ABSTRACT
DOWNWIND JOURNALISM:
OBJECTIVITY AND THE UPSHOT/KNOTHOLE TEST SERIES
This paper examines press coverage of Operation Upshot/Knothole,
one of a series of above-ground nuclear tests in southern Nevada. The tests were
later found to have caused high rates of cancer among civilians living downwind.
Coverage of Upshot/Knothole was examined in three Utah newspapers, as well as
the The New York Times. This study found that safety issues were marginalized
by reporting that emphasized national security and scientific achievement.
Price Competition
DOWNWIND JOURNALISM
OBJECTIVITY AND THE UPSHOT/KNOTHOLE TEST SERIES
Between January 27, 1951 and October 30, 1958, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) conducted 94 above-ground nuclear tests at a site in southern
Nevada.[1] More than two decades later, in Allen v. United States (1984), a
federal district judge found that nuclear fallout from those tests had caused
unusually high rates of cancer among civilians who lived downwind. Judge Bruce
Jenkins also determined that the United States Government had misled the
downwinders about the hazards of the nuclear tests and was therefore liable for
damages. The decision to award damages was later overturned on the grounds that
AEC personnel had acted within the broad discretionary powers granted federal
officials by the Federal Tort Claims Act. But the Federal Court of Appeals that
voided the damages did not dispute Judge Jenkins' findings that the tests had
caused cancer and that the government had misled the public.[2]
This paper examines press coverage of the fifth of eight series of
atmospheric tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Operation Upshot/Knothole was
conducted in the spring of 1953 and comprised eleven nuclear detonations. During
Upshot/Knothole, many residents of southwestern Utah were afforded visible
evidence that fallout from the tests was being carried to their communities.
Ball wrote that for downwinders, the period of the Upshot/Knothole test series
"...was an extremely worrisome time because of the number of 'dirty bombs,'
i.e., detonations that deposited nuclear radioactive fallout on their small
towns."[3] In the hours after the detonations, downwinders saw radioactive
clouds shower them with fallout. Radioactive particles burned their flesh,
nauseated them and, in some cases, caused their hair to fall out.[4] During
Upshot/Knothole, some tentative questions about fallout danger were raised in
the press. This paper will argue, however, that safety issues were marginalized
by reporting that stressed national security and scientific achievement and
accepted the authoritativeness of government reassurances on test safety. It
will also be argued that these characteristics of Upshot/Knothole coverage were
imposed by the conventions of objectivity, the dominant journalistic standard of
that era.
Schudson traced the evolution of objectivity in American journalism
from the penny papers of the 1830's to the mass media of the second half of the
twentieth century. He asserts that in the 1920's and 1930's, many American
journalists began to abandon the form of objectivity based on a "naive
empiricism" that trusted in simple "facts."[5] Naive empiricism was challenged
by another form of objectivity in which "...a person's statements about the
world can be trusted if they are submitted to established rules deemed
legitimate by a professional community. "[6] This brand of objectivity defines
facts not as aspects of the world, but as consensually-validated statements
about it. Schudson noted that naive empiricism did not disappear from the scene
and, to a degree, still holds force. But by the early 1950's, Schudson's
"consensually-validated" objectivity held sway among many journalists.
Sigal offered a definition of objectivity that is similar to
Schudson's consensual validation of reality: "Objectivity in journalism denotes
a set of rhetorical devices and procedures used in composing a news story.
Objectivity, in this sense, has no bearing whatsoever on the truthfulness or
validity of a story."[7] Sigal argued that this version of objectivity not only
excludes the reporter's personal values from the story, it also minimizes
interpretation. This procedure places reporters at the mercy of their sources:
"Keeping the reporter out of the news means relying on sources. Who reporters
talk to thus tells a lot about the news."[8]
Tuchman identified another characteristic of objective journalism
that is relevant to this study. She noted that journalists often present
conflicting claims and allow the news consumer to choose between them. In this
regard, the journalistic definition of objectivity differs from more traditional
definitions: "Inasmuch as 'objectivity' may be defined as 'intentness on
objects external to the mind,' and 'objective' as 'belonging to the object of
thought rather than the thinking subject' (both dictionary definitions), it
would appear difficult to claim--as newspapermen do--that presenting conflicting
possibilities fosters objectivity."[9]
This study examined press coverage that would have been most
available to communities in southwestern Utah. These communities lie directly
downwind of the Nevada Test Site and were particularly hard-hit by NTS fallout.
Two local newspapers were selected, the Washington County News, a weekly
published in St. George, Utah, the county seat of Washington County and the Iron
County Record, a weekly published in Cedar City, Utah, which is also a county
seat. The Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, a Salt Lake City afternoon daily,
was also examined. L. Glen Snarr, city editor of the Deseret News in 1953, later
recalled that the Deseret News had strong circulation in rural areas of Utah in
the early fifties.[10] In addition, the Deseret News was owned by the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and perhaps had special credibility with the
predominately Mormon population of southwestern Utah.[11] For a national
perspective, coverage of Upshot/Knothole in The New York Times was also
examined.
This study employed a "literary" analysis that emphasized the tone
of the articles and sought out consistent themes. It also attempted to locate
assumptions about nuclear safety, the Cold War and government credibility.
Gitlin argued that the literary approach offers a suppleness that is more
appropriate for the examination of cultural artifacts.[12]
The Nevada nuclear tests of the 1950's must be viewed in the
context of the Cold War and the arms race between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The Soviets detonated their first nuclear device in 1949, thus
becoming the word's second nuclear power. In 1950, the United States became
embroiled in a shooting war with the Soviet-backed communist government of North
Korea. North Korea's Chinese Communist allies soon joined the conflict. With the
outbreak of the Korean War, the United States accelerated its development of
nuclear weapons. In the late 1940's, the United States conducted its nuclear
tests on the Eniwetok Proving Grounds in the southwestern Pacific. But on
December 18, 1950, President Truman granted the Atomic Energy Commission
permission to conduct nuclear weapons tests on a new site 90 miles north of Las
Vegas.[13] The Nevada Test Site was more accessible to American military and
scientific personnel than the Eniwetok Proving Grounds and was believed to be
more secure from enemy threats.[14]
In the spring of 1953, cold war anxieties were running high. The
United States was still embroiled in the Korean War; hostilities would not end
until an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. The death of Soviet dictator
Josef Stalin on March 5, 1953 may have briefly eased U.S.-Soviet tensions, but
the weeks that followed saw uncertainty over Stalin's successor. Senator Joseph
McCarthy continued to hold sway as chairman of the permanent subcommittee on
investigations of the Senate Government and Operations Committee. McCarthy used
this platform to make charges about alleged communist infiltration of American
institutions. While McCarthy's charges were mostly lies, they fanned many
Americans' fears of the communist challenge.
It was amid reports of the Korean War, the Soviet succession
struggle and McCarthyism that southern Utahns read about a new series of nuclear
detonations on the Nevada Test Site.
The first test in the Upshot/Knothole series, code-named "Annie,"
received great attention from the press, as well as live television coverage.
Some 300 reporters were invite to the test site to witness the blast, along with
37 members of Congress.[15]
A piece that appeared in the Deseret News on March 12, five days
before the detonation, heralded live KSL television coverage of the spectacle.
TV critic Howard Pearson noted that not only would KSL televise the actual
detonation, but on March 15, prior to the explosion, CBS cameras would visit the
test site and "...depict the dwelling to be blasted to bits." On the afternoon
after the morning detonation, cameras would "...carry viewers to the site and
note what damage the bomb might have caused." Pearson devoted the bulk of his
story to nuclear test coverage and gave lesser billing to upcoming programs like
the Academy Awards telecast, the Marciano-Walcott heavyweight championship
fight, and the broadcast of a Sonja Henie ice skating show.[16]
On March 17, the day of the test, the Deseret News carried three
photographs of "Annie's" mushroom cloud on the front page. It also featured
three front-page accounts of the event. One of them, "Utah Viewers Say Tuesday
A-Blast Milder Than Usual," described Utahns' reaction to the explosion, which
was visible from northern as well as southern portions of the state. The story
concentrated on the spectacle of the explosion rather than its possible health
hazards. It was reported that: "Small crowds which gathered in St. George's
downtown area to watch were thrilled by a brilliant flash of orange."[17]
Another front-page story, "Utah Woman Sees A-Test" was a first-hand
account of the explosion written by Mrs. Rae Ashton of Vernal, Utah. As
president of the American Legion Women's Auxiliary, Mrs. Ashton was one of
several women invited to the test site. Her story was somber in tone and began
with the statement, "I really believe that some day science could destroy the
whole world with a bomb like this." Although she expressed fear in the presence
of such an awesome weapon, there is no mention of any concerns over specific
health hazards. She concluded her story by referring to the mannequins that were
destroyed in the blast: "Maybe it's just a woman's logic. But there must be some
way to live without using something like this on objects with warmer blood than
store dummies."[18]
The third piece on the front page of the Deseret News was an INS
wire story by reporter Bob Considine. Considine was also present at the test
site and he too emphasized the destructive power of the atomic weapon. He
described the damage done to houses, cars and mannequins placed near ground
zero. He also reported that the explosion had created a cloud that moved slowly
eastward, spilling "hot" particles. Considine noted that military planes would
be following the cloud in a "day long chase." However, he made no connection
between the eastward movement of the radioactive clouds and the potential danger
to communities that lay east of the test site.[19]
On page 2-A, the Deseret News carried a truculent statement from
Utah Governor J. Bracken Lee, who was also at the test site to observe the
"Annie" detonation. Lee urged that the atomic devices be tested on communist
troops in Korea. The Governor complained: "I certainly hate to see them waste
atomic bombs on the Nevada desert when they could be using them so much more
effectively against our enemies in Korea."[20]
The Iron County Record carried another first-hand account of
"Annie" that ran on page one.[21] Record reporter Klien Rollo had also been
invited to the Nevada Test Site and his lead sentence began: "It was my good
fortune to be invited, as a representative of the Iron County Record to the
recent public experiment of the Atomic Energy Commission..." Like Considine,
Rollo emphasized the damage the bomb had wreaked on the houses, mannequins and
cars near ground zero. Rollo reported that journalists were taken to within a
half mile of ground zero, but were only allowed to remain a short time due to
intense radiation. Like Considine, he failed to make any connection to possible
radiation hazards to downwind communities.
The March 19 Washington County News also carried a front-page
description of the "Annie" test.[22] It noted that infantrymen were placed in
trenches near the explosion to simulate the use of battlefield nuclear weapons.
After the detonation, the troops were moved into the explosion area to simulate
a "mop up" of enemy forces. The story's final paragraph noted that: "A trip by
newsmen into the make-believe city area was delayed for hours when aerial checks
disclosed excessive radiation." However, the story did not address the issue of
possible radiation danger to Washington County.
The March 18 edition of The New York Times carried a front-page
photo of the "Annie" detonation and two front page stories with datelines from
the Nevada Test Site. Both stories discussed the military implications of the
test. Hanson W. Baldwin's piece also gave a detailed, scientific description of
the formation of the radioactive cloud after detonation. However, he wrote that:
"Neither heat nor the nuclear radiation released at the moment of the
detonation, it has been determined by the tests, is hazardous outside the limit
of the proving ground."[23]
The March 18 Times also carried an editorial on page 30 that
commended tactical nuclear weapons as a possible deterrent to the Soviet
Union.[24] And on page 45, television writer Jack Gould applauded the test
broadcast "...as an impressive sight on the home video screen...."[25] However,
Gould worried that the awesome display might lead to a fatalism that would
discourage Americans from civil defense preparations.
The press did carry a story which addressed the possible danger of
the radioactive cloud from the "Annie" test. That item appeared in the March 20
New York Times.[26] The four-paragraph story appeared on page 25 and noted the
cloud's appearance over New York City two days after the test. It stated that
the cloud had dumped .58 inches of rain on the city. According to the AEC,
radiation in the atmosphere over New York had jumped to seven times the normal
level. However, the story carried a statement from an AEC official, Dr. John
Harley, who said that the radiation levels would have to have been 100 times
higher for the rainfall to constitute a danger. Harley also stated that the
atmospheric radiation levels would quickly return to normal.
The "Annie" detonation received the most media attention of any in
the Upshot/Knothole series. The reportage of "Annie" also typified much of the
Upshot/Knothole coverage that followed. Reporters stressed the military
implications of the test series, with particular emphasis on the simulation of
nuclear battlefields and on the planned firing of the world's first atomic
cannon. Other stories emphasized the awesome display nuclear power and the
reactions of spectators. While some writers like Rae Ashton took a more somber
view and lamented the destructive potential of nuclear weaponry, it was
accepted--implicitly or explicitly--as an evil necessitated by the Cold War.
This attitude toward nuclear testing was further illustrated in the editorial
"Man and Doom in the Deseret" that appeared in the Deseret News the day after
the "Annie" detonation: "It is tragic, it is insane, it is fantastically-costly,
but the play must go on."[27]
Another pattern emerged from "Annie" coverage. In those instances
when specific safety concerns were raised, as in the case of the New York City
radiation cloud, government assurances on safety were generally accepted at face
value.
On March 24, 1953, the AEC detonated "Nancy," the second blast in
the Upshot/Knothole series. Unlike "Annie," "Nancy" was a "secret" test;
journalists were not allowed on the test site. However, the blast was felt as
far away as Ogden, Utah and Payson, Utah. The March 24 Deseret News carried two
front-page stories on the test.[28] Once again, the Deseret News stories focused
on the military aspects of the test and on the sheer power of the explosion.
There was no discussion of possible radiation hazards from the test.
However, on March 26, two days after the "Nancy" detonation, the
Deseret News ran the most authoritative warning on radiation of the entire
Upshot/Knothole series. A story entitled "A-Cloud Danger in S.L. Studied; U.
Nuclear Expert Finds High Rays Concentration" appeared on page one of the local
section.[29] The twelve-paragraph piece consisted entirely of statements from
Dr. Lyle E. Borst, a member of the University of Utah physics faculty and the
former director of the AEC's Brookhaven National Laboratories.
Borst raised the possibility of cumulative radiation effects,
although he conceded that there were differences in scientific opinion on this
issue. He couched his concerns in cold war terms by asserting that the
accumulation of small doses of radiation from the Nevada tests could prove
crucial during an atomic attack. Borst stated that when an atomic bomb is
dropped "...there will be people somewhere on the fringe for whom the difference
between life and death will not be the amount of radiation from the bomb, but
the amount of radiation they have previously received."
Borst noted that he had not allowed his children outside in the
hours after the "Nancy" test and that he was requiring them to bathe more
frequently than usual. He also criticized the AEC for placing a cloak of secrecy
on radiation readings within a 200-mile radius of the Nevada Test Site. Borst
complained that this blacked out radiation readings in both Cedar City and St.
George.
Borst's statements did not appear in The New York Times, the
Washington County News or the Iron County Record. But they touched off a
mini-debate in the pages of the Deseret News. One day after the Deseret News ran
the Borst interview, an AEC rebuttal appeared on page one of the local section
under the headline "A-Cloud Safe, Utah Told; Danger Claim Disputed."[30] Dr.
John C. Bugher, director of the AEC's biology and medicine division stated that
Salt Lake radiation levels from the most recent tests would be no more than what
would be received in a few days exposure to normal radioactivity in soil or
water. Clarence N. Stover, research administrator at the University of Utah's
radiobiology laboratory, claimed that the maximum level reached in Salt Lake
City after the "Nancy" test was two milliroentgens. Stover stated that: "Even if
the maximum level had reached 80 milliroentgens, it would have required 10 weeks
to accumulate the permissible dosage of 3,000 milliroentgens." Although Borst
had also criticized AEC test procedures in St. George and Cedar City, neither
Bugher nor Stover made any reference to radiation issues in southwestern Utah.
Borst was also interviewed for the March 27 story, but this time he
indicated his intention to back away from the radiation debate. Borst said he
refused to argue with anyone in the columns of a newspaper and declined to
comment on the statements of his fellow scientists. However, Borst declared that
he stood by his original statements and that he would continue to keep his
children indoors whenever an atomic cloud passed over Salt Lake City.
On March 27, the Deseret News also ran an editorial entitled "The
Safest Way." The editorial admitted that Utahns were feeling "some uneasiness"
over fallout from the Nevada Test Site. The editorial took note both of Borst's
concerns and of the AEC's assurances that the level of radiation "cannot
possibly be harmful to human beings." The editorial made no judgments about the
validity of either claim, but suggested a plan that might be acceptable to all
parties and might at the same time advance the cause of civil defense. Like
Borst's statements, the proposal employed cold war logic:
When an atomic cloud passes over any area, civil
defense organizations could immediately call a full dress
rehearsal for
the
public, just as though a cloud of dangerous intensity were
threatening the region as a result of enemy bombing. The benefits would be
two-fold: people would learn what to do in case of an enemy atomic attack,
and at the same time they would be giving themselves the fullest possible
protection from whatever real or potential dangers the milder radiation may
carry.[31]
With Borst's decision to avoid further public debate, the
discussion of radiation hazards subsided for several weeks. In the Washington
County News and the Iron County Record, where Borst's comments were ignored, the
debate never really got started.
The May 14 edition of the Washington County News was published
three days after the "Ray" detonation. Columnist Nora R. Lyman noted that:
"Local opinions concerning the effects of the most atomic blast have been
varying, so I attempted to find out what the experts think about it."[32]
Lyman's expert was Clarence N. Stover of the University of Utah's radiobiology
lab. Stover stated that an atomic cloud had indeed passed over Utah, but that no
measurable fallout had been found anywhere in the state. After Stover's
reassuring statement, Lyman suggested that: "Perhaps the reason for so much
agitation and excitement was that the wind was extremely high, and the
thermometer kept jumping around without rime or reason."
Lyman's May 7 column was probably more typical of the southern Utah
press's ho-hum attitude toward the nuclear tests. She observed that: "Atomic
detonations are becoming so commonplace with us now that few of us in this area
even raise an eyebrow...."[33]
The Washington County News and the Deseret News carried front page
stories on the April 6 "Dixie" detonation.[34] Both articles noted that traffic
had been temporarily halted on Highway 95 in southwestern Utah. Both articles
also noted that because of potential danger from "Dixie's" radioactive cloud,
the Civil Aeronautics Administration had briefly banned commercial flights above
24,000 feet in an enormous area bounded by Las Vegas, Yuma, Nogales and
Albuquerque. However, neither story raised any questions about the possible
connection between the hazards in the air and potential hazards on the ground
beneath the radioactive cloud.
While Borst's statements touched off a short-lived debate in the
Salt Lake City press, another critique of nuclear test safety scarcely left a
ripple. Ralph J. Hafen was a native of St. George and a veteran of World War II.
In the spring of 1953 he was a 28-year-old law student at the University of
Utah. Hafen's future brother-in-law, Gene King, was a graduate student in
physics and through King, Hafen became acquainted with several members of the
physics faculty, including Lyle Borst.[35] Stimulated by his conversations with
Borst and others, Hafen decided to conduct his own research on the possible
effects of the Nevada nuclear tests. In May of 1953, Hafen gathered his findings
into a letter, which he sent to several newspapers around the state.[36] The
letter was published on page nine of the May 7 edition of the Iron County
Record. Unlike Borst, whose focus was Salt Lake City, Hafen addressed the impact
of radiation on southern Utah. And unlike Borst, Hafen made no attempt to
justify his critique in cold war terms.
In a well-reasoned, well-organized presentation, Hafen stated four
primary areas of concern: the possible effects of inhaling plutonium; the
possible link between radiation and eye cataracts; the possible connection
between AEC roadblocks and high radiation levels; and the possibility of genetic
damage caused by radiation. Hafen conceded that there was sharp dispute over the
possible health hazards of radiation. But he concluded that the AEC carried a
"moral burden of proof" before proceeding with additional nuclear tests.[37]
Hafen's letter subsequently appeared in the "Forum" section of The
Washington County News on May 21.[38] The Deseret News printed a shorter version
of the letter in its "Letters From Readers on Current Issues" section on May
23.[39]
Forty-two years later, Hafen remembered that he had no trouble
getting the letters published. But Hafen also recalled that his letters caused
virtually no comment, either in Salt Lake City, where he was a student, or in
his hometown of St. George. Hafen said that: "I think people were not at all
convinced of the gravity of the situation. I don't think they realized what was
going on at all."[40] It would require a more vivid and dramatic event than the
publication of Ralph J. Hafen's letter to revive the controversy over the Nevada
tests.
Staged on May 19, 1953, the "Harry" detonation was the ninth in the
Upshot/Knothole series. Fradkin wrote that the test "...was distinguished from
other shots by its rawness and unevenness..."[41] It later became known as
"Dirty Harry" because it probably rained more fallout on civilians than any
other Nevada test.[42]
An Associated Press story on the front page of the May 19 Deseret
News reported that "Harry" had rattled windows 200 miles away in Bishop,
California.[43] The story noted that the test was primarily for "scientific"
purposes and that 80 experiments had been conducted during the test. A second
front-page story, "St. George Goes Indoors As Atomic Cloud Passes," gave a hint
of the concern that "Harry's" fallout had caused in southern Utah.[44] The story
noted that AEC officials had advised motorists to close their car windows and
air intakes. It was reported that parents and teachers in St. George were
advised to keep their children indoors, although it was later revealed that many
residents got the warning too late.[45]
The following day, May 20, the Deseret News ran a front page story
that was more reflective of the magnitude of "Harry's" fallout. The story, "AEC
Sends Experts to Check Sick Utahns," reported that seven miners had become sick
after a radioactive cloud had passed over the southern Utah town of Orderville.
AEC experts and a U.S. Public Health Service doctor were dispatched to
Orderville to investigate the apparent radiation sickness. It was also reported
that AEC monitors had found the radiation to be less than one-hundredth the
level dangerous to human life; a few paragraphs later, the story carried the
apparently conflicting information that geiger counters in southern Utah had
gone off the scale. The story also noted that Utah Congressman Douglas
Stringfellow had informed AEC Chairman Gordon Dean that he was "greatly
disturbed" by the reports of a radioactive cloud over St. George. Congressman
Stringfellow requested that the current Nevada tests be concluded quickly.[46]
The May 21 edition of the Iron County Record addressed the fallout
controversy in an editorial. An observation in the editorial's third paragraph
seemed to rank concerns about tourism over concerns for the safety of local
residents:
What do you suppose will be the reaction of people who have
planned to spend a few days in Cedar City during the tourist
season? Do you think they may now give it a second thought? Or what is the
effect of fall-out on us, the people of this area?[47]
While the first four paragraphs of the editorial expressed concerns
over the fallout from Harry, the final twelve paragraphs were entirely devoted
to a statement from Dr. Gordon Dunning, of the AEC division of biology and
medicine. After a long justification of AEC policies and safety procedures,
Dunning concluded that: "...it has been shown that the levels of radiation
produced outside the test control area were in no way harmful to humans, animals
or crops."
In St. George, the city most disrupted by the fallout, the May 21
the Washington County News ran a single, front-page story under the headline
"St. George Gets Publicity From Radioactive Pall After Atomic Detonation."[48]
The story gave a cursory description of the test, the radioactive cloud, and the
orders for St. George residents to stay indoors. It also carried the
by-now-standard AEC statement that the radiation had not reached a hazardous
level; that statement seemed to contradict the AEC's earlier warnings for
citizens to stay indoors. The story carried no descriptions of individuals who
suffered fallout burns or radiation sickness, although many such accounts
surfaced in later years.
On May 25, The New York Times ran a follow-up story on the "Harry"
radiation. Gladwin Hill's page 21 story had a Las Vegas dateline and the
headline "Atom Test Studies Show Area Is Safe." The story was essentially an
apology for AEC policy and it is clear that Hill drew entirely from AEC sources.
Hill wrote that: "In some of the excitement that has been generated by the
atomic tests, the commission has been the victim of its policy of never taking
any chances that are avoidable."[49]
Coverage of the Nevada tests became more upbeat with the May 25
firing of the world's first nuclear cannon. The Deseret News noted that the
"Grable" test kicked up the largest mushroom cloud of any Nevada detonation.[50]
The Washington County News, the Iron County Record and The New York Times all
carried stories that lauded the successful test of the new weapon.[51]
The upbeat coverage continued when the May 28 Washington County
News reported on Congressman Stringfellow's visit to St. George. Representative
Stringfellow announced that he had toured the Nevada Test Site and was now
satisfied that the nuclear tests posed no danger to the health of southern Utah
residents.[52]
On June 4, the AEC conducted "Climax," the eleventh and final
detonation in the Upshot/Knothole series. The nuclear device dropped from a B-36
bomber delivered the most powerful detonation of the series.[53] News coverage
of "Climax" largely reverted to the "gee-whiz" approach of earlier tests. In a
front-page story in the June 4 Deseret News, photographer Ray G. Jones said that
photographing the blast from the grounds of the State Capitol in Salt Lake City
"..was one of the greatest thrills of my 12 years as a press
photographer..."[54] The June 4 Deseret News did report that an atomic cloud had
passed over St. George, but noted that no radiation had been detected by AEC
monitors.[55]
On June 5, the Deseret News marked the end of the Upshot/Knothole
test series with an editorial entitled "Let's See What Happens Now." The
editorial ignored the controversy over nuclear fallout and instead delved into
the more fanciful debate over the Nevada tests' possible effect on weather
patterns. It concluded lightheartedly:
We shan't take sides in this [weather] controversy. We'll grant
the
professors and the Ph.D.s every one of their scientific
points...but we'll join the man on the street in heaving a sigh of relief that
the atomic shooting has stopped, for this year anyway.[56]
Was enough known about the hazards of radiation in 1953 to
criticize the government's actions during Upshot/Knothole and other test series?
Judge Jenkins' answer in Allen v. United States (1984) was an emphatic "yes." In
his decision, Judge Jenkins wrote that: "In summary, a good deal was known about
radioactivity, and about radiation, about atomic bombs, about fallout, and about
real and potential effects on human health in 1951."[57]
It is another matter, however, to criticize the press for not
obtaining that information. Even if journalists had mounted a more aggressive
investigation, much information was simply unavailable at the time. Endres has
pointed out that in 1951, President Truman's Executive Order 10290 created a
system by which millions of classified documents were kept from the press.[58]
For the first time, civilian agencies like the AEC were given the authority to
classify documents on national security grounds.
During Upshot/Knothole, public debate never reached a level that
might have forced a more honest assessment of the hazards of nuclear testing.
However, it would be improper to use the lack of public concern as the standard
by which to evaluate the reportage of Upshot/Knothole. Such reasoning depends
not only on an assessment of the press, but also on making assumptions about
what the public's reaction might have been under a different set of
circumstances. By posing the counterfactual question of how Upshot/Knothole
coverage might have elicited a debate that never happened, we threaten to drift
into what Fischer called the "fallacy of fictional questions."[59]
Even with these caveats against the arrogance of hindsight,
however, it still seems fair to argue that press coverage of the Upshot/Knothole
test series was not what it might have been. L. Glen Snarr was the city editor
of the Deseret News in 1953 and thus had a participant's understanding of
journalists were up against. Forty-two years later, he expressed the general
belief that the press had failed in its coverage of the nuclear tests: "I think
we lost the significance of the event as far as fallout danger."[60]
Without making counterfactual assumptions about public opinion or
the availability of AEC documents, it still seems appropriate, then, to examine
specific shortcomings of Upshot/Knothole press coverage. That examination was
undertaken earlier in this paper. But the context of those shortcomings will be
better understood after exploring their relationship to the objective standard
of journalism.
Schudson's assertion that by the 1950's, objectivity had evolved
into a consensual validation of reality has already been noted, as has Sigal's
argument that this form of objectivity makes journalists almost wholly dependent
on sources. With a few notable exceptions like Lyle Borst, almost all credible
scientific sources supported the AEC's version of events in 1953.
Many journalists felt dependent on the AEC's cooperation, because
the AEC seemed the sole source of authoritative information. Gladwin Hill, the
New York Times reporter who wrote the May 25 "Dirty Harry" follow-up that
exculpated the AEC, later remembered:
Except for what you could gleam [sic] from personal observations,
informationally, the AEC was the sole source, both vis a vis the
reporters there and vis a vis the American people as a whole. The only
things, practically, that anyone knew about nuclear detonations or radiation
were put out by the AEC, and they were generally accepted as gospel.[61]
Hill's statement seems to support Sigal's argument that journalists
prefer sources over direct personal observation. A study by Hallin, Manoff and
Weddle found that journalists reporting national security issues were
particularly dependent on governmental sources.[62] These points are
particularly relevant to Upshot/Knothole coverage because, in retrospect, some
of the most telling evidence seemed to come from reporters' personal
observations or from "non-authoritative" sources.
In his story on the "Annie" test, Bob Considine observed that
airplanes pursued the radiation cloud eastward on a day-long chase. Yet
Considine apparently ignored the health implications of a radiation cloud
drifting over populated areas.[63] It has also been noted that following the
April 6 "Dixie" detonation, several newspapers reported that commercial flights
were banned above 24,000 feet across a large swath of the southwestern United
States.[64] In the face of reassurances from authoritative government sources,
journalists were apparently unwilling to make the commonsensical connection
between radiation hazards above 24,000 feet and radiation hazards on the ground
below.
In downwind communities, there were many reports of Geiger counters
going off the scale after nuclear tests; these reports were generally discounted
or presented along with more authoritative AEC readings that showed no danger.
In the Allen v. United States (1984) trial, many civilians testified that
fallout caused skin burns, hair loss or radiation sickness.[65] Reportage of
these incidents would have been based on both personal observation by
journalists and on interviews with non-authoritative sources; such accounts
rarely appeared in the press in 1953.
Those instances in which the press did place "non-authoritative"
concerns about fallout alongside AEC assurances recall Tuchman's observations
about objective journalism's tendency to offer competing claims without making
judgments about validity. In the case of Upshot/Knothole, the press's failure to
investigate truth-claims generally amounted to victory for the more
authoritative AEC.
Cold war ideology unquestionably shaped coverage of the
Upshot/Knothole test series. Here again, Schudson and Sigal's characterization
of objectivity as a consensually validated form of reality seems relevant. To
construct a consensual reality in 1953, journalists employed standard procedures
and interviewed standard types of sources. For all the "appropriate" sources,
the Cold War was the dominant reality. Even when Lyle Borst criticized AEC
policy, he couched his critique in cold war terms. Ralph J. Hafen was perhaps
the one critic who ignored cold war logic, but it is significant that he reached
the public through letters to the editor and was never interviewed. In any
event, as a student, his "non-authoritative" status may have rendered his
critique irrelevant.
Because cold war thinking was dominant among virtually all news
sources in 1953, the consensual nature of objective journalism led to coverage
that stressed cold war themes like national security, military technology and
American scientific achievement. Any attempt to stress the hazards of fallout
amounted to straying away from the dominant view of what the Upshot/Knothole
tests were about.
The AEC's power as a news source was discussed in the previous
section. Given the dominant view of the Cold War in 1953, it is understandable
that consensually-validated, objective journalism was unable to effectively
challenge the AEC's version of events during the Upshot/Knothole test series.
In conclusion, objective journalism is often criticized, but its
distinctive features are still very much in evidence. Reporters still construct
a consensually-validated reality and still place a heavy dependence on
sources--especially authoritative sources--even to the exclusion of personal
observation.[66] Journalists still include competing truth-claims in their
stories, with no attempt to validate those claims.
Contemporary reporters are generally more suspicious of government
sources, but they still face many of the same constraints that influenced
journalists covering Upshot/Knothole. When covering issues of science or
national security, practitioners of objective journalism may still be
compromised by their dependence on authoritative, official sources. When
reporting stories for which there is a powerful consensus, objective journalists
may be vulnerable to "appropriate" sources unwilling to venture outside that
consensus.
NOTES
[1] 1. Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247, pp. 462-465 (D. Utah
1984).
[2] 2. Allen v. United States, 816 F.2nd 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
[3] 3. Howard Ball, Justice Downwind: America's Atomic Testing
Program in the 1950's (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 66.
[4] 4. Philip L. Fradkin, Fallout: An American Nuclear Tragedy
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989), 6-26.
[5] 5. Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History of
American Newspapers (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 6-7.
[6] 6. Ibid.
[7] 7. Leon V. Sigal, "Sources Make the News," in Reading the News,
ed. Robert K. Manoff and Michael Schudson (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 15.
[8] 8. Ibid., 16.
[9] 9. Gaye Tuchman, "Objectivity as a Strategic Ritual: An
Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity," American Journal of Sociology
77 (1971-72): 666-667.
[10] 10. L. Glen Snarr, interview by author, Salt Lake City, May 19,
1995.
[11] 11. Ibid.
[12] 12. Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the
Making & Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1980), 303.
[13] 13. Ball, 27-31.
[14] 14. Ibid., 29.
[15] 15. Fradkin, 3.
[16] 16. Howard Pearson, "Atom Test Among Top Shows Set for TV,"
Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, 12 March 1953, A-12.
[17] 17. "Utah Views Say Tuesday A-Blast Milder Than Usual," Deseret
News and Salt Lake Telegram, 17 March 1953, A-1, A-3.
[18] 18. Raye Ashton, "Utah Woman Sees A-Test," Deseret News and
Salt Lake Telegram, 17 March 1953, A-1.
[19] 19. Bob Considine, "Village is Sacrificed in Interest of
Science," Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, 17 March 1953, A-1, A-3.
[20] 20. "Lee Would Test," Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, 17
March 1953, A-2.
[21] 21. Klien Rollo, "Eye Witness Account Given of Yucca Flats
'Atomic Device' Explosion," Iron County Record, 19 March 1953, p. 1.
[22] 22. "Utahns See Horizon Painted by Blast; Atomic Device
Explodes at Yucca Flat," Washington County News, 19 March 1953, p. 1.
[23] 23. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Troops in Trenches 2 Miles Off
Experience Shock But No Heat," New York Times, 18 March 1953, p. 1, 12.
[24] 24. "On Yucca Flat," New York Times, 18 March 1953, p. 30.
[25] 25. Jack Gould "Television in Review," New York Times, 18 March
1953, p. 45.
[26] 26. "Radioactive Rain Falls; City is Sopping But Safe," New
York Times, 20 March 1953, p. 25.
[27] 27. "Man and Doom in the Deseret," Deseret News and Salt Lake
Telegram, 18 March 1953, A-12.
[28] 28. "A-Bomb Shock Hits Utah As Far As Ogden"; "Secret Tuesday
Blast Jolts Wide Territory," Deseret News And Salt Lake Telegram, 24 March 1953,
A-1.
[29] 29. "A-Cloud Danger in S.L. Studied; U. Nuclear Expert Finds
High Rays Concentration," Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, 26 March 1953,
B-1.
[30] 30. "A-Cloud Safe, Utah Told; Danger Claim Disputed," Deseret
News and Salt Lake Telegram, 26 March 1953, B-1.
[31] 31. "The Safest Way," Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, 27
March 1953, A-12.
[32] 32. Nora R. Lyman, "Observations," Washington County News, 14
May 1953, p. 1.
[33] 33. Nora R. Lyman, "Observations," Washington County News, 7
May 1953, p. 1.
[34] 34. Sherwin F. Garside, "Scientists Fire New Type Atomic Shot,"
Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, A-1; "Nuclear Device Detonated Above Yucca
Flat; Plane Flights Regulated," Washington County News, 9 April 1953, p. 1.
[35] 35. Ralph J. Hafen, interview with author, Salt Lake City, May
18, 1995.
[36] 36. Ibid.
[37] 34. Ralph J. Hafen, "Effects of Atom Blasts on Southern Utah
Discussed by U. of U. Student," Letter published in Iron County Record, 7 May
1953, p. 9.
[38] 38. Ralph J. Hafen, Letter published in "The Forum," Washington
County News, 21 May 1953, p. 7.
[39] 39. Ralph J. Hafen, "Letters From Readers on Current Issues,"
Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, 23 May 1953, A-12.
[40] 40. Hafen, interview.
[41] 41. Fradkin, 3.
[42] 42. Ibid., 18.
[43] 43. "Atom Blast Shakes Town 200 Miles Off," Deseret News and
Salt Lake Telegram, 19 May 1953, A-1.
[44] 44. "St. George Goes Indoors As Atomic Cloud Passes," Deseret
News and Salt Lake Telegram, 19 May 1953, A-1.
[45] 45. Fradkin, 14.
[46] 46. "AEC Sends Experts to Check on Sick Utahns," Deseret News
and Salt Lake Telegram, 20 May 1953, A-1.
[47] 47. "Atomic Winds, Fall-Out," Iron County Record, 21 May 1953,
p. 10.
[48] 48. St. George Gets Publicity From Radioactive Pall After
Atomic Detonation," Washington County News, 21 May 1953, p. 1.
[49] 49. Gladwin Hill, "Atom Test Studies Show Area Is Safe," New
York Times, 25 May 1953, p. 21.
[50] 50. U.S. Fires First Atomic Shell; Cloud is Reported Largest
Yet," Deseret News and Salt Lake Telegram, 25 May 1953, A-1.
[51] 51. "Atomic Shot Proves Successful; Another May Be Set Off,"
Iron County Record, 28 May 1953, p. 3; Gladwin Hill, "Cannon Fires Atomic Shell;
Target 7 Miles Away Blasted," New York Times, 26 May 1953, p. 1; "Eye Witnesses
Report Detonation of Atomic Rifle at Frenchman Flat," Washington County News, 28
May 1953, p. 1.
[52] 52. "Douglas P. Stringfellow Visits Southern Utah; Talks on
Atomic Fallout," Washington County News, 28 May 1953, p. 10.
[53] 53. Allen v. United States, 1984, 463.
[54] 54. "News Lensman Captures S.L. View of Vegas Blast," Deseret
News and Salt Lake Telegram, 4 June 1953, A-1.
[55] 55. "A-Flash Lights Up Utah Sky to Ogden," Deseret News and
Salt Lake Telegram, 4 June 1953, A-1.
[56] 56. "Let's See What Happens Now," Deseret News and Salt Lake
Telegram, 5 June 1953, A-12.
[57] 57. Allen v. United States, 1984, 370.
[58] 58. Karen L. Endres, "National Security Benchmark: Truman,
Executive Order 10290, and the Press," Journalism Quarterly, 67 (1990):
1071-1077.
[59] 59. David H. Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of
Historical Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 15-20.
[60] 60. Snarr.
[61] 61. Fradkin, 20.
[62] 62. D.C. Hallin, K.M. Manoff and J.K. Weddle, "Sourcing
Patterns of National Security Reporters," Journalism Quarterly, 70 (1993):
753-766.
[63] 63. Considine, 1953.
[64] 64. "Nuclear Device Detonated," 1953; Garside, 1953.
[65] 65. Allen v. United States, 1984; Fradkin, 1989.
[66] 66. See Sigal, 15-25.
|
