ALLENC ANCHOR$ 93 RTVJ Paying Anchors in Local TV News
[Editor's note: Tables could not be accurately reproduced in plain text
format from submitted file.]
Paying the Anchor in Local Television News:
A Comparative Study of Priorities Between General Managers and
News Directors
By
Craig Allen
Assistant Professor
Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Telecommunication
Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona 85287-1305
602-965-5011
Paying the Anchor in Local Television News:
A Comparative Study of Priorities Between General Managers and
News Directors
ABSTRACT
As local television stations downsize their news operations,
an important question is whether management views anchor salaries
as a budget-cutting option. Anchor salaries can represent 10
percent of a news operating budget although this expense mainly
defrays a talent fee, not an investment in journalistic
commitment. A national study that compared the budget priorities
of affiliate general managers and news directors found that anchor
salaries have been and will remain unaffected by news downsizing.
Both groups agreed that ratings determine the health of a news
operation and that anchors contribute more to profitability than
non-anchors. While management is somewhat concerned by "runaway"
anchor salaries, it may reduce salaries of some non-anchors to
attract a promising "star." The study pointed to a need for more
research that assesses managers, particularly news directors, on
tradeoffs between journalistic and commercial investments in the
newsroom.
Paying the Anchor in Local Television News:
A Comparative Study of Priorities Between General Managers and
News Directors
Paying the Anchor in Local Television News:
A Comparative Study of Priorities Between General Managers and
News Directors
An important matter in local television journalism is whether
the salaries of anchors will be effected as stations "downsize"
their news operations. One half of local TV newsrooms enacted
budget cuts in 1990-91, with virtually all of these cuts having
involved either the elimination of news positions or the paring
down of editorial services.0 Some predict further reductions as
the revenues of local stations are threatened by increased
competition in the marketplace.1 With less being spent on news,
questions surround what Jacobs called the "runaway salaries" of
news anchors.2 Former CBS News President Fred Friendly has
proposed that local stations could resolve many of their budget
anxieties and still keep their news commitments in tact by
reducing the salaries of just a handful of anchors.3
Anchors, referred to in the trade as "talent" and hired to
host broadcasts, are on average paid three times more than
reporters, producers, and editors.4 These averages suggest that a
station needing to sizably cut expenses could indeed do so
reducing anchor pay. A similar case could be made from the 1992
estimate of Don Fitzpatrick Associates, a leading talent
consultant, that the salaries paid a station's weeknight anchors
(news, weather, and sports) can comprise 10 percent of newsroom
operating expenses.5
While the literature has established economic uncertainty and
the sacrifice of news-related personnel and services, there has
been no systematic attempt aimed at determining whether managers
expect anchors to share the sacrifice. This study, the first
direct comparison of TV general managers and news directors to be
derived from national data, was such an attempt. Identical
questionnaires were sent to each of the nation's affiliate general
managers and news directors. Findings reflect an overall response
of 63 percent.
General managers and news directors were compared because
these figures jointly allocate news resources. Of interest in the
study was preceding evidence that general managers and news
directors may have conflicting views as to how much of the
resource should be spent on news presentation. General managers,
because their first concern is profitability, must ensure high
ratings and thus are shown to favor anchors, believing them to be
"drawing cards" for viewers. News directors, if not resistant to
judging journalistic endeavors by ratings, have upheld news
coverage, not news presentation, as the main reason people watch.
News directors supervise the contributions of all news workers,
not just anchors, and thus may question the anchor's compensation,
particularly because the jobs of many non-anchors have been lost
in cutbacks.
While differences were expected, few were found. Both
general managers and news directors held ratings as a goal and
agreed that anchors contribute more to this goal than other news
workers. Both, while rejecting some options for directly diverting
news gathering resources into presentation, tentatively agreed
they would hire future non-anchor news workers at decreasing
salaries to free resources for promising anchors. The study
sought to determine if newsrooms are "autonomous" or if the hand
of upper management reaches into them at an appreciable degree.
Findings suggested the latter. News directors agreed that general
managers establish the anchor's share of resources and, thus, what
is left to cover all of the other expenses required in news
gathering. Evidence that anchors are not a budget-cutting option
were affirmed in expectations that anchor salaries will grow
proportionally to those of non-anchors in the years ahead.
Background
Interest in anchor salaries has evolved from industry reports
that document major income disparities between anchor and non-
anchor personnel. Between 1981 and 1991, top anchors at
affiliates saw an average annual salary increase, adjusted for
inflation, of 10.8 percent. By contrast, reporters in real terms
lost money and were paid an average of 4.5 percent less each year.
In 1991, primary anchors were paid an average of $86,005, more
than three times the $25,405 paid reporters and the $23,660 paid
producers. There were greater disparities between anchors and
non-anchors in the twenty-five largest markets. There, top
anchors earned an average of $232,500, compared to around $57,000
for reporters and $40,000 each for producers, assignment editors,
and videographers. Another person paid less than the anchor was
the news director. Across all stations, the news director's 1991
average salary of $52,760 was two-thirds that of primary anchors.6
Weaver and Wilhoit's studies have likewise shown that the salaries
of most journalists were "eroded seriously" during the 1980s.7
Although anchors are active in editorial and managerial
tasks, it is accepted that their value to TV stations has
relatively little to do with their journalistic contributions.
Powers and Matusow each maintained that many anchors are
commercial elements, not unlike the hosts or "stars" of
entertainment programs, whose outward displays of charisma and on-
set theatrics maximize ratings.8 Sanders and Pritchett affirmed
that the "non verbal communication" of anchors could "play a role
in determining which [newscast] the viewer will select."9
Cathcart's study reached a similar conclusion.10 In research
investigating a phenomenon known as "parasocial interaction,"
Levy, Houlberg, Rubin, and Perse, in different studies, found that
viewers may watch local news broadcasts for a vicarious "bonding"
with anchors. Levy's study saw commercial implications in this
bonding and speculated that anchors "may deliberately manipulate
their self-presentation" in order to "attract large audiences."11
While there is some evidence that viewers attend news
broadcasts in the expectation of seeing certain anchors, there is
no conclusive evidence that viewers do not also seek an intake of
news and information. Lin, in fact, demonstrated that anchors
were less important than the "quality and scope of local news" in
drawing viewers to particular programs.12
Because the quality and scope of local news, as well as the
quality of the anchors, is determined by the economic resources
they command--and because these resources are limited--an
important matter is how general managers and news directors
establish respective budgetary priorities.
Past studies indicate that general managers would favor
quality anchors and treat news quality as a lesser priority.
While likely unfamiliar with scholarly studies, general managers
commission their own audience research. A study of this
commercial research by Shosteck indicated that it, like the
"parasocial" research, elevates anchors as elements to which
viewers react.13 This commercial research may validate the GM's
personal impression, noted by Turow, that "hosts" instill an
outward "identity" and "feeling of unity" in a broadcast.14 That
anchors are easily isolated as "drawing cards" is meaningful to a
general manager, whose job security hinges on station
profitability; Wicks found that news operations can account for 50
percent of station profits.15 While a general manager may
personally prefer a newscast rich in substance and detail, the
ratings become the practical measure of news vitality to a GM.
Because an anchor's cosmetics and delivery key the outward
appearance of the news, it might not matter to a general manager
if the anchor had a college degree or editorial experience.
Another meaningful factor to the general manager is that
mainly through on-air talent is upper management able to
facilitate decision-making in news that is analogous to that
elsewhere in its domain. Most general managers advance not from
news but from sales and programming departments, where replacing
programs is a routine activity.16 Anchors are enlisted much the
way whole programs are purchased, on a short term often with two-
year contracts. A GM thus can "cancel" an anchor if that person
fails to stimulate ratings. Yet an anchor capable of luring more
viewers like a "hit show" could be worth a substantial investment.
Several have noted that because ratings to a general manager are
never "high enough" there exists in television news a perpetual
talent hunt for anchors. A third party that includes agents and
consultants bids up the price for promising anchor talent.17 This
competitive environment may require GMs to reserve a large share
of news resource for finding new anchors and/or keeping popular
existing anchors.
While general managers may favor quality anchors, past
studies suggest that news directors would invest maximum resources
on quality news coverage. Some studies further hint that news
directors do not uphold ratings and disagree that profit margins
must be calculated prior to every investment. Weaver and Wilhoit
found that most news managers had advanced through positions in
newsrooms, where "altruism" and public service are goals. These
authors explained that those in newsrooms become alienated when
their "autonomous" goals must be sacrificed to those of the "total
organization," such as when newsrooms must work with other
corporate units "toward the common goal of increased
profitability."18 Stone characterized TV news directors as
"highly comparable" to newspaper managing editors, not corporate
figures.19 Wulfemeyer provided similar evidence after news
directors in a national survey expressed to him "almost unanimous
. . . support for the ideals of fair, balanced and accurate
reporting."20 These studies suggest that news directors, unlike
general managers, would favor if not demand newscasts rich in
substance and would use resources to attract news workers with
college educations and past editorial experience.
Additional evidence has shown that news directors to the
extent they evaluate ratings may agree with Lin that the influence
of anchors in drawing viewers is overrated. News directors
complained when with commercial research, consultants, and agents
the "star system" emerged in local news in the 1970s.21 The
Weaver-Wilhoit study, moreover, addressed the matter of
"entertaining the audience" and found those in television "among
the least likely to acknowledge entertainment as important."22
That news directors stress news gathering, not "entertaining"
anchors, as a means of staking a position in the marketplace was
affirmed, although not unanimously, in Jacobs' informal survey.
In this study, reported in 1990, news directors tended to view the
ratings contributions of reporters and producers as at least
comparable to those of anchors. Accordingly, some news directors
professed to a "hard-nosed" approach in future anchor salary
negotiations because they wanted the "money to go into the
product, not [to] the presenter."23
The literature thus points to opposing perspectives between
general managers and news directors and the basis of a
disagreement over what proportion of a limited news resource
should be spent on news presentation.
Acknowledging these differences, trade sources beginning in
the late 1980s hinted that extreme positions had narrowed. In
articles that sketched a "managerial marriage," the Radio-
Television News Directors Association found general managers more
reflective of the journalistic integrity of their newscasts and
news directors more attuned with their commercial imperatives.24
Yet there has been no systematic attempt to test how far one side
may have ventured toward seeing "eye to eye" with other. Anchor
salaries, because they define a trade between the journalistic and
commercial interests of these two types of decision-makers,
qualify as a base for such a test.
The study proposed that:
(1) Affiliate general managers are more likely than news
directors to view ratings as the most important determinant of a
news operation's health.
(2) General managers consider anchors more essential to
attracting viewers than reporters, feature reporters,
videographers, producers, and assignment editors. News directors
associate the viewer's news-viewing motive with the news itself
and consider those in journalistic positions more essential to
attracting viewers than anchors.
(3) General managers stress demonstrated performance
capabilities and thus favor investments in commericial audience
research; they also are willing to terminate an anchor if the
anchor's performance fails within three years to boost ratings.
News directors will reject the use of commercial research and
disfavor the anchor "revolving door."
(4) General managers are less likely than news directors to
seek anchors who have journalistic experience and a college
degree.
(5) In a hypothetical situation of budgetary conflict,
general managers will prioritize the anchor and favor the
sacrifice of other parts of a newsroom budget. News directors
will not prioritize the anchor and will reject all options for
accommodating an anchor that involve news-related cuts.
(6) General managers are less likely than news directors to
question anchor salaries and more likely to anticipate greater
salary disparities.
(7) General managers will agree that they, not the news
director, select anchors and determine their salaries. Because
anchors are employed in newsrooms and their salaries are part of a
newsroom budget they directly supervise, news directors will
disagree that GMs exert this control.
Methodology
Identical questionnaires were sent to every non-satellite
affiliate, one each to the general manager and news director. The
sample was limited to affiliates because these stations comprise
83 percent of the local TV stations engaged in news.25 A
preliminary telephone survey revealed that twenty-one affiliates
had dropped news operations, leaving 541 affiliates in the final
sample. Of the 1,082 questionnaires sent, 688 were returned,
providing a total response rate of 63 percent. The responses
within the groups were almost equal: 64 percent among general
managers and 63 percent among news directors. The questionnaire
was pre-tested among general managers and news directors in state
that had affiliates in all market-size categories. The data
collection occurred between June and August 1992.
Respondents were instructed to affirm or refute items based
on a nine-point scale, in which "1" corresponded to "Strongly
Disagree" and "9" to "Strongly Agree." The means of the responses
are reported across all stations and by four market-size
categories; differences were analyzed with t tests.
To test the hypothesis that general managers place greater
stock in the ratings than news directors, the groups responded to
item that read, "Ratings are most important in determining the
health of your news operation." To test the hypothesis that the
public, in the view of the general managers, watches the news for
the anchors, and that news directors believe journalism is the
public's primary viewing motive, the two groups responded to an
item that read, "In determining ratings, anchors are essential."
The two groups then assessed the extent reporters, feature
reporters, videographers, producers, and assignment editors are
essential to ratings.
The hypothesis that general managers and news directors
differ on the importance of performance abilities was tested in a
two-part series of items. The first part sought reaction to the
use of commercial research and consultants in evaluating anchors;
the second part sought to determine how long an anchor would be
allowed to remain on the air if performance abilities did not
improve ratings. The hypothesis that general managers are less
likely to conceive writing-reporting experience and a college
degree as important in anchor selection was tested with items
worded accordingly.
To test the hypothesis that general managers are more likely
to enlarge the share of the anchor resources by reducing the
proportion spent on news gathering, the two groups were given
items that read, "If you are determined to enlist or keep a
promising anchor and the money necessary has not been budgeted,
you would . . . ." The groups were then given budget-cutting
options that included reducing capital expenditures, denying
raises to non-anchors, not filling non-anchor openings, filling
future openings with part-time staff, filling future openings with
fulltime staff at reduced salary, and layoffs.
The hypotheses that general managers are less likely to
question anchor salaries, are more likely to anticipate larger
anchor salaries, and are more likely to affirm their aegis over
salaries, were tested with items so worded.
Results
The purpose of the study was to determine the intensity of
expected differences between general managers and news directors
based on several items relating to anchors. While some
differences were found, only two of seven hypotheses were firmly
supported. The failure of other hypotheses was most often the
result of unexpected responses among the news directors.
Hypothesis 1, that general managers are more likely than news
directors to stress ratings, was supported, as shown in the first
item in Table 1. A surprise, though, was the intensity of feeling
among news directors that ratings do determine news health. While
their responses differed significantly from the general manager's,
the news directors clearly agreed that ratings were the chief
determinate; their mean on the nine-point scale was 6.06, higher
still among those in the larger markets.
Hypothesis 2, that general managers view anchors as more
essential to ratings that those in other news work categories, and
that news directors have opposite feelings, was rejected. As
remaining items in Table 1 show, both groups overwhelming agreed,
and with no significant differences, that the anchor is essential
to viewership, an expected outcome among general managers but
another surprise among news directors, whose mean was 8.05 overall
and 8.45 in the top-25 markets. The only significant differences
emerged in the producer and videographer items; news directors
upheld the contributions of these employees more intensely than
general managers. Both groups strongly agreed that non-anchors
are essential to ratings; the extent the general managers did so
was unanticipated. Yet in no case did the intensity of feeling
for a non-anchor exceed that of an anchor. Because this was an
unexpected response among the news directors, an additional
statistical analysis was performed in which the news directors'
anchor item means were paired against those of the non-anchors.
The t values appear in Table 2. In virtually every comparison,
the anchor means significantly differed.
Hypothesis 3, that general managers would be more inclined
than news directors to invest in the evaluation of an anchor's on-
air performance and replace an anchor whose performance did not
increase ratings was rejected. As Table 3 shows, both groups
agreed that research on anchors, both formal and informal, was
important. Both groups, moreover, had almost identical sentiment
on anchor longevity. There was agreement in both groups that an
anchor whose performance failed to stimulate ratings should be
replaced after two years, more intense feeling that the axe should
fall after three years.
There was support for Hypothesis 4, that general managers are
less attracted to an anchor's journalistic experience and
education (Table 4). The intensity of feeling among news
directors that anchors need writing (8.09) and reporting (8.08)
experience was noteworthy.
Yet Hypothesis 5, that GMs would favor sacrificing other
parts of a news budget, and that news directors would oppose such
sacrifices, had only partial support (Table 5). General managers
joined news directors in refusing to accommodate anchors by laying
off non-anchors, denying non-anchor raises, and cutting capital
expenditures. General managers did agree, although slightly, that
anchors could be accommodated by hiring more part-timers and not
filling non-anchor openings; news directors rejected those
options. Nevertheless, they both agreed that a promising anchor
could be accommodated by hiring new employees at lower pay than
their predecessors. While neither group intensely agreed with
this option, there was indication that news directors, contrary to
expectations, may have some mind to divert resources from
journalism into presentation.
Hypothesis 6, regarding the direction and perceived status of
anchor salaries, likewise had mixed support (Table 6). The two
groups differed significantly as to the future direction of anchor
salaries; general managers expressed positive sentiment (6.18)
that anchor salaries will increase in proportion to non-anchors,
while news directors (5.42) were less willing to agree. Yet there
was no significant difference in their respective concerns about
this trend. Both groups are concerned but news directors (5.78)
were only nominally more bothered than general managers (5.65).
Affirming a mutual vote of confidence in high anchor salaries was
intense disagreement among both groups that anchors contribute
little to the news.
Finally, Hypothesis 7 was rejected, as the final two items in
Table 6 indicate. While there was little evidence that general
managers have more influence than news directors in deciding just
who anchors the news, this does appear to be a joint decision.
Yet with no significant difference general managers (7.09) and
news directors (6.85) clearly agreed that general managers decide
what the anchors are paid.
Discussion
Debate endures between those who conceive local television
news as a journalistic service and others who consider it more as
a form of public entertainment. There have been few attempts
aimed at determining how television managers, who allocate the
financial resources available to news, may view this journalism-
entertainment question.
The study showed that both in the newsroom and in the
executive suite the contributions of those who photograph, report,
and prepare the news are acknowledged. Management expects even
its anchors to make some of these contributions. Thus top
managers do highly regard the journalistic integrity of their news
programs.
Yet the study provided some of the first systematic evidence
that both general managers and news directors also embrace an
entertainment dimension, in the form of the charismatic and
audience-appealing news "star." Managers believe that ratings
best gauge the health of a local TV news operation and that
anchors are more essential to ratings than those in any other news
work category. Management is comfortable with putting into anchor
salaries a share of resources that would otherwise defray news
gathering. This share may represent only about 10 percent of news
operating resources but is nonetheless considerable. Moreover,
management expects the anchor's share to increase, at a time when
total resources available to local TV stations are diminishing.
While the study was limited to items relating to anchors, the
results challenge claims that managers conceive news broadcasts
exclusively as journalistic services.
An important subject for further investigation are the
anchors themselves. Evidence that managers appraise an anchor's
editorial experience expands on recent observations that anchors,
because of cutbacks, must increasingly write, report, and produce
the news. There is little research, though, that assesses anchors
as news "gatekeepers." What seems a vital research question are
the motivations of anchors in executing editorial tasks when such
tasks reward others a fraction of the anchor's pay.
The study also stresses the need for more audience effects
studies on anchors, including those that shed light on the
phenomenon of "parasocial interaction." While anchors may make
editorial contributions, the anchor's performance abilities are
clearly what counts to managers; the large difference in pay
between an anchor and a non-anchor is without doubt a measure of
the priority TV stations place on performance. Management appears
not only acquainted with the "bonding effect" that some scholars
have proposed; it is willing to expend additional news resources
on telephone surveys, auditorium screenings, and focus groups to
determine which anchors bond and which do not. Even in the small
markets both general managers and news directors agree that these
investments are necessary.
Results of the study bode for additional research not only on
anchors. It appears as well that more needs to be learned of
general managers and news directors.
The general manager, whose job is to ensure profits and who
may have no background in news, has influence in directing news
operations in local television. Here it was shown that GMs set
anchor salaries and are active in anchor hiring decisions.
Additionally, each of the 351 responding general managers answered
the items on newsroom budget-cutting options, indirect evidence
that their hands may extend quite far into their news departments.
These findings are consistent with recent evidence from the RTNDA
that a "managerial marriage" now exists between general managers
and news directors. More needs to be known of this "marriage"
because it questions Weaver and Wilhoit's finding, from their
research in the early 1980s, that "journalists still percieve
substantial autonomy in their work."26
The degree to which general managers upheld the contributions
of non-anchor news employees was unanticipated. Yet in all of the
other items, including the item that affirmed their ratings
priorities, the GMs reacted the way the literature predicted they
would. Those in the executive suite guard the "bottom line" and
seek elements, such as anchors, that can conveniently and
expediently be managed toward maximizing it.
That news directors by and large reacted the same way was the
source of the study's greatest number of unexpected results. News
directors, like GMs, hold ratings as the determinant of news
health, are not greatly concerned that non-anchors earn a fraction
of the anchor's pay, are comfortable with a talent "revolving
door," and may be willing to pay anchors more by cutting news
expenditures elsewhere. This is not consistent with sources that
portray news directors as voices of journalistic commitment.
What may be indicated is the prevalance of a type of news
director different from that generally recognized in scholarly
literature. Less autonomous and compelled into a union with
general managers, news directors increasingly may be swayed that
profit-making is central to news endeavors. News directors may
leave a newsroom's journalistic well-being to subordinates. Some
news directors see the marriage a "shot gun" affair and accept the
conversion grudgingly. Stone found many news directors
uncomfortable with "managerial activities" and linked this
discomfort to their high turnover from average tenures of around
two years.27 However, a sizable number of news directors
apparently welcome the conversion. A 1987 RTNDA study reported
that 56 percent of news directors aspired to be general
managers.28
News directors who think like general managers can effect the
journalistic expectations many have for local television. This is
because in TV's chain of command the news director is the only
link between those in the newsroom, who depend on resources to
cover the news, and those at the corporate level, who allocate
those resources. Corporate figures including general managers
identify with anchors, less so with those who work behind the
scenes. Only news directors readily identify with all news
workers and are in a position to lobby for the resources they
need.
That news directors may be missing lobbying opportunities can
be interpreted in some of the findings reported here. Even though
news directors strongly agreed that anchors are essential to
ratings, they nonetheless had positive sentiment for the
contributions of all their employees. The mean of the "producer"
item, 7.76, had 95 percent the intensity of the of "anchor" mean
of 8.05. If news directors believe that producers add to the
bottom line as indicated, a question remains as to why they do not
pay producers $80,000 per year, 95 percent of the anchor's salary,
rather than the reported $24,000. Similar questions are raised
for all of the other employee categories. Even using a commercial
measure, the vast salary disparities between anchors and non-
anchors appear here to have mixed justification in the news
director's mind. Importantly, general managers may likewise be
confused; as shown, GMs also upheld the bottom line contributions
of non-anchors. Thus general managers may be receptive if news
directors sought a redistribution of resources. It may be because
news directors think like general managers, and prioritize
convenient ratings-indusive factors, that the salary structure
will continue to greatly reward the anchors.
A better scholarly portrayal of news directors is needed.
Future studies should test news directors not only on their news
judgment and journalistic priorities but by means that force them
to react to tradeoffs between journalistic and commercial factors.
Decisions that have accompanied this field's downsizing are rich
in tradeoff variables. One tradeoff may pertain to the extent
news directors favor the reduction of reporting positions and
"filling" local newscasts with inexpensive nationally-syndicated
material and video news releases. Another tradeoff is the extent
news directors favor the adding of newscasts without the addition
of news staff. Yet another tradeoff pertains to the extent news
directors favor the replacement of fulltime staff with part-timers
and those who can be hired on a per-diem basis. These tradeoffs
and others were described in a national study of downsizing
reported in 1992 by the RTNDA.29
It is because of downsizing, and evidence of economic
tradeoffs, that the anchor's large salary remains another key
variable. There was little evidence in this study to indicate
that recent economic restraint effects the "star system" in local
TV news. To the contrary, the "star" may assume greater
importance in the years ahead as management faces increasing
ratings challenges in a now congested TV marketplace. Resources
that defray presentation and journalism draw from the same trough;
as anchor pay goes up, news gathering resources may be forced
down. Thus an important research pursuit in local TV news is
following the money. Doing so may help determine what management
has in mind in offering local TV news services to the public.
TABLE 1
Differences Between GM's and ND's Assessment of Ratings and
Employees
("1" Strongly Disagree, "9" Strongly Agree)
ALL
STATIONS ADI 1-25 ADI 26-50
ADI 51-100 ADI 101-208
Item GM Me n ND Mean GD Me n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Mean ND
Mean
Ratin
s
Deter
ine
Health
of
News
Opera
ion 6.
3 6.06
** 6.
8 6.
5 7.
6 6.
0** 7.
9 6.1
*** 6.82 5.8
***
Ancho
s
Essen
ial to
Ratin
s 7.
8 8.05 7.
1 8.
5* 8.
2 8.
0 8.
5 8.21 7.70 7.40
Produ
ers
Essen
ial to
Ratin
s 7.
0 7.76* 7.
8 7.
2 7.
7 7.
8 7.
4 7.9
* 7.38 7.59
Assig
ment
Edito
s
Essen
ial to
Ratin
s 7.
2 7.62 7.
9 7.
6 7.
9 7.
5 7.
5 7.74 7.39 7.54
Repor
ers
Essen
ial to
Ratin
s 6.
6 6.97 6.
7 7.
1* 7.
6 7.
5 6.
7 6.91 6.96 6.93
Video
raphe
s
Essen
ial to
Ratin
s 6.
8 6.85* 6.
5 6.
1* 6.
3 7.
8 6.
3 6.9
* 6.61 6.70
Featu
e
Repor
ers
Essen
ial to
Ratin
s 6.
7 5.90 5.
5 5.
3 6.
2 5.
0 76
11 5.95 6.26 5.80
n=
51 n=337 n=
6 n=
6 n=
8 n=
0 n=
9 n=1
1 n=1
8 n=1
0
T-Test Probabilities
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
TABLE 2
Anchors Versus Other Employees as "Essential to Ratings,"
Comparison of News Director Means
ALL
STATIONS ADI 1-25 ADI 26-50
ADI 51-
100 ADI 101-
208
Pair T-Value T-Value T-Value T-Value T-Value
Anchor
-
Produc
rs 4.08*** 3.34** 2.01 2.63* 1.34
Anchor-
Assign
ent
Editors 4.96*** 3.61*** 2.91** 3.36** 1.46
Anchor-
Report
rs 12.53*** 6.81*** 5.40*** 8.49*** 5.92***
Anchor-
Videog
aphers 12.07*** 6.23*** 6.14*** 7.66*** 6.21***
Anchor
-
Feature
Report
rs 20.09*** 8.49*** 6.85*** 12.12*** 12.09*
Probabilities
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
TABLE 3
Differences Between GMs and NDs Regarding On-Air Evaluation
And Longevity of Anchor Who Fails to Increase Ratings
("1" Strongly Disagree, "9" Strongly Agree)
ALL
STATIONS ADI 1-25 ADI 26-50
ADI 51-
100 ADI 101-
208
Item GM
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Mean ND
Mean
Phone
surve
s,
audit
rium
scree
ings
impor
ant 6.
2 6.30 7.
8 6.
8 7.
3 7.
8 6.
2 6.26 6.03 5.94
Infor
al
impre
sions
impor
ant 6.
8 7.38
** 6.
8 7.
1* 7.
5 7.
8 6.
6 7.2
* 6.96 7.34
Consu
tants
impor
ant 5.
5 5.21 6.
1 5.
5 5.
9 6.
3 5.
6 5.45 5.12 4.63
Termi
ate in
one
year 3.
6 3.50 3.
8 2.
5 3.
2 2.
7 3.
8 3.12 4.53 4.03
Termi
ate in
two
years 5.
5 5.42 5.
4 5.
7 5.
3 5.
8 6.
7 5.22 5.45 5.65
Termi
ate in
three
years 6.
9 6.32 7.
9 6.
6 6.
4 7.
4 6.
1 6.16 5.65 5.95
n=
51 n=337 n=
6 n=
6 n=
8 n=
0 n=
9 n=1
1 n=1
8 n=1
0
T-Test Probabilities
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
TABLE 4
Differences Between GMs and NDs Regarding Anchor's Background
("1" Strongly Disagree, "9" Strongly Agree)
ALL
STATIONS ADI 1-25 ADI 26-50
ADI 51-
100 ADI 101-
208
Item GM
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Mean ND
Mean
Ancho
s need
writi
g
skill 7.
4 8.09
** 7.
5 7.
8 7.
6 8.
0** 7.
7 7.98 7.94 8.2
*
Ancho
s need
repor
ing
skill 7.
8 8.08
* 7.
1 7.
2 7.
3 8.
8* 7.
3 8.11 7.83 8.1
*
Ancho
s need
colle
e
degree 6.
5 6.48* 6.
1 5.
5 5.
7 6.
3* 6.
0 6.7
* 6.29 6.53
n=
51 n=337 n=
6 n=
6 n=
8 n=
0 n=
9 n=1
1 n=1
8 n=1
0
T-Test Probabilities
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
TABLE 5
Differences Between GM's and ND's Acceptance of Budget-Cutting
Options
For Paying Promising Anchors
("1" Strongly Disagree, "9" Strongly Agree)
ALL
STATIONS ADI 1-25 ADI 26-50
ADI 51-
100 ADI 101-
208
Item GM
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Mean ND
Mean
Layoff
of
Non-
Anchor 2.
9 2.15
** 2.
1 2.
8 2.
6 1.
8** 2.
9 1.9
** 2.77 2.1
**
Cut
Capit
l
Expen
itures 3.
3 3.80
** 2.
6 3.
6* 3.
2 3.
3 3.
2 3.58 3.21 4.0
**
Deny
Raises
of
Non-
Ancho
s 3.
8 3.27 2.
9 3.
0* 2.
7 3.
3 2.
7 3.00 3.57 3.29
Hire
More
Part-
Timers 5.
8 4.81* 5.
6 5.
6 5.
0 4.
5 5.
8 4.4
* 5.12 4.73
Not
Fill
Non-
Anchor
Openi
gs 5.
6 5.28 5.
6 5.
5 5.
6 4.
5 5.
8 5.26 5.25 5.24
Hire
Future
Fullt
me
Non-
Ancho
s at
Lower
Pay
6.
9 6.32 7.
9 6.
6 6.
4 7.
4 6.
1 6.16 5.65 5.95
n=
51 n=337 n=
6 n=
6 n=
8 n=
0 n=
9 n=1
1 n=1
8 n=1
0
T-Test Probabilities
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
TABLE 6
Differences Between GMs and NDs on Future Direction, Assessment,
And Control of Anchor Salaries
("1" Strongly Disagree, "9" Strongly Agree)
ALL
STATIONS ADI 1-25 ADI 26-50
ADI 51-
100 ADI 101-
208
Item GM
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Me
n GD
Me
n ND
Mean GD
Mean ND
Mean
Propo
tion
paid
ancho
s will
incre
se 6.
8 5.42
* 6.
4 4.
3** 6.
2 4.
0* 6.
8 5.2
** 6.22 5.89
Dispr
porti
nal
anchor
salar
es
a
conce
n 5.
5 5.78 6.
4 6.
3 6.
7 6.
3 5.
4 6.00 5.24 5.25
Ancho
s
contr
bute
little
to
news 2.
9 2.97 2.
2 2.
8 3.
4 2.
5 2.
4 3.34 2.83 2.93
GM,
not
ND,
decid
s who
will
anchor 5.
2 4.24
** 4.
4 3.
6* 4.
4 4.
0 5.
3 4.81 5.39 4.0
***
GM,
not
ND,
sets
anchor
salar
es 7.
9 6.85 7.
1 6.
2** 6.
7 6.
5 7.
2 6.86 7.13 7.05
n=
51 n=337 n=
6 n=
6 n=
8 n=
0 n=
9 n=1
1 n=1
4 n=1
8
T-Test Probabilities
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
NOTES
0 Vernon A. Stone, "Downsizing Myths: What the Numbers Really
Show," RTNDA Communicator,
Apr., 1992, pp. 32-34.
1 Merrill Brown, "Feeling Pressure in the Nervous Nineties,"
Channels, Dec., 1989, p. 13; and
Neal Rosenau, "After the Cutbacks," Columbia Journalism Review,
Sept.-Oct., 1988, pp. 46-50.
2 Jerry Jacobs, Changing Channels (Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield,
1990), pp. 2-3.
3 Emerson Stone, "The Salad Days Are Over," RTNDA Communicator,
Apr., 1987, pp. 14-16.
4 Vernon A. Stone, "News Salaries Stand Still," RTNDA Communicator,
Feb., 1992, pp. 14-15.
5 Report on anchor salary trends, Don Fitzpatrick Associates, San
Francisco, Aug. 31, 1992.
6 Vernon A. Stone, "Moderate Gains in News Salaries," RTNDA
Communicator, Dec., 1981,
pp. 16-19; and Stone, "News Salaries Stand Still."
7 David H. Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit, The American
Journalist, 2nd ed., (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 102.
8 Ron Powers, The Newscasters (New York: St. Martin's, 1977), pp.
39-44; and Barbara Matusow,
The Evening Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), pp. 245-46.
9 Keith P. Sanders and Michael Pritchett, "Some Influences of
Appearance on Television
Newscaster Appeal," Journal of Broadcasting 15:293-301 (Summer 1971).
10 William L. Cathcart, "Viewer Needs and Desires in Television
Newscasters," Journal of
Broadcasting 14:55-62.
11 Mark R. Levy, "Watching TV News as Parasocial Interaction,"
Journal of Broadcasting
23:69-80 (Winter 1979); Rick Houlberg, "Local Television News Audience
and the Parasocial
Interaction," Journal of Broadcasting 28:423-429 (Fall 1984); Alan
Rubin, Elizabeth M. Perse, and
Robert Powell, "Loneliness, Parasocial Interaction and Local Television
News Viewing," Human
Communication Research 12:155-180 (Winter 1985); Elizabeth M. Perse,
"Media Involvement and
Local News Effects," Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media
14:55-62 (Winter 1990).
12 Carolyn A. Lin, "Audience Selectivity in Local Television
Newscasts," Journalism Quarterly
69:373-382 (Summer 1992).
13 Herschel Shosteck, "Factors Influencing Appeal of TV News
Personalities," Journal of
Broadcasting 18:63-71 (Winter 1973-74).
14 Joseph Turow, "Local Television: Producing Soft News," Journal
of Communication
33:111-123 (Spring 1983).
15 Robert H. Wicks, "Segmenting Broadcast News Audiences in the New
Media
Environment," Journalism Quarterly 66:114-120 (Summer 1989).
16 William Baker, "Is There A Future For Local Television?,"
Television Quarterly 17:31-40
(Winter 1981-82).
17 Jeremy Gerard, "Deciding Who Makes a Million in TV News," New
York Times, Feb. 20,
1989; "Anchor Salaries Today," Forbes, Apr. 25, 1983, pp. 15-16; Elmer
Lower, "Bottom-line Value
of Superanchors," Television/Radio Age, July 21, 1981, pp. 34-37, 72-86;
Harry Waters and George
Hackett, "Sex and the Anchor Person," Newsweek, Dec. 15, 1980, pp.
65-66.
18 Weaver-Wilhoit, American Journalist, pp. 102, 214.
19 Vernon A. Stone, "Changing Profiles of News Directors of Radio
and TV Station, 1972-
1986," Journalism Quarterly 64:745-749 (Winter 1987).
20 K. Tim Wulfemeyer, "Defining Ethics in Electronic Journalism:
Perceptions of News
Directors," Journalism Quarterly 67:984-991 (Winter 1990).
21 Marvin Barrett, ed., Moments of Truth? (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell, 1975, pp. 89-112.;
Powers, pp. 87-94; and "Halina Czerniejewski and Charles Long, "Local
Television News in 31
Flavors,: The Quill, May 1974, p. 5.
22 Weaver-Wilhoit, American Journalist, pp. 74, 122-23.
23 Jacobs, Changing Channels, pp. 106-108.
24 John M. Quarderer and Vernon A. Stone, "NDs and GMs Describe
Their Managerial
`Marriages'" RTNDA Communicator, May, 1989, pp. 32-34; and Vernon A.
Stone, "News Directors
Move for Advancement," RTNDA Communicator, Sept., 1988, pp. 16-18.
25 Broadcasting Publications, Broadcast Yearbook 1991, Washington,
D.C., 1991, passim. The
figure is based on outlets that listed news management in the station
directory.
26 Weaver-Wilhoit, American Journalist, pp. 102.
27 Stone, "Changing Profiles of News Directors."
28 Vernon A. Stone, "News Directors Aspire to Become GMs," RTNDA
Communicator, Sept.,
1987, pp. 59-62.
29 Stone, "Downsizing Myths."
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