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Framing the Enemy Following September 11
Jeff Patterson
The University of Texas at Austin
5304 Beckett Circle
Austin, Texas 78749
(512) 899-8715
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Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, Americans
struggled to make sense of the motivations of those behind the
attacks. Instead of ascribing the attacks to the criminal acts
perpetrated by a few individuals, Americans sought grander answers
that were writ large on the stage of international geopolitics and
morality. The earnestly asked question "why do they hate us?"
received a plethora of answers in the news media. The explanations
were framed in a complex range of religious, economic, cultural,
political, moral, and psychological rationales that not only defined
whom the enemy was, but suggested how and where this new "war" should
be prosecuted.
The framing of the enemy in the war on terror has significant
implications for the formulation of priorities and the implementation
of government policies to combat terrorism. The presence and
promotion of such themes was suggested in a recent content analysis
of newsmagazines in the weeks immediately following the attacks
(Hutcheson, et.al., 2004). In the study, Hutcheson, et.al., found
that government and military leaders often articulated pro-American
themes in their public communications in an attempt to unite the
American public behind the eminent war on terrorism, and that news
media tended to reflect and reinforce those strategic messages in its
coverage (Hutcheson, et.al., 2004) . However, while the Hutcheson
et.al., study spoke to the patriotic themes to coalesce public
support, less attention was given to the definition of the "enemy" in
the new war on terror. In very powerful ways, the definition of not
only who "we" are in the
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
war on terrorism has to be juxtaposed against whom "they" are in the
fight. Defining a presumed enemy and its motivations is essential
to not only setting the boundaries on where, how, and to what end
this new war on terrorism should be waged, but also encourages a
situational definition of Americans' own collective national identity
by establishing the parameters of inclusion and exclusion, or an "us"
versus "them" scenario in which American (or Western) values and
cultures are defined in contrast to other cultural, political, or
religious structures.
The purpose of this study is to define which definitions of the enemy
and his motivations tended to dominate the coverage of the emerging
war on terrorism, and the extent to which those themes were put forth
by different political and governmental authorities as a strategic
means of coalescing public support for the war.
Depictions of enemies have always been considered instrumental tools
in the conduct of political propaganda and psychological warfare.
From prehistoric cave drawings, through pamphleteers and propaganda
posters, to mass media images and websites, wartime propaganda
attempts to indoctrinate the populace to a consistent image of the
enemy. Social and individual contextualizations of an enemy in times
of conflict have drawn a good deal of attention in the academic
literature. Cognitive and social psychologists have explored theories
that individuals psychologically need enemies as suitable targets for
the displacement of their own personal fears and hostilities (Volkan,
1985); and as a means of
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
understanding and rationalizing events and circumstances
(Silverstein, 1989). Sociologists have noted that conflict can have
functional or positive benefits for groups, primarily that a common
enemy can reconcile a group of people to sacrifice and fraternity,
which may not have been possible during peacetime. (Hermann &
Fischerkeller, 1995).
Most pertinent are the studies of propaganda and the rhetoric of war,
in which depictions of enemy images and ideology are found to play a
significant role in social psychology by engendering animosity and
fear of the enemy; by themes in which the opponent is inherently
hostile, hateful, and intent upon destroying the values and
livelihood of the society and individual (Perlmutter, 1999; Keen,
1986; Silverstein and Holt, 1989 Dower, 1986; Keene, 1986; Ivie,
1980). Groups in conflict tend to maximize the group-centric "good
versus evil" differences between them, with events and circumstances
being interpreted or framed in a way that draws a stark contrast
between the virtues of one and the villainy of the "other" (Spillman,
& Spillman, 1991).
The concept of self and "the other" has been recognized in the social
psychology literature since Carl Schmitt (1928) first introduced the
concept of self and "other" as a tool of political analysis, by
positing that state authority was linked to a collective
understanding of the borders of social identity. Elites' ability to
maintain these boundaries was essential to maintaining authority and
cohesion; in other words, the process by which governmental leaders
employing concepts of enemies to mobilize the nation around common
aims and to support
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
policy aims in prosecuting the war. These images of other
societies –either as rivals or enemies—is essential to maintaining
state unity and legitimating rulers and policies. William Eckhardt
has also indicated how enemy images can be used in propaganda and war
preparation by political elites in preparation for war. (Eckhardt,
1991). These depictions are in line with what Johan Galtung terms
to be cultural violence, in which the "symbolic sphere of our
existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art…that
can be used to justify or legitimate direct of structural violence."
(Galtung, 1990, p.291). For example, in Faces of the Enemy, Sam Keen
(1986, p 44-66) shows how enemy images are historically categorized
within a number of dehumanizing archetypes that overlap and mutually
reinforce one another. These archetypes are by no means exhaustive
listing, but includes images of the enemy as barbaric (a threat to
civilized culture); the enemy as criminal; the enemy as torturer
and/or committer of atrocities; the enemy as evil; the enemy as
rapist/desecrator/subjugator of women; enemy as beast/inhuman; the
enemy as death (or the ultimate threat). During the Cold War,
Americans were consistently told that they were engaged in a struggle
with a wily and implacable enemy bent on conquering the world and
whose basic values are the antithesis of everything that democratic
countries believe (Holt & Silverstein, 1989; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 1990).
This utilization of imagery to construct a view of an enemy can be
specifically related to the political circumstances and cultures of
the Middle East—particularly in regards to Islam. The West's
conception of Islam is rooted
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
as far back as the Medieval Age of the Christian crusaders. Western
imagery of Muslim enemies paints them in broad, oversimplified
strokes that seldom distinguish between individual perpetrators,
states, regions or factions and Islam in general (Esposito,
1991). Edward Said argues, American news media cover events related
to Islam within a framework of pre-conceptions, prejudices and
political interests which only perpetuates a narrow and unfavorable
image of Islamic peoples. To Western eyes, the Orient is seen as
being insular, backward, passive, and inferior; an antipodal
perception essential to constructing the West's definition of
itself. The Oriental male is presented as being feminine, weak, yet
possessing a strangely malevolent and untrustworthy mystique. Too
often, Said argues, the western media portray a myriad of Middle
Eastern cultures, each made up of countless unique individuals with
varying beliefs, as a single Oriental culture heavily influenced by
zealots and kamikaze terrorists.
Said's argument builds upon the observations of the news media
playing a significant role in engendering such images and depictions
of the enemy, particularly via the media's influence in shaping the
audience's perceptions of social reality. The public relies on the
mass media as secondhand sources to provide us with information about
the outside world in which it can have little or no firsthand
knowledge and conceives of only in the abstract. This mediated
reality is a crucial component in the creation and interpretation of
perceptions of foreign nationalities and circumstances, even if they
represent only broad generalizations that may only project the
characteristics of a prominent individual
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
or individuals that represent an entire culture, nation, or political
philosophy (e.g., Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, Joseph Stalin) or of
ethnicities in general (Holt & Silverstein, 1989). Philip Knightly
(1975) asserts that one of the most tangible elements of war
reporting is to "demonize" the enemy and portray him as "an animal in
human disguise" to make the horrors and sacrifices of war not only
palatable to the public, but engender support for governmental
authorities' decisions and actions in pursuing the war.
The news media's role in engendering and reinforcing enemy images
can be explicated through theoretical approach of framing, in which
the selection, presentation, emphasis and exclusion of media frames
results in persistent patterns of cognition and interpretation that
routinely organize content and the parameters of public discourse.
(Reese, et.al., 2001)
News frames are a well-established concept in communications
research, describing the way that reporters seek to make their
stories understandable to news consumers by drawing upon shared
social/cultural themes to put events into context. By employing
various stylistic cues, rhetorical choices, and determinations of
salience and selection (i.e., emphasizing certain aspects of a news
event while downplaying or excluding others) reporters "shape the way
in which news consumers conceptualize situations, identify problems,
evaluate solutions, assign blame/responsibility, and draw moral
judgments" about the events being reported (Entman, 1993; Tuchman,
1978; Graber, 1988). News frames operate not only as a way for
journalists to contextualize stories, but are
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
also the method by which news consumers use stored knowledge/previous
experience to interpret and rationalize their understanding of events
and social situations. News consumers are not merely passive
recipients of news frames, but use a warehouse of common knowledge to
filter and evaluate the information they receive. In other words,
public opinion grows out of an interaction between how media messages
are framed and the frames audiences use to make sense of them (Entman, 1993).
This interaction between news and consumer frames is complex and
contingent upon the circumstances in which frames are employed;
essentially the concepts of activation, association, and
inference. If as numerous cognitive psychologists suspect, that
political knowledge is organized along linkages of concepts or memory
constructs that differ in manner of their accessibility, then news
frames could make certain information in news stories salient to the
reader, while de-emphasizing other information. In this way, news
frames stimulate and activate certain patterns of memory constructs:
1) by evaluating information as it is consumed (i.e., online-based
model) for its salience, and 2) by recalling stored data with which
to evaluate and reconcile incoming information to make political
judgments (i.e., memory-based model). (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997;
Bennett, 1981) When strategic news frames incite cynical judgments,
it unduly influences the way that news consumers interpret/learn
about events through activation (on-line-based processing) and/or
association (memory-based processing).
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
This study uses framing theory to explicate what thematic
characteristics and motivations were used to define the enemy in the
war on terrorism, specifically through identifying and categorizing
specific attributes employed in the media portrayals. The study
seeks to determine the frequency of those portrayals and the extent
to which those themes were put forth by different political and
governmental authorities as a strategic means of coalescing public
support for the war.
Methodology
This study is a content analysis of the newsmagazines Time, Newsweek,
U.S. News and World Report, and the Economist in the eight weeks
following the attacks of September 11, 2001 to identify the thematic
attribute frames about the motivations and suggested causal factors
underlying the terrorist attacks. The study limited itself to
examining only those stories that dealt with those presumed
responsible for the September 11 attacks and the prospective
reasons/motivations that prompted the attacks. Newsmagazines were
chosen for the medium of study because they generally provide more
in-depth analysis of news events and are more likely to reflect a
broader, more thorough range of sources to explain events. Also, in
terms of effect, these publications generally saw the highest
newsstand sales in their history, indicating that a significant
portion of the public were at least exposed to their messages (Sutel, 2002).
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
The analysis of these stories was conducted on two levels. The first
used sentences within the stories as the level of analysis to
identify the thematic attributes that explain the root causes and/or
motivations of the terrorists and their sponsors. Individual
sentences were chosen because quite often a number of different
thematic attributes would be addressed in the same story, yet
individual sentences tended to convey a specific thematic
concept. Given the distinctive circumstances of the attacks of
September 11, 2001—in which the appearance of an identified enemy was
rapid and did not emerge gradually over a period of time—it was
decided not to adapt the thematic categories from previous studies,
but instead to identify those themes that became apparent from the
texts themselves. Therefore, the thematic categories were derived
through an initial reading of the stories, based upon two questions:
How the terrorist/enemy is described in terms of its essential
characteristics (i.e., criminal, evil, formidability), and what
factors are emphasized as the reasons that motivate the
terrorist/enemy. These thematic attributes were grouped into eight
encompassing categories:
Culture These themes attributed terrorists' motivations as a "clash
of civilizations" in which eastern culture was enmity of the forces
of western culture, of which the united States was emblematic. This
included historical references stretching back to the crusades
through colonialism, tribalism, and a rejection of modernization,
globalization, and western-style democracy that may have had a
religious subcontext, but which were not specifically linked to
Islamic beliefs.
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
Morality These themes ascribed terrorists' motivations arising out
of a general sense of immorality. In these attributions, terrorists
were described as "evil," "barbaric," "malevolent," "satanic," and "hateful."
Religious These themes explain terrorists' motivations to be based
upon fundamentalist, radical, or militant Islamic beliefs and the
nature of the Islamic religion to be rooted in a level of violence.
Socio-Economic This includes theses in which terrorists' motivations
are driven by poor economic conditions, a lack of education,
unemployment, and a jealousy against the bounty of the west and the
United States.
Middle Eastern Politics This theme characterizes terrorists'
motivations as a function of political factors in the Middle East,
such as the reaction to U.S. support of Israel, the political
repression by corrupt governmental regimes .
Criminal These thematic attributes described the terrorists acting
not only outside the rule of international law in terms of violent
acts, but in circumventing laws in order to travel and disseminate
resources, raising monies through illegal operations, and
participating in drug running and illegal financial schemes.
Formidable These thematic attributes focus primarily on fear,
describing terrorist "networks" as continually being a menacing
threat, dangerous, powerful, ubiquitous, furtive, and untrustworthy.
Psychological These thematic attributes focus primarily upon the
individuals within the terrorist network who are described as being
psychologically unstable. For example, these attributes most often
describe indefinite individuals as being psychotic, sociopathic,
fanatical, loners, etc.
U.S. Foreign Policy These attributes ascribe terrorists' motivations
to be reactions (or "blowback") from U.S. foreign policies either in
the region generally or to predominately Islamic states in
particular. Specifically, these attributes include references to the
United States' support for Israel, the first Gulf War and the
economic sanctions on Iraq, support of Mujahideen insurgents in
Afghanistan in the 1980s, support for the shah of Iran, etc.
The second level of analysis sought to identify whether different
thematic attributes tend to differ depending upon the types of
sources. Specifically, the
attributes will be categorized based upon one of five sources of the
attribute:
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
to White House officials, government officials, U.S. policy experts,
citizens, law enforcement, religious experts, academic experts,
foreign sources, the terrorists themselves, and the journalist
himself or no attribution. As was indicated in the study of patriotic
frames employed following the September 11 attacks (Hutchinson,
et.al., 2004), this level of analysis seeks to determine whether
there exists a correlation between the type of thematic attribute and
the source attributed to that attribute, in order to infer if there
exists a strategic communication component by which
political/governmental elites can be seen to setting the attribute
agenda for the news media.
Results
A total of 140 stories were coded from the four weekly magazines for
the eight-week period following September 11, including the special
editions printed by Time and Newsweek, resulting in 1,234 sentences
selected and coded within the eight previously identified thematic
categories.
As can be seen in Table One below, an aggregate measure of
descriptions of the enemy and its motivations in the war on terror
were far more often focused upon the Islamic fundamentalists than any
other attribute. A third of the attributions described the enemy to
be Islamic militants acting out of their religious beliefs, nearly
double the closest thematic attribute of the terrorist networks
arising from Middle Eastern politics (15 percent). The magazines
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
depicted the motivations of the terrorists as resulting from regional
politics, cultural factors and U.S. foreign policy at about the same rate.
Table One: Thematic Attributes Describing Enemy in War on Terror and
Their Motivations
Themes
Newsweek
Time
US News
Economist
TOTAL
Militant Islam
134 36%
76 27%
122 32%
38 25%
370 30%
Regional Politics
55 14%
55 17%
50 13%
21 14%
181 15%
Cultural
36 9%
49 15%
64 17%
23 15%
172 14%
Formidable
13 3%
49 15%
47 12%
23 15%
132 11%
U.S.Policy
21 6%
38 12%
31 8%
29 19%
119 10%
Morality
23 6%
19 6%
44 11%
11 7%
97 8%
SociEconomic
31 8%
9 3%
15 9%
3 2%
58 5%
Psychological
48 13%
4 1%
7 2%
6 4%
65 5%
Criminal
12 3%
22 7%
5 1%
1 .6%
40 3%
TOTAL
373
321
385
155
1234
There is a remarkable consistency in the percentages of thematic
attributes across all four newsmagazines, even though some anomalies
existed. With the exception of Newsweek, which gave greater emphasis
to psychological attributes among the enemy (13 percent), the
differences between the newsmagazines in content varied little. In
much the same way, the descriptions of the enemy as a potent and
imminent threat seemed to show up at about the same rate throughout
the stories.
Surprisingly, the second level of analysis—which sought to identify
whether different thematic attributes tend to differ depending upon
the types of sources—found a remarkably low level of source
attribution to the thematic attributes described in the news
stories. As is evidenced in Tables Two A and B, the newsmagazines
were consistent in not attributing sources for the attributes and
assertions made describing the enemy in the war on terror and its
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
motivations. In more than 943 (76 percent) of the instances in which
thematic attributions are made, journalists provided no source for the claim.
Table Two A: Source Attributions for Thematic Frames
Themes
Journalist/ No Attribute
White House
Govt Official
US Policy Expert
Citizen
Cultural
140
4
9
1
Morality
41
12
13
Islam
295
3
10
4
Politics
164
2
7
29
2
SocEcon
49
15
Psych
48
2
2
Criminal
12
5
6
1
US Policy
100
10
9
Formidable
94
8
5
3
1
Total
943
34
39
67
23
Table Two B: Source Attributions for Thematic Frames
Themes
Law Enforce
Religious Expert
Terrorist
Academic
Foreign
Expert
Cultural
2
4
15
2
Morality
5
2
Islam
1
20
5
8
7
Politics
1
3
3
SocEcon
1
1
2
2
Psych
4
1
Criminal
18
1
US Policy
1
10
1
Formidable
2
2
2
2
Total
28
26
13
42
19
Discussion
These findings indicate that trying to identify and understand the
terrorist/ enemy in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks was
clearly of interest to the public discourse. The sheer number of
stories focused exclusively on identifying and describing the
terrorist/enemy network (140) indicates a high level of interest to
finding explanations and motivations.
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
Given the abruptness in which the attacks occurred, it is interesting
to note the ways in which enemy images quickly corresponded to the
traditional structures of enemy constructions envisioned in the
previous academic literature. For example, Keen's typologies of the
enemy (i.e., the enemy as barbaric; the enemy as criminal; the enemy
as torturer and/or committer of atrocities; the enemy as evil; the
enemy as rapist/desecrator/subjugator of women; enemy as
beast/inhuman; the enemy as death) are loosely paralleled in the
thematic attributes ascribed to in the stories.
However, the overwhelming emphasis on religious and (to a lesser
extent) political motivations in the thematic frames in explaining
the reasons behind the attacks raises interesting issues on the
effects on public opinion and the functioning of the news media in
the first weeks of the new war on terror. Given Said's concerns
of news media coverage being overly simplistic in terms of portraying
the panoply of diversity of the Middle East and Islam, it raises
concerns about the functioning of the news media in creating
sufficient images with which to make rational choices in the sphere
of public opinion.
For example, previous explorations of the verbal and pictorial
stereotypes used in media representations of minorities blames many
of society's existing stereotypes to the journalistic struggles to
represent reality within a limited amount of space and time through
easily accessible frames (Lester, 1996). Journalists are often
forced into a type of descriptive shorthand in which new information
is typified accepted, rejected, or reshaped into such a way as to
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
preserve existing perceptions, worldviews and/or stereotypes. This
processing model is only amplified by frames (Capella and Jamieson,
1997;Graber, 1988). While this sample is limited to weekly
newsmagazines' coverage, it is reasonably assumed that their coverage
can reliably indicate similar themes were framed in other media
outlets at the time. While it is not possible to go back and
collect survey data to see if the thematic frames as presented had an
agenda-setting effect on public opinion, we can look at a
contemporary survey conducted just two months after the attacks by
the Pew Center for the People and the Press. Researchers conducted a
telephone survey among a nationwide sample of 1,500 adults, 18 years
of age or older, during the period November 13-19, 2001. For the
most part, Americans were asked why the terrorists attacked, with a
majority (49 percent) believing that the terrorists were primarily
driven by political motives and a smaller minority (30 percent)
believing that the terrorists' religious beliefs were a
factor. Familiarity with the Muslim faith has an influence on
attitudes. Those who say they are most familiar with Islam are among
the least likely to say they see a religious motivation to the
attacks. Fewer than one-in-four (24 percent) of those who say they
know at least something about the Muslim faith say religious beliefs
alone were behind the attacks, while more than half (51%) say it was
mostly political. By comparison, a third of those who say they know
little or nothing about Islam think the attacks were motivated
primarily by religious beliefs.
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
What makes this study most curious was the level in which journalists
at these newsmagazines did not attribute the thematic attributes to
elites. Previous literature on the effects of media coverage of
foreign policy issues strongly suggests that journalists follow the
routine indexing of their coverage and language to that of U.S.
governmental elites (Althaus, et.al., 1996; Bennett 1990; Entman and
Rojecki, 1993; Chomsky, 1985). In this instance, however, the
presence of such indexing by identification of source quotes and/or
attributions seldom existed. There may be two reasons for this. The
first is a reflection of the sample itself. The nature of the
newsmagazine routines and structures, in which the weekly reports are
a digestization of news reports from the preceding week, and the
journalistic requirements for attribution may not be as rigorous
(Gans, 1979). A second reason could be suggested by Daniel Hallin,
in whose The Uncensored War is suggested that journalists can
sometimes look upon the events or circumstances of what they are
reporting (such as the perceptions of the world after September 11)
are so clearly obvious and unassailable that getting someone else to
authenticate it is unnecessary. Given the possibility that reporters
and editors are themselves possibly affected by enemy images, it is
reasonable to suppose that they assumed the public held and expected
confirmation of those assumptions.
But given the significant amount of literature suggesting that what
the public knows about foreign affairs come primarily from reports in
the news media, the over-representation of religious and (to a much
lesser extent) political
Framing the Enemy Following September 11, 2001
motivations in the depictions of enemy images have an impact on the
process of articulating meanings, regardless of whether or not those
images can be shown to have a correlation to the strategic intentions
of political elites. There exists a relationship between the
individual cognitive process and what might be conceived as a
societal or group cognitive process that lead to an item's appearing
in the news. The enemy image of terrorist/enemy is nonetheless a
rhetorical tool used by the news media, which consciously or
unconsciously, intentionally or unintentionally, transmits an
ideological message to the receiving audience.
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