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Coverage of Illusion: Framing the Pre-Iraq War Debate
Mass Communication and Society Division
Jacob Groshek
Graduate Student
School of Journalism
Indiana University
704 W. 4th St.
Bloomington, IN 47401
[log in to unmask]
812-333-9718
Submitted for possible presentation to the Association for Education
in Journalism and Mass Communication national conference, August 2005
and for consideration in the Leslie J. Moeller Award competition.
Coverage of Illusion: Framing the Pre-Iraq War Debate 9
Coverage of Illusion: Framing the Pre-Iraq War Debate
In a January 2003 Knight Ridder poll, 66% of respondents reported a
"good understanding" of the reasons for and against going to war in
Iraq (Berman, 2003). The same poll, however, revealed that a large
proportion of people surveyed incorrectly understood several crucial
justifications for the pending war. These included the involvement
of Iraq and Saddam Hussein in the September 11 attacks and proof of
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Similar polls, including one
conducted by the Pew Research Center, corroborated public opinion of
the time (Berman, 2003; Kull, Ramsey, & Lewis, 2003).
Media critic and author Michael Massing attributed the lack of
accurate public understanding regarding the Iraq War to ineffective
and overly sympathetic news reporting (2004). "With many analysts
prepared to discuss the competing claims over the intelligence on
Iraq, the press was in a good position to educate the public on the
administration's justifications for war. Yet for the most part, it
never did so" (Massing, 2004, p. 9). Physicist and former weapons
inspector David Albright agreed, stating that "the administration was
setting the agenda for what stories should be covered, and the news
media bought into that, rather than take a critical look at the
administration's underlying reasons for war" (cited in Massing, 2004, p. 10).
Other, similar post-hoc criticisms of "the cheerleading and
passivity of the coverage before and during the war" (Seib, 2004, p.
156) have emerged recently. This study seeks to examine the news
coverage of the pre-Iraq War debate, specifically how the debate and
opposition or support for the war were framed. In doing so, this
study attempts to determine if news coverage of the pre-war period
had the capacity to engender citizens' understanding of the pros and
cons of the war and thereby act as an effective agent of democracy.
The Proportion and Shape of Coverage
Entman and Page (1994) wrote that "reporting that circulates
information and opinion at odds with the administration is vital to
the possibility of democracy in foreign policy" (p. 83). There have
been numerous scholarly studies that have examined the degree to
which the media are critical of the administration (see Althaus, Edy,
Entman, & Phalen, 1996; Bennett, 1990; Herman & Chomsky, 1988;
Mermin, 1999; Zaller & Chiu, 1996). These studies have concluded
that media coverage, specifically of foreign affairs, has limited
independence from the government and journalists act as "passive
'chroniclers' rather than active 'examiners'" (Dorman & Livingston,
1994, p. 76). The erosion of a confrontational media similarly
reduces the basis for citizens to participate in the deliberation of
foreign policy or to consider alternatives. As Graber (2002) wrote,
"Judged in terms of the information needs of the ideal citizen in the
ideal democracy, the end product of the gatekeeping process is
inadequate" (p. 131).
Mermin (1999) reported low levels of critical coverage surfacing in
press coverage over several U.S.-initiated military campaigns. His
findings were generally consistent, albeit more extreme, with those
of Zaller and Chiu (1996) and Entman and Page (1994). Regarding
coverage of the pre-Iraq War debate, New York Times columnist Paul
Krugman wrote, "U.S. media outlets–operating in an environment in
which anyone who questions the administration's foreign policy is
accused of being unpatriotic–have taken it as their assignment to
sell the war, not to present a mix of information that might call the
justification for war into question" (cited in Seib, 2004, p.
79). When considering this assessment and previous research,
Hypothesis 1 predicts that a "journalism of deference to the national
security state" (Dorman & Livingston, 1994, p. 76) will continue.
H1: There will be more nonoppositional coverage (N) of President
Bush's policy toward Iraq than oppositional coverage (O). (N > O, p < .05).
Implications and Types of News Frames
Thus far, this study has addressed the volume of opposition in media
coverage during the pre-Iraq War debate. While the previously posed
hypothesis examined a key aspect of debate coverage, it fails to
capture how the debate was framed by the media. Framing is an
important interpretive process of selecting and highlighting some
features of reality and obscuring others while promoting "a
particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution" (Entman,
2003, emphasis in original) in news coverage. Framing is how the
media define and give meaning to issues and connect them to a larger
environment (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001). The question at the heart
of the issue of news frames is not merely what information coverage
provides, but how interpretative frames structure understanding of an issue.
The months leading up to the start of the Iraq War saw large amounts
of media coverage devoted to the potential war. In doing so, the
media adopted particular frames and explanations to report on the
looming prospect of war. Such explanations often originate with
either hawks or doves, and the media generally follow these cues when
reporting stories (Sigal, 1973). Through framing, news coverage may
magnify or shrink elements to make them more or less publicly salient
(Entman, 1991). "By providing, repeating, and thereby reinforcing
words and visual images that reference some ideas but not others,
frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less
so – and others entirely invisible" (Entman, 1991, p. 7). Through
consistency in news frames, a story often assumes a dominant
interpretation of events and issues. This dominant frame will be
"more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others"
(Entman, 1991, p. 7). Similarly, this dominant frame has the
potential to preclude other frames and views from emerging or being
considered legitimate. Alternative viewpoints may be minimized or
negated in the construction of one dominant news frame that emerges
in media coverage.
Most news frames can be broken down into one of two major
categories: strategy frames or substance frames (Nacos, Shapiro, &
Isernia, 2000). Strategy frames report stories from a competitive
standpoint, in terms of winners and losers. Substance frames focus
on the issue based on its own merits. This lexicon is similar in
scope to episodic or thematic (Iyengar & Simon, 1994)
frames. Strategy frames have qualities that resemble episodic
frames, whereas substantive frames are more closely aligned to
thematic framing, which "places public issues in some general or
abstract concept" (Iyengar & Simon, 1994, p. 171). For purposes of
this study, the categorization outlined by Nacos, Shapiro, and
Isernia (2000) was followed. In addition, this categorization could
also capture the spirit of Iyengar and Simon's typology.
Strategy frames tend to politicize an issue. These frames can be
seen in coverage of the "horse-race," or "game-framing," of
election-day polling coverage. Strategy frames emphasize political
bickering and conflict between parties and are generally
characterized by simplicity, emotions, and personality (Nacos, et.
al., 2000). Strategy frames are closely related to procedural
coverage, as described by Entman and Page (1994). Procedural frames
focus on "the process and politics of decision-making" (Entman &
Page, 1994, p. 87). Strategy and procedural frames remain popular in
the news media and with reporters.
Substance frames focus on making known to the public important
information on policy issues (Nacos et. al., 2000). Substance frames
avoid the trap of politicizing coverage. This style of reporting
does not look at issues or policy decisions as contests with winners
and losers, but rather "concentrates on the debate of facts, issues,
context, policies, and institutional policy issues" (Nacos et al.,
2000). A substance-framed news story would look at the history,
background, and goals of a policy and use that information to explain
the issue.
Iyengar and Simon (1994) noted that media coverage of debate
surrounding the use of force is often political in nature. That is,
the coverage focuses on the political day-to-day of the debate as
well as the process of implementing the policy. Relatively little
coverage is devoted to explaining policy options and alternatives,
which is also consistent with the findings of Dorman and Livingston
(1994). In the same manner, Hypothesis 2 tests the relative amounts
of substance and strategy framed coverage.
H2: Strategy coverage (St) of President Bush's policy toward Iraq
will appear more frequently than substantive coverage (Su) of the
Bush policy toward Iraq.
(St > Su, p < .05).
Framing Opposition and Support in Media Coverage
To promote a further understanding of how the public could know the
debate, the follow section examines how both opposition and support
for the policy were framed. As previously discussed, substance
frames are not necessarily simply explanations of issues; they also
carry weight as value-laden judgments. "Substantive news frames
perform at least two of the following basic functions in covering
events, issues, and political actors: defining effects or conditions
as problematic, identifying causes, conveying a moral judgment of
those involved in the framed matter, endorsing remedies or
improvements to the problematic situation" (Entman, 2003, p.
417) Therefore, substantive frames impart a larger platform for
understanding than strategy frames.
Undoubtedly, the winning and losing of political debates and policy
decisions is a crucial part of the American political
process. "Democratic politics is at heart a strategic contest for
power" (Mermin, 1999, p. 27). However, the news media should not
"encourage citizens to experience politics in these terms" (Mermin,
1999, p. 27). Likewise, Cappella and Jamieson (1997) found that
strategy-framed coverage promoted cynicism among the American public
towards the political process and actors.
Despite the shortcomings of strategy framing, it remains a widespread
practice in news reporting. Specifically, when covering debate or
conflict over an issue, journalists can quickly cover and simplify
the story by using a strategy frame rather than opting for the
deeper, contextualized substantive frame. Alternatively, when making
its case for policy, the administration often lay bare the goals,
merits, and justifications of its policy. Since the administration
and proponents of the policy essentially "spell out" the policy and
its justifications and benefits, journalists are apt to frame
supportive (or nonoppositional) material in a substantive
manner. This subjective experience and interpretation of news
coverage led to Hypotheses 3 and 4.
H3: Oppositional coverage (O) will be framed more frequently with
strategy frames (OSt) than substantive frames (OSu). (OSt > OSu, p< .05).
H4: Nonoppositional coverage (N) will be framed more frequently with
substantive frames (NSu) than strategy frames (NSt). (NSu > NSt, p < .05).
Method
To test the hypotheses, a content analysis of coverage in the New
York Times and Washington Post was conducted. These papers were
selected because they have "large foreign news staffs, high prestige
and sophistication, and a proven record of willingness to take on the
government" (Entman & Page, 1994, p. 84). Additionally, these two
papers are "often regarded as the two leading newspapers in the
country" (Dorman & Livingston, 1994, p. 69). As such, these
newspapers are the leading intermedia agenda setting outlets (Weaver,
McCombs, & Shaw, 2004). What these papers consider important and how
they handle the issue is likely to be duplicated across other media
outlets. Therefore, these newspapers can be considered generally
representative of the mediated public sphere (Bennett et al., 2004)
and this study predictive of mainstream media coverage at large.
The timeframe for the analysis ran from two weeks before Congress
passed the resolution on October 11, 2002, which authorized President
Bush to use military force in Iraq to two weeks after the vote: from
September 27 to October 25, 2002. This two-week period before and
after the vote was chosen because it was "long enough for critical
angles that might not have been immediately apparent to emerge"
(Mermin, 1999, p. 42). Also, this timeframe can be considered
representative of the most vigorous debate, specifically domestically.
Articles from the "news section" of each newspaper comprised the
sample of this study. The news section was defined as section A on
weekdays and section 1 on weekend editions. This study focused on
coverage understood by the public to be unbiased, objective news and
purported to be so by news organizations. The sample therefore did
not include editorials, letters, and opinion pieces because they are
not held to the same notions of objectivity. Furthermore, editorials
were excluded on the basis they are not as widely read. Bogart
(1981) reported editorial readership at only 25%, compared to 53% of
news readers who start reading with the front page. Bogart also
wrote that nine in ten readers claimed to open the general news
section. "News analysis" pieces were included because they appear in
the news section and are presented as objective analyses of issues
and events.
Several key aspects defined the Bush administration's policy towards
Iraq: Forcing the immediate disarmament of Iraq, using military force
if necessary, and acting unilaterally if necessary. This was the
platform of the Bush administration in its attempts to build domestic
and international support from the outset. While the administration
may have made some concessions or emphasized some issues in order to
gain support for this policy, it remained fundamentally the same in
the timeframe studied.
Articles that focused on the administration's policy towards Iraq
were selected for study. These articles centered on at least one of
three topics: First, international or domestic commentary, support,
or opposition of the policy; second, U.N. inspections of Iraqi
weapons; third, coalition building for the policy, either
international or domestic. Selected articles included information
either about the policy or the process of implementing the policy
both domestically and internationally.
The sample did not include articles that peripherally mentioned the
Bush policy. Also excluded were articles that discussed the Bush
policy towards Iraq primarily as being only a minor issue for
political elections, foreign or domestic. Other excluded articles
focused on business or economic issues and only mentioned the Bush
policy towards Iraq as a corollary.
The unit of analysis was a paragraph of text. Photographs and
cutlines that appeared with photos were also coded using the same
rules as paragraphs. Photographs featured independently of an
article were treated as a separate article, coded in the same manner
as other items of analysis. The framing impact of visuals is
considerable, and this study attempted to incorporate their
effect. Charts, graphs, and any images other than photographs were
not included in this study due to their complexity and infrequent
appearance with news stories.
The headline and first ten paragraphs of each article were
coded. Ten was chosen for the number of paragraphs because most
articles in the Times and Post are between fifteen and thirty
paragraphs long (Mermin, 1999). Because of the typical inverted
pyramid style of reporting, the tone of the article was well
established in the first ten paragraphs. As such, information
regarded as the most important appears in the first ten paragraphs,
and the information buried further in the story carries less
weight. Similarly, any alternative viewpoints expressed in the first
ten paragraphs are considered more important. These paragraphs are
also more crucial to the framing of the story than paragraphs at or
near the end of the article or after a page jump, where readership
has been shown to drop (Bogart, 1981).
Oppositional and Nonoppositional Codes
To test Hypothesis 1, each paragraph was coded as being either
"oppositional" or "nonoppositional" toward President Bush's
policy. Nonoppositional coverage included both "neutral" and
"supportive" categories, which were not used to avoid ambiguity
(Mermin, 1999). Paragraphs that clearly articulated criticism or
indicated opposition to President Bush's policy or questioned
official justification were coded as oppositional. The measure of
the oppositional frame was determined from a closed-ended "yes/no"
option with two categories measuring criticism of President Bush's
policy and opposition to President Bush's policy. The categories
were: first, was criticism of President Bush's policy present in the
paragraph and second, was opposition to President Bush's policy
present in the paragraph. If the "no" option was recorded for both
categories, the paragraph was coded as nonoppositional. If the "yes"
option was recorded for either category, the paragraph was coded as
oppositional.
Oppositional coverage included any mention of debate surrounding the
policy, as the debate itself was an indication of opposition to the
policy. Oppositional coverage may have appeared as opposition or
criticism to any of the "core" assumptions of the Bush policy. These
core assumptions included: Iraq should be disarmed, the Iraq regime
should change, Iraq presents a threat to the United States, military
engagement is acceptable, unilateral action by the United States is
acceptable, and action to disarm Iraq must be taken immediately.
Paragraphs that predicted or suggested failures or negative side
effects of the policy were coded as oppositional. Paragraphs that
mentioned opposition as semantic disagreements, such as the number of
UN Security Council resolutions, were also coded as
oppositional. Photographs that portrayed anti-war demonstrations
were coded as oppositional.
Paragraphs that simply described the policy or its goals were coded
as nonoppositional. Nonoppositional paragraphs included all of the
paragraphs that did not clearly express or indicate opposition or
criticism to the Bush policy towards Iraq. Criticisms outside the
scope of the policy towards Iraq, such as criticisms of Bush's
competence, were coded as nonoppositional. Photographs that showed
politicians speaking, shaking hands, and so forth were coded as
nonoppositional.
Substantive and Strategy Codes
To examine Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, paragraphs were coded in terms of
substance and strategy. These paragraphs were differentiated on the
basis of the following yes/no categorization: paragraphs that
describe why this policy is being implemented were coded as
substantive paragraphs; paragraphs that described the process of the
policy being implemented were coded as strategy paragraphs.
Substantive paragraphs were concerned with answering why the policy
is or is not desirable. Substantive paragraphs included descriptions
of the policy, merits of the policy, goals of the policy, and the
implications or impacts of the policy (Lawrence, 2000). Substantive
paragraphs were recognized by their focus on the policy. Substantive
coverage addressed the core assumptions of the policy: Iraq should be
disarmed, the Iraq regime should change, Iraq presents a threat to
the United States, military engagement is acceptable, unilateral
action by the United States is acceptable, and action to disarm Iraq
must be taken immediately. Any paragraph that discussed these core
assumptions was considered substantive.
Strategy paragraphs covered information on the "process and politics
of decision making" (Entman & Page, 1994, p. 87) such as President
Bush's attempts to build a coalition and sway Congressional and
public opinion. Strategy paragraphs described how the policy is or
is not being implemented. Paragraphs that described debate between
international or domestic parties on policy issues were coded as
strategy paragraphs, as this was considered a function of the
political process of implementing the policy. Strategy paragraphs
included evaluations of President Bush's competence, leadership, and
ability. Paragraphs that discussed, but did not definitively predict
the outcome of the policy as a success or failure were coded as
strategy paragraphs (see Mermin, 1999). Strategy paragraphs were not
concerned with the core assumptions of the policy, but rather issues
that surrounded the policy, including: political alliances for the
policy, public, elite, and foreign opinion, political motives of the
policy, competence of Bush, political implications of the policy,
winning or losing policy debate, and the success or possible, not
predicted, failure of the policy.
Coders and Reliability
The author coded all of the articles that met the selection
criteria. For reliability purposes, approximately one-quarter of the
selected articles were also coded by two coders trained in the
definitions of the categories and data input. Each coder
independently coded the same one-quarter of the articles, selected at
random. The reliability scores were tested between the author and
the two coders using Cohen's Kappa. "Oppositional or nonoppositional
coverage" agreement earned a score of 0.85. "Substantive or strategy
coverage" agreement produced a score of 0.73. These agreement
scores, which controlled for chance, are generally considered
acceptable (Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000).
Results
A total of 202 articles, which included 2442 units of analysis, were
coded. One hundred and ten articles appeared in the New York Times
and 92 in the Washington Post. Of the 202 articles, 161 included at
least one paragraph with oppositional coverage. All units were coded
in terms of oppositional or nonoppositional as well as substantive or
strategy frames.
The first hypothesis predicted that there will be more
nonoppositional coverage (N) of President Bush's policy toward Iraq
than oppositional coverage (O).
(N > O, p < .05). This hypothesis was supported, with 793 (32%)
paragraphs coded as oppositional compared to 1,649 (68%) paragraphs
coded as nonoppositional. A difference of proportions test revealed
a statistically significant difference: Z = 12.6, p<.001. It can
therefore be concluded that opposition to policy was less frequent
than neutral and supportive coverage, lending evidence to the
suggestion that "Most investigative energy was directed at stories
that supported, rather than challenged, the administration's case"
(Massing, 2004, p. 9).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that strategy coverage (St) of President
Bush's policy toward Iraq will appear more frequently than
substantive coverage (Su) of the Bush policy toward Iraq. (St > Su,
p < .05). This hypothesis was supported. A total of 564 (23%)
paragraphs were coded as framing the policy in a substantive manner
whereas 1,878 (77%) paragraphs were coded as framing the policy as a
strategy issue. A difference of proportions test was run to examine
this data. This test yielded a Z-score of 28.6, which indicates that
the difference between these two groups was not due to
chance. Written using statistical indicia, Z = 28.6, p <.001. Thus,
it can be concluded that the pre-Iraq war debate presented in the two
newspapers under investigation overwhelming framed it as a matter of
process and politics, not substance.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that oppositional coverage (O) will be framed
more frequently with strategy frames (OSt) than substantive frames
(OSu). (OSt > OSu, p< .05). This hypothesis was analyzed using a
t-test. There was a significant effect for frames, t(200) = 8.18, p
< .001, with strategy frames appearing more frequently than
substantive frames. The mean number of substantive-framed paragraphs
was 0.96 per article, compared to 2.95 strategy-framed paragraphs per
article. Opposition was dominantly framed as a matter of process and
politics, rather than a merit-based evaluation of the policy
itself. This evidence suggests media coverage did not provide
citizens a "foundation for continued opposition" (Entman & Page, 1994, p. 90).
Hypothesis 4 predicted that nonoppositional coverage (N) will be
framed more frequently with substantive frames (NSu) than strategy
frames (NSt). (NSu > NSt, p < .05). This hypothesis was also
analyzed using a t-test. There was a significant effect for frames
in this category as well, however not in the direction predicted,
t(200) = 8.57, p < .001. Strategy frames dominated again, with an
average of 6.35 per article, compared to 1.83 substantive-framed
nonoppositional paragraphs per article.
This can best be explained as a response to the largely
strategy-framed opposition. With a dearth of substantive criticisms,
little effort was made by the administration and the press to balance
these criticisms. These findings suggest that supportive and neutral
(nonoppositional) coverage was framed in direct proportion to the
framing of oppositional coverage. Although this hypothesis was not
supported, it reveals a significant relationship in the practice of
framing nonoppositional articles. Even neutral or supportive
coverage was framed in a manner of process and politics, which
suggests the media gave relatively little basis for citizens to
understand the policy itself, and focused on how the policy was going
to be decided upon and implemented. The relationship between
oppositional and nonoppositional coverage and its framing can be seen
in Figure 1.
-- Insert Figure 1 about here --
Conclusion
As expected, oppositional coverage was overwhelmed by
nonoppositional coverage (by a margin of approximately 1 to 2). This
provides evidence of media coverage as more closely following, and
cultivating support for administration claims (Dorman & Livingston,
1994; Entman & Page, 1994; Massing, 2004; Seib, 2004). The
relatively minimal oppositional coverage may also have been evidence
of the political culture of the time. Indeed, many readers "were
intolerant of articles critical of the president" and "Fox News, Rush
Limbaugh, and The Weekly Standard, among others, all stood ready to
pounce on journalists who strayed, branding them as liberals or
traitors – labels that could permanently damage a career" (Massing,
2004, p. 10).
The results of this study suggest that pre-Iraq War debate was
presented more as a matter of procedure and politics rather than a
description or analysis of policy. Strategy frames were
overwhelmingly dominant. Explanations, goals, and merits of the
policy were not evaluated in a significant manner when compared to
the amount of coverage concerned with who was winning or losing the
debate and how the policy would be implemented. The dominance of
strategy-framed coverage implies that the complexities and relevant
background information of the policy were not reinforced and made as
salient in media coverage as other political matters. While it is
impossible from this study to measure what the public knew about
President Bush's policy, the kind of information presented about the
policy is clearly not focused on describing and evaluating the
policy. It can be inferred that if since this information was
lacking, the public became familiar with the policy in a procedural
and political manner.
In a synthesis of coverage type and its framing, oppositional and
nonoppositional coverage was combined with substantive and strategy
framing. Each paragraph assumed one of four categories:
oppositional/substantive, oppositional/strategy,
nonoppositional/substantive, and nonoppositional/strategy. Over the
course of the entire study, the most infrequent type of coverage was
oppositional/substantive. The dominant type of coverage was
nonoppositional/strategy. This provides some evidence that the media
failed to provide citizens with a means for both understanding and
participating in policy debate, because the majority of coverage was
supportive and uncritical of the policy and framed it in a strategic
manner unlikely to evaluate the policy. This correlates with
previous research, such as that by Entman and Page (1994) who wrote,
"Procedural reproaches, even if decoded by the mass audience as
disguised attacks on the policy itself, provide the public little
cognitive basis for participating in deliberation" (p. 90).
These results also align with similar, major studies in this field
(Bennett, 1990; Dorman & Livingston, 1994; Mermin, 1999). Shortly
after the Iraq War began, Berman wrote that "when the war dies down,
editors and media analysts should catch their breath and ask
themselves: How much did press coverage (or lack of coverage)
contribute to the public backing for a pre-emptive invasion without
the support of the United Nations?" (2003, p. 2). The results of
this study suggest the answer to that question is that the media
played a central role in failing to properly inform citizens and
cultivate public deliberation on crucial policy matters.
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Coverage of Illusion: Framing the Pre-Iraq War Debate 9
Coverage of Illusion: Framing the Pre-Iraq War Debate
In a January 2003 Knight Ridder poll, 66% of respondents reported a
"good understanding" of the reasons for and against going to war in
Iraq (Berman, 2003). The same poll, however, revealed that a large
proportion of people surveyed incorrectly understood several crucial
justifications for the pending war. These included the involvement
of Iraq and Saddam Hussein in the September 11 attacks and proof of
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Similar polls, including one
conducted by the Pew Research Center, corroborated public opinion of
the time (Berman, 2003; Kull, Ramsey, & Lewis, 2003).
Media critic and author Michael Massing attributed the lack of
accurate public understanding regarding the Iraq War to ineffective
and overly sympathetic news reporting (2004). "With many analysts
prepared to discuss the competing claims over the intelligence on
Iraq, the press was in a good position to educate the public on the
administration's justifications for war. Yet for the most part, it
never did so" (Massing, 2004, p. 9). Physicist and former weapons
inspector David Albright agreed, stating that "the administration was
setting the agenda for what stories should be covered, and the news
media bought into that, rather than take a critical look at the
administration's underlying reasons for war" (cited in Massing, 2004, p. 10).
Other, similar post-hoc criticisms of "the cheerleading and
passivity of the coverage before and during the war" (Seib, 2004, p.
156) have emerged recently. This study seeks to examine the news
coverage of the pre-Iraq War debate, specifically how the debate and
opposition or support for the war were framed. In doing so, this
study attempts to determine if news coverage of the pre-war period
had the capacity to engender citizens' understanding of the pros and
cons of the war and thereby act as an effective agent of democracy.
The Proportion and Shape of Coverage
Entman and Page (1994) wrote that "reporting that circulates
information and opinion at odds with the administration is vital to
the possibility of democracy in foreign policy" (p. 83). There have
been numerous scholarly studies that have examined the degree to
which the media are critical of the administration (see Althaus, Edy,
Entman, & Phalen, 1996; Bennett, 1990; Herman & Chomsky, 1988;
Mermin, 1999; Zaller & Chiu, 1996). These studies have concluded
that media coverage, specifically of foreign affairs, has limited
independence from the government and journalists act as "passive
'chroniclers' rather than active 'examiners'" (Dorman & Livingston,
1994, p. 76). The erosion of a confrontational media similarly
reduces the basis for citizens to participate in the deliberation of
foreign policy or to consider alternatives. As Graber (2002) wrote,
"Judged in terms of the information needs of the ideal citizen in the
ideal democracy, the end product of the gatekeeping process is
inadequate" (p. 131).
Mermin (1999) reported low levels of critical coverage surfacing in
press coverage over several U.S.-initiated military campaigns. His
findings were generally consistent, albeit more extreme, with those
of Zaller and Chiu (1996) and Entman and Page (1994). Regarding
coverage of the pre-Iraq War debate, New York Times columnist Paul
Krugman wrote, "U.S. media outlets–operating in an environment in
which anyone who questions the administration's foreign policy is
accused of being unpatriotic–have taken it as their assignment to
sell the war, not to present a mix of information that might call the
justification for war into question" (cited in Seib, 2004, p.
79). When considering this assessment and previous research,
Hypothesis 1 predicts that a "journalism of deference to the national
security state" (Dorman & Livingston, 1994, p. 76) will continue.
H1: There will be more nonoppositional coverage (N) of President
Bush's policy toward Iraq than oppositional coverage (O). (N > O, p < .05).
Implications and Types of News Frames
Thus far, this study has addressed the volume of opposition in media
coverage during the pre-Iraq War debate. While the previously posed
hypothesis examined a key aspect of debate coverage, it fails to
capture how the debate was framed by the media. Framing is an
important interpretive process of selecting and highlighting some
features of reality and obscuring others while promoting "a
particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution" (Entman,
2003, emphasis in original) in news coverage. Framing is how the
media define and give meaning to issues and connect them to a larger
environment (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001). The question at the heart
of the issue of news frames is not merely what information coverage
provides, but how interpretative frames structure understanding of an issue.
The months leading up to the start of the Iraq War saw large amounts
of media coverage devoted to the potential war. In doing so, the
media adopted particular frames and explanations to report on the
looming prospect of war. Such explanations often originate with
either hawks or doves, and the media generally follow these cues when
reporting stories (Sigal, 1973). Through framing, news coverage may
magnify or shrink elements to make them more or less publicly salient
(Entman, 1991). "By providing, repeating, and thereby reinforcing
words and visual images that reference some ideas but not others,
frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less
so – and others entirely invisible" (Entman, 1991, p. 7). Through
consistency in news frames, a story often assumes a dominant
interpretation of events and issues. This dominant frame will be
"more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others"
(Entman, 1991, p. 7). Similarly, this dominant frame has the
potential to preclude other frames and views from emerging or being
considered legitimate. Alternative viewpoints may be minimized or
negated in the construction of one dominant news frame that emerges
in media coverage.
Most news frames can be broken down into one of two major
categories: strategy frames or substance frames (Nacos, Shapiro, &
Isernia, 2000). Strategy frames report stories from a competitive
standpoint, in terms of winners and losers. Substance frames focus
on the issue based on its own merits. This lexicon is similar in
scope to episodic or thematic (Iyengar & Simon, 1994)
frames. Strategy frames have qualities that resemble episodic
frames, whereas substantive frames are more closely aligned to
thematic framing, which "places public issues in some general or
abstract concept" (Iyengar & Simon, 1994, p. 171). For purposes of
this study, the categorization outlined by Nacos, Shapiro, and
Isernia (2000) was followed. In addition, this categorization could
also capture the spirit of Iyengar and Simon's typology.
Strategy frames tend to politicize an issue. These frames can be
seen in coverage of the "horse-race," or "game-framing," of
election-day polling coverage. Strategy frames emphasize political
bickering and conflict between parties and are generally
characterized by simplicity, emotions, and personality (Nacos, et.
al., 2000). Strategy frames are closely related to procedural
coverage, as described by Entman and Page (1994). Procedural frames
focus on "the process and politics of decision-making" (Entman &
Page, 1994, p. 87). Strategy and procedural frames remain popular in
the news media and with reporters.
Substance frames focus on making known to the public important
information on policy issues (Nacos et. al., 2000). Substance frames
avoid the trap of politicizing coverage. This style of reporting
does not look at issues or policy decisions as contests with winners
and losers, but rather "concentrates on the debate of facts, issues,
context, policies, and institutional policy issues" (Nacos et al.,
2000). A substance-framed news story would look at the history,
background, and goals of a policy and use that information to explain
the issue.
Iyengar and Simon (1994) noted that media coverage of debate
surrounding the use of force is often political in nature. That is,
the coverage focuses on the political day-to-day of the debate as
well as the process of implementing the policy. Relatively little
coverage is devoted to explaining policy options and alternatives,
which is also consistent with the findings of Dorman and Livingston
(1994). In the same manner, Hypothesis 2 tests the relative amounts
of substance and strategy framed coverage.
H2: Strategy coverage (St) of President Bush's policy toward Iraq
will appear more frequently than substantive coverage (Su) of the
Bush policy toward Iraq.
(St > Su, p < .05).
Framing Opposition and Support in Media Coverage
To promote a further understanding of how the public could know the
debate, the follow section examines how both opposition and support
for the policy were framed. As previously discussed, substance
frames are not necessarily simply explanations of issues; they also
carry weight as value-laden judgments. "Substantive news frames
perform at least two of the following basic functions in covering
events, issues, and political actors: defining effects or conditions
as problematic, identifying causes, conveying a moral judgment of
those involved in the framed matter, endorsing remedies or
improvements to the problematic situation" (Entman, 2003, p.
417) Therefore, substantive frames impart a larger platform for
understanding than strategy frames.
Undoubtedly, the winning and losing of political debates and policy
decisions is a crucial part of the American political
process. "Democratic politics is at heart a strategic contest for
power" (Mermin, 1999, p. 27). However, the news media should not
"encourage citizens to experience politics in these terms" (Mermin,
1999, p. 27). Likewise, Cappella and Jamieson (1997) found that
strategy-framed coverage promoted cynicism among the American public
towards the political process and actors.
Despite the shortcomings of strategy framing, it remains a widespread
practice in news reporting. Specifically, when covering debate or
conflict over an issue, journalists can quickly cover and simplify
the story by using a strategy frame rather than opting for the
deeper, contextualized substantive frame. Alternatively, when making
its case for policy, the administration often lay bare the goals,
merits, and justifications of its policy. Since the administration
and proponents of the policy essentially "spell out" the policy and
its justifications and benefits, journalists are apt to frame
supportive (or nonoppositional) material in a substantive
manner. This subjective experience and interpretation of news
coverage led to Hypotheses 3 and 4.
H3: Oppositional coverage (O) will be framed more frequently with
strategy frames (OSt) than substantive frames (OSu). (OSt > OSu, p< .05).
H4: Nonoppositional coverage (N) will be framed more frequently with
substantive frames (NSu) than strategy frames (NSt). (NSu > NSt, p < .05).
Method
To test the hypotheses, a content analysis of coverage in the New
York Times and Washington Post was conducted. These papers were
selected because they have "large foreign news staffs, high prestige
and sophistication, and a proven record of willingness to take on the
government" (Entman & Page, 1994, p. 84). Additionally, these two
papers are "often regarded as the two leading newspapers in the
country" (Dorman & Livingston, 1994, p. 69). As such, these
newspapers are the leading intermedia agenda setting outlets (Weaver,
McCombs, & Shaw, 2004). What these papers consider important and how
they handle the issue is likely to be duplicated across other media
outlets. Therefore, these newspapers can be considered generally
representative of the mediated public sphere (Bennett et al., 2004)
and this study predictive of mainstream media coverage at large.
The timeframe for the analysis ran from two weeks before Congress
passed the resolution on October 11, 2002, which authorized President
Bush to use military force in Iraq to two weeks after the vote: from
September 27 to October 25, 2002. This two-week period before and
after the vote was chosen because it was "long enough for critical
angles that might not have been immediately apparent to emerge"
(Mermin, 1999, p. 42). Also, this timeframe can be considered
representative of the most vigorous debate, specifically domestically.
Articles from the "news section" of each newspaper comprised the
sample of this study. The news section was defined as section A on
weekdays and section 1 on weekend editions. This study focused on
coverage understood by the public to be unbiased, objective news and
purported to be so by news organizations. The sample therefore did
not include editorials, letters, and opinion pieces because they are
not held to the same notions of objectivity. Furthermore, editorials
were excluded on the basis they are not as widely read. Bogart
(1981) reported editorial readership at only 25%, compared to 53% of
news readers who start reading with the front page. Bogart also
wrote that nine in ten readers claimed to open the general news
section. "News analysis" pieces were included because they appear in
the news section and are presented as objective analyses of issues
and events.
Several key aspects defined the Bush administration's policy towards
Iraq: Forcing the immediate disarmament of Iraq, using military force
if necessary, and acting unilaterally if necessary. This was the
platform of the Bush administration in its attempts to build domestic
and international support from the outset. While the administration
may have made some concessions or emphasized some issues in order to
gain support for this policy, it remained fundamentally the same in
the timeframe studied.
Articles that focused on the administration's policy towards Iraq
were selected for study. These articles centered on at least one of
three topics: First, international or domestic commentary, support,
or opposition of the policy; second, U.N. inspections of Iraqi
weapons; third, coalition building for the policy, either
international or domestic. Selected articles included information
either about the policy or the process of implementing the policy
both domestically and internationally.
The sample did not include articles that peripherally mentioned the
Bush policy. Also excluded were articles that discussed the Bush
policy towards Iraq primarily as being only a minor issue for
political elections, foreign or domestic. Other excluded articles
focused on business or economic issues and only mentioned the Bush
policy towards Iraq as a corollary.
The unit of analysis was a paragraph of text. Photographs and
cutlines that appeared with photos were also coded using the same
rules as paragraphs. Photographs featured independently of an
article were treated as a separate article, coded in the same manner
as other items of analysis. The framing impact of visuals is
considerable, and this study attempted to incorporate their
effect. Charts, graphs, and any images other than photographs were
not included in this study due to their complexity and infrequent
appearance with news stories.
The headline and first ten paragraphs of each article were
coded. Ten was chosen for the number of paragraphs because most
articles in the Times and Post are between fifteen and thirty
paragraphs long (Mermin, 1999). Because of the typical inverted
pyramid style of reporting, the tone of the article was well
established in the first ten paragraphs. As such, information
regarded as the most important appears in the first ten paragraphs,
and the information buried further in the story carries less
weight. Similarly, any alternative viewpoints expressed in the first
ten paragraphs are considered more important. These paragraphs are
also more crucial to the framing of the story than paragraphs at or
near the end of the article or after a page jump, where readership
has been shown to drop (Bogart, 1981).
Oppositional and Nonoppositional Codes
To test Hypothesis 1, each paragraph was coded as being either
"oppositional" or "nonoppositional" toward President Bush's
policy. Nonoppositional coverage included both "neutral" and
"supportive" categories, which were not used to avoid ambiguity
(Mermin, 1999). Paragraphs that clearly articulated criticism or
indicated opposition to President Bush's policy or questioned
official justification were coded as oppositional. The measure of
the oppositional frame was determined from a closed-ended "yes/no"
option with two categories measuring criticism of President Bush's
policy and opposition to President Bush's policy. The categories
were: first, was criticism of President Bush's policy present in the
paragraph and second, was opposition to President Bush's policy
present in the paragraph. If the "no" option was recorded for both
categories, the paragraph was coded as nonoppositional. If the "yes"
option was recorded for either category, the paragraph was coded as
oppositional.
Oppositional coverage included any mention of debate surrounding the
policy, as the debate itself was an indication of opposition to the
policy. Oppositional coverage may have appeared as opposition or
criticism to any of the "core" assumptions of the Bush policy. These
core assumptions included: Iraq should be disarmed, the Iraq regime
should change, Iraq presents a threat to the United States, military
engagement is acceptable, unilateral action by the United States is
acceptable, and action to disarm Iraq must be taken immediately.
Paragraphs that predicted or suggested failures or negative side
effects of the policy were coded as oppositional. Paragraphs that
mentioned opposition as semantic disagreements, such as the number of
UN Security Council resolutions, were also coded as
oppositional. Photographs that portrayed anti-war demonstrations
were coded as oppositional.
Paragraphs that simply described the policy or its goals were coded
as nonoppositional. Nonoppositional paragraphs included all of the
paragraphs that did not clearly express or indicate opposition or
criticism to the Bush policy towards Iraq. Criticisms outside the
scope of the policy towards Iraq, such as criticisms of Bush's
competence, were coded as nonoppositional. Photographs that showed
politicians speaking, shaking hands, and so forth were coded as
nonoppositional.
Substantive and Strategy Codes
To examine Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, paragraphs were coded in terms of
substance and strategy. These paragraphs were differentiated on the
basis of the following yes/no categorization: paragraphs that
describe why this policy is being implemented were coded as
substantive paragraphs; paragraphs that described the process of the
policy being implemented were coded as strategy paragraphs.
Substantive paragraphs were concerned with answering why the policy
is or is not desirable. Substantive paragraphs included descriptions
of the policy, merits of the policy, goals of the policy, and the
implications or impacts of the policy (Lawrence, 2000). Substantive
paragraphs were recognized by their focus on the policy. Substantive
coverage addressed the core assumptions of the policy: Iraq should be
disarmed, the Iraq regime should change, Iraq presents a threat to
the United States, military engagement is acceptable, unilateral
action by the United States is acceptable, and action to disarm Iraq
must be taken immediately. Any paragraph that discussed these core
assumptions was considered substantive.
Strategy paragraphs covered information on the "process and politics
of decision making" (Entman & Page, 1994, p. 87) such as President
Bush's attempts to build a coalition and sway Congressional and
public opinion. Strategy paragraphs described how the policy is or
is not being implemented. Paragraphs that described debate between
international or domestic parties on policy issues were coded as
strategy paragraphs, as this was considered a function of the
political process of implementing the policy. Strategy paragraphs
included evaluations of President Bush's competence, leadership, and
ability. Paragraphs that discussed, but did not definitively predict
the outcome of the policy as a success or failure were coded as
strategy paragraphs (see Mermin, 1999). Strategy paragraphs were not
concerned with the core assumptions of the policy, but rather issues
that surrounded the policy, including: political alliances for the
policy, public, elite, and foreign opinion, political motives of the
policy, competence of Bush, political implications of the policy,
winning or losing policy debate, and the success or possible, not
predicted, failure of the policy.
Coders and Reliability
The author coded all of the articles that met the selection
criteria. For reliability purposes, approximately one-quarter of the
selected articles were also coded by two coders trained in the
definitions of the categories and data input. Each coder
independently coded the same one-quarter of the articles, selected at
random. The reliability scores were tested between the author and
the two coders using Cohen's Kappa. "Oppositional or nonoppositional
coverage" agreement earned a score of 0.85. "Substantive or strategy
coverage" agreement produced a score of 0.73. These agreement
scores, which controlled for chance, are generally considered
acceptable (Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000).
Results
A total of 202 articles, which included 2442 units of analysis, were
coded. One hundred and ten articles appeared in the New York Times
and 92 in the Washington Post. Of the 202 articles, 161 included at
least one paragraph with oppositional coverage. All units were coded
in terms of oppositional or nonoppositional as well as substantive or
strategy frames.
The first hypothesis predicted that there will be more
nonoppositional coverage (N) of President Bush's policy toward Iraq
than oppositional coverage (O).
(N > O, p < .05). This hypothesis was supported, with 793 (32%)
paragraphs coded as oppositional compared to 1,649 (68%) paragraphs
coded as nonoppositional. A difference of proportions test revealed
a statistically significant difference: Z = 12.6, p<.001. It can
therefore be concluded that opposition to policy was less frequent
than neutral and supportive coverage, lending evidence to the
suggestion that "Most investigative energy was directed at stories
that supported, rather than challenged, the administration's case"
(Massing, 2004, p. 9).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that strategy coverage (St) of President
Bush's policy toward Iraq will appear more frequently than
substantive coverage (Su) of the Bush policy toward Iraq. (St > Su,
p < .05). This hypothesis was supported. A total of 564 (23%)
paragraphs were coded as framing the policy in a substantive manner
whereas 1,878 (77%) paragraphs were coded as framing the policy as a
strategy issue. A difference of proportions test was run to examine
this data. This test yielded a Z-score of 28.6, which indicates that
the difference between these two groups was not due to
chance. Written using statistical indicia, Z = 28.6, p <.001. Thus,
it can be concluded that the pre-Iraq war debate presented in the two
newspapers under investigation overwhelming framed it as a matter of
process and politics, not substance.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that oppositional coverage (O) will be framed
more frequently with strategy frames (OSt) than substantive frames
(OSu). (OSt > OSu, p< .05). This hypothesis was analyzed using a
t-test. There was a significant effect for frames, t(200) = 8.18, p
< .001, with strategy frames appearing more frequently than
substantive frames. The mean number of substantive-framed paragraphs
was 0.96 per article, compared to 2.95 strategy-framed paragraphs per
article. Opposition was dominantly framed as a matter of process and
politics, rather than a merit-based evaluation of the policy
itself. This evidence suggests media coverage did not provide
citizens a "foundation for continued opposition" (Entman & Page, 1994, p. 90).
Hypothesis 4 predicted that nonoppositional coverage (N) will be
framed more frequently with substantive frames (NSu) than strategy
frames (NSt). (NSu > NSt, p < .05). This hypothesis was also
analyzed using a t-test. There was a significant effect for frames
in this category as well, however not in the direction predicted,
t(200) = 8.57, p < .001. Strategy frames dominated again, with an
average of 6.35 per article, compared to 1.83 substantive-framed
nonoppositional paragraphs per article.
This can best be explained as a response to the largely
strategy-framed opposition. With a dearth of substantive criticisms,
little effort was made by the administration and the press to balance
these criticisms. These findings suggest that supportive and neutral
(nonoppositional) coverage was framed in direct proportion to the
framing of oppositional coverage. Although this hypothesis was not
supported, it reveals a significant relationship in the practice of
framing nonoppositional articles. Even neutral or supportive
coverage was framed in a manner of process and politics, which
suggests the media gave relatively little basis for citizens to
understand the policy itself, and focused on how the policy was going
to be decided upon and implemented. The relationship between
oppositional and nonoppositional coverage and its framing can be seen
in Figure 1.
-- Insert Figure 1 about here --
Conclusion
As expected, oppositional coverage was overwhelmed by
nonoppositional coverage (by a margin of approximately 1 to 2). This
provides evidence of media coverage as more closely following, and
cultivating support for administration claims (Dorman & Livingston,
1994; Entman & Page, 1994; Massing, 2004; Seib, 2004). The
relatively minimal oppositional coverage may also have been evidence
of the political culture of the time. Indeed, many readers "were
intolerant of articles critical of the president" and "Fox News, Rush
Limbaugh, and The Weekly Standard, among others, all stood ready to
pounce on journalists who strayed, branding them as liberals or
traitors – labels that could permanently damage a career" (Massing,
2004, p. 10).
The results of this study suggest that pre-Iraq War debate was
presented more as a matter of procedure and politics rather than a
description or analysis of policy. Strategy frames were
overwhelmingly dominant. Explanations, goals, and merits of the
policy were not evaluated in a significant manner when compared to
the amount of coverage concerned with who was winning or losing the
debate and how the policy would be implemented. The dominance of
strategy-framed coverage implies that the complexities and relevant
background information of the policy were not reinforced and made as
salient in media coverage as other political matters. While it is
impossible from this study to measure what the public knew about
President Bush's policy, the kind of information presented about the
policy is clearly not focused on describing and evaluating the
policy. It can be inferred that if since this information was
lacking, the public became familiar with the policy in a procedural
and political manner.
In a synthesis of coverage type and its framing, oppositional and
nonoppositional coverage was combined with substantive and strategy
framing. Each paragraph assumed one of four categories:
oppositional/substantive, oppositional/strategy,
nonoppositional/substantive, and nonoppositional/strategy. Over the
course of the entire study, the most infrequent type of coverage was
oppositional/substantive. The dominant type of coverage was
nonoppositional/strategy. This provides some evidence that the media
failed to provide citizens with a means for both understanding and
participating in policy debate, because the majority of coverage was
supportive and uncritical of the policy and framed it in a strategic
manner unlikely to evaluate the policy. This correlates with
previous research, such as that by Entman and Page (1994) who wrote,
"Procedural reproaches, even if decoded by the mass audience as
disguised attacks on the policy itself, provide the public little
cognitive basis for participating in deliberation" (p. 90).
These results also align with similar, major studies in this field
(Bennett, 1990; Dorman & Livingston, 1994; Mermin, 1999). Shortly
after the Iraq War began, Berman wrote that "when the war dies down,
editors and media analysts should catch their breath and ask
themselves: How much did press coverage (or lack of coverage)
contribute to the public backing for a pre-emptive invasion without
the support of the United Nations?" (2003, p. 2). The results of
this study suggest the answer to that question is that the media
played a central role in failing to properly inform citizens and
cultivate public deliberation on crucial policy matters.
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Coverage of Illusion: Framing the Pre-Iraq War Debate
Mass Communication and Society Division
Jacob Groshek
Graduate Student
School of Journalism
Indiana University
704 W. 4th St.
Bloomington, IN 47401
[log in to unmask]
812-333-9718
Submitted for possible presentation to the Association for Education
in Journalism and Mass Communication national conference, August 2005
and for consideration in the Leslie J. Moeller Award competition.
Coverage of Illusion: Framing the Pre-Iraq War Debate
ABSTRACT
This study examined how two leading news outlets framed the pre-Iraq
War debate. Not only was opposition seldom framed in a substantive
manner, neutral and supportive coverage were also rarely framed
substantively. These findings suggest that the public was given
little basis for participating in policy deliberation and that the
media made more effort to illustrate how the policy was going to be
implemented, rather than why it should (or should not) be implemented.
Key words: Framing, foreign policy, Iraq War, democratic debate, role of media
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