Davids and Goliaths: The Economic Restructuring
of the Postwar Magazine Industry, 1950-1970
David Abrahamson
New York University
Department of Journalism and Mass Communication
Mail address: 165 East 32nd St., New York, NY 10016
Phone: (212) 689-5446
FULL TEXT OF PAPER
Democratic nations...will habitually
prefer the useful to the beautiful and...require
that the beautiful should be useful.
-- Alexis de Tocqueville <1>
During the 1960s, the American consumer magazine industry
completed a major transformation: a shift away from general-interest
mass-market publications toward more specialized magazines. By the
early 1970s, four of the most celebrated mass magazines, _Life_,
_Look_, _Saturday Evening Post_, and _Collier's_, had ceased
publication, and in their place, another genre of magazine, the
"special- interest" publication, began to flourish. Edited for
specific, smaller audiences, addressing particular reader interests
related to specific leisure activities, special-interest magazines
with titles as diverse as the nation's newfound avocational pursuits
(_Boating_, _Car and Driver_, _Cycle_, _Flying_, _Golf_, _Popular
Electronics_, _Popular Photography_, _Skiing_, _Stereo Review_,
_Tennis_, etc.) blossomed during the 1960s. Based both on the
historical literature and recent interviews with prominent publishing
executives, as well as proprietary company financial data, the focus
of this paper is an examination of the economic and sociocultural
factors which contributed to this transformation.
It is generally agreed that three principal causes led to the
demise of the traitional mass-market magazine: competition from
television, mismanagement by publishing companies, and, as a less
obvious but important undercurrent, an inability on the part of some
of the publications to respond to fundamental sociocultural changes.
"The late 1950s and early 1960s were a very difficult period for
publishing executives, and many wondered if magazines were going to
survive," recalled Robert Farley, executive vice president of Magazine
Publishers of America (MPA). "Many general magazines had circulation
and advertising strategies based on competition with television that,
because TV could create an audience at no cost, destroyed their profit
margins."<2>
According to Michael Hadley, former president of Times Mirror
Magazines, "By the late 1950s, many of us suspected that TV was going
to be the bigger and tougher kid on the block." The perception of
broadcasting's comparative superiority in swaying mass audiences was
certainly apparent by the 1960s, at least on the part of those with a
pivotal influence on corporate advertising decisions. "Television
became the glamorous medium, and the advertising agencies fell in love
with it at the expense of magazines," said Archa Knowlton, director of
media planning from 1958 to 1978 for General Foods, a major consumer
advertiser. "It all sounds somewhat irrational, but every night
advertising people went home, watched TV, and loved it. Few went home
and read _Ladies Home Journal_."<3>
It was widely believed that advertising on television worked
differently from print ads. For mass marketers, TV held out a promise
even the largest magazine could not match: the power to create a
nation of buyers. "Everyone was watching the same thing," said Gilbert
Maurer, executive vice president of the Hearst Corporation, "and there
was an immediacy to its effect. Run a commercial on Sunday night, and
on Monday you would be inundated with customers."<4> In addition,
another reason for television's appeal as a national advertising
medium was an early trade practice that remained in effect until the
late 1960s: By agreement with the networks, major consumer-goods
advertisers such as General Electric, Proctor & Gamble, Westinghouse,
and Kraft Foods were allowed to produce their own TV shows, thus
insuring their complete control over program content. "With shows like
Danny Thomas, Andy Griffith, and Lucille Ball, we virtually owned
Monday nights from 8:30 to 10:00 during 1960s," recalled General
Foods' Archa Knowlton.<5>
Rapid improvements in broadcasting technology and reception
quality added to the magazines' troubles. Of particular import was the
advent of color television in the early 1960s, for the new technology
meant that TV could present vivid and attractive images which
previously could only have been displayed in magazines. Once color
commercials were possible, magazines as an advertising medium lost
their last advantage.
It can be argued that, for many people in magazine publishing,
television's sudden rise to prominence may have had psychological as
well as economic effects. Magazines had been the primary national
advertising medium since the late nineteenth century. Moreover, a
select, highly visible group of mass magazines accounted for the vast
majority of total circulation, with, by one estimate, twenty titles
enjoying eighty percent of the circulation in the country. "After
seventy-five years of dominance, we were suddenly being consigned to a
lesser position by TV," said Donald Kummerfeld, president of the
Magazine Publishers of America and former president of Murdoch
Magazines. "There was shock and panic as magazines' share of market
declined. We didn't know where the bottom was."<6>
In retrospect, the principal miscalculation in the management
strategy of many mass magazines in the 1950s and 1960s seems to have
centered on an unrestrained belief in the wisdom of ever-increasing
circulation. It is perhaps worth noting that, for many of the most
prominent publications, this strategy was a widely held article of
faith well before the rise of television. "In the years following
World War II," said Hearst's Gilbert Maurer, "there was a tacit
agreement between the large advertising agencies such as Batten,
Barton, Durstine, and Osborn (BBD&O) and Young & Rubicam and
publishers like Cowles and Curtis that, in placing its national
advertising, American industry would buy all the 'reach' available."
It was this business understanding, rather than any actual demand from
the public, that may have driven much of the postwar circulation
growth of magazines such as _Life_, _Look_, and the _Saturday Evening
Post_.<7>
Initially, the sale of the advertising space to national
manufacturers to promote the postwar expansion of the consumer economy
proved enormously profitable to the publishers. With a surfeit of
advertising pages, it was possible for the magazines to "buy"
circulation. "The ethos of the 1950s was that a good circulator can
sell anything at the right price," Maurer explained. "Editors had
little responsibility for their magazines' circulations, and in a
palmy advertising climate, it is always easy to look good." The large
advertising volumes allowed the mass magazines to make a profit from
every additional unit of circulation, no matter what the additional
readers cost them to acquire and renew.<8>
Few observers at the time, however, appreciated the degree to
which many general-interest magazine publishers had leveraged
themselves to obtain these large circulations. Like the junk-bond
crisis of the late 1980s, maintaining the large circulations proved to
be a huge obligation, one that would prove exceedingly difficult to
meet--and still earn a profit--once television had arrived. "The
wonderful money machine turned, in just a few years, into a
loss-making machine. It became a tiger by the tail," a publishing
official later noted. The reason for this was that the fundamental
economics of publishing rewarded the raising of a magazine's
circulation and severely penalized its lowering. In the calculus of
matching circulation guarantees to advertising rates, a decrease in
circulation not only meant lost circulation revenue; publishers were
also required to pay back a portion of the advertising income to
compensate the advertisers for the smaller audience for their ads. It
is likely, in the management mindset of the time, that reducing
circulation was never considered anything other than the option of the
very last resort.<9>
Indeed, with the emergence of TV, the mass magazines, enamored of
their large circulations, elected to try to fight it on the new
medium's own ground. "It was a clear case of mismanagement," said
James Manousos, editor-in-chief of _Publishing Trends and
Trendsetters_, an industry newsletter. "To increase their circulation,
they gave away their magazines at a loss. Circulation salesmen would
get a bonus of fifty cents for every new subscription, so many would
just sit down with a phone book and send in the names. _Look_, for
example, had a lot of that circulation at the end."<10>
Virtually giving their magazines away to maintain their
circulations was not the only ploy the mass magazines used to compete
with the ever-increasing audience offered to advertisers by
television. Asserting that every copy of their publications was seen
by an average of three or four readers, many also began to sell "total
readership" rather than paid circulation. The basis of the claim was
something called "syndicated research." Conducted by third-party firms
hired by the magazine companies, these commercial surveys had as an
unspoken but obvious objective the inflation magazine readership
numbers by including calculations for "pass-along" circulation.<11>
Also called "total-audience research," these syndicated studies
actually originated in the early 1950s; one of the first survey firms
involved was the A.C. Nielsen Company, which would later concentrate
on serving the research needs of the television industry. By the
1960s, however, the studies that the large publishers needed to
support claims of pass-along readership were being supplied by more
sympathetic research firms such as W.R. Simmons Company and MRI, Inc.
The magazines were not disappointed with the results provided. Though
the _Saturday Evening Post_'s paid circulation in the mid-1960s was
approximately 6 million, it could claim a total audience, based on the
pass-along surveys, of some 14 million readers. _Look_'s 8 million
circulation reportedly reached 18 million readers, while _Life_'s 7
million copies were, the studies asserted, read by 21 million
people.<12> Despite these inflated claims, the mass-circulation
magazines clearly failed to meet the challenge of television's growing
dominance as the mass advertising medium of choice. During the 1960s,
TV's share of the national advertising expenditures more than doubled,
from $1.5 billion to over $3.5 billion. In contrast, magazine
advertising revenues were relatively flat during the same period,
rising from under $1 billion to $1.2 billion.<13>
As many of the mass magazine's financial troubles worsened during
the 1960s, a measure of recklessness may have tainted their management
decision-making. There is little evidence to suggest, however, that
the prevailing gospel of ever-increasing circulations was ever
seriously questioned. In 1969, for example, _Look_'s circulation
briefly overtook that of _Life_. To celebrate its accomplishment,
_Look_ placed a full-page advertisement in the _New York Times_; the
headline read: "_Look_ is bigger than _Life_." Stung by the taunt and
eager to regain its former status, _Life_ quickly bought the
subscriber list of the _Saturday Evening Post_ when it folded later
that year. "This may have been the biggest mistake in the latter part
of _Life_'s existence," a publishing executive remarked later. "No one
should have touched that subscriber list." Within a year, it was clear
that the former _Post_ readers were not renewing their subscriptions
to _Life_, so the magazine had to spend more money to find new readers
to maintain its enlarged rate base.<14>
As the mass magazines continued to increase their circulations by
any means possible in an attempt to compete with television, they also
raised the prices they charged their advertisers. "After a while, the
advertisers began to look more closely at what was going on," recalled
one industry observer, "and they were not pleased." Before long, the
most serious of consequences became apparent: The number of
advertising pages in the mass magazines suffered a marked decline. The
annual total of advertising pages carried in _Life_ Magazine, for
example, decreased by almost fifty percent during the 1960s.<15>
Some national advertisers were sympathetic to the magazines'
plight. Concerned about the geometric increases in broadcast
advertising at the expense of print in the late 1960s, General Foods
conducted an extensive marketing study to compare the relative merits
of magazines and television as advertising vehicles; the test showed
that the two media were equally effective in selling products. As a
result, General Foods, as well as Proctor & Gamble and a number of
other large consumer advertisers, began to require that their agencies
include magazines in all proposed advertising schedules. "We wanted,"
said General Foods' Archa Knowlton, "to allow magazines to compete
with this monster that was devouring them."<16>
The fundamental problem, however, of artificially inflated
circulations remained. "We were concerned about the large magazines,
particularly how they were maintaining their circulations," remembers
Knowlton. "We'd look at the audited circulation reports and see
newsstand sales falling, increases in discounted subscriptions, and a
lot of arrears. We could see what they were doing to themselves."
Perhaps by that time it was far too late for most mass magazine
executives to change course. "When we'd bring up our concerns with
them, they'd say, 'You stick to your business and we'll stick to
ours.'"<17>
Beyond the evident economic and management considerations, it can
also be argued that much of the trouble experienced by many
mass-market magazines in the 1960s may have been due, in the words of
the MPA's Robert Farley, to "their editorial failure to keep up with
the changes in American society in the 1960s." According to social
researchers, it was a decade of "new rules," and the social and
cultural values inherent in, for example, a Norman Rockwell _Post_
cover, _Liberty_'s "reading times," or another starlet pictorial in
_Life_ seemed clearly out of step with the times.<18>
As reflectors and shapers of the widespread social consensus that
defined postwar America until 1960, the mass-market magazines had
great success with editorial personas that underscored the conformity
of the age. They could indeed serve as "the best periodical measures
of the concerns, the tastes, and the standards of an era," wrote the
historian Theodore Greene. "In the 1950s, everyone wanted to wear the
same clothes, drive the same car, live in the same house. Uniformity
was not a bad thing," said one industry observer. "In fact, limited
choice was seen as the key to American efficiency, and mass marketing,
not the consumer, was king back then."<19>
In the view of some publishing executives, the editorial
weaknesses of the mass magazines may have been suggested by a
particular item in their circulation reports. (See Appendix A, Table
1.) "As a magazine publisher, one way to gauge how well you are
serving your readers' interests is single-copy sales on newsstands,"
said Gilbert Maurer of Hearst. "I think it is revealing that the paid
circulations of _Life_, _Look_, and the _Saturday Evening Post_, for
example, all had less than five percent newsstand sales. During their
circulation run-ups in the 1960s, they clearly lost sight of what the
American public wanted to read."<20>
The Rise of the Specialized Magazine
As many of the mass-circulation publications suffered, magazines
addressing the specific interests of specific readers prospered.
Between 1955 and 1965, the circulations of a wide variety of more
targeted publications enjoyed significant growth. For instance, the
readership of _Boy's Life_ and _Sports Illustrated_ doubled during
this period, _Mechanix Illustrated_ and _Scientific American_ almost
tripled in size, and the circulation of _Playboy_, certainly a special
case, increased tenfold.<21>
A number of factors may have contributed to the process of
specialization in U.S. magazines during the 1960s. In economic terms,
major advances in printing technology that not only lowered costs but
changed the economies of scale were critically important. The
computerization of both typesetting and color-separation processes, as
well as the advent of compact, high-quality offset presses, resulted
in reduced per-copy manufacturing costs. Large print runs were no
longer necessary, and small circulation magazines suddenly became more
profitable. (See Appendix A, Table 2.) "With production costs
falling," said James Manousos of _Publishing Trends_, "it became
possible to produce smaller magazines for specialized audiences--which
was a more 'natural' way to distribute information. This change in the
economics has been a normal development in every communications
medium."<22>
In his thoughtful book, _The Power to Inform_, the media critic
Jean-Louis Servan-Schreiber suggested a variety of social changes that
influenced the trend toward specialized diversity in magazines. A
general increase in social tolerance may have allowed the greater
assertion of new freedoms and tastes. This, along with the postwar
rise in levels of education which helped to create a multiplicity of
personal interests, produced new, smaller social groupings which
smaller, more specialized magazines could effectively address.
Increased affluence, moreover, made even smaller potential magazine
markets financially feasible as business propositions, particularly
those related to the rising interest in leisure activities.<23>
Despite the troubles of many large-circulation magazines, the
total number of periodicals rose in the 1960s from 8,422 to 9,573
titles, and personal expendi- tures on periodicals increased from $2.1
billion to $3.4 billion. (See Appendix A, Tables 3-5.) As a result, a
wide assortment of magazines targeted at specific subjects
flourished. In some cases, established magazine genres particularly
benefited; both religious periodicals of all denominations and
"handyman" magazines for the do-it-yourselfer proliferated. In others,
whole new categories of special-interest magazines emerged. These
included a new breed of city/regional magazine, largely modeled on
Clay Felker's _New York_ (founded in 1967 as in insert in the _World
Journal Tribune_, a newspaper) which was both journalistically
aspiring and service-oriented, and a wide variety of psychological
awareness and self-improvement magazines such as _Psychology Today_
(1966).<24>
Particularly notable was the success enjoyed by magazines focused
on active leisure pursuits. Described by one observer as a
"revolutionary boom," participatory sports burgeoned during the 1960s.
Personal expenditures on recreation more than doubled during the
decade, increasing from $18.3 billion to $40.7 billion. Similarly, the
number of books published about sports and recreation also doubled
(from 233 titles in 1960 to 583 in 1970).<25>
At least two other factors favored the special- interest magazine
publishers of the 1960s. First, a study examining the period from 1946
to 1977 suggested that, although the loyalty of readers to newspapers
had been declining since the 1950s, magazine readership, especially
among the young, continued to climb steadily during the period,
despite the popularity of television. (See Appendix A, Table 6.)
Second, rather than compete with the time individuals spent reading,
it appeared that leisure activities merely whetted the appetite of
many for more printed information about their avocational pursuits.
(See Appendix A, Table 7.) The more compelling their interest, the
more likely they were to want to read more about it.<26>
As a result, by the early 1960s, a number of newspaper and
broadcasting companies saw the potential in special-interest magazine
publishing. The Hearst Corporation set the precedent, and was soon
followed by Times Mirror, CBS, the New York Times, and ABC. Some
started new magazines; others bought existing titles. "This
'multimedia-ization' dramatically changed special-interest publishing,
transforming what had been a number of small separate cottage
industries into big businesses," said Michael Hadley, former president
of Times Mirror Magazines. "We were up against companies such as
Ziff-Davis and Petersen, which were dedicated solely to
special-interest magazine publishing, and the competition was
intense."<27>
The rewards for success in the competition were considerable. The
Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, for example, concentrated its efforts
on consumer magazines aimed at aviation, automotive, boating,
photography, and skiing enthusiasts. Its titles, each the dominant
entry in its category, included _Flying_, _Car and Driver_, _Boating_,
_Popular Photography_, and _Skiing_, as well as _Cycle_, _Popular
Electronics_, and _Stereo Review_. During the decade of the 1960s, the
circulation of its magazines grew by an annual average of almost ten
percent, while its gross revenues more than doubled and its profits
increased more than fifteen times.<28> (See Appendix A, Tables 8-11.)
Similar gains were realized by other publishers who chose to
apply themselves to the leisure-oriented special-interest magazine
genre: Hearst, Times Mirror, Petersen, the New York Times Company, and
both ABC's and CBS's magazine subsidiaries. In contrast, the
companies that published three of the four most celebrated postwar
general-interest publications, _Look_, the _Saturday Evening Post_,
and _Collier's_, were soon out of the consumer magazine business
altogether.<29>
In an industry as diverse and decentralized as magazine
publishing, however, it would not be accurate to suggest that these
two trends of the 1960s, the precipitous decline of the large
general-interest publication and the sudden rise of the leisure-active
specialized magazine, were historical absolutes. Though often
considered in a class by itself, _Reader's Digest_ was certainly a
mass-audience publication, and during the 1960s its U.S. circulation
grew from 13 million to almost 18 million.<30> Similarly, during this
period a number of other specialized magazine genres unrelated to
recreational pursuits--the newsweeklies, the city/regional magazines,
business and financial publications, and women's magazines covering
home and fashion, to name a few--also thrived. Nevertheless, the
proliferation and sustained success of what had previously been
called, somewhat derisively, the "hobby books" were two of the
significant markers of the era.<31>
It is also worth noting that leisure-active publications as a
genre had existed long before the 1960s. One of the magazine
categories with the longest history, outdoor or "sporting" journals,
had blossomed shortly after the Civil War. By the turn of the century
there were more than such fifty magazines, most of which were
gentlemen's journals celebrating "the sporting life" and devoted to
hunting, fishing, horse racing, and other outdoor activities.<32>
Some wielded significant social and political influence in their
day. _Forest and Stream_, for example, established in 1873, was the
force behind the founding of the Audubon Society, while _Appalachia_,
established three years later, was instrumental in the passage of the
Congressional act that created the national forests. During the 1930s,
however, many of these journals declined, the result of the Great
Depression's hardships and changing social tastes, and only three
major titles, _Field & Stream_, _Outdoor Life_, and _Sports Afield_,
were in a position to benefit in the larger postwar boom in
recreation-centered special-interest magazines.<33>
A Marketing Revolution
One can argue that two requirements were (and to this day
continue to be) essential for long-term success in magazine
publishing: first, specific information in a specific form that could
be expected to appeal to a definable segment of readers, and second, a
group of manufacturers or distributors with the means and willingness
to advertise their products and services to those readers. One of the
most important aspects is the preceived level of reader commitment to
a magazine's subject. "The key is that the special-interest
publications demand high reader involvement--subscribers are
participants in the subject being written about," wrote the media
scholar Benjamin Compaine. "Thus the special-interest magazine is
selling a readership of unquestionable homogeneity... while providing
a waiting audience with sought-after information that often results in
intense cover-to-cover reading of editorial and advertising content
alike."<34>
"Some companies like Ziff-Davis were very successful in
developing specialized magazines," said James Manousos. "It was good
business because, with 'generic' advertisers so well defined, one
could get in for less. And with so little 'wasted' circ, you could
charge your advertisers more." Because they dealt with a single
product or activity that was fundamental not only to the editorial
material but also to the bulk of advertising, specialized magazines
could deliver a specific, highly defined audience to their
advertisers.<35>
Most successful special-interest magazines relied on a fairly
simple editorial formula that supported both these requirements. The
basic tenets concerning editorial content included: an unremitting
focus on nonfiction rather than fiction; product rather than "people"
articles; a participatory, hands-on-tutorial rather than vicarious
approach to all subjects; and a high degree of technical complexity.
More important perhaps than simply serving the informational needs of
some readers, all of this was designed to attract the specific kinds
of deeply committed readers, "heavy users" in the parlance of
publishing, whom potential advertisers would find attractive.<36>
"People had long read what were once called 'fan' publications,
but in the 1960s it became clear that people who read our
special-interest magazines wanted to buy things," recalled one
magazine executive. "We were always amazed by our purchasing studies.
Our readers accounted for seventy percent of all high-quality,
high-priced products sold, roughly $1000 a year. So for advertisers,
the people they wanted to reach with their ads selected themselves by
reading our magazines."<37>
An interesting aspect of this equation was the practice of subtly
discouraging less-committed readers unattractive to advertisers. "We
scared away the readers we didn't want by intimidating them," said
William Ziff, chairman of Ziff-Davis Publishing. "They either weren't
competent to read it technically, or they weren't competent to read it
in terms of ideational or vocabulary complexity." As an added benefit,
this exclusionary approach lowered the companies' circulation
promotion costs. "Our attitude was that we didn't want everyone to
subscribe. So we saved our money, and instead simply said: 'Here it
is. If you don't already know about it, you're not going to subscribe
anyway.'"<38>
Fortuitously, the ability of special-interest magazines to
deliver finely targeted, high-consuming audiences to advertisers
coincided with two major transformations in consumer marketing. First,
many postwar brands of consumer goods had become well established by
1960. As a result, the goal of much national advertising began to
shift from image creation and brand recognition to more closely fought
contests of market share. One implication of this was that advertising
had to appeal to more knowledgeable customers than in the immediate
postwar years. To accomplish this, many ads began to provide more
information, rather than simply selling "image."
At the same time, advances in computer technology, as well as
reductions in its price, led to a second trend: the evolution of
proprietary research in market segmentation by lifestyle, attitudes,
and behavior. "It is important to remember that media planning before
about 1960 was an emotional thing," recalled one media planner. "Ads
in _Life_ were bought and sold over drinks at the Stork Club in those
days. People at the advertising agencies would decide what they wanted
to do, and then simply build a rationale for it."<39>
At first, the magazines themselves seemed to understand best
targeted marketing; this was, after all, one of the few advantages
they had over television. "The media were most influential in teaching
advertisers how to do things differently," James Manousos recalled.
"They taught the advertising world how to advertise." As a result of
these efforts by the special-interest publishers, specificity of
audiences came to be accepted by the ad agencies, and soon the driving
force was the large national advertising agencies such as J. Walter
Thompson, Young & Rubicam, and Ogilvy & Mather. "Few clients back then
had their own research departments," one analyst remembered, "so the
agencies competed with each other on the basis of the uniqueness of
the research they could offer."<40>
The result was a marketing revolution: from inventing a product
and then finding customers for it to first studying one's customers
and then making what they wanted. Early attempts at targeted marketing
were crude. Gender was the first differentiation, because certain
advertisers decided they primarily wanted to reach women. Soon new
research techniques were developed to study not just the demographics
of audiences, but their psychographics as well. Employing only the
gross demographic categories, one could presume that, for example,
Phyllis Schafly and Gloria Steinem were similar customers. Or that
Grace Slick of Jefferson Airplane and Tricia Nixon Cox, or perhaps
Anita Bryant and Renee Richards, could be reached with the same
advertisement. By using more revealing variables such as education
level, residential zip code, and occupational status, however,
customer characteristics could be far more sharply defined.<41>
Some of the large consumer-goods companies embraced targeted
marketing with a passion. "We developed our own computerized media
planning system in 1961, one of the first in the industry," recalled
Archa Knowlton of General Foods. "It allowed us to match the
demographics of magazines and TV shows by age, income, marital status,
and geography with the target audience for specific products." The
General Foods software also assigned a 'persuasion value' to each
specific medium for each product; for example, a Jello ad would be
more effective in a culinary magazine than in a men's magazine.
"Remember, this was the early 1960s. It took our computer fifty hours
of processing to produce the printout. It was the damndest thing you
ever saw."<42>
The rise of narrowly focused marketing clearly favored the
position of special-interest magazines in the 1960s as advertising
vehicles. Of particular importance was their appeal to upscale males,
a market segment that national advertisers had traditionally found
difficult to reach. As a result, the magazines were able to raise
dramatically their advertising rates, in some cases more than tripling
them during the course of the decade.<43> (See Appendix A, Tables
8-11.)
The price of advertising is usually expressed in terms of "cost
per thousand" (cpm) readers or viewers. For magazines, the cost is
that of a black-and-white advertisement, one full page in size; for
television, a thirty-second commercial. At the beginning of the 1960s,
the cpm's of the special-interest magazines, though three times larger
than network TV's, were still below those of newsmagazines such as
_Time_ and _Newsweek_. By the end of the decade, their cpm advertising
rates were twice those of the newsweeklies, and eight times the size
of television's.<44> "If one understands the difference between
incremental and average costs of production," one special-interest
magazine official remarked with remembered satisfaction, "one can
perhaps appreciate what that did for our profitability."<45>
By the end of the 1960s, the transformation of the consumer
magazine industry was virtually complete. Victims of television's
ascendancy and their own mismanagement, many mass-audience magazines
had failed. In their place, a wide variety of specialized magazines
were flourishing. The evolution of both targeted marketing techniques
by major advertisers and of publishing technology contributed to their
development, and many magazine publishers eagerly established new and
expanded existing special-interest titles, particularly those
concerned with active leisure activities.
In a broader sense, however, the success of the special-interest
magazines in the 1960s may also have been due to concurrent
sociocultural change. Many Americans, it seemed, wanted to pursue new
means of self-expression, to devote themselves to new, more
individualistic interests, perhaps to reinvent themselves. This was
the need that many of the specialized magazines served, and it was
this yearning that in large part determined the future character of
the American consumer magazine industry.
APPENDIX A: TABLES
Table 1: U.S. Consumer Magazine Subscription and
Single-Copy Circulation, 1955-1970
Subscription Single-Copy
Circulation Circulation
Year (percent) (percent)
1955 60.5% 39.5%
1960 67.3 32.7
1965 69.1 30.9
1970 71.0 29.0
Relative percentage increase (decrease):
1955-1960 11.2% (17.2%)
1960-1965 2.7 (5.5)
1965-1970 2.7 (6.1)
Source: Benjamin M. Compaine, _The Business of Consu-
mer Magazines_ (White Plains, NY: Knowledge Industry
Publications, 1982), 24.
Discussion 1: Despite the importance placed by some
publishers on single-copy sales as an indicator of
editorial "vitality," it is clear that the general trend
of the period favored the growth of subscription
circulation. The rise of the suburbs and a decrease in
the number of urban newsstands certainly played a role in
this shift in magazine circulation patterns.
Table 2: U.S. Consumer Magazine Circulation,
1960-1970
Number of Aggregate Average
ABC-Audited Circulation Circulation
Year Magazines Per Issue Per Issue
(millions) (thousands)
1960 545 245.0 450
1965 768 291.9 380
1970 1009 307.0 304
Percentage increase (decrease):
1960-1965 40.7% 19.1% (15.6%)
1965-1970 31.4 5.2 (20.0)
Source: Benjamin M. Compaine, _The Business of Consu-
mer Magazines_ (White Plains, NY: Knowledge Industry
Publications, 1982), 9.
Discussion 2: The 1960s were a time of magazine
proliferation. Although both the number of Audit Bureau
of Circulation-audited consumer magazines and their
aggregate circulations increased, the average circulation
size of magazines fell from 450,000 readers per issue to
304,000, a decrease over the decade of more than thirty
percent. More magazines were being published, but they
were aimed at smaller audiences.
Table 3: U.S. Periodical Publishing, 1950-1970
Personal
Number of Expenditures
Year Periodicals on Periodicals
(billions)
1950 6960 1.49
1960 8422 2.19
1970 9573 3.90
Percentage increase:
1950-1960 21.0% 47.0%
1960-1970 13.7 78.1
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, _Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times to 1970_ (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1975); U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, _Statistical Abstract of
the United States_ (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1950-1980).
Table 4: Comparison of GNP to Value of
Periodical Industry Shipments, 1960-1975
U.S. Industry Industry
Year GNP Value Portion of GNP
(billions) (billions) (percent)
1960 $ 506.0 $ 2.1 0.0041%
1965 688.1 2.6 0.0038
1970 982.4 3.2 0.0033
1975 1528.8 4.4 0.0029
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, _U.S. Industrial Outlook_ (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, 1971,
1976).
Table 5: U.S. Periodical Publishing Industry,
1958-1977
Value Share
Number of Industry of 8 Largest
Year Companies Value Companies
(billions) (percent)
1958 2246 $ 1.7 41%
1967 2430 3.1 37
1977 2860 6.1 35
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, _Census of Manufacturers_ (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).
Discussion 3-5: Between 1950 and 1970, the U.S.
periodical industry as a whole prospered. The total
number of periodicals increased by more than a third,
while personal expenditures for periodicals more than
doubled (Table 3). But despite the periodical industry's
growth during the 1960s and early 1970s, its relative
share of the GNP declined (Table 4). And as the number of
publishing companies and their revenues increased,
industry concentration decreased slightly (Table 5).
Table 6: Magazine Readership by Age, 1957-1976
1957 1966 1976
Age Survey Survey Survey
(percent)a (percent) (percent)
20-29 29% 24% 30%
30-39 25 21 28
40-49 25 22 24
50-59 25 27 26
60+ 27 27 27
Overall 27 25 28
a Percentage of respondents to national surveys
indicating that they read a magazine "yesterday."
Source: John P. Robinson, "The Changing Reading
Habits of the American Public," _Journal of Communi-
cation_ 30.1 (Winter 1980): 147.
Discussion 6: It is apparent that the advent of
television had no lasting effect on the appeal of
magazines. Despite a small decline in overall magazine
readership in the 1960s, by the mid-1970s it had sur-
passed the level it had attained prior to the dominance
of TV. Perhaps largely due to a proliferation of
special-interest titles, magazines also regained the
loyalty of younger readers.
Table 7: Comparison of Leisure Activities
and Magazine Readership
Total Read Read Books
Activity Sample Magazines & Magazines
(percent) (percent) (percent)
Gardening 41% 38% 43%
Outdoors activit. 35 32 38
(e.g. camping)
Individual sports 33 24 42
(e.g. golf)
Physical fitness 33 24 39
(e.g bicycling)
Source: George F. McEvoy and Cynthia S. Vincent,
"Who Reads and Why?" _Journal of Communication_ 30.1
(Winter 1980): 138.
Discussion 7: The fear on the part of some industry
observers that an increased interest in recreation might
lower Americans' appetite for reading proved unfounded.
Indeed, for magazine publishers, there was a reassuringly
high correlation between the pursuit of leisure
activities and magazine readership.
Table 8: _Boating_ Magazine, Economic Data, 1963-1970
1963 1966 1970
Total Advertising Pages 720 680 963
Page Rate, 1xB&W ($) $1695 1780 2010
Circulation (000s) 188 193 204
Operating Statements ($000):
Advertising Income 1051 1084 1643
Circulation Income 347 393 573
Subscription Income 198 227 359
Single-copy Income 149 166 214
Other Income 0 0 20
Total Income 1398 1484 2236
Operating Profit 152 126 435
Source: William Phillips, interview by author, 15
March 1991, New York.
Table 9: _Car and Driver_ Economic Data, 1963-1970
1963 1966 1970
Total Advertising Pages 398 477 533
Page Rate, 1xB&W ($) $1585 3150 6215
Circulation (000s) 228 303 577
Operating Statements ($000):
Advertising Income 817 1295 1947
Circulation Income 665 967 1238
Subscription Income 379 546 885
Single-copy Income 286 421 353
Other Income 0 61 38
Total Income 1482 2323 3223
Operating Profit 325 677 835
Source: William Phillips, interview by author, 15
March 1991, New York.
Table 10: _Flying_ Economic Data, 1963-1970
1963 1966 1970
Total Advertising Pages 570 780 705
Page Rate, 1xB&W ($) $1755 2299 3655
Circulation (000s) 220 257 347
Operating Statements ($000):
Advertising Income 1051 1084 1643
Circulation Income 347 393 573
Subscription Income 198 227 359
Single-copy Income 149 166 214
Other Income 0 0 20
Total Income 1398 1484 2236
Operating Profit 152 126 435
Source: William Phillips, interview by author, 15
March 1991, New York.
Table 11: _Popular Photography_ Economic Data, 1963-1970
1963 1966 1970
Total Advertising Pages 907 1103 1200
Page Rate, 1xB&W ($) $3853 4315 6797
Circulation (000s) 397 417 535
Operating Statements ($000):
Advertising Income 1888 2456 3647
Circulation Income 925 1040 1276
Subscription Income 473 554 637
Single-copy Income 452 486 639
Other Income 0 7 75
Total Income 2813 3503 4998
Operating Profit 496 843 1506
Source: William Phillips, interview by author, 15
March 1991, New York.
Discussion 8-11: A review of historical economic data
from four representative special-interest magazines
suggests the bases of their financial success during the
1960s. _Boating_ (Table 8), _Car and Driver_ (Table 9),
_Flying_, (Table 10), and _Popular Photography_ (Table
11) all enjoyed increases in total advertising pages
sold, the rates charged for advertising, and total
circulation. As a result, revenues from both advertising
and circulation increased, yielding significant profit
growth.
As noted in the text, the attractiveness to
potential advertisers of the audiences of the special-
interest magazines allowed the magazines to effect
substantial annual increases in their advertising rates.
Due to this evident "elasticity" in advertising rates,
advertising revenues typically represented a larger share
of total income than circulation revenues.
NOTES
1. Alexis de Tocqueville, _Democracy in America_ , ed.
Richard D. Heffner (New York: New American Library,
1956), 169.
2. P. Robert Farley, interview by author, 3 December
1991, New York. For an examination of the business
prospects of many of the large mass-market magazines,
see also Antoon J. van Zuilen, _The Life Cycle of
Magazines: A Historical Study of the Decline and Fall of
the General Interest Mass Audience Magazine in the
United States During the Period 1946-1972_ (Uithoorn, The
Netherlands: Graduate Press, 1977); and Peter Bart,
"Giants On Uneasy Footing," _Columbia Journalism Review_ 1
(Spring 1962): 32-33.
3. J. Michael Hadley, interview by author, 23
December 1991, New York; Archa Knowlton, interview by
author, 18 December 1991, New York. See also Jacob Jacoby
and Wayne D. Hoyer, _The Comprehension and Miscomprehen-
sion of Print Communication: An Investigation of Mass
Media Magazines_ (New York: Advertising Education
Foundation, 1987) and C.D. Urban, "Correlates of Magazine
Readership," _Journal of Advertising Research_ 20.4
(August 1980): 73-84.
4. Gilbert C. Maurer, interview by author, 23 December
1991, New York.
5. Knowlton interview.
6. Donald D. Kummerfeld, interview by author, 23
December 1991, New York. See also Leo Bogart, "Magazines
Since the Rise of Television," _Journalism Quarterly_ 33
(Spring 1956): 153-166.
7. Maurer interview.
8. See R. Krishnan and L.C. Soley, "Controlling Magazine
Circulation," _Journal of Advertising Research_ 27.4
(August/September 1987): 17-23.
9. Maurer interview.
10. James Manousos, interview by author, 30 December
1991, Gales Ferry, CT.
11. Kummerfeld interview. See also S.C. McDonald,
"Procedure for the Use of Syndicated Audience Research to
Develop Synthetic Cohorts for Historical Media Analysis,"
_Journal of the Market Research Society_ 28.2 (April 1988):
175-188.
12. Hadley interview. See also J. Jacobson,
"Research Activity of Magazine Publishing," _Journalism
Quarterly_ 65.2 (Summer 1988) 511-514; and T.C. Kinnear,
D.A. Horne, and T.A. Zingery, "Valid Magazine Audience
Measurement: Issues and Perspective," in J.H. Leigh, C.R.
Martin, eds., _Current issues and Research in Advertising
1986_ (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Graduate School
of Business, 1986), 261-270.
13. Van Zuilen, _Life Cycle of Magazines_, 167. See also
T. Puliyel, "High Readers-Per-Copy: An Attempt at
Validation," _Journal of the Market Research Society_
28.2 (April 1986): 115-124.
14. Maurer interview; and "Look Is Bigger Than Life,"
(advert.) _New York Times_ (31 May 1969): 32. See also
Stephen Holder, "The Death of the _Saturday Evening Post_,
1960-1970: A Popular Culture Phenomenon," in Russell B.
Nye, ed., _New Dimensions in Popular Culture_ (Bowling
Green, OH: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1972),
78-89; and Michael Mooney, "The Death of the _Saturday
Evening Post_," _The Atlantic Monthly_ (November 1969):
73-75.
15. Manousos interview; Van Zuilen, _Life Cylce of
Magazines_, 169. See also J.R. Rossiter, "The Increase in
Magazine Ad Readership," _Journal of Advertising Research_
28.5 (October/November 1988): 35-39.
16. Knowlton interview. See also W.M. Towers, "Uses and
Gratifications of Magazine Readers: A Cross-Media
Comparison," _Mass Comm Review_ 13.1 (1986): 44-51; and
Alan D. Fletcher and Paul D. Winn, "An Intermagazine
Analysis of Factors in Advertising Readership,"
_Journalism Quarterly_ 51.3 (Autumn 1974): 425-430.
17. Knowlton interview. See also Paul H. Chook, "A
Continuity Study of Magazine Environment, Frequency, and
Advertising Performance," _Journal of Advertising Research_
25.4 (August/September 1985): 23-33.
18. Farley interview. See also Daniel Yankelovich, _New
Rules: Searching for Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside
Down_ (New York: Random House, 1981). Founded in
1924, _Liberty_, "A Weekly for Everybody," had more than
2.5 million subscribers shortly after World War II. One
of its standard features was an assumed reading time
(e.g. "5 Minutes 5 Seconds") posted at the beginning of
each article. The magazine ceased publication in the
early 1950s; see John W. Tebbel and Mary Ellen
Zuckerman, _The Magazine in America, 1741-1990_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), 193.
19. Theodore Greene, _America's Heroes: The Changing
Models of Success in American Magazines_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), 61; Kummerfeld
interview.
20. Maurer interview. See also Stanley Rothman, "The
Mass Media in Post-Industrial Society," in Seymour
Martin Lipset, ed., _The Third Century: America as a
Post-Industrial Society_ (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford University, 1979), 345-388.
21. See Association of National Advertisers, _Magazine
Circulation and Rate Trends: 1940-1974_ (New York: Assoc-
iation of National Advertisers, 1976). See also Benjamin
M. Compaine, _Consumer Magazines at the Crossroads: A
Study of General and Special Interest Magazines_ (White
Plains, NY: Knowledge Industry Publications, 1974); and
W.A. Katz, "Ten Years of Living with Magazines," _Serials
Librarian_ 10.1 (Fall 1985): 281-287.
22. Manousos interview. See also Dorothy S. Schmidt,
"Magazines, Technology, and American Culture," _Journal of
American Culture_ 3 (Spring 1980): 3-16.
23. Jean-Louis Servan-Schreiber, _The Power to Inform_ (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 36-38. It is also important to
note that, in addition to consumer magazines, trade
periodicals serving professional and business markets
also prospered during this time. See K.L Endres,
"Ownership and Employment in Specialized Business
Press," _Journalism Quarterly_ 65.4 (Winter 1988):
996-998; and Howard Cohn, "Differences Narrow Between
Consumer and Trade Magazines," _Advertising Age_ (18
November 1974): 99-100. For a solid history of the trade
press, see David P. Forsyth, _The Business Press in
America, 1750-1865_ (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964).
24. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
_Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial
Times to _1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1975), 810; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census, _Statistical Abstract of the United States_
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980),
204. See also S. Board, "Moving the World With Magazines:
A Survey of Evangelical Magazines," in Q.J. Schultze, ed.,
_American Evangelicals and the Mass Media_ (Grand Rapids:
Academic Books/Zondervan, 1990), 119-142; Amil Menon,
Alan J. Bush, and Denise T. Smart, "Media Habits of the
Do-It-Yourselfers," _Journal of Advertising Research_, 27.5
(October/November 1987): 14-20. See also J.P. Hayes,
"City/Regional Magazines: A Survey, Census," _Journalism
Quarterly_ 58.2 (Summer 1981): 294-296; Alan D. Fletcher,
"City Magazines Find a Niche in the Media Marketplace,"
_Journalism Quarterly_ 54.4 (1977): 740-743; S.G. Riley
and G. Slenon, "Southern Magazine Publishing, 1764-1984,"
_Journalism Quarterly_ 65.4 (Winter 1988): 898-901; and
D.A. Brenders and John P. Robinson, "An Analysis of
Self-Help Articles: 1972-1980," _Mass Comm Review_ 11.3
(Fall 1985): 29-36.
25. Robert H. Boyle, _Sport: Mirror of American Life_
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 45; U.S. Bureau of the
Census, _Historical Statistics_, 316-318, 808.
26. See John P. Robinson, "The Changing Reading Habits of
the American Public," _Journal of Communication_ 30.1
(Winter 1980): 141-152; and George F. McEvoy and Cynthia
S. Vincent, "Who Reads and Why?" _Journal of Communication_
30.1 (Winter 1980): 134-140. See also Roger H. Smith, ed.,
_The American Reading Public: What It Reads, Why It Reads_
(New York: R.R. Bowker, 1963).
27. Hadley interview. See also Benjamin M. Compaine, _The
Business of Consumer Magazines_ (White Plains, NY:
Knowledge Industry Publications, 1982).
28. William Phillips, interview by author, 15 March
1991, New York. Note: Permission from the Ziff-Davis
Publishing Company, a closely held private firm, to
review company financial operating statements from this
historical period is gratefully acknowledged.
29. See Dennis Holder, "The Decade of Specialization,"
_Washington Journalism Review_ 3 (November 1981): 28-32;
and Edward W. Barrett, "Sex, Death and Other Trends in
Magazines," _Columbia Journalism Review_ 13 (July-August
1974): 24-26.
30. For interesting insights into the editorial formula
for the _Reader's Digest_ success, see R.F. Smith, and L.
Decker-Amos, "Of Lasting Interest? A Study of Change in
the Content of the _Reader's Digest_," _Journalism Quarterly_
62.1 (Spring 1985): 127-131.
31. See Association of National Advertisers, _Magazine
Circulation_, 22-33, 68-193.
32. Frank Luther Mott, _A History of American Magazines_
(vol. 3; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938),
210-211.
33. For an excellent review of the social impact of early
American outdoors magazines, see Mark Neuzil, "Sporting
Journals, Power Groups and Culture in 19th Century
America: The Case of _Forest and Stream_ and Hunting
Ethics" (paper presented at the Spring Meeting,
Association of Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication, April 1991). See also Donald Klinko,
"Antebellum American Sporting Magazines and the
Development of a Sportsman's Ethic" (Ph.D. diss.,
Washington State University, 1986).
34. Benjamin M. Compaine, "The Magazine Industry:
Developing the Special-Interest Audience," _Journal of
Communication_ 30.2 (Spring 1980): 103.
35. Manousos interview. See also V. Appel,
"Editorial Environment and Advertising: Effectiveness,"
_Journal of Advertising Research_ 27.4 (August/September
1987): 11-16; and H.M. Cannon, "Reach and Frequency
Estimates for Specialized Target Markets," _Journal of
Advertising Research_ 23.3 (June/July 1983): 45-50.
36. Geri Brin, "How Special Interest Publications
Capture Specialized Audiences," _Magazine Age_ (September
1980): 64-69.
37. Furman Hebb, interview by author, 1 February 1991,
New York.
38. William Ziff, interview by author, 8 February 1991,
Manalapan, FL, 5 March 1991 and 12 March 1991, New York.
From a management perspective, the issue of "ideational
and vocabulary complexity" was an engaging one. "We
always told our editors," Ziff recalled, "to write up to
their audiences, which is to say that it was okay to be
difficult to read if it wasn't obscurantism, that they
were talking in a sophisticated way to knowledgeable
people, that they didn't have to reduce things. But that
always 'product' was the key. Product! Tutorial! Close
analysis! The colorful writing was fun, part of the
panache, but it was only window-dressing."
39. Knowlton interview.
40. Manousos interview; Paul Chook, interview by author,
21 December 1990, New York.
41. John O'Toole, interview by author, 7 January
1992, New York. See John E. O'Toole, _The Trouble with
Advertising: A View from the Inside_ (2nd ed.; New York:
Times Books, 1985), 81-83.
42. Knowlton interview.
43. See H.M. Cannon and D.L. Williams, "Toward A
Hierarchical Taxonomy of Magazine Readership," _Journal
of Advertising_ 17.2 (1988): 15-25. See also David G.
Pugh, "History as an Expedient Accommodation: The
Manliness Ethos in Modern America," _Journal of American
Culture_ 3 (Spring 1980): 53-68; and G.V. Skelly and W.J.
Lundstrom, "Male Sex Roles in Magazine Advertising,
1959-1979," _Journal of Communication_ 31.4 (Fall 1981):
47-52.
44. For comparison, network television's current (1992)
cpm is below five dollars, a figure which, not coinci-
dentally, is also the cpm of _TV Guide_. Women's "service"
magazines such _Better Homes & Garden_ and _Ladies Home
Journal_ have cpm's below fifteen dollars, while the
newsweeklies such as _Time_ and _Newsweek_ cluster around
twenty dollars. Most special-interest magazines now have
cpm's over forty dollars. Stanley R. Greenfield,
interview by author, 19 December 1990, New York.
45. Hebb interview.
Presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communi-
cation (History Division) Annual Convention, Kansas City, MO, 14 Aug 1993
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