change in Chinese Society (Praeger, 1979).
[13] Burch, 130-131.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Frederic Wakeman, History and Will, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1973.
[16]
[17]
[18] Burch, 122.
[19] A summary of these debates and doubts can be found in an article entitled
" Two Generations of Reporters on the Promotion of Models," in Chinese
Journalist (June 1995), pp. 4-6.
[20] See People's Liberation Army Daily, 31 December 1993; China Youth Daily, 7
January 1994; Guangming Daily, 9 January 1994; and People's Daily, 11 January
1994.
[21] This account is pieced together by the author through a search of all
relevant information in different news reports.
[22] Among them a most detailed account was "In Tibet There Is Such A Native of
Shandong" by Wei Wu, in Mass Daily, 17 February 1994.
[23] Wei Wu, "Forever Remembered--Tracing the Story of Kong Fansen," Chinese
Journalist (June 1995), pp. 7-8.
[24] Li, op cit.
[25] China Central Television (CCTV) news, 3 February 1994; 27 January 1995.
[26] Li, op cit. Xiao, op cit.
[27] He Ping, "Ode to the Hero of Our Times," Chinese Journalist (June 1995),
pp. 12-13.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Xiao, op cit.
[30] CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995; 13 February 1994.
[31] Local and provincial news media provided a large amount of coverage on the
rise of crimes.
[32] This hidden motive was made explicit by a reporter Wang Shiliang in his
article "Seeking A Model for Public Servants," in Chinese Journalist (June
1995), pp. 9-10.
[33] CCTV news, 26 February 1994; 4 January 1995; 15 April 1995.
[34] CCTV news, 17 May 1995.
[35] This summary is the result of viewing the televised reports in comparison
with print media stories.
[36] CCTV news, 19, 21, February 1994; 1, 4 March 1994.
[37] CCTV news, 22, 26 February 1994.
[38] CCTV news, 26 February 1994.
[39] 18 February 1994.
[40] CCTV news, 10, 12, 20 January 1995.
[41] CCTV news, 14, 15 January 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11 April
1994.
CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11 April
1994.
CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11 April
1994.
CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
[42] 1.Xiao Ping, "Review of the Reporting of Hero Xu Honggang," Chinese
Journalist (May 1994), pp. 28-30.
2. "Salute A Guardian of the People," People's Daily, 11 January 1994, p. 1.
3. Li Hua, "The Story behind Han Suyun's Rise to Fame," People's Political
Consultation Press, June 1995.
4. Xinhua News Agency, "Kong Fansen--A Model for All Leaders," 6 April 1995.
5. This observation emerged from a review of all the editorials regarding the
three models respectively in China's leading national newspapers.
6. A summary of these debates and doubts can be found in an article entitled "
Two Generations of Reporters on the Promotion of Models," in Chinese Journalist
(June 1995), pp. 4-6.
7. Frederic Wakeman, History and Will, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1973.
8. See People's Liberation Army Daily, 31 December 1993; China Youth Daily, 7
January 1994; Guangming Daily, 9 January 1994; and People's Daily, 11 January
1994.
9. This account is pieced together by the author through a search of all
relevant information in different news reports.
10. Among them a most detailed account was "In Tibet There Is Such A Native of
Shandong" by Wei Wu, in Mass Daily, 17 February 1994.
11. Wei Wu, "Forever Remembered--Tracing the Story of Kong Fansen," Chinese
Journalist (June 1995), pp. 7-8.
12. Li, op cit.
13. China Central Television (CCTV) news, 3 February 1994; 27 January 1995.
14. Li, op cit. Xiao, op cit.
15. He Ping, "Ode to the Hero of Our Times," Chinese Journalist (June 1995), pp.
12-13.
16. Ibid.
17. Xiao, op cit.
18. CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995; 13 February 1994.
19. Local and provincial news media provided a large amount of coverage on the
rise of crimes.
20. This hidden motive was made explicit by a reporter Wang Shiliang in his
article "Seeking A Model for Public Servants," in Chinese Journalist (June
1995), pp. 9-10.
21. CCTV news, 26 February 1994; 4 January 1995; 15 April 1995.
22. CCTV news, 17 May 1995.
23. This summary is the result of viewing the televised reports in comparison
with print media stories.
24. CCTV news, 19, 21, February 1994; 1, 4 March 1994.
25. CCTV news, 22, 26 February 1994.
26. CCTV news, 26 February 1994.
27. 18 February 1994.
28. CCTV news, 10, 12, 20 January 1995.
29. CCTV news, 14, 15 January 1995.
30. CCTV news, 2 July 1995; 26 June 1995; 14 May 1995. Mass Daily, 9 April 1995.
31. CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
32. CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
33. CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
34. CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
35. CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11
April 1994.
36. CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
37. CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11 April
1994.
CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11 April
1994.
CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
[43] CCTV news, 17, 19 May 1995; 15 April 1995.
[44] C.P. Cell, Revolution at Work: Mobilisation Campaigns in China, New York:
Academic Press, 1977.
[45] This observation emerged from interviews with a wide range of people of
different age groups with different socioeconomic status, most of whom remarked
that "if the government wants to make movies and TV series out of these folks,
it really wants them to be remembered."
[46] CCTV news, 6, 9 March 1995.
[47] CCTV news, 11 May 1995.
[48] CCTV news, 29 June 1995; 22 March 1995.
[49] CCTV news, 5, 12 July 1995; 21 June 1995; 18 May 1995; 9 January 1995; 11
April 1994.
[50] CCTV news, 18 April 1995; 6 January 1995.
[51] CCTV news, 4 May 1995.
[52] Schramm, Wilbur, Four Theories of the Press, University of Illinois Press,
1956.
[53] M.C. Kelman, "Processes of Opinion Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25
(1961), pp. 57-58.
[54] Stanley Rosen, "The Effect of Post-4 June Re-education Campaigns on
Chinese Students,"
The China Quarterly, (June 1993), no. 134, pp. 310-334.
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