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Subject: AEJ 05 ScottB INTL Does the Internet Affect Attitudes? Comparing Democratic Values Of U.S. Journalism Students With Those in Post-Soviet Nations
From: Elliott Parker <[log in to unmask]>
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Date:Sun, 5 Feb 2006 13:11:23 -0500
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This paper was presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and
Mass Communication in San Antonio, Texas August 2005.
         If you have questions about this paper, please contact the author
directly. If you have questions about the archives, email
rakyat [ at ] eparker.org. For an explanation of the subject line, 
send email to
[log in to unmask] with just the four words, "get help info aejmc," in the
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(Feb 2006)
Thank you.
Elliott Parker
====================================================================

Does the Internet Affect Attitudes?
Comparing Democratic Values
Of U.S. Journalism Students
With Those in Post-Soviet Nations

International Communication Division
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
2005 Annual Meeting
San Antonio, TX

By*
Byron T. Scott
Professor
Anya Litvak and Irina Guseva
Graduate Students
University of Missouri – Columbia
School of Journalism
321B Lee Hills Hall,
Columbia, MO, 65211
and
Stanley Ketterer
Assistant Professor
Oklahoma State University
School of Journalism and Broadcasting



Abstract: Two hundred and seventy-eight second-year journalism 
students in the United States, Russia, Bulgaria, and Albania were 
given a structured questionnaire identical to that used in a 2001 
study of students in Kazakhstan.  Focusing on media usage and 
democratic attitudes, this pilot analysis pays particular attention 
to differences that might be related to Internet usage between U.S. 
subjects and the youth of post-Soviet societies.  Results showed 
differences that, in combination with sociological studies of 
post-Soviet societies, point to Internet usage as important, but 
hardly the governing mediating influence predicted in early post-Cold 
War euphoria.

•	Address communications to the principal author:  s 
321BPhones:  573-882-7792, office; 445-4996, home; 884-1841, fax.
•	The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of several 
overseas colleagues, particularly Altin Rraxhimi, University of 
Tirana; Marco Mulcahy, American University in Bulgaria; Maria Lukina 
and Andrei Raskin, Moscow State University. Special thanks to 
Stephanie Craft, Missouri School of Journalism.
Does the Internet Affect Attitudes?  AEJMC International 
Communication Division, Page 4

International Communication Division

Abstract:  Does the Internet Affect Attitudes? Comparing Democratic 
Values of U.S.  Journalism Students With Those in Post-Soviet Nations –
Two hundred and seventy-eight second-year journalism students in the 
United States, Russia, Bulgaria, and Albania were given a structured 
questionnaire identical to that used in a 2001 study of students in 
Kazakhstan.  Focusing on media usage and democratic attitudes, this 
pilot analysis pays particular attention to differences that might be 
related to Internet usage between U.S. subjects and the youth of 
post-Soviet societies.  Results showed differences that, in 
combination with sociological studies of post-Soviet societies, point 
to Internet usage as important, but hardly the governing mediating 
influence predicted in early post-Cold War euphoria.



























	


Attempts to project the results of the transitional period begun with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union have frequently focused on the youth 
of Russia and the various other nations of the former Communist 
bloc.  Whether the goal is globalization, capitalism or a civil 
society based in the values of Western democracy, many observers have 
made the assumption that newer generations would be more adaptable to 
change than those who had achieved adulthood under the old society's 
values, systems, and rewards.  Michael McFaul, the Stanford social 
scientist who has conducted multiple studies of the post-Soviet 
generation gap in Russia, put it this way :
"…this is the first generation since 1917 in Russia to come of age in 
(a) an independent Russia, (b) a capitalist economy, and (c) a "free" 
(albeit not altogether democratic) political system. The group has a 
set of preferences about the economy, the polity, and the world that 
are distinct from those of their parents--the cohort that has tried 
to be productive in two radically different systems--and very 
distinct from those of their grandparents, who worked mostly in the 
communist system."
Similar observations have been made about the newest generations in a 
number of other studies in former Communist nations, including the 
former Yugoslavia and Poland , Hungary, Czech Republic and Bulgaria , 
Belarus  and Albania .  However, the bulk of studies and observations 
of values and attitudes in the post-Soviet "generation gap" have been 
done within Russia itself (for example, see , 2003; .
	The aggregate impression of post-Soviet youth is hardly 
encouraging.  These young men and women are seen as cynical, deeply 
frustrated, passive and self-centered – hardly the profile of 
democratic change agents.  Titarenko (1999) characterizes their 
condition as follows:
"Taking into consideration the deep contradiction between the painful 
process of transition and the expected rosy results, it is easy to 
understand why the countries (of the former Soviet bloc) cannot meet 
the high expectations of youth and create appropriate conditions for 
the younger generation to play a dominant role in this process. If 
the rest of the population tries simply to survive the current 
deepening crisis, post-Soviet youth wants to enjoy being able to live 
in an advanced Western-type society now."

Theories of communication and democracy

John Stuart Mill's notion of a marketplace of ideas has 
idealistically re-emerged with the advent and dissemination of 
Internet technology as the basic facilitator of democracy.
Several years before the Internet and the Worldwide Web emerged, 
Jürgen Habermas (1989), known for his theories on deliberative 
democracy, emphasized the importance of a public sphere in liberal 
democratic society. His insistence that democracy is borne out of a 
dialogue of ideas, not just exposure to them, outlines what he 
labeled the three components of an "ideal speech situation": absolute 
inclusion, coercion-free communication, and openness and symmetry of 
discussion. Habermas agreed with Mills and numerous others in seeing 
information as a powerful agent of social change, with an inherent 
potential for societal transformation. The apparent access and 
universality of the Internet held the promise of Habermas' 
deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1989), at least in theory.  In the 
euphoria immediately following the end of the Cold War, some social 
analysts and government officials saw the Internet as amounting to 
democracy's "terrible, swift sword."[1]
Others disagreed.  Chantal Mouffe, another democracy theorist, 
claimed that for discussion to have any meaning, it had to take place 
unconstrained  by an established system of ideas, a framework 
(Thornton, 2002). According to her, the basic act of qualifying a 
discussion within a certain context necessarily dooms the strife for 
coercion-free deliberation. The adoption of any system is in itself a 
restraint, she claims (Mouffe, 1997). In fact, the cultural and 
technical frameworks that shape Internet development and content can 
be considered elements of exclusion and control. "The Internet does 
not operate in a sociological vacuum." (Thornton, 2002). In context, 
it operates under a parallel power structure as other institutions 
and can serve to further solidify social frameworks.
In his article How the Internet Did Not Transform Russia, Rafal 
Rohozinski says that "the 'new dog' of the Internet was adapted and 
used to perform the 'old tricks' inherent to the Soviet system." 
Rohozinski talks about the emergence of the Russian Net, which 
disappointed the romanticized expectations of single-handedly 
transitioning the Russian political and social climate into a Western 
democracy. Superior to the pluralistic potential of information 
access on the Internet is the framework of power already in place in 
Russia, he argues. And, to a certain extent, it guides the format, 
purpose, and effect of the Internet as the medium feels out its place 
in post-Soviet society.
"Russia's Internet development vividly demonstrates a wider point 
concerning the error of assuming that information technologies are 
the handmaidens of democratic development." (Rohozinki, 338)
Does modern reality, in fact, contradict the foundational, 
journalistic belief that access to truth will make us free?  Put more 
elaborately:  if journalism and technology are at the heart of social 
change, if the "Fourth Estate" retains its historical role of helping 
provide direction and force in times of transition, then it seems 
important to examine the attitudes of that subset of post-Soviet 
youth currently studying journalism in the universities and 
institutes of those nations.  In general, these studies have not yet 
been done, either on an individual or comparative basis.  While 
cross-cultural studies of news values and behaviors among currently 
practicing journalists of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
have begun to emerge ; , the student journalist has been largely 
"below the horizon" for journalism scholars.  One exception is the 
2000 study by two Oklahoma State investigators  exploring the media 
usage and democratic attitudes of 203 Kazakhstani journalism 
students, predominantly in their first and second years of 
study.  The investigators used a 44-item questionnaire to examine 
four questions –
1.	What are the kinds of media monitored by these students and how frequently?
2.	What democratic principles do they perceive as essential?
3.	How do they perceive democracy as it operates in their nation, 
particularly regarding leaders and elections?
4.	What do these journalism students perceive as "normal" in a democracy?
Important to note here it that, for their media use questions, these 
investigators adapted a Pew Center study examining political 
disinterest among American youth .  The democracy questions made use 
of "seven factors of a liberal democracy" postulated by Dahl .  The 
questionnaire itself, because it also forms the basis of the current 
study, is attached to this paper as an appendix.[2]
In their discussion of the Kazakh study, the authors wondered to what 
extent the patterns seen were generalizable to other Soviet states, 
particularly those not embedded in the cultural and political 
traditions of Central Asia.  Noting also the comparatively low 
computer and Internet usage by their subjects,[3]  they also wondered 
how this electronic isolation might affect their opinions and 
attitudes.  "The lack of computer and Internet access means that few 
students were exposed to outside views," they noted.  "…As Internet 
use increases, they will be exposed to a wider variety of 
viewpoints.  It will be interesting to see what effect Internet use 
has on these students in the future."  This study seeks to respond to 
those questions, at least as to similarly situated journalism 
students in three nations:  Albania, Bulgaria, and Russia 
itself.  And, because both the questionnaire and the values probed 
are so much a part of the U.S.-accepted form of democracy, the 
current study asks the same questions of a comparable group of 
American student journalists.

Methodology

This study uses the same questionnaire employed by Ketterer and 
Nemecek.  It was translated into Albanian for the Tirana subjects but 
English proficiency was sufficient for its original English version 
to be used by Russian and Bulgarian subjects.  As in the Kazakhstan 
study, it was administered to predominantly second year journalism 
students.  Results from other question arrays in the instrument (see 
appendix) are being reported elsewhere. It is important to note that 
this is not a sample.  All second-year, eligible students at these 
overseas institutions were asked to respond.  This resulted in a 
relatively smaller N for Bulgaria and Albania than for Russia and the 
U.S., as well as the prior study in Kazakhstan.[4]
The subjects constituted entire classes at all four 
institutions.  The questionnaire was reviewed by administrators at 
all schools[5] prior to being given to the students during regular 
class hours.  All questionnaires were filled out in the presence of 
one of the authors, who first explained that all responses were 
anonymous and that participating was voluntary.  Because the senior 
author was familiar with the classes in question, the authenticity of 
the demographic data was easy to confirm.
The four subject groups, comprising a total of 278 student journalists, were:
•	32 students at the University of Tirana, Albania, who filled out 
the questionnaire in Albanian.
•	31 students at the American University in Bulgaria, Blagoevgrad.
•	55 students at Moscow State University Faculty of Journalism.
•	160 students at the University of Missouri- Columbia School of Journalism.
The demographics of the response group were both similar and 
different from that encountered in Kazakhstan in 2001[6].   The 
preponderance of students (75-85%) was 17-to-21 years old, but, where 
the American (71%), Bulgarian (62%) and Kazak (75%) groups were 
overwhelmingly female, the Russian sample contained more males (66%) 
and the Albanian group had slightly more males (58%) than females.
Although world or national events are certain to have affected 
specific responses, it is impossible to allow for these intervening 
variables in this study.[7]  The nature of the questionnaire itself 
is such as to exclude opinions about current events, but opinions in 
transitional societies are as subject to change as are day-to-day 
living conditions.  Economic and political forces in all three 
countries remain unstable, but the forces of war, famine, and anarchy 
were absent.
Results
	The pattern of media usage among the students studied is perhaps 
best seen in Table A, below, showing the percentage that make daily 
use of specific mass and computer-related media and of interpersonal 
communication (discussions with classmates).  In examining the 
comparative percentages, it is important to consider the general 
economic and living conditions of the students in the five nations, 
including the 2000 Kazak cadre.  In common with the their colleagues 
in Kazakhstan, the Albanian students tend to have very low incomes, 
even though most are also working, than do the Russians, who also 
tend to have jobs outside of school.  Both Russian and Albanian 
students tend to use the computers available to them on their jobs 
rather than the limited ones in Internet cafes or the 
classrooms.  Moreover, many Russian journalism students live with 
their parents in the Moscow area where Internet in the apartments is 
not uncommon.  Students at the American University in Bulgaria (AUBG) 
are not typical in all aspects of their media usage.  Even though 
many are from poor villages, they are attending an American-style 
institution, which has scores more computers available in the 
classrooms and dormitories than those of the other three 
schools.  However, the authors note that in Sofia, Plovdiv, Borgas, 
and other major Bulgarian cities, the youth are the principal 
customers in a rapidly growing number of Internet cafes.  The 
American students, of course, are likely to have their own laptops 
and enjoy daily access via Wi-Fi and numerous high-speed linkages.

Table A:  Daily Media Usage, Use of Mass, Computer-Mediated and 
Interpersonal Communications[8]
		Russia	Bulgaria	Albania	U.S.	(Kazakhstan)
TV News	71.9		48		84		13.1	(46.8)
Radio News    36.4		45		61		 8.1	(66.5)
Newspaper     47.3		42		48	          35.0	(29.6)
Talk shows      5.5		10		10                    6.9	(14.8)
Computer      98.2		100		48	        100.0	(19.7)
Internet        81.8		100		35	         99.4 	 ( 8.4)
I'net News   36.4		71		16	        40.6	 ( 1.5)
E-mail	        65.5		97		32	        97.5          ( 9.4)
Interp'l       98.2		52		44	       32.5	(59.1)
	In common with Kazak journalism students, Albanians are heavy users 
of radio news, while the AUBG students seem to spread their time 
across media, both print and broadcast.  In all three nations, 
however, radio is more readily available and offers a wider range of 
news and entertainment options than television.  In all three 
nations, economic constraints restrict access to daily newspapers, 
weeklies, and magazines sold from the kiosks.  Radio is not only the 
most available medium but arguably the most trusted in transitional 
nations.  Nevertheless, the sheer numbers of competing newspapers 
allow students to share newspapers, even those many days old, among 
themselves.  The fact that Albanian students, for example, say they 
read a daily newspaper frequently does not necessarily mean that they 
see it on the day of issue.
	The Russian journalism students, all studying at the most 
prestigious institution in the nation, Moscow State University, 
present a picture that might more closely resemble that of an 
American college journalism student.  They are high consumers of all 
media, comparatively speaking.  TV is more generally available to 
them, in both over the air and cable delivery.  Since most also are 
working or living at home, they tend to be able to afford more access 
to all types of media, including print.  Overall, it might be said 
that the media usage of Russian journalism students more accurately 
reflects that of Muscovites, living in a comparatively upscale, 
cosmopolitan capitol.
	The media consumption of the Missouri journalism students is similar 
to American college students in general.  Their higher interest in 
international news on the Internet is certainly related to their major.
Areas of interest were surprisingly similar in all four post-Soviet 
nations.  Males were most interested in sports, females more so in 
entertainment.  Interests in politics, perhaps discouragingly, and in 
religion, were uniformly low – and more archetypically American.  All 
four groups expressed the highest interest in news from outside their 
own nations, paying significantly more attention to international 
news than do most of their American counterparts.
	Whether e-mail or other Internet usages, American, Russian and 
Bulgarian journalism students were by far greater users of 
computer-mediated communication techniques than their Albanian or 
Kazakh colleagues were.   More than twice the percentage reported 
daily usage of the Internet.  But were their attitudes about 
democracy different from those with narrower "windows to the 
world"?  The next three tables summarize the profiles of these five 
groups of student journalists.  In Table C and D, two Likert-scale 
items have been combined because the percentages of those in the 
"Strongly Agree" category often ranged between zero and two percent.
Table B: Percentage Answering "Strongly Agree" to Items Considered
"Essential to a Democracy"
			Russia   Bulgaria	   Albania	U.S.	   (Kazakhstan)
Free/Fair Elections    56.4		84		65	  90.0		(54.7)
Speech/Assembly	58.2		71		68	  86.3               (41.4)	
Rule of Law		50.9		61		42	  51.9               (44.8)
Human Rights	58.2		81		42	 81.3    	(66.5)	
Private Property	36.4		65		26	 49.4		(22.2)
Free Association	25.5		48		35	64.4		(23.6)

As Merrill, among others, has commented, the concept of democracy 
varies widely across the globe, from "demos" to "demos."  However, 
the basic concepts of the Western conception are clearly embodied in 
the six principles noted in Table B.  And yet, with the exception of 
the Bulgarian sample – taken from an American-style university – 
these principles are not taken as inarguable democratic "essentials" 
by the student journalists studied.  Although human rights offer the 
strongest support, the other democratic principles get at best a 
small majority of absolute agreements.  The questions of private 
property and free association are less regarded among the respondents 
as being essential to democratic society.  Of course, all these 
elements fared significantly better when "Agree" was added to the 
scalar total.  The doubts about private property in the new, free 
market economies of formerly socialist societies are to be expected, 
but the relative lack of value given to free association deserves 
further examination.
The American sophomores' responses adhere, not surprisingly, to the 
Western version of essential freedoms.  The relatively lower regard 
for rule of law, private property and the market economy raises 
eyebrows, as does the relatively low opinion of the freedom of 
association as a pillar of democracy – considering its prominence in 
the 1st Amendment. The authors can only conjecture that this response 
is somehow related to the stage of life, values and life experiences 
of these young U.S. students.  Certainly these values have been less 
challenged during their lifetimes and the lifetimes of their parents 
than those in the post-Soviet nations.
	By comparing Tables B and C, which combine Strongly Agree and Agree 
categories, we see a hint of the reasons involved.  In none of the 
four transitional nations, according to the student journalists, do 
these situations currently exist.  News events would seem to validate 
their cynicism.  In fact, Russian journalism students give the worst 
"report card" of any national group.[9]  By combining these two 
agreement categories, we also see that the perceived reality of free 
association fares much better in Bulgaria and Albania, but still 
garners only a bare majority in Russia.  The responses of the 
American student journalists indicate that they feel their freedoms 
are secure, perhaps so secure that it does not directly concern them 
or, at least, does not have the salience in their daily lives of 
their post-Soviet  counterparts.
Table C: Percentage Answering "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" to Items
That "We Have in Our Country Today…"
			Russia   Bulgaria	   Albania	U.S.    (Kazakhstan)
Free/Fair Elections	10.9		65	         19	90.6            (57.6)
Speech/Assembly	21.8		58	        48	97.5            (56.6)
Rule of Law		 9.1		20	       19		93.0            (50.2)
Human Rights	21.8		32	       42		93.8            (43.3)
Private Property	56.4		48	       62		94.4           (21.7)
Free Association	52.7		71	       79 	90.1           (23.2)

Although the current study did not survey its subjects' perceptions 
of media credibility, inferences of collected data indicate what 
might be characterized as a hesitant relationship with Internet news 
and with more traditional outlets. The authors have been told by 
these students, for example, that:  "We don't watch TV news, we 
witness it."  Even during times of social transition, these students 
focus on non-controversial and less subjective areas such as sports 
and entertainment.  Much as with many American students, there is a 
visible disinterest in politics, suggesting low credibility of news 
sources may play a role in shaping media absorption. When considered 
in conjunction with the unfavorable assessment of democracy in their 
countries (with only a fifth of the Russian students seeing freedom 
of speech at work in their nation), this study may further the 
suspicion that even unconventional and "Western" modes of 
communication, such as the Internet, would share these traditional 
suspicions and values.  In short, why should the new media be any 
more credible than the old?
Looking at Tables B and C, we also see reflected a cynical picture of 
the future of such democratic nations in the minds of these 
post-Soviet future journalists.  This appears to indicate that 
journalism students in these transitional societies are no more 
optimistic or idealistic than the youth in other fields and at other 
levels, described by others.  Considering the mix of cynicism and 
idealism so highly valued by Western journalists, this is 
discouraging.  The origins are found in numerous events in these 
nations over the past decade-and-a-half, as well as in their 
tumultuous histories, particularly of the 20th century.  It comes 
forward in a three-dimensional fashion by the attitudes reflected in Table D.
Table D: Percentage Answering "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" to Items
That "It is normal in a democracy to find…"
			   Russia	Bulgaria	Albania    U.S.     (Kazakhstan)
Strong-hand leader	    54.5		48		52	         65.6             (60.6)
Information control	    20.0		 9		13	         15.6	      (36.0)
Economic elite	    12.7		 9		39	         33.7             (16.8)
Election manipulation   18.2		13		10	         15.7             (12.3)
Crime & disorder	    3.6		12		19	         20.6             (11.8)

	Interpretations of a "strong leader" vary when applied to 
personalities:  George Bush, Vladimir Putin, etc.  Referring to the 
appended questionnaire, note that the entire statement reads: "It is 
normal in a democracy for the leader to have a strong hand to 
preserve law and order."  The interpretation of "law and order" also 
varies widely in the transitional nations of the post-Soviet world, 
from the near dictatorship of Kazakhstan's N. Nazarbayev to the shaky 
leadership of Albania's Fatos Nano to Vladimir Putin's 21st century 
"managed democracy."  However, the students from all four 
transitional nations seem to see this as an element of democracy, 
although only barely.  Less "normal" by far are the other, more 
disturbing features, of life in many of the transitional nations, 
"mafia" of various sorts, challenges to press freedom, the maligned 
oligarchs, and doubtful election procedures that cause international 
observers to shake their heads in disbelief.  All four post-Soviet 
student groups tend to see these as aberrations to the developing 
democratic processes of which they are a part.
	Unlike their Eastern-European colleagues, American students 
responding to the questionnaire likely drew their assertions from 
their own political system, rather than a hypothetical and, perhaps, 
idealistic democracy. This may explain why American numbers trumped 
nearly all percentages from the other samples. Missouri students may 
have interpreted the question to mean "the following is common in a 
democracy," whereas the Eastern-European students may have read it as 
"it is acceptable to have the following in a democracy." The 
distinction may explain why students living the world's most famous 
democracy are so permissive of such negatively-connoted concepts as a 
strong-handed leader and the control of an economic elite.
	Furthermore, given the relatively young age of the surveyed 
Americans, their assessments are likely to reflect their rating of 
the current administration, rather than a historical evaluation of 
American democracy. Given the recent events in Iraq, the comfortable 
majority of Missouri students accepting a strong-handed leader in 
maintaining law and order begins to make sense.  Although of 
comparable age, the other respondents have different recent 
experiences relative to the idea of democracy.

Discussion –
The 1999 Gallup International Millennium Survey[10] puts into context 
some generalized attitudes towards democracy in different areas of 
the world. Although Western democratic reformers continue to see 
cause for alarm for the state of democracy across the world, Eastern 
European and Central Asian countries (Russia is both)seem to be in 
particular trouble.
Slightly less than a third of the world's population considers their 
country to be governed by the will of the people. In Eastern Europe, 
that number is only 12%, the lowest of all surveyed areas. Eastern 
Europeans are also the least confident in free and fair elections, 
with only 26% answering positively, as compared with the 47% 
international average. More than half of the citizens in Eastern 
Europe questioned in this survey described their governments as 
corrupt, the highest percentage in the world. Asia, West Africa and 
Latin America trailed Eastern Europe in perceived government 
corruption by more than 10%.
This study's findings suggest a dissonance between the application of 
the Internet in the countries examined and its predictive powers of 
social mobilization and change. There is also an evident political 
cynicism common in the young people polled in this study.  None of 
this, of course, is particularly surprising.  The long-discredited 
"Bullet Theory" of mass communication is more unified with 
expectations of 19th century Jeffersonian libertarians than the "real 
politic" practitioners of today.
	While the subjects' perceptions of democratic essentials may appear 
inconsistent with Habermas' expectations for a partially media 
conscious and web-savvy audience, their level of political 
participation is certainly a good fit to his models of deliberative 
democracy. Even given the chance to learn about and observe 
democratic ideas, the students in these countries cannot yet see the 
product of their participation in the results of government and society.
Before there can be full participation in democracy, individual 
citizens must see themselves as an important part of political life. 
They must take the concept of participation in government seriously, 
and believe that they have a contribution to make and a duty to make 
it (Thornton, p. 20).

Habermas would argue that their inability to really control their own 
polities renders their existence in the public sphere futile and 
perhaps even inconsequential.
	There is another question to be asked in thinking about the 
students' responses to what constitutes a democracy—whose democracy 
is being represented through their media and the Internet? Thornton 
argues that there is an inherent "first-world bias" operating on the 
Internet, which sets the electronic agenda according to American 
culture and concerns (2002). More Americans use the Internet than all 
other nationalities combined, with American domain names amounting to 
nearly half of the content on the net (Thornton, 2002). This can 
potentially breed cynicism and indifference about the Internet's 
relevance and potential for social transformation in other 
countries.  Not surprisingly, our Missouri students fit nicely to the 
assumptions of Internet-fed democracy and democracy in general.
	There are many other obstacles to predicting what capability the 
Internet has for furthering the democratic process. Language and 
access are among the obvious tangible factors. A more subtle but real 
concern is government control and surveillance. Thornton asserts that 
there is a fear that "government controls will diminish the ability 
of the Internet to support democracy affectively," (2002). This can 
be interpreted both as the deliberate measures taken by the 
government to stifle unwanted materials from spreading, and as the 
impetus for self-censorship and mistrust of the Internet's anonymity 
in the pursuit of information.

Conclusions and Comments –
	The major limitation of this study is that it involves a secondary 
analysis of data from a larger study designed for a broader 
purpose.  It is possible to view our observations as only a pilot 
effort that could be more efficiently studied with a different 
instrument or even a different methodology.  We would accept that 
judgment, but also point to a paucity of evidence that is in danger 
of being overwhelmed by democratic rhetoric and Western hopes and dreams.
In the aggregate, this three-nation convenience data set, when 
combined to the earlier Kazak study and compared to the parallel 
American profile, gives little confidence that Internet access is a 
stimulus to belief in democratic principles and practices.  Russian 
students were perhaps more doubting of democratic principles and 
results than the Kazaks or Albanians, who had relatively much less 
access to computer-mediated communication and its opportunity to see 
the outside world.  The Bulgarian sample, as mentioned above, is if 
anything perhaps more reflective of the Americanized environment of 
education at AUBG.  In many aspects it mirrors the American data but 
the small N is perhaps most instructive for its heuristics.
	Social science contradicts philosophy at many points.  To think that 
the Internet is a magical, electronic ride to Jeffersonian 
principles, much less to the marketplace of ideas, could easily be 
labeled naïve.  Rather, for the increasingly media-wise students of 
the E-Generation in any nation, exposure to the Internet is a 
"window" to both the good and the bad in the world.  The WWW window's 
breadth is perhaps more even-handed potentially than the Cold War 
propaganda that helped breed such unrealistic expectations among the 
citizens of the Communist bloc.  As such, it can breed cynicism and 
anger as well as ambition and envy.
	Future studies should attempt to link more directly the images 
encountered on the Internet with the opinions of post-Soviet 
youth.  Nevertheless, no protocol that takes place in the 
transitional realities of post-Soviet nations can presume to offer a 
clear cause-and-effect relationship.  There will always be the 
intervening and confounding variables of current events, of the 
"Russian/Bulgarian/Albanian/Kazak reality" in which the student 
journalists studied already find themselves. Our American data offer 
similar questions and complications.   How appreciative of democratic 
freedoms are U.S. journalism students and how will this awareness, or 
absence of it, affect their future professional level.
Other possibilities for future research might focus on how journalism 
students are taught to treat internet news and information in terms 
of credibility and censorship. Obviously not everything on the WWW 
can be trusted, but how to you select while keeping the ideal of a 
marketplace of ideas?
Also, it might be interesting to research trends in foreign-language 
websites. How many are news-centered? How many charge for access? How 
popular are they? How long do they stay up? Such research would help 
to gauge how internet media outlets that are more relevant and even 
tailored to these transitional nations are progressing.
Perhaps the ultimate question is this:  Will Internet access and 
proficiency make them better journalists in the future?  This is a 
question worth asking for student journalists of transitional and 
stable societies, developed and developing nations alike.

References:






















Appendix
Questionnaire

	Thank you for agreeing to participate in a comparative 
cross-cultural study. Please answer the following questions fairly 
and honestly. The administrators of the study guarantee your 
anonymity and will keep your answers confidential.

I. In the following section, indicate your media use by circling the 
response that most clearly reflects your opinion. Your responses will 
be kept confidential.

1. How often do you watch national TV newscasts? (Circle one.)
Rarely			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

2. How often do you listen to radio newscasts?
Rarely			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

3. How often to you read a newspaper?
Rarely			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

4. How often do you read a magazine with social and political content?
Rarely			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

5. How often do you watch primetime TV talk shows?
Rarely			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

6. How often do you use a computer?
Never			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily
	
7. How often do you use the Internet?
Never			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

8. How often to you use the Internet for world news?
Never			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

9. How often do you use e-mail?
Never			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

10. How often do you discuss contemporary issues with your classmates?
Never			Monthly 		Weekly			Daily

11. How interested are you in news about political figures and events 
in your nation's capital?
	Not at all		Not too			Somewhat		Very

12. How interested are you in news about International Affairs?
	Not at all		Not too			Somewhat		Very

13. How closely do you follow news about local government?
	Not at all	Not too closely	Somewhat closely	Very closely

14. How closely do you follow news about people and events in your 
local community?
	Not at all	Not too closely	Somewhat closely	Very closely

15. How closely do you follow news about religion?
	Not at all	Not too closely	Somewhat closely	Very closely

16. How closely do you follow news about health?
	Not at all	Not too closely	Somewhat closely	Very closely

17. How closely do you follow news about sports?
	Not at all	Not too closely	Somewhat closely	Very closely

18. How closely do you follow news about entertainment?
	Not at all	Not too closely	Somewhat closely	Very closely

19. How closely do you follow news about economic issues?
	Not at all	Not too closely	Somewhat closely	Very closely

20. Essential to democracy are:
a.	Free and fair elections
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
b.	Freedom of speech and assembly
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
c.	The rule of law
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
d.	Individual human rights
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
e.	Private property and market economy
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
f.	The right of free association
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

21. In my county we have:
a.	Free and fair elections
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
b.	In my country we have freedom of speech and assembly
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
c.	In my country we have the rule of law
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
d.	In my country we have individual human rights
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
e.	In my country we have private property and market economy
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
f.	In my country we have the right of free association
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

22. It is normal in a democracy for the leader to have a strong hand 
to preserve law and order.
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree


23. It is normal for the leader of a democracy to control the flow of 
information.
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

24. It is normal in a democracy to find a concentration of economic 
power in the hands of the new elite.
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

25. It is normal in a democracy to find manipulation in elections.
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

26. It is normal in a democracy to have a lot of crime and disorder.
Strongly agree		Agree		Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

27. You are:	____   Female		____  Male

28. Your age group is
      ___ 17-19	   ___ 20-21	  ___ 22-24	___ 25-27	___ 28-30	___ over 30

29. In which class are you?
      ___a. Freshman   ___b. Sophomore  ___c. Junior  ___d. 
Senior   ___e. Grad student

30. Of what country are you a citizen? ___________________

31. Do you have work experience in mass media?
	_____ Yes		_____ No

32. If you answered "yes" to the previous questions, please, explain 
what work experience in mass media do you have:

______________________________________________________________________




Thank you for your cooperation!
[1]  With apologies to those fond of the American Civil War's own 
"Battle Hymn of the Republic."
[2]  For other details of their methodology consult their original 
paper, presented to the International Communication Division at the 
2001 AEJMC convention in Washington, DC.
[3]  Only half used a computer at least weekly.  A fifth used the 
Internet, and only a tenth looked at the WWW  for world news on a weekly basis.
[4]  The nations chosen were governed by the overseas teaching 
assignments and contacts of the senior author who is part of the 
faculty at the U.S. journalism school and has served as a visiting 
professor at universities in all three nations.  These experiences 
also helped him assess the validity of the data, particularly the 
usage patterns reported by the students.  Most of this paper's 
observations of how students at these three universities live and 
work is based on his personal observations.
[5]  A federal-mandated, institutional requirement for human subjects 
studies at most American universities.
[6]  Respondents were usually citizens of the nations where they went 
to school, with the exception of one Turk in the Albanian group and a 
Ukrainian from the Moscow State group.  However, a third of the AUBG 
sample was from elsewhere in the Balkan region:  Albania, Kosovo, 
Romania, Macedonia, and Moldova with one other from Belarus.  All 
U.S. respondents were American citizens.
[7]  The instrument was administered between November 2001 and 
October 2003 for the overseas groups.  American students were polled 
in February 2005.

[8]  Because of the comparatively smaller N's the Bulgarian and 
Albanian questionnaires were hand-analyzed and percentages were 
rounded.  The larger Russian and Kazakh samples were analyzed using 
SPSS and use fractional percentages.
[9]  It is interesting to note that, at Moscow State, the instrument 
was administered in the "run-up" to the elections for the Fall 2003 
Russian parliament (Duma).
[10]  The Gallup International Millennium Survey is the largest 
survey ever made on World Opinion. 50,000 people in 60 countries have 
been interviewed. This represents a total global population of 1.25 billion.
www.gallup-international.com/ContentFiles/millennium5.asp.



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