(Open Competition)
Private Enterprise Broadcasting And Accelerating Dependency:
Case Studies From Nigeria And Uganda
By
Folu Folarin Ogundimu, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
School of Journalism
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824-1212
(517)353-6459
Email: [log in to unmask]
Submitted to the International Communication Division of AEJMC
Convention, August 10-13, 1996, in Anaheim, California.
Private Enterprise Broadcasting And Accelerating Dependency: Case
Studies From Nigeria And Uganda
Abstract
This paper shows how political economy transformations in sub-Saharan
Africa have led to private broadcasting. Also, it shows how differences in
national polities have led to different outcomes regarding regulatory controls
and programming content. Contrary to expectation, political economy constraints
and high dependence on foreign imports for equipment and programming, have not
slowed the proliferation of these commercial broadcast enterprises.
Private Enterprise Broadcasting And Accelerating Dependency...
Private Enterprise Broadcasting And Accelerating Dependency:
Case Studies from Nigeria and Uganda.
Overview
The emergence of private commercial broadcasting in sub-Saharan
Africa the last few years calls for a major revision of the literature on the
region's media regimes. Presently, this literature is inadequate for at least
three reasons. First, political reforms and media privatization in sub-Saharan
Africa have so far outpaced writings on the subject, with several newly-formed,
indigenously-owned, private (commercial) broadcasting stations going on the air
the last two years. Second, the emergence of private commercial broadcasting
enterprises exposes the fallacy of assumptions regarding the "the failure of the
African press" because of what Hachten calls "the crisis of political economy
transformation" (Hachten, 1993:3-4). Thirdly, no one has yet given a definitive
account of the profile of existing private commercial broadcasting in
sub-Saharan Africa beyond confirming their existence.
This paper addresses these three shortcomings. It uses the examples
of Nigeria and Uganda, two sub-Saharan Africa countries that have allowed
privately-owned commercial broadcasting, as illustrative case studies. I will
use a political economy framework, as suggested by Galtung (1993), to show how
press transformation is taking place in this region. Furthermore, in updating
the profile of commercial broadcasting in the two countries, I will use recent
field data to show how privatization is accentuating structures of dependency
within Africa's broadcast sector.
Before discussing the emergence of commercial broadcasting in Uganda
and Nigeria, I should first clarify the status of commercial broadcasting
enterprises in the two countries. The information provided in this section of
the paper was obtained by way of site visits to Uganda and direct communication
with commercial broadcast operators in Nigeria and Uganda, as well as interviews
with officials of the Nigerian National Broadcasting Commission, the regulatory
agency responsible for granting licenses to commercial broadcast operators in
Nigeria. Today, six commercial and privately-owned broadcast stations are in
operation in Uganda. Two of the stations, Radio SANYU 88.2 FM, and SANYU TV
(STV) 28 UHF, are owned by the Katto family. Mr. Katto is a wealthy Ugandan
industrialist with interests in banking, insurance, and seven manufacturing
enterprises. The other commercial radio station, Capital Radio (91.3 CAPITAL
FM), is owned by a consortium of 12 individuals. The principal owners of the
station are Patrick Quarcoo, a Ghanaian entrepreneur with past Reuters and BBC
experience, and William Pike, the British-born editor of the Ugandan
government-owned New Vision daily newspaper. These two own 51 percent of CAPITAL
FM, the other 49 percent belonging to ten Ugandan minority shareholders.[1] Both
Kampala-based radio stations are FM (frequency modulation) signal stations.
Capital Radio broadcasts on a 2 Kilowatt transmitter with a total transmitter
power output of 20 Kilowatt and a coverage of 45 - 67 miles around Kampala. The
station was launched on December 31, 1993. Radio Sanyu broadcasts on 5 Kilowatt
transmitter with a total transmitter power output of 40 Kilowatt which covers 67
miles around Kampala. The station was launched on December 12, 1993. Its sister
station, STV, was launched on October 8, 1994. It broadcasts on 1 Kilowatt
transmitter and its coverage is limited to 28 miles around Kampala. Three other
stations, all television re-transmission facilities are less well-known. They
include Stem Cable about which not much is known, Cablesat, and Madhvani TV, the
close-circuit station owned by the Madhvani family, one of the richest Asian
families in East Africa.
In Nigeria, 114 licenses have been issued since the National
Broadcasting Commission decree was enacted in 1992.[2] Of the 114 licenses
granted, 31 operators have paid license fees, seven over-the-air
privately-owned, commercial television stations have started broadcasting, in
addition to 15 satellite re-transmission services, and two FM radio stations.[3]
One of the two FM stations, RAY POWER 100 FM, based in Nigeria's commercial
capital, Lagos, is owned by DAAR Communications Limited whose principal owner is
the Nigerian businessman, Raymond Dokpesi. The other FM station is based in the
eastern Niger River town of Obosi, Onitsha. The station is one of three
broadcast operations currently under the ownership of Minaj Systems, a
wholly-owned operation of M.A. Ajegbo. Ajegbo also owns Minaj Systems Television
(MST), a 5 Kilowatt commercial TV station broadcasting out of Obosi, and Minaj
Cable Network (MCN), a 20 Kilowatt satellite re-transmission service also
broadcasting out of Obosi. The Minaj Network plans to launch six more cable
franchises over the next five years.
Literature
I suggested earlier that one of the shortcomings of international
communications literature on sub-Saharan Africa is the failure to accommodate
rapid changes in political liberalization which have led to the privatization of
mass media in the region. This is especially true of the privatization of
broadcasting. For example, at the time Merrill's book on global journalism was
published in 1995, it was thought that comparative advantage, economic,
technological, and programming limitations pose major handicaps for the
emergence of private broadcasting in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa
(Merrill, 1995:61-62). Moreover, it was assumed that African states were
unwilling to allow private commercial broadcasting despite constitutional
provisions (Merrill, 1995:224-225). Louise Bourgault's recent book on the mass
media in sub-Saharan Africa provided some of the most recent developments on the
privatization of broadcasting and the trend towards commercialization by
existing state-owned broadcasting operations. But this study, like many others,
fail to provide accurate accounts of what has now emerged as indigenously-owned,
commercial, private broadcast regimes. For example, Bourgault's speculation that
private enterprises in Uganda were most likely to be launched by foreign
operators (Bourgault, 1995:100), has proven not to be the case. Similarly, the
1993 extensive survey on West African broadcasting conducted by the PANOS
Institute and the West African Union of Journalists is now considerably dated,
although the study itself provides some of the most useful context for
evaluating the emerging private broadcast regimes in the sub-region (PANOS,
1993). Moreover, assumptions about the inroads likely to be made by powerful
international broadcasting entities, (Bourgault, 1995:101-102), needs evaluation
and clarification. Similarly, we need to know more about the anticipated impact
on domestic African polities, of programming, news control, and commercial
considerations (Bourgault, 1995:223-225).
Until now, the application of development theory to international
communications research has essentially focused on the contribution of mass
media to national development (Schramm, 1964; Lerner, 1958; McAnany, 1980), and
the growth of media within the larger framework of global transformations in
international communications (Hachten, 1993). The discussion of the nature of
transformations occurring within the sub-Saharan Africa region are at best
marginal. Also missing from these studies are explanations of how mass media
thrive or develop within and across different polities of sub-Saharan Africa.
This is not to say that international communications scholars fail to recognize
the usefulness of political economy explanations. Indeed, other scholars have
called for greater recognition of political economy factors in the studies of
such transformations (Galtung, 1993), although few works have yet examined or
suggested how such political economy factors effect transformations. In
examining the emerging privately-owned commercial broadcast enterprises in
sub-Saharan Africa, I have adopted in this paper, an analytic framework which
combines a review of the structure and function of the newly launched commercial
broadcast regimes with political economy explanations of the transformations
taking place in Uganda and Nigeria. Furthermore, I intend to show how emerging
trends in sub-Saharan Africa's commercial broadcast sector are accelerating
dependency on foreign communications technology and programming. Although the
data on which I base my conclusions are limited, given that the evidence
accounts for only 5 of the 30 known commercial broadcast operations in Uganda
and Nigeria, the evidence nevertheless provides useful information for
evaluating the connection between policy, commercialization, outcomes, and
dependency as provided in the literature on international communications. In my
conclusion, I intend to show how regulatory policy might be used to alter
outcomes, improve the climate for pluralist choice policies and democratization,
and encourage the development of home-grown commercial broadcast regimes that
would de-emphasize features of dependency and possibly contribute to economic
and social development in sub-Saharan Africa.
Academic analysis of international media activities reveal two
outstanding features of communications regimes which amount to influence by
developed states on developing countries. These features relate to (a) the
uni-directional nature of international media flows, mostly from the United
States to the rest of the world; and (b) the dominance of a small number of
source countries in international media flows, with the U.S., Britain, France,
West Germany, Russia, Italy, and Japan accounting for a substantial share of the
flows (Boyd-Barrett, 1977:117). More recent analysis of these international
media flows reveal that the flows between countries are closely related to
limits in national media production, the difficulty of producing media at home
having a great deal to do with what media contents are exported and imported
across borders (Straubhaar and La Rose, 1996:124). In general, this media
dependency on the more developed states is regarded as a manifestation of media
imperialism (Boyd-Barrett, op.cit). Of the weak comparative position of
developing countries in relation to international communications regimes,
Bourgault states that the economic positions of periphery states render them
largely cut off from the profits of global information expansion, noting that
existing infrastructures are only partially ready to be converted to use by
local citizens (Bourgault, 1995). On the marginal position of the periphery
states in controlling the outcomes of communications regimes within their own
polities, Boyd-Barrett argues that the overall context of power imbalance within
which media activities occur and are transmitted indicates that far greater
freedom of choice or option accompanies the process of export and dissemination
(from the developed countries) than the process of adoption and absorption in
the developing countries (Boyd-Barrett, op.cit:119). The relevance of this
argument is underscored by recent data on international media flows. For
example, Straubhaar and La Rose show that TV news flows across borders has been
increasing dramatically since the 1970s as CNN, BBC, and other direct broadcast
satellite (DBS) providers began to offer entire newscasts and even all-day news
coverage across borders, primarily to satellite TV receivers and cable
television operators (Straubhaar & La Rose, op.cit:125). Bourgault's observation
concerning the diffusion of DBS programs and the class differences in the
exposure to, and acquisition of foreign programs and technology in Nigeria
(Bourgault, 1995), shows that the phenomenon described by Straubhaar and La Rose
is already prevalent in Nigeria. I will show in my own discussion that the
incursion of DBS and other foreign programming via commercial broadcasters in
Uganda is even far more extensive than previously known.
From an analytic framework, several reasons are given for the
dominance of core country media influences over those of the periphery.[4] Most
of the explanations relate to economies of scale, production attributes, and
trade policy regimes. Regarding American film exports to the rest of the world,
for example, Straubhaar and La Rose mention three attributes which ensure
success and dominance: (1) the enormous size of the U.S. market for movies
permit cost recoveries in domestic release, as does the element of disposable
income and size of an affluent national audience. (2) The narrative forms of
American films are much simpler and more universal, thus ensuring the ability of
American films to capture large, diverse audiences around the world. (3) Under
the leadership of the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA), American film
producers have been able to work together in promoting exports and in
controlling overseas distribution networks. (Straubhaar & La Rose,
1996:124-130). This dominant feature of America's film industry is duplicated by
the music industry which is also primarily based in the U.S., and which appeals
to a globalized youth culture (Ibid). But the dominant position of U.S. film and
music industry notwithstanding, Straubhaar and La Rose note that the developing
countries are not without options for successfully developing local film and
music industries, especially if the domestic market is large, or if production
aims at capturing a multicountry audience that is defined and to some degree
protected by a shared language and culture. In particular, they point to ratings
in many countries that reflect audience preferences for local programming if
they can get it and if it is well produced. American programming they argue, is
attractive to a highly stratified segment of world audiences, especially those
who are cosmopolitan in tastes and previous media exposure. Otherwise, it seems
that people more frequently look for television programming that is more
culturally proximate --i.e. closer to their own languages, cultures, histories,
and values (Straubhaar & La Rose, 1996:128).
Origin of Privately-owned Broadcasting In Uganda
Few detailed accounts have been given about the emergence of
privately-owned commercial broadcast stations in Uganda. Unlike the Nigerian
case which I discuss later, there is hardly any official documentation one could
examine regarding the legal and regulatory framework governing the evolution of
commercial broadcasting in Uganda. This is partly because licenses for
commercial broadcast operations have so far been handled by the Department of
Posts and Telegraph (P&T), the public telegraph and telecommunications agency
charged with all forms of postal and wireless telegraphy regulation. As with
most ministerial departments in sub-Saharan Africa, the P&T hardly conducts its
business in the public sphere. Furthermore, it provides little guidance on its
rules and procedures. Consequently, no definitive account has yet been written
about the evolution of privately-owned commercial broadcasting in Uganda, almost
three years after Radio Sanyu and Capital FM went on the air within three weeks
of each other. As it turns out, these stations were born out of a coincidence of
factors involving the enterprising dreams of the Ugandan businessman, Thomas
Katto, his close friendships with the Museveni government, and liberalizing
political and economic reforms encouraged since the middle 1980s in sub-Saharan
Africa by international lending organizations --especially the IMF and the World
Bank. Katto's dreams of owning a broadcast company go back 20 years but the
political climate at the time was unstable for such ventures. Idi Amin was in
power. And any talk of private broadcasting was inconceivable.[5] Katto started
out as a manufacturer, owning seven companies manufacturing toilet paper, cotton
wool, toothpaste, and soaps. Aside from broadcasting, Katto also owns interests
in banking, insurance brokerage, and marketing/distribution services. During the
tumultuous Amin years, and again under the dictator, Milton Obote, Katto lost
his manufacturing enterprises and other businesses twice. He went into exile in
Kenya for six years beginning in 1979, returning to Uganda in 1986 on the heels
of the Museveni National Resistance Army (NRA) government.
On his return from exile, Thomas Katto rebuilt his manufacturing
enterprises and other financial businesses before branching into broadcasting.
By the time the Museveni government took power in 1986, Katto had cultivated
friendships and powerful alliances within the ruling NRA government. He recalls
that after the government took power, he asked his friend, the information
minister, if the new government would be favorably disposed to granting a
broadcast license. The response was, "maybe. Make an application and we'll
consider it."[6] An application was made. The minister discussed the application
with cabinet colleagues. None had objections and the license was issued. John
Katto who runs both Radio Sanyu and Sanyu TV as General Manager said when the
application was made, "everybody was sure there was some legal constraint
against private broadcasting, but the constitution and the laws said nothing.
So, this was taken to mean nothing precludes commercial broadcasting, although
there was no enabling law to make commercial broadcasting possible."[7] The
elder Katto recalls with pleasure that, "from application to approval took
approximately one month. Radio Sanyu was on the air six months later."[8] In
Luganda, Sanyu means "joy". Mr. Katto's other manufacturing enterprises were
called "Sanyu Industries." And although the radio and television stations retain
the Sanyu name in their call signals, the corporate name of the broadcast
properties is International Television Network, (ITN), with its headquarters
located on Naguru Hills in Kampala.
News of the approval of a Radio Sanyu license opened the flood gates
of requests by other applicants. Not wanting to be accused of impartiality, the
government gave other licenses, the Capital FM group launching its own broadcast
station within three weeks of Radio Sanyu. As it turns out, one of the two
principal owners of the Capital FM group is William Pike, the British-born
editor of the Ugandan government-owned newspaper, The New Vision. Pike's
connections with Museveni's NRA group and the Ugandan military go back many
years. He has remained as the Vision's managing editor for nine years, in
addition to having other business interests around Kampala. Other licenses have
been issued to ethnic, communal, and religious groups. They include the Voice of
Toro (western Uganda kingdom), the Anglican Church in Mbarara Town (south
-western Uganda) and the Roman Catholic Church in Lira Town (northern Uganda),
[Obbo, 1995:21). None of these stations have yet gone on the air although they
were expected to do so at the end of 1995.
The story of the emergence of commercial broadcasting in Uganda
underscores the view that in many sub-Saharan African countries, privatization
has often taken place in the context of "the logic of patrimonialism" (Tangri,
1995:181). By this, we mean that in general those with access to political
influence tend to monopolize access to credits, contracts, and concessions which
are essential to the development of domestic capital. Tangri's recent discussion
of privatization exercises and the commercialization of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) in sub-Saharan Africa shows that these initiatives arose out of the need
by African governments to comply with donor-driven economic reform programs of
which divestiture and greater political and economic liberalization constituted
an integral part. Tangri states emphatically that "Given their troubled economic
conditions and acute dependence on foreign financial flows, African governments
officially accepted privatization so as not to forfeit the international support
crucial for their political survival" (Tangri, 1995:173). Whereas most of
Tangri's discussion relates to the political economy constraints of
privatization in the context of SOEs, two factors he mentions are nevertheless
applicable to the Ugandan experience with commercial broadcasting. The first is
what was referred to earlier as the logic of patrimonialism, a factor which
ensures that the politically powerful are most likely to enjoy monopolies of
privilege in the award of concessions which are essential to the development of
domestic capital. The second factor relates to generally weak market
environments which are exacerbated by weak domestic investments and private
savings. Because private investments and domestic savings as a proportion of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are generally low, nowhere in Africa has
privatization or domestic private investments proceeded far enough to alter
public-private enterprise balances (Tangri, op.cit). Whereas this statement is
true, in general, given the evidence suggested by macroeconomic indicators, one
must conclude that at least in the case of privately-owned commercial broadcast
operations, public sector dominance over private enterprise broadcasting does
not seem to be the case in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ugandan case suggests
otherwise. Based on data obtained from Steadman & Associates, Nairobi-based
market research firm that does marketing research for Ugandan broadcast
stations, the share accounted for by four Ugandan private broadcast operations
was 58 percent of the total billings for the top 10 advertiser product
categories during the month of February, 1995. Four public broadcast stations
accounted for 16 percent share, the remaining 26 percent representing the market
share of newspapers, magazines, and outdoor advertising.[9] This shows that
whereas government-owned broadcasting stations have struggled to maintain market
shares with increasing competition from the private sector, the newly emergent
privately-owned broadcast stations have so far discovered what John Katto calls
"a gold mine" in radio broadcasting, at least. The high capital-intensive nature
of television has so far prevented cost recoveries, although there is ample
evidence to show that given the realignment of resources at Sanyu TV, effective
cost recoveries can be attained relatively quickly. This point will be addressed
in the conclusion of the paper.
Having provided some of the political economy framework for the
emergence of privately-owned commercial broadcasting in Uganda, I will now turn
to a brief description of the features of some of the existing commercial
broadcast operations I visited in Uganda. This discussion is provided in order
to illustrate how commercial broadcasting accentuates features of dependency
despite the unlikely fact that capital for the enterprises was largely
home-grown. The data on which I base my discussion relates to the three leading
privately-owned commercial operations --Capital Radio FM, Radio Sanyu, and Sanyu
TV. Where financial and budgetary information is required, I have deliberately
masked the exact cost functions of the stations in order to assure the integrity
of my on-going study of commercial broadcasting, privatization, and political
liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, I will defer a detailed
discussion of my findings on the Ugandan broadcast operations for some future
consideration because of the limitations of space in this paper.[10]
Features of Uganda's privately-owned broadcast stations
I referred earlier to the technical specifications of both the
Ugandan and Nigerian commercial broadcast operations. I need not, therefore,
repeat that information here. Rather, I need only mention that the three Ugandan
broadcast operations under reference are equipped with some of the most
upto-date technological hardware, and would appear in the case of at least two
of the Ugandan stations, to have been overcapitalized. Collectively, the Ugandan
stations reported investing $2.24 million to establish the two FM radio and one
UHF TV stations. In 1994-95, the three stations spent a combined $700,000 on
equipment purchases and another $555,000 on programming. All equipment and
programming was acquired from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
European Community.
91.3 Capital FM broadcasts 22 hours daily, seven days a week. For 16
of the 22 hours, it originates its own programs. For the remaining 6 hours, it
carries British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) programs. It estimates that DBS
transmissions account for 27 percent of its programming. Foreign productions
account for 65 percent of its total program content, and advertising as a
proportion of all its broadcasts equals 13 percent. Its target audience is the
24 - 35 year-old age group. Most of its program consists of "American Top 40
Hits". It reports the following programming distribution:
Commercial music only 90 percent
News and sports 7 percent
Public Affairs 3 percent
Capital FM operates with 20 full-time employees and 15 part-timers. It
spends heavily on promotions, market research and training, estimating about 3 -
4 percent of its recurrent expenditure being devoted to training, research, and
development. The station fully recovered its investments within eight months of
launching the station. Its major expansion plans during the next five years
include studio upgrades, computerization, hire more news staff, increase
research expenditures, and start new radio stations.
Radio Sanyu 88.2 FM broadcasts 24 hours daily, seven days a week.
Foreign productions account for 75 percent of its programming. It originates its
own transmissions for 17 1/2 hours daily, from 6:30 a.m. until Midnight. From
Midnight until 6:00 a.m., it carries VOA/Europe programs, and from 6:00 a.m.
until 6:30 a.m., it carries VOA/Washington, D.C. programs. Radio Sanyu estimates
it receives 27 percent of its programs via direct broadcast satellites.
Advertising as a proportion of all its broadcasts is put at 10 percent. Its
target audience is the 18 -35 year-old age group, saying the focus of its
programming in general remains "urban contemporary music."[11] The station
reports the following programming distribution:
Commercial music only 80 percent
News and sports 10 percent
Public Affairs 2 percent
Other types 8 percent
As with Capital FM, Radio Sanyu has found commercial radio
broadcasting profitable, reporting cost recoveries within nine months of going
on the air. The sister station, Sanyu-TV, also broadcasts 24 hours a day, seven
days a week. Its dependence on foreign programming is overwhelming. It reports
that 95 percent of its programs are foreign, and only 5 percent account for
local origination programming, with advertising constituting 5 percent of all
broadcasts. All of its foreign broadcasts consists of the Atlanta-based Cable
News Network (CNN) programming, and the United States Information Service (USIA)
WorldNet Television Service. It hooks up with CNN from Midnight until 3:00 p.m.
daily, and with Worldnet from 3:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. Between 6:00 p.m. and
Midnight, it originates its own programming, the substantial portion of which is
made up of British and American films. Sanyu-TV estimates that DBS transmissions
account for 75 percent of its broadcasts. Sanyu-TV has yet to break even, and
continues to invest heavily, particularly in hardware and program
acquisition.[12] Its long-range plans include extension of its coverage
nationwide, expansion of its local production capacity, expansion of its news
capability, upgrades of marketing, and exploration of opportunities for export
programming. Both Radio Sanyu and Sanyu TV have a combined staff of 71 full-time
employees and 10 part-timers.
Origin of Privately-owned Broadcasting In Nigeria
The history of privately-owned, commercial broadcast operations in
Nigeria is already well documented in some recent literature (PANOS, 1993;
Bourgault, 1995). We need not repeat, therefore, the particulars of this
historical evolution except as a way of situating developments of private
commercial broadcasting within an analytic framework that is markedly different
from the Ugandan case I have just examined. The current status of private
broadcasting regimes in Nigeria was mentioned earlier, noting that as at the
time of writing, there were a total of 24 such operations in Nigeria: 7 over the
air TV stations; 15 satellite re-transmission services; and 2 FM radio stations.
This represents an increase of four more facilities since the last known report
(Ajia, 1994). The proliferation of private commercial broadcasting in Nigeria
despite a highly unstable internal polity attests to the resilience of both the
private economy in Nigeria and the ability of Nigerian institutions to function
in environments of uncertainty and unstable polities. The private commercial
broadcast stations are additional to 43 television and 35 radio broadcast
stations owned by the Nigerian federal and state governments.
Given the analytic framework I adopted at the on-set, perhaps one
should note the political origin of the Nigerian press in general and its
implications for the emergent private enterprises in broadcasting. Although
Nigeria would abort its transition to civil rule program in 1992, and continues
to tinker with a democratic transition program which would seem acceptable to
powerful interests within the civilian and military establishment, the country
has nevertheless remained faithful to its overall program of privatization and
structural adjustment begun sometimes during the middle 1980s. The emergence of
pluralist choice policies as priority reforms pushed by the World Bank, the IMF,
and other international lending institutions in the post-cold war era merely
served to speed the reformist trend towards the weakening of broadcasting as a
monopoly institution of the state. Hence Ajia notes that although the 1979
Nigerian constitution established the principle of private broadcasting, no
government was willing to tackle the issue until the impetus for real change
coalesced around serious advocacy by leading industry professionals,
professional journalists, and other practitioners (Ajia, 1994). This unity of
purpose resulted in a national conference and the release of the National Mass
Communication Policy document in 1990. This document preceded by two years, the
enactment of legislation creating the National Broadcasting Commission, the
regulatory agency empowered to issue broadcast licenses in Nigeria.
This brief discussion of the evolution of broadcast privatization as
a policy in Nigeria, shows the remarkable difference between the Ugandan and
Nigeria case studies. Whereas private broadcasting evolved in Uganda by way of
patrimonous, ad hoc, and carte blanche policy, the opposite seems to be the case
in Nigeria.[13] In the Nigerian case, public interest groups and practicing
professionals spearheaded the campaign for privatization, capitalizing on the
climate of broad structural adjustment and pluralist reform choice policies
being pushed by international political and economic regimes. This methodical
aggregation of public purpose as private interest was not without historical
antecedent. As I mentioned earlier, the political origin of the Nigerian press
is well-documented, beginning first with the anti-colonial and nationalist press
and much later, being transformed into commercial institutions with expressly
political and advocacy functions (PANOS, 1993:134). These twin features would
later affect the character of public broadcasting in Nigeria (Uche, 1989; Obe,
1992). It would seem, therefore, that the emergence of private broadcasting in
Nigeria fits within this historical context of public advocacy and the tendency
by Nigerians to create their own institutional structures for managing public
demands. Thus, the enactment of legislation creating a National Broadcasting
Commission for the purpose of processing demands and granting approvals for
private broadcasting has turned out to be a remarkable feature for lessening
features of dependency by Nigerian private commercial broadcast operators,
compared with their Ugandan counterparts. Before I provide a discussion of
outcomes related to this regulatory policy, I intend to first discuss the
regulatory environment governing the operation of private commercial
broadcasting in Nigeria.[14] I will return in the conclusion of the paper to the
distinctions to be made between outcomes in the Nigerian case and outcomes in
the Ugandan case.
Regulatory Environment for Nigeria's Private Broadcasting
The Nigerian National Broadcasting Commission Decree (No.38 of 1992)
is a sweeping legislation, which if scrupulously enforced could cripple the
presently flourishing enterprise of private broadcasting in Nigeria. Luckily for
Nigeria's private entrepreneurs, the NBC has so far operated under enlightened
management. Its chief executive, Tom Adaba, has a doctorate from Indiana
University, Bloomington. Many of its top management have extensive professional
media and teaching experience and exposure to traditions of highly liberalized
press regimes. The power of the NBC to regulate broadcasting covers 16
categories, proceeding from the general to the specific. This power includes the
power to regulate and control programming content, adjudicate over programming
disputes, uphold national standards and codes, and uphold ethical and technical
standards (Nigeria Gazette, 1992: A316). The commission has a governing board of
11 members, including its chairman, and a director-general who functions as the
commission's chief executive. The nine other members represent seven
disciplinary interests: law, business, performing arts, education, social
science, media, and public affairs.
Decree No. 38 specifies the conditions for granting a private
broadcast license, the most important being a Nigerian citizen clause, and a
national interest clause. The national interest clause refers to requirement
that a "station shall be used to promote national interest, unity,and cohesion,
and shall not be used to offend the religious sensibilities or promote
ethnicity, sectionalism, hatred and disaffection among the people of Nigeria"
(Nigeria Gazette, 1992: A319). The commission cannot grant licenses to religious
organizations or political parties. It is also illegal to have controlling
shares in more than two TV stations. The 3rd Schedule to the decree contains
some of the most important provisions which has effectively determined the
programming orientation of broadcast content. In this 3rd Schedule, a station is
required to keep a daily log of its programs and the station log shall include a
transmitter output power and radiating frequencies. Furthermore, a license
application must contain proposed programs over a given period, e.g. quarterly,
and local program content must not be less than 40 percent (Nigeria Gazette,
1992: A324-325). The NBC has since stipulated a local content provision in
carving distinction between over-the-air radio and television stations and
satellite re-transmission services. The over the air stations must carry a
minimum of 60 percent local programming. The satellite re-transmission services
must meet a 20 percent local content minimum (NBC Documents, undated: Section
10). I will return to the significance of this provision in a moment, in
comparing the program content features of Ugandan and Nigerian broadcasting.
The Minaj Systems TV And Cable Network
I provided the technical specifications, as well as ownership profile
of the Minaj Systems and Cable Network of Nigeria in the earlier part of this
paper. I need not be redundant about this aspect of the network, except to
mention that I have chosen to use this network as one illustrative case of
emerging private broadcasting enterprises in Nigeria because Minaj group was
just 1 of some 50 private broadcast entrepreneurs in Nigeria who have so far
provided comprehensive data about their operations since I began this study
almost two years ago. As with the Ugandan operation I visited in 1995, the Minaj
Systems TV and cable operations are surprisingly capital intensive projects for
a relatively low market environment. The group reported spending $3 million in
establishing the two stations between 1993 and 1994. Minaj Cable Network was
launched on December 15, 1993. Its TV franchise, MST, was launched on June 19,
1994 --on record as Africa's first independently-owned, commercial television
station. The Minaj group spends about $950,000 a year on equipment and
programming. All of its equipment purchases are from the USA and the United
Kingdom. Its program acquisitions are obtained from the USA, Britain, Germany,
and the domestic (Nigerian) market.
Minaj Systems TV broadcasts 12 hours daily, seven days a week; its
cable operation broadcasts 18 hours daily, every day. The group does not break
down its programs by subject categories, claiming a "general" audience as its
target audience. It, however, reports 55 percent local and 45 percent foreign
productions for its TV station, and 80 percent foreign, 20 percent local
production for its cable franchise. For MST, advertising accounts for 10 percent
of all broadcast content; while this accounts for 5 percent of broadcast content
for Minaj Cable Network. None of its programs are by DBS transmissions but the
group says it plans to originate its own satellite programming from Nigeria. It
also hopes to develop six other cable franchises. Its major complaint against
regulatory policy is that the NBC should remove restrictions on wider coverage,
and the restriction of ownership being limited to three channels. Since the data
was furnished, the Minaj group has launched its own FM radio station at Obosi.
Conclusion
I have shown in this paper that the political economy transformations
taking place in sub-Saharan Africa are partly responsible for the emergence of
privately-owned, commercial broadcast stations. I have tried to update knowledge
regarding the conditions under which these stations evolved in the cases of
Nigeria and Uganda. The study shows that contrary to assumptions in existing
literature, the emergence of private radio varies considerably in the two case
studies I have looked at. In the Nigeria case, we see that evolution of
privatized commercial broadcasting was placed within a historic context of
activist politics and policy advocacy by partisan interests. In the Uganda case,
on the other hand, we saw privatized broadcasting begun as a result of what we
have identified as the logic of patrimonialism, a phenomenon in which
politically powerful interests in society have a monopoly of access to credits,
contracts, and concessions. Futhermore, I have used a political economy
framework to show that the failure of political economy transformations in these
two countries, at least, have not stopped the emergence of thriving, private,
commercial broadcast enterprises. And neither the existence of low market
factors, nor the institutional feature of dependency regarding technological and
programming supplies have constrained the emergence or viability of commercial
broadcasting. However, the study shows very high dependence on foreign programs,
and equipment, most of the dependence relating to manufacturers in the United
Staters, the UK, and Germany. This expectation was substantiated by other
findings, e.g. the recent publication by Straubhaar and La Rose (Straubhaar,
op.cit.)
The second major conclusion of the paper is that where regulatory
policy specifies the foreign composition of programming allowed, or stipulates
the nature of ownership, this appears to have dramatic effects on outcomes in
the two cases examined. In Nigeria where such regulatory policy was effected, no
foreign ownership or part ownership of private broadcasting has emerged. And
because the threshold of foreign program content was limited to 40 percent for
over the air TV, and 80 percent for cable re-transmission systems, we see how
Minaj group has barely stayed within these threshold limits. In Uganda on the
other hand, where no such rules are in place, the consequence of policy absence
has been both foreign ownership of the media and high foreign program content
--as high as 95 percent for Sanyu TV. Even more worrisome in the Ugandan case
has been the high penetration of private commercial broadcasting by western
government-owned propaganda stations such as the VOA and the BBC. Why African
countries would allow these propaganda institutions to lease airwaves of
indigenously-owned private commercial stations free-of-charge, is a mystery,
especially at a time when countries such as the United States and Britain are
putting pressure on the sub-Saharan African countries to privatize their own
media regimes.
Finally, I need to mention that despite obvious constraints, the
newly emergent commercial broadcast regimes in Uganda and Nigeria have several
options for upgrading managerial and production capacity, and for engaging in
collaboration with one another as a means of minimizing existing accelerating
structures of dependency on foreign providers of programming, equipment, and
technical expertise. Since I have already run out of room in this paper, these
issues need to be examined separately.
Endnotes
[1] Author's field interviews and notes, Kampala (Uganda), June
-July, 1995. Also, see World Radio and TV Handbook, 1996.
[2] Decree No. 38, National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) Decree 1992
established the NBC for the purpose of "receiving, processing and considering
applications for the ownership of radio and television stations including cable
television services, direct satellite broadcast and any other medium of
broadcasting" (Nigeria Gazette, 1992: A316).
[3] The most recent data was obtained March 29, 1996. Author's phone
interview with National Broadcasting Commission officials.
[4] Use of the terms "core" and "periphery" in this paper is
consistent with usage in political economy literature, with the core states
referring to the more developed states (mostly western market economies) and
periphery states referring to those in developing countries (including
sub-Saharan Africa countries).
[5] Author's interviews with Thomas Katto, and other informants
(Kampala, Uganda June - July, 1995).
[6] Author's notes, interview with T. Katto, Kampala, Uganda, 1995.
[7] Author's interviews, Kampala (Uganda), June - July 1995.
[8] Author's interviews, Kampala:op.cit.
[9] This pattern had remained relatively stable over a six-month
period. Data compiled from Steadman & Associates (U) Ltd Advertising Expenditure
Report, February 1995.
[10] [Paper's Author]. Private broadcasting and African
liberalization: Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia. (forthcoming). The author's
identity is masked in order to conform with AEJMC paper guidelines.
[11] Author's interviews, Kampala, 1995.
[12] The Worldnet affiliation is cost-free, but STV pays CNN $10,000
yearly in broadcast rights fees for carrying CNN programming.
[13] Some of the private broadcast entrepreneurs in Uganda say as far
as they know, no rules govern the content or any aspect of broadcasting in
Uganda, with the possible exception of obscenity. Whereas some of them would
like to see this laissez affaire approach continue, some actually called for the
establishment of an Independent Broadcast Authority to formulate guidelines for
broadcast operation. (Author's notes, Uganda, 1995).
[14] By "outcomes", reference is to the manifest output of program
content and programming expenditures, the two areas where I have accurate with
which to compare private broadcasting enterprises in Nigeria and Uganda.
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