Newspaper Accounts of Moscow Coup
Ideological Manipulation Via Newspaper Accounts of Political Conflict:
A Cross-National Comparative News Analysis of the 1991 Moscow Coup
By
Li-Ning Huang
Doctoral Student
Department of Communication
University of Michigan
2020 Frieze Building
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1285
(313) 665-3453
Email: [log in to unmask]
and
Katherine C. McAdams
Assistant Professor
College of Journalism
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20705
(301) 405-2423
Running Head: Newspaper Accounts of Moscow Coup
Paper submitted to the Newspaper Division for presentation at the annual
conference of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication, Washington, D. C., August, 1995.
Ideological Manipulation Via Newspaper Accounts of Political Conflict:
A Cross-National Comparative News Analysis of the 1991 Moscow Coup
By
Li-Ning Huang and Katherine C. McAdams
Doctoral Student Assistant Professor
Department of Communication College of Journalism
University of Michigan University of Maryland
2020 Frieze Building College Park, MD 20705
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1285 (301) 405-2423
(313) 665-3453
Email: [log in to unmask]
Abstract
This study is a comparative content analysis to detect the ideological
bias in newspaper coverage of the 1991 Moscow coup across three
countries--the United States, Taiwan and China. By quantitatively
analyzing the news space, main actor and different terminologies to name
this event and event leaders within the hegemony theoretical
framework,
this study provides evidence that each country's news coverage was
biased
in politically motivated directions to maintain the dominant
political-economic system.
Ideological Manipulation Via Newspaper Accounts of Political Conflict:
A Cross-National Comparative News Analysis of the 1991 Moscow Coup
Abstract
This study is a comparative content analysis to detect the ideological
bias in newspaper coverage of the 1991 Moscow coup across three
countries--the United States, Taiwan and China. By quantitatively
analyzing the news space, main actor and different terminologies to name
this event and event leaders within the hegemony theoretical
framework,
this study provides evidence that each country's news coverage was
biased
in politically motivated directions to maintain the dominant
political-economic system.
Ideological Manipulation Via Newspaper Accounts of Political Conflict:
A Cross-National Comparative News Analysis of the 1991 Moscow Coup
Some structural and behavioral factors affecting the content of news have
been widely discussed in the newsroom and gatekeeper studies, as
exemplified by the works of David White (1950), Warren Breed (1955), Leon
Sigal (1973), Edward Epstein (1973), Gaye Tuchman (1978), and Herbert
Gans
(1979). Different factors both on the individual level and the
organizational level have been identified to affect the news production.
However, one weakness of these studies is found to produce static
descriptions of factors influencing the media rather than identifying the
underlying process or investigating news production within a larger
social
context.
Numerous perspectives have been offered to integrate the news process and
the messages produced by it within a more general conception of social
organization. One concept which has been increasingly receiving a good
deal of scholarly attention is the broader conception of "hegemony"
which
assumes that the media content is a function of ideological
mobilization
and a tool of the status quo. The media content is framed within the
ideology of the powerful to mobilize public support.
Although journalists try hard to be objective, in practice, they are still
constrained to explain the facts from an ideological acceptable
perspective (Parenti, 1986, p.35). That is the news frame through which
events are presented and as a result of which they come to be given
one
dominant or primary meaning rather than another. For example, Hall
(1982)
argues that particular accounts may be ideological, "not because of
the
manifest bias or distortions of their surface contents, but because
they
were transformations based on a limited ideological matrix" (p. 72).
This ideological bias in treating news can be more easily detected in
international political news. The study of the bias in international
news
coverage within the United States has yielded a rich body of
literature
(for example, Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Ahern, 1984; Chang, 1988; Hopple,
1982;
Mazharul Haque, 1983; McNelly& Izcarey, 1986; Peterson, 1981;
Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1985; Stevenson & Cole, 1984; Graber, 1989; Gans,
1979; Lent, 1977; Van Dijk, 1984 & 1988a). However, their findings, not
based on a multi-cultural studies, are limited to explain the news bias
in
the United States. Also, they only present a surface bias in foreign
news
content instead of addressing the theoretical issue of explaining the
deep
structure that generates the patterns of the coverage.
Thus, this study, in an attempt to go beyond the description of
international news and to place it in the broader theoretical framework of
"hegemony," examines how United States', Taiwan's, and China's
newspapers
covered a foreign event--Moscow Coup which occurred on August 1991.
By
comparing the news coverage of the Moscow coup, this study demonstrates
how
this foreign event was treated, was defined, and in what context it was
explained by the media in these three countries. The scope of this
event
allows us to look at the ideological linkage between the media and the
status quo in these three different political contexts. It is expected
that
the coverage in a country reflects a world view consistent with its values
or policies of the status quo.
Relevant Literature: Objectivity vs. Hegemony
Bias and Objectivity
Objectivity has been described as "the emblem" and "keystone" of American
journalism (Hackett, 1984). Although journalists claim to exclude
personal
values in reporting, Gans (1979) proposes that neither they nor anyone
can
proceed without values. He argues that some "enduring values" are
"unconsciously" built into news judgment (p.182). These enduring values
include ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism,
small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order and
national leadership, which are rarely explicit and can be found in many
different types of news stories over a long period of time.
Similar to Gans' argument, McQuail (1977, p.197) suggests several possible
manifestations of bias: explicit argument and compilation of evidence
favoring one view; a tendentious use of facts and comments, without any
explicit statement of preference; the use of language which colors an
otherwise factual report and conveys an implicit but clear value
judgement,
and the omission of points favoring one side, in an otherwise straight
news report.
Numerous content analyses have sought to evaluate the objectivity of news
coverage and the challenges to the claims of media objectivity are
broad-ranging. Several studies (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Tuchman, 1978;
Epstein, 1973) argue that the news media unavoidably structure their
representation of social and political events in ways which are not
pregiven in the events themselves. Far from constituting a detached
observer, the media help actively to construct that world. Similarly,
Weaver and Wilhoit (1983) cited MacBride Report that "the act of
selecting
certain news items for publication, while rejecting others, produces
in the
minds of the audience a picture of the world that may well be incomplete
or distorted" (p. 134)
In addition, Morley (1976) argues that "labelling implies evaluation" (p.
246-7). In his words, "evaluations are already implicit in the
concepts,
the language in terms of which one observes and records" (p. 246-7).
Hall
(1982) also argues that such connotations are not fixed and pregiven,
as in
a dictionary, but rather are a product of political struggle over
signification.
News Framing
Implicit in the process of encoding of news is selection of codes which
assign meanings to events, placing events in a referential context
which
attribute to them. Davis (1990) notes that the meaning that is
imposed is
limited by and relative to the context in which meaning is generated.
There are significantly different ways in which events--especially
troubling events which breach our normal or threaten the status quo in some
way--can be coded (Hall, 1977).
Hall (1977, p.343) observes that the selection of codes, those which are
the "preferred" codes in the different domains, and which appear to
embody
the "natural" explanations which most members of the society would
accept,
casts these problematic events, consensually, somewhere within the
"repertoire" of the dominant ideologies.
Likewise, Gitlin (1980) defines media frames as "persistent patterns of
cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis,
and
exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse,
whether
verbal or visual" (p. 7).
Hackett (1984) mentions that framing is not necessarily a conscious
process during journalistic practices. He suggests that it may be "the
result of the unconscious absorption of assumptions about the social
world
in which the news must be embedded in order to be intelligible to its
intended audience."
Similarly, Hall (1982, p.72) argues that particular narratives may be
ideological, not because of the manifest bias or distortions of their
surface contents, but because they are generated out of "a limited
ideological matrix"--a set of rules and concepts for making sense of the
world. Hackett (1984) points out that this matrix constitutes a "deep
structure" which is activated without journalists' consciousness.
Carey (1989) proposes a ritual view of communication which conceives
communication as a process through which a shared culture is created,
modified, and transformed. It is directed not toward "the extension of
messages in space," but "the maintenance of society in time" and "the
representation of shared beliefs" (p. 18 & 43).
The ritual view of communication considers newspaper reading less as
sending or gaining information and more as a portrayal and reinforcement
of
a particular view of the world. Carey (1989) emphasizes that "what is
arrayed before the reader is not pure information but a portrayal of
the
contending forces in the world" (p. 20). Newspapers, says Carey, "do
not
operate as a source of effects or functions but as dramatically
satisfying,
which is not to say pleasing, presentations of what the world at root is"
(p. 20). That's why Carey claims that newspapers are "a presentation
of
reality that gives life an overall form, order, and tone" (p.21).
For example, the Cold War perspective once organized virtually all foreign
affairs coverage into a coherent ideological picture supportive of
American world hegemony. Hallin (1987, p.17) points out that the Cold War
ideology is produced through a primarily "unconscious" process,
employed by
journalists not so much to make a political point as to "package" the
presentation of news in terms they assume the audience will find
interesting and easy to understand.
The process of encoding an event within the preferred meanings is
"unconscious," even for the encoders. Hall (1977) explains that "it is
masked, frequently, by the intervention of the professional
ideologies--those practical-technical routinizations of practice which
structure the everyday practices of encoding, and which, in any case,
distances journalists effectively from the ideological content of the
material they are handling and the ideological inflexions of the codes he
is employing" (p. 344). Hence, though events will not be
systematically
encoded in a single way, journalists tend, systematically, to draw on a
very limited ideological or explanatory repertoire, and that repertoire
tends to cast meanings within the sphere of the dominant ideology.
To explore the underlying ideologies that generate and frame patterns of
newspaper coverage, this study uses "hegemony" theory to analyze the
coverage of Moscow coup.
Hegemony as a Process of Ideological Mobilization
"Hegemony," as Hallin defines (1987), is "power sustained by ideology" (p.
11). Hall (1977) also agrees that the hegemony works through "ideology."
It is not a "given and permanent state of affairs, but has to be
actively
won and secured" (p. 333).
Basically, the notion of media hegemony assumes that media content is a
function of ideological positions and a tool of the status quo. The
hegemony theory predicts that media content is influenced by the ideology
of the powerful or the elite to win the consent of the population.
The
powerful groups control the massages of the media in search of an
enduring
basis for legitimate authority (Gitlin, 1980; McQuail, 1987;
Shoemaker,
1987; Gramsci, 1971).
Gramsci, who was the first to specify the concept, suggests that "hegemony
is a ruling class's domination of subordinate classes through the
elaboration and penetration of ideology into their common sense and
everyday practice" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 253).
Stuart Hall (1979) has elaborated the notion of hegemony and begun to use
it in the analysis of popular culture. In Hall's words, drawing on
Gramsci's terminology:
"hegemony" exists when a ruling class (or, rather, an alliance of ruling
class fractions, a "historical bloc") is able not only to coerce a
subordinate class to conform to its interests, but exerts a "total social
authority" over those classes and the social formation as a whole.
"Hegemony" is in operation when the dominant class fractions not only
dominate by direct--lead: when they not only possess the power to coerce
but actively organize so as to command and win the consent of the
subordinated classes to their continuing sway. "Hegemony" thus depends on a
combination of force and consent. But--Gramsci argues--in the
liberal-capitalist state, consent is normally in the lead, operating
behind
"the armor of coercion" (Hall, 1977, p.332).
In the liberal capitalist societies, the dominant class does not produce
and disseminate the ideology "directly and alone." Rather, no
institution
is devoid of hegemonic functions. Hegemony is accomplished through
the
agencies of the superstructures of religion, family, politics, the art,
law, education and cultural institutions, as well as the coercive side
of
the state--the law, police, the army (Hall, 1977, p.333; Gitlin,
1980).
Similarly, Hallin (1987) argues that although the state plays a role in
the propagation of the world view, the legitimating cultural system is
maintained largely by private and autonomous institutions such as the
family, the church and the mass media. Moreover, Gans (1980) points out,
professional, organizational, economic, political and ideological
forces
"together" constitute images of the news which are limited in definite
ways
and tilted toward the prevailing frames.
In other words, the hegemony working by "ideology" (Hall, 1977,
pp.332-333) implies that the "definitions of reality," favorable to the
dominant class fractions, come to constitute the primary "lived
reality" as
such for the subordinate classes. In this way, ideology provides the
"cement" in a social formation, "preserving the ideological unity of the
entire social bloc." This operates as the dominant classes succeed in
"framing" all competing definitions of reality "within their range",
bringing all alternatives within their horizon of thought. In this way,
communication may be biased through selective release of information
that
is favorable to the power elites, or by constraining information that
is
unfavorable to them (Van Dijk, 1989).
Hegemony in the News Media
The media, in the twentieth-century advanced era, have established a
decisive and fundamental leadership in the cultural sphere (Hall, 1977).
They have progressively colonized the cultural and ideological sphere.
As
social groups and classes live increasingly fragmented, the mass media
are
more and more responsible for providing the knowledge through which
groups
and classes perceive the whole world.
According to Hallin (1987), the concept of hegemony plays a double role in
the study of the media. First, it is used to "conceptualize the political
function of the media" (p. 4). The media play the role of maintaining
the
dominant political ideology: they propagate it, glorify it, explain
the
world in its terms, and, at times, modify it to adapt to the demands of
legitimation in a changing world.
At the same time, the concept of hegemony is employed to "explain the
behavior of the media, the process of news production itself" (Hallin,
1987, p.4). Hallin (1987) observes that the media themselves are subject
to
the hegemonic process. The dominant ideology shapes the production of news
and entertainment. That's why the media can be expected to function as
agents of legitimation, despite the fact that they are independent of
direct political control.
Shoemaker (1987) points out that this hegemonic approach suggests that
U.S. media owners have a vested interest in seeing the status quo
continue,
because they are part of the U.S. power structure, defined by Dreier
(1983) as "the top positions in the institutional structure of the
society." The members of this powerful structure, Dreier says, may hold
different opinions on some topics, but still maintaining an overall
high
degree of cohesiveness.
Although the media will criticize the status quo to a certain extent, thus
establishing their own legitimacy as news organizations, the media will
never criticize the status quo enough to seriously threaten or change
it
(Gitlin, 1980). Hallin (1987) also argues that even in periods when
the
media do not support the foreign policy elites, they tend to at least
equally not support any attempt to challenge the established authorities.
That's why mass media cover the one's own state's policy or action in
a po
sitive image and portray the enemy state's policy or action being
wrong and
unreasonable if the two countries have different opinions toward the same
issue.
Some critics charge the media news with being often operated by the
government to mobilize public support for the national interest and
despite
for enemy states. Harvey Jolotch and Marilyn Lester (1981), for example,
argue that the media do not mirror reality; instead, they reflect "the
practices of those having the power to determine the experience of
others."
There arise different arguments toward media's function as agents of
social control. On the Left, Marcuse has suggested that "the mass media
lull the audience with modern equivalents of the Roman circus,
persuading
them to accept the political status quo." On the Right, Ellul has
proposed
that "the mass media supply propaganda rather than information, confusing
a poorly educated audience into becoming unwitting victims of the
propagandists" (Gans, 1974, p.43-51).
The mobilization of ideology is obvious in foreign affairs reporting. To
say the media play a "hegemonic" role is to say that they contribute
to the
maintenance of consent for a system of power. The relevant system of power
here in Western world refers to the capitalist system dominated both
politically and economically by the United States, but in China, it
refers
to the socialism.
The leading power has to maintain the consent both of subordinate nations
and of its own population. The domestic public has to consent to the
domestic system of power--to recognize the legitimacy of foreign policy,
the elites and the institutions of their rule--and also to the
international system itself.
For example, Hallin (1987) points out that the Cold War ideology was
ideally suited to maintaining this consent. He observes that American
dominance of the international system was justified by the threat of a
Soviet-dominated world system. The tight elite control of foreign policy
is
justified by the danger to national security that could lie in any
conflict.
It has become common for background reports on foreign conflicts to pose
the Cold War interpretation as the major political issue to be
explored.
The "politicization" of the Cold War ideology is reflected in the
pattern
of foreign news coverage. Usually, the Cold War consensus was heavily
laced
with warnings about "Communist propaganda" (Hallin, 1987, p.9).
Hegemony as a Product of Journalistic Routines
The hegemonic theory suggests that journalists' news gathering habits or
the "media logic" through which the media present and transmit
information
are susceptible to the dominant class's or the elite's ideological
mobilization (Altheide & Snow, 1979).
Normally, the dominant frames are taken for granted by media
practitioners, and reproduced and defended by them for reasons, and
via
practices, which the practitioners do not conceive to be hegemonic.
Shoemaker (1987) identifies some examples of media routines that may
affect the content of media news:
1) Deadlines, which make the journalist stop seeking information in order
to file the story.
2) Story quotas, because a fixed minimum amount of news stories are needed
each day.
3) Availability of sources, which affects who gets media access.
Institutional sources are more readily available to the journalist than
individuals and special interest groups, making it difficult for
noninstitutional sources to get their ideas transmitted.
4) The inverted-pyramid style of writing news stories, which conveys the
journalists' assessment of what is important to the reader.
5) The selection, shaping, and timing of stories--or gatekeeping--which
influences what gets covered, how much, and when.
Media reliance on official sources is an important symbolic acknowledgment
of the legitimacy of political authorities. Fishman (1980, p.140) points
out that the ideological character of news follows from journalists'
routine reliance on raw materials which are already ideological. Cohen
(cited in Hallin, 1987, p.6) notes that because the dominant
professional
ideology of objective journalism held that it was the reporter's job
simply
to provide a record of what was said and done by those in positions of a
uthority, the news tended most of the times to reflect official views,
whatever the reporter's personal beliefs.
Foreign News Coverage
Following the work of Galtung and Ruge (1965), a body of research has been
developing suggesting bias in foreign news reporting. Buzek, Robison, and
others (cited in Nnaemeka & Richstad, 1981) provide detailed accounts
of
the role of ideology in the news selection. The conclusion these
studies
made is that "ideology" represents a strong force in shaping both the
kind
of foreign news that the press in the socialist systems project to
their
readers, and the editorial decisions regarding the amount of Western
-produced international news and information disseminated in the Communist
world.
Further research on the role of ideology in shaping "news perspectives"
comes from Gerbner's (1961) comparative study of the socialist
Hungarian
daily, Nepszabadsag and the capitalist United States New York Times,
as
well as other works (see also Gerbner, 1964; Gerbner and Marvayni,
1977;
Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956; Schramm, 1959).
Gerbner's analysis of the reporting pattern of the two dailies, revealed
that the Times was consistent with the market-oriented ideology of a
capitalist system in which conflict, tension, arousal, and sensationalism
constitute the news. Several other international communication
analyses,
such as Shiller (1974, 1976), Gultung and Ruge (1965), Smith (1969),
and
Hester (1971, 1973) reach substantially conclusion.
On the basis of works similar to those cited above, many scholars
(Stevenson & Cole, 1984; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1981, 1983; Chang, Shoemaker &
Brendlinger, 1987; McNelly & Izcaray, 1986; Viswanath, 1988) criticize
American news coverage of foreign countries--especially of less
developed
countries--as biased, largely because it is characterized by the
violent,
the bizarre, and the conflictual.
Among the sensational news that the Western press favors is the military
coup. Chu (1985) remarks that "in reporting political or military
crises in
a foreign country, the government is usually depicted as a villain while
the opposition, irrespective of its popularity, would more often than
not
be portrayed as the hero."
The observation is similar to the results of a work by Weaver and Wilhoit
(1981 & 1983). They analyzed the foreign news coverage in AP and UPI wire
services and noted that the bulk of the wire service coverage focused
on
political and military activity and crime.
Agbese and Ogbonadah (1988) analyzed New York Times, Washington Post and
Wall Street Journal's coverage of coups in Nigeria and remarked that
if a
government that is supportive of American interests is overthrown, the
political change is greeted with hostility by the U.S. press. They also
found that the U.S. press utilizes a biased and distorted framework in
its
coverage of political event in the Third World.
Chomsky and Herman (1979b) contend that the Western media are part of the
ideological institutions that "falsify, obscure, and reinterpret the
facts
in the interest of those who dominate the economy and political
system."
Parenti (1986) argues in a similar vein that the major role of the
U.S.
press "is to continually recreate a view of reality supportive of
existing
social and economic class power." This study examines the Moscow coup
in
light of past research on foreign coverage.
Background of Moscow Coup
On August 19, 1991, Tass announced that Soviet Vice-President Gennady
Yanayev replaced Mikhail Gorbachev as president because Gorbachev was
ill
and unable to perform his duties.
The new president declared that "the state of emergency" was established
in order to save Soviet Union from "the profound and comprehensive
crisis,
political, ethnic and civil strife, chaos and anarchy that threaten
the
lives and security of the Soviet Union's citizens and its sovereignty,
territorial integrity, freedom and independence" (Washington Post,
August
19, 1991, A1)
Vice President Yanayev was assuming presidential powers under a new entity
called "the State Committee for the State of Emergency."
At that time, Gorbachev was vacationing on the Black Sea coast, and there
was no word of his whereabouts.
The statement made by the Emergency Committee said that Soviet Union's
new leaders wanted to live in friendship with the rest of the world
and
would observe all international agreements.
According to Western newspapers, these officials who seized the power were
conservative Communist members and have opposed the reforms of President
Gorbachev.
After establishment of the Emergency Committee, columns of tanks and
armored cars had entered several parts of Moscow and key sites of Baltic
republics and surrounded several important sensitive communications
facilities.
Within hours of learning that Soviet President Gorbachev had been
replaced, thousands of Muscovites gathered around the capital to argue and
plead with the army troops and tank crews. The largest and most
organized
demonstrations against the takeover were led by Russian President
Boris
Yeltsin who urged Soviet people to resist government takeover by
Communist
hardliners.
On August 20, the resistance appeared to be growing around the Soviet
Union with leaders in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan denouncing the takeover
and thousands of people attending protest demonstrations.
On August 22, the self-proclaimed eight-man State of Emergency Committee
collapsed. President Mikhail Gorbachev returned to Moscow and the
members
of the Committee were arrested. As news of the collapse of the
Committee
spread throughout the country, tanks and trucks began to leave Moscow
and
Baltic republics. Cheers went up among the people.
On August 23, Gorbachev demanded the resignation of his entire government
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin shut down Communist Party
organizations
throughout the vast republic.
Study Hypotheses
A single question emerged from the previous research and information
collected about the event of Soviet coup: How did the political ideology
of
each nation influence the amount of news and the coverage pattern?
Considering this question, several hypotheses were set up to be tested:
H1: The amount of news about the coup is far less in China than in the
other two countries, because it is expected that, while Taiwanese and
American news media covered the anti-coup demonstrations extensively,
Chinese news media devoted less news space to the anti-coup
demonstrations
or even suppressed all relevant news.
H2: Because Taiwan and the United States are democratic and capitalist
societies, the direction of coverage was similar in these two
countries.
H3: Because of the different political ideologies between democratic and
communist countries, coverage in China tended to favor the Emergency
Committee, whereas coverage in the U.S. and Taiwan favored the
"reformists"--Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the demonstrators.
H4: Because this event "overthrew" Gorbachev who was a symbol of economic
and political reforms, this nature of this event conflicts with
democratic
countries' political ideology but is compatible with communist
societies'
political ideology. Accordingly, China government would support this
event
and China media would use favoring terms while reporting it, whereas
the
U.S. and Taiwan governments would oppose this event and their media
would
present it in a negative frame.
These hypotheses and research question will be examined by a comparative
content analysis of each nation's two newspapers' stories on the
Moscow
event.
Methodology
A quantitative content analysis was conducted to compare how the news
event--Moscow Coup--was reported by the press in three countries--the
United States, Taiwan and China during the first three-day period (August
19-21, 1991). Two prominent newspapers each from the three countries
were
selected for the study: People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) and Enlightment
Daily
(Guangming Ribao) of China; United Daily and China Times of Taiwan; and
Washington Post and New York Times of the United States.
Moscow Coup occurred on August 19, 1991. Because of the twelve-hour
difference between the East and the West, the time frame for the content
analysis is from August 19 to 21 for American newspapers and August 20
to
22 for Taiwanese and Chinese newspapers.
The sample for this study was the straight hard news about the happening
of Soviet coup and the following anti-coup demonstrations, excluding
editorials, feature stories, news analyses, profiles and commentaries.
Moreover, since this study attempts to test the assumption that the
dominant political ideology in one country affects its Moscow coup news
coverage, reportage about the reaction of one country toward this event
appearing in that country's newspapers was coded.
The unit of analysis was each news story. The factors which may influence
the direction of news coverage such as the origin of the news story,
news
source, the main actor and second actor of the story, terminologies to
describe this event, event leaders and its legitimate status and the
nation's reaction toward this event were coded.
Concerning the intercorder reliability, two mandarin-speaking graduate
students, one from Taiwan and the other from mainland China, coded all
selected Chinese news stories and both of them and one American graduate
student coded all selected American news stories. Holsti's formula
(1969)
was used to determine the intercorder reliability coefficients. For
Chinese
newspapers coded by the two mandarin-speaking students, the intercorder
reliability coefficient is 0.91 for People's Daily and 0.92 for
Guangming
Daily.
For Washington Post, the reliability coefficient is 0.82 between the
American and Chinese; 0.92 between the American and Taiwanese; and 0.85
between Taiwanese and Chinese. The overall reliability coefficient
among
the three students is 0.81.
For New York Times, the reliability coefficient is 0.85 between the
American and Chinese; 0.93 between the American and Taiwanese; and 0.89
between Taiwanese and Chinese. The overall reliability coefficient
among
the three coders is 0.83.
Findings and Discussion
Hard News about the Coup
The hypothesis that Chinese newspapers devoted less space to the coverage
of the Soviet coup than did American and Taiwanese newspapers is
supported
by the frequency analysis shown in Tables 1 and 2. During the first
three-day sample period, Washington Post carried 33 news stories; New York
Times, 53; United Daily, 130; China Times, 113; however, People's
Daily and
Guangming Daily carried only 11 and 14 stories respectively (see Table 1).
Because the languages in these three countries are different from one
another and the typical length of a news story also differs according to
the regulation of the press in each country, the total number of
articles
about the Soviet coup in each newspaper per day is therefore not an
unbiased criterion for comparing the amount of coverage among these three
countries' newspapers. Thus, the percentage of Soviet news and of
photos on
the front page is computed and then is used to evaluate the importance or
newsworthiness of Soviet coup in each country.
No distinct difference in the percentage of Soviet coup news on the front
page was found between American and Taiwanese newspapers (see Table
2). The
percentage ranges from 40 percent to 66 percent for the stories, 5 percent
to 28 percent for photos in Washington Post. In New York Times, the
percentage ranges from 44 percent to 49 percent for stories and from 17
percent to 36 percent for photos. In other words, the total space
devoted
to the coup in both American newspapers accounted for over 50 percent
of
the news on the front page.
Similarly, Taiwanese newspapers on the average devoted over 50 percent of
space on the front page to the Soviet coup during the sample period.
The
percentage of news ranges from 47 percent to 69 percent and of photos
from
13 percent to 18 percent in United Daily. In China Times, the
percentage of
news ranges from 40 to 46.
The comparison of total news items and photo numbers and of page or
section location reveals similarities between American and Taiwanese
newspapers as well as differences between democratic and Communist
countries. On average, only one story about the coup appeared each day on
the front page of Chinese newspapers. Even on August 22 when the coup
failed, there was no story on the front page of Guangming Daily. After
the
coup occurred, American and Taiwanese newspapers carried extensive
coverage
of this event. In addition to the front page, American and Taiwanese
newspapers devoted several full inside pages to cover the Soviet coup,
each
page with a specific theme. However, in Chinese newspapers, instead of the
full page coverage, some short articles were scattered on inside page
(page 4 or 6).
Origin of the Whole Story and News Source
As shown in Table 3, most of stories (67 percent) in American press system
were supplied by the system's own correspondents (staff writers) or
free-lance writers. Taiwanese newspapers depended primarily on the Western
wire services such as AP and UPI to get the news about the coup
indicting
that the coup in Taiwanese newspapers was portrayed most of times from
the
Western point of view. It is evident that the Western news agencies
are
influencing the agenda for Taiwanese press. However, in Chinese
newspapers,
since all the foreign news was supplied by the government-controlled news
agency, all the news stories (100 percent) about the coup were
supplied by
Xinhua (New China) news agency.
Some may argue that since all the news in China was supplied by the
official news agency and news in Taiwan by Western wire services, of
course, their coverage of the Moscow event differed--that is, the news
origin variable explains everything. However, even if the news suppliers
were identical across the three countries, difference in news
presentation
could still emerge. For example, both Taiwanese and American press
covered
this event from the Western point of view, but there were differences
in
news presentation and emphases between the two countries. Moreover,
although the official news agency in China determined what news should be
released and what should not, individual writers and editors still had
opportunities to treat that news with "a preferred meaning." Therefore,
further analysis examined differences in other characteristics.
Another important difference was found in the three press systems' use of
news sources. As shown in Table 4, 35 percent of American stories
used
U.S. government sources. Most of the stories using U.S. official
sources
were negative toward the coup, suggesting measures such as
condemnation and
suspension of economic aid. The claim that American media oppose the coup
and support the demonstrations is supported by the finding that 21
percent
of news items used or quoted Yeltsin's or democratic side's opinion.
Although 14 percent of American news sources was Soviet Acting President
Yanayev or the Emergency Committee, it is low if compared with the
percentage (25 percent) used in Chinese press. Similar to American press,
the percentage is also low in the Taiwanese press (11 percent).
China's press system relied heavily on the Russian official news agency.
Over half (65 percent) of the news came from Tass, compared to 26
percent
of Taiwanese stories. The American press seemed to have discredited
the
Tass source generally. While both Taiwan and China relied on Tass for
further information about the coup, only 9 percent of American news was
supplied by Tass.
Main Actor and Second Actor in the Lead
The comparison of the main actor in the lead also shows some notable
difference among the three countries, as Table 5 illustrates. Although,
across the three countries, State Committee of Emergency accounted for
at
least one of every five stories in each country, U.S. President Bush
and
Acting Soviet President Yanayev were most frequently found to be the
main
actor in American and Chinese news respectively. China government
accounted
for only 10 percent of news in China and Taiwan government accounted only
11 percent of Taiwanese news. This finding suggests that the reaction
of
the U.S. government toward this coup was covered more extensively in
its
own press than other two governments' reactions in their newspapers.
However, since the U.S. reaction is negative, the coverage is consequently
negative and the U.S. population may perceive this event as an immoral
attempt by Communist members. The reactions among people in the three
countries will be analyzed later.
Table 5 also reveals that China press's coverage of this event apparently
favored the Acting President Yanayev who was the main actor in 45
percent
of Chinese news, whereas in American and Taiwanese news, he appeared
in
only 4 percent to 7 percent of news leads. Compared to Chinese press,
American and Taiwanese press devoted larger space to the anti-coup
demonstrations and relatively limited space to Yanayev. The anti-coup
demonstration leader Yeltsin was not mentioned at all as the news leader
in
Chinese newspapers, but received at least 8 percent in the United States
and Taiwan. The demonstrators (Soviet people) only accounted for 5
percent
of main actors in China, whereas in Taiwan and U.S., they accounted
for 7
percent and 13 percent respectively.
Another important finding is that both Taiwan and American press mentioned
the Emergency Committee-controlled "troops" or "soldiers" as the main
actor in the lead (17 percent and 9 percent respectively), whereas the
army
was never mentioned in Chinese news. This may be a reflection of China
government's fear that the soldiers may arouse Chinese people's memory
about the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Overall, the result of the analysis on the second actor in the lead is
similar to the findings on the main actor, as shown in Table 6. The
percentage of State Emergency Committee was roughly the same across the
three press systems. The troops were never mentioned either as the main
actor or as the second actor in Chinese news. In other words, any
demonstration against the coup was not covered at all by Chinese press,
although Yeltsin received 10 percent as second actor. In general, these
parallel findings support the hypothesis that American and Taiwanese
press
covered this event from the point of view of the U.S. government and
pro-democracy side while Chinese press covered it from the Emergency
Committee's perspective. In addition, American and Taiwanese press
coverage
concentrated mostly on the anti-coup actions while China focused on the
Emergency Committee's (the so-called "coup plotters" in Western media)
announcements about their legal act to maintain Soviet Union's unity and
protect Soviets.
Quantitative Assessment of Terminology
As mentioned earlier, the use of different terms by reporters not only
reflects their perception of a particular event, but conditions the way
their reportage is decoded. It creates different interpretations of the
same event. For example, calling the Soviet coup an "overthrow of
Gorbachev," "putsch," "Rightist coup," or "crime" rather than calling it
"political change," or "internal change in Soviet Union" definitely
implies
that the act was illegitimate and may invite readers to interpret the
event negatively. This part of the analysis attempts to see how the
dominant political ideology influences the media's perception of this event
across the three countries.
Terminology to Name This Event
The variation among the three countries in using terminology to name this
event is noteworthy. It is evident that political ideology is again a
major
determinant of the media's perception of the Soviet leadership change. No
malicious words were used by the Communist/socialist media in
reference to
the Kremlin leadership change, whereas some negative language was used
by
media from the capitalist countries. This dichotomy found in the news
treatment of this event clearly reflects their different dominant
political
ideology.
As Table 7 illustrates, the U. S. media used the strongest and most
emotional words while reporting this event. Ten different terms were used
by American newspapers to label this event. The most frequently used
terms
were "coup" (31 stories), "overthrow" (11 stories), "ouster" (10 stories),
and "takeover" (10 stories). Other terms with negative implications were
"putsch" (6 stories), "crime" (3 stories) and "grab of power" (2
stories),
of which "putsch," the extreme negative and emotional term, was used
only
by the American newspapers.
The nature and direction of terminologies used by American and Taiwanese
newspapers were similar, but the relative frequency of use was a
little bit
different. For Taiwanese media, similar to American press, the most
frequently used term was "coup" (37 stories). Moreover, like American
press, negative words such as "overthrow" (10 stories), "ouster" (26
stories), "grab of power" (11 stories), "rightist coup" (3 stories), and
"crime" (2 stories) were also largely used by Taiwanese newspapers.
However, while the strongly negative term "putsch" was used only by
American newspapers, the comparatively neutral term "stepdown" was used
only by Taiwanese press (15 stories).
In addition, some neutral terms such as "Kremlin power shift" and
"political change" were also used by American and Taiwanese press. "Kremlin
power shift" was used in five stories and nine stories respectively in the
American and Taiwanese newspapers. However, only this kind of neutral
terms were used by Chinese newspapers. Chinese press regarded the event
as
merely "political change." Although "coup" was mentioned in Chinese
stories, that was because the story was explaining from the viewpoint of
the State Emergency Committee that the act was not a "coup." Other
negative
terms such as "rightist coup," "crime," "overthrow," or "ouster" were
never found in Chinese coverage of this event. In doing so, Chinese
media
suggested legitimacy of the Emergency Committee's power takeover.
Descriptive Terminology
The analysis of the descriptive terminology used to describe this event
also reveals pronounced differences among the three countries, as
Table 8
illustrates. Again, the result provides evidence that political
ideology
influences media use of adjectives when describing this event.
The Chinese media did not use as many adjectives as did the American and
Taiwanese media, failing to support the hypothesis that Chinese media
used
positive adjectives to describe this event. Some 85 percent of Chinese
stories did describe this event as either legitimate or
nonconstitutional.
Most of Chinese stories remained more "impartial" than American and
Taiwanese newspapers. Only one story (5 percent of coverage) in Chinese
newspapers reported that Yeltsin accused the Emergency Committee as an
"unconstitutional" organization and only two stories (19 percent of
coverage) quoted Yanayev's emphasis that the Committee was
"constitutional."
Taiwanese press was neither as "impartial" as Chinese media nor as
"strongly resistent" as American media toward this event. Table 8 shows
that 75 percent of stories remained impartial, whereas 24 percent of
stories described this event as "unconstitutional." Only 1 story (1
percent) mentioned that this event was legal.
Like the Taiwanese newspapers, only one American story (2 percent)
mentioned that this act was legal. However, over 50 percent of stories
described it as "unconstitutional," "illegitimate," or "misguided." The
term "misguided" was used only by American press. Moreover, 19 stories
(44
percent) remained impartial, the lowest percentage among the three
countries.
Terminology to Name The Event Leaders
The analysis of the terminology used by newspapers to identify the event
leaders shows some interesting similarities between the American and
Taiwanese newspapers as well as important differences between the above
two
democratic countries and China.
As Table 9 illustrates, while both the American and Taiwanese newspapers
used some negative terms such as "hardliners," and "putschists" to
label
the leaders, Chinese press used only one term, "State Emergency
Committee,"
to name the leaders. This result supports the claim that Chinese press did
not oppose the act made by the eight committee members.
Coincidentally, the most frequently used negative terms in both American
and Taiwanese stories were "hardliners" (16 and 27 stories
respectively)
and "coup plotters/leaders" (17 and 14 stories). Other terms with
negative
implications used by both press were "putschists" (5 and 1 stories)
and
"adventurists" (4 and 1 stories). Although both American and Taiwanese
newspapers sometimes used neutral terms such as "new rulers" (10 and 17
stories), "new Kremlin group/new government" (5 and 15 stories) and
"Emerge
ncy Committee" (16 and 35 stories), American press used more negative
terms
such as "hoods/hoodlums" (one story), "renegades" (one story) and "junta"
(6 stories) to name the leaders. These negative terms were not used
neither
by Taiwanese nor by Chinese press. Moreover, "conservatives" was used
only by Taiwanese press in contrast with "reformists."
Reaction Terminology
The findings show that, of 43 American straight hard news during the
sample period, there were 12 stories concerning the U.S. government's
reaction. All twelve stories condemned the coup and denied its
legitimacy.
The Bush government even asked other Western countries to suspend
economic
aid. This confirms that the U.S. government strongly opposed this
Communist
coup.
Even though the American and Taiwanese press both condemned this event,
the intensity of their reactions was different. Taiwan government's
reaction was not as strong and emotional as that of the U.S. government.
There were a total of eight stories in Taiwanese newspapers dealing
with
the Taiwan government's reaction. Although this event was a Communist
coup,
there were only 2 (25 percent) stories stating the Taiwan government's
condemnation. The other six stories (75 percent) reported the Taiwan
government's hesitation to make any comment or any political decision
since
there is no official political relationship between Taiwan and the Soviet
Union. Most of the news articles during the sample period concerning
the
impact of hits event on Taiwan focused on the economic effects rather
than
on the political effects.
While the democratic countries were "stunned" by this event, China
government proclaimed that it would not interfere in other countries'
internal affairs. There was only one story concerning China government
reaction in each Chinese newspaper during the three-day period. The two
stories expressed the views that China government would respect the
Soviet
people's choice. No condemnation or accusation appeared in any Chinese
newspapers. This finding reveals that China government neither condemned
this act nor approved it.
The reason China government did not support this event and claimed to be
an outsider could have been that no one could predict whether this
coup
would succeed or not, especially when U.S. government strongly
condemned
this act and planned to suspend economic aid. If China government had
clearly condemned or supported the coup, there was a risk. That is, if
China government claimed to support this coup, diplomatic relationships
would have been negatively affected if the coup failed at the end.
Conclusion
This study examined the characteristics of news coverage of the Moscow
coup in three countries to detect the ideological bias in news
selection
and presentation. Several hypotheses were tested and most of them were
strongly supported by the findings of the quantitative content analysis.
The major results of this study are the followings:
1) Political ideology was shown to influence the direction of news
coverage and the amount of news devoted to this event in all the three
countries. As a result, media in democratic countries tended to portray
the
event of Moscow coup in a negatively frame, whereas media in Communist
country portrayed this event in a less negative way. In addition, the
American and Taiwanese newspapers appeared to report this event from the
perspective of demonstrators (Soviet public) or Gorbachev, whereas
Chinese
newspapers appeared to report this event from the perspective of
Emergency
Committee (called "coup plotter" by American newspapers).
2) Foreign policy played an important role in the direction of American
news coverage, but was not manifest in Taiwanese and Chinese news
coverage.
3) Overall, American coverage and Taiwanese coverage of the Moscow event
were similar to each other and both were quite different from the
Chinese
coverage.
This study reveals that American and Taiwanese press systems carried far
more news than Chinese press system did on this event. They also gave
more
prominence to this event by placing more of it on the front page and
many
inside pages.
Moreover, U.S. government reaction and its foreign policy corresponded to
the direction of news coverage of Moscow event, whereas Taiwan and
China
government reactions and foreign policies were not truly reflected in
the
news presentation; but the political ideology was apparently shown to
influence their news coverage. U.S. government opposed this event and
American media quoted heavily the U.S. president's and officials'
condemnation and used negative and emotional terms to describe this event.
China government adopted a relatively neutral attitude--not to interfere
in other countries' internal affairs--and similarly Taiwan government
hesitated to make any comment. However, China's and Taiwan's "stand-by"
foreign policy did not lead to a balanced or impartial news coverage.
Although Chinese press used relatively neutral terms while reporting this
event, their news selection and emphases were biased to favor the
Emergency
Committee members and suppress all the news about the anti-coup
demonstrations. The coverage in Taiwan was also biased by emphasizing the
anti-coup demonstrations and using negative terms to describe this
event.
In sum, this study found that each country's news coverage of the Moscow
coup was framed from an ideologically acceptable perspective to maintain
the status quo. No news coverage across these countries can be found
objective. Each was biased in a different way. The above major findings
support the assumption of hegemony theory that the news content is
framed
within the ideology of the powerful to mobilize public opinion. The
news
coverage is stereotyped or biased in line with prevailing political
views.
It appears that in covering the Moscow coup, journalists encoded the
news
event with a "dominant or preferred meaning," constructing the social
and
political realities and helping to maintain the dominant
political-economic
system.
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Table 3
Origin of the News Story
U.S. Taiwan China
(N = 43) (N = 72) (N = 20)
n % n % n %
Staff 15 34.5 12 16.7
Freelance 14 32.6 1 1.4
Western Wire 10 23.3 58 80.6
Government-Owned 20 100
Wire Services
Others 1 2.3
Unidentifiable 3 7.0 1 1.4
Table 4
News Source
U.S. Taiwan China
(N = 43) (N = 72) (N= 20)
n % n % n %
U.S. Government 15 34.9
China Government 2 10.0
Taiwan Government 8 11.1
U.S.S.R. Acting 6 14.0 8 11.1 5 25.0
President/Committee
Yeltsin, Gorbachev 9 20.9 12 16.7
Their Aides
Tass 4 9.3 19 26.4 13 65.0
Other Countries 2 4.7
Others 6 14.0 15 20.8
Unidentifiable 1 2.3 10 13.9
Table 5
Main Actor of the Lead
U.S. Taiwan China
(N = 43) (N = 72) (N= 20)
n % n % n %
Yanayev 3 7.0 3 4.2 9 45.0
Emergency Committee 11 25.6 18 25.0 4 20.0
Gorbachev/Aides 3 7.0 4 5.6 1 5.0
Yeltsin/Aides 4 9.3 6 8.3
U.S. Government 13 30.2
Soviet People 3 7.0 9 12.5 1 5.0
Demonstrators
China Government 2 10.0
Taiwan Government 8 11.1
Troops/Soldiers 4 9.3 12 16.7
Others 1 2.3 10 13.9 3 15
Unidentifiable 1 2.3 2 2.8
Table 6
Second Actor of the Lead
U.S. Taiwan China
(N = 43) (N = 72) (N= 20)
n % n % n %
Emergency Committee 8 18.6 10 13.9 3 15
Gorbachev/Aides 9 20.9 21 29.2 2 10.0
Yeltsin/Aides 1 2.3 4 5.6 2 10.0
Soviet People 4 9.3 8 11.1 1 5.0
Demonstrators
Taiwan Government 1 1.4
Other Countries 1 2.3 1 1.4 2 10.0
Troops/Soldiers 4 9.3 4 5.6
Others 1 2.3 4 5.6 1 5.0
Unidentifiable 15 34.9 19 26.4 9 45.0
Table 7
Terminology to Name the Event Used by Three Countries'
Newspapers
(Based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of the term in each selected news story)
Occurrence of the term used by
newspapers in
U.S Taiwan China
(N=43) (N=72) (N=20)
Coup 31 37 2
Rightist Coup 4 3
(Reactionary Coup)
Takeover 10 8
Putsch 6
Crime 3 2
Internal Change 2 2
(Political Change)
Kremlin Power Shift 5 9
Ouster 10 26
(Being ousted)
Overthrow 11 10
(Being overthrew)
Stepdown 15
Grab of Power 2 11
Table 8
Descriptive Terminology of the Event
Used by Three Countries' Newspapers
(Based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the term
in each selected news story)
U.S. Taiwan China
(N=43) (N=72) (N=20)
n % n % n %
Against such as 23 53.5 17 23.6 1 5.0
Unconstitutional
Illegitimate
Misguided
Pro: Legitimate 1 2.3 1 1.4 2 10.0
Constitutional
No Descriptive 19 44.2 54 75.0 17 85.0
Terminology Found
Total 43 100.0 72 100.0 20 100.0
Table 9
Terminology to Name the Event Leaders
used by Three Countries' Newspapers
(Based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of the term in each selected news story)
Occurrence of the term used by
newspapers in
U.S. Taiwan China
(N=43) (N=72) (N=20)
Hardliners 16 27
Putschists 5 1
New Rulers 10 17
Adventurists 4 1
Coup Plotters 17 14
Hoods/Hoodlums 1
Renegades 1
New Kremlin Group 5 15
New Government
Junta 6
Emergency Committee 16 35 12
Conservatives 11
Table 1
Number of Stories Related to Soviet Coup
During the First Three-Day Period
8/19 8/20 8/21 8/22 Total
U.S. Newspapers
Washington Post
Front Page: 1 4 4
Inside Page: 0 13 11
Total: 1 17 15 33
New York Times
Front Page: 3 4 4
Inside Page: 3 23 16
Total: 6 27 20 53
Taiwan Newspapers
United Daily
Front Page: 3 3 3
Inside Page: 41 44 36
(Page 3,4,5,6) (P. 3,5,6,7) (P. 3,4,5,7)
Total: 44 47 39 130
China Times
Front Page: 3 2 3
Inside Page: 31 41 33
(Page3,4,5,6)
Total: 34 43 36 113
China Newspapers
People's Daily
Front Page 1 1 1
Inside Page (Page 4): 2 6 0
Total: 3 7 1 11
Guangming Daily
Front Page: 1 2 0
Inside Page (Page 6): 2 6 3
Total: 3 8 3 14
Table 2
Percentage of Soviet Coup Coverage
on the Front Page
8/19 8/20 8/21 8/22
U.S. Newspapers
Washington Post
Stories: 47.3% 40.23% 66.32%
Photos: 5.36% 19.18% 27.55%
Total: 52.66% 59.41% 93.87%
New York Times
Stories: 47.9% 49.47% 44.34%
Photos: 17.32% 35.69% 34.89%
Total: 65.22% 85.16% 79.23%
Taiwan Newspapers
United Daily
Stories: 49.88% 46.73% 68.69%
Photos: 17.9% 13.72% 12.63
Total: 67.78% 60.45% 81.32%
China Times
Stories: 45.53% 44.84% 39.71%
Photos: 20.83% 0 0
Total: 66.36% 44.84% 39.71%
China Newspapers
People's Daily
Stories: 11.7% 7.3% 6.77%
Photos: 0 0 0
Total: 11.7% 7.3% 6.77%
Guangming Daily
Stories: 9.77% 10.25% 0
Photos: 0 0 0
Total: 9.77 10.25 0
Table 3
Origin of the News Story
U.S. Taiwan China
(N = 43) (N = 72) (N = 20)
n % n % n %
Staff 15 34.5 12 16.7
Freelance 14 32.6 1 1.4
Western Wire 10 23.3 58 80.6
Government-Owned 20 100
Wire Services
Others 1 2.3
Unidentifiable 3 7.0 1 1.4
Table 4
News Source
U.S. Taiwan China
(N = 43) (N = 72) (N= 20)
n % n % n %
U.S. Government 15 34.9
China Government 2 10.0
Taiwan Government 8 11.1
U.S.S.R. Acting 6 14.0 8 11.1 5 25.0
President/Committee
Yeltsin, Gorbachev 9 20.9 12 16.7
Their Aides
Tass 4 9.3 19 26.4 13 65.0
Other Countries 2 4.7
Others 6 14.0 15 20.8
Unidentifiable 1 2.3 10 13.9
Table 5
Main Actor of the Lead
U.S. Taiwan China
(N = 43) (N = 72) (N= 20)
n % n % n %
Yanayev 3 7.0 3 4.2 9 45.0
Emergency Committee 11 25.6 18 25.0 4 20.0
Gorbachev/Aides 3 7.0 4 5.6 1 5.0
Yeltsin/Aides 4 9.3 6 8.3
U.S. Government 13 30.2
Soviet People 3 7.0 9 12.5 1 5.0
Demonstrators
China Government 2 10.0
Taiwan Government 8 11.1
Troops/Soldiers 4 9.3 12 16.7
Others 1 2.3 10 13.9 3 15
Unidentifiable 1 2.3 2 2.8
Table 6
Second Actor of the Lead
U.S. Taiwan China
(N = 43) (N = 72) (N= 20)
n % n % n %
Emergency Committee 8 18.6 10 13.9 3 15
Gorbachev/Aides 9 20.9 21 29.2 2 10.0
Yeltsin/Aides 1 2.3 4 5.6 2 10.0
Soviet People 4 9.3 8 11.1 1 5.0
Demonstrators
Taiwan Government 1 1.4
Other Countries 1 2.3 1 1.4 2 10.0
Troops/Soldiers 4 9.3 4 5.6
Others 1 2.3 4 5.6 1 5.0
Unidentifiable 15 34.9 19 26.4 9 45.0
Table 7
Terminology to Name the Event Used by Three Countries' Newspapers
(Based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of the term in each selected news story)
Occurrence of the term used by
newspapers in
U.S Taiwan China
(N=43) (N=72) (N=20)
Coup 31 37 2
Rightist Coup 4 3
(Reactionary Coup)
Takeover 10 8
Putsch 6
Crime 3 2
Internal Change 2 2
(Political Change)
Kremlin Power Shift 5 9
Ouster 10 26
(Being ousted)
Overthrow 11 10
(Being overthrowed)
Stepdown 15
Grab of Power 2 11
Table 8
Descriptive Terminology of the Event Used by Three Countries' Newspapers
(Based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the term
in each selected news story)
U.S. Taiwan China
(N=43) (N=72) (N=20)
n % n % n %
Against such as 23 53.5 17 23.6 1 5.0
Unconstitutional
Illegitimate
Misguided
Pro: Legitimate 1 2.3 1 1.4 2 10.0
Constitutional
No Descriptive 19 44.2 54 75.0 17 85.0
Terminology Found
Total 43 100.0 72 100.0 20 100.0
Table 9
Terminology to Name the Event Leaders used by Three Countries' Newspapers
(Based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of the term in each selected news story)
Occurrence of the term used by
newspapers in
U.S. Taiwan China
(N=43) (N=72) (N=20)
Hardliners 16 27
Putschists 5 1
New Rulers 10 17
Adventurists 4 1
Coup Plotters 17 14
Hoods/Hoodlums 1
Renegades 1
New Kremlin Group 5 15
New Government
Junta 6
Emergency Committee 16 35 12
Conservatives 11
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