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This paper was presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and
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Frames Reshaped
A Textual Analysis of China's Image in the New York Times, 1966-1976
Author: Jianchuan Zhou
Doctoral Student in Mass Communication
Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication
University of Georgia
Phone: (706) 254-1605
Email: [log in to unmask]
Submission to the International Communication Division
Abstract:
This study is a textual analysis of the New York Times coverage of
China from 1966 to 1976. Contrast to the wide-held "persistent
patterns" concept of framing theory, the analysis demonstrates some
changes of the frame in which China was portrayed. The frame was of
an "isolated China" in the 1960s, while in the 1970s it was reshaped
as a more serious, rational international player. The study suggests
that this change correlated to the change of U.S. policy on China.
Frames Reshaped
A Textual Analysis of China's Image in the New York Times, 1966-1976
Submission to the International Communication Division
Abstract:
This study is a textual analysis of the New York Times coverage of
China from 1966 to 1976. Contrast to the wide-held "persistent
patterns" concept of framing theory, the analysis demonstrates some
changes of the frame in which China was portrayed. The frame was of
an "isolated China" in the 1960s, while in the 1970s it was reshaped
as a more serious, rational international player. The study suggests
that this change correlated to the change of U.S. policy on China.
Frames Reshaped:
A Textual Analysis of China's Image in the New York Times, 1966-1976
- 0 -
Frames Reshaped[1]
A Textual Analysis of China's Image in the New York Times, 1966-1976
In July 1971, Dr. Henry Kissinger, former national security advisor
for President Richard Nixon, visited the People's Republic of China.
The secret visit was made known a few days later and President Nixon
announced his decision to visit China. Nixon's ice-breaking trip to
China was realized on February 21, 1972, and the normalization of
relations between the two countries formally began. Although some
measures had been taken since 1970 to ease tensions, such a rapid
policy change toward an adversarial communist country, with which
America had no contact for two decades, was still drastic and
surprised many. The change in the government's foreign policy on
China, as some researchers observed, was closely reflected in the way
U.S. media portrayed the country.[2]
The historical backdrop of the U.S.-China relations was complicated.
The United States backed Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government in
the Chinese civil war. After the communist victory in 1949, the U.S.
Government refused to recognize the newly founded People's Republic
of China. The Nationalists, with the help of the United States,
retreated to Taiwan and survived on the island under the shield of
the U.S. 7th Fleet. In the international arena, the Nationalist
regime continued to occupy the China seat in the United Nations until
1971, when an overwhelming majority of U.N. members voted that the
Government of the People's Republic of China, not the Nationalists
regime of Taiwan, should take the China seat in the world body.
In the Cold War era following World War II, the world was divided
into the West, led by the United States, and the East, headed by the
Soviet Union. The People's Republic formed an alliance with the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries. For two decades after
regime change, the Chinese and the Americans had no substantial
contact except on the battlefields of the Korean Peninsula. But
China-Soviet relations began to deteriorate in the late 1950s, and
the rift became open in the 1960s. China, as a broken link of the
Eastern bloc, became a wild card of crucial importance in the game of
international geopolitics. As the Soviet Union remained the principle
adversary of the United States, it also became a greater threat than
the United States for the Chinese. It was under this circumstance
that both the United States and China realized it was of their common
interest to end their adversity. Meanwhile, the Taiwan issue
continued to be the main obstacle to a better U.S.-China relationship.
Mass Media and Foreign Policy
Studies dedicated to the relationship between the media and
U.S.-China relations remain sporadic, although more on the subject
can be found in general media-foreign policies study. While general
studies of media and policies present a general clue, studies on
individual countries allow us to delve deeper. Most previous studies
in this area have focused on quantitative measurement of frequencies
of mentioning,[3] distribution of topics,[4] or counting the use of
symbols.[5] Chang's comparison of symbols in newspapers and documents
showed that the news coverage reflected the ups and downs of
U.S.-China relations over 35 years.[6] Yan's structural analysis of
the New York Times also discovered that the coverage of China in the
Times changed in accordance with the shifts of American foreign
policy toward China over the four decades from 1949.[7] Although
these findings confirm close coordination between foreign policies
and news coverage, they are identified in terms of quantifiable
variables such as topics, symbols, etc. These researches have shown
the power of the quantitative approach, but also its limitation in
capturing subtle change of the tones in the texts.
Interpretations of this close coordination are inconsistent as well.
For some scholars, the media's role is either passive or subordinate.
Berry suggested that in the relationship between foreign policy and
the press, "the press is a moon, not a sun; it reflects light."[8] In
Herman and Chomsky's view, the U.S. media is to "serve to mobilize
support for the special interests that dominate the state and private
activity," and "their choices, emphases, and omissions" of news
coverage are strictly for that purpose.[9] These scholars also
observed that the media became inconsistent, critical of the U.S.
foreign policy only when consensus started to erode in Congress, or a
particular policy was failing.[10] For others, the media plays a more
active role. One of the earliest works supporting this view is
Cohen's heavily cited study, The Press and Foreign Policy. Cohen
described that "the glass that the press holds up is refractive
rather than reflective, and the beams that come out of it strike the
policy makers as well as a larger public."[11] Two decades later,
Larson discussed the dual role of network television as an observer
and a participant in the foreign policy process, in which foreign
policy elites not only influence but also depend on the television
news.[12] Whether the U.S. media refracts or reflects the
government's foreign policy, the causes of this correlation remain unclear.
The current study is the first step of a larger project aiming to
better understand this relationship.[13] In this study, the New York
Times' coverage of China from 1966 to 1976 was examined in the manner
of textual analysis. The question in this study is whether or not
there was a change in the tone of the Times' coverage of China over
this period, and how so. Tone is a rich and complex mode of
linguistic registration, one of the central ways in which the news
text presents itself. It indicates to the reader an evaluative "set",
or stance, towards a certain topic (or range of topics) taken by "the
speaker"; and it invites the reader to assume a similar stance.[14]
There is the possibility that a discernable change in the tones might
not exist, and if that is the case, the change of a country's image
in the newspaper might indeed come as a result of topical change or
change of symbols, as discovered in previous studies. In a sense, the
use of semantic symbols is directly related to the tone of the
coverage, but this study is not to count the frequencies of these
symbols in quantitative measurement. Instead, it will look at how the
symbols were used in the text and in context. Whatever result, such
analysis is to add to our understanding of how the image of a nation
is constructed and reconstructed, how it is demonized and glorified.
If such change in the Times' tone occurred, a later stage of the
larger project shall explore various factors (and identify the key
factors) that contributed to the change.
Frames Are Not Always Persistent
The theoretical implication of this study is its contrast to what
some framing theorists called the "persistent patterns" of news
frames.[15] Gitlin described media frames as "principles of
selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit
theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters."[16] In
broader perspective, news framing is realized through selection of
topics and components of the stories; in more subtle way, it is the
"unspoken and unacknowledged" tactic of managing labels and symbols
and the tones "between lines." In Gitlin's definition, frames are
"persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation,
of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers
routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual."[17] In
similar terms, Reese argued that "[u]nless frames endure over time
they have relatively little importance for analysis," and "[t]he more
persistent the frame, the more likely it deserves examination."[18]
Gitlin and Reese's points clearly articulate the importance of
persistence to a meaningful frame. After all, frames will be too
elusive to discover if they are ephemeral. The persistent patterns
argument stresses frames' resistance to change, however, there seem
to be evidences suggesting that frames can defer to intervening
forces and are subject to change. Gamson and Modigliani[19] present
another example. Their longitudinal study of 40 years of media
discourse and public opinion on nuclear power identifies three major
phases of the frames evolvement. In the case of media coverage of
China, Mann made a vivid account describing how the frames changed
over decades:
In the 1950s and the 1960s, the "frame" was of China as little blue
ants or automatons. In the 1970s, following the Nixon
administration's opening, the frame was of the virtuous
(entertaining, cute) Chinese, displaying their timeless qualities
even under communism. In the 1980s, the frame was that China was
"going capitalist." And for most of the 1990s, the frame was of a
repressive China.[20]
As in Yan's analysis of the New York Times, Mann identified the first
major change of the news frame in China coverage was between the
1960s and the 1970s. Mann's account and the findings of others
suggest that news frames may not be a persistent pattern under
certain conditions. It can be reshaped overtime as it succumbs to
outside forces. Such forces were recognized even in Gitlin's
"persistent pattern" accounts, as he also considered the major themes
and tones of coverage on the New Left in the 1960s, and how they
shifted over time. In his words, " (t)he world of news production is
not self-enclosed; for commercial as well as professional reasons, it
cannot afford to ignore big ideological changes."[21]
Sampling the Text
The current study focuses on newspaper coverage. Wary of possible
different tones in different newspapers and the danger of distorted
findings as a consequence, the researcher made the decision to
analyze ONE newspaper as the beginning step. The New York Times was
selected because of its prominence and influence, especially in
international coverage. Cohen discovered that foreign policy
officials, in general, regard the Times as "the single most important
newspaper."[22] Moreover, the Times was identified as the newspaper
that influences the content of other mass media,[23] and was regarded
as an "indicator of the general thrust of news" that reaches the
American citizenry.[24] For practical reason to overcome time
constraint and keep the current study manageable, only front-page
stories are sampled for analysis. This is a consistent practice that
has been used in many other similar studies.[25]
The 11-year time window is not randomly selected. The "Cultural
Revolution," a Chinese political upheaval, started from 1966 and
ended in 1976. This period of time was chosen primarily for two
reasons. One is that China's international environment changed
remarkably during this period. The People's Republic replaced the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan as the legitimate representative for
China. Major foreign policies and relations shifted among the
U.S.-China-Soviet Union triangle, as well as between China and the
United States. Second, during the same period, China's domestic
politics was consistently dominated by ideology purges and power
struggles. Such consistency of internal disorder certainly negatively
affected the country's image, but is important to the evaluation of a
shift in U.S. media coverage. It provided confidence that the change
of China's image in the Times, if found, was not due to domestic development.
Within this relatively shorter historical period, this study will
focus on a couple of important themes that are, though not
exhaustive, central enough to project a general picture. Yan's
Q-analysis of the Times' coverage on China identified a few major
concerns that remained as Times' prominent topics for decades. Among
other topics, Yan reported that two of the most prominent are the
Taiwan issue and issue of China-Soviet relations, concurring to the
major concerns of the United States' China policy throughout the
studied period.[26] In the preliminary emersion process of this
study, these two topics were also found as lasting themes throughout
the period concerned. Some topics, such as China's role in Vietnam,
however intensive in a short term, were not lasting enough to allow a
meaningful analysis within the whole studied period. Thus, the Taiwan
issue and China-Soviet relations became the two central themes in
which the analyses were done. Analyses are carried out within each of
the two categories. This approach is parallel to controlling
variables in quantitative analysis. The essence of its logic is to
avoid the danger of taking the change of topics as the change of
tones. To illustrate the potential danger of analyzing news stories
within different topics, one needs only to consider comparing
coverage on Nixon's China trip in 1972 to stories of a Chinese
ideological purge in 1966, and then conclude that the coverage had
become more favorable.
The sample of the front-page stories on China is obtained from the
Historical New York Times database via ProQuest online service. This
online tool empowers the researcher to sort out coverage of certain
topics with key words search. The dates for search were from January
1 of 1966 to December 31 of 1976. The combination of key words
(China) OR (Chinese) OR (Peking) was used to search front-page
articles pertaining China. To eliminate stories containing one of
these key words but only tangent to the subject, key word search was
confined to abstract rather than full text, an option provided by the
database. A total of 991 stories were generated as the result,
providing an appropriate data pool for further sampling.
With the list of 991 stories, each headline was carefully examined.
Attention was devoted to the two central themes most important in
U.S.-China relations, as discussed previously. Stories that are
centered on the Taiwan issue were grouped together, as were the
stories centered on China-Soviet relations. Since the two regimes of
the Chinese were isolated from each other for the time studied, most
relevant stories were those regarding U.N. seating and those on
changes of relations with other countries, including the United
States. For China-Soviet relations, because the rift between the two
biggest communist powers was by no means a separate event in the
communist movement, stories are found often to involve other
communist countries as well. The grouping process resulted in 82
stories pertaining the Taiwan issue and 146 on China-Soviet
relations. In the final sample, the number of stories was reduced to
allow adequate time for more careful analysis. Out of the 82
Taiwan-related stories, 41 stories with even numbers in their
sequential order were selected. Out of the 146 Soviet-related
stories, those ending with 1 or 6 in their sequential numbers were
selected into the sample, totaling 28 stories in this category. The
final sample formed the core of the text for analysis. Other stories,
on occasion, were referred to only when they provided closely related
backgrounds.
Change in the Naming
The Times employed a variety of ways to construct the China frames,
one of which was identified in Chang's study as the use of symbols,
or the naming of the country. Before President Richard Nixon
announced that he would visit China, not a single story in this
sample referred to China used her official name, the People's
Republic of China. Occasionally, the single word "China" would be
used when the situation was clear that the story was not about Chiang
Kai-shek's Nationalist Government on Taiwan. In most cases, the
symbols were colored as "Red China", "Chinese Reds", "Communist
China", "Chinese communists", etc.
The official name of China was seen in Times' articles after the
announcement of Nixon's plan of a "Journey for Peace," mostly when
U.S. officials were cited using it. Although the name "Communist
China" was still used very often, "Red China" was virtually dropped
from the Times' vocabulary. More often than before, the term "China"
and "Mainland China" were assigned to the People's Republic. The
Nationalist Government on Taiwan, after the U.S.-China thaw, and
especially after it was expelled from the U.N seat in 1971, was no
longer called "China" in the Times. Rather, it was referred to as
"Nationalist China," or simply "Taiwan."
Change in the Sources
Another way the Times defined its tone was in its use of sources.
This was done by selection of the sources and their rhetoric. The
sample examined for this study shows a shift in the use of sources.
Pro-Peking[27] sources, or even authoritative sources from Peking,
were cited more often after the Washington-Peking thaw, resulting in
more rhetoric in Peking's favor. This was true both on the Taiwan
question and for Peking-Moscow relations. Although the Times usually
presented both sides' views in most stories, it is also common that
the rhetoric of the two sides would enjoy different prominences.
Until the People's Republic of China replaced the Chinese Nationalist
regime in the United Nations, the Times covered U.N. debate over
China seating every year. The yearly coverage on this important issue
presented an interesting change in its use of sources from 1966 to
1971. Years included in the sample are 1966, 1967, and 1971. These
years' coverage is sufficient to demonstrate such a change. Delegates
in the debates were cited in Times stories. However, in the years
1966 and 1967, stances of those pro-Peking delegates were mentioned
only in passing without substantive arguments, while the delegates
attacking Peking were cited in length. In both the 1966 debate and
the 1967 debate, rhetoric of the delegates of the Nationalist
Government was given special treatment under a subtitle in Times
coverage. By emphasizing the anti-Peking views and depressing those
of the pro-Peking, "Communist China" was portrayed as a regime of
"fear" and "deceit", a "disruptive influence" on the world, and an
"uncertainty" in itself.[28] In this pattern of reports, the stances
of Washington and Taipei and their supporters were framed as
"normal", and the Chinese communists were "other".
By 1971, U.N.-debate coverage by the Times changed. The voice of
pro-Peking delegates had gained remarkable prominence. The Albanian
representative, the principle sponsor of a draft resolution to seat
Peking and expel Taipei, and Peking's new supporters from Mexico,
were the two main sources in this story. The Mexican president was
quoted as declaring that mainland China should be given its "rightful
place" in the United Nations and that the Assembly, at the same time,
should "recognize that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Chinese nation are juridically [sic] indivisible."[29]
A Frame of "Isolated China"
Prior to 1970, the portrayal of China in the Times was of a country
isolated from the world, one facing internal struggles and external
difficulties both in and outside the communist camp.
Until 1971, when the People's Republic of China replaced the
Nationalist Government in the United Nations as the sole legitimate
representative the Chinese people, a bulk of Times' reports
concerning both sides of the Chinese was about the fighting over
seating Peking and ousting Taipei in the world organization.
On the forum of the United Nations, dispute took place year after
year over which Chinese government—the communist in Peking or the
nationalist in Taipei, should take the China seat in the United
Nations. Each year the Times reported the U.N. debates and results of
the vote. From 1965 to 1968, votes that supported the resolution
seating Peking and expelling Taipei was 46 in 1966, 45 in 1967, 44 in
1968, 48 in 1969, and in 1970, 51 votes were for this resolution to
49 against. Were it not for the United States insisting two thirds of
votes be required, Peking would have been seated one year earlier.
Nevertheless, in Times' coverage, "isolation" remained the central
theme of Peking's international status throughout these years. As the
United States continued efforts to block Peking, the Chinese
communists themselves were blamed for its "isolation." The "Red Guard
upheaval,"[30] or the "purge of anti-Maoists,"[31] in China was cited
as one reason more delegates had turned against the communist regime.
"Chinese attempts, direct or indirect, to subvert African
Governments,"[32] was another.
The image of an "isolated" China was reinforced in Times coverage on
the China-Soviet rift.
The Times showed great interest in observing this dispute within the
communist camp, and especially how other communist countries took
sides. North Vietnam and North Korea, enemies otherwise, now served
as jury in the Times' China trial. "The Asian Communists' plan to
attend (the Soviet Congress) was seen here as a bitter blow to Peking
in the struggle with Moscow for influence in Asian affairs," the
paper declared.[33]
In an explicit instance, the Times, citing analysts, said that
Hanoi's shift to Soviet's orbit of influence "is the fault of the
Peking leadership's demonstrations of confusion and internal disarray
at a time when the Vietnamese would welcome a single-minded show of
support."[34]
The Times finally announced, in April 1971, that "end of Mainland's
isolation" was favored by a special Presidential Commission.[35] The
implication of this statement was clear: Mainland China, though still
"isolated", now deserved good will and some help from the United
States. In its tone, the United States was superior; China, and to
some extent, other nations that had supported China before America
did, were subordinate. By the autumn of the same year, it was clear
that the majority of U.N. members welcomed Peking into the
organization as the only legitimate Chinese government. And that
year, with an overwhelming defeat of the U.S. policy, the Chinese
people's legal rights were restored in the United Nations and the
Nationalist regime was expelled.[36]
The Times' officially pronounced the "end of China's isolation" in a
headline after the U.N. vote. It is remarkably notable that the
"isolation" frame also vanished in China-Soviet rift stories, in
spite of the continuation of the dispute. Overall examination of the
sample found that the "isolation" frame actually was already less
visible in the year 1970, after Washington and Peking agreed to renew
talks and subsequent measures were taken by the Nixon Administration
to ease restrictions.
The Aggressor vs. Defender image in China-Soviet Coverage
The China-Soviet rift was real throughout the period studied. With
Moscow maintaining a diplomatic tie and Peking having no contact with
Washington before 1970, it was implied in the Times' tone, that China
was mainly responsible for the communist feud. In the exchange of
charges against each other, typically, Peking was suggested to be the
party that initiated the quarrels while Moscow would do the same "as
retaliation,"[37] or "in reprisal move."[38]
The tension between China and the Soviet Union escalated to serious
border clashes in 1969. At the same time, it was also becoming clear
that the Nixon Administration was interested in improving its
relationship with China, although no substantial steps had been
taken. Such interest expressed by U.S. scholars and politicians was
reflected in the Times' handling of its tone in China coverage. In a
series of stories on the China-Soviet border clashes, the Times took
great care to balance the two sides' stories. For whatever reasons,
it decided its best position was to remain truly "impartial."
By 1970, the two sides had refrained from further border conflicts
but tension remained, and rhetorical wars continued. The Times'
position between the two rivals was slightly leaning in favor of
China. In most China-Soviet dispute stories after 1970, it was
suggested that the Soviets were the aggressor while Peking was the
defender, even in the case of China taking active actions. The Times
reported in July 1972 that China was rapidly building an arsenal of
tactical nuclear weapons and special aircraft designed "to deter a
major Soviet military thrust across the long border, or to throw up a
nuclear defense if deterrence should fail."[39] The Times' source in
this story was "senior American analysts."
Chinese Charges Against the United States
In the winter of 1966, Chinese press and the official Hsinhua[40]
News Agency charged "the military encirclement of China by American
imperialism." In a February 6 news analysis in the Times, this charge
on "U.S. encirclement" was suggested as a "new phase of China-Soviet
rift," because the Chinese press had also criticized Moscow for its
"policy of appeasement in Europe," which allowed U.S. troops to be
released for duty in South Vietnam.[41]
In this article and others alike, Chinese charges against America
were reported in detail. In many cases the Chinese rhetoric was
quoted verbatim. The Times appeared to have little worry that
American readers were vulnerable to the Chinese propaganda. At least,
the speaker might assume its audience would take the Chinese charges
as "mad talk," by which means the image of isolation and hysteria of
China was transferred from the text to the minds of readers. To help
its readers get this innuendo, "analysts in Hong Kong" compared the
Chinese concept of encirclement to the "Soviet dictator" Stalin's
charge of capitalist encirclement, which was indicated as a tool to
"rally the population against the danger of a foreign attack and as a
pretext to smash internal political opposition."[42] The redirection
of Chinese spearhead toward the Soviets further boosted that image by
emphasizing China's enmity even against her old friend. And by
labeling Stalin "dictator", the comparable move by the Chinese was
vocally condemned.
Comparing against the earlier charge, the Times' treatment of an
August 1971 Chinese charge against America reveals some interesting
difference. This was the Times' report on Peking denouncing the U.S.
stand on U.N. seat, after U.S. Secretary of State issued a statement
that "would support the seating of Chinese Communist Government while
opposing any action to expel the Chinese Nationalist Government on
Taiwan."[43] It is understandable that what remained unchanged was
the assumption that the Chinese official press agency served the
communist propaganda. However, opportunity was now given to the
communist propaganda to present some of its substantial arguments. To
what extent would Americans disagree or agree was a separate
question. For example, the Times reported that the Chinese dismissed
the U.S. official claim of "policy shift" in the United Nations, one
from blocking Peking to "welcoming Peking" while retaining Taipei, as
"two Chinas plot" or "one China, one Taiwan" absurdity. It was also
reported that the Chinese press noted that this year's Albanian
Resolution "won warm approval and support from more countries,"[44]
and asserted that the U.S. Government, facing predicament of becoming
more isolated than ever, had to "make some changes in its
tactics."[45] The Chinese argument was certainly contradictory to the
Times' own assessment of a "closely split" in the 1971 U.N. Assembly.[46]
It was seen in the Times coverage that such accusation from China had
become less frequent and less bitter as U.S.-China relations began to
improve. The Times, rather than mocking the Chinese propaganda, began
to report more seriously the Chinese stances on issues. An example of
this new approach is a news analysis on August 7, 1971. This article,
which appeared in the wake of Nixon's surprise announcement of his
China trip, outlined the principle elements of Chinese foreign
policies in detail.[47] Reports like this, which presented fully and
thoroughly the Chinese stance on issues, cannot be found in this
study in years prior to Nixon's announcement.
Change in the Image of Chinese Leaders
Until Nixon's visit to China, the image of Mao Tse-tung[48] in the
New York Times was hardly human. As a matter of fact, Western
correspondents virtually had no access to the Chinese Communist
Party's Chairman. His image, embedded in the term "Maoist", was
represented by the ruthlessness of Maoists depicted in the Times'
coverage. And from there, it was suggested that Mao was a radical
ideologist who purged the moderates at odds with his revolutionary philosophy.
Direct and detailed accounts of Mao were rare in the sample. In most
cases, Premier Chou En-lai[49] was the public face in China's
diplomacy. The chairman usually held himself in reserve until well
into the program of a distinguished visitor. In the context of
increasing contacts between the two peoples, the hermit style of the
communist leader had aroused great curiosity of Western journalists.
When the rare chance of observing Mao did come, they reported in as
great detail as possible.
A wire story combining UPI and Reuters reports, with the headline
"Tokyo Official Says Japan Will Cut Ties With Taiwan,"[50] was
printed on September 28, 1972. The first part of this story, from
UPI, reported the progress of negotiations between the Japanese and
the Chinese. The second part is the Reuters report from Peking, and
it described the Chinese leader receiving his guests in an amicable manner:
Chairman Mao began the meeting… by saying jokingly of the
Chinese-Japanese negotiations here: "Is the fighting over or not?"
…
The two men (Chairman Mao and Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka) then
discussed mao tai, the fiery Chinese drink served at state banquets here.
Finally, after a brief conversation on Chinese literature, Chairman
Mao gave Mr. Tanaka six books, including one by the Chinese poet Chu Yuan.
After the meeting, Mr. Mao saw his guests to the door.[51]
Although the Japanese party is the subject in this headline, Chairman
Mao clearly overshadowed his Japanese guest as the story's center. In
every sentence throughout the Reuters report, except in one case,
either the Chinese leader or "the two men" is the subject. Instead of
saying "Premier Tanaka told Chairman Mao…" it reported:
Chairman Mao was told by Premier Tanaka, who has completed seven
hours of substantive talks with Premier Chou about establishing
diplomatic relations and ending a legal state of war between the two
countries, that "after heated discussion people got quite friendly."[52]
The news report even made a point to credit one of Mao's major feats,
providing that in the 1930s and 1940s, he "led Communist forces
against the invading Japanese army, in which Mr. Tanaka served as a
foot soldier."[53] In the lively description of his hospitality and
those "normal" conversation topics, Chairman Mao's new image was
amiable and even charismatic.
The image of Premier Chou En-lai in the Times' coverage was
relatively persistent and relatively positive even when enmity was
tense between the two countries. His high publicity, decided by his
position, might have helped Western journalists to better understand
him. His populist style as well as his pragmatism even in the context
of ideological struggle might have appealed to Western
correspondents. Although Premier Chou worked closely with Chairman
Mao, in the Times' coverage, he was not hinted as a "Maoist".
Conclusions
This study found that the New York Times used certain types of frames
to portray the image of China. It also identified some changes in the
frames and images over the period from 1966 to 1976. These changes
did not happen over night, nor did they take a steady evolutionary
course. They are notably discernable in 1970, 1971, and 1972,
concurrent to policy change of the Nixon Administration and the thaw
of U.S.-China relations.
In its portrayal in the New York Times, the "isolated" China of the
1960s was to become a more serious international player as the decade
turned into the 1970s. These frames were used to portray the regime,
but this change collaborates with Mann's description of news frames
on the Chinese people—the "automatons" in the 1950s and 1960s, and
the "virtuous Chinese" in the 1970s even under communism. The frames
of the 1960s were reshaped in the wake of U.S. policy shift and
Peking's triumph on the battle of U.N. seating. In the construction
of the new frames, China as the "other" shifted towards the "normal,"
although not in a full sense.
One way of framing in the Times, found in this study, was using
attributes in a set of labels such as "Red China" and "Communist
China". One reason these attributes were assigned was to distinguish
the People's Republic, which the United States Government still
refused to recognize, from the Nationalist regime ruling on Taiwan,
which also claimed to be the sole legitimate government of China.
Important to framing is that these labels had become value bearing
after the McCarthy era. They were pithily embedded with the
monolithic direful curse on the communist demon, as portrayed by
McCarthy and his associates. Even after the downfall of the
witch-hunter, simply mentioning these labels served to remind readers
of the demon nature of communists.
Pro-Peking Sources were cited in the Times more often after the
Washington-Peking thaw. Western analysts, U.S. officials, and
debating delegates at the U.N. Assembly floor were important sources
in the sampled articles. Anonymous analysts contributed a great deal
in Times' interpretations of Chinese behaviors. Similar behaviors or
rhetoric of the Chinese received different interpretations in the
1970s than they did in the 1960s. Citing the analysts helped to cloak
the coverage with "objectiveness." Citing analysts, especially
anonymous analysts, also provided convenience and legitimacy for this
shift in interpretations and tones of the coverage without a desire
for justification.
In the 1960s, America and China were indeed isolated from each other
and U.S. journalists were not allowed in the Chinese mainland to
collect news information.[54] Americans tried to understand what was
happening in China by using second-hand sources, a few news copies
smuggled out of China, and by intercepting the mainland's broadcast
airwaves from the British colony Hong Kong. The scarcity of
first-hand information and heavy reliance on second-hand sources
might be one of the factors defining the Times' coverage on China.
It is not the intention of this study to pass judgment on how close
these images portrayed in the Times were to the historical realities
of China. However, some changes in the frames of China coverage were
indeed identified in the textual analysis approach. These changes
confirm what Gitlin noted, that even the "persistent pattern" of
frames cannot afford to ignore big ideological changes. Understanding
the frames would empower the reader to adjust her view when she
observes the real world through media's refractive glass.
The findings may be more significant if they are also found in study
of multiple newspapers. Recommended replication may incorporate
several large national papers. It is also suggested that this study
be replicated using different news formats, for instance, television
news. The current study suggests a concurrence of changes in news
frames to changes in government policies. In this way it directs to
important questions for future studies. If news frames are not always
persistent, causes of their construction and reconstruction should be
carefully explored. Possible causes may include, as Gitlin suggested,
commercial as well as professional influences. Reese regarded
persistency as the value of frames when he said: "The more persistent
the frame, the more likely it deserves examination." Extending rather
than contending this view, the current study implies that the more
persistent before the frame is reshaped, the more likely this change
deserves examination. Evidence also suggests that news frames do not
always adjust at the same pace of policy changing, while it is
certainly subject to deliberation of policymakers. After the
extensive and enthusiastic coverage of American table tennis team
visit China in the spring of 1971, the U.S. vice president reportedly
complained that U.S. journalists had helped the Chinese communist
government score a propaganda triumph.[55] In this sense,
understanding the frame, its construction and reconstruction, is an
important question for the journalist who wishes to pursue higher
degree of independence and higher degree of "objectiveness."
Notes:
[1] The author likes to thank Jia Dai of the University of Texas at
Austin for her contribution to the current study. The theoretical
concept of "reshaped frame" partly owes to Dai's unpublished work
"Evolving Frame: U.S. Newspaper Coverage of China in the Olympics
from 1980 to 2004." The author is also grateful to Dr. Janice Hume of
the University of Georgia and the anonymous reviewers for their
insightful comments.
[2]
[3] Eg.,
[4] Eg.,
[5] Eg.,
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] p. 133.
[12]
[13] The larger project envisioned includes corroborating studies
that will examine other news media, primarily television portrayal of
China. Later, forces that reshape the frames and how these forces
negotiate one another are to be explored. The underlying importance
of "what reshape the frame" as opposed to "what maintain the frame"
is its indication to the power issue in a society's political discourse.
[14] Stuart Hall, "Introduction" in p. 23.
[15] Eg.,
[16]
[17] pp. 6, 7.
[18] Stephen Reese, "Prologue—Framing Public Life: A Bridging Model
for Media Research, " In pp. 15, 16.
[19]
[20] James Mann, "Framing China: A complex country cannot be
explained with simplistic formulas," In p.102.
[21] p. 4.
[22]
[23] , p.299.
[24] p. 651.
[25] Eg.,
[26]
[27] In order to keep consistent with the historical documents used
in analysis, Wades-Giles spelling rather than modern Pinyin are used
in the text. "Peking" is spelled as "Beijing" in modern Pinyin.
[28] See Note 22 and Note 23.
[29] "Albania Says Peking Bars Any 2-China Plan at U.N., " The New
York Times, 6 October 1971.
[30] "U.N. Defeats Move to Seat Red China and Oust Taiwan, " The New
York Times, 30 November 1966.
[31] "U.N. Bars Peking by Decisive Vote, " The New York Times, 29
November 1967.
[32] Ibid.
[33] "High Hanoi Aides Going to Moscow, Korean Reds Also Reported
Due at Congress Despite Boycott by Peking, " The New York Times, 25
March 1966. Parentheses added.
[34] "Chinese Upheaval Said to Put Hanoi in Soviet's Orbit," The New
York Times, 10 September 1966.
[35] "Panel Urges U.S. Seek Early Entry of Peking to U.N, But
Special Committee Says Ouster of Taiwan Regime Must Be Opposed, " The
New York Times, 27 April 1971.
[36] The 26th U.N. General Assembly in 1971 voted 76-35 for the
so-called "Albanian Resolution" to seat Peking and expel Taipei on
October 26. One and a half hours earlier than voting on this
Resolution, the Assembly also voted 59-55 to reject the American
draft resolution that would have declared the expulsion of the
Nationalists an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority
for approval. In a report not included in the samples, the Times
denounced that "pandemonium broke out on the Assembly floor," when
the electrical tally boards flashed that the "important question"
proposal had failed, delegates jumped up and applauded. The victory
of the "Albanian Resolution," Times described, "brought delegates to
their feet in wild applause."
[37] "2 Chinese Aides Ousted by Soviet, Step Viewed as Retaliation
for Expulsion of Russian Diplomats a Week Ago," The New York Times,
19 March 1967.
[38] "Moscow Expels Chinese Students in Reprisal Move, " The New
York Times, 8 October 1966.
[39] "Shift in Strategy by Peking is Seen, U.S. Aides Believe China
is Speeding Nuclear Build-Up to Deter Soviet Attack," The New York
Times, 25 July 1972.
[40] In modern Pinyin: Xinhua.
[41] "New Phase of China-Soviet Rift Centers on 'U.S.
Encirclement'", The New York Times, 6 February 1966.
[42] Ibid.
[43] "Peking Denounces Stand of U.S. on U.N. Seat as a 'Clumsy
Trick'," The New York Times, 5 August 1971.
[44] The wording in quotation marks is the quote by the Times from
the Chinese news agency.
[45] Ibid.
[46] "U.N. Found Closely Split on Eve of China debate," The New York
Times, 18, October 1971.
[47] "China Said to Want Accord on Key Issues Before Ties," The New
York Times, 7 August 1971.
[48] In modern Pinyin: Mao Zedong.
[49] In modern Pinyin: Zhou Enlai.
[50] This headline appeared on the Times' front page on September
28, 1972. Title for the Reuters reports jump to Page 3 was "Japan
Prepared to Cut Taiwan Tie. "
[51] "Tokyo Official Says Japan Will Cut Ties with Taiwan," The New
York Times, 28 September 1972. Parentheses added.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Negotiations between Peking and Washington for an exchange of
correspondents had been conducted in the past, but had virtually
grounded to a halt since 1961, as a result of charges and
countercharges by the two sides. The first full-time American
correspondents to visit China since 1949 were John Roderick of The
Associated Press, and John Rich and Jack Reynolds of the National
Broadcasting Company. The three Americans, among a group of seven
newsmen, were granted visas on April 10, 1971, to cover the
concurrent visit of an American table tennis team.
[55] "Agnew Voices Misgivings on the U.S.-China 'Thaw'," The New
York Times, 20 April 1971.
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