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Explaining Charitable Giving During Times of Crises:
An Exploration of Two Psychological Paradigms
by
Richard D. Waters,
Doctoral Student
Department of Public Relations
College of Journalism and Communications
University of Florida
and
Jennifer Lemanski
Doctoral Student
Department of Advertising
College of Journalism and Communications
University of Florida
Running Head: Moeller Award Competition and Charitable Giving
Correspondence to:
Richard D. Waters
700 SW 16th Ave #102
Gainesville, FL 32601
(352) 359-6837
[log in to unmask]
Paper submitted to the 2005 convention of the Association for
Education in Journalism and Mass Communication's Mass Communication
and Society Division for the Leslie J. Moeller Award competition.
Abstract
A survey of two Red Cross chapters' donors revealed that donors to
the December 2004 tsunami relief efforts were more likely to
experience feelings of cognitive dissonance than non-donors and their
donations resulted in a consonance restoration. Testing the mere
exposure theory, it was found that increased exposure to news
concerning the tsunami did not correlate to increased
donations. This study found support for Festinger's hypothesis that
individuals avoid situations that increase feelings of dissonance.
Introduction
Shortly before 8:00 in the morning on December 26, 2004, an
earthquake in the Indian Ocean occurred and generated one of the most
deadly natural disasters in modern history. The resulting tsunami
devastated 14 countries in Southeastern Asia and Africa with
infrastructure damage and a major loss of human life; an additional
six countries in the Pacific Ocean experienced minor damage, such as
flooding. Vacationing tourists from 44 additional countries were
confirmed dead or missing based on current reports from their
respective national embassies (Wikipedia, 2005)
Individuals around the world gave financial donations generously to
the international relief efforts to help those in need. Based on the
total amount of money given by individuals, Americans gave more than
other countries; however, other nation's, such as Australia, Germany,
and Japan, had government assistance that was greater than the United
States (Lenkowsky, 2005).
Americans donate more than $240 billion annually to nonprofit
organizations; for the tsunami relief efforts, Americans gave $942
million in cash and an additional $117 million in medical supplies,
food, and blankets. More than 130 nonprofit organizations raised
funds to help with the international relief efforts; however, the
majority of the donations went to a handful of organizations. Nearly
one-third of the donations Americans made to the tsunami relief
efforts went to the American Red Cross (Baker, 2005). The other two
nonprofit organizations that raised more than $50 million were UNICEF
($78.3 million) and Catholic Relief Services ($75.9 million).
Fund-raising literature on giving during times of crises focuses on
emotional reasons for giving, such as an increased sense of urgency
or desire to help victims; however, it rarely examines using a
theoretical framework. The purpose of this study is to compare the
impact two psychological paradigms—cognitive dissonance and mere
exposure theory—have on charitable individuals giving during times of
crises and to see if either paradigm is more reliable in determining
if an individual is likely to give to crisis relief efforts.
Literature Review
Crisis Fund Raising
Fund raising is defined as "the management of relationships between
a charitable organization and its donor publics" (Kelly, 1998, p.
8). Unlike popular misconceptions, fund raising is not primarily
concerned with financial contributions. The principal goal of the
profession is to build strong relationships by developing trust with
and communicating honestly with donor publics (Burnett, 2002; Hall,
2002). Kelly (1998) says the main purpose of fund raising "is not to
raise money, but to help charitable organizations manage their
interdependencies with donor publics who share mutual goals and
objectives" (p. 9).
Drawing on the Grunig and Hunt's (1984) models of public relations,
Kelly (1995) found striking similarities to fund-raising
practices. For nonprofit organizations, the models focus on the
direction of an organization's fund-raising messages and whether
communication between the nonprofit and its donor publics is
symmetrical. Paralleling public relations, all of the models are
still practiced, and most organizations utilize all of the models to
meet certain campaign objectives. The press agentry model of fund
raising is considered the least ethical as it relies on emotional
rather than using two-way communication to build a relationship with the donor.
In times of natural disasters, fund-raising organizations frequently
use graphic images of the devastation and the victims to "pull on
people's heartstrings" (Fischer, 2000, p. 125). Because of the
immediate need for fund-raising appeals to address crises relief
efforts, many scholars advocate using the Internet to raise funds
(Hart, 2002; Elliot, Katsioloudes, & Weldon, 1998). Practitioner
literature suggests that nonprofit organizations raising funds for
relief efforts should also provide links to news stories about the
crisis so donors have an opportunity to evaluate the need for their
donation (Johnston, 2002).
Cognitive Dissonance
The use of graphic images and persistent use of video footage of
disasters in the broadcast news media can create a mental imbalance
for individuals; when this imagery is combined with a fund-raising
solicitation, individuals are given an opportunity to restore the
balance. This shifting was first recognized by Leon Festinger in
1957 when he proposed the cognitive dissonance theory, which centers
on an individual's reaction to inconsistent mental
states. Specifically, the theory's initial hypotheses were:
1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable,
will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve
consonance. [and]
2. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it,
the person will actively avoid situations and information which would
likely increase the dissonance. (Festinger, 1957, p. 3)
Festinger states that two mental conditions are in dissonance "if,
considering these two alone, the obverse of one element would follow
from the other" (Festinger, 1957, p. 13).
Dissonance as a theoretical concept has evolved as decades of
research has explored the topic; it is commonly defined as "a
negative, unpleasant state that occurs whenever a person holds two
cognitions that are psychologically inconsistent" (Aronson, 1968, p.
6). Research has shown that the elements involved in cognitive
dissonance studies may be (1) irrelevant to one another, (2)
consistent with one another, or (3) inconsistent with one
another. Relationships between two concepts do not have to be
logically related to create or upset psychological balance; what may
seem as logically inconsistent to an observer may by psychologically
consistent to another.
Cognitive dissonance studies have generally focused on three main
areas: decision making, forced compliance, and selective exposure
and attention (Severin & Tankard, Jr., 2001). Numerous studies have
shown that consumers experience dissonance after large purchases
where they regretted their decision (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Elliot &
Devine, 1994; Prast & de Vor, 2005) and sought information confirming
their decision (Ehrlich, Guttman, Schonbach, and Mills, 1957;
Albarracín & Wyer, Jr., 2000). Studies have found that cognitive
dissonance in a consumer setting only impacts decisions where a
decision cannot be revised (Scher & Cooper, 1989; Simon, Greenberg, &
Brehm, 1995). Forced compliance studies have found that individuals
are likely to try to convince themselves that a message they disagree
with may be correct or a group they are forced to be involved with
has positive characteristics to reduce the mental imbalance (Aronson
& Mills, 1959; Gerard & Mathewson, 1966; Cooper & Axsom, 1982;
Quattrone, 1985; Nail, Misak, & Davis, 2004; Matz & Wood, 2005).
Of the three areas, communication scholars have shown the most
interest in the area of selective exposure and attention (Claussen,
2004). Numerous studies have been conducted to test Festinger's
hypotheses; however, little support has been generated for the second
hypothesis that individuals would avoid information that could
potentially increase the dissonance (Jecker, 1964; Brehm & Cohen,
1962). The Brehm and Cohen study found that "while subjects sought
out dissonance-reducing information, they did not necessarily avoid
dissonance-increasing information" (1962, p. 93).
To test the cognitive dissonance theory in relation to the Asian
tsunami three hypotheses were created. To test the first premise of
the theory, the first hypothesis measures the amount of dissonance
for the targeted population:
H(1): Individuals who experience stronger feelings of dissonance
after learning
about the December 2004 tsunami are more likely to donate
to charitable
relief efforts.
This hypothesis looks at both donors and non-donors to the tsunami
relief efforts; it is hypothesized that individuals who donated to
the tsunami will experience more dissonance than individuals who did
not donate to the cause.
Additionally, to test the first component concerning the elimination
of dissonance of Festinger's theory, a second hypothesis was created
to measure this restoration for individuals who made donations:
H(2): Individuals who donated to the tsunami's charitable relief
efforts are likely
to experience a consonance-restoration effect by making a donation.
This hypothesis compares the donors' internal assessments of the
impact of the tsunami and their financial contribution to the relief
efforts. Following Festinger's original hypothesis, individuals
should report that their internal impact assessment of making a
donation should match or exceed the internal assessment of learning
about the tsunami.
The final hypothesis testing cognitive dissonance explores the second
component of Festinger's original idea, which has seldom received
scholarly support. This component states that individuals are likely
to avoid situations that would increase their levels of
dissonance. For this study, the following hypothesis was developed:
H(3): Individuals who experienced a greater amount of dissonance as
a result of
learning about the tsunami are more likely to reduce news
consumption in
wake of the event.
Mere Exposure Theory
Mere exposure theory states that "simple exposure to communication
can influence attitudes" (Perloff, 2003, p. 282) and
behavior. Numerous scholars have found strong support for the mere
exposure theory since it was first hypothesized (Bornstein,
1989). Studies have shown that merely seeing a message repetitively
can lead to changes in an individual (Zajonc, 1968). Stang (1977)
found that individuals evaluated items favorably as exposure to the
items increased. A study of elementary school children found
favorable impressions of beer brands and an increased intent to drink
as an adult simply based on repeated exposure to beer advertising on
television (Grube & Wallack, 1994). Providing further support for
behavior changes, Crandall (1985) found that remote Alaskan villages
changed their dietary habits based on repeated exposure to new
flavors and food choices.
Research has shown that simple exposure to a message does not always
lead to increased attitudes and behavior change. Mere exposure works
best for neutral products and issues; mere exposure helps explain how
attitudes are formed about these products (Baker, 1999). When an
individual has already developed a strong attitude toward an item,
repeated exposure to the issue or product can create feelings of
annoyance (Tesser, 1978; Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002).
Research has also shown that exposure to a message too many times can
lead to wear-out (Bornstein, 1989; Solomon, 1999). Initially,
exposure to a message can be positive by reducing uncertainty about
an issue and bringing feelings of pleasure (Olson & Thjømøe,
2003). After a certain point, the repetition has an opposite effect,
and negative feelings are induced because of the exposure to the message.
Due to time and space constraints of news organizations, foreign news
coverage rarely comes to the forefront of American news unless there
is a crisis, especially when the event does not directly affect the
American citizenry (Atwood, 1993). The December 2004 tsunami
illustrates Atwood's assertion. News coverage of Southeast Asia
increased dramatically after the event. Many of the 24-hour news
outlets devoted round-the-clock coverage as the number of missing and
confirmed dead rose, and up-to-date tsunami information was
prominently displayed on the front page of major newspapers and on
news Web sites.
Many newspapers frequently published lists of organizations
collecting donations for the international relief efforts. Likewise,
television stations provided audiences with toll-free numbers to
these organizations, and charitable organizations' Web sites were
quickly redesigned to highlight their tsunami relief
efforts. Because many of the initial media stories of crises include
methods of giving to relief efforts (DiPerna, 2003), the study's
fourth hypothesis was created to test the mere exposure theory:
H(4): Subjects who had increased news consumption during the
tsunami
aftermath were more likely to donate to charitable relief
efforts than those
who did not increase news consumption.
Comparing the results of the first and fourth hypothesis will allow
for an understanding of which psychological paradigm can best explain
why individuals donate during times of crises, especially those in
remote areas far from the donor.
Methodology
To test the hypotheses, an Internet-based survey of donors to two
Southeastern chapters of the American Red Cross was conducted. Red
Cross donors were informed about the survey and invited to
participate in the project via an e-mailed invitation from a Red
Cross fund-raising practitioner. Between the two chapters, 1,916
invitations were e-mailed requesting participation in the
survey. The Red Cross sent two e-mails to their donors. The initial
e-mail asked for participation in the project; the second e-mail
served as a reminder and was sent one-week after the first
message. The survey response rate was 37 percent.
The Participants
The participants in the survey (n=712) are predisposed to charitable
giving; however, fund raisers at the two chapters estimated that
one-third of their chapters' donors gave to the tsunami relief
efforts. Using a sample that consists of individuals who both gave
and did not give to the tsunami's relief efforts will allow for
better measurement of the two psychological paradigms.
Survey Design
The survey consisted of 27-questions: 23 closed-ended questions and
4 open-ended questions. To evaluate the impact of cognitive
dissonance on giving, an index was adapted from Sweeney, Hausknecht,
and Soutar's (2000) cognitive dissonance scale. Scale items can be
seen in Table 1. For individuals that made a donation to the relief
efforts, an additional index was created that measured how the
donation affected the subject's state of mind. These consonance
items can be seen in Table 2.
To test the hypotheses concerning the mere exposure theory, two news
consumption indices were created by asking subjects about their use
of the television, print, radio, and Internet media for the days
following the tsunami and in a typical day. Additional demographic
information was collected. Items for the news consumption indices
are presented in Table 3.
Indices Reliability
Prior to launching the full study, the four indices were pretested
with 53 individuals using a convenience sample. After the
implementation of the study, the Cronbach's alpha for the dissonance
and consonance indices were .91 and .82, respectively. The news
consumption indices measured print, broadcast, radio and Internet
consumption in the days following the tsunami and during an average
day. These measures were also found to be reliable with Cronbach's
alphas measuring .74 and .72, respectively.
While there is no universally accepted standard for reliability
measures, Carmines and Zeller (1979) encourage scholars to strive for
alpha measures of .80 or higher. Others, such as Bowers and
Courtright (1984), have argued that alpha measures can be as low as
.70 especially in early stages of scale construction. The first two
measures met the Carmines and Zeller standard; the final two met the
latter standard.
Results
Participants
Of the 712 participants, 55 percent donated to the tsunami relief
efforts (n = 394). Women made up the majority of the participants
(58 percent). Caucasians represented 69 percent of the participants,
and African-Americans were the next largest population (12
percent). Asians and Latino/as comprised 8 and 7 percent of the
sample, respectively. The remaining four percent of the population
classified themselves as "other." The average age of the
participants was 33-years-old; ages ranged from 18 to 71-years.
The participants most likely first learned about the Asian tsunami
from television coverage (58 percent); the remaining participants
found out about the tsunami from the Internet (20 percent),
interpersonal communication with friends or family (15 percent),
radio (5 percent), and newspapers (2 percent). The participants had
a wide variety of educational backgrounds. Participants were more
likely to have a bachelor's degree (35 percent) or a
graduate/advanced degree (28 percent). The remaining participants
took some college classes (21 percent), had a high school diploma (11
percent) or had some high school classes (5 percent).
The individuals' socio-economic status also varied
considerably. Income data was collected along the following
breakdown: Less than $17,000 (17 percent), $17,001 - $35,000 (19
percent), $35,001 - $65,000 (21 percent), $65,001 - $100,000 (15
percent), $100,001 - $250,000 (12 percent), $250,001 - $500,000 (4
percent), and more than $500,001 (3 percent). Nine percent of the
participants selected "I don't know" or did not provide an
answer. The 394 donors contributed $44,581 to the tsunami relief
efforts with the mean gift size being $113.15; the smallest donation
was $3, and the largest donation was $4,000.
Hypothesis 1
To test the first hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA was run to compare the
mean scores of the dissonance index for individuals who did donate
and those who did not. For individuals who did donate to the tsunami
relief efforts, their mean score on the five question dissonance
index was 19.98; the dissonance mean for individuals who did not
donate was 17.76. This difference was significant at the p < .001
level. Table 1 presents the mean scores for the individual items
used to create the index and the results of this test.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Insert Table 1 Here
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
As this table shows, the cognitive dissonance paradigm provides a
solid explanation for why an individual makes financial contributions
to crisis relief efforts; however, it alone does not prove the
explanatory power of the theory. To establish this power, the second
hypothesis must also be supported.
Hypothesis 2
To compare the levels of dissonance caused by the tsunami with the
restoration effects of the individuals' donations, a paired t-test
was run to compare donors' levels of dissonance when they first
learned about the tsunami and the positive feelings they experienced
when making the financial contribution to the relief efforts. As
shown in Table 2, the mean score for the five-question consonance
restoration index (20.78) was significantly greater than that of the
dissonance index (19.98).
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Insert Table 2 Here
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
The difference between the mean scores for the two indices, .80,
was significant at the p<.001 level. When combined with the first
hypothesis, there is ample evidence that cognitive dissonance plays a
significant role in determining whether an individual is likely to
donate to crisis relief efforts.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis tests the second component of Festinger's
original hypotheses. Because of the heavy presence of tsunami news
in the weeks after the natural disaster, it was hypothesized that
individuals who experienced increased levels of dissonance were more
likely to reduce their news consumption. To calculate news
consumption, participants were asked to answer six questions about
watching, reading, and listening to news for the days after the
tsunami occurred and for their average daily news consumption. This
information is presented in Table 3.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Insert Table 3 Here
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
A one-way ANOVA was run comparing individuals' dissonance mean scores
with their reported media change, which was calculated by subtracting
the value of news consumption after the tsunami from the value of
average news consumption. Thus, an individual who increased news
consumption after the tsunami would have a negative consumption score
whereas an individual who decreased news consumption after the
tsunami would have a positive value. To run the one-way ANOVA, it
was necessary to collapse the reported dissonance levels into five
tiers: 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, and 21-25. The analysis could not
be carried out initially because of the sparse number of cases in the
lower tiers. The results from the one-way ANOVA using the collapsed
cases is presented in Table 4.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Insert Table 4 Here
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
The initial result from the one-way ANOVA shows a statistically
significant relationship among the five groups. A Bonferroni post
hoc test confirmed that the means were significant among some of the
groups; however, it was not significant between all of them. The
individuals in tier five who experienced the greatest feelings of
cognitive dissonance were more likely to reduce news consumption than
the remaining groups; however, the reported values between the
remaining groups did not attain the established levels of statistical
significance in social science research with the exception of Tier 4
and Tier 1, which was also significant at the p<.05 level. The
results from the Bonferroni test are presented in Table 5.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Insert Table 5 Here
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Hypothesis 4
The final hypothesis tested the power of the mere exposure paradigm
to explain charitable giving. To test this hypothesis, a one-way
ANOVA was run comparing the changes in news consumption against an
individual's decision to donate to the tsunami relief efforts. The
change in news consumption was calculated in the same manner as news
consumption for the third hypothesis. Table 6 presents the results
of the test.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Insert Table 6 Here
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Not surprising, given the results from the third hypothesis, the mere
exposure hypothesis was not supported. Individuals who donated to
the tsunami relief efforts were not more likely to have increased
news consumption following the tsunami. The news consumption mean
difference between donors and non-donors was 0.95; this value was
statistically significant at the p<.001 level. The test found the
exact opposite of what was hypothesized, which indicates that the
mere exposure theory has no power in predicting the individuals that
are most likely to donate to charitable relief efforts.
Discussion
The goal of this paper was to seek a psychological explanation for
charitable giving to relief efforts in remote area by testing
individuals' reactions to the Asian tsunami in relation to cognitive
dissonance and mere exposure theories. These two leading paradigms
take different approaches to explaining individuals' attitudes and
behavior. As the statistical tests proved, cognitive dissonance was
quite powerful in predicting whether an individual would donate to
the relief efforts. There was no support for the mere exposure
theory hypothesis.
The mean scores for the dissonance measures were greater than the
neutrality point for all of the study's participants; however, all of
the individuals were not affected by the news in the same
manner. Individuals who experienced the greatest dissonance were
deeply upset after learning about the impact of the tsunami. In one
of the open-ended questions asking about the individual's immediate
thoughts after learning about the tsunami, a female participate
responded, "I was swept away with horror, revulsion, sympathy, and a
slew of other emotions. As much as I tried, I could not get the
pictures of the waves crashing on shore out of my head." Another
male participated commented that he immediately questioned "How can
Mother Nature wipe out entire generations in a matter of
moments? Why weren't people given any warning?"
Another individual reported that he "couldn't comprehend what had
happened—it baffled me that a natural event had just killed so many
people." These participants all experienced some of the greatest
feelings of dissonance; subsequently, they all donated to various
relief efforts. Just as Fisher (2000) predicted, organizations that
use visuals that appeal to an individual's emotions during crises are
likely to be successful.
Other participants were emotionally moved by the tsunami though not
to the level of making a financial contribution. One male
participate was intrigued by the event and said, "I was wrapped up in
a variety of emotions. I was horrified that it happened, but I also
wanted to see the devastation to get an idea of what was happening
over there. I wanted to see more [news] footage." Perhaps this
reaction best summed up the non-donors reaction as they did tend to
have increased news consumption during this time.
One individual's answer to the open-ended questions stood out from
the rest. A young female commented, "It's sad. Your survey confirms
what I've always suspected of myself. Even after seeing pictures of
the tsunami, I didn't feel anything. I wanted to feel bad about what
happened, but I didn't. I hope others aren't as selfish as
me." Given the uniqueness of the tsunami, this view is not
particularly surprising. Others stated that "I didn't know what to
think" and questioned "Why didin't (sic) they know it was coming?"
For fund raisers, these questions are not uncommon. No matter how
nonprofit organizations approach prospective donors, they will not be
able to persuade individuals to donate to their causes if the
prospects do not comprehend the magnitude of the problem. The Asian
tsunami is a prime example of this phenomenon. Most individuals only
give to organizations to which they have a strong connection (Kelly,
1998; Cutlip, 1990). Lenkowsky (2005) reflected that for many
Americans the tsunami was tragic; but because of the remote
geographic distance from the United States and its citizenry's lack
of knowledge and experiences with the devastation a tsunami can
cause, many would not feel the true sense of urgency.
Prince and File (1994) agree that for many donors; remote crises,
such as the tsunami, are not on their philanthropic radar
screens. However, this group represents a minority in the American
donor community. They maintain that individuals will donate if they
are properly informed about the need for financial contributions.
Contrary to the mere exposure paradigm, this study found that
individuals did not need to receive messages numerous times before
they acted on them. Drawing on DiPerna's (2003) analysis of news
coverage of the September 11th terrorist attacks, news coverage
frequently includes calls for donations in the week following the
crisis. Participants in this study reduced their news consumption as
Festinger hypothesized; they avoided situations that would generate
additional feelings of dissonance.
When individuals made their donations, they reported that they
experienced relief in the open-ended question asking them to describe
how making a donation to the relief efforts made them feel. One of
the participants who donated $5 said, "I felt like I was making a
difference no matter how small the donation was. I was glad that I
could help." Another male participated commented, "Every little bit
helps, i'm (sic) not rich but i've (sic) got a hell of a lot more
than these people do now." A female participant said, "I felt kinda
(sic) good to have helped."
These individuals were all among the smaller donors, but they all
reported strong feelings of consonance restoration as a result of
making a donation. An individual that donated $2,500 said, "I'm very
fortunate to have what I do. It would be wrong for me not to
donate. Whole families were swept out to sea, and many children were
left homeless and without parents. I had to make a donation. These
people needed the money more than I did."
Implications for the Fund-Raising Profession
Many fund raisers operate under the belief that their organizations
would receive increased donations if only they could generate news
coverage (Prives, 2005). This study has proven that this belief is a
misconception. Nonprofits cannot simply rely on news coverage to
educate donors about their cause. As Kelly (1998) and Hall (2002)
suggest, successful fund-raising campaigns will never rely on mass
mediated messages. The best fund-raising campaigns utilize
interpersonal communications. Hopefully, this study can serve as a
catalyst for nonprofit organizations to put more efforts into
communicating directly with donors and fewer resources into getting
media coverage.
Conclusion
Through conducting a survey of Red Cross donors (n = 712) from two
Southeastern chapters, this study found that donors experience strong
feelings of dissonance when learning of crisis situations and that
making a donation restores the mental balance. This study also
supported Festinger's original hypothesis that individuals would
avoid situations that would increase their feelings of
dissonance. By reducing news consumption, individuals were able to
avoid seeing the repeated footage of the waves crashing into the
coastal towns. This avoidance also wound up showing that the mere
exposure theory had no power in predicting charitable giving during
these crisis situations.
Limitations
The main limitation of this study concerned its timing. The study
was conducted in early March, 2005. The self-reported values,
particularly those involving news consumption, would have been more
accurate had they occurred closer to the beginning of the year. Even
though there were significant differences between the values, the
participants' were asked to recall their news consumption nearly two
months after the event had occurred. Had the survey been conducted
more closely to the timing of the tsunami, it is plausible that this
data would have been more accurate.
Another limitation of the survey is the population that was being
examined. These individuals are predisposed to charitable
giving. To have received the e-mail invitation to participate in the
Internet-survey, the individuals had to have donated to one of two
American Red Cross chapters in the Southeast within the past five
years. Despite this predisposition to giving, a significant number
of Red Cross donors did not give to the tsunami relief efforts. Of
the 712 participants, 318 (45 percent) did not give to the any
nonprofit organization's tsunami fund-raising campaign. The donors
in this survey closely parallel the average national donor. Ciconte
and Jacob (1997) found that the average donor in the United States is
a college-educated, middle-aged woman, who is 43-years-old and has a
median household income of $49,100. The similarity between this
profile and that of the donors in this study help to provide external
validation for the results.
Future Research
The results of this study provide two interesting avenues for future
research. First, this study is one of the first to support
Festinger's hypothesis that individuals would avoid situations that
are likely to create dissonance. Perhaps this finding is a one time
occurrence; however, this result is opposite to most cognitive
dissonance studies. This hypothesis should be examined again to see
if the results can be replicated to further strengthen the connection
between charitable giving and Festinger's cognitive dissonance
theory; it would also strengthen the cognitive dissonance paradigm by
providing evidence that people do actively seek to avoid
dissonance-causing situations
Secondly, very little scholarly work has been done conducted on fund
raising both from the organizational and donor perspectives. Kelly
(1991; 1995; 1998) and Hall (2002) have explored the similarities of
public relations and fund raising. But, mass communication theories
and related paradigms have largely been ignored even though the
majority of fund-raising donations come from individuals with modest
incomes—not the major gift donors who receive specialized
interpersonal communication from nonprofit organizations. This study
serves as an initial delve into understanding the fund-raising
process by studying mass communication theories. By increasing the
scholarly knowledge on fund raising, it is possible for nonprofits to
ensure their livelihood by adapting their communication practices to
ensure they are capable of providing relief efforts during future crises.
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Table 1: Mean Scores for Dissonance Items for Non-Donors and Donors
to the December 2004 Tsunami Charitable Relief Efforts.
Dissonance Item Non-Donors Donors
When I first learned about the tsunami, I . . .
1. felt scared for the victims. 3.78 4.31
2. felt depressed. 3.17 3.51
3. felt sick. 3.35 3.75
4. felt pain and agony for the victims. 3.71 4.23
5. had an uneasy feeling. 3.75 4.18
Index Mean 17.76 19.98
Analysis of Variance F Score = 79.82; p<.001
Table 2: Mean Scores for Dissonance and Consonance Restoration
Scales for Donors to the December 2004 Tsunami Charitable Relief Efforts.
Dissonance Item
When I first learned about the tsunami, I…
1. felt scared for the victims. 4.31
2. felt depressed. 3.51
3. felt sick. 3.75
4. felt pain and agony for the victims. 4.23
5. had an uneasy feeling. 4.18
Index Mean 19.98
Consonance Items
1. Donating to the tsunami relief efforts 4.39
made me feel good.
2. I felt morally obligated to donate to the 4.31
tsunami relief efforts.
3. My donation was used to help victims. 4.43
4. Once I made my donation, I felt relieved that I 4.31
was able to help the victims.
5. Once I made my donation, I felt things could 3.34
get back to normal for the tsunami victims.
Index Mean 20.78
t = -4.632, df = 393, p < .001
Table 3: Individuals' News Consumption after the Tsunami and in an
Average Day
After the Tsunami Average Day
How much time did you spend per day…
1. Watching television news?
None 72 46
Up to ½ hour per day 249 183
Between ½ hour and 1 hour per day 190 184
Between 1 hour and 1-½ hours per day 110 208
Between 1-½ hours and 2 hours per day 51 28
More than 2 hours per day 40 63
2. Reading news on the Internet, newspapers, or magazines?
None 82 52
Up to ½ hour per day 282 202
Between ½ hour and 1 hour per day 209 258
Between 1 hour and 1-½ hours per day 104 151
Between 1-½ hours and 2 hours per day 19 32
More than 2 hours per day 16 17
3. Listening to news on the radio?
None 285 163
Up to ½ hour per day 262 262
Between ½ hour and 1 hour per day 95 196
Between 1 hour and 1-½ hours per day 39 63
Between 1-½ hours and 2 hours per day 16 15
More than 2 hours per day 15 13
Table 4: Variance of News Consumption by Tiers of Dissonance
Dissonance Tier N News Consumptiona
1 (Least feelings of dissonance) 3 -2.67
2 12 -1.08
3 87 .007
4 365 0.82
5 (Most feelings of dissonance) 245 1.75
____________
a Calculated by subtracting reported values of news consumption per
day after the tsunami from reported values of news consumption in an
average day (e.g., Negative values result in increased news
consumption after the tsunami, and Positive values result from
decreased news consumption after the tsunami)
Analysis of Variance F Score = 8.95; p<.001
Table 5: Absolute Values of Mean Differences of News Consumption
Between Tiers of Dissonance
Dissonance Tier 1 2 3 4 5
1 (Least feelings of dissonance)
.000 1.58 2.74 3.49a 4.42a
2 .000 1.15 1.91 2.84a
3 .000 0.76 1.69a
4 .000 0.93a
5 (Most feelings of dissonance) .000
_______________
a p<.05
Table 6: Mean Scores for News Consumption for Non-Donors and
Donors to the December 2004 Tsunami Charitable Relief Efforts
Donors Non-Donors
Change in News Consumptiona 1.43 0.48
_______________
a Calculated by subtracting reported values of news consumption per
day after the tsunami from reported values of news consumption in an
average day (e.g., Negative values result in increased news
consumption after the tsunami, and Positive values result from
decreased news consumption after the tsunami)
Analysis of Variance F Score = 17.59; p<.001
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