The Double Face of China's Media Under Reform:
A Media Sociology Perspective on the
Commercialization of China's Media Content
Huailin Chen
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Department of Journalism & Communication
E-mail: [log in to unmask]
Zhongshi Guo
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Mass Communications Research Center
5050 Vilas Communication Hall
821 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
Tel: (608) 251-4501
E-mail: [log in to unmask]
(draft, do not cite)
Huailin Chen is an assistant professor at the Hong Kong Chinese
University and Zhongshi Guo is a doctoral student at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
Paper submitted to the Annual Convention of the Association for
Education in Journalism and Mass CommunicationInternational Communication
Association (AEJMC), Aug. Anaheim, Calif.
The Double Face of China's Media Under Reform:
A Media Sociology Perspective on the
Commercialization of China's Media Content
Abstract
Based on the media sociology perspective, this article provides a
theoretical framework and systematic analysis of recent commercialization
tendencies observed in China's media content. Data analyses and in-depth
interviews with Chinese journalists found the emergence and growing dominance of
dual goals in China's media content resulting from multiple-level influences:
while rigid propaganda continues to be the staple in everyday journalistic
practice, commercialized, human interest-oriented content has secured its place
in mass media.
Faculty Competition
The Double Face of China's Media Under Reform:
A Media Sociology Perspective on the
Commercialization of China's Media Content
Western media sociology theories typically subject mass media content
to the manipulative impulses of various forces at the individual,
organizational, and social levels. Studies probing the nature of social effects
on media content have identified a broad array of sources ranging from
individual journalists' professionalism to corporate ownership to cultural and
ideological factors (e.g., Shoemaker & Reeves, 1991; Herman & Chomsky, 1988;
Cohen, 1981; Fishman, 1980). Although the phrase causal relationship is rarely
used, media sociologists and political economists have established a well-argued
directional relationship flowing from independently varying social entities to
media content, despite the latter's self-claimed autonomy in the Western world.
However, few attempts have been made in previous research to examine these
theoretical relationships across national and/or cultural borders, not the least
of which are countries under authoritarian regimes where such relationships are
supposedly most manifest.
This article examines Western media content theories in the context
of People's Republic of China. More specifically, it extends these theories in
light of China's rapidly changing journalistic practice and the dynamics in the
relationships between social forces at various levels and mass media content in
that country. Classical normative media theories painted a rather static
picture of the relationship between the press and
China's media
government in Communist countries under the general label of
"authoritarian theory" (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). Following the
collapse of the Communist world and the gradual freeing of its press, this
perspective and studies stemming from it in the past several decades can no
longer adequately describe the socio-political origins of media content in most
of the ex-Communist nations. Although China remains one of the last strongholds
of Communism with a rigid ideological facade, the burgeoning market orientation
has in essence changed the meaning of "socialism" in everyday life. Of
particular relevance to our study is the impact of these on-going changes on
mass media content in China. The main questions that arise are: in what ways is
China's media content different and what is the nature of relationship between
social change and media content in China.
One starting point in theorizing about the government-press
relationship in China is the recent shift in the Chinese government's political
and financial policies toward the press, a move that is ultimately responsible
for the commercialization of the Chinese press. Here, media content is the key
dependent variable while sources accounting for its variability constitute the
focal relationships to be examined. The late 1980's saw the mushrooming of mass
media accompanied by the skyrocketing cost of media operation, thus
"objectively" weakening the government's political control over media content
and practically prohibiting the government from fully funding or subsidizing
both the old and China's media
the new media. For instance, the cost of newsprint rose from 1980's
RMB730 per ton to 1988's RMB2,050 and the figure exceeded
RNB6,000 in 1994 ($1=RMB8.3). The number of newspapers climbed from
1978's 186 to 1994's 2108[1]. Despite the unchanging State ownership of all
forms of media, the rising social demand for advertising makes it possible for
media organizations to gain financial autonomy for the first time since the
Communist takeover in 1949.
In several field study trips to China, we conducted in-depth
interviews with journalists and secondary analysis of the latest available data
from multiple sources. The Western media sociology perspective subsumes many
theories which, though rigorous in explaining Western media phenomenon, do not
fully capture what is going on in today's Chinese media. Given the lack of
clear theoretical guidance, theoretical models specified in our study,
therefore, are largely exploratory in nature.
The relationships between media content and social change occurring
at various levels are sometimes treated as a set of bivariate relationships
(e.g., Shoemaker and Reese, 1991; Gans, 1979). Variations in individual
professionalism, daily routines, media organizational policies, other
organizations, and political ideology each can have direct and indirect effects
on media content. These factors can also have combined and interactive effects
on media content. However, whether theories of social
China's media
influences on mass media content matter depends on one's distinctions
of types of content. Ideally, content categories within one theoretical model
are both mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Explicating "Media Content in China"
The new trend in China's media content has been labeled as propaganda
vs. junk food journalism in a recent study (Polumbaum, 1994). However, this
dichotomy leaves out a sizable portion of media content that comes under the
heading of "objective content." Typically, disaster reports, international hard
news events, news analyses, investigative articles, profiles, and feature
stories that are non-party line in purpose and tone belong to this category.
Stories of this type reflect the press' information transmission rather than
public education functions. These are the kind of stories where Western and
Chinese journalists alike strive for journalistic professionalism characterized
by a consistent style and a sense of impartiality. The term "junk food
journalism" carries an appropriately pejorative connotation for an emerging
content type that we more politely label as "commercialized media content."
Strictly speaking, commercialized media content is the product of the new
benefit-seeking trend in Chinese journalism. Profit-driven desires have given
space for this content genre which is akin to the sensational "yellow
journalism" sweeping the American press at the beginning of this century.
China's media
Our conceptualization of China's media content first separates the
country's news media into two broad categories of "Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Media" and "Other Media." The two are separable because the government has
distinctly different expectations and now different structural and financial
policies towards them. Specifically, the former serves more strictly as a
mouthpiece of the Party and has a much more restricted Party-line editorial
policy than the latter. In addition to receiving favorable taxing treatment,
CCP newspapers which are alternatively known as the "Party's institutional
press" also differ from other media in organizational affiliations (Liang,
1995). The former is directly accountable to central or local Party
organizations while the latter is normally attached to a branch of the
government or an institution. Before media commercialization, the content of
each of them could be divisible into two dimensions of propaganda and objective
reports, both of which can be measured by more specific indicators (e.g.,
speeches, meetings, achievements, accidents, international hard news, etc.).
Media commercialization has added a whole new dimension--commercialized
content--to media content.
Since 1949, means of State control over media had been mainly
accomplished through governmental intervention in three media production related
areas: Structural control gives government the sole right of appointment of
editorial staff; policy control imposes specific stipulations (e.g., all media
are China's media
the mouthpiece of the Party and media should do nothing to undermine
established authority or disturb order) and codes of conduct (e.g., media should
mostly publish positive reports); and financial control denies media of all
sources of revenue other than subscription and government subsidies. Violations
of these would meet with severe punishment, not the least of which is suspension
of publication. In a comparative study, Merrill (1988) found that China was
among countries where the press was most controlled. The introduction of market
resources in recent years, however, has changed this pattern of control (see
Figure 1 and Figure 2).
At the content level in both figures, sizes of letter font are
proportional to the degree of emphasis attached to a given type of content by
the media organization whereas the dotted line (in Figure 2) indicates a weaker
influence. Before commercialization (Figure 1), although all media
organizations were subject to the three controls by the government, CCP media
and other media placed differential weights to propaganda and objective content.
For instance, while CCP media had to carry the full text of a high-ranking
official's keynote speech, other media could choose to only print excerpts and
devote the remaining space to news and feature events. Following
commercialization (Figure 2), the pattern of government control has changed:
Although the government still holds on to its right
China's media
of top editorial personnel appointment[2], it has loosened its policy
control on non-CCP media. In some cases, journalists can launch their own
papers by means of buying an affiliation with an organization. More
dramatically, the government has given up its financial control of non-CCP media
by cutting its subsidies and granting these media organization the
responsibility for their own profits and losses (Liang, 1992). Market
resources, particularly media advertising, have become the most important source
of revenue for these organizations.
This gave rise to "commercialized content" characterized by
sensational reports (e.g., crime, pornography, and fantasies, etc.) and
quasi-advertising articles for which journalists often receive payment from
sources against their professional codes of ethics. Proportionally, this type
of content now occupies the greatest amount of space in the mushrooming non-CCP
media and has made its way into the CCP media. The net result for both types of
media is the shrinkage of media space for sheer propaganda content.
Theoretical Models
Having set the boundaries of content types and located changes in the
government control-press relationships in China, we now examine in greater
details two sets of relationships: the
China's media
relationship between social change and media operation and the
relationship between social change and media content. Each of these
relationships relates media to power and other social elements in ways that
require some assumptions and propositions. Given the specific situation in
China, we mainly concentrate on
China's media-6
the potential effects of social change on media and their content,
although possibilities exist that even in the context of China media content may
be a causal force of social change.
Social change and media operation
Currently, Chinese media without exception are facing pressure from
two macro-level sources: ideological and commercial. At the systemic level, a
paradox becomes increasingly apparent: On the one hand, political life is still
primarily dominated by a ideological rigidity which culminated in the clamping
down of the 1989 student movement; on the other hand, the freeing of the market
forces has resulted in a breakaway entrepreneurship that is running amuck (Chan,
1993). Unlike regions and countries with similar experiences (e.g., Taiwan,
South Korea, etc.), the prospect of press freedom in China is nowhere in sight.
Central to China's media production at this stage thus is not whether press
could gain independence from state control, but how it can successfully adapt to
the new environment.
China's media
Media at the transitional period Changes in the Chinese media's
operational behaviors during the current social transition have created
nontrivial shift not only in media's internal and external structures, but more
importantly, their relationships with the social structure. These changes can
be summarized into the following set of propositions:
1. Under the dual ideology-commercialization pressure, Chinese media
have redefined their professional norm. Increasingly at issue, particularly for
non-CCP media, is survival. Media operation is literally forced into switching
from the past propaganda orientation to propaganda and commercial orientation;
2. Media cannot completely free themselves from the political control
by the government. This is mainly because the government structural and policy
controls are yet to see fundamental changes;
3. Many media are now relying on market resources for operational
expenses. This is the result of the official separation of media into
government-subsidized and non-government-subsidized organizations (Liang, 1995);
4. Media organizations and individual journalists tend to resort to
illegal or unethical means of profit seeking. This is in part due to the lack
of a full-fledged legal system and in part due to media's financial imperatives;
5. Professional journalistic practices are still valued and
China's media
will eventually overcome much of the current commercialized
tendencies. As media workers are well aware, financial success through
commercialization of journalism are gained at the severe expense of media
credibility;
6. Media market is highly monopolized. Competitions among media
organizations for available advertising resources are not based on equal
opportunity since the State exerts strict control over media registration and
access to news (He, 1993);
7. The size of the media managerial staff is catching up with the
editorial staff. This one of the most prominent internal structural changes in
the Chinese media whose editorial staff used to outnumber and outrank its
managerial staff by a large margin (Wang, 1994);
8. Media have extended their social network. China's media which
were solely subordinated to their superior authorities prior to
commercialization are now well connected with advertisers and other interest
groups;
9. Media groups and media corporate systems are taking shape. Many
media organizations are launching serial publications and setting up business
companies.
10. Media showing a tendency of unequal development. This can be
seen in the contrast between declining circulation of major CCP newspapers and
the rising circulation of burgeoning evening news, while in general, print media
are falling behind
China's media
broadcast media in terms of advertising revenue and per capita
personnel income.
Media advertising Although the first media advertisement appeared
in January 1979, full legitimation of media advertising came many years later
(Wang, 1994). Today it has become the most important source of income for
China's media organizations (see Table 1). From 1983 to 1994, advertising
revenues jumped up by billions of RMB yuan for practically all forms of media,
not only increasing media's financial prowess, but also media staff's per capita
income (see Table 2).
In 1992, the total advertising revenue gained by the entire
broadcasting industry in China was 84% of the year's total government
subsidies[3]; Total government allocation of funds for Shanghai's TV and
broadcasting industry amounted to less than 3% of the industry's total income in
1994[4]. In the same year, newspaper total income reached RMB13 billion yuan,
among which nearly half, or RMB5 billion, came from advertising (Ma, 1995). In
most of the years between 1983 and 1994, newspapers took the lead in advertising
revenue while television is rapidly catching up. Radio and magazine industries
also showed steady increase in advertising income (Table 1). Not surprisingly,
increases in media organization's total income have boosted their staff
China's media
members' annual income (Table 2). The relationship between media
organizational income and journalists' income has a positive, reciprocal
influence. That is, a high overall media per capita income promotes loyalty and
commitment among staffers whose productivity in turn leads to augment in
circulation and readability.
New circulation/subscription pattern A steady decline in the
individual subscription of Partisan newspapers is accompanied by the "golden
age" of mushrooming tabloids-like evening newspapers. The number of evening
news in China increased from 1991's 40 to 138 in 1995[5]. Whereas individual
subscriptions to Partisan newspapers rarely exceed 10 percent of the latter's
total circulation, individual subscription rate to evening newspapers, China's
closest equivalent to alternative media, generally stays at 90 percent of total
circulation. With the government gradually holding back its media subsidies,
Partisan newspapers which rely heavily on State-funded subscriptions may soon
find themselves defenselessly facing market competitions (Table 3).
Table 3 shows the drastic decline in the circulation of CCP media
from 1990 to 1995 in the wake of a general circulation drop for many other
newspapers. For instance, People's Daily suffered a 30% loss in circulation in
the past five years. On the other
China's media
hand, two out of the three evening newspapers (Xinmin and Yangcheng)
have seen steady rise in circulation.
Overall, the effects of social change on media operations can be
described as occurring at three levels: At the societal level, changes in
government policies (e.g., differential subsidization, monopoly over
registration, etc.) have resulted in concomitant changes in media operations.
At the same time, society-wide commercialization craze has offered media
opportunities for internal restructuring, extending their social network,
self-development, and particularly financial autonomy. However, media's
financial independence from the government is by no means equal to political
independence, nor does it necessarily lead to editorial autonomy. At the
organization level, regions, and government branches and departments are not shy
in showing favoritism over their own media publications in terms of subscription
and provision of advertising and other financial resources. At the individual
level, the swelling managerial staff is turning media organizations into
businesses while rampant journalist violations of media ethics are eroding media
credibility. A popular limerick which says "always be on guard for arsonist,
mugger, and reporter" is a good testimony of public sentiment toward sensational
journalists.
Social change and media content
The departure of China's media from the traditional journalistic norm
can be observed in changes in inter-media
China's media
relationships, media-other organization relationships, media internal
structure, and everyday journalistic practices. But nowhere can it be more
clearly seen than in the change in media content. Like the nature of the
relationship between social change and media operations, the relationship
between social change and media content can also be summarized into several
propositions:
1. Rigid propaganda still takes up considerable media space. This is
particularly true with media such as national newspapers and television stations
whose audience coverage is the highest and with high visibility story placement;
2. Soft, sensational news, and popular culture stories are
increasingly favored by various media organizations. Most of these stories
appeal to curiosity, escapism, and fantasy with the aim of serving as the most
common denominator;
3. The appearance of paid news articles reflects media organization's
condonation and individual journalists' pursuit of personal gains at the price
of professionalism. This tendency threatens to be a new journalist norm[6];
4. Advertising is encroaching more and more into media space. Fixed
proportions of advertising in media allowed by governmental stipulations kept
expanding until the stipulations were abolished;
China's media
5. As a result of a trend to increase the number of pages by many
newspapers, the absolute number of objective news also increased. In the past,
almost all Chinese newspapers had only four pages. Now, over half of the
provincial newspapers carry eight pages (Chan, 1993).
6. The number of critical and investigative reports has been reduced.
In addition to the lingering political control from the central government, news
media now also are fearful of offending advertisers and interest groups. A
society in transition typically suffers from a variety of disorders, a category
of topics (e.g., unemployment, social conflict etc.) that is made "untouchable"
or taboo for media by the government under the guise of "maintaining social
stability;"
7. Peripheral channels of news are being used for stories whose news
values are high but propaganda values are low. Peripheral channels mainly refer
to those low visibility news space (e.g., non-prime time news programs on
television and weekend supplement of major newspapers). For instance, CCTV's
mid-day and late night news takes a more Westernized approach in story selection
and placement than its prime-time news.
Shoemaker and Reese (1991) suggested a multi-level hierarchical view
of influences on media content. They organized social influences on media
content into five levels: individual, media routines, organization, extramedia,
and ideological level. According to the researchers, each level has its own
effects on
China's media
content, which are limited by each hierarchically superior level.
Part of this conceptual model is applicable to the situation in China. In doing
so, we have made some revisions to the model by excluding two levels
(ideological and media routine) and adding some dimensions to each of the
remaining ones in light of China's current conditions (Figure 3 and Figure 4).
As discussed earlier, the ideological environment in China remains basically
unchanged and therefore is treated as a constant in our theoretical framework.
The same is true with the media routine in China.
In our conceptualization of social influences on China's media,
certain tension exists within the social factor at each level. At the
individual journalist level, traditionally-valued professionalism clashes with
the emerging pursuit of personal benefit. At the organization level,
responsible journalism is at conflict with sensationalism. And at the
extramedia level, the market force is contradicting government control.
Earlier, we have made individual propositions about these opposing elements at
some length. Here, the focus is on tensions between them and the impact of such
tensions on media content. Tension at the individual-level is characterized by
journalists' respect for professional news values, facts seeking, and
objectivity which is still the staple in most serious newspaper and broadcast
organizations and hardline propaganda which still prevails while
profit-motivated content is becoming rampant. A direct result is
China's media
the emergence, acceptance, and co-existence of three different types
of content (objective, propaganda, and commercial) within one media.
Indirectly, the fact that many top-notch journalists succumb to the lure of the
new profit-oriented journalism has seriously damaged the quality of China's
media. For instance, the provincial paper Liaoning Daily was among many which
was plagued by the problem of unfillable holes for serious news articles, a
situation never before experienced (Qiu, 1993).
Similar conflict found between responsible journalism and
sensationalism as two opposing organizational standards and goals also has
direct and indirect effects on media content. The direct impact comes from the
organization's editorial policies (Sigelman, 1973), covert newsroom
socialization (Breed, 1955), and enforcement of incentives and punishment in
favor of content types consistent with the organizational policies. Here, the
source of conflict is the dualism between media's social responsibility and
financial survival. Reflected in content is a divide between Party-line news
items generated from instructions from higher authorities and articles appealing
to the widest possible range of audience (of which sensationalism is one type).
Clearly, the correspondence between dual goals and dual content is also
indicative of an indirect influence from media organizational goals to content
through the former's effect on individual journalists. Ultimately, such
polarized dualism observed in Chinese media's organizational standards,
China's media
journalistic practices, and media content can be seen as a function of
the tensions between the emerging dualistic orientations at the extramedia level
where inroad of market forces runs counter to attempt of government control.
These tensions stem from a new pattern of mass media's social demands which now
come from several sources rather than the past sole source of central
authorities: continuing demand from the government and Party for public
education, authority establishment, and social stability; increasing demand from
advertisers and other sponsor for economic benefits; and emerging demand from
audience members and interest groups for readability and representation of their
concerns and interest. Clashing as they are, all these forces have power over
media and seek content change in their favor, resulting in a content pluralism
shown in Figure 5.
At the center of Figure 5 is the overlapping core of media content
where all three types meet. Priority propaganda content (e.g., keynote
speeches, new government and/or Party political or economic moves, etc.) is the
area below the dotted line, but not overlapping with any other types. Content
within priority propaganda category and the overlapping core is guaranteed
publication. For instance, a report on the country's most wanted criminals
yielding to the promise of leniency in legal policy and turning themselves in
would be a good example of such a content overlap. Next to it are the areas
where only two types of
China's media
content overlap. These stories are less likely to be considered for
publication than content at the core, but more likely to be published than
non-overlapping content with the exception of priority propaganda.
Figure 6 summarizes the direct and indirect effects of social change
on media operations and content. Generally speaking, in China, the impact of
social change at the micro and macro levels on media content can be thought of
as being either internal or external.
Social forces at each level, regardless of internal or external
impact, exert direct influences on media content. Consistent with the Shoemaker
and Reese (1991) model of hierarchical social influence on media content, in
Figure 6, factors at a higher level tend to restrict the range of effects of
those below them through which the former also produces indirect effects on
media content. Given the specific situation in China, the flow of influence
seems irreversible. That is, changes and occurrences at a specific level
rarely, if at all, have the opportunity to affect the course of events at a
higher level. However, within the same level, media's internal and external
sources of influences may act on each other and produce joint effects on
content. It is clear that what gets selected into the print and electronic
media in today's China is by and large the product of multiple level social
changes and tensions amongst them.
China's media
Conclusion
The main questions of concern in this article have to do with what
has happened to media content in China and why. Our most important discovery in
this regard is the tendency of polarization between hardline propaganda and
market-driven sensationalism. To a great extent, sources for media's "double
faces" come directly or indirectly from changes in government's media policy,
society-wide commercialization craze, media organizational behavior, and
individual journalist's beliefs and daily practices. Adopting the Western media
sociology perspective, we provided a multi-level theoretical framework for
understanding the dynamics in the mass communication process in China. Media
content is necessarily subject to the influence from norms, attitudes,
behaviors, and policies at the individual, organizational, and societal levels.
Although press freedom and manifestation of its adversarial functions are out of
the question at this stage, the new trend has reduced the amount, if not the
strength, of long-standing political, partisan and ideological bias in media
content and somewhat lessened media's serviceability to central power interest.
While commercialized content keeps on the rise, objective content has also
gained status. Mass media which previously assumed the sole role as a member of
the ruling family and entirely a Party controlled apparatus are now market
bound. The tendency for such media-power structural disjunction is coupled with
media's economic
China's media
survival strategies: maximization of profits within the ideological
confines. Changes in media organizational operations have social antecedents
that are distinctly different from those for non-media organizations. Of
particular interest to us in this article, however, is the consequences on media
content produced by such changes and their social antecedents.
The changing relationships between media and government, media and
market, media and other organizations, media and audience, and between
journalists and sources are all found to have a prominent bearing on media
content. Some of these changes (e.g., more advertising, more human interest
stories, etc.) have won official acknowledge while others such as paid news and
pure sensational stories are vying for acceptance. Previous press reform
attempts in 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were all short-lived following the change in
political climate. The dualism now manifest in media content may eventually
give way to professionalism, but the taste of financial autonomy and freedom,
however limited it might be, makes media's move away from central control an
irreversible one.
[1] Source: China News Almanac.
[2] In-depth interviews we conducted with Chinese journalists and
media personnel revealed a general consensus that all top media editorial
personnel are without exception to be appointed by the central government.
[3] Source: China Broadcasting Industry Yearbook.
[4] The figures were obtained from interviews with the Shanghai TV
and broadcasting stations.
[5] The figure was obtained from a report carried on Xinmin
Evening News.
[6] A popular limerick "colorizes" what makes hot media content
"red is government secret, golden is money, yellow is pornography, black is
suppression."
Table 1
Total Volume of Media Advertising Revenue in China from 1983 to 1994
(in million RMB yuan)
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
National Total
234
365
605
845
1112
1493
1999
2502
3509
6787
13401
20030
Newspaper
73
119
220
256
355
501
629
677
962
1618
3771
5050
cwly (%)*
--
116.9
185.5
116.3
138.9
141.0
125.6
107.6
142.1
168.2
233.0
133.3
Magazine
11
13
28
36
45
71
85
87
100
173
184
395
cwly (%)
--
120.0
216.5
126.9
127.4
155.5
120.4
102.1
115.0
172.8
106.8
214.1
Television
16
34
69
115
169
256
362
561
1000
2055
2944
4480
cwly (%)
--
209.1
202.2
167.6
147.0
151.1
141.5
155.1
182.2
205.4
143.3
152.2
Radio
18
23
27
36
47
64
75
86
140
199
349
500
cwly (%)
--
128.6
115.0
133.4
132.5
135.2
116.9
115.8
162.6
141.8
175.4
143.1
Note: *cwly stands for "compared with last year."
Source: The Advertising Bureau under the State Administration of
Industry and Commerce
Table 2
Individual Media Organization's Staff Size, Advertising Revenue, Per
Capital Advertising Volume, and Per Capita Annual Income
for Editorial Staff in China in 1994
(in RMB yuan)
Organization
Staff Size
Advertising Revenue
(in million yuan)
Per Capita Ad
(in 10,000 yuan)
Staff Per Capita Annual Income
People's Daily
1,200
98.0
8.17
12,000 - 15,000
Economics Daily
--
70.0
--
--
CCTV
3,600
1,000.0
27.8
20,000 - 25,000
Beijing Youth Daily
300
30.0
10.0
1,500
Liberation Daily
700
200.0
28.6
10,500 - 20,000
Wenhui Daily
700
90.0
12.9
10,500 - 20,000
Xinmin Evening News
210
240.0
114.3
25,000 - 35,000
Shanghai TV
800
250.0
31.3
25,000 - 35,000
Oriental TV
300
205.0
68.3
35,000 - 45,000
Shanghai Cable TV
100
40.0
40.0
25,000 - 35,000
Yangcheng Eve. News
--
300.0
--
--
Guangzhou Daily
--
360.0
--
--
Notes: Advertising revenue figures come from each media's own
estimation. Staff annual income figures, which includes salary, pricing
subsidies, position subsidies, bonus, internal rate payment for articles, and
all other legal source of income (but excluding staff members' income generated
from out of media sources), are estimated from our own interviews of the media.
Figure 1 Media Content and Influence of Social Factors Before
Commercialization in China
Figure 2 Media Content and Influence of Social Factors After
Commercialization in China
Figure 3. Hierarchical model of influences on media content.
(Simplified from:
"Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass
Media
Content," Shoemaker & Reese [1991].)
Figure 6. The dualistic relationships between social factors at
various levels and
media content in China
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