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Manipulation of the Media:
Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
David W. London
Central Michigan University
Department of Journalism
415 Moore
Mt. Pleasant, MI 48858
Email: [log in to unmask]
Phone: 989-779-0227
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
INTRODUCTION
Seventeen ninety-seven was not a good year for Great Britain. It
began with the news of an
attempted invasion of Ireland. In February a major sea battle was
fought off the coast of
Spain, but the news didn't reach England for six weeks. In March a
French raid on the tiny
Welsh village of Fishgard led to a run on the banks and the
suspension of gold payments. In
late April government submitted a record budget and requested massive
tax increases.
Throughout the year the land war went badly as one ally after another
gave up the fight
against Revolutionary France. Rumors of troop buildups in northern
France and Holland,
the construction of flat-bottomed boats and sightings of an actual
invasion fleet weighed
heavily on the public mind. Yet, it was the news of the naval
mutinies occurring between
April and June that captured and held the public's attention. The
naval historian Edward
Brenton described them as "endangering the safety of the British
Empire" and pronounced
them to be the one crisis during the entire reign of George III that
"occasioned a political
paralysis" that could have produced its downfall. Both government and
opposition sought to
manipulate the news of the mutinies to their political advantage.
Both discovered that, while
newspapers could be manipulated, they could not be controlled. And to
their mutual dismay,
an aggrieved minority, the seamen of the Channel Fleet, proved
capable and unusually adept
at using the medium to win the battle for public sympathies.
This paper considers how the press was used to influence public
opinion during the mutiny.
It seeks to prove (or disprove) a specific contemporary accusation of
manipulation by tracing
the story in question from its source to its appearance and
interpretation in various
newspapers. It examines the media's role in the events leading up to
the critical moment of
the mutiny, the moment where it threatened to slip out of control -
including indiscretions in
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
the House of Lords, misrepresentations in newspapers and exaggerated
threats of invasion.
It compares the public, the private and the official records of those
events. It avails a review
of (1) the propaganda literature to posit questions related to
manipulation of the media and
its manifestations in coverage of the mutiny and (2) the historical
record ships' logs,
dispatches, letters, Admiralty minutes and, of course, newspapers.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Harold Lasswell defined propaganda as an act of intention, involving
an effort to influence
collective attitudes by manipulating words and symbols.1 He
acknowledged public opinion's
vital role in support of democracy and assigned propaganda the task
of shaping it.
Walter Lippmann stressed the importance of fictions and symbols in
the machinery of
human communication. He described how the pictures formed inside our
heads formed the
basis of public opinion and argued "public opinions must be organized
for the press if they
are to be sound."2 He believed the public should be provided with a
selective presentation of
the facts and led to form the desired conclusions, rather than being
presented with all of the
facts and allowed to form its own conclusions.
Edward Bernays, of public relations fame, advocated a "leadership
democracy" where an
intelligent minority would regiment and guide the habits and opinions
of the masses. He
described propaganda as an "unseen mechanism of society" and propagandists as
constituting "an invisible government which is the true ruling power
of our country."3
Jacques Ellul saw propaganda more as a sociological phenomenon than
an act of intention.
He spotted a flaw in democratic theory that gave rise to the
propaganda: "Democracy is
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
based on the concept that man is rational and capable of seeing
clearly what is in his own
interest, but the study of public opinion suggests this is a highly
doubtful proposition."4
Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson argued that by guaranteeing
freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, our Constitution ensured that persuasion would
be at the heart of our
political process.5 In theory, the media keeps and eye on those in
power and keeps the public
informed. In practice, however, rather than informing the public,
they have become the
principal means for those in power to influence public opinion. The
goal is no longer to
enlighten, but to move the masses toward a desired point of view.6 In
1807, the great English
media observer, William Cobbett, made the distinction between
democratic theory and
practice clear:
The English Press, instead of enlightening, does, as far as it has
any power, keep the people in ignorance.
Instead of cherishing notions of liberty, it tends to the making of
the people slaves; instead of being their
guardian, it is the most efficient instrument in the hands of all
those who would oppress or wish to
oppress them.7
Fifty years later, the great American media observed, Henry Adams,
observed: "The Press is
the hired agent of a monied [sic] system, set up for no other reason
than to tell lies where the
interests are concerned."8 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky argued that
it serves "to
amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the
values, beliefs, and codes
of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional
structures of the larger society."9
In response to accusations of news bias, media professionals argue
that it is unavoidable.
The pressures of deadlines, limited space, human error, budgetary
constraints, and the
"difficulty of reducing a complex story into a concise report" make
distortions and
inaccuracies inevitable.10 They say that it is impossible to report
everything. Selectivity is
inherent to the process of mass communication. Michael Parenti
acknowledges the need for
selectivity, but questions the principles involved in its
application. He argues that the bias is
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
not random. It consistently favors the dominant ideology. According
to Parenti, the methods
of media manipulation include omissions and suppression, lies,
labeling, face value
transmission, false balancing and framing.
The result is propaganda. It is the means to an end. It
short-circuits the rational process by
replacing thoughts with feelings. It does not enlighten or elevate
man, but makes him serve.
It operates at an unconscious level agitating emotions, exploiting
insecurities, capitalizing
on the ambiguity of language and bending the rules of logic."11
Propaganda controls public
sympathies, not through fabrication, but with a selective
presentation of the truth. It moves
its audience "to a predetermined point of view by using simple images
and slogans that
truncate thought by playing on prejudices and emotion."12 It
communicates a point of view
with the goal of having the audience accept it as its own.13
Today, we recognize propaganda in the form of advertising and
political commentary, but
often overlook the more insidious forms of media manipulation. While
there is little doubt
that the public is presented with only a selection of the facts,
intentions are notoriously
difficult to prove. While the dissemination of information may or may
not be controlled, it is
almost always guarded making motives extremely difficult to detect.
The situation is aggravated by information overload. The volume of
information and the
need to process it quickly make mental shortcuts mandatory. The
public is bombarded with
persuasive communications. "These appeals persuade not through the
give-and-take of
argument and debate, but through the manipulation of symbols and of
our most basic
human emotions."14 This information overload also makes it difficult
for researchers to
identify a source or even an instance of manipulation. Readership
surveys and content
analysis can demonstrate that some news stories receive more
attention than others, but they
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
are at best a crude measure. Simply by measuring the number of column
inches devoted to
stories sympathetic versus those opposed to government policy, Herman
and Chomsky
amassed a convincing case for media manipulation.15 They offered
compelling examples, but
failed to provide any proof.
The struggle to define propaganda centers on the questions of cause
and effect. Lasswell's
argument that intent must be proved results in a restrictive
definition where, absent access to
the propagandists' deliberations, very little can be proved. Ellul's
preoccupation with social
phenomena and the psychological process suggests that almost anything
that impacts public
opinion should be considered propaganda. While most scholars who comment on the
subject feel compelled to offer their own definitions of propaganda,
Leonard W. Doob
argued that "a clear-cut definition is neither possible nor desirable."16
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study examines how the media is used to manipulate public
opinion. It juxtaposes a
narrative of the mutiny with the literature of propaganda. The
complexity of the media today
- the volume of news, the variety of news sources and the velocity at
which news travels -
makes it impossible to trace a story from its sources to its
appearance in the media. The
problems for researchers are compounded by the inaccessibility of
government documents.
This paper seeks to solve these dilemmas by examining a major news
story occurring over
200 years ago the second mutiny at Spithead. It was a simpler time,
a time far beyond the
limitations of the Official Secrets Act, a time when the mass media
were limited to
newspapers; when newspapers were limited to four pages; when news
sources were limited
to a handful of eyewitnesses and government officials, and when the
pace of the news was
limited to the speed of a horse. Questions framed from the propaganda
literature include:
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
(1) Was the public provided a selective presentation of the facts and
led to form a conclusion?
(2) Who manipulated the media? How did they do it and why?
(3) Did newspapers in the late 18th century keep an eye on those in
power and keep the public informed?
(4) Was media bias in this instance unavoidable or did it favor the
dominant ideology?
(5) Was propaganda in this instance deliberate or accidental i.e.
merely a sociological phenomenon? If
it was accidental, was it propaganda?
METHODOLOGY
This paper constructs a narrative of the events leading to a second
mutiny at Spithead by
drawing on primary records located in the Public Record Office, the
British Library, the
National Maritime Museum and the Royal Naval Museum. A narrative
inquiry offers the
means to give public attention to private voices. These records
demonstrate the various
omissions and commissions and point to the choice of sources and
facts in the dominant
discourse of the mutiny (i.e. newspaper accounts) and how that
discourse was used to
influence public opinion. The primary documents examined include the following
contemporary newspapers: The Times, the London Chronicle, the Morning
Herald, the Morning
Chronicle, the Morning Post, the Star, the Observer & Public
Advertiser, and the True Briton.
NARRATIVE
At the height of the French Revolution, at a time when England stood
alone against Europe
and invasion seemed imminent, the kingdom's last defense appeared to
collapse. On 15
April 1797, thirty thousand seamen of the Channel Fleet mutinied.
They refused to weigh
anchor "unless the French Fleet was sighted" until they received
a pay increase to a
shilling a day. Their refusal (the seamen never described it as a
mutiny) occurred within sight
of Portsmouth at the anchorage of Spithead. The mutiny (by naval law
and tradition a refusal
to obey orders cannot be described as anything else) was remarkably
peaceful. Until 7 May,
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
all orders were obeyed (except weighing anchor) and discipline was
maintained. Until 7 May,
no violence occurred.
Beyond its sheer size, its peaceful nature and its ultimate success
(from the seamen's
perspective), the Spithead Mutiny was unique in that it was very
public. All navies, but
especially the Royal Navy, abhor mutiny. It represents a breakdown in
discipline. Over its
long and celebrated history, hundreds of mutinies have occurred in
the Royal Navy. Virtually
all of them were contained or suppressed quickly, quietly and without
any public discussion.
This mutiny was the exception. Given Spithead's proximity to Portsmouth and the
community's close identification with the seamen, the news could not
be contained.
As Revolutionary France appeared ready to invade and revolutionary
ideas threatened to
undermine England's delicate social structure, the crisis nearly
brought down the
government of William Pitt. Pitt's Secretary at War, William Windham,
blamed the media:
"If at the time the Mutiny prevailed in our fleets, any man had asked
him what had been the
cause, he would have answered, 'in a great measure the
Newspapers'."17 He added that "had
it not been providentially suppressed" the mutiny "would have ruined
the Navy and laid our
Country at the feet of France."18 Windham retreated slightly from
suggesting newspapers
actually caused the mutiny, but maintained his conviction that: "No
man would be hard
enough to doubt that what passed from that House to the fleets
through the Newspapers,
had certain, and great and pernicious effect on the minds of the
seamen."19 Another
overstatement perhaps, but what passed from the speeches made in the
House of Lords on
4 May 1797 through the medium of newspapers to the seamen at Spithead
did affect the
mutiny's outcome. In describing its effect as pernicious, Windham
assumed his colleagues in
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
Commons shared his opinion that the medium had breached Parliamentary
Privilege,
exacerbated a volatile situation and became involved in the messages
they delivered.
His assumptions were safe. A vital source of information and
entertainment, eighteenth
century newspapers were immensely popular and exerted an influence
far beyond their
modest circulations.20 It was an influence those in power and those
aspiring to power
necessarily employed, but found intrusive and inherently threatening.
Windham assured the
honorable gentlemen that "he never saw a man with a newspaper in his
hand, without
regarding him with the sensation that he was taking poison."21
Relishing the metaphor, he
added "newspapers circulated poison every twenty-four hours and
spread its venom down to
the extremity of the Kingdom."22 Again, he offered the mutiny as
proof of his point.
While Pitt's Secretary of State at War, William Windham, railed
against any representation of
what passed in Parliament, Pitt's Secretary of State for War, Henry
Dundas, could not afford
to indulge in such sweeping generalizations. A master at manipulating
the media to achieve
political ends, Dundas restricted his criticism to
misrepresentations, arguing the seamen had
been misled. Referring to a time when the mutiny threatened to become
violent, he argued:
No jealousy ever appeared however, till some for whose extreme
wickedness I can find no name
sufficiently descriptive, insinuated to the seamen that the pardon
which had been issued in their favour
was a forgery. When the conversation which took place on the subject
got into the public papers, a new
mode of misrepresentation presented itself, and the diabolical malice
which laboured to renew disturbance,
changed its mode of attack. It was represented to them, with the most
abominable wickedness, that their
Bill had been thrown out by Parliament.23
While newspapers informed the public of what was happening in
Portsmouth, they also
informed the fleet of what was (or was not) happening in London. They
enabled the seamen
to follow the public discussion and gave them a measure of public
sympathies. Admiral Sir
Alan Gardner, who played a prominent, though not particularly
distinguished, role in the
proceedings, complained: "Public Newspapers are read by almost
everybody in the fleet."24
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
If he was only half right and only half the fleet could read, the
other half could and
apparently did listen when the news was read aloud.25
Newspapers did more than present the news. How they presented and
interpreted it
influenced public opinion, a potential appreciated and exploited by
opposition and
government. With poor prospects in Parliament, opposition leaders
found they could
exaggerate their influence and advance their ambitions through the
press. The politician and
playwright Richard Sheridan proved particularly adept at exploiting
his close connections
with the press.26 However, in the struggle for public sympathies,
government's needs were
far more pressing. Given the demands of the war against revolutionary
France, the ministers
had no choice but to enlist public support. In January of 1793, the
Morning Chronicle
recognized that the nature of warfare had changed. It saw the war
with Revolutionary France
as being "fought over 'principles' and there was a danger that we
must go on killing as long
as there are any Frenchmen left to kill, or leave their opinion, as
all who ever made war upon
opinions have hitherto left them, invigorated and exasperated by the
conflict."27 It was the
advent of total war. The battles were real, but the conflict was also
ideological. Twenty-two
years later little had changed when The Times admitted: "We are
engaged in a war - a war of
no common description - a war of system against system, in which no
choice is left to us but
victory or expiration."28
Although the king and his ministers were determined to "keep our
exertions within such
bounds that we may continue the war for many years and thus by time
overcome the
enemy,"29 the expense involved, particularly those associated with
creating and maintaining a
navy of a thousand ships and 120,000 men, exceeded all expectations.
In addition to
requiring "large numbers of men from a wide range of social
backgrounds to take up arms in
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
support of the British state,"30 those remaining in England paid the
bill - both for the king's
army and navy and those of his reluctant allies. On 27 April 1797,
Pitt submitted a record
budget of £42 million, over three-quarters of which could be
attributed to the war effort.
In the past government depended on private capital to fund its wars.
Having borrowed £18
million in a loyalty loan in December of 1796 and more than £156
million since the war
began, the supply of private capital was nearly exhausted. With bad
news from the
battlefields, creditors lost their enthusiasm for the war. When the
solvency of the Bank of
England came into question, Pitt suspended cash payments. Unwilling
to countenance
further debt or higher interest rates, he turned to England's
taxpayers to make up the
difference.31 He sought public support without public interference
and used the press to get
it. While Pitt may have sympathized with Windham, he took his lead from Dundas.
Both government and opposition assumed the press could be used to
political advantage.
Government used it to influence public opinion and secure popular
support. Opposition
used it to undermine confidence in government to pave the way for an
assumption of
power. Neither government nor opposition considered the possibility
that an aggrieved
community within the public could usurp those advantages. They
assumed they controlled
the flow of information and failed to appreciate that, to satisfy the
public's appetite for news,
newspapers would print news from any source. Newspapers provided the
seamen of the
Channel Fleet with the means and the opportunity to capture public
sympathies. Developing
at a pace and intensity far beyond government's ability to manage, or
opposition's ability to
capitalize upon the news, the mutiny proved: "Perhaps the most
important aspect of the
history of the press in this period is the decline in the ability of
governments to control it."32
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
The seamen of the Channel Fleet admitted the role of newspapers in keeping them
informed. The crew of one of the ships at Spithead declared:
We smile at the simplicity of our officers in attempting to divide
us, we know the consequence of our oath
and value it equal to our lives. Redress we will have. Saduced we
will not be. We can Plainly foresee by
the Papers that was Read on Yesterday on Board of our Ship it Seamed
onely a desing to keep us in the
Preasent state of Pay and Provisions unless Passed into an Act of
Parlement for you might Plainly see by
the act Passed in the Reing of King Charles the Second that Unless
this is Passed Into an act of
Parlement the Admiralty, the Parlement or the whole nation at large
may promise to take our Grevences
into Consideration and after that trample them and us under their
feet when we are devided. So brothers
we will never flinch from you in this Present Cause old and Young and
never fear the Defiance.33
Their assurances of solidarity were directed at the delegates of the
fleet the men elected by
the crews of the 17 ships-of-the-line at Spithead to represent their
interests. Their comments
suggest that, far from being the semi-literate drunkards of popular
prejudice, the seamen at
Spithead were well aware of the importance and tenuous nature of
public opinion.
When his attempts to harangue and intimidate the men proved
ineffective, Admiral Sir Alan
Gardner wrote to Secretary of the Admiralty Evan Nepean that
newspaper accounts of the
speeches made in the House of Lords "have been eagerly perused, and
have been productive
of incredible mischief, by misleading & poisoning the minds of the
Seamen of the Fleet who
I believe are fully convinced that it is not the intention of
Government to pay any attention
to their petitions."34 Gardner, a staunch supporter of government,
implied that the seamen
were deliberately misled and that newspaper coverage of the speeches
in the House of Lords
on 3 May was inaccurate. On the contrary and given the practical
limitations and difficulties
in transcription, reports of speeches heard in the House of Lords on
4 May 1797 were
remarkably consistent and accurate when compared with each other or
the official record.35
The differences in coverage tended to be subtle more a matter of
interpretation than fact.
The differences, however, were significant.
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Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
Admiral Lord Howe, at the time England's most celebrated naval
officer and, until 8 April,
Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet,36 appeared in the House of
Lords to refute
suggestions of having neglected the seamen of the Channel Fleet.
Specifically, he was
accused of ignoring the thirteen petitions sent to him in February.
The petitions were formal,
circumspect and made only one request: that the seamen of the Royal
Navy might be
granted a pay increase to a shilling a day.37 The petitions were
virtually identical. All, but one,
were posted on the 28th of February. And all of them were
anonymous.38 Howe, who was
unwell and out of touch with the fleet, concluded the petitions were
forgeries. He made
informal inquiries and forwarded the petitions to the Admiralty.
When ordered to weigh anchor and put to sea on 15 April, the seamen
of the Channel Fleet
refused. Instead, they manned the yards and cheered. They elected
delegates and sent more
petitions this time signed by the crews of each ship - to both the
Admiralty and
Parliament. While the key issue remained pay, their grievances were
expanded to include
other issues related conditions of service. Significantly, the new
petitions insisted that their
pay increase should be confirmed by Parliament and a pardon issued by
the King before they
would weigh anchor.39 They did promise, however, to set aside their
grievances and set sail if
the French fleet was sighted.
The seamen's complaints were now made public. Copies of their new
petitions were sent to
newspapers. The Morning Chronicle reported: "The Sailors, in one of
their Petitions, complain
of the inattention of Earl Howe to their interests in not laying, the
Petition, which they
delivered to him near two months ago, before the Board of
Admiralty."40 As the leading
opposition paper, it sought to transfer the blame from Howe to
government by suggesting
that the "old and gallant Commander [had] presented the Petition to
one of the Lords
12
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
Commissioners of the Admiralty, accompanied with a strong
recommendation to the Board
to take it under immediate consideration."41 Seeking to undermine
public confidence in
government, the editors suggested that the blame and censure for the
crisis "ought to be
transferred from [Howe] to his Majesty's Ministers, who, with a
consistent folly and
stupidity, approaching to insanity, entirely neglected the prayer of
a body of men on whom
depend the hopes, the safety, and the very being of the Country."42
The Observer, another
opposition newspaper, also invented a defense for the aged admiral
that brought the blame
back to government: "the Noble Earl
repeatedly urged, both the
Admiralty Board and
Mr. Pitt, of the justice of the Seamen's claims, their worth, and the
consequences to be
apprehended from resisting the prayer of their petitions."43 Both
newspapers appeared to
base their assurances on assumptions, rather than any knowledge of the facts.
Howe's situation was untenable. He was a naval legend and one of
England's greatest
admirals, but he certainly had his faults. He rarely spoke without
being misunderstood.44
Throughout his long and distinguished career, he managed to confuse,
confound and
alienate his officers. "Howe was an inarticulate man, who may have
become interested in
signaling systems because he had such difficulty conveying his
intentions in any other way."45
An admirer described him as "too forbearing."46 The eminent naval
historian John Laughton
wrote that he was "a man universally acknowledged to be unfeeling in
his nature, ungracious
in his manner, and who, upon all occasions, discovers a wonderful
attachment to the dictates
of his own perverse, impenetrable disposition."47 During the fleet
mutiny of 1783, the
admiral negated the good effect of meeting every ship by promising
each crew they would be
the first to be paid off. According to one naval officer, "after the
battle of the 1st June, Lord
Howe hinted, if he did not actually promise, he would endeavour to
get the seamen's pay
increased."48 This officer, Lt. Phillip Beaver, who remained with the
fleet in 1797, described
13
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
the petitions sent to Howe as similar to the ones sent "to the lords
of the Admiralty, and
others I believe to the minister; to none have they received any
answer; they have been
treated with contemptuous silence."49
After failing to intimidate or divide the Fleet, the Lords of the
Admiralty conceded most of
its demands. The seamen celebrated their victory and waited for
confirmation of their pay
increase to come from Parliament. There was little or no news from
Portsmouth until May 8,
when the Morning Herald announced the renewal of the mutiny at
Spithead. It reported that it
was now attended "with the most alarming violence." The editors
blamed government for
not satisfying the seamen's demands and bringing the matter before Parliament:
The discontents which produced this unfortunate event originated, we
understand, in a supposition that
the promises held out to the Sailors by the Board of Admiralty were
not meant to be fulfilled by
Government; which no doubt was founded not only upon the
unaccountable neglect of Ministers, in not
bringing the affair immediately before Parliament, but also upon the
language made use of in the House
of Lords, a few evenings since, by one of his Majesty's Secretaries of State.50
Ministerial delays and procrastination quickly became the cause
celθbre of the opposition press.
However, Lord Grenville was a curious choice for criticism. His only
contribution to the
discussion was to plead with the peers not to discuss a matter of
such delicacy. As a member
of government, Pitt's Foreign Secretary, he could be criticized,
while those who actually
made the damaging remarks could not.
The exchange began on 3 May when the Duke of Bedford rose to ask
"whether any of his
Majesty's Ministers had it in charge, from his Majesty, to make any
communication upon the
recent important transactions which had occurred in the Marine
department?"51 According
to the Morning Chronicle, Lord Spencer responded, "he had it not in
charge to make any
communication to the House, nor did he foresee, that any
communication would be made
upon that subject." Subtle variations were introduced in transcribing
and editing his remarks.
14
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
Thus, the Morning Post added a note of arrogance by suggesting
Spencer said, "he had it not
in command from his Majesty to make any communication to the House on
that head, nor
did he believe he should have."52 The True Briton removed the sting
and transferred the
responsibility to an unimpeachable source by reporting, "he had it
not in Command, from
His Majesty to make any communication to the House on the subject,
nor did it appear to
him as likely that he should be ordered to do so."53 The Times simply
reported: "he had
nothing to specific at present, nor had he his Majesty's commands to
bring the late
transactions of the fleet at Spithead before that House."54 While
Bedford's question was
rhetorical, Spencer's refusal, particularly as it was presented in
opposition newspapers,
appeared to abrogate a ministerial responsibility. As First Lord of
the Admiralty, Spencer
was required to give the members of Parliament "the opportunity of
obtaining from him in
person an account and, if necessary, a defense both of his own
administrative acts and of the
naval policy of the Government."55
If Spencer's reticence aroused the seamen's suspicions, Lord Howe and
the Duke of
Clarence's ill-advised candor that followed it confirmed their worst
fears. Howe, presumably
still in full uniform, rose to defend his honor. While offering to
postpone his comments, he
proceeded to say what nearly everyone thought, but had the sense not
to say in public. The
Morning Chronicle reported that Howe had "expressed a wish, however,
that for the sake of
the service, the business had never brought under discussion, for the
Legislature would be
brought by it into a most delicate situation."56 Unfortunately, he
went on to say that:
Either they must approve of transactions which there was no man who
did not wish had never happened,
or they must withhold that approbation, and thus acknowledge that
they have made concessions under the
pressure of the moment which they think improper to confirm.57
Again transcriptions and interpretations varied. Ironically, the
Morning Post reported Howe as
entreating their Lordships to be cautious:
15
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
He begged them to consider that if they came to any resolution,
approving of the demands of the Sailors,
it would materially affect the future discipline of the Fleet, by
conveying an acquiescence to their conduct.
If they disapproved it by any resolution, it would convey to the
Seamen of the fleet an idea that the
promises which had been made to them were not meant to be performed.58
Irrespective of the phrasing, the comment should not have been made,
certainly not in a
forum that guaranteed publication. The fact that Howe added, "all
engagements made to
them should be punctually complied with" in no way compensated for
the enormity of his
error and was, in any case, lost in the ensuing controversy.
Grenville was merely trying to
limit the damage when he "agreed entirely with the Noble Earl of the
inexpediency and
impolicy of bringing the subject under discussion, and entreated
their Lordships to allow
matters to rest as they were."59 The Duke of Clarence, the youngest
son of George III, also
"rose to deplore further discussion," but tactlessly added that, in
his opinion, it was
"improper to have complied with the demands of the seamen, however
the concession
might have been politic or proper in other points of view."60
According to Admiral Phillip
Patton, his comments "tended to excite a doubt whether the demands of
the seamen should
have been granted."61 Howe rose in appreciation, but again said the
wrong thing. He
declared the question before Parliament to be: "Will you agree to the
terms made by the
Admiralty with the Seamen, or not? If the terms were fully ratified,
it would virtually be
giving a sanction to their conduct. If refused, it would show the
Seamen that no reliance was
to be placed on the promises of Government."62 Following such
statements, it required no
misrepresentations for the seamen to suspect "the promises held out
by the Board of
Admiralty were not meant to be fulfilled by Government."63
The seamen were well informed of the discussion as it was thoroughly,
though variously,
reported by the press. Admiral Gardner advised Nepean that newspaper
accounts of the
speeches made in the House of Lords were "eagerly perused" and had
produced "incredible
16
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
mischief, by misleading & poisoning the minds of the Seamen who I
believe are fully
convinced that it is not the intention of Government to pay any
attention to their petitions.64
While the opposition press focused on indiscretions and ministerial
delays, government and
its supporters insisted the second outbreak of mutiny was "wholly, or
in a great degree, to be
ascribed to misrepresentations" appearing in newspapers.65 The Times
argued such
misrepresentations were designed "to inculcate a notion abroad, that
the Administration of
the country was disposed to evade the promises made by Earl Spencer
to the seamen."66 In
its version of "what had passed in the House of Lords" no mention was
made of Howe's
awkward question and the royal duke was quoted as saying: "He
entertained the highest
opinion of the abilities and conduct of the Noble Admiral; at the
same time that he could
not but deprecate a discussion in that House of the late discontents
of the fleet. It might do
much harm, and could be productive of little, if any, good."67 To
avoid misrepresenting the
aged admiral or the future king, The Times chose not to represent
them at all.68 Readers were
left to wonder why there had been so many calls for silence - calls
that came far too late.
The first news of the second outbreak of mutiny began with a fleet
sighting. The French
fleet had been sighted at the outer road of Brest.69 The Morning
Herald reported that "17 sail
of the line and a number of transports appeared ready for sailing at
a moment's notice."70
Orders were sent for the Channel Fleet to meet this invasion threat.
However, instead of
weighing anchor, the seamen "manned the yards and cheered" following
which "boats were
seen plying from ship to ship."71 The paper observed that "every mind
on shore is agitated
with the most poignant alarm and suspense" and reported the mutiny's
first violence: "when
the boats attempted to go on board Admiral Colpoys' ship, he and his
officers resolved to
17
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
oppose their coming on board with force, and in the encounter seven
of the boat's crew
were killed, and nine wounded."72 The editors added their
interpretation to the news:
The refractory spirit of the Seamen on the present occasion has been
manifested in a manner that reflects
very little credit on their boasted loyalty and attachment to their
country's cause. What! the natural
defenders of Old England refuse to put to sea, and sluggishly remain
in port, under a frivolous pretext, at
a time when her coasts are menaced by a daring and enterprising foe!
Such behaviour is surely unworthy
of the character of British Seamen; and yet, if we are rightly
informed, such has actually been their
unfortunate instance to which we now allude.73
Whether they hoped to shame the seamen into submission or turn public
opinion against
them was unclear. However, their statement was untrue. At no point
during the mutinies
were the French, Dutch or Spanish fleets enterprising enough to put
to sea let alone
menace England's coasts. The True Briton offered a similar report
with a similar comment:
A report has been prevalent for these two or three days past, that
the French Fleet consisting of seventeen
sail of the line, with a considerable number of transports, were
lying in the outer road of Brest ready for
sea, and it was even stated yesterday, that this Fleet was actually
at sea. If this be the case, our seamen
will be furnished with an opportunity of evincing the sincerity of
their return to their duty, by giving such
an account of the Enemy as they have hitherto ever been accustomed to
do; and we trust that they will
soon atone for their present misconduct, by some great naval achievement.74
Throughout the mutiny, reports of enemy fleet sightings appeared in
both government and
opposition papers. Most were based on nothing more substantial than coffeehouse
speculations. Others were gleaned from continental papers; and,
having no foundation in
fact, were either French exercises in propaganda (to bolster local
morale) or disinformation
(to deceive or dishearten the British). And some were so detailed
that they could only have
come from the Admiralty. Their motives, in releasing some reports and
withholding others,
were not stated, but were revealed in the patterns they followed.
The British approach to manipulating the media was subtle. There was
no need to falsify or
fabricate news. A selective release of information provided the
necessary impetus for
propaganda. The Admiralty shared the following details regarding the
sighting from a report
submitted to it by Sir John Borlase Warren, commander of the
blockading squadron:
18
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
18 Sail of the Line, two of them getting their topmasts through [and]
6 or 7 Frigates. Most of the above
ships have their sails bent, and are apparently ready for sea. It is
reported that there are one hundred sail of
Transports in the Harbour.75
However, the Admiralty chose not to share all that they knew about
the fleet at Brest. They
were aware that, despite Warren's report, the French fleet was in no
condition to sail, that
the French lacked the men and provisions needed to mount a major
expedition. On 1 March
Spencer advised Bridport: "it does not appear that they have either
men or stores enough to
enable them to go to Sea."76 Recognizing the opportunity provided by
the mutiny, the
French made every effort, but could manage no more than the show of
force that Warren
observed.77 Intelligence reports from Texel suggest similar activity
and similar confusion.
Plans were made and orders were issued, but not executed:
I understand there are 14 sail of the line and 4 frigates in the
Texel. All the officers were ordered to
repair to their respective regiments on the 3rd inst. and that the
troops had begun to embark. They were
to be joined by a French Fleet for the purpose of attempting three
different descents on this country. The
public there laughed at the idea of such an invasion, as they are
persuaded it will meet with the same fate
as that attempted in Ireland.78
The same demands of total war and want of money that led to the
crisis in England
precluded the possibility of invasion.79 On 1 April Windham heard
from Texel: "Orders have
been given for 9 months provision to this Fleet, but no one is
disposed to enter into the
contracts. There is little to be apprehended from any active service
of the marine force of
this country during this year."80 The intelligent reports were
consistent. In March the
Admiralty learned from Captain d'Auvergne, its chief intelligence
officer stationed in the
Channel Islands, that there were ten line-of-battle ships at Brest,
"all extremely ill-fitted and
badly manned."81 D'Auvergne explained that "the extreme want of
stores leaves great doubt
whether those in the Road will be completed, much less those in the
harbour refitted,
without fresh supplies from either Holland or Spain" and added that
"sailors continue to
desert in crowds, insomuch that forced levies scarcely compensate for
them."82 On 20 April
19
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
Sir Robert Strachan confirmed that "[t]here is said to be a great
scarcity of seamen in France
and that those they have in the Navy are continually deserting."83
Yet another report stated
there were "16 to 17 ships-of-the-line at Brest," but "there was
scarcely a sufficiency of
seamen or marines on board to do the ordinary duty of the ships
almost all having
deserted from want of victuals, clothing, and pay." 84 The observer
concluded that he did
"not think it possible that they can send a Fleet to sea, and such
seems to be the general
opinion of people at Brest. Stores of all kinds are extremely
deficient."85 On 29 April,
d'Auvergne, confirmed that the situation in France had not changed:
The desertions of the seamen continues in an excessive degree. The
Bishoprick of Leon is full of them.
They are supported by the peasants. Colonnes Mobiles have been
marched in the country, but the soldiers
either avoided taking them up or sent them notice to keep out of the
way for their expedition has been
fruitless. The ships in the Road are not above half manned.86
On 8 May the Star preceded its report of the second outbreak with the
news: "It is very
currently reported, that the French fleet are at sea, and have a
fleet of transport with them."87
On 9 May the Morning Post denied the sailing, but confirmed the
possibility: "It is stated that
the French Fleet had worked out into the outer road of Brest,
consisting of 17 sail of the line
and a number of transports, which appeared ready for sailing at a
moment's notice."88 That
afternoon the Star linked the sighting with the situation at Portsmouth:
In consequence of information having been received at the Admiralty,
that the Brest fleet, consisting of 18
ships of the line, with a great number of transports having troops on
board, was anchored at the outer
roads of Brest, orders were transmitted to Lord Bridport, to put to
sea immediately, and his instructions
to that effect reached him on Sunday morning. His Lordship made
signal for weighting and putting to
sea, but not a crew would act. It seems they had read the late
conversation in the House of Lords, in
which silence on the subject of the Seamen's complaints was so
strongly recommended by Ministers and
their friends; and they suspected there was a design of deceiving
them; they thought that the Ministers had
no serious intention of having their demands sanctioned by
Parliament. This was the reason they refused
to weigh anchor on Sunday morning; and finding themselves, by the
call made on them to put to sea,
forced to a decisive line of conduct, they resolved to hold a
Convention of Delegates on board the London
lying at Spithead.89
Providing enough detail to identify an official source, The Times
fuelled invasion fears by
suggesting that at least double the number of ships observed by
Warren were ready to sail:
20
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
THE FRENCH FLEET
Although the reports made by the Galetea frigate to Sir J B Warren,
and sent express by him to the
Admiralty, mention their having counted but 17 ships of the line in
Brest water, we are not to conclude
that the enemy have no more ships equipped in the outer road of Brest
and in the harbour than barely
that number; but it is politic in them to suffer no more to be
visible at one time to our cruisers off the
harbour's mouth; whilst the rest may continue concealed within the
intervening headland, which partly
separates the outer road from the Brest water, in like manner as
ships in Catwater or Hamoaze are
most invisible to ships in Plymouth Sound. That they have double the
above number the following
statement will evince, and which must all be ready for sea at this
instant, provided they have their
complement of men. When our Seamen read this list, we hope they will
not temporize a moment longer,
but cheerfully weigh anchor in search of the enemy. Present state of
the armament at Brest. May 1, 1797
Guns Guns
Les Peuples 120 Le Republicain 110
La Convention Nationale 110 Le Terrible 110
Richery's Late Squadron; and three frigates
Le Jupiter 80 Le Duquesne 74
La Victoire 80 Le Censeur 74
Le Resolution 74 Le Berwick 74
Le Barras 74
Villeneuve's Squadron from Toulon, which arrived at Brest about
Christmas last; and two frigates
Le Formidable 80 Le Tyrannicide 74
Le Rosseau 74 Le Morne Blanc 74
Le Jemappe 74
Returned in January from the Irish expedition and eleven frigates
L'Indomptable 80 Le Fougeux 74
Le Trajan 74 Le Redoubtable 74
Le Nestor 74 Le Patriote 74
Le Cassud 74 Le Mutius 74
Le Tourville 74 Le Watigny 74
Le Ζote 74 La Constitution 74
Le Pluton 74 Le Revolution 74
Le Pegase 74
Arrived at Brest from Toulon the latter end of January, and two frigates
Le Tonnant 80 Le Gillaume Tell 74
Total 33 of the Line and 18 Frigates
To join immediately from Toulon 7 of the Line
40
Equipping at L'Orient 4 Ships of 76 guns
Grand Total 44 Ships of the Line
It is manifest, therefore, that their aim is to outnumber greatly our
Grand Channel Fleet; which, if united
and in harmony, would however be more than a match for all the
combined forces of France and Spain.90
21
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
The qualification, "provided they have their complement of men," was
lost in the
announcement that the French were "ready for sea at this instant."91
Significantly, the list
included the names of the ships, their armament, their captains, but
not their condition. This
was no oversight. The information was certainly available to the
Admiralty. No intelligence
report would have been meaningful without it. However, had the
condition of the allied
fleets been made public, it would have been obvious that virtually
none of them were in a
condition to sail.
Of course, naval intelligence was not made public at least not
until it was convenient. Once
the Channel Fleet was safely at sea, The Times reported that the
"French fleet is certainly in a
very disorganized state." With no mention of their earlier alarm, the
editors explained that
the French government had "no money to pay the sailors in specie" and
that "the desertions
have been very great; and a large body of troops is drawn down
towards Brest to stop their
further progress."92 However, the unusual number of fleet sightings
and the attempt to
manipulate the press did not go unnoticed:
The stories of the French being at sea are fortunately without
foundation. Such falsehoods ought not to be
circulated. God knows we have already suffered too much from the
Jesuitical policy of false alarms! What
might be the consequence to England, if by these very cunning alarms,
we should prompt the impetuous
seamen to hurry the fleet to sea, of their own accord, without
instructions, without concert, without a
rendezvous, and without auspices! If there was nothing material to
the conduct of a Fleet, but bravery in
the hour of action, we should have pleasure in seeing the British
Seamen, self-organised, opposed to the
enemy however numerous, but the detail of signals, the co-operation
of the Admiralty at home, and with
all the other stations of the service, the intelligence with respect
to the enemy, and a thousand other
considerations which depend on concert and establishment, must
convince the sailors themselves that even
their own strength, their importance, and their success must depend
on system, on discipline, on duty, and
that they can only hope to retain the glory they have acquired by
returning to the order which has made
them the pride of the Universe.93
22
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
FINDINGS & CONCLUSION
The media of 200 years ago operated under many of the same
constraints and pressures as
they do today. They struggled with economic realities, limited access
to sources and the
impossibility of presenting all of the news. They engaged in
perpetual self-criticism and
ethical discussions. They pondered their role in democratic society
and recoiled in selfrighteous
indignation from all attempts to limit it. They suffered from an
inherent bias and
served as the principal means of influencing public opinion.
One of the more important lessons to be learned from this analysis of
news coverage of the
mutiny was that there wasn't just one public. There were several
one of which included the
seamen of the Channel Fleet. Beyond question, that public was
provided with a selective
presentation of the facts with the object of leading them to believe
that an invasion was
imminent. Ironically, their loyalty was assumed. Their promise to
weigh anchor if the French
fleet was sighted was taken for granted as was their ignorance
about the true condition of
the French fleet. Upon reading the exaggerated details of the French
fleet, the seamen were
expected to "cheerfully weigh anchor in search of the enemy."94 While
they later proved their
loyalty beyond question, in this instance the seamen proved that they
were determined and at
least as well informed as the Lords of the Admiralty.
Both government and opposition politicians used newspapers to
influence public opinion.
Government supplied the papers with information about the mutiny and opposition
interpreted the news to their political advantage. Neither government
nor opposition seemed
particularly concerned with how the seamen of the Channel Fleet would
react to their
manipulations. While the issue was still debated, parliamentary
privilege was breeched long
before 1797. However, the mutiny demonstrated the dangers involved in unguarded
23
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
discussion of public affairs. Ultimately, the indiscretions of
Admiral Howe and the Duke of
Clarence, rather than the misrepresentation of their remarks,
exacerbated the mutiny.
While the media of the late 18th century reveled in the role of
watchdog, they put far more
effort into influencing the public than informing it. Newspapers of
the era were no more or
less independent then than they are now. They certainly reflected the
bias and ideologies of
those contending for political or commercial power; but,
paradoxically, they also fulfilled
their basic function in a democratic society. Though inconsistent,
contradictory and
confusing, they did inform the public and served to check those who
would abuse their
power. In addition to supplying the public with information,
newspapers also gave the public
a voice. They shaped public opinion, but they also reflected it. In
this instance, they gave the
seamen a forum in which to air their grievances and the opportunity to monitor
government's progress in redressing them.
The manner and timing of the fleet sightings reported by the press
prove intent and the
presence of propaganda. The incomplete and inaccurate reports of the
French fleet sailing
were linked with challenges of the seamen's character and loyalty.
Information regarding the
condition of the French fleet was clearly withheld until after the
mutiny was settled. The
reports do not, however, provide the identity of the propagandists.
While government did
withhold vital information, its manipulations primarily took the form
of feeding the media's
collective impulse for analysis, interpretation and speculation.
24
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
A SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The temptation to compare fleet sightings that occurred 200 years ago
with weapons
inspections that occurred two years ago is nearly irresistible. Both
involved the manipulation
of the media in an effort to influence public opinion. Both involved
an effort to justify
unpopular policy with an ultimate fear the fear of invasion an
invasion of not just troops,
but of an ideology that had proved its ruthlessness in a Reign of
Terror - or the fear of
weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of a madman a
madman who had
demonstrated his ruthlessness by using such weapons on his own
people. The temptation is
there, but this researcher is willing to leave such comparisons to
other scholars. While they
certainly would establish the relevance of this research to the
current discussion of
manipulation of the media, it would also dilute the analysis offered
here. The depth of
analysis offered here is possible only because the events studied
occurred so long ago.
Access to private and official records including critical naval
intelligence documents is
unrestricted. The amount of information available is staggering, but
not overwhelming. And
the events studied occurred long enough ago that the researcher's
inherent bias in framing or
filtering the records is a minor rather than a major problem. Still,
the temptation remains and
it is useful for scholars to occasionally remember that history
follows patterns and that there
is truth in the old adage: "The more things change, the more they
stay the same."
1 H Lasswell, Democracy through Public Opinion (New York: George
Banta Publishing, 1941), 1, 42-46
2 W Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan Company, 1961), 32
3 E Bernays, Propaganda (New York: Ig Publishing, 2005, originally
published in 1928), 38
4 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes (New
York: Vintage Books, 1973), 124
5 A Pratkanis & E Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and
Abuse of Persuasion (New York: W H
Freeman & Company, 2001), 8
6 Ibid., 14
7 Cobbett's Political Register, 11 April 1807. Cobbett was known in
the US as "Peter Porcupine" for his scathing
attacks on Jeffersonian democracy.
25
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
8 R McChesney, "Journalism, Democracy and Class Struggle," Monthly
Review, November 2000
9 E Herman and N Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (Pantheon Books, 1988), PAGE #
10 C Jensen and Project Censored, 20 Years of Censored News (New
York: Seven Stories Press, 1997), 27-31
11 Ellul, 38. Historian, journalist and novelist, Henry Adams was
also the grandson and great-grandson of US
Presidents John and John Quincy Adams.
12 A Pratkanis & M Turner, "Persuasion and Democracy: Strategies for
increasing deliberative participation and
enacting social change," Journal of Social Issues, 52 (1996), 190
13 A Pratkanis & E Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and
Abuse of Persuasion (New York: W H
Freeman & Company, 2001), 11
14 Ibid., 7
15 E Herman and N Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1988), PAGE #
16 E Barnouw, et al, International Encyclopedia of Communications
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 375;
G Jowett and V O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, 1999), 4
17 The Times, 1 January 1799
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. Windham's comments were made in response to George Tierney's
complaints of a breach of
Parliamentary privilege and libelous misrepresentations by The Times.
20 The combined circulation of the London dailies in the late 1790s
did not exceed forty thousand. However, as
each copy might be read by twenty or thirty people in coffee-houses,
public-houses, pot-houses and circulating
libraries, readership estimates run as high as 1.2 million. I
Christie, Myth & Reality in Late Eighteenth Century
British Politics and Other Papers (London: MacMillian, 1970), 325
21 Parliamentary History, xxxiv, 162-4
22 Ibid.
23 Star, 11 May 1797
24 PRO ADM1/107, Gardner to Nepean, 8 May 1797
25 Little is known about literacy amongst seamen. Estimates of
functional literacy (ability to read, but not write)
for the general population in the late 18th century range from half
to two-thirds. J Feather, A History of British
Publishing (London: Routledge, 1991), 85; F O'Gorman, The Long
Eighteenth Century: British Political & Social
History 1688-1832 (London: Arnold, 1997), 129; Webb, 22
26 Sheridan also owned the Drury Lane Theatre. Of the advantage,
William Cobbett commented: 'I shall make
a full exposure of your connexion with the newspaper press, shall
show the reciprocal dependence which
subsists between you and the persons concerned in the conducting of
that press, and shall point out the
mischiefs which have arisen, and which will yet arise, from this
reciprocity.' Cobbett, Political Proteus, 11
27 Morning Chronicle, 30 January 1793
28 The Times, 15 February 1812
29 P Mackesy, War Without Victory, The Downfall of Pitt 1799-1802
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 32
30 Colley, 287. While this may have been true of the army, militia
and fencibles, the majority of those pressed or
recruited into the naval service were already seamen.
31 Income taxes were introduced in 1798.
32 A Wadsworth, Newspaper Circulation: 1800-1954 (Manchester:
Manchester Statistical Society Transactions,
1955), 11
33 ADM 1/5125, Letter from the Ship's Company of HMS Defiance to the
Delegates, n.d. (filing suggests 18-22
April 1797)
34 ADM 1/107 268, Gardner to Nepean, 8 May 1797
26
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
35 Journal of the House of Lords, xli, 1797
36 ADM 1/107 187, Howe to Nepean, 8 April 1797
37 The seamen had not received a pay increase since 1664.
38 The seamen's reluctance to sign the petitions was understandable.
It was common for ringleaders to be
selected for punishment from the names listed on any petition that
was considered mutinous.
39 ADM 1/5125, A Detail of the Proceedings, 18-24 April 1797
40 Morning Chronicle, 22 April 1797
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Observer & Public Advertiser, 23 April 1797
44 J G Bullocke commented: 'Those who have come across Lord Howe's
letters ... know that their amazing
circumlocution of style was matched in his conversation'. Bullocke,
Sailors' Rebellion: a century of naval mutinies
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1938), 229
45 N Tracy, Nelson's Battles: The Art of Victory in the Age of Sail
(London: Chatham, 1995), 73
46 Lady Bourchier, Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward
Codrington (London: Longmans, Green, 1873), 32
47 Dictionary of National Biography, x, 97
48 J Laughton, ed., Naval Miscellany I (London: NRS, 1902), 408-409;
E Hallam Moorhouse, ed., Letters of the
English Seamen: 1587-1808 (London: Chapman & Hall, 1910), 180
49 Moorhouse, 180
50 Morning Herald, 8 May 1797
51 Morning Chronicle, 4 May 1797
52 Morning Post, 4 May 1797
53 True Briton, 4 May 1797
54 The Times, 4 May 1797
55 O Murray, 'The Admiralty', Mariner's Mirror, xxiii (1937), 22
56 Morning Chronicle, 4 May 1797
57 Ibid.
58 Morning Post, 4 May 1797
59 Morning Chronicle, 4 May 1797
60 Star, 4 May 1797
61 P Patton, "Account of the Mutinies at Spithead & St Helen's,"
Papers on Naval Affairs (Edinburgh: Murray &
Cochrane, 1807), 7
62 True Briton, 4 May 1797
63 Morning Herald, 8 May 1797
64 PRO ADM1/107, Gardner to Nepean, 8 May 1797; see also P Patton,
"Account of the Mutinies at Spithead
& St Helen's," 8
65 London Chronicle, 6-9 May 1797. Sheridan artfully responded 'the
second discontents were wholly to be
ascribed to the procrastination of Ministers'.
66 The Times, 9 May 1797
67 Ibid., 4 May 1797
27
Manipulation of the Media: Misrepresentations, Indiscretions & Fleet Sightings
68 While the official version of what was said confirms the damaging
remarks, the impressions created by
newspapers were all that mattered.
69 Brest was the main French naval base on the Channel.
70 Morning Herald, 8 May 1797
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 True Briton, 11 May 1797
75 PRO ADM1/107, Warren to Nepean, 3 May 1797
76 BL Addl MS 35 197.85, Bridport Papers, Spencer to Bridport, 1 March 1797
77 PRO ADM1/4172, d'Auvergne, 23 April 1797; ADM1/4172, d'Auvergne,
16 May 1797; ADM1/107,
Durham to Warren, 29 April 1797; ADM1/4172, d'Auvergne, 16 May 1797
78 PRO ADM 1/4172, Nagzinshi to Carter, 7 April 1797; ADM1/6033,
Duncan, 17 April 1797; ADM1/3974,
The Hague, 28 April 1797
79 The Spanish fleet had not recovered from its defeat at Cape St Vincent.
80 PRO ADM1/6033, Holland, 1 April 1797; PRO ADM1/4172, Secretary of
State, 1 April 1797
81 Ibid., Brest 19 & 20 March 1797
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., Strachan, 20 April 1797
84 Ibid., Brummell, 24 April 1797; BM Add MS 35197, Bridport Papers
85 Ibid.
86 PRO ADM1/4172, report from d'Auvergne, 16 May 1797
87 Star, 8 May 1797
88 Morning Post, 9 May 1797
89 Star, 9 May 1797
90 The Times, 12 May 1797
91 Ibid.
92 London Chronicle, 13-16 May 1797; The Times, 18 May 1797
93 Morning Chronicle, 10 May 1797
94 The Times, 12 May 1797
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