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Does the Internet Affect Attitudes?
Comparing Democratic Values
Of U.S. Journalism Students
With Those in Post-Soviet Nations
International Communication Division
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
2005 Annual Meeting
San Antonio, TX
By*
Byron T. Scott
Professor
Anya Litvak and Irina Guseva
Graduate Students
University of Missouri – Columbia
School of Journalism
321B Lee Hills Hall,
Columbia, MO, 65211
and
Stanley Ketterer
Assistant Professor
Oklahoma State University
School of Journalism and Broadcasting
Abstract: Two hundred and seventy-eight second-year journalism
students in the United States, Russia, Bulgaria, and Albania were
given a structured questionnaire identical to that used in a 2001
study of students in Kazakhstan. Focusing on media usage and
democratic attitudes, this pilot analysis pays particular attention
to differences that might be related to Internet usage between U.S.
subjects and the youth of post-Soviet societies. Results showed
differences that, in combination with sociological studies of
post-Soviet societies, point to Internet usage as important, but
hardly the governing mediating influence predicted in early post-Cold
War euphoria.
• Address communications to the principal author: s
321BPhones: 573-882-7792, office; 445-4996, home; 884-1841, fax.
• The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of several
overseas colleagues, particularly Altin Rraxhimi, University of
Tirana; Marco Mulcahy, American University in Bulgaria; Maria Lukina
and Andrei Raskin, Moscow State University. Special thanks to
Stephanie Craft, Missouri School of Journalism.
Does the Internet Affect Attitudes? AEJMC International
Communication Division, Page 4
International Communication Division
Abstract: Does the Internet Affect Attitudes? Comparing Democratic
Values of U.S. Journalism Students With Those in Post-Soviet Nations –
Two hundred and seventy-eight second-year journalism students in the
United States, Russia, Bulgaria, and Albania were given a structured
questionnaire identical to that used in a 2001 study of students in
Kazakhstan. Focusing on media usage and democratic attitudes, this
pilot analysis pays particular attention to differences that might be
related to Internet usage between U.S. subjects and the youth of
post-Soviet societies. Results showed differences that, in
combination with sociological studies of post-Soviet societies, point
to Internet usage as important, but hardly the governing mediating
influence predicted in early post-Cold War euphoria.
Attempts to project the results of the transitional period begun with
the collapse of the Soviet Union have frequently focused on the youth
of Russia and the various other nations of the former Communist
bloc. Whether the goal is globalization, capitalism or a civil
society based in the values of Western democracy, many observers have
made the assumption that newer generations would be more adaptable to
change than those who had achieved adulthood under the old society's
values, systems, and rewards. Michael McFaul, the Stanford social
scientist who has conducted multiple studies of the post-Soviet
generation gap in Russia, put it this way :
"…this is the first generation since 1917 in Russia to come of age in
(a) an independent Russia, (b) a capitalist economy, and (c) a "free"
(albeit not altogether democratic) political system. The group has a
set of preferences about the economy, the polity, and the world that
are distinct from those of their parents--the cohort that has tried
to be productive in two radically different systems--and very
distinct from those of their grandparents, who worked mostly in the
communist system."
Similar observations have been made about the newest generations in a
number of other studies in former Communist nations, including the
former Yugoslavia and Poland , Hungary, Czech Republic and Bulgaria ,
Belarus and Albania . However, the bulk of studies and observations
of values and attitudes in the post-Soviet "generation gap" have been
done within Russia itself (for example, see , 2003; .
The aggregate impression of post-Soviet youth is hardly
encouraging. These young men and women are seen as cynical, deeply
frustrated, passive and self-centered – hardly the profile of
democratic change agents. Titarenko (1999) characterizes their
condition as follows:
"Taking into consideration the deep contradiction between the painful
process of transition and the expected rosy results, it is easy to
understand why the countries (of the former Soviet bloc) cannot meet
the high expectations of youth and create appropriate conditions for
the younger generation to play a dominant role in this process. If
the rest of the population tries simply to survive the current
deepening crisis, post-Soviet youth wants to enjoy being able to live
in an advanced Western-type society now."
Theories of communication and democracy
John Stuart Mill's notion of a marketplace of ideas has
idealistically re-emerged with the advent and dissemination of
Internet technology as the basic facilitator of democracy.
Several years before the Internet and the Worldwide Web emerged,
Jürgen Habermas (1989), known for his theories on deliberative
democracy, emphasized the importance of a public sphere in liberal
democratic society. His insistence that democracy is borne out of a
dialogue of ideas, not just exposure to them, outlines what he
labeled the three components of an "ideal speech situation": absolute
inclusion, coercion-free communication, and openness and symmetry of
discussion. Habermas agreed with Mills and numerous others in seeing
information as a powerful agent of social change, with an inherent
potential for societal transformation. The apparent access and
universality of the Internet held the promise of Habermas'
deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1989), at least in theory. In the
euphoria immediately following the end of the Cold War, some social
analysts and government officials saw the Internet as amounting to
democracy's "terrible, swift sword."[1]
Others disagreed. Chantal Mouffe, another democracy theorist,
claimed that for discussion to have any meaning, it had to take place
unconstrained by an established system of ideas, a framework
(Thornton, 2002). According to her, the basic act of qualifying a
discussion within a certain context necessarily dooms the strife for
coercion-free deliberation. The adoption of any system is in itself a
restraint, she claims (Mouffe, 1997). In fact, the cultural and
technical frameworks that shape Internet development and content can
be considered elements of exclusion and control. "The Internet does
not operate in a sociological vacuum." (Thornton, 2002). In context,
it operates under a parallel power structure as other institutions
and can serve to further solidify social frameworks.
In his article How the Internet Did Not Transform Russia, Rafal
Rohozinski says that "the 'new dog' of the Internet was adapted and
used to perform the 'old tricks' inherent to the Soviet system."
Rohozinski talks about the emergence of the Russian Net, which
disappointed the romanticized expectations of single-handedly
transitioning the Russian political and social climate into a Western
democracy. Superior to the pluralistic potential of information
access on the Internet is the framework of power already in place in
Russia, he argues. And, to a certain extent, it guides the format,
purpose, and effect of the Internet as the medium feels out its place
in post-Soviet society.
"Russia's Internet development vividly demonstrates a wider point
concerning the error of assuming that information technologies are
the handmaidens of democratic development." (Rohozinki, 338)
Does modern reality, in fact, contradict the foundational,
journalistic belief that access to truth will make us free? Put more
elaborately: if journalism and technology are at the heart of social
change, if the "Fourth Estate" retains its historical role of helping
provide direction and force in times of transition, then it seems
important to examine the attitudes of that subset of post-Soviet
youth currently studying journalism in the universities and
institutes of those nations. In general, these studies have not yet
been done, either on an individual or comparative basis. While
cross-cultural studies of news values and behaviors among currently
practicing journalists of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
have begun to emerge ; , the student journalist has been largely
"below the horizon" for journalism scholars. One exception is the
2000 study by two Oklahoma State investigators exploring the media
usage and democratic attitudes of 203 Kazakhstani journalism
students, predominantly in their first and second years of
study. The investigators used a 44-item questionnaire to examine
four questions –
1. What are the kinds of media monitored by these students and how frequently?
2. What democratic principles do they perceive as essential?
3. How do they perceive democracy as it operates in their nation,
particularly regarding leaders and elections?
4. What do these journalism students perceive as "normal" in a democracy?
Important to note here it that, for their media use questions, these
investigators adapted a Pew Center study examining political
disinterest among American youth . The democracy questions made use
of "seven factors of a liberal democracy" postulated by Dahl . The
questionnaire itself, because it also forms the basis of the current
study, is attached to this paper as an appendix.[2]
In their discussion of the Kazakh study, the authors wondered to what
extent the patterns seen were generalizable to other Soviet states,
particularly those not embedded in the cultural and political
traditions of Central Asia. Noting also the comparatively low
computer and Internet usage by their subjects,[3] they also wondered
how this electronic isolation might affect their opinions and
attitudes. "The lack of computer and Internet access means that few
students were exposed to outside views," they noted. "…As Internet
use increases, they will be exposed to a wider variety of
viewpoints. It will be interesting to see what effect Internet use
has on these students in the future." This study seeks to respond to
those questions, at least as to similarly situated journalism
students in three nations: Albania, Bulgaria, and Russia
itself. And, because both the questionnaire and the values probed
are so much a part of the U.S.-accepted form of democracy, the
current study asks the same questions of a comparable group of
American student journalists.
Methodology
This study uses the same questionnaire employed by Ketterer and
Nemecek. It was translated into Albanian for the Tirana subjects but
English proficiency was sufficient for its original English version
to be used by Russian and Bulgarian subjects. As in the Kazakhstan
study, it was administered to predominantly second year journalism
students. Results from other question arrays in the instrument (see
appendix) are being reported elsewhere. It is important to note that
this is not a sample. All second-year, eligible students at these
overseas institutions were asked to respond. This resulted in a
relatively smaller N for Bulgaria and Albania than for Russia and the
U.S., as well as the prior study in Kazakhstan.[4]
The subjects constituted entire classes at all four
institutions. The questionnaire was reviewed by administrators at
all schools[5] prior to being given to the students during regular
class hours. All questionnaires were filled out in the presence of
one of the authors, who first explained that all responses were
anonymous and that participating was voluntary. Because the senior
author was familiar with the classes in question, the authenticity of
the demographic data was easy to confirm.
The four subject groups, comprising a total of 278 student journalists, were:
• 32 students at the University of Tirana, Albania, who filled out
the questionnaire in Albanian.
• 31 students at the American University in Bulgaria, Blagoevgrad.
• 55 students at Moscow State University Faculty of Journalism.
• 160 students at the University of Missouri- Columbia School of Journalism.
The demographics of the response group were both similar and
different from that encountered in Kazakhstan in 2001[6]. The
preponderance of students (75-85%) was 17-to-21 years old, but, where
the American (71%), Bulgarian (62%) and Kazak (75%) groups were
overwhelmingly female, the Russian sample contained more males (66%)
and the Albanian group had slightly more males (58%) than females.
Although world or national events are certain to have affected
specific responses, it is impossible to allow for these intervening
variables in this study.[7] The nature of the questionnaire itself
is such as to exclude opinions about current events, but opinions in
transitional societies are as subject to change as are day-to-day
living conditions. Economic and political forces in all three
countries remain unstable, but the forces of war, famine, and anarchy
were absent.
Results
The pattern of media usage among the students studied is perhaps
best seen in Table A, below, showing the percentage that make daily
use of specific mass and computer-related media and of interpersonal
communication (discussions with classmates). In examining the
comparative percentages, it is important to consider the general
economic and living conditions of the students in the five nations,
including the 2000 Kazak cadre. In common with the their colleagues
in Kazakhstan, the Albanian students tend to have very low incomes,
even though most are also working, than do the Russians, who also
tend to have jobs outside of school. Both Russian and Albanian
students tend to use the computers available to them on their jobs
rather than the limited ones in Internet cafes or the
classrooms. Moreover, many Russian journalism students live with
their parents in the Moscow area where Internet in the apartments is
not uncommon. Students at the American University in Bulgaria (AUBG)
are not typical in all aspects of their media usage. Even though
many are from poor villages, they are attending an American-style
institution, which has scores more computers available in the
classrooms and dormitories than those of the other three
schools. However, the authors note that in Sofia, Plovdiv, Borgas,
and other major Bulgarian cities, the youth are the principal
customers in a rapidly growing number of Internet cafes. The
American students, of course, are likely to have their own laptops
and enjoy daily access via Wi-Fi and numerous high-speed linkages.
Table A: Daily Media Usage, Use of Mass, Computer-Mediated and
Interpersonal Communications[8]
Russia Bulgaria Albania U.S. (Kazakhstan)
TV News 71.9 48 84 13.1 (46.8)
Radio News 36.4 45 61 8.1 (66.5)
Newspaper 47.3 42 48 35.0 (29.6)
Talk shows 5.5 10 10 6.9 (14.8)
Computer 98.2 100 48 100.0 (19.7)
Internet 81.8 100 35 99.4 ( 8.4)
I'net News 36.4 71 16 40.6 ( 1.5)
E-mail 65.5 97 32 97.5 ( 9.4)
Interp'l 98.2 52 44 32.5 (59.1)
In common with Kazak journalism students, Albanians are heavy users
of radio news, while the AUBG students seem to spread their time
across media, both print and broadcast. In all three nations,
however, radio is more readily available and offers a wider range of
news and entertainment options than television. In all three
nations, economic constraints restrict access to daily newspapers,
weeklies, and magazines sold from the kiosks. Radio is not only the
most available medium but arguably the most trusted in transitional
nations. Nevertheless, the sheer numbers of competing newspapers
allow students to share newspapers, even those many days old, among
themselves. The fact that Albanian students, for example, say they
read a daily newspaper frequently does not necessarily mean that they
see it on the day of issue.
The Russian journalism students, all studying at the most
prestigious institution in the nation, Moscow State University,
present a picture that might more closely resemble that of an
American college journalism student. They are high consumers of all
media, comparatively speaking. TV is more generally available to
them, in both over the air and cable delivery. Since most also are
working or living at home, they tend to be able to afford more access
to all types of media, including print. Overall, it might be said
that the media usage of Russian journalism students more accurately
reflects that of Muscovites, living in a comparatively upscale,
cosmopolitan capitol.
The media consumption of the Missouri journalism students is similar
to American college students in general. Their higher interest in
international news on the Internet is certainly related to their major.
Areas of interest were surprisingly similar in all four post-Soviet
nations. Males were most interested in sports, females more so in
entertainment. Interests in politics, perhaps discouragingly, and in
religion, were uniformly low – and more archetypically American. All
four groups expressed the highest interest in news from outside their
own nations, paying significantly more attention to international
news than do most of their American counterparts.
Whether e-mail or other Internet usages, American, Russian and
Bulgarian journalism students were by far greater users of
computer-mediated communication techniques than their Albanian or
Kazakh colleagues were. More than twice the percentage reported
daily usage of the Internet. But were their attitudes about
democracy different from those with narrower "windows to the
world"? The next three tables summarize the profiles of these five
groups of student journalists. In Table C and D, two Likert-scale
items have been combined because the percentages of those in the
"Strongly Agree" category often ranged between zero and two percent.
Table B: Percentage Answering "Strongly Agree" to Items Considered
"Essential to a Democracy"
Russia Bulgaria Albania U.S. (Kazakhstan)
Free/Fair Elections 56.4 84 65 90.0 (54.7)
Speech/Assembly 58.2 71 68 86.3 (41.4)
Rule of Law 50.9 61 42 51.9 (44.8)
Human Rights 58.2 81 42 81.3 (66.5)
Private Property 36.4 65 26 49.4 (22.2)
Free Association 25.5 48 35 64.4 (23.6)
As Merrill, among others, has commented, the concept of democracy
varies widely across the globe, from "demos" to "demos." However,
the basic concepts of the Western conception are clearly embodied in
the six principles noted in Table B. And yet, with the exception of
the Bulgarian sample – taken from an American-style university –
these principles are not taken as inarguable democratic "essentials"
by the student journalists studied. Although human rights offer the
strongest support, the other democratic principles get at best a
small majority of absolute agreements. The questions of private
property and free association are less regarded among the respondents
as being essential to democratic society. Of course, all these
elements fared significantly better when "Agree" was added to the
scalar total. The doubts about private property in the new, free
market economies of formerly socialist societies are to be expected,
but the relative lack of value given to free association deserves
further examination.
The American sophomores' responses adhere, not surprisingly, to the
Western version of essential freedoms. The relatively lower regard
for rule of law, private property and the market economy raises
eyebrows, as does the relatively low opinion of the freedom of
association as a pillar of democracy – considering its prominence in
the 1st Amendment. The authors can only conjecture that this response
is somehow related to the stage of life, values and life experiences
of these young U.S. students. Certainly these values have been less
challenged during their lifetimes and the lifetimes of their parents
than those in the post-Soviet nations.
By comparing Tables B and C, which combine Strongly Agree and Agree
categories, we see a hint of the reasons involved. In none of the
four transitional nations, according to the student journalists, do
these situations currently exist. News events would seem to validate
their cynicism. In fact, Russian journalism students give the worst
"report card" of any national group.[9] By combining these two
agreement categories, we also see that the perceived reality of free
association fares much better in Bulgaria and Albania, but still
garners only a bare majority in Russia. The responses of the
American student journalists indicate that they feel their freedoms
are secure, perhaps so secure that it does not directly concern them
or, at least, does not have the salience in their daily lives of
their post-Soviet counterparts.
Table C: Percentage Answering "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" to Items
That "We Have in Our Country Today…"
Russia Bulgaria Albania U.S. (Kazakhstan)
Free/Fair Elections 10.9 65 19 90.6 (57.6)
Speech/Assembly 21.8 58 48 97.5 (56.6)
Rule of Law 9.1 20 19 93.0 (50.2)
Human Rights 21.8 32 42 93.8 (43.3)
Private Property 56.4 48 62 94.4 (21.7)
Free Association 52.7 71 79 90.1 (23.2)
Although the current study did not survey its subjects' perceptions
of media credibility, inferences of collected data indicate what
might be characterized as a hesitant relationship with Internet news
and with more traditional outlets. The authors have been told by
these students, for example, that: "We don't watch TV news, we
witness it." Even during times of social transition, these students
focus on non-controversial and less subjective areas such as sports
and entertainment. Much as with many American students, there is a
visible disinterest in politics, suggesting low credibility of news
sources may play a role in shaping media absorption. When considered
in conjunction with the unfavorable assessment of democracy in their
countries (with only a fifth of the Russian students seeing freedom
of speech at work in their nation), this study may further the
suspicion that even unconventional and "Western" modes of
communication, such as the Internet, would share these traditional
suspicions and values. In short, why should the new media be any
more credible than the old?
Looking at Tables B and C, we also see reflected a cynical picture of
the future of such democratic nations in the minds of these
post-Soviet future journalists. This appears to indicate that
journalism students in these transitional societies are no more
optimistic or idealistic than the youth in other fields and at other
levels, described by others. Considering the mix of cynicism and
idealism so highly valued by Western journalists, this is
discouraging. The origins are found in numerous events in these
nations over the past decade-and-a-half, as well as in their
tumultuous histories, particularly of the 20th century. It comes
forward in a three-dimensional fashion by the attitudes reflected in Table D.
Table D: Percentage Answering "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" to Items
That "It is normal in a democracy to find…"
Russia Bulgaria Albania U.S. (Kazakhstan)
Strong-hand leader 54.5 48 52 65.6 (60.6)
Information control 20.0 9 13 15.6 (36.0)
Economic elite 12.7 9 39 33.7 (16.8)
Election manipulation 18.2 13 10 15.7 (12.3)
Crime & disorder 3.6 12 19 20.6 (11.8)
Interpretations of a "strong leader" vary when applied to
personalities: George Bush, Vladimir Putin, etc. Referring to the
appended questionnaire, note that the entire statement reads: "It is
normal in a democracy for the leader to have a strong hand to
preserve law and order." The interpretation of "law and order" also
varies widely in the transitional nations of the post-Soviet world,
from the near dictatorship of Kazakhstan's N. Nazarbayev to the shaky
leadership of Albania's Fatos Nano to Vladimir Putin's 21st century
"managed democracy." However, the students from all four
transitional nations seem to see this as an element of democracy,
although only barely. Less "normal" by far are the other, more
disturbing features, of life in many of the transitional nations,
"mafia" of various sorts, challenges to press freedom, the maligned
oligarchs, and doubtful election procedures that cause international
observers to shake their heads in disbelief. All four post-Soviet
student groups tend to see these as aberrations to the developing
democratic processes of which they are a part.
Unlike their Eastern-European colleagues, American students
responding to the questionnaire likely drew their assertions from
their own political system, rather than a hypothetical and, perhaps,
idealistic democracy. This may explain why American numbers trumped
nearly all percentages from the other samples. Missouri students may
have interpreted the question to mean "the following is common in a
democracy," whereas the Eastern-European students may have read it as
"it is acceptable to have the following in a democracy." The
distinction may explain why students living the world's most famous
democracy are so permissive of such negatively-connoted concepts as a
strong-handed leader and the control of an economic elite.
Furthermore, given the relatively young age of the surveyed
Americans, their assessments are likely to reflect their rating of
the current administration, rather than a historical evaluation of
American democracy. Given the recent events in Iraq, the comfortable
majority of Missouri students accepting a strong-handed leader in
maintaining law and order begins to make sense. Although of
comparable age, the other respondents have different recent
experiences relative to the idea of democracy.
Discussion –
The 1999 Gallup International Millennium Survey[10] puts into context
some generalized attitudes towards democracy in different areas of
the world. Although Western democratic reformers continue to see
cause for alarm for the state of democracy across the world, Eastern
European and Central Asian countries (Russia is both)seem to be in
particular trouble.
Slightly less than a third of the world's population considers their
country to be governed by the will of the people. In Eastern Europe,
that number is only 12%, the lowest of all surveyed areas. Eastern
Europeans are also the least confident in free and fair elections,
with only 26% answering positively, as compared with the 47%
international average. More than half of the citizens in Eastern
Europe questioned in this survey described their governments as
corrupt, the highest percentage in the world. Asia, West Africa and
Latin America trailed Eastern Europe in perceived government
corruption by more than 10%.
This study's findings suggest a dissonance between the application of
the Internet in the countries examined and its predictive powers of
social mobilization and change. There is also an evident political
cynicism common in the young people polled in this study. None of
this, of course, is particularly surprising. The long-discredited
"Bullet Theory" of mass communication is more unified with
expectations of 19th century Jeffersonian libertarians than the "real
politic" practitioners of today.
While the subjects' perceptions of democratic essentials may appear
inconsistent with Habermas' expectations for a partially media
conscious and web-savvy audience, their level of political
participation is certainly a good fit to his models of deliberative
democracy. Even given the chance to learn about and observe
democratic ideas, the students in these countries cannot yet see the
product of their participation in the results of government and society.
Before there can be full participation in democracy, individual
citizens must see themselves as an important part of political life.
They must take the concept of participation in government seriously,
and believe that they have a contribution to make and a duty to make
it (Thornton, p. 20).
Habermas would argue that their inability to really control their own
polities renders their existence in the public sphere futile and
perhaps even inconsequential.
There is another question to be asked in thinking about the
students' responses to what constitutes a democracy—whose democracy
is being represented through their media and the Internet? Thornton
argues that there is an inherent "first-world bias" operating on the
Internet, which sets the electronic agenda according to American
culture and concerns (2002). More Americans use the Internet than all
other nationalities combined, with American domain names amounting to
nearly half of the content on the net (Thornton, 2002). This can
potentially breed cynicism and indifference about the Internet's
relevance and potential for social transformation in other
countries. Not surprisingly, our Missouri students fit nicely to the
assumptions of Internet-fed democracy and democracy in general.
There are many other obstacles to predicting what capability the
Internet has for furthering the democratic process. Language and
access are among the obvious tangible factors. A more subtle but real
concern is government control and surveillance. Thornton asserts that
there is a fear that "government controls will diminish the ability
of the Internet to support democracy affectively," (2002). This can
be interpreted both as the deliberate measures taken by the
government to stifle unwanted materials from spreading, and as the
impetus for self-censorship and mistrust of the Internet's anonymity
in the pursuit of information.
Conclusions and Comments –
The major limitation of this study is that it involves a secondary
analysis of data from a larger study designed for a broader
purpose. It is possible to view our observations as only a pilot
effort that could be more efficiently studied with a different
instrument or even a different methodology. We would accept that
judgment, but also point to a paucity of evidence that is in danger
of being overwhelmed by democratic rhetoric and Western hopes and dreams.
In the aggregate, this three-nation convenience data set, when
combined to the earlier Kazak study and compared to the parallel
American profile, gives little confidence that Internet access is a
stimulus to belief in democratic principles and practices. Russian
students were perhaps more doubting of democratic principles and
results than the Kazaks or Albanians, who had relatively much less
access to computer-mediated communication and its opportunity to see
the outside world. The Bulgarian sample, as mentioned above, is if
anything perhaps more reflective of the Americanized environment of
education at AUBG. In many aspects it mirrors the American data but
the small N is perhaps most instructive for its heuristics.
Social science contradicts philosophy at many points. To think that
the Internet is a magical, electronic ride to Jeffersonian
principles, much less to the marketplace of ideas, could easily be
labeled naïve. Rather, for the increasingly media-wise students of
the E-Generation in any nation, exposure to the Internet is a
"window" to both the good and the bad in the world. The WWW window's
breadth is perhaps more even-handed potentially than the Cold War
propaganda that helped breed such unrealistic expectations among the
citizens of the Communist bloc. As such, it can breed cynicism and
anger as well as ambition and envy.
Future studies should attempt to link more directly the images
encountered on the Internet with the opinions of post-Soviet
youth. Nevertheless, no protocol that takes place in the
transitional realities of post-Soviet nations can presume to offer a
clear cause-and-effect relationship. There will always be the
intervening and confounding variables of current events, of the
"Russian/Bulgarian/Albanian/Kazak reality" in which the student
journalists studied already find themselves. Our American data offer
similar questions and complications. How appreciative of democratic
freedoms are U.S. journalism students and how will this awareness, or
absence of it, affect their future professional level.
Other possibilities for future research might focus on how journalism
students are taught to treat internet news and information in terms
of credibility and censorship. Obviously not everything on the WWW
can be trusted, but how to you select while keeping the ideal of a
marketplace of ideas?
Also, it might be interesting to research trends in foreign-language
websites. How many are news-centered? How many charge for access? How
popular are they? How long do they stay up? Such research would help
to gauge how internet media outlets that are more relevant and even
tailored to these transitional nations are progressing.
Perhaps the ultimate question is this: Will Internet access and
proficiency make them better journalists in the future? This is a
question worth asking for student journalists of transitional and
stable societies, developed and developing nations alike.
References:
Appendix
Questionnaire
Thank you for agreeing to participate in a comparative
cross-cultural study. Please answer the following questions fairly
and honestly. The administrators of the study guarantee your
anonymity and will keep your answers confidential.
I. In the following section, indicate your media use by circling the
response that most clearly reflects your opinion. Your responses will
be kept confidential.
1. How often do you watch national TV newscasts? (Circle one.)
Rarely Monthly Weekly Daily
2. How often do you listen to radio newscasts?
Rarely Monthly Weekly Daily
3. How often to you read a newspaper?
Rarely Monthly Weekly Daily
4. How often do you read a magazine with social and political content?
Rarely Monthly Weekly Daily
5. How often do you watch primetime TV talk shows?
Rarely Monthly Weekly Daily
6. How often do you use a computer?
Never Monthly Weekly Daily
7. How often do you use the Internet?
Never Monthly Weekly Daily
8. How often to you use the Internet for world news?
Never Monthly Weekly Daily
9. How often do you use e-mail?
Never Monthly Weekly Daily
10. How often do you discuss contemporary issues with your classmates?
Never Monthly Weekly Daily
11. How interested are you in news about political figures and events
in your nation's capital?
Not at all Not too Somewhat Very
12. How interested are you in news about International Affairs?
Not at all Not too Somewhat Very
13. How closely do you follow news about local government?
Not at all Not too closely Somewhat closely Very closely
14. How closely do you follow news about people and events in your
local community?
Not at all Not too closely Somewhat closely Very closely
15. How closely do you follow news about religion?
Not at all Not too closely Somewhat closely Very closely
16. How closely do you follow news about health?
Not at all Not too closely Somewhat closely Very closely
17. How closely do you follow news about sports?
Not at all Not too closely Somewhat closely Very closely
18. How closely do you follow news about entertainment?
Not at all Not too closely Somewhat closely Very closely
19. How closely do you follow news about economic issues?
Not at all Not too closely Somewhat closely Very closely
20. Essential to democracy are:
a. Free and fair elections
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
b. Freedom of speech and assembly
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
c. The rule of law
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
d. Individual human rights
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
e. Private property and market economy
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
f. The right of free association
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
21. In my county we have:
a. Free and fair elections
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
b. In my country we have freedom of speech and assembly
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
c. In my country we have the rule of law
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
d. In my country we have individual human rights
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
e. In my country we have private property and market economy
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
f. In my country we have the right of free association
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
22. It is normal in a democracy for the leader to have a strong hand
to preserve law and order.
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
23. It is normal for the leader of a democracy to control the flow of
information.
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
24. It is normal in a democracy to find a concentration of economic
power in the hands of the new elite.
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
25. It is normal in a democracy to find manipulation in elections.
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
26. It is normal in a democracy to have a lot of crime and disorder.
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
27. You are: ____ Female ____ Male
28. Your age group is
___ 17-19 ___ 20-21 ___ 22-24 ___ 25-27 ___ 28-30 ___ over 30
29. In which class are you?
___a. Freshman ___b. Sophomore ___c. Junior ___d.
Senior ___e. Grad student
30. Of what country are you a citizen? ___________________
31. Do you have work experience in mass media?
_____ Yes _____ No
32. If you answered "yes" to the previous questions, please, explain
what work experience in mass media do you have:
______________________________________________________________________
Thank you for your cooperation!
[1] With apologies to those fond of the American Civil War's own
"Battle Hymn of the Republic."
[2] For other details of their methodology consult their original
paper, presented to the International Communication Division at the
2001 AEJMC convention in Washington, DC.
[3] Only half used a computer at least weekly. A fifth used the
Internet, and only a tenth looked at the WWW for world news on a weekly basis.
[4] The nations chosen were governed by the overseas teaching
assignments and contacts of the senior author who is part of the
faculty at the U.S. journalism school and has served as a visiting
professor at universities in all three nations. These experiences
also helped him assess the validity of the data, particularly the
usage patterns reported by the students. Most of this paper's
observations of how students at these three universities live and
work is based on his personal observations.
[5] A federal-mandated, institutional requirement for human subjects
studies at most American universities.
[6] Respondents were usually citizens of the nations where they went
to school, with the exception of one Turk in the Albanian group and a
Ukrainian from the Moscow State group. However, a third of the AUBG
sample was from elsewhere in the Balkan region: Albania, Kosovo,
Romania, Macedonia, and Moldova with one other from Belarus. All
U.S. respondents were American citizens.
[7] The instrument was administered between November 2001 and
October 2003 for the overseas groups. American students were polled
in February 2005.
[8] Because of the comparatively smaller N's the Bulgarian and
Albanian questionnaires were hand-analyzed and percentages were
rounded. The larger Russian and Kazakh samples were analyzed using
SPSS and use fractional percentages.
[9] It is interesting to note that, at Moscow State, the instrument
was administered in the "run-up" to the elections for the Fall 2003
Russian parliament (Duma).
[10] The Gallup International Millennium Survey is the largest
survey ever made on World Opinion. 50,000 people in 60 countries have
been interviewed. This represents a total global population of 1.25 billion.
www.gallup-international.com/ContentFiles/millennium5.asp.
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