Abstract
 
The Role of Private Philanthropic Foundations
in Communications Policy Making
 
 
     The paper argues that it is important to study the role of
private philanthropic foundations in communications policy
making.  Foundations' significant access to economic and
informational resources makes them central agents in the process
of structuration of power relationships in communications policy
making.  In order to begin to understand this process better, the
paper suggests that it would be particularly relevant and useful
to analyze the way in which foundations define the "public
interest," to study the funding patterns in support of that
"public interest" and foundations' ability to communicate their
definition formally and informally to relevant decision makers
with its implications for policy outcomes.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Role of Private Philanthropic Foundations
in Communications Policy Making
 
 
 
Katharina Kopp
Annenberg School for Communication
University of Pennsylvania
3620 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6220
215-898 7041
e-mail: [log in to unmask]
 
Summer:
2846 27th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20008
202-483 5814
e-mail:[log in to unmask]
 The Role of Private Philanthropic Foundations
in Communications Policy Making
 
Most accounts of the public policy processes do not
systematically  analyze the substantial role of private
philanthropic foundations{1}.  In fact, it appears that most in
and out of the foundation world are not conscious of the often
deliberate political role a significant number of foundations
carry out through their trustees, staff and recipients (Colwell,
1993).  Particularly, there appears to be little comprehensive
research on the role of foundations with regards to
communications and information technology.  As the debates about
the structures and development of communications systems have
risen on policy makers' agenda, due to their increasing economic,
political and cultural importance (Haight, 1983) a careful
analysis of the role of foundations in the decision making
process in communications policy is called for.
 
The goal of this paper is to help us understand better the
process of communications policy making in the United States by
focusing on the role of private philanthropic foundations, an
often neglected, nevertheless as the evidence suggests, a
critical actor in the public policy process.  The common notion
of public policy suggests that public policy is what the
government does.  However, Nadel (1975) and Lindblom (1980),
point out that a significant amount of public policy is made "by
corporations and other private governments" by directly affecting
citizens' lives and "without having to go through formal
government authority"(Nadel, 1975:32).  While the central role of
corporate public policy making in people's lives must be
emphasized, the role of third sector institutions, such as
private philanthropic foundations must become more of a focus in
the analysis of public policy.  While privately made public
policy by corporations to a large extent affects people's lives
directly, foundations' privately made public policy appears to
indirectly affect people's lives by significantly shaping the
politics of knowledge and thus both private and government policy
making.  This paper argues that foundations appear to be
important actors in the public policy process, which makes the
study of foundations and their particular impact on
communications policy an important scholarly topic for further
investigation.
 
Commonly the analysis of policy making separates the process into
its components steps and analyzes each step in turn (Lindblom,
1980).  One studies first how policy problems arise and appear on
the agenda of government decision makers, then how people
formulate issues for action, next how legislative or other action
follows, how administrators subsequently implement the policy,
and finally at the end of the process, how policy is evaluated
(Lindblom, 1980).  In such a step-by-step analysis of policy
making, one should keep in mind, however, that there are
universal issues and phenomena beyond the particular aspects of
policy making unique to each step.  Most notably, (Lindblom,
1980:4) policy making is an untidy, extremely complex process, a
process shaped to different degrees by different actors with
different resources which exert control, influence, or power over
each other which produce outcomes called "policies." These
outcomes are rarely based on analysis, but mostly determined by
politics.  That "the competition of ideas" which ostensibly
characterizes a democracy (Lindblom, 1980) is in fact a "politics
of ideas" where competition is unequal, should become more clear
when one studies the role of foundations in public policy making.
 
 
It is the goal of this paper to argue for the importance of
assessing the changing meaning of the definition of the "public
interest" in information technology policy making by private
philanthropic foundations, of tracking and analyzing foundation
funding patterns as they relate to communications policy making,
of analyzing additional means foundations use to influence the
public policy making process such as through informal channels of
communication, and eventually of assessing foundations' impact on
communications policy outcomes.  Conclusions drawn from such a
study should help us understand better what the role of
foundations as knowledgeable actors in communications policy
making has been, specifically the role of foundations in shaping
and defining the "public interest" in past struggles over new and
evolving information technologies, and should inform our
understanding of future communications policy making.
 
The study of the role of foundations in communications policy as
opposed to other policy areas is particularly important as it
critically adds to our understanding of the interplay between
economic and informational or ideological resources, and hence
the extension of power and domination in advanced industrial
societies.  An OTA (1991) report summarizes the importance of
communications and thus the importance of communications policy:
"The communications infrastructure is both nested in and sustains
the larger social system of which it is a part.  For
communication is the basis for all human interaction and one of
the means of establishing and organizing society.  Communications
is the process by which all social activity is conducted; without
it a society could not survive."  Beniger (1986) points to the
growing importance of information technologies in the information
economy and has emphasized the convergence of all information
technologies - mass media, telecommunications, and computing -
into a single infrastructure of control in the information
society.  The various message production techniques of
information technologies shape the beliefs and behaviors through
the quantity and quality of knowledge available to the public
(Gerbner, 1984), and indeed also policy actors.  Thus, the
primary focus on the communications policy process is warranted
as its outcome not only affects the struggle over other policy
issues, but because more generally, the outcome will determine
the negotiation and distribution of economic, political and
cultural power.
 
Buxton's (1994) historical account of Rockefeller philanthropy's
involvement in early communications research and policy might
serve to summarize much of foundations' activities in this field.
The Foundation's goal during the 1930s was to find a place for
educational radio programming within the primarily commercial
framework that had been consolidated under the 1934
Communications Act.  Rejecting calls for developing a vigorous
and autonomous network of educational broadcasters, it sought
instead to transform particular educational broadcasters by
drawing on the resources of their commercial counterparts.
Rockefeller's efforts and resources were directed toward the
private broadcasting sector.  Above all, it sought to find ways
of convincing private broadcasters that educational programming
could have an appeal to their audiences.  Buxton concludes that
Rockefeller philanthropy was able to deploy social scientific
knowledge to redefine the public policy framework, thereby
pursuing their private interests more effectively.  "While these
interests were couched in terms of public service, it was assumed
that the public could best be served by a capitalist system of
ownership and control" (p. 170).  The tendency not to challenge
the existing communications structure, (i.e. a market economy),
but rather to try to reform it, appears to be a characteristic
that describes well foundations subsequent involvement in
communications policy.  Whether this is indeed so and how
foundations' understanding of public policy objectives affected
public policy making needs to be investigated.
 
In the late 1960s foundations were not concerned to confront
issues of power in society, according to Kramer (1977).  The
author argues that in the past the major foundations' definition
of public needs in the broadcasting area was based on traditional
patterns of private philanthropy: foundations were not concerned
with the "fundamental premises of power in society as they are
reflected in the media"(1977:1325), but they were concerned with
support for education and cultural institutions.  Where
foundations in the 1960s and `70s addressed issues of control and
power over and through the media they did so "almost never as a
part of a communications program"(1977: 1323), but from programs
dealing with social reform or civil rights issues.  For reasons
that need to be explored in another study, foundations were
influenced by some critical shifts in the perception of
foundations' roles in society.  Subsequently, foundations began
to increasingly recognize the relevance of communications policy
and became more involved in this field.  Thus foundations have
gone through a change in their understanding of the issue and its
relevance to them.  This change in attitude and foundations'
subsequent impact on public policy is important to understand.
 
Considering the role of foundations in communications public
policy making from an agenda setting perspective, foundations
appear to be critical actors.  Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) reject
the theory that social problems are objective and identifiable
societal conditions that have intrinsically harmful effects.
They agree with Blumler (1971) who argues instead that a "social
problem exists primarily in terms of how it is defined and
conceived in society"(p.300).  Research on agenda setting and
framing suggest that the stage of issue formulation, where
foundations appear to be particularly active, as I will show
later, is a especially significant stage.  According to
Hilgartner and Bosk(1988)  "which `reality' comes to dominate
public discourse has profound implications for the future of the
social problem, for the interest groups involved, and for policy"
(p.58).  Competition among social problems occurs simultaneously
on two levels: first, within an issue area, different ways of
framing an issue may compete to be accepted as an authoritative
version of reality, and secondly, there is competition for public
attention between issue areas.  The "frame" of an issue suggests
what the issue is about, it answers the question, what is the
basic source of controversy or concern on this issue (Gamson,
1988).  Without distorting or suppressing information, merely by
the framing of outcomes and contingencies, decisions can be
influenced (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1986).  Foundations, I
suggest, are involved on both levels of the issue generation
process: the framing process is shaped in the way in which
foundations identify and define social problems and issues like
the "public interest," and in the competition for attention
through their allocation of resources, either through their
funding decisions or through their ability to communicate the
importance of an issue and its particular frame to relevant
policy decision makers.
 
In their public arenas model Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) emphasize
the importance of the linkages between the different public
arenas shaping public agendas and the public policy process.  The
authors point to the "patterns of interaction among the different
arenas...through which activities in each arena are spread
throughout the others"  and the "networks of operatives who
promote and attempt to control particular problems and whose
channels of communications crisscross the different
arenas"(1988:56).  One can suggest that foundations' resources
include their ease of access to relevant decision makers (Cobb
and Elder, 1983) and ability to communicate and use these
communications links to shape the public policy debate.  This
process is not well understood.
 
A good starting point to understand the role of philanthropic
foundations in communications policy making, is an analysis of
the process by which foundations define the meaning of the
"public interest."  The much used, rarely defined and variously
interpreted term of the "public interest" has been brought
forward in policy debates surrounding various communications
technologies and its meaning has changed and evolved over the
years.  As authors like Polic and Gandy (1993) and Haight(1979)
have argued, there has been a significant shift among policy
makers in the rationale of how best to serve the common good
through communications policy making.  This shift has been
characterized by a displacement in the 1980s of the public
interest standard as expressed in the public trusteeship model
for broadcasting by a marketplace standard, characterized by
deregulation and the marketplace agency model (Polic and Gandy,
1993).   Polic and Gandy (1993) point out that "both public
trusteeship model and the marketplace agency model incorporate
the idea of the public interest"(p. 226).  The public trusteeship
model emphasizes the normative ideal of the "public interest"
which "strives towards realization of the ultimate goal of the
`multiplicity of ideas' that is understood as the true expression
of the workings of democracy"(p. 225).  The market place agency
model of the "public's interest " emphasizes the empirical
construct of the interest of a concrete public in real time and
space.
 
McQuail (1992) has developed different concepts of the public
interest based on a typology by Held (1970) beginning with the
preponderance model followed by the common interest model and the
unitary model.  The different typologies differ on one level as
to the specificity of the substance or meaning of the `public
interest,' especially the degree to which they emphasize some
normative ideal where the public interest are those interests
which all members are presumed to have in common (unitary model).
Secondly, they differ as to the means of determining the public
interest.  The preponderance theory, for example, defines the
public interest in a majoritarian way, whereas the common
interest theory, according to McQuail(1992), refers to experts or
tradition rather than to majoritarian decision making as a good
means of arriving at the ideal of the `public interest.'
 
Similarly, Entman and Wildman (1992) argue that the communication
policy debate can be divided roughly between the "market
economics" and "social value" schools of thought.  The "market
economics" school advocates competition and efficiency and the
market mechanism or majoritarian (consumer) decision making.  The
"social value" school associates problems with the market process
and sees governmental intervention as at times beneficial.  The
social value school represents the "normative ideal" perspective
of the "public interest."  Both schools, according to Entman and
Wildman (1992), espouse diversity, "a metaphorical marketplace of
ideas," as a goal of communications policy. Where the difference
between the two schools lies is in their frameworks for
understanding diversity: product, idea, or access diversity.
Whereas the "market economics" school argues that product and
similarly access diversity will accomplish idea diversity the
"social value" school argues that competition and efficiency will
not necessarily perform well with regards to other social
objectives.  For them product diversity will not yield
necessarily sufficient idea diversity.  The different
interpretations of diversity and how to achieve it reflect the
larger policy debate over the meaning and means of achieving the
`public interest.'  Thus, these different understandings of
diversity, might help us identify the shifting definitions of the
`public interest' in communications policy making in general.
 
The shift toward a legitimation of the marketplace agency model,
eventually equated the public's interest with the interests of
the communication industry (Polic and Gandy, 1993).  These
distinctions made here by Polic and Gandy (1993), McQuail (1992)
and Entman and Wildman (1992) help to clarify the different
possible meanings of and the struggle over the interpretation of
the public interest.  The different concepts of the public
interest could then be distinguished according to their emphasis
on an abstract normative objective, the means of obtaining it
(either through the market or through some other mechanism such
as the government, an independent body, or some other non-market
means of identifying the public interest), and their emphasis as
to product or idea diversity.  These concepts of the public
interest, however, are rather recent and might not be very useful
in analyzing the changing definition of the public interest over
a longer time period, e.g. since the 1934 Communications Act.  A
more general approach in addition to the one above might be used
in a historical analysis of the public interest definition by
foundations.
 
Pointing out the futility of arriving at a relatively specific
model of the public interest due in part to the absence of a
unitary value system to which one could appeal, McQuail suggests
Held's ( 1970) approach to the problem.  Held argues that one
should think in terms of competing claims: `public interest'
claims are normative assertions that something (an action or a
goal) is justifiable on grounds of wider benefits, within the
terms of a given political system and framework of norms.
McQuail (1992) has developed a framework of principles for media
assessment based on the study of communications policy debates
over the previous decades.  It represents the main evaluative
ideas which are actually encountered in public debate and in
regulations concerning media performance.  Most societies
recognize a wide range of `communications goods' such as freedom,
diversity, education, services to democracy etc.  In general,
such values are not themselves in dispute, but there can be
conflict about their relative precedence and their applicability
to particular circumstances.  The discussion of media performance
is rooted in time and place but largely coincides with the core
values of modern Western society.  While the particular terms are
open to alternative interpretation, it is proposed that these
values are:
1. freedom
2. justice/equality
3. order/solidarity
These three basic values, McQuail argues, do often come into
conflict with each other and an appeal to one may be made in
order to counter an appeal to another.  How the tension over
these values is played out over time by private philanthropic
foundations should be the focus of research proposed here.
 
Freedom as a public communication value or principle has often
been defined (as in the First Amendment of the US Constitution)
in terms of an unrestricted right to publish without prior
permission or license and without reprisal, aside from the normal
provisions of the law, which apply to all citizens.  It is a
condition, rather than a criterion of performance, since freedom
does not predict any specific performance outcome.  Freedom
should not only be defined as freedom from the government, but
media in general cannot entirely escape controls and demands of
other private sector agents: the pragmatic demands as well as
normative expectations of their various external partners,
especially those of sources, clients (audiences and advertisers),
and would-be communicators.  Thus, as a condition of media
structure, freedom calls not only for the absence of a legally
imposed licensing or censorship mechanism, but a degree of
independence from the main kinds of pressures and constraints
encountered in public life, i.e. in social relations other than
with the government.  I therefore distinguish between structural
conditions, that is the legal freedom to publish, and the
operating conditions, the independence from economic and
political pressures and relative autonomy for journalists.
 
The condition of a free press or media system, as suggested by
McQuail brings with it a series of benefits for society.  These
benefits include reliability and objectivity of the
communications system as no other institution or social agents
influences the media's output and as independence is a necessary
condition for detachment and truthfulness.  Similarly, a free
communications system will lead to a robust and uninhibited press
with a critical stance that can pursue its watchdog function.  A
free media will provide access to a diversity of knowledge as it
is open to new ideas and able to provide a platform for the
expression of opinions, needs and demands.  Finally a free media,
so its advocates, will lead to innovation and creativity.
 
The three values mentioned above are not entirely mutually
exclusive, or rather the benefits expected from them are not.
For example, one could argue that freedom promotes participation
of citizens in formulating the objective and goals of society and
in choosing means for achieving them.  At the same time, equality
could be argued to promote those objectives.  Although one might
object that this is somewhat arbitrary, I would categorize
participation as essentially a value deriving from the equality
variable since participation is only truly possible if all actors
are more or less equal in their capacity to participate.
Similarly, the issue of diversity could be categorized under
freedom or quality.  This category, I suggest, can be
distinguished in terms of the context it is used in, whether it
is derived from freedom or equality as a social value of the
communications system and thus should be derived from freedom or
equality separately.
 
The value of equality corresponds closely with the idea of
justice (equality of rights before the law, fairness of social
arrangements).  The expression of grievances and processes of
justice require adequate channels of communication and the means
of publicity.  The potential to communicate and to receive
communication is a social good which should be universally and
equally available.  Particularly the democratic process requires
the services of public channels of communication as the concept
of a democratic citizenship presupposes an informed and
participant body of citizens.  The value of equality needs to be
translated into more specific meanings to be applied to a
communications system.
 
Equality requires that no special favor be given to power-holders
and that access to media should be given on a fair, if not always
an equal, basis to contenders for office and, in general, to
oppositional or deviant opinions, perspectives or claims.  Equal
access for senders to the communications system can be based on
the principle of open/equal access, that is equal air time for,
e.g. all political contenders; or it could be based on the
principle of fair/proportional or `appropriate' allocation of
access based on proportional representation of political support
or demand.
 
The value of equality also supports policies of universal
provision in broadcasting and telecommunications and of sharing
out of the costs of basic services.  Thus equality calls for an
absence of discrimination or bias in the amount and kind of
access available to senders or receivers, in spite of economic
differences of the citizens, as far as is practical.
 
What is practical then, leads to distinctions within the value of
equality in terms of how far one is willing to push that value.
Some advocates might support the notion that potentially all
citizens can or should be senders, producers, or creators of
communication; whereas more conservative advocates of this value
might argue that only a limited number of communicators can and
should be senders, producers and creators of communication since
the more inclusive idea might be considered `impractical.'
 
The value of equality should bring about several socially
beneficial consequences.  In terms of communication demands, as
opposed to supplies, equality promotes access to knowledge, an
educated and informed body of citizens or consumers.  As all
communicators have an equal right to provide communications,
express their opinion, needs and preferences publicly and
citizens have an equal opportunity to satisfy their demands,
access to knowledge and education is facilitated.
 
Benefits also derive from the value of equality in terms of the
supply of communications.  Equality promotes diversity and choice
in terms of various measures:  in terms of the kinds of media,
the different products; in terms of diversity in function or type
of content; in terms of diversity in geographic levels of
operation, i.e. on the national, regional, or local community
level; in terms of diversity in audiences aimed at and
reached(e.g. beyond differentiation by income or age); and in
terms of diversity in language, ethnic or cultural identity,
politics or ideology.
 
Like freedom, equality also promotes objectivity in media
practices.  Whereas freedom promotes objectivity since
independence is a necessary condition for detachment and
truthfulness, equality promotes objectivity as it requires a fair
and non-discriminatory attitude to sources and to objects of news
reporting, and equal chance to hear and report on those sources
and objects.  For the purposes of the proposed study here,
objectivity should only be counted as part of the value of
freedom as it appears to me that it is the emphasis on freedom of
the press/media rather than on the equality of all communicators,
that is emphasized when talking about the value of objectivity.
Also, it is more an attitude, a media practice norm, that
produces objectivity and that is more closely associated with
ideas of freedom of the press than with notions of equality.
 
Order in the sense of peace and rule of law has usually been
regarded as a precondition for a just and civilized society.  It
can also be regarded as a communication value according to the
definition of communication as a means of increasing commonalty
and leading to the sharing of outlook and experience.  The
interdependence and stability of collective life of a society or
community, according to McQuail (1992), derive from and depend on
communication processes and call for expressions of identity and
belonging, as well as involving social control through
communication.  Order can be referring to cohesion and harmony,
but it is normatively ambiguous because of its potential
association with control, with hierarchy and subordination of the
weak to the powerful.
 
Order or control may refer to a particular level of social
organization, and it also may refer to the processes which
strengthen or weaken this cohesion of which communication is one
aspect.  This aspect of order, control or coherence is manifested
in communication content and patterns of flow.  The central
question in distinguishing between these different values is that
of whose order, coherence and harmony is promoted, i.e. the
perspective, either from above or from below, is central.  This
distinction corresponds to that between order, in the sense of
control, and order in the sense of solidarity and cohesion.  It
is not easy to keep the various aspects of this value
conceptually apart.  However, the following categories are
suggested for analysis of foundations' definition of the public
interest.
 
First, one has to distinguish broadly between the aspects or
variables of social organization of the communications system and
the symbolic content or culture that the value of order/social
control may refer to.  With regards to social organization one
can distinguish between the top-down perspective of
control/compliance and the bottom-up perspective of
solidarity/attachment.  These two categories are concerned with
the question of `whose order' of the communications system is
promoted.  Here also references to content can be included.  For
the control/compliance category media performance gives attention
to disruption of order, it suggests negative portrayal of
conflict, disorder and deviance and support given to institutions
of the established order.  The category of solidarity/attachment,
in terms of media performance, gives attention to failings of the
established order (as perceived by more marginal and cultural
groups in society) and emphasizes that society is composed of
many sub-groups, different bases of identity and interests.  It
stands against a unitary perspective of a consensual `good' order
and links private and local experience with wider social
implications.
 
The second variable of symbolic content or culture may refer to
hierarchy/quality or authenticity/identity.  Here again the
question is `whose culture.'  The first category refers to a
top-down perspective and suggests a hierarchical view of culture.
It refers to standards of `high culture,' the dominant,
established set of cultural values with traditional criteria of
quality.  Standards of `high culture' are `certified' by
established cultural institutions and professional or expert
criteria.  Claims pertaining to order may be framed negatively in
terms of requirements of limiting the exposure of children or
other vulnerable groups to possible moral or cultural `harm.'
The category of authenticity/identity in terms of `whose
culture?' refers to a bottom-up perspective.  It emphasizes
alternative values relating to cultural or sub-cultural identity
for which aesthetic or technical quality plays no significant
role.
 
The three basic communications values outlined here, freedom,
equality/justice, order/solidarity, are a starting point for
assessing foundations' communications policy values over time.
More thinking will be necessary to develop a detailed instrument
for analysis that takes the changing values and debates in public
policy as well as the changing capacities and opportunities of
communications technology into consideration.  Since foundations
appear to be significant players in the public policy making
process, it is important to understand how they have interpreted
the term of the public interest and what kinds of projects
serving the "public interest" they have funded.  Insights into
these processes should inform us about the more recent discourse
and future developments in communications policy making.
The Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony serves as a useful
concept and frame in studying the role of foundations in the
public policy process.  The role of key institutions in the
development of culture or public policy and the political
significance of that role can only be properly evaluated when
considering the relationship of foundations to policy actors.
According to Karl and Katz (1987), Gramsci's contribution to
Marxist theory was his development of a more finely nuanced
theory of civil society and its relationship to the state.
Gramsci distinguished within the civil society between the
relations of production, which he saw as structural, and social
relations, classified as superstructure.  The social relations of
civil society are the cultural, ideological, and intellectual
relations and forces that are embodied in such organizations and
institutions as the mass media, the church, and political
parties.  "Indeed, the philanthropic foundation is an excellent
example of an organization Gramsci would have conceived of as
embodying the social relations of civil society" (Karl and Katz,
1987:3).
 
The authors continue, "the real success of a particular class' s
push for societal predominance occurs when it uses its political,
moral, and intellectual leadership to articulate a basic world
view that subordinate classes come to adopt.  This world view
becomes, for Gramsci, the `common sense' of the society.  "....It
comes to be reflected in the practices, ideologies, and
institutions that comprise the dominant value system of the
society....one of the chief ways in which the dominant class acts
to maintain its hegemony is by forging an elite of intellectuals
drawn from the dominant class, but also from subordinate
classes." (1987:4).  For Gramsci (Graubard, 1987) the dominant
class in a society will invariably use its power to articulate
views and propagate opinions that keep subordinate classes in
line; "the genius of such a class is that it creates
institutions, like foundations, to achieve these ends.  This is
rarely openly acknowledged; it may not even be covertly thought
of"(p. VI).  With this notion of hegemony Gramsci discarded
Marx's notion of a purely coercive conception of class rule, and
contributes this insight of an informational or manipulative
aspect of the power relationship between classes.  As helpful as
such an insight might be, in order not to fall into the trap of a
functionalist explanation of these processes, it is up to
scholars to identify the precise process by which agents acting
on behalf of foundations exercise this hegemony through policy
discourse and formation.
 
Giddens (Wright, 1989) in his theory of structuration has
emphasized the importance of allocative resources (resources
involving control over nature) and authoritative resources
(resources involving control over social interactions) of
knowledgeable actors.  The control over any resource can be
specified in terms of its extension over time and space.  The
ability of actors to exercise control depends on their ability to
employ allocative and authoritative resources in time and space
in power relations.  Foundations' quite substantial ability to
employ allocative and authoritative resources makes them
significant actors in the policy making process.  The concept of
resources should be helpful in understanding the process by which
foundations exercise power in the process of structuration.
 
The process of hegemonic control by foundations might be better
understood by considering the role of what Haas (1992) calls the
"epistemic community."  The author points to the increasing
importance of the "knowledge elite" or "epistemic community" in
modern societies and in public policy making specifically.  The
expansion and professionalization of bureaucracies and the
growing technical nature of problems and their increasing
complexity "have fostered an increase in the deference paid to
technical experts and, in particular, to that of scientists"(P.
11).  Not only do these epistemic communities help decision
makers reduce their uncertainty and help justify still
essentially political (as opposed to "rational") decisions, these
communities "may succeed in imposing their views and moving
toward goals other than those initially envisioned by the
decision maker"(p. 16).  Epistemic communities may be able to
introduce policy alternatives, influence the selection of
policies and of building coalitions in support of these policies,
according to Haas (1992).  If foundations are able to shape the
knowledge pool, the values, the definition of the "public
interest," for example, of these epistemic communities, then
their role in public policy making is considerable.
 
Let me now consider the various ways in which foundations
exercise power or influence over the public policy making
process.  Where possible I will refer specifically to the
communications policy making realm and to the implications for
the definition of the `public interest.'  Foundations have and do
play a major role in policy making through their funding of
research, organizations and conferences and other means of
communicating policy recommendations.  The funding of certain
ideas over others produces a certain ideological climate and a
particular pool of ideational resources from which policy actors
can draw.  Moreover, foundations create and are part of an
intricate network of policy actors which is largely hidden from
the public.  In these circles policy is discussed and directions
are decided often long time before they reach the public policy
arenas.  Their funding also supports particular types of
institutions and political organizations which become significant
policy actors shaping policy making and thus extend the
foundations reach beyond the confines of their own organizational
influence.  Foundations' track record and various resources
privilege them with considerable authority so that their views
and decisions are met by more responsive public policy decision
makers, that is relatively to other policy actors.  In the
subsequent discussion I will show how foundations' significant
access to economic and informational resources, i.e. allocative
and authoritative resources, makes them central agents in the
process of structuration of power relationships in communications
policy in particular and in society at large.
 
According to Arnove (1980) the "power of foundations has long
resided in their providing necessary seed money for professional
advancement and institutional growth, for innovations and
research in unchartered and perhaps risky areas where other
sources of funding are unavailable.  Through funding and
promoting research in critical areas foundations exercise
decisive influence over the growing edge of knowledge, the
problems that are examined and by whom, and the uses to which
generated information is put."  The author writes that , the Ford
Foundation, for example, has been described as the "word's
largest investor in new ideas"(1980:5).  Whether "new" or not,
and "despite the disclaimers of the big foundations that the
federal government spends 150 times more than all private
foundations and 1,500 times more than the Ford Foundation"
(Arnove, 1980:6), foundation assets are, nevertheless,
substantial.  Arnove (1980:5) quotes Whitaker that in the early
1970s foundations owned nearly 1 percent of the wealth of the
United States.  Moreover, as Lagemann (1989) points out, due to
the "competition" from new private and governmental foundations
in the post World War II period, the Carnegie Corporation's
assets (and presumably those of other foundations, too) were
leveraged to strategically influence public policies which the
foundation's key decision makers viewed as essential for
establishing an ordered postwar American society.  The exercise
of resource allocation by foundations, clearly, is a significant
aspect in shaping the policy making process.  What the funding
patterns are and what the impact on policy outcomes might be, is
not well understood, however, particularly in communications
policy making.
 
Several scholars have scrutinized the historical role foundations
have played in the formulation of ideology in the Progressive
Period (Slaughter and Silva, 1980), the development of the social
sciences (Fisher, 1983) or, for example, the development of the
political (Seybold, 1980) and economic (Goodwin, 1989) sciences,
specifically, to show some of the real impacts foundations have
had in changing the informational and ideological environment in
American society.  In the Progressive Period philanthropic
foundations intervened in the era's "marketplace of ideas, using
their vast resources to further those groups who produced and
disseminated world views supportive of the status quo, and using
the weapons at their disposal to contain and discredit
alternative, especially socialistic, ideologies" (Arnove, 1980:
8).  Slaughter and Silva (1980) write that foundations were
involved in the "production" and "marketing" of ideology.
Foundations recruited professors and other professionals in their
role as experts who claimed objectivity and value neutrality,
representing no constituency other than science, to mediate the
idea flow from corporate capital to the public.
 
Both Fisher (1983) and Seybold (1980) provide extensive
documentation of the means by which foundations structure a
scholarly field in their interest.  These include the funding of
leading individuals and institutions; the identification,
recruitment, and training of promising young scholars; the
capturing of key journals in a field as well as the leadership of
professional associations; the use of prestigious intermediary
agencies, such as the Social Science Research Council and the
American Council of Learned Societies.  Foundations may
eventually recede into the background, as Arnove (1980) points
out, "but the seminal influence they exerted is very much
manifest in the issues which are examined, the research paradigms
and methods that are used, and the center-stage individuals who
determine the nature and direction of the field's endeavors" (p.
13).
 
Specifically, according to Fisher (1983), the creation of
foundations was part of the societal rationalization process and
was a means of both objectifying and distancing philanthropic
activities from individual capitalists.  As the men at the
Rockefeller Foundation believed that the best way to contribute
to the improvement of society by maintaining and strengthening
the system of capitalist democracy, the foundation developed
goals for the development of the social sciences as part of an
ideological production aimed at the reproduction of the existing
social structure.  Tensions between two conceptions of knowledge
emerged:  professional social scientists were committed to the
search for objective knowledge.  On the other hand, the ruling
class wanted knowledge that would present their position and
thereby contribute to stability and social control.  In the end,
the "commitment to `academic science' and the strengthening of
the professionalization process placed the social sciences above
reproach.  These `new intellectuals' could then become the
technical experts who would provide unbiased, objective solutions
to social problems" (p.224).
 
According to Seybold (1980) from 1948 to 1961 a "revolution took
place in American political science.  The traditional
institutional approach to the study of politics was replaced by
the `new' behavioral science.  The long-term decline of political
theory and the general disappearance of the notion of the state
are for all purposes synonymous with the rise of the `scientific'
attitude toward the study of politics"( p. 269).  Seybold
contends that the Ford Foundation was able to set the tone for
research in political science by promoting the behavioral
revolution which discouraged "traditional political science,
constitutional law, political history, and radical political
science research" (p. 274).  "As it happens, the research that
was encouraged was that of the pluralist and democratic elitists
and that which was discouraged was that of the power structure
analysis"(p. 275).  Following the author's argument, "the
foundation's interest in developing sophisticated methods to
analyze electoral behavior was linked closely to its efforts to
judge the level and form of political protest in the United
States and to develop strategies to structure that protest" (p.
298).  Thus these authors have shown how in the past foundations
have had direct impact in shaping the research agenda.
 
Goodwin (1989) also considers the importance of the funding of
ideas, looking specifically at the Ford Foundation's changing
role in spreading economic ideas.  The author suggests that by
the "1950s economics had acquired a highly privileged position
with American foundations, which saw the new burgeoning social
sciences as likely to provide the answers to many of society's
looming problems"(p. 158).  Furthermore he argues that "the
foundations came to be among the most powerful vectors for the
spread of economic ideas - directly themselves, indirectly
through the provision of funds to others, and very indirectly by
placing their Good Housekeeping Seal on the work of
economists"(p. 159).  The Ford foundation did much to support the
spread of economic ideas in the public policy realm: through a
special program concerned with Economic Development and
Administration which was established during the 1950s and lasted
until the 1970s, the Ford Foundation funded reforms of business
schools and schools of public administration to feature applied
economics, it assisted empirically based research institutes and
funded empirical research.  Even though the support of economics
by foundations has cooled according to the author, the lasting
support of the discipline is likely to have contributed to the
rise of the market place standard paradigm and the "success of
science over the approach of the `philosopher kings,'"(Miller,
Gandy, 1990) in communications policy making as in other policy
areas.  Miller and Gandy (1990) have shown, for example, that
there has been a "clearly identifiable increase in economic
publications[in scholarly communications journals] beginning in
1973 and repeated somewhat more dramatically in 1977"(p. 670).
The foundation support of economics probably contributed to
foundations' changing definition of the "public interest" in
communications policy in turn and is likely to have affected
which perspectives on the "public interest" were funded and
communicated to relevant decision makers.  Eventually, taking a
degree of response lag between the beginning of foundation
support for economics (1950s-70s) and its effect on the public
policy decision making community into consideration, these
preferences and emphases in foundation funding policies are
likely to have had an impact on public policy outcomes.
 
Thus, by shaping the research agenda and thus the ideological
climate, foundations also shape the policy making agenda.  The
processes by which foundations mold a scholarly field influence
academics in the way in which they participate and contribute to
the policy making process.  As Haight (1983) points out,
researchers are involved in the communications policy making
process in three ways: "first, they are asked to make accurate
predictions about the economic consequences of alternative plans
for technological developments, in order to inform investment
decision.  Second, they are asked to make accurate prediction of
the social consequences of these plans.  Third, their expertise
is used by decision-makers as justifications for decisions made"
(p. 228).  The relationship between foundations and researchers
and foundations' shaping of a scholarly field is one part of the
politics of knowledge with its significant implications for
policy making.  An empirical analysis of the changing definition
of the "public interest" must pay particular attention to the
kinds of research funded, support of other disciplines such as
economics and support of professional associations or other
influential institutions such as scholarly journals.
 
It is not simply the enormous financial resources that
foundations bring to bear in the policy process, but it is also
the set of intricate networks, i.e. their resources of
"recruited" personnel, which define foundations' resources and
which they can mobilize to exercise power.  Domhoff (1979) traces
foundation influence through the appointment of foundation
trustees and staff and foundation created "experts" to high level
governmental positions, and to "blue ribbon commissions."
Domhoff (1979) identifies four general processes by which elites
involve themselves in government at all levels, of which
foundations are involved in the second and fourth:  1. special
interest process, 2. policy planning process, 3. candidate
selection process, 4. ideology process.  By funding many of the
policy-formation groups that bring together members of the elite
and their hired experts and by providing a "setting in which
differences on various issues can be thrashed out and the
opinions of various experts can be heard" (1974:8) foundations
exercise influence in the policy formation process.  They are
also active agents in the ideology shaping process as attempts
are made to convince the public that "this is for all its
defects, the best of all possible worlds" (1974:14).  Thus, the
concept of resources and its impact on the policy making process
is not a straight forward one.  Resources may be allocated to
specific research projects, pilot studies or institutions acting
on a certain interpretation of the "public interest," or they may
be given to forums where these interpretations could get
disseminated.  It is perhaps the ability of foundations and their
agents to shape the agendas of meetings and other organizations
that shapes the overall public policy making agenda long before
it reaches the formal stages of decision making.  When analyzing
financial resource allocation, attention must be paid to the
support given to these kinds of channels of influence on policy
planning with its implication for the dissemination of ideas and
building alliances.
 
Several authors have emphasized the close connection between
foundations, the government and corporate America.  These
networks are likely to influence the thinking of policy makers as
well as that of foundation personnel about the  "public
interest."  Colwell (1993) argues that the critical connection in
this network are the links that involve trustees whose attitudes,
knowledge, values and goals are a critical element in what
foundations do, with few exceptions and.  The most important
influence on funding policies is the board of trustees which
"almost exclusively consist of members of the political and
economic elite" (p. 11). 57% of the 98 trustees studied were
directors of big American corporations.  From 40-47% of the
trustees of the Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation and
Rockefeller Foundation held high-level governmental positions in
the past or at the time of the research.  Colwell studied the
links amongst foundations, which serve as an informal forum for
exchanging information about "good grantees" and unsuccessful
projects, and the links between foundations and policy planning
organizations.  The foundation trustee/policy planning
organization trustee links are most critical here.  Ten of the 20
foundations in the public policy sample were directly linked to
18 of the 31 recipient organizations studied.  48 foundation
trustees were members of the boards of these 18 policy
organizations.  When Colwell studied the boards of the 31
recipient organizations and their foundation links, she found
many of the board members were also foundation board members.  It
is significant to point out that "this is especially true of the
important public policy-formation organizations" (p. 89).  40% or
more of the boards of seven important public policy-formation
organizations (Brookings Institution, 60%;  the Council on
Foreign Relations, 56%; the Hoover Institution, 53%; Committee
for Economic Development, 47%; American Enterprise for Public
Policy Research, 40%; the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies,
43%; Overseas Development Council, 40%) were also members of
foundation boards.  Although the precise process by which ideas
are communicated, disseminated and adopted has not been
documented, Colwell concludes that there is an obvious and
substantial interrelationship between policy organizations'
boards, government organizations and foundation boards.  Thus a
particular definition of the "public interest" is likely to be
influenced by an elite group of trustees, recruited from
corporate bodies and thus likely to favor a market place standard
of the "public interest."  Government agencies and policy
planning organizations are likely to be particularly susceptible
to the communicated ideas of trustees with links to foundations
as they are likely to be dependent on foundation's funding at
that time or some time in the future.
 
Jenkins (1989) agrees with Colwell on the importance of
foundation networks adding that peer networks make foundations
follow established paths and fads and that foundations resort to
coordinated or joint grants to diffuse responsibility for risky
grants.  Larger foundations have more staff to evaluate projects,
smaller foundations frequently wait until the larger founders
have identified the "responsible" projects.  Furthermore, Jenkins
(1989) has shown that the take-off in foundation funding of
social movements typically lagged behind 3-5 years.  Kramer
(1977) points out that the four major advocacy groups in
communications policy in the 1970s had to "establish track
records of enormous proportions before they received any major
foundation support"(p. 1323).  If this is indeed so, it would be
important to analyze how foundations influence each other through
their networks in defining and funding the "public interest" in
communications policy and at what stages in policy debates and
the decision making process which kinds of foundations get
involved.
 
In his analysis of the emergence of the "abundance allows for
deregulation" rationale accompanying the debate on the rewrite of
the 1934 Communications Act between 1969 and 1978, Haight (1979)
argues that what is "important to know in understanding the
politics of the rewrite is how these ideas were carried forward
until they became the main thrust of the rewrite" (p. 245).
Through an analysis of various reports and FCC decisions Haight
(1979) documents the "progressive abandonment of protections
other than marketplace forces to insure diversity in mass
communications.  While the need to innovate has risen on the
agenda, concern for fairness seems to have faded in the light of
technology's promise"(p. 253).  When Haight (1979) turns to
addressing the question why this shift in rationale took place in
the various policy formation circles, he considers, apart from
the overwhelming corporate interests and the power of a new
technological paradigm of abundance, the importance of "private"
policy formation groups such as The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation's
Commission on Cable Communications, The Conference Board and The
Aspen Institute.  He points to the importance of their board of
directors representing mostly corporate interests, their informal
channels for deliberation, and their closeness in culture and
personnel with government decision makers.  In addition, the
author acknowledges, major universities and research institutes
contribute expertise to this process of generating policy
formulations which precede legislation and hearings.  Clearly,
foundations enable many of these groups to exist and enable many
researchers to conduct their investigations.  However, the role
of foundations in financing these groups active in communications
policy, has not been systematically considered by Haight, but
appear to have had significant impact on the interpretation of
the "public interest" and on communications policy making in the
past.
 
Brown (1988) has also analyzed the reshaping of the debate over
broadcast regulation in the United States but went further in
identifying the role of foundations in this process.  He
concludes that the activities of these foundation sponsored
organizations such as the Rand Corporation, the Aspen Institute,
the Sloan Commission, and university based communication policy
research centers, "provided a context in which a relative
consensus on specific communications policy issues could be
reached before they were inserted into the formal policy-making
process.  The mechanisms by which this consensus develops include
the flow of personnel from project to project and organization to
organization, plus the many informal meetings which take place
between members of the communications policy community" (p.30).
 
In his analysis Brown (1988) identifies several processes and
tools through which this shift toward an emphasis on marketplace
solutions in communications policy took place.  He suggests that
the most significant aspect of the funding by the Ford and Alfred
P. Sloan foundations was through the informal meetings around
Washington at various conferences and lunch-time seminars.  The
Ford Foundation funded a publication with a new emphasis on an
economic perspective and contracted with the Rand Corporation.
Based on Rand's research Ford filed comments with the FCC.  Brown
points out that the characterization of the Rand research as
"independent" and the very different and less favorable reception
given to the research from organizations with a direct `economic
interest' reveals an important factor which contributes to the
power of think thanks and, one needs to add, the power of
foundations. The Alfred P. Sloan foundation was also directly,
(as opposed to indirect involvement through grantees), involved
in this process.  The Sloan foundation funded, produced, and
promoted the report of the Sloan Commission on Cable
Communications.  The Markle Foundation, amongst others, was
influential in the creation of the Communications and Society
Program of the Aspen Institute.  The Program could be regarded as
being involved in `defining' major policy issues, and how those
major issues should be approached and resolved.  The Program,
funded originally to a large proportion by the Markle foundation,
organizes many opportunities for policy actors from business,
government and other third sector institutions,  to meet
informally.  Although there are many opportunities in Washington
for policy actors to do so, the "ability to create and structure
one of those opportunities is not a form of power so
insignificant that conventional accounts of communication policy
making processes can ignore it," (p.21)  Brown contends.
 
Foundations' resources may go beyond their financial assets and
channels of communication.  Decision makers may have different
levels of responsiveness to different policy actors (Cobb and
Elder, 1983).  I suggest their responsiveness to foundations is
particularly high.  Policy decision makers may be more open to
foundation requests as they hope to bargain with foundation
representatives in the process in order to obtain foundation
support for other issues dear to them.  Some groups are also held
in greater esteem by decision makers than others and thus can
demand greater access to decision makers.  Their authority as
legitimate "neutral" actors in public policy making may provide
them with greater ease of access or ability to set agendas of
policy planning organizations or other policy planning forums.
Haas (1992) writes that the professional training, prestige, and
reputation for expertise of scientists (of whom many are funded
by foundations) accord them access to the political system and
legitimize or authorize their activities.  "Similarly, their
claims to knowledge, supported by tests of validity, accord them
influence over policy debates and serve as their primary social
power resource"(p. 17).  Through their promotion of the image of
"neutral" policy actor and their proven track records as
professionals and experts, foundations and their grantees appear
to have better access to decision makers than others.  Cobb and
Elder (1983) write that the decision maker may be indebted to a
particular group or identify herself as a member of a group.  The
flow of personnel between foundations, think tanks and
governmental institutions is relevant here.  Thus foundations
appear to be in a strong position to promote a particular
interpretation of the public interest through their
communications channels and their authority as legitimate policy
experts alone.
 
The issue of elite group decision making in the democratic
process stresses again why it is important to study the role of
foundations.  Lagemann (1989) is concerned with the role of
elites in her discussion of the "politics of knowledge" and the
role of private foundations in the American political process.
According to her assessment of the Carnegie Corporation, the
foundation continues to confront the dilemmas of an elite
institution trying to shape public policy, that is the
foundation's preference for efficiency over participation, in a
sense of expertise over democracy.  Expertise could stand in
opposition to universal and equal participation in public
affairs; it could provide a basis for claims to superordinate
rights.  And yet, despite this, it was deemed by foundations to
be necessary to modern life.  The struggle over competing goals
of efficiency and equity and the way in which foundations appear
to favor efficiency over equity goes to the heart of the
democratic process and emphasizes the significant role of
foundations as political actors.  This apparent preference for
efficiency suggests that foundations' interpretation of the
public interest definition is more likely to lean towards a
marketplace standard in communications policy making.
 
Foundations are also significant actors in the way in which they
have supported or created institutions such as think tanks or
political organizations, that is in the way in which they have
shaped the character and nature of the political landscape.
Brown (1991), for example, calls attention to the "substantial
core funding"(p. 18) provided by the Markle Foundation to set up
the Aspen Institute's communications program.  Similarly, Markle
and Ford' s funding have been central to, for example,
establishing the communications program at the Rand Corporation
and other communications programs at universities or at the
Brookings Institution.  Through policy planning organizations
such as these foundations can play important roles in shaping the
policy making process and outcomes.
 
Foundations have also had significant impact on existing
political organizations, particularly with respect to so called
advocacy and "public interest" social movements.  According to
Judis (1992), the pluralist vision of democracy "vastly
overstated the extent to which America's pressure groups
represented the general public or were equal in power to each
other" (p. 15).  Judis asserts that the new advocacy political
organizations have almost as narrow an economic base as the old
organizations of the 1950s, not the least due to the impact of
foundation funding.  Jenkins (1989) studied philanthropic funding
and found that between 1958-80 less than one percent of total
foundation funding went to "social movements" or "advocacy
groups" (unfortunately he fails to ever define those terms
clearly).  Only 17% of the money to social movements went to
grassroots organization, the rest went to professional groups.
According to Judis (1992) foundations' major impact on these
organizations has been structural rather than partisan or
narrowly political.  Jenkins explains:  foundations are political
cautious; grass roots organizations lack a clear track record and
are more likely to become involved in protests or other
activities that might stir criticism; they are more informal and
decentralized, lacking the fiscal and management devices that
foundations expect from their recipients; professional
organizations are more hierarchical in structure and are so more
intelligible to foundation boards who typically come from
business and academia; the lower likelihood of being connected to
the peer networks of foundations also places grass roots
organizations at a disadvantage in funding.  Therefore,
foundations have encouraged professionalization and discouraged
militant protest strategies.
 
Nevertheless major foundations were instrumental in the formation
of many of these new organizations.  Foundation grants made these
organizations less dependent upon members and have encouraged
professionalization.  As a result, new lobbies, research groups,
and think tanks that have arisen over the last three decades have
not provided an alternative line between citizens and their
government.  Instead, they have become centralized bureaucracies
as remote from the average citizen as the government itself and
has increased their susceptibility to foundation influence.
Roelofs (1987) suggests that `leadership training' provided by
foundations also deradicalized citizen movements in the 1960s and
70s.  Thus foundations do not only shape specific policy debates
by shaping the politics of knowledge through the available
research, but foundation policy tends to favor or weaken certain
policy actors by favoring certain forms of political organization
over others.  Clearly, common notions of the workings of a
liberal pluralist democracy in the United States are challenged
by assessments like Lagemann's and Judis'.
According to these two authors, foundation funding does not only
have an impact on political organization, but also more
specifically on the kinds of issues organizations have pursued.
Foundation preference for specific outcomes steers organizations
into short-term projects that are deemed "fundable" but deters
development of long-term programs, according to Jenkins (1989).
Judis adds that foundations often prefer studies of action to
action itself, prefer studies with uncontroversial conclusions
that will not call into question their own impartiality.  A major
calculation for foundations is the likelihood that the projects
will generate significant change, thereby rebounding to the
credit of the foundation as an effective social change innovator.
"The clearer the likelihood of victory , the greater the
probability of funding"(Jenkins, 1989:302).  This suggests that
the more the request for funding is within the confines of the
existing political system, that is the more clearly the grantee
can demonstrate the likelihood of specific policy changes in
terms of reform rather than radical restructuring, the more
likely the funding.  Jenkins (1989) concludes that "foundations
could be seen as political gatekeepers, identifying the leaders
and organization that would eventually prevail as the legitimate
representatives of new social interests" (p. 311).  Therefore,
the analysis of the definition of the "public interest" by
foundations is important not only in terms of what is and what is
not considered a legitimate social problem, but more specifically
what kinds of organizations are likely to be supported in pursuit
of the "public interest."  The kinds of patterns identified by
Jenkins and Judis are likely to characterize the framing and
funding of the "public interest" in communications policy making.
 
 
Advocacy groups in communications policy in the 1970s such as the
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, Citizens
Communications Center, Action for Children's Television and the
Media Access Project also have received significant foundation
funding, from the most part, however, from small foundations.  Of
the major foundations, only The Ford Foundation and the
Rockefeller Family Fund have had significant involvement (Kramer,
1977).  Thus foundations play an important role in creating and
supporting institutions or through the denial of funding in
preventing institutions to emerge.  It appears that only a small
number of larger foundations, particularly Ford and Markle
(Kramer, 1977) played a significant role in this process.
 
Kramer (1977) points to several advocacy organizations in
communications policy "that were designed to enhance direct
public participation in the media's setting of the national
agenda [which] have not been funded" in the 1960s and `70s and
soon folded or adjusted their objectives to foundations'
conceptions of public needs.  Organizations from the "counter ad"
movement (PCI - Public Communications Inc., 1971-73) or
organizations concerned with the coverage of African Americans
and their media needs (Unity House and later BEST - Black Efforts
for Soul in Television, 1968-72), according to Kramer were too
radical and "did not respond to their [foundations'] own
preconceptions of `public need:' the need for educational effort
and the need for a `quality' or `cultural' alternative to
commercial broadcasting as opposed to the need for
redistribution, reallocation, and alteration of decision making,
control, and economic power over broadcasting"(p. 1329).  The
author suggests that foundations' particular definition of a
"public interest" guided their funding decisions.
 
The above arguments emphasize the importance and rationale for
studying the role of foundations in public policy, particularly
communications policy.  Foundations' significant access to
economic and informational resources, i.e. allocative and
authoritative resources, makes them central agents in the process
of structuration of power relationships in society.  These
resources allow foundations to exercise informational control of
power relations through their involvement in the politics of
knowledge.   The politics of knowledge, in turn, in which
foundations are involved in through their support of elite and
expert institutions and communications activities privileges
foundations and their recipients as actors in the public policy
process and  challenges common notions of liberal democracy where
actors supposedly have an equal chance of determining outcomes.
This privileged position of foundations in the policy making
process, particularly in the issue evolution and definition
stage, may in turn enhance foundations' power as the particular
kinds of policies supported by foundations appear to privilege
and call for further expert knowledge and processes.  Of the
different policy areas foundations are involved in, analysis of
their involvement in communications policy warrants particular
attention by scholars.  Decisions in this area more so than in
others determine the negotiation and distribution of economic,
political and cultural power in society at large.
 
To conclude, the paper suggests that understanding the role of
private philanthropic foundations in the politics of knowledge
will help us understand better the public policy making process
and that research in this area is lacking.  I have argued that it
would be particularly relevant and useful in order to begin to
understand this process to analyze the way in which foundations
define the "public interest," to study the funding patterns in
support of that "public interest" and their ability to
communicate this definition formally and informally to relevant
decision makers with its implications for policy outcomes.
 
Such a study might focus in depth on only one foundation, the
Ford foundation, as the apparently most significant actor in
communications policy making in the past.  It would study the
official documents, such as annual reports, other publications,
or official testimony at hearings or conferences, and internal
documents as to the changing meaning of the "public interest"
over the years.  The "public interest" definition would be
categorized as to its emphasis on a marketplace standard, product
diversity as opposed to idea diversity, and as to the means of
arriving at it.  Concluding from the above discussion one would
expect to find a change in the definition of the "public
interest" approaching the market place standard.  Moreover, it
would need to be analyzed in terms of the above identified three
core communications policy values: freedom, equality/justice, and
order/solidarity.  Furthermore, the study would identify what
kinds of research, research organizations and which policy
planning organizations, events or forums, or advocacy groups in
the communications area received funding for what purposes.
Particular attention must be paid to those organizations which
received all or a large proportion of their funding from The Ford
Foundation.  One would be able to study the official documents
produced by these organizations.  Where possible one should try
to identify those organizations which were unsuccessful in
obtaining funding and to ascertain why (from the foundation's
perspective.)  Another important aspect of understanding the role
of foundations in communications policy would be to interview
staff and trustees of foundations and relevant grantees, as well
as policy decision makers.  This would aim to explore the
informal channels of communication that appear to play such an
important role in advancing certain issues and their framing onto
the policy making agenda.  Developing an organizational chart,
with the different links through board of directors and other
overlap in personnel should help illuminate this process of
informational communications channels better.  Particular
attention should be paid to formal and informal meetings, their
agendas, possible conclusions, and documents or press coverage
produced.  As many of these kinds of communications go on behind
closed doors and are not well documented, this aspect of
foundations' role in communications policy making will be
particularly difficult to track.
 - prepare presentatino
- prepare typology of values
 
 
     TYPOLOGY OF PUBLIC INTEREST VALUES
 
Freedom
     - structural conditions
     - operating conditions
 
     - effect on
          reliability
          diversity
          critical stance
          innovation
Equality
     - access of senders
     - universal service
     - broad or narrow definition of producers of content
     - benefits on demand side
          access to knowledge, education
          public expression
     - benefits on supply side
     diversity/choice
          in kinds of media
          function or type of content
          diversity in geographic level of operation
          audience aimed at (not just differentiated by income
and age)
          language, ethnic or cultural identity, politics or
ideology
 
Order/Solidarity
     social organization/relation:
          control/compliance
          solidarity/attachment
 
     symbolic/cultural content:
          hierarchy/quality
          authenticity/identity
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES********************************
 
{1}Philanthropic foundation, as defined by the Foundation Center,
an information service affiliated with the Council on
Foundations, is a "non-governmental, non-profit organization,
with funds and program managed by its own trustees or directors,
established to maintain or aid social, educational, charitable,
religious, or other activities serving the common welfare"
primarily through making grants(Lewis, 1971).
 
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