This paper was presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and
Mass Communication in San Antonio, Texas August 2005.
If you have questions about this paper, please contact the author
directly. If you have questions about the archives, email
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Thank you.
Elliott Parker
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Three Tales of a Tragedy:
Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
David W. London
Central Michigan University
Department of Journalism
415 Moore
Mt. Pleasant, MI 48858
Email: [log in to unmask]
Phone: 989-779-0227
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
INTRODUCTION
On 29 August 1782, the Royal George sank within sight of Portsmouth.1
Reports vary, but as
many as 1,200 men, women and children were lost. The tragedy occurred
at a time when the
war in the colonies2 was going badly for Britain and when French and
Spanish forces had
combined to lay siege to Gibraltar. The news of the sinking captured
the emotions and the
imagination of the British public and dominated public discussion for
months. In addition to
the human loss, the strategic consequences were serious, and the
potential for political
damage was enormous. Beyond the environs of Portsmouth, public
perceptions of the
tragedy were framed at first by newspaper coverage and later by a
poem that found its way
into Britain's patriotic literature and popular mythology.
As in all stories, there is not one version of the sinking, but
several. In this case, there are
three tales of the tragedy: the public version, the officers' version
and the seamen's version.
This paper examines all three and considers how contemporary
newspapers paradoxically
both revealed and concealed the truth. It demonstrates how a
selective presentation of the
facts can become an incredibly effective piece of propaganda.
This paper avails a review of (1) the propaganda literature to posit
questions related to
propaganda and its manifestations in the coverage of this disaster
and (2) the historical
record – court martial transcripts, official documents, private
letters, survivors' narratives,
William Cowper's poem On the Loss of the Royal George, and
contemporary newspapers to
chronicle the various accounts of the disaster.
1
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
LITERATURE REVIEW
Harold Lasswell defined propaganda as an act of intention, involving
an effort to influence
collective attitudes by manipulating words and symbols (i.e. songs,
parades, pictures, poems,
etc.).3 He acknowledged public opinion's vital role in support of
democracy and assigned
propaganda the task of shaping it.
Walter Lippmann stressed the importance of fictions and symbols in
the machinery of
human communication. He described how the pictures formed inside our
heads formed the
basis of public opinion and argued that "public opinions must be
organized for the press if
they are to be sound."4 He believed the public should be provided
with a selective
presentation of the facts and led to form the desired conclusions,
rather than being
presented with all of the facts and allowed to form its own conclusions.
Edward Bernays, of public relations fame, advocated a "leadership
democracy" where an
intelligent minority would regiment and guide the habits and opinions
of the masses. He
described propaganda as an "unseen mechanism of society" and propagandists as
constituting "an invisible government which is the true ruling power
of our country."5
Jacques Ellul saw propaganda more as a sociological phenomenon than
an act of intention.
He spotted a flaw in democratic theory that gave rise to the
propaganda: "Democracy is
based on the concept that man is rational and capable of seeing
clearly what is in his own
interest, but the study of public opinion suggests this is a highly
doubtful proposition."6
Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson argued that by guaranteeing
freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, our Constitution ensured that persuasion would
be at the heart of our
political process.7 In theory, the media keeps and eye on those in
power and keeps the public
2
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
informed. In practice, however, rather than informing the public,
they have become the
principal means for those in power to influence public opinion. The
goal is no longer to
enlighten, but to move the masses toward a desired point of view.8 In
1807, the great English
media observer, William Cobbett, made the distinction between
democratic theory and
practice clear:
The English Press, instead of enlightening, does, as far as it has
any power, keep the people in ignorance.
Instead of cherishing notions of liberty, it tends to the making of
the people slaves; instead of being their
guardian, it is the most efficient instrument in the hands of all
those who would oppress or wish to
oppress them.9
Fifty years later, the great American media observed, Henry Adams,
observed: "The Press is
the hired agent of a monied [sic] system, set up for no other reason
than to tell lies where the
interests are concerned."10 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky argue that
it serves "to
amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the
values, beliefs, and codes
of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional
structures of the larger society."11
Propaganda is the means to an end. It short-circuits the rational
process by replacing
thoughts with feelings. It does not enlighten or elevate man, but
makes him serve. It
operates at an unconscious level – agitating emotions, exploiting
insecurities, capitalizing on
the ambiguity of language and bending the rules of logic."12
Propaganda controls public
sympathies, not through fabrication, but with a selective
presentation of the truth. It moves
its audience "to a predetermined point of view by using simple images
and slogans that
truncate thought by playing on prejudices and emotion."13 It
communicates a point of view
with the goal of having the audience accept it as its own.14 The
situation is aggravated by
information overload. The volume of information and the need to
process it quickly make
mental shortcuts mandatory.
3
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
The information overload also makes it impractical, if not
impossible, for researchers to
identify a source or even an instance of such manipulation.
Readership surveys and content
analysis allow us to demonstrate that some news stories receive more
attention than others,
but they are at best a crude measure. Simply by measuring the number
of column inches
devoted to stories sympathetic versus those opposed to government
policy, Herman and
Chomsky amassed a convincing case for media manipulation.15 They
offered compelling
examples, but failed to provide any proof.
The struggle to define propaganda centers on the questions of cause
and effect. Lasswell's
argument that intent must be proved results in a restrictive
definition where, absent access to
the propagandists' deliberations, very little can be proved. Whereas,
Ellul's preoccupation
with social phenomena and the psychological process suggests that
almost anything that
impacts public opinion should be considered propaganda. While most scholars who
comment on the subject feel compelled to offer their own definitions
of propaganda,
Leonard W. Doob argued that "a clear-cut definition is neither
possible nor desirable."16
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study examines how the media is used to manipulate public
opinion. It juxtaposes the
story of a national disaster with the literature of propaganda. The
complexity of the media
today - the volume of news, the variety of news sources and the
velocity at which news
travels - makes it impossible to trace a story from its sources to
its appearance in the media
and reappearance as propaganda. This paper seeks to solve this
dilemma by examining a
major news story occurring over 200 years ago – the sinking of the
Royal George. It was a
simpler time, a time when the mass media were limited to newspapers;
when newspapers
were limited to four pages; when news sources were limited to a
handful of eyewitnesses and
4
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
government officials, and when the pace of the news was limited to
the speed of a horse.
Questions framed from the propaganda literature include:
(1) Was the public provided a selective presentation of the facts and
led to form a conclusion?
(2) Who were the propagandists? Who benefited from the news? Who
demonstrated intent?
(3) Did newspapers in the late 18th century keep an eye on those in
power and keep the public informed?
(4) Was propaganda in this case deliberate or accidental – i.e.
merely a sociological phenomenon? If it
was accidental, was it propaganda? What point of view was
communicated? What was the intent of the
propagandists?
(5) What can we deduce about propaganda in general from the
narratives of this tragedy?
METHODOLOGY
This paper constructs a narrative of the sinking by drawing on
primary records located in the
Public Record Office, the British Library, the National Maritime
Museum, the Royal Naval
Museum and the Hampshire Record Office. These records demonstrate the various
omissions and commissions and point to the choice of sources and of
facts in the telling of
the tragedy. The primary documents examined include the following contemporary
newspapers that were published in London but distributed nationally:
the London Chronicle,
the Morning Herald, the Morning Chronicle and the Morning Post. It
also includes the Hampshire
Chronicle, which was published in Winchester and distributed
throughout Hampshire. As the
local paper, the Hampshire Chronicle relied heavily on sources in
Portsmouth. In addition to
these sources, the narrative draws upon a treatise on seamanship and
navigation written by
William Nichelson (the Master Attendant at Portsmouth dockyard) who
commented on the
sinking in the appendix, a survivor's account published in Penny
Magazine in 1834, the
transcript of the court martial of Captain Waghorn, various other
published and unpublished
accounts of other survivors and witnesses, and the poetry of William Cowper.
5
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
NARRATIVE
While the truth about the sinking of the Royal George was buried in
the archives, the myth was
celebrated in English literature. William Cowper, a frail, neurotic
and deeply religious poet,17
provided the public version of the tragedy:
TOLL for the Brave –
The brave! that are no more:
All sunk beneath the wave,
Fast by their native shore.
Eight hundred of the brave,
Whose courage well was tried,
Had made the vessel heel
And laid her on her side;
A land-breeze shook the shrouds,
And she was overset;
Down went the Royal George,
With all her crew complete.
Toll for the Brave –
Brave Kempenfeldt is gone,
His last sea-fight is fought,
His work of glory done.
It was not in the battle,
No tempest gave the shock,
She sprang no fatal leak,
She ran upon no rock;
His sword was in its sheath,
His fingers held the pen,
When Kempenfeldt went down
With twice four hundred men.
Weigh the vessel up,
Once dreaded by our foes,
And mingle with our cup
The tear that England owes;
Her timbers yet are sound
And she may float again,
Full charg'd with England's thunder,
And plough the distant main;
But Kempenfeldt is gone,
His victories are o'er;
And he and his Eight Hundred
Must plough the wave no more.18
6
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
First word of the tragedy came from Admiral Lord Richard Howe – whose
flagship, the
Victory, was moored less than a hundred yards from the Royal George
at the anchorage of
Spithead within sight of both Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight.
Within the hour, Howe
informed the Admiralty: "It is with inexpressible concern that I have
reason to inform you
of the loss of the Royal George, which being upon the heel this
morning, suddenly overset,
filled & sank. The captain much injured and some of the people (I
fear not many) have been
saved."19 It was a measured response to a catastrophe. No doubt, his
grief was inexpressible
as well, but professional decorum dictated restraint. As a practical
matter, Howe was faced
with the sudden and inconvenient loss of a 104-gun ship-of-the-line,
her crew of prime
seamen, and his most useful subordinate, Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfeldt.
The tragedy occurred while England was having some difficulties
across the Atlantic.20
Howe's fleet of over 300 ships had been ordered to relieve the French
and Spanish siege of
Gibraltar. Howe's statement was remarkable, given his reputation for
being obtuse,21 both in
its brevity and accuracy. While everything he said was true, he said
almost nothing. He
provided the barest description of what happened; without explaining
how it happened, why
it happened or who was at fault. Of course, to speculate on the cause
or affix any blame
before any facts were gathered would have been irresponsible and
dangerous. Howe did
exactly what was expected of him.
Henry Martin, the Resident Commissioner of Portsmouth Dockyard, expressed less
emotion, but not as much restraint, as he denied responsibility for
the tragedy. While he
described the accident as most melancholy, he neglected to mention
that anyone died.
I have to inform you of the most melancholy accident. Royal George
has sunk. The only particulars I
have are as follows. The plumbers were sent off from the Yard by Adm.
Kempenfeldt's desire to put a
pipe through the side for letting water to the cistern in the well,
higher up than the former one. The ship
7
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
was heeled and it is supposed that a sudden squall took her by which
the water came in through the
lower-deck ports.22
Martin emphasized that the repairs were done at Admiral Kempenfeldt's
request, that the
lowerdeck gunports were open and that the new pipe was installed
"higher up than the
former one" – implying the prudence of his plumbers. He suggested
that, rather than
oversetting, a sudden squall caused water to enter through the open
gunports. As the
commissioner was nowhere near the ship at the time of the sinking nor
would have had time
to speak with the survivors before he wrote to the Admiralty, his
observations were based
on assumptions rather than facts. As there would have been no point
in installing the pipe
higher up than the former one, Martin was being slightly
disingenuous, anticipating criticism
and establishing his first line of defense.
While Howe and Martin kept their composure, apparently no one else
did. The Hampshire
Chronicle reported: "The unspeakable distress this fatal catastrophe
has occasioned is
inconceivable."23 It went on to describe the impact of the sinking on
the local community:
"The shore for a length of time exhibited scenes of the most poignant
grief, being lined with
persons lamenting their fathers, their husbands, or their children,
who had perished in this
calamity."24 Other local accounts provided morbid details:
About nine or ten days after the wreck the dead bodies would come up,
eight or ten at a time, rising to
the top of the water so suddenly as to frighten people who were
passing near. The watermen made a good
thing of it; for as the bodies rose, they took from them shoe
buckles, money and watches, and then towed
them on shore, some to Point, some to Common Hard, and a vast number
to the Isle of Wight.25
Such unpleasant details served to focus the community's attention on
the emotional impact
of the tragedy, but they did not appear in the London newspapers.
Instead, it was reported
that the news had "thrown a damp upon the face of every man" and
claimed there never
were "such visible signs of grief exhibited by the public as on the
present occasion."26 In lieu
of details, the London Chronicle provided comfort and reassurance:
8
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
When brave men die in battle, the ardour which accompanies the
misfortune, as it impels them to glory,
so it makes them insensible of their danger, and leaves a brilliancy
behind, which, in a great measure,
mitigates the grief of friends and relatives. But nothing surely can
be more distressing, than for a number
of brave fellows, in a moment of inactivity, anchored on their own
coast, and riding on smooth water, to
be plunged into an abyss, perhaps in the midst of amusements and at
the height of enjoyment.27
Such sentiments both shaped and reflected the public reaction to the
tragedy, a reaction that
served government's purposes and inspired Cowper's classic poem. On
31 August, the
Morning Herald reported:
[The] unfortunate accident happened while the ship was hove upon a
careen,28 in order to have the water
pipe to her cistern repaired, at which juncture a strong squall at
NNW came on, and her keel lying
across the tide current, she fell suddenly on her beam-ends, and
before they could right ship she filled, and
went down, her topmasts only appearing at the water's edge! At the
time of this calamity 848 officers and
seamen were on board, 331 only of which were saved by the boats of the fleet.29
This public version suggests that the tragedy was an accident, an act
of God or a fluke of
nature. The paper provided the poet with enough information to paint
an evocative picture.
Cowper took poetic license in simplifying details and rounding off
numbers. He neglected to
mention those saved. And neither the paper nor the poet mentioned
that sharing the
"amusements" were three hundred women and children.30 Ironically, while England
celebrated her seamen's courage and virtues in plays, poems and
paintings, the seamen were
not allowed to go ashore for fear they would desert. Instead, their
families, wives and
prostitutes flocked on board and were herded below. Virtually all of
the seamen and their
visitors died when the ship sank.31
Cowper's neglect may have been more a matter of ignorance than
design. He probably
assumed that what appeared in the newspaper was accurate. And that
paper presumably
published what information was available to it. In the eighteenth
century, the news came
from official sources32 or correspondence – letters written to the
editors by eyewitnesses or
well-informed observers. Newspaper staffs were limited and reporters,
other than those in
the galleries of Parliament, played a very minor role. It was a
primitive form of journalism –
9
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
where news stories were copied with little or no modification from
other newspapers. Stories
appeared amid an almost random and frequently contradictory
collection of facts, rumors,
gossip, opinions, speculation and advertising.
However, it was significant that the Morning Herald supported the
nascent government of the
Earl of Shelburne.33 The paper reported the facts, but not all of
them. Newspapers of the
period were intensely political. Much of their income came from
political sources – either
directly in the form of subsidies or bribes or indirectly in the form
of advertising or printing
contracts. The year 1782 was particularly troubling for King George
III. The war in America
was going badly and was unpopular at home. Largely as a result of
Whig opposition to the
war and the British defeat at Yorktown, the Tory government of Lord
North34 fell in March
and was replaced by a Whig government under Lord Rockingham.
Rockingham immediately
repealed the Stamp Acts, acknowledged American independence and
initiated an end to
hostilities. Unfortunately, he died in July and a new, more
conciliatory government was
formed under the Earl of Shelburne. The political climate remained
volatile and Shelburne's
hold on power was tenuous. Newspapers supporting him were charged with the
responsibility of restoring public confidence in government.
It involved, not so much an effort to change attitudes, as a
determination to solidify
support.35 A tragedy, particularly one involving massive loss of
life, served that purpose
particularly well. Evoking a panoply of human emotion including
sympathy, sorrow,
frustration, helplessness and grief, news of the sinking brought the
nation together and
shielded government from criticism. However, it could work only if
the victims could be
seen as heroic and the tragedy as unavoidable.
10
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
Rumors were already in circulation suggesting that the tragedy was
less an accident than the
product of neglect or incompetence – that the ship's timbers were not
sound or that her
officers were not fully attentive to their duties. William Trimmer, a
young midshipman
awaiting assignment in Portsmouth, wrote to his mother:
I suppose you have heard of that schocking accident which happened on
thursday last a little before 10 in
the morning of the Royal George overseting which was the ocsition of
the first Lieutenant she being on a
very Deep heel and his paying no regard to the water comeing in at
the Lower ports she overset and sunk
which was shocking … to see dead men and women floting by hammocks
hats Ducks pigs floting on
pieces of spare masts fowls geese hen coops chests Blocks Boats keel
upwards & it is supposed there was
not less than 8 hundred souls lost.36
However, the London newspapers concealed such unpleasantness. In doing so, they
dissembled and obscured the truth. Their editors chose not to print
eyewitness accounts that
mentioned the women or children who were on board or to re-print the
accounts that
appeared in the local newspapers. Thus, Cowper used an incomplete and
inaccurate account
to create a remarkably effective piece of propaganda.37 It is
tempting to accuse government
of deception. However, the Admiralty sought to manage a crisis, not
the news. Until it had
more information, it supplied the press with a minimum of facts and
avoided speculation.
Influencing public opinion was not its concern.
By circumstance rather than design, Cowper's inaccurate version of
the tragedy indelibly
marked the collective memory of a nation. His haunting poem ensured
that the public would
remember that eight hundred of England's brave seamen perished by a
fluke of nature, not
the negligence or incompetence of man. Those memories were not
sullied by the presence of
prostitutes or the suggestion that, given the opportunity, most of
those who served in the
King's navy would desert. Recited by generations of English
schoolchildren and occupying
an honored position in Britain's patriotic literature, On the Loss of
the Royal George actually
concealed an ugly scandal.
11
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
However, the truth could not be contained. Amidst the contradictory
rumors and confused
speculations of early newspaper accounts appeared hints of the
culpability that government
sought to conceal. On 31 August, the Morning Chronicle reported that
the "unfortunate
accident" was due to "an experiment which was trying to let water in
by a brass cock, to
wash the lower-deck."38 It described how the ship was heeled: "Her
guns were all on one
side," and added that "her lower-deck ports open."39 However. Despite
supplying such
details, the report concluded that "from a sudden gust of wind she
shipped a great deal of
water, and in about six minutes sank."40
Significantly, the paper mentioned the nature of the repairs being
attempted. During the
Royal George's refit in 1780, pipes with brass seacocks were
installed three feet below the
waterline on both sides of the ship.41 The pipes allowed water to
flow into a cistern, from
which it could be pumped up to wash the ship's decks. The seacock on
the starboard side
had become clogged and repair had proven impossible. Instead,
dockyard plumbers were
boring a hole through the hull to install a new pipe and seacock.
In its account of the tragedy, the London Chronicle also suggested no
one was to blame but
provided further details that led knowledgeable readers to question
both the ship's condition
and the repair being attempted. Other hints that there might be more
to the story soon
surfaced. The Morning Chronicle described the Royal George as a
"remarkably tight ship."42
Other papers reported that she "made water on her last cruise"43 and
that the "ship was old
and so crazy that it was determined to lay her up the ensuing
winter."44 Such discrepancies
signaled the continuation of a controversy between the Navy Board and
the Board of
Admiralty and the emergence of two other versions of the tragedy. If
the ship's hull or the
timbers were so rotten as to give way, the dockyards and ultimately
the Navy Board were to
12
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
blame.45 If, instead, a dangerous manoeuvre was attempted to make an
unnecessary repair,
the ship's officers and ultimately the Board of the Admiralty46 were to blame.
The dangerous manoeuvre involved heeling an old, top-heavy and fully
laden ship in the
Solent.47 The Master Attendant at Portsmouth, William Nichelson,
later claimed he
categorically refused to sanction the manoeuvre when consulted by
Admiral Kempenfeldt on
28 August.48 He argued that repairs below the waterline should only
be attempted in drydock
or at least in the more protected waters of Portsmouth Harbor and
that, before heeling,
a ship should be secured to a hulk and lightened by unloading all
possible guns and stores.
Nichelson felt the risks involved were unwarranted. He emphasized:
"It was not a work of
necessity, therefore the less to be said for the risk there was to be
run in heeling her without
an absolute necessity."49 Seeking a moral lesson in the tragedy, he
argued that the ship
"might have proceeded on her voyage with great propriety; but some
ill fate hung over her,
which gives me pain to mention, when I see the idle and whimsical
ideas of unthinking men,
though trifling in their nature, produce things of the greatest consequence."50
Nichelson said he used "every argument in my power to dissuade my
much-esteemed friend
from his design in heeling the Royal George," 51 but his advice was
ignored. He described how
the ship's middle and upper deck guns were run out on the larboard
side. The guns on the
starboard side were removed from their breechings and moved amidships
and shot was
rolled over to the larboard side of the ship. The danger, he
indicated, was that the maneuver
provided no quick or easy way to right the ship. In an emergency, the
guns and stores
manhandled to one side would have to be manhandled back – this time
with gravity working
against them. Under normal circumstances, such risks were not taken.
13
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
The circumstances, however, were far from normal. While the English
vainly tried to
suppress the rebellion in the colonies, the French, Dutch and Spanish
did all they could to
add to their difficulties – hence the siege of Gibraltar. The Royal
Navy simply did not have
enough ships to satisfy all the demands. Those ships it had were
generally old, rotten or
both. Regardless, the Navy Board was expected to provide ships. They
patched up what they
could, fitted-out, victualled and sent them on their way – often with
more hope than
confidence that they would reach their destinations.
The Royal George was the oldest ship in Howe's fleet. Her keel was
laid in Woolwich in 1746,
where she remained on the stocks for ten years. In addition to being
unusually large, the
Royal George was by 1782 of an out-dated and awkward design – "short
and high as all the old
first rates are."52 With a mainmast towering 114 feet 3 inches above
the deck, she was topheavy,
but fast. Consequently, she served as a flagship for most of her
career – commanded
in turn by Admirals Anson, Boscawen, Hawke, Rodney, Howe and
Kempenfeldt. She played
a central role in Hawke's celebrated victory over the French at
Quiberon Bay in 1759.53
Copper sheathing was added to her hull in 1780.54 It provided little
more than a false sense
of security. It restored the ship's vaunted speed, but concealed,
rather than cured, her rot.
The ship was repaired at Plymouth Dockyard in March of 1782 – during
which the hull's
planking, but not her timbers were replaced; and the twenty-eight
42-pound brass cannons
of her lower gun deck were replaced with 32-pound iron cannons. While
the change in
armament lightened the ship and decreased the strain on her timbers,
it also raised the centre
of gravity. As a result, the ship became less stable and crank.
Nichelson held that "the
judgment of the seamen should be to keep the centre of gravity as
near the centre of cavity55
as it may be in his power."56 He explained that when "a ship is
upright, the centre of gravity
may be supposed to be nearly in the centre of the ship … it is
supposed to lie not far below
14
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
the line of floatation."57 If a ship is top-heavy, its centre of
gravity is higher than its centre of
buoyancy. The danger was compounded when the Royal George was heeled.
… with all the guns got over on one side of the ship, with the shot
and every thing that is moveable, and
the great weight of masts, yards, rigging, and sails, which is so
high above the hull of the ship, or acting
against her, and pressing her down: … the centre of gravity … is
removed from the centre of the ship,
and is carried entirely on one side of her; the extreme breadth of
the ship, the only thing that should be
her support, is many feet under water; and so much heavy solid weight
being put on one side of the ship,
and her heel is so great, that the centre of gravity acts against her
to overset, or turn her over; and by the
injudicious management of heeling the ship, ship is brought so near
an equilibrium that the smallest
additional weight will turn her over, or, in the seaman's phrase,
will overset her; so nice the equilibrium
may be supposed to be, that a crow alighting on the top-gallant-mast
head may overset the ship.58
On the morning of August 29, the danger was further compounded when
provisions were
received through and stacked alongside the ship's larboard,
lower-deck gunports. While this
escaped the attention of the London newspapers, the local press was
better informed of
both the cause and effects of the sinking:
On Thursday morning between nine and ten o'clock, the Royal George
man of war of 100 guns, on
board of which Admiral Kempenfeldt had hoisted his flag, nearly in
the center of Lord Howe's fleet at
Spithead, most unfortunately and instantaneously went to the bottom.
The melancholy accident was
occasioned by the ship being heeled upon her side, in order to have
the water-pipe of her cistern repaired,
at which instant of time a strong squall of wind at NNW threw her
further upon her side, and the lower
port holes being unluckily open, she filled and went down in less
than three minutes. The alarm and
confusion at an event so unexpected and so horrid, is indescribable.
A victualling sloop, and several
wherries full of people, which had just put off in order to go
ashore, were drawn down by the prodigious
whirlpool and suction occasioned by the sinking of the ship.59
The editors appreciated not only the human tragedy, but the strategic
consequences of the
sinking. They also confirmed the ship's distinguished history and
supplied enough details of
the ship's construction and refitting to anticipate Nichelson's speculations.
Less than a month after the sinking, the court martial of the captain
of the Royal George
offered the following verdict:
It appeared that the ship was not overheeled … the Captain, Officers
and Ship's Company used every
exertion to right the ship as soon as the alarm was given of her
settling; and the Court is of the opinion,
from the short space of time between the alarm being given and the
sinking of the ship, that some
material part of her frame gave way, which can only be accounted for
by the general state of the decay of
15
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
her timbers, as appears upon the minutes. The Captain, Officers and
Ship's Company are acquitted of
all blame.60
This court conceded the obvious – that the tragedy was not merely an
act of God. It
declared three points to be salient: the ship was not overheeled, the
officers did all they
could to save her, and a loud crack was heard just before the ship
sank.61 Their verdict, in
addition to being sympathetic to Captain Waghorn62 was convenient for
the Admiralty. It
allowed them to escape responsibility (and censure) for the tragedy.
Instead, the court
emphasized the ship's "general state of decay" and blamed the Navy Board.
The Morning Post described the court martial as "merely a matter of
etiquette."63 However,
the Admiralty took no chances. Vice Admiral Milbanke, a member of the
court, testified
that, during the Royal George's repairs in Plymouth, he had seen her
opened and "found her
so bad" that he could not remember seeing a "sound timber." He added:
"I asked several of
the Officers of the Yard, what they intended to do with her, and they
said, they should be
able to make her last a summer, and very bad she was indeed, inasmuch
that they could
scarce find fastenings for the repairs she underwent."64 Sir John
Jervis, who also preferred
giving testimony to weighing it, concurred. He quoted Admiral
Barrington as having told the
carpenters during the refit that "he thought it impossible they could
make her fit for
service."65 He added further hearsay with the carpenters' response
that "they were obliged to
patch her up for the summer in the best manner they could after which
she would be laid
up."66 Jervis concluded by attributing a degree of prescience to
Barrington that, no doubt, all
present wish it had acted upon. He said the admiral had observed that
"it would be well if no
accident happened, as her timbers were rotten."67
Confirmation of the ship's condition and the Navy Board's culpability
seemed to come from
the ship's carpenter, Thomas Williams. The Morning Post reported that
he testified: "the ship
16
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
was so rotten, that she started a plank and not a peg would hold her
together."68 The report's
credibility suffered as Williams was not among the survivors. The
testimony attributed to
him probably came from George Aynon, a dockyard shipwright assisting
in the repairs.
When asked: "How was the plank?" Aynon testified: "Sound, but the
timbers were rotten."69
Rather than testifying, Captain Waghorn submitted a carefully worded
statement suggesting
that everything he did was both prudent and had been approved by
Kempenfeldt.70 He
wrote that he was astonished when the ship's carpenter reported that
the ship was settling:
"Settling! What do you mean?" [I] turn'd round to Saunders the 1st
Lieut. And said, 'Beat to
Quarters on the Lower-deck, get the Weather Guns out and the Lee ones
in and hous'd as
soon as possible and send the people aft that are Quarter'd here to
get these Guns over.'"
Waghorn added that few minutes later when:
… the Master came up and told me there was a great deal of Water in
the ship. I ordered to beat to
general Quarters, and told the Master to roll any Cask he might have
upon the Deck over to the
windward. When these things were adjusted for righting ship, I went
down in order to acquaint the
Admiral of it, and at the foot of the Ladder, before I could reach
his Door, the Ship went down almost
in an instant.71
After his statement was read into the minutes, Waghorn stayed behind
to question, prompt
and occasionally badger the remaining witnesses. His officers
corroborated his statement,
thereby escaping their own culpability. They stated that the ship was
not overheeled and that
the captain and they had done everything they could to save her. Of
course, no one admitted
that what was done was done far too late – when the ship was already sinking.
Unfortunately, the only officer in a position to actually see what
was happening on the
lower-deck, Lieutenant McKillop, went down with the ship.72
While this satisfied the court and served the Admiralty's purposes,
some observers noted
inconsistencies in this version of the tragedy. James Anthony
Gardner, a naval officer and a
17
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
witness to the disaster, commented: "God knows who the blame ought to
light on, for
blame there must be somewhere, for never was a ship lost in such a strange and
unaccountable manner."73
The survivors from the lower-deck had less problem affixing blame and
offered another
version of what went wrong – only a small part of which came out at
the court martial or
appeared in newspapers. William Murray, a quarter gunner who was
loading provisions
through the larboard, lowerdeck gunports, provided the first clue.
When asked by the court:
"How far were the Larboard Ports from the water?" he responded: "When
she was heeled,
the Ports appeared to me within Six Inches of the water."74 When
asked: "Did you look
out?" Murray answered: "No, I could not, for the water in the inside
was almost level with
that on the out."75 The court either missed or ignored the
significance of his comment about
water inside the ship and continued their line of questioning: "How
long was that before the
ship went down?"76 He responded: "About 20 Minutes."77 When asked:
"Did you acquaint
any Officer of the water being so high up between decks?"78 Murray answered:
I was walking fore and aft between the Larboard Bay and Main
Hatchway, and I was very uneasy, I
saw the Master's Mate of the 1st Watch, I don't recollect his name.
Speak to him, I did not – but I went
nigh him and spoke in his hearing to my ship mates that were round
me, that there was a great deal of
Water laying in the Larboard scuppers; to the best of my knowledge, I
told there was above Fifty Tons
fore and aft, and if the Ship was not righted in a few Minutes that
we could never right her. This was 20
minutes before the ship went down. I was standing between the sheet
cable and the larboard side of the
ship, with the water very near my feet. There were only three or four
planks between the sheet cable and
the water. Two ports had been lowered, but not secured.79
Ignoring his testimony of water inside the ship and two unsecured
gunports, the court asked:
"Did you feel any shock or hear any Crack or Noise just before the
Ship's going down?"80
Ignoring their prompting, Murray responded: "No I did not. After the
Drum beat I heard
the Noise of the People and of the Guns and shot on the Middle
Deck."81 The court tried
another approach: "Did you find any difficulty from the Heeling of
the ship?"82 Murray,
18
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
however, refused to be diverted and answered: "No – my uneasiness
arose from the quantity
of Water in the Lee Scuppers, and not from the Heel."83
Other witnesses proved more co-operative - indicating that, when
heeled that morning, there
was at least a foot between the sills of the lower-deck gunports and
the water. A few
required prompting; most were in poor positions to observe; and none
of them indicated
when they made their observations. Murray's messmate, William Wright,
confused matters
when he confirmed that Murray had declared that "If the Ship was not
righted in a little time
that she would swamp,"84 but was unsure of the timing. When the court
asked: "How long
was this before the ship went down?"85 He replied: "5 Minutes, I
think, or thereabouts."86 In
his confusion and under considerable pressure, Wright provided the
court with an excuse to
reject Murray's testimony that his warning came twenty minutes before
the disaster.
Vindication for Murray came fifty years later when another lower-deck
survivor, James
Ingram, published a detailed account of the sinking. Ingram described
the weather as "fine,
with a strong breeze from the west;" and indicated the ships at
Spithead were "riding the
flood tide, with their heads toward Cowes."87 Unlike other accounts,
he insisted "the whole
of the larboard guns were run out. The shifting over of this great
weight of metal brought
the lower-deck cills just level with the water."88 He indicated that,
in addition to the weight
of the guns and the cargo, "almost all of the men were on the
larboard side, and that
brought down the ship still more."89 Ingram reported, the ship's
carpenter "perceived the
danger" and asked the officer of the watch to right the ship, but was
given "a very short
answer."90 According to Ingram, when the carpenter returned below, he
found that:
… the water came in so fast that he saw the ship was getting beyond
her bearings, and he therefore came
up a second time on the quarterdeck to the lieutenant, and said to
him "If you please Sir, to right the
ship; it is my duty to tell you she will not bear it any longer." He
spoke in a very positive way, as was his
duty; but the lieutenant immediately answered, "If you think, Sir,
that you can manage the ship better
19
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
than I can, you had better take the command." In the waist at the
time were a good many men, and they
heard what the carpenter said, and what answer the lieutenant gave.
They were all aware of the danger,
and felt very uncomfortable; there were plenty of good seamen on
board who knew what they were about
as well as their officers, and certainly much better than the one who
had the watch.91
William Nichelson, the Master Attendant of Portsmouth Dockyard,
suggested the loss of the
Royal George was not an act of God, but of Providence:
Providence at times permits us to conduct ourselves in such a manner
as to bring on our ruin and
destruction, and also that of others, which occurred by the dreadful
accident that happened in the loss of
that Ship, and so many hundred lives. This is what is called an
accident; I call it a human event of the
most extraordinary nature, and should be held up to posterity as a
beacon or sea-mark to them to avoid
such danger in similar cases, as it is more profitable to improve by
other men's miscarriages than by their
own.92
It pained him to relate the particulars of how and why the Royal
George sank, as it was "a
severe reflection on the service."93 Clearly, Nichelson was not a
disinterested observer. Thus,
he spared no reputations in repeating what he could not have witnessed:
… several people began to think the ship in danger, and perceived
her, as they thought, to settle in the
water; this induced the Carpenter of the ship to go on the
quarter-deck to the Captain, to represent the
state of the ship, and the danger he thought she was in, and advised
righting the ship; the Captain seemed
displeased with him, and gave him an unpleasant answer; the Carpenter
left the quarter-deck, and went
to his duty, as the Captain had ordered him, and seemed very much
affected at what had been said to
him by the Captain.94
Perhaps the most succinct description of what happened appeared in a
small booklet bound
in oak sawn from timbers recovered from the Royal George:
About 9 o'clock, the crew having just finished breakfast, the last
lighter, called the Lark, of 50 tons,
laden with rum, came on the low side of the ship to unload, when a
number of the crew were ordered to
"clear lighter," and the rum being put on board that side before it
was stowed away below, this. Together
with the weight of the men so employed, caused her to heel beyond
what was apprehended, and every ripple
or wave of the sea kept dashing in at the ports, which having no
possibility of escape, she soon has so
great a weight of water in her hold, that she gradually and
imperceptibly stole farther down on her side.95
Both lowerdeck and quarterdeck perceptions of what happened on 29
August 1782 differed
radically from what was told to the public. But the truth is never
simple; perception96 and
prejudice97 always play a role; and there are at least three tales to
every tragedy. The forces of
20
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
nature – wind, tide and spray – all contributed to the disaster, as
did the failings of man. The
ship was old, top-heavy and rotten.
However, when all is taken into account, the negligence of the Royal
George's officers stands
out. It was their responsibility to know the condition of their ship,
as well as the
unpredictable currents and weather on the Solent. They chose to
undertake an unnecessary
repair; and, against the advice of the master attendant, to heel a
fully laden ship without
moving her into Portsmouth Harbor and without securing her to a hulk.
And, regardless of
the added risk, they decided to load supplies through the lower-deck
gunports on the
larboard side, then failed to see that the lids of gunports not be
used for receiving provisions
were closed and secured. The captain hesitated too long and then made
the wrong decision
in ordering sixty tons of human ballast (the crew) to the wrong side
of the ship. One thing
did not cause the Royal George to sink. Everything (including the
weather) combined to cause
the tragedy. Far more important than the officers' failure to respond
effectively to an
emergency was their neglect of their most basic responsibility – the
care and safety of their
ship and her crew. Judgment comes easily in retrospect, but in this
instance the risks taken
were clearly not justified; and, as a result, over a thousand men,
women and children died.
While the myths surrounding the loss of the Royal George dominated contemporary
newspaper accounts, the facts or at least indications that there was
more to the story than
the Admiralty or government was willing to admit appeared as well.
While editors generally
did their best to reassure the public, the correspondents in
Portsmouth supplied enough
details – confused and contradictory though they were – to undermine
their efforts.
Ironically, the public was not so easily led. Readers relied on
newspapers for access to the
world. The press provided information and insights into what was
happening around them,
21
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
but knowledgeable readers did not accept it all without question.
Some may have been
deceived, but others were more skeptical. In 1780, a reader,
identified only as WC, observed:
I have often observed, that there is not so inconsistent, so
incoherent, so heterogeneous, although so useful
and agreeable thing as a public newspaper: The very ludicrous
contrast in advertisements, the
contradictory substance of foreign and domestic paragraphs, the
opposite opinions and observations of
contending essayists, with premature deaths, spurious marriages,
births, bankruptcies (sic), etc. etc. from
a fund of entertainment for a world of which it is in itself no bad epitome.98
It is tempting to speculate, but impossible to prove, that this
astute reader was William
Cowper. The timing, syntax and sentiments expressed certainly suggest
the possibility.99
FINDINGS
The public was provided a selective presentation of the facts
regarding the sinking of the
Royal George and led to believe that the tragedy was an act of God.
There is no question that
the government of the Earl of Shelburne benefited from the deception;
however, there is no
proof that the deception was deliberate.
Clearly, the news of the sinking was used as propaganda. Admiral Howe
informed the
Admiralty of the tragedy without going into the details of what went
wrong or who was to
blame. Commissioner Martin was not quite as economical with
information as he sought to
escape responsibility. Neither the admiral nor the commissioner can
be considered
propagandists. For either of them to share more information or engage
in speculation would
have been irresponsible. Similarly, the Admiralty sought to manage a
crisis, not the news,
and certainly not public opinion. However, a some point between the
release of information
by the Admiralty, its appearance and interpretation in newspapers,
and its reappearance in
Cowper's poem, the news became propaganda.
22
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
The media of 200 years ago operated under many of the same pressures
and influences that
they do today. They struggled with economic realities, limited access
to sources and the
impossibility of presenting all of the news. They engaged in
perpetual self-criticism and
ethical discussions. They pondered their role in democratic society
and recoiled in selfrighteous
indignation from any attempts to limit it. They suffered from inherent bias and
served as the principal means of influencing public opinion.
The public version of the sinking of the Royal George was presented
by newspapers without
perspective. It would have been impossible for them to do otherwise.
They printed the news
as it occurred in a random, almost chaotic fashion, but they did not
print all of it. The
national newspapers chose not to reveal details that appeared in the
local press. The editors
clearly exploited their newspapers' potential for influencing public
opinion. They played
upon public sympathies – both by selectively presenting the facts and
by emphasizing the
emotional issues involved. They provided comfort and reassurance but
discouraged public
discussion. Ironically, they also provided hints that the sinking was
not merely a tragic
accident, but an act of God.
It is impossible to present a full account of the sinking. The
information that has survived –
what was recorded and what remains in the archives – preserves only
fragments of the story.
But history is by nature a fragmentary record. There are always
several versions of any story
– each varying according to the perceptions and predispositions of
the narrators. While they
are far from complete, the surviving records do provide enough
information, coming from
enough sources, to reconstruct three narratives of the sinking. They
also provide the clues
and insights needed to understand (if not conclusively determine)
what really happened. And
they demonstrate the serendipitous path by which news becomes propaganda.
23
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
In this instance, however, the record does not prove intent. Cowper's
intentions were, if not
innocent, certainly subconscious. The cryptic note found on the
manuscript copy of
Cowper's poem indicating that it was written "when the news arrived,
by the desire of Lady
Austen, who wanted words to the March in Scipio"100 suggests little
more than an effort to
accommodate a wealthy patron. Regardless of the poet's intentions, his poem was
propaganda. It served to distract the public from the truth about the
sinking. It glossed over
the facts and appealed to emotion rather than reason. The editors of
the London newspapers
also ignored the more unpleasant aspects of the tragedy. Instead they
offered polite homilies,
like the one appearing in the London Chronicle, designed to inculcate
both feelings of sadness
and pride in the sacrifice made by British seamen – without
mentioning the conditions under
which they served. It certainly was propaganda. It pandered to public
sympathies, but it also
diverted public attention away from the causes of the sinking and
shielded government from
criticism. It replaced rational thought with patriotism.
CONCLUSIONS
Can propaganda exist without a propagandist? I found no evidence to
suggest that the
government of the Earl of Shelburne, the London newspapers or the
poet William Cowper
set out to influence public opinion. However, the news, as it was
reported, clearly did serve
government's purposes. The newspapers did not present all of the news
that was available
and a poem of questionable literary merit was accepted into England's
patriotic literature.
The question comes back to how we define propaganda. It is certainly
far easier to identify if
we can demonstrate intent. But how often are intentions declared? It
seems far more likely
that intentions will remained concealed even from the most diligent
researchers. In any case,
24
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
propaganda does not necessarily follow a design or a deliberate plan.
It responds to the news
and capitalizes upon circumstance. To be truly effective, it follows
the currents of public
sympathies. It seeks to channel them, perhaps even to control them,
but it does not generally
seek to change them.
1 On the southern coast of England between Hampshire and the Isle of Wight
2 The American Revolutionary War
3 H Lasswell, Democracy through Public Opinion (New York: George
Banta Publishing, 1941), 1, 42-46
4 W Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan Company, 1961), 32
5 E Bernays, Propaganda (New York: Ig Publishing, 2005, originally
published in 1928), 38
6 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes (New
York: Vintage Books, 1973), 124
7 A Pratkanis & E Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and
Abuse of Persuasion (New York: W H
Freeman & Company, 2001), 8
8 Ibid., 14
9 Cobbett's Political Register, 11 April 1807. Cobbett was known in
the US as "Peter Porcupine" for his scathing
attacks on Jeffersonian democracy.
10 R McChesney, "Journalism, Democracy and Class Struggle," Monthly
Review, November 2000
11 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (Pantheon
Books, 1988), PAGE #
12 Ellul, 38. Historian, journalist and novelist, Adams was also the
grandson and great-grandson of US
Presidents John and John Quincy Adams.
13 A Pratkanis & M Turner, "Persuasion and Democracy: Strategies for
increasing deliberative participation and
enacting social change," Journal of Social Issues, 52 (1996), 190
14 A Pratkanis & E Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and
Abuse of Persuasion (New York: W H
Freeman & Company, 2001), 11
15 E Herman and N Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1988)
16 G Jowett and V O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999), 4
17 Dictionary of National Biography, IV, 322
18 W Cowper, "On the Loss of the Royal George -Written when the news
arrived, by the desire of Lady Austen,
who wanted words to the March in Scipio, Written September 1782,
published 1803"; H Milford, Cowper: Poetry
& Prose (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 77-8
19 ADM 1/979, Howe to Stephens, 29 August 1782
20 The American Revolutionary War
21 The famed naval historian, John Laughton, described Howe as "a man
universally acknowledged to be
unfeeling in his nature, ungracious in his manner, and who, upon all
occasions, discovers a wonderful
attachment to the dictates of his own perverse, impenetrable
disposition." Dictionary of National Biography, X, 97
22 POR/H/12, Commissioner Martin to Admiralty, 29 August 1782
23 Hampshire Chronicle, 2 September 1782
24 Ibid.
25 Anonymous, The Royal George Disaster: Contemporary Accounts
(Portsmouth: Portsmouth City Library, 1956,
unpublished manuscript), 8
26 London Chronicle, 31 August – 3 September 1782, 220
27 Ibid.
28 Heeled to raise the area to be worked upon above the water.
29 Morning Herald, 31 August 1782; see also London Chronicle, 31
August – 3 September 1782
25
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
30 Their presence, however, was not overlooked by the local papers:
"Of about fourteen hundred men, women,
and boys which were on board, not more than 320 were saved …"
Hampshire Chronicle, 2 September 1782
31 The survivors were primarily those who were on deck – i.e. the
officers and their visitors.
32 Primarily the official newspaper of record the London Gazette
33 Prime Minister from July of 1782 until April of 1783
34 A close advisor to the King and the chief architect of the war.
35 Ogle & Marbury, Public Opinion and Political Dynamics (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin, 1950), p???
36 RNM 1998/21, W Trimmer to his mother, September 1782
37 Aware of his poem's inaccuracies or unaware of its appeal, Cowper
refused publication in his lifetime.
38 Morning Chronicle, 31 August 1782
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 The seacocks were opened to pump water up to wash the decks. As
one is facing the bow, starboard is to the
right and larboard (or port) is to the left.
42 Morning Chronicle, 31 August 1782
43 London Chronicle, 31 August – 3 September 1782
44 Morning Post, 31 August 1782
45 The administrative body responsible for the construction and
repair of the Royal Navy's ships
46 The administrative body responsible for manning the navy and the
deployment of ships
47 The body of water between Portsmouth (or southern Hampshire) and
the Isle of Wight
48 W Nichelson, A Treatise on Practical Navigation and Seamanship
(London: Gilbert & Co., 1796), appendix. As
master attendant, Nichelson was responsible for the movement of ships
within Portsmouth Harbor and the
repair of ships in the Solent.
49 Ibid., 4
50 Ibid., 5
51 Ibid. The master attendant's relationship with the admiral may not
have been as close as he implied. Certainly,
someone of Kempenfeldt's seniority and position would not take kindly
to a dockyard official telling him what
he could or could not do.
52 London Chronicle, 31 August – 3 September 1782, 220
53 Hampshire Chronicle, 2 September 1782. Quiberon Bay is part of the
Bay of Biscay on France's northwestern
coast. Ironically, the victory at Quiberon Bay inspired the immortal
sea-song, "Heart of Oak" by the David
Garrick and Dr William Boyce. Also see Charles Dibdin's "Poor Tom
Bowling." Dibdin's songs were said to
be "worth ten thousand sailors to the cause of England." G Davidson,
The Songs of Charles Dibdin (London:
How & Parsons, 1842)
54 Copper sheathing proved the most effective way of fighting shipworm.
55 i.e. centre of flotation
56 W Nichelson, appendix, 14
57 i.e. the waterline
58 Nichelson, appendix, 21-22
59 Hampshire Chronicle, 2 September 1782
60 ADM 1/5321, Court-Martial of Captain Waghorn, 7 September 1782
61 Ibid.
62 In addition to losing his ship, his admiral and most of his crew,
Waghorn lost his only son.
63 Morning Post, 31 August 1782. In the Royal Navy, a court martial
of the captain was standard procedure
following the loss of any ship.
64 ADM 1/5321, Court-Martial of Captain Waghorn, 7 September 1782
65 Ibid.
26
Three Tales of a Tragedy: Propaganda and the Sinking of the Royal George
66 Ibid.
67 Morning Post, 12 September 1782
68 Ibid.
69 ADM 1/5321, Court-Martial of Captain Waghorn, 7 September 1782
70 Waghorn had until a month before been ashore on half-pay. He had
very little command experience.
71 Hampshire Chronicle, 2 September 1782
72 Lt McKillop was supervising the loading of provisions through the
lower deck gunports.
73 R Hamilton & J Laughton, Recollections of James Anthony Gardner
(NRS, 1906), 24
74 ADM 1/5321, Court-Martial of Captain Waghorn, 7 September 1782
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 This contradicted Waghorn's statement: "Mr. Saunders told me he
had ordered the two guns ahead of the
vessel to be hous'd and the Ports secured, as the spray from the
vessel's bow flew in at them." Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Penny Magazine, 3 May 1834; also see JS, A Narrative of the Loss
of the Royal George (Portsea: S Horsey, 1841).
Cowes is a town on the Isle of Wight two miles southwest of where the
Royal George was anchored.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 The officer of the watch, Lt Monis Hollingbury, survived the
shipwreck, but was not called by the court to
testify. Significantly, he remained a lieutenant until he retired from service.
91 Penny Magazine, 3 May 1834
92 Nichelson, appendix, 2-3
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 8. His comments were published 38 years before Ingram's appeared.
95 JS, A Narrative of the Loss of the Royal George (Portsea: S
Horsey, 1841), 10
96 limits to the information available
97 predisposition, bias or the need to justify actions
98 Reading Mercury & Oxford Gazette, 31 July 1780
99 It was certainly a subject Cowper revisited in his poem The Task.
100 H Milford, Cowper: Poetry & Prose (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1953), 77-8. The Lady Austen in question was
not the novelist, but was a member of the prominent naval family.
Scipio was an opera by Handel.
27
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