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Comparative Analyses of Singapore and China's SARS Crisis Management


Different means to the same end: A comparative Contingency analyses of
Singapore and Chinese governments' management of the perceptions and
emotions of their multiple publics during the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) crisis

Yan Jin
Ph.D. Student
Missouri School of Journalism
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Augustine Pang
Ph.D. Student
Missouri School of Journalism
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Glen T. Cameron, Ph.D.
Professor and Maxine Wilson Gregory Chair in Journalism Research
Missouri School of Journalism
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Manuscript submitted to the Public Relations Division of
the 2004 Annual Conference of the Association for Education in Journalism
and Mass Communication (AEJMC). All correspondence concerning this
manuscript should be addressed to Yan Jin, 211 S. College Ave, #3,
Columbia, MO 65201.













Different means to the same end: A comparative Contingency analyses of
Singapore and Chinese governments' management of the perceptions and
emotions of their multiple publics during the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) crisis



Abstract

Using content analyses of SARS news coverage in both Singapore and China,
the contingency theory of conflict management and current crisis management
literature were integrated to examine how crisis was communicated at the
macro levels by the two governments, what were the stances taken, and what
strategies were used to manage their multiple publics. Findings showed that
although both countries, which shared similar cultures and media systems,
perceived the crisis similarly in terms of severity and attribution, the
dominant factors and motivations influencing each of their stances and
strategies between advocacy and accommodation were different. Singapore,
perceiving SARS as threatening its political and social fabric, was more
internally motivated, hence was more advocating. China, anxious to downplay
the pressure from its international detractors, was externally motivated,
hence more accommodating. The differentiation of culture and political
circumstance were accentuated in an examination of comparative approaches
like this, highlighting the critical role culture plays in studies
involving the government as the organization as well as between governments
in international public relations.


















Different means to the same end: A comparative Contingency analyses of
Singapore and Chinese governments' management of the perceptions and
emotions of their multiple publics during the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) crisis



Introduction

For months in 2003, the world laid under siege by a strain of virus that
masqueraded as pneumonia but inflicted a far more lethal effect. By all
accounts, the mystery of how the virus in the Severe Respiratory Acute
Syndrome, or SARS, has come to be has remained largely unsolved (Bradsher,
& Altman, 2003).  What began as routine fever and cough in a Chinese
physician, later identified as a super-carrier, rapidly spread to people
who had cursory contacts with him, spiraling into a worldwide crisis that
spanned across Asia and the North Americas (Rosenthal, 2003).
On March 18, 2003, Singapore, a cosmopolitan city-state nestled at the tip
of Malaysia, entered the annals of the World Health Organization (WHO) as a
casualty of the dreaded SARS. On April 2, 2003, after months of
foot-dragging and denial, China reluctantly joined Canada, Singapore, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan in the SARS-hit list. It soon became apparent that both
countries were to take different approaches to resolve the crisis.
Singapore, on the one hand, adopted a transparent approach. When it was
finally cleared of SARS on May 31, it was praised by WHO for its
"exemplary" (Khalik, & Wong, 2003, p. 1) handling of the crisis. China, on
the other hand, has been blamed for escalating the crisis through its
failure to curb the disease earlier and for covering up news about the
rapid outbreak (Eckholm, 2003). Except for a huge sigh of relief, it did
not receive the same kind of reception that Singapore did when it was
declared SARS-free on June 25. Despite the difference in approaches, what
was also apparent was that during the months in which they were listed as
SARS-hit, the two governments worked at frenetic paces to contain and
communicate the SARS crisis with its different publics.
Most studies on conflict management in public relations have focused on the
local level, between the organization and its publics (Dougherty, 1992;
Seegar, & Ulmer, 2002; Wigley, 2003). These studies analyze how the
strategies organizations use to communicate with its publics, such as
employees, stakeholders, the media, and the community, when the
organization appears to be culpable (Walters, Wilkins, & Walters, 1989;
Fink, 1986; Fearn-Banks, 2002; Pauchant, & Mitroff, 1992; Henry, 2000).
However, few studies have sought to examine how crisis is communicated at
the national level, between the government and its people, understanding
the kinds of public relations strategies used by the government, and the
response of the publics when they are more dynamic and varied, and when
culpability is not immediately known. Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997) argued
that governmental intervention is crucial when a serious threat exists in
the socio-political system, when there is a necessity to respond to the
threat, when there is a necessity for government decisions, when promptness
is required of governmental decisions, and when the government needs to
engage the publics in its decision-making.
The crisis literature has illuminated several insights on crisis
communication. Some have focused on communication strategies (Lukaszweski,
1997; Booth, 1993; ten Berge, 1988; Barton, 1994; Davis, & Gilman, 2002;
Cohn, 2002; Henry, 2000; Pincus, & DeBonis, 1994; Ray, 1999);
communications planning (Marra, 1998; Ferguson, 1999); others have focused
on relationship/issues management and media relations (Ulmer, 2001; Seegar,
& Ulmer, 2002; Cowden, & Sellnow, 2002; Barton, 1993, Pauchant, & Mitroff,
1992; Harrison, 1999; Massey, 2001).
Given the diametrically opposite approaches adopted by the Singapore and
Chinese governments, we propose to study how they manage their publics, and
the stances taken by the governments and their publics leading to the
resolution of the crisis, using the contingency theory of conflict
management. Cameron and his colleagues (1997; 1998; 1999; 2001; 2002) takes
an alternative perspective from the thought that crisis communication is
characterized as a two-way symmetrical model, where communication flows
both ways between the organization and the public and both sides are
prepared to change their stances, with the aims of resolving the crisis in
a professional, ethical and effective way (Grunig, & Grunig, 1982; Grunig,
& Hunt, 1984). Cameron (1999) proposed a crisis communication model that is
examined through a continuum whereby organizations practice a variety of
stances at any given point, and these stances change, depending on the
circumstances. The continuum has two ends, at one end of the continuum is
advocacy, Between advocacy, which means one pleading one's own case, and at
the opposite end, accommodation, which means building trust with the
publics (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997; Yarbrough, Cameron,
Sallot, & McWilliams, 1998).
The present study attempts to compare the approaches taken by both the
Chinese and
Singapore governments in their crisis communication of SARS and how they
differ, at three levels: 1) At the organization's level, to identify and
compare what strategies the two governments employed to manage the
perception and emotion of their different publics, and what contingent
factors under-gird each of their strategies; 2) At the publics' level, to
identify the key publics and their type transitions in the crisis, to
examine the publics' perception and emotion in response to the each of the
government's performance in the crisis, and the contingent factors that
under-gird these strategies; 3) Taking a contingency approach to examine
how the organization and the publics moved along the continuum throughout
the life cycle of the crisis.
        To analyze the two approaches, content analyses are used. To analyze
Singapore's approach, data come from the population of SARS stories from
The Straits Times, Singapore's prestige newspaper, a newspaper of record
(Turnbull, 1995), and Singapore's highest circulating newspaper ("A turn-on
for more," 2003, p. H2) throughout the duration of the SARS outbreak, from
March 18, 2003, till June 7, 2003, one week after Singapore was declared
SARS-free by WHO. To analyze China's approach, data come from the
population of SARS stories from China Daily, China's government-run,
prestige English daily (Marsden, 1990) throughout the duration of the SARS
outbreak, from March 18, 2003, two weeks before China was officially
declared SARS-hit and when international pressure became more evident for
China to open up (WHO was pressing China to make known the SARS condition
officially), till June 25, 2003, the day China was declared SARS-free.
A solid line of crisis research has developed along the lines of
organizational culpability and crisis responsibility. What remains less
clear, however, is how organizations should respond to crisis when the
cause of the crisis and the locus of control rest externally, particularly
when the organization is the government. By integrating the contingency
theory of conflict management with current crisis literature, this study
seeks to examine how crisis is communicated and managed at the macro level,
between the government and its diverse publics, and understand the kinds of
strategies used through the various stages of the crisis life cycle.
Although the results show two different approaches adopted by the two
countries, the findings reveal similar modus operandi that suggest support
for the contingency theory: The characteristics of the dominant coalition
(top management) play a vital role in determining how the crisis is
communicated, and how the coalition steers its multiple publics along a
continuum from pure advocacy to pure accommodation over time in a crisis.
In China's case, findings suggest initial internal contradictions the
government faced in communicating and managing the crisis, a reflection,
perhaps, of the conundrum faced by its political and media systems, which
are in the transition. However, once the contradictions were resolved, the
government's subsequent proactive stance in communicating the crisis
through news coverage was found to be effective in managing the perception
and emotion of the publics. The Singapore's case lacked such ambiguity and
was more forthcoming and straightforward: The government was to play a
predominant role in managing how the publics perceive the crisis and it
used the media to extensively communicate its strategies and stances.
In both cases, multiple publics were identified in the news coverage, with
varied perceptions of the crisis and the government's performance. In
China's case, external pressures from WHO and other "powerful" publics like
foreign governments and big businesses were found to play key roles in
shaping the crisis communication strategies the government employed. In
Singapore's case, its internal regulatory system to overcome the crisis as
soon as possible was found to play a dominant role in overcoming the
crisis. Yet, in both cases, for the publics to support the organization in
dealing with the crisis, the organization moved dramatically from more
advocacy stances to more accommodating stances. Advocacy can be embedded in
accommodation if the organization wants its publics to follow the same
direction of stance as the organization did, perhaps as a form of
"face-saving" that is so prevalent in Asian cultures that these two
countries come from.
The contrasting means, both leading to the same end, provide interesting
insights into the varied ways in which crisis can be communicated. More
significantly, this study illuminates the nuance and finesse in which
national public relations are conducted in international eyes. Even as this
study builds further understandings on the contingency theory and crisis
literature further, it is hoped that the practical insights will prove
invaluable for public relations practitioners on the delicate balance and
strategies they can use when they manage diverse publics in a national
crisis that has international repercussions.
Literature Review and Research Questions
Development of Crisis Theories in Public Relations Research
Much of the literature on effective public relations in crises have been
built on Grunig and Grunig's (1992) and Grunig and Hunt's (1984) public
relations' excellence theory, which Fearn-Banks (2002) argued, forms the
"bedrock of most crisis communications theories" (p. 15).
Four models of excellence have been posited: (1) Press Agentry/Publicity
model: Here, the organization is only interested in making its ethos and
products known, even at the expense of half-truths (p. 16); (2) Public
Information model: Predominantly characterized by one-way transfer of
information from the organization to the publics, the aim is to provide
information "journalistically" (p. 15); (3) Two-way asymmetric model:
Instead of a rigid transference of information, the organization uses
surveys and polls to persuade the publics to accept its point of view (p.
16); (4) Two-way symmetric model: Here, the organization is more amenable
to developing a dialogue with the publics (p. 16). Communication flows both
ways between the organization and the public and both sides are prepared to
change their stances, with the aims of resolving the crisis in a
professional, ethical and effective way. The two-way symmetrical model have
been positioned as normative theory, which states how organizations should
be practicing public relations that is regarded as the most ethical and
effective manner (Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2001; Fearn-Banks, 2002;
Plowman, 1995).
Further, Murphy (1991), Dozier, L. Grunig and J Grunig (1995), Cancel,
Cameron, Sallot and Mitrook (1997) argued that public relations strategies
are more accurately portrayed in a continuum. Moreover, because of the
fluidity of the circumstances, which, in turn, may affect an organization's
stance and strategies, a continuum would be far more grounded to reality
that is able to "more accurately portray the variety of public relations
stances available" (p. 34). The continuum, argued Cancel, Mitrook and
Cameron (1999), thus explains "an organization's possible wide range of
stances taken toward an individual public, differing from the more
proscriptive and mutually exclusive categorization" (p. 172) found in the
four models.
Cameron and his colleagues take the idea of continua further, one, which
they argue, that emphasizes a more realistic description of how public
relations is practiced. It examines how organizations practice a variety of
public relations stances at one point in time, how those stances change,
sometimes almost instantaneously, and what influence the change in stance
(Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997, p. 33). Instead of clustering
and pigeonholing public relations practices and techniques into
strait-laced models, Cameron and his colleagues came up with a continuum
model whereby communication techniques and stances chosen by an
organization can actualize at any point along the continuum, depending on
the circumstances (Yarbrough, Cameron, Sallot, & McWilliams, 1998, p. 51).
The organizational response to the public relations dilemma at hand,
according to the contingency theory, which has, at one end of the
continuum, advocacy, and at the other end, accommodation, is, thus, it
depends. The theory offers a matrix of 87 factors, arranged thematically,
that the organization can draw on to determine their stance. Between
advocacy, which means one pleading for one's own, and accommodation, which
means building trust with the publics, the authors argue, is a wide range
of operational stances that influences public relations strategies and
these "entail different degrees of advocacy and accommodation." (Cancel,
Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997, p. 37). Along this continuum, the theory
argues that any of the 87 factors, culled public relations literature,
excellence theory, observations, and grounded theory (Cameron, 1999, p.
31), can affect the location of an organization on that continuum "at a
given time regarding a given public" (Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 1999 p.
172; Yarbrough, Cameron, Sallot, & McWilliams, 1998, p. 40; Cameron, 1999,
p. 30).
The theory seeks to understand the dynamics, within and without the
organization, that affect an accommodative stance. By understanding these
dynamics, it elaborates, specifies the conditions, factors, and forces that
under-gird such a stance, along a continuum, so that public relations need
not be viewed by artificially classifying practice into boxes of behavior.
It aims to "offer a structure for better understanding of the dynamics of
accommodation as well as the efficacy and ethical implications of
accommodation in public relations practice" (Yarbrough, Cameron, Sallot, &
McWilliams, 1998, p. 41).
This study aims at identifying the strategies and contingent factors that
affect the organization's stance towards its multiple publics. For
Singapore, the organization is operationalized as the Singapore government,
or any government-related agencies, such as the Ministry of Health,
National Environment Agency, or Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority, that is
involved in fighting SARS. For China, the organization is operationalized
as the Chinese government, or any government-related agencies, such as the
ministerial departments of health, agriculture; the State Council, the
local governments, or the National Task Force or SARS Prevention and
Control, that is involved in fighting SARS.
By the same token, while the contingency theory recognizes that there can
be numerous publics to be addressed at a given time, any attempt to deal
with the public relations stance that encompasses all the publics is
"difficult at best." (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997, p. 37). Ray
(1999) supported this observation. "[W]hat works in one situation does not
necessarily work in another" (p. 10). What is known, however, is that the
public is dynamic and can take different forms, and hence the stances taken
towards it must be equally, if not, more dynamic. New insights that the
contingency theory has found that the publics are not "monolithic", and the
issues and the publics can be interwoven to form a cohesive whole that is
dynamic, and often "long-lived" in public memory (Yarbrough, Cameron,
Sallot, & McWilliams, 1998, p. 54). Gonzalez-Herroro and Pratt (1996)
asserted that the publics "differ in the degree…they respond to the it [the
crisis]" (p. 84).
Thus, another purpose of this study is to identify, inductively, who the
publics are in this crisis, and to understand what contingent factors
appear to move the stances of the organization, and what contingent factors
appear to move the publics on the continuum.  Therefore,
RQ1.1: How different are the stances of the Singapore and Chinese
governments toward their publics, as presented in the news coverage?
RQ1.2: How different are the stances of the different publics toward the
Singapore and
Chinese governments, as presented in the news coverage?
RQ1.3: What contingent factors appear to affect the stances of the
Singapore and Chinese governments, and how different are they, as presented
in the news coverage?
RQ1.4:  What contingent factors appear to move the stances of the Singapore
and
Chinese governments as well as their respective publics on the continuum,
and how different are they, as presented in the news coverage?
Crisis Communication Strategy along the Accommodation Continuum
Yarbrough, Cameron, Sallot and McWilliams (1998) argued that a central
point of the contingency theory is that the degree of accommodation
"depends upon the weighing of many factors found in the theory" (p. 50).
While practitioners agree that the continuum is an accurate representation
what happens in public relations (Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 1999; Shin,
Cameron, & Cropp, 2002), they agree that some of the 87 variables feature
more prominently than others. Studies on the contingency theory have shown
that certain key variables predispose an organization to accommodation
while others prohibit any form of accommodation. Then, there are also those
that are in between, depending on the prevailing circumstances, that steer
the organization towards more accommodation or advocacy.
Here is a broad overview of the predisposing and situational factors which
are conducive for accommodation to take place. Predisposing variables,
argue Yarbrough, Cameron, Sallot and McWilliams (1998), are most likely to
influence an organization prior to interaction with specific external
public. The predisposing variables "influence an organization's location
along the continuum before it enters into a particular situation involving
an external public" (p. 41). Among the factors that affect are the
organization's exposure to the crisis; the political will, and
enlightenment of organization to resolve the crisis public (Yarbrough,
Cameron, Sallot, & McWilliams, 1998; Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 1999;
Cameron, Cropp, & Reber, 2001).
Situational variables, argued Yarbrough, Cameron, Sallot and McWilliams
(1998), can determine the degree of accommodation an organization takes.
"Those variables that were labeled as situational are most likely to
influence how an organization relates to an external public by effecting
shifts from a predisposed accommodative or adversarial stance along the
continuum during an interaction with the external public" (p. 43). Some of
the situational variables that have received support include the urgency of
the situation; characteristics of the external public; potential or obvious
threats; and potential costs or benefit for the organization from choosing
the various stances (Yarbrough, Cameron, Sallot, & McWilliams, 1998;
Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 1999; Cameron, Cropp, & Reber, 2001).
Cameron, Cropp and Reber (2001) argued that an organization may not move
from its predisposed stance if the situational variables are not compelling
nor powerful enough to influence the position or if the opportunity costs
of the situational variables do not lead to any visible benefits.
Using contingency theory to study how the United States and China resolve
the crisis over the collision of a US Navy reconnaissance plane with a
Chinese fighter jet in the South China Sea in April 2001, Zhang, Qiu and
Cameron (2003) found that some of the factors that support accommodation
over advocacy include the nature of the organization's (in this case, the
state's) leadership, its ethos, and how the organization regarded the
threats to be.
Cameron (1999) argued that there are times when accommodation is not
possible at all, due to moral, legal, and regulatory reasons. He labels
them proscriptive variables. Six have been identified so far. When there is
moral conviction that an accommodative or dialogic stance towards a public
may be inherently unethical; when there is a need to maintain moral
neutrality in the face of contending publics; when legal constraints
curtail accommodation; when there are regulatory restraints; when senior
management prohibits an accommodative stance; and lastly, when the issue
become a jurisdictional concern within the organization and resolution of
the issue take on a constrained and complex process of negotiation. Studies
by Cameron, Cropp and Reber (2001) found that of the six, four, moral
conviction, contending publics, legal constraints, and jurisdictional
issues, do preclude accommodation "on some occasions" (p. 255).
To study the full range of advocacy or accommodation undertaken by the
organization towards its publics and vice versa, we have adapted Coombs'
(1998) crisis communication strategies into the contingency
framework.  Coombs' (1998) typology consists of seven strategies: Attack,
denial, excuse, corrective action, justification, ingratiation, and full
apology. To reflect the true spirit of the contingency theory, we modified
this framework by reordering corrective action and justification, and by
adding another strategy, cooperation, into the continuum.
Advocacy                                                                Accommodation
I---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I
Attack  Denial  Excuse   Justification Corrective action        Ingratiation
Cooperation Full apology
        Therefore,
RQ2.1: What strategies utilized by the Singapore and Chinese governments
are in evidence in the management of the SARS in the news coverage, and how
do they compare between the two countries?
RQ2.2: What contingent factors that affect the strategies of the Singapore
and Chinese governments in the crisis are in evidence in the news coverage,
and how do they compare between the two countries?
Publics in a Crisis
While the previous section discussed the variables that are conducive to
and/or curtail accommodation or advocacy, this section deals with the other
key tenet of the contingency theory: Who forms the publics during a crisis?
Publics are "specific audiences" targeted by the organization. Grunig and
Hunt (1984) defined a public as a "group of people who face a common issue"
(Gonzelez-Herraro, & Pratt, 1996, p. 84). They include a broad range of
people, employees, customers, members of the community, unions,
stockholders, and other stakeholders (Fearn-Banks, 2002, p. 3).
Davis and Gilman (2002) argued that a key role the organization should
embark on in a crisis is to identify the publics and develop appropriate
messages to reach out to them. This can help de-escalate the crisis
situation. "The antidote to crisis is not good news. It is "established
relationships" (p. 41) with the publics. Ray (1999) posits that because the
publics have different perceptions of what caused the crisis, the
organization's communication with them can ameliorate any unfounded
anxieties. Plowman (1995) suggested that the role of public relations in a
crisis is all about "management of conflict between the organization and
its important stakeholders" (p. 238). Coombs (1999) argued that an
organization thrives or survives by "effectively managing the stakeholders"
(p. 20).
In a crisis, the publics have been defined differently, according to their
importance to resolving situation, their functional roles, and their
long-term influences. Lukaszweski (1997) argued that there are four key
publics that the organization must communicate with, and priorities must be
made to communicate with them as soon as possible. They are: (1) Those most
directly affected, the victims; (2) The employees, who may bear the brunt
of the wrath from the publics; (3) Those indirectly affected like families
and relatives; (4) The news media and other channels of external
communication. Harrison (1999) argued that local community and pressure
groups, and the government can form the next significant layer of the
publics. Dougherty (1992) preferd to examine publics in terms of their
functional roles. Enabling publics, which include shareholders, board of
directors and regulatory agencies, have the power and authority to control
the organization's resources. Functional publics mainly consist of the
organization's consumers. Normative publics are formed because of shared
values, like political or interest groups. Diffused publics are people who
are not members of a formal organization, yet, nonetheless, powerful
groups. They include the media and interested citizens. "[T]he media have
the power to define a situation as a crisis…sometimes, a conflict arises
between the mandate of the media to provide information to the public and
the need of the organization to control the flow of information…If the
organization decides to restrict access to information, the spokesman must
explain the rationale" (Ferguson, 1999, pp. 105-108). Ulmer (2001)
categorized the publics in terms of their long-term influences. He sees the
primary public as the community in which the organization works in, and the
employees. The customer and the media would be classified as a secondary
public.
In our study, we want to examine,
RQ3: What is the process of type transition of the publics (aware and
active publics) in the whole life cycle of the crisis as evidenced in the
news coverage, and how different are they in the Singapore and Chinese
contexts?
Publics' Perception and Emotion of the Publics in a Crisis
Fink (1986) developed a four-staged model of a crisis life cycle: (1) The
"prodromal crisis stage", or the warning stage; (2) The "acute crisis
stage", or when the crisis happens; (3) The "chronic crisis stage", or the
clean-up stage; and (4) The "crisis resolution stage", or when dust has
settled and evaluations are made to assess how the crisis has been handled
and what can be done to deal with the next one (pp. 20-25).  Mitroff (1994)
argued for a five-staged model that includes (1) Detection of the crisis,
or looking out for warning signs; (2) Prevention/Preparation of the crisis,
or what can be done to prepare for its occurrence; (3) Containment, which
refers to efforts to limit the duration of the crisis and localize it; (4)
Recovery, which refers to restoring order and normalcy to the organization;
and (5) Learning, the process of evaluating the crisis and examining what
lessons can be learnt from it.
In his three-stage model, Coombs posited a "unified system" (p. 14) that
could "accommodate all the various models plus additional insights" of
crisis management experts (p. 14). The three-stage model comprises the
precrisis, crisis and postcrisis stages. The pre-crisis stage entails
actions that organizations "should perform" before a crisis hits. It
involves three sub-stages: signal detection, prevention, and crisis
preparation (p.15). Among the measures suggested here are issues
management, risk aversion, and relationship building (p. 15). The crisis
stage involves the actions the organization can perform from the onset of
the crisis to the time it is resolved. Coombs (1999) further divided this
into three sub-stages: crisis recognition, crisis containment, and business
resumption. Critical to this phase is communication with the publics (p.
16). Coombs argued that the last stage, the post-crisis stage, is equally
important even though the crisis is officially "over" (p. 16).
Organizations must consider how it can be better prepared for the next
crisis and make sure that stakeholders are left with a "positive
impression" of the organization's crisis management efforts (p. 16).
In this study, though we are not going to precisely plot the exact life
cycle of the crisis by coding news stories, we do propose to utilize
Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt's (1996) paradigmatic development of a crisis
model as a more appropriate reflection of the life cycle of the SARS crisis
by generally looking at the crisis from Birth, Growth, Maturity, to
Decline.  As the strategies the organization employed varies over time, we
propose that its publics' cognitive and affective response to the
organization's performance should also move along the life cycle the crisis.
Perceptions of the severity of the crisis can actualize in two ways:
Perceptions of culpability and perceptions of the locus of control of the
crisis. Coombs (1998) argued that if the organization is perceived by its
publics as culpable, it is more likely to utilize more accommodative
strategies to control the damage. Consequently, if the publics perceive
that the locus of control of the crisis lies with the organization, the
perception of its crisis responsibility increases. Conversely, if the
publics perceive the locus of control to be external to the organization,
the perception of crisis responsibility decreases.
In this study, besides finding out how the organization and its publics
perceive where the locus of control of the crisis is, we are interested to
find out how that in turn influences each other's performance.
Therefore,
RQ 4.1: What are the perceptions of the Singapore and Chinese governments
and its multiple publics in the crisis situation, regarding crisis
attribution and crisis damage severity, as evidenced in the news coverage,
and how do they compare?
RQ 4.2: How do the perceptions of the performances of the Singapore and
Chinese governments, as evidenced in the news coverage, vary among the
multiple publics involved, and how do they compare with each other?
RQ 4.3: What contingent factors appear to affect the publics' perception of
the performances of the Singapore and Chinese governments in the crisis, as
evidenced in the news coverage, and how do they compare?
Jin and Cameron (2003) called for greater attention to the construct of
emotion in public relations theory by providing an adapted appraisal model
of emotion in public relations and a crucial dimension to the
conceptualization of the contingency theory.  They further propose that any
given public relations stance can be assessed as a relational encounter
with emotional forces that conform to a model expressed in three
dimensions: 1) Emotional tone as the valence of the emotion ranging from
negative to positive; 2) Emotional temperature as the intensity level of
the emotion; and 3) Emotional weight regarding the importance of the
emotional stimulus in strategic consequences.  Since the perceived severity
works as emotional weight here, we are particularly interested to examine
the emotional tone and temperature as two key dimensions of the publics'
emotion toward the organization in the crisis situation.  Therefore,
RQ 5.1: What are the natures and strengths of the multiple publics'
emotions toward the Singapore and Chinese governments in the crisis, as
evidenced in the news coverage, and how do they compare?
RQ 5.2: What contingent factors appear to affect the publics' emotions
toward the Singapore and Chinese governments in the crisis, as presented in
the news coverage, and how do they compare?
Method
This study employs the content analysis method to understand the crisis
management of SARS from the organizations' points of view in dealing with
its relationship with multiple publics. This contingency oriented approach
has been initially explored by Shin and her colleagues (2003a, 2003b).  For
example, they conducted a content analysis of news coverage over two years
for four major high profile public conflicts and another content analysis
for another seven public conflicts, which provide a natural history of the
use of the contingency theory in public relations.
In this study, the organizations are operationalized as the Singapore and
Chinese governments. It examines how the stances and strategies of the
organizations and their multiple publics move or change on the continuum
over time, and what contingent factors are associated with the
organizations' stance and crisis management strategies, as well as that
associated with the publics' stances, perception of the organizations'
performance, and the emotion toward the organizations.
Krippendorff (2002) argued that to understand the politics of a country, a
most common way is to analyze the prestige newspaper read by the political
elite of that country. "This choice is grounded on the assumption that
political agendas are set and public debates are led by these so-called
prestige papers rather than by local newspapers, which are less likely to
reproduce the contents of the former and are, hence, less relevant" (p.
14-8). Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998) argued that prestige newspapers are
valid instrument for analysis because they play a "key role in history" (p.
86).
In Singapore, of the five main English-language newspapers, the dominant
newspaper is The Straits Times (1845). It is the highest circulating
English newspaper, with daily circulations averaging 400,000, commanding 42
percent of the readership ("A turn-on for more," 2003, p. H2). It is a
prestige newspaper, and a newspaper of record (Turnbull, 1995). The elites
and general readers monitor the newspaper as it often reflects government
sentiments and the social reality that the government constructs for
Singapore (Turnbull, 1995). In China, the dominant English-language
newspaper is China Daily China's leading, national English daily (Marsden,
1990) that is run under the supervision of the government's Information
Department. This paper directly reproduces the "official" news of the
country (Lecher, 2003). With daily circulations averaging 300,000 (Kwang,
2000), it is the highest circulating English newspaper in China (Marsden,
1990). In many ways, to understand the stance and strategies of the Chinese
government, it is reasonable to analyze how the government-run China Daily
covers the news because as Hsu (2003) argued, the Chinese press tend to
take sides "in line with government stances" (p. 94).
Sample
For Singapore, data came from the population of stories, from March 18,
2003, when Singapore was declared by WHO as SARS-hit, to June 7, 2003, one
week after Singapore was declared by WHO as SARS-free. Stories were
uploaded from Lexus-Nexus by typing in the key words SARS and Singapore.
For China, data came from the population of stories, from March 18, 2003,
two weeks before China was officially declared SARS-hit and when
international pressure became more evident for China to open up (WHO was
pressing China to make known the SARS condition officially), to June 25,
2003, when China was declared by WHO as SARS-free. Stories were uploaded
from the online searchable archive of China Daily by typing in the key
words "SARS"and "Government."
The stories on SARS in Singapore yielded 2,018 stories, while stories on
SARS in China yielded 520 stories. From the 2,538 stories, the authors
screened all of them based on the following criteria: 1) No editorials,
opinions, commentaries, and letters to the editors; 2) At least two parties
should be involved in the SARS story, with one of the parties being the
Government; and 3) If there were more than one public involved in the same
story, the dominant public would be identified as the prominent public for
the story under analysis.  To further delineate the selection of stories,
up to four news stories that fit the criteria stated above were identified
from each issue.  If there were fewer than four news stories published in
an issue, all the available stories were chosen for sampling.
The 2,018 stories from Singapore were eventually filtered to 258 stories
which captured how the organization related to its publics. Seven types of
publics were identified: WHO (N=11), medical professionals (doctors and/or
nurses) (N=15), taxi-drivers (N=7), neighboring countries (N=34),
quarantined public (patients and/or suspects) (N=68), general public
(N=93), and others (N=30). The 520 stories from China were eventually
filtered to 165 stories which captured how the organization related to its
publics. Nine types of publics were identified: WHO (N=19), medical
professionals (doctors and/or nurses) (N=15), foreign countries/businesses
(N=20), affected publics (patients and/or suspects) (N=18), general public
(N=51), domestic businesses (N=24), Taiwan (N=4), farmers/those living in
rural areas (N=7), and others (N=7). Additionally, 50 stories identified in
the archives were not coded because of missing links to these stories. In
all, 423 stories were coded.
For the purpose of comparing China and Singapore, we combined and recoded
the overlapped public into five categories as WHO, medical professionals,
foreign countries, affected publics, and general public.  For those unique
public categories for each country, we combined and recoded them as "others."
Coders and Training
Two coders, both graduate students and familiar with the content analysis
method, conducted the analysis. With the help of a codebook, the coders
were given detailed instruction and description of the various categories
used. Practice sessions were held using copies of the newspaper not
included in the sample. The coders worked independently and were not
allowed to consult with each other about the coding. Using Holsi's formula,
the coders achieved an 86 percent agreement.
Coding Instrument
The unit of analysis is defined as any news story. This includes stories by
the staff of the newspaper and wire stories. The content analysis
instrument is designed to evaluate the stances and strategies of an
organization in crisis management, its multiple publics' stances and
perceptual as well as emotional response to the organization's performance,
and the contingent factors associated with the stances and strategies of
the above parties.  The operational definitions of stance and contingent
factors are framed by the contingency theory, and the crisis management
strategy, crisis situation perception, and public types are adapted from
crisis management literature. The decision scheme included the
characteristics of each variable arranged to make identification of each
variable in the news story.
The 423 stories were coded for 19 variables. They were: Case source, news
story number, publics involved in the crisis; the overall impression on the
stance of the organization toward the according public, the overall
impression on the stance of a specific public toward the organization
(measured on a 7 point Likert scale, where 1 was "very advocate," and 7
was  "very accommodate"), crisis management strategy employed by the
organization (attack, denial, excuse, justification, corrective action,
ingratiation, cooperation, and full apology.); the organization and the
multiple publics' perception of the crisis situation (crisis attribution
was measured by 1 "externally controllable" and 2 "internally
controllable", and severity of the crisis was measure on a 7 point Likert
scale with 1 as "very insevere" and 7 as "very severe"); type of the public
(1 as "aware" and 2 as "active" ); the public's perception of the
organization's performance (measured on a 7 point Likert scale with 1 as
"very unsatisfying" and 7 as "very satisfying"), the public's emotion
toward the organization in the crisis (measured on two 7 point Likert
scales, one with 1 as "very negative" and 7 as "very positive", and the
other with 1 as "very mild" and 7 as "very intensive").
Adapting and merging Coombs' (1998) crisis communication strategies into
Cameron's continuum model of advocacy and accommodation, we propose to
measure the strategies in terms of:
1.      Attack: This means confronting the party and actively advocating that it
follows a certain course of action to help fight the crisis.
2.      Denial: This means stating that the culpability does not rest with the
party in question, or denying that the crisis is of any consequence.
3.      Excuse: This means minimizing the party's responsibility for the crisis,
and/or shifting responsibility of the crisis to an external factor.
4.      Justification: This means the party explaining why it has to take a
certain course of action.
5.      Corrective action: This means the party is actively taking a course of
action that is meant to address the problems in sight.
6.      Ingratiation: This means the party is actively taking a course of action
that is meant to make the other party approve of its actions, which leads
to a favorable impression.
7.      Cooperation: This means the party makes overtures to reach out to the
other party with the goal of resolving the problem.
8.      Full apology: This means the party takes full responsibility of the
crisis and asks for forgiveness, with the promise of some form of
compensation that comes with the apology.
As for the list of contingency factors, for our analysis, we have adapted
and modified from Cameron's original matrix of contingency factors and
retained the key factors most appropriate for our analysis. The key factors
of analysis are:
1. Threats: Stories that address the SARS virus, how dangerous it is; the
SARS crisis and how it needs to be contained
2. Industry environment: Stories that describe the impact SARS had on the
economy and market.
3. General political/social environment/cultural environment: Stories that
deal with political support for the people, political support for
businesses; stories that show the organization wanting to lend the extra
help to the people; stories that portray the organization trying to improve
the livelihood of the people.
4. External public: Stories that address the unique characteristics of the
public. For instance, if the public is the medical professionals, stories
about the difficulties medical professionals face vis-à-vis the
organization in trying to contain SARS.
5. Issue under question: Stories that address the image and reputation of
the organization and its people.
6. Others: Stories that do not address any of the above.
Each story is coded as one entry, as a single primary issue.
Result
Organization's Stance toward Publics
RQ1.1 examines the different stances of the Singapore and Chinese
governments toward their publics, as presented in the news
coverage.  Comparing Chinese government and Singapore government's stances
toward their respective publics, the overall impression of their stances as
evident in the news stories demonstrate that Chinese government tended to
be more accommodating when dealing with its multiple publics.
Stance toward WHO.  Chinese government's stance toward WHO (M = 6.82, SD =
.73) is more accommodating than that of Singapore government (M = 6.11, SD
= .93).  The difference is found to be statistically significant (F = 4.67,
p < .05).
        Stance toward foreign countries.  Chinese government's stance toward
foreign countries (M = 6.2, SD = 1.52) is more accommodating than that of
Singapore government (M = 3.72, SD = 2.52).  The difference is found to be
statistically significant (F = 12.36, p < .01).
        Stance toward general publics.  Chinese government's stance toward foreign
countries (M = 4.65, SD = 2.60) is more accommodating than that of
Singapore government (M = 3.35, SD = 2.51).  The difference is found to be
statistically significant (F = 8.07, p < .01).
Public's Stance toward Organization
RQ1.2 examines the different stances of the different publics toward the
Singapore and Chinese governments, as presented in the news coverage.  The
only significant difference found among publics when their stances toward
the organization lies in foreign counties (F = 16.81, p < .001).  It seemed
that foreign countries were more accommodating toward Chinese government (M
= 6.17, SD = 1.34) than toward Singapore government (M = 3.48, SD = 2.55).
Contingent Factors Moving Organization and publics' Stances
RQ1.3 examines what contingent factors appear to affect the stances of the
Singapore and Chinese governments, and how different they are, as presented
in the news coverage.  Results showed that the factors moving Chinese
government and Singapore government's stance toward their publics were
significantly different (_2 = 34.05, p< .001).  Comparing both
organizations in terms of each contingent factor, respective, we found the
following result: Threats (67.9 % vs. 60.1 %), Industry Environment (8.5 %
vs. 12 %), General Culture (7.3 % vs. 10.9 %), External Public (1.2 % vs.
10.1 %), and Issue (1.8 % vs. 3.9 %).  The most dominant factor driving
Chinese government and Singapore government was threats, while external
public seemed much more important in driving Singapore than Chinese
government's stance.
RQ1.4 aims at looking at what contingent factors appear to move the stances
of publics in the Singapore and Chinese governments as well as their
respective publics on the continuum, and how different they are, as
presented in the news coverage.  Results showed that the factors moving
their publics' stances toward them were significantly different (_2 =
29.67, p< .001).  Comparing publics in both countries in terms of each
contingent factor, respective, we found the following result: Threats (35.2
% vs. 39.9 %), Industry Environment (10.3 % vs. 7 %), General Culture (.6 %
vs. 6.6 %), External Public (2.4 % vs. 12 %), and Issue (.6 % vs. .4
%).  The most dominant factor moving publics in China and Singapore was
threats, while general culture and external public seemed more important in
driving Singapore publics than Chinese publics' stance.
Organization's Crisis Management Strategy
RQ2.1 examines what strategies utilized by the Singapore and Chinese
governments are in evidence in the management of the SARS in the news
coverage, and how they differ between the two countries.  It is obvious
that Chinese government and Singapore government employed different
packages of strategies to deal with their multiple publics (_2 = 28.94, p<
.001).  Comparing Chinese government and Singapore government in terms of
each crisis management strategy, respective, we found the following result:
Attack (24.2 % vs. 32.8 %), Denial (1.2% vs. 1.2%), Excuse (1.8 % vs. .4
%), Justification (4.8 % vs. 11.6 %), Corrective Action (8.5 % vs. 9.7 %),
Ingratiation (7.9 % vs. 12.4 %), Cooperation (35.2 % vs. 27.9 %), and Full
Apology (1.8 % vs. 1.6 %).  The most used strategy used by Chinese
government was cooperation while the most used strategy of Singapore
government was attack.
Contingent Factors Moving Organization's Strategy
RQ2.2 looks at what contingent factors that affect the strategies of the
Singapore and Chinese governments in the crisis are in evidence in the news
coverage, and how they differ between the two countries.  Results showed
that the factors driving Chinese government and Singapore government's
strategies in dealing with their publics were significantly different (_2 =
29.83, p< .001).  Comparing both organizations in terms of each contingent
factor, respective, we found the following result: Threats (65.5 % vs. 60.5
%), Industry Environment (9.1 % vs. 10.5 %), General Culture (10.9 % vs.
11.2 %), External Public (1.8 % vs. 10.5 %), and Issue (1.2 % vs. 4.7
%).  The most dominant factor driving Chinese government and Singapore
government was threats.  Again, external public seemed much more important
in driving Singapore than Chinese governments' strategy.
Types of Publics in Crisis
RQ3 examines the process of type transition of the publics (aware and
active publics) in the whole life cycle of the crisis as evidenced in the
news coverage, and how different they are in the Singapore and Chinese
contexts.  Publics in Chinese and Singapore government in the crisis were
largely active (73.3 % vs. 68.2 %).  However, there were less proportions
of aware publics identified in news stories about Chinese government than
Singapore government (13.9 % vs. 30.2 %), which was statistically
significant (_2 = 35.15, p< .001).
Organization and Publics' Crisis Perception
RQ 4.1 is interested in the perceptions of the Singapore and Chinese
governments and its multiple publics in the crisis situation, regarding
crisis attribution and crisis damage severity, as evidenced in the news
coverage, and how differ they are.  Comparing the publics in China and
Singapore, we found there is no statistically significant difference in
both crisis attribution and crisis severity between each pair of publics in
both countries.  On the organizations' side, it seemed that both Chinese
government (M = 6.69, SD = 1.07) and Singapore government (M = 6.79, SD =
.70) perceived the severity of the crisis in a similar way.  We also found
that both Chinese and Singapore government largely deemed the crisis was
internally controllable (64 % vs. 54.5 %).  However, there were less
proportion of externally controllable perceptions revealed in news stories
about Chinese government than Singapore government (19.9 % vs. 41.2 %),
which was statistically significant (_2 = 30.66, p< .001).
Public's Perception of Organization's Performance
RQ 4.2 concerns how the perceptions of the performances of the Singapore
and Chinese governments, as evidenced in the news coverage, vary among the
multiple publics involved, and how do they compare with each other.  The
only difference we found is in foreign countries, which seemed to be
significantly more satisfied (F = 13.89, p < .01) with Chinese government's
performance in dealing with the crisis (M = 6.00, SD = 1.46) than with
Singapore government's performance (M = 3.67, SD = 2.06).
Contingent Factors Moving Public's Perception of Organization's Performance
RQ 4.3 is to locate the contingent factors appearing to affect the publics'
perception of the performances of the Singapore and Chinese governments in
the crisis, as evidenced in the news coverage.  Results showed that the
factors moving Chinese government and Singapore government's stance toward
their publics were significantly different (_2 = 21.17, p< .01).  Comparing
publics in both countries in terms of each contingent factor, respective,
we found the following result: Threats (26.72 % vs. 37.2 %), Industry
Environment (9.1 % vs. 6.6 %), General Culture (1.8 % vs. 7 %), External
Public (5.5 % vs. 10.1 %), and Issue (.6 % vs. .8 %).  The most dominant
factor moving publics in China and Singapore was threats, while general
culture seemed more important in driving Singapore publics than Chinese
publics' stance.
Public's Emotion toward Organization
RQ 5.1 examines the natures and strengths of the multiple publics' emotions
toward the Singapore and Chinese governments in the crisis, as evidenced in
the news coverage.
Emotional Tone.  Foreign countries seemed feeling more positive (F = 7.74,
p <. 01) toward Chinese government (M = 5.95, SD = 1.46) during the crisis
than toward Singapore government (M = 3.84, SD = 2.29).  Affected publics
seemed feeling slightly more positive (F = 3.09, p <. 10) toward Chinese
government (M = 6.20, SD = 1.30) during the crisis than toward Singapore
government (M = 4.58, SD = 1.95).
        Emotional Temperature.  There is no significant difference found regarding
multiple publics' emotional intensity toward either Chinese government or
Singapore government.
Contingent Factors Moving Public's Emotion
RQ 5.2 examines what contingent factors appear to affect the publics'
emotions toward the Singapore and Chinese governments in the crisis, as
presented in the news coverage.  Results showed that the factors moving
Chinese government and Singapore government's stance toward their publics
were significantly different (_2 = 14.06, p< .05).  Comparing publics in
both countries in terms of each contingent factor, respective, we found the
following result: Threats (20 % vs. 22.5 %), Industry Environment (7.3 %
vs. 4.3 %), General Culture (1.2 % vs. 5.8 %), External Public (8.5 % vs.
15.1 %), and Issue (.6 % vs. .4 %).  The most dominant factor moving
publics in China and Singapore was threats, while external public seemed
more important in driving Singapore publics than Chinese publics' stance.
Discussion
Focusing on the crisis situation faced by the government as an
organization, the approach taken in this study may provide possibilities
for utilizing contingency theory in crisis communication and crisis
management.  The comparison between Chinese and Singapore government shed
light on different stances and strategies different organizations employed
in a given crisis and how their respective publics respond cognitively and
affectively.  Figure 1 is a framework illustrating our key findings.
Insert Figure 1 Here
Organizations' Perceptions of the Crisis: Similar perceptions, similar
motivations
Given that both Chinese and Singapore government perceived the severity of
the crisis in a similar way, we conclude that both governments set their
stances and strategies on the same baseline, which is: The SARS crisis was
severe and largely internally controllable. In a common crisis where both
governments were not culpable, and the locus of control was external, based
on Coombs' (1998) typology, it was left to the respective governments to
take responsibility instead of attributing blame to external parties.
Perhaps this is a reflection of the conservative, collectivist (Schwartz,
1994) culture that Singapore and China come from. Such cultures are
characterized by family security, restoration of social order, preservation
of values, and national security (p. 102). In a scenario where the enemy is
largely unknown, and dangerous, it appears that the respective governments
took over the mantle of leadership, and galvanized its peoples towards
restoration. There is a famous Chinese saying that has filtered into the
psyche of Singaporeans as well: Your fate is in your own hands.
This is also consistent with the hallmarks of the two governments as well:
The Chinese government is centrally controlled. As Wu (2002) argued, the
China Communist Party relies on effective leadership, under-girded by the
dual social forces of traditional values and patriotism to reconstruct a
new cohesive force.  In that regard, it is possible that the media, which
is neo-authoritarian (Merrill, 2000), would frame the government as capable
of taking the full responsibility to handle the crisis. Singapore also has
a neo-authoritarian media system. More than just a reflection of media
framing, the Singapore government has been known to be extremely proactive
in taking the lead when it is confronted with threats to the country's
survival, particularly political threats (Sikorski, 1996). This can be
extended to biological threats as well.
Organizations' Stances and Strategies: Advocacy to galvanize, accommodation
to steer
Comparing the Chinese government and Singapore government's stances toward
their respective publics as evident in the news stories, our findings show
that these two governments tend to move in a similar way. The Chinese
government, however, tended to be more accommodating when dealing with
publics such as WHO, foreign countries as well as the general publics. As
Chen (2003) argued, a crisis, like SARS, brings about a government public
relations crisis for the Chinese government at all levels and it could be
conjectured that the newly empowered Chinese central leadership under
President Hu Jintao realized that government public relations programs, if
executed properly, could help with the management of this kind of crisis.
Taking a cautious and proactive position, the new Chinese government seemed
to put substantial efforts in building up constructive and cooperative
relationship with a variety of key publics threatened or damaged by the
SRARS crisis. But why these three publics in particular? We surmise that
this could be political realism. It was the stance China took when China
was in conflict with the US over an alleged spying incident by the US. As
Zhang, Qiu and Cameron (2003) found, even though advocacy may be used at
first, to maintain harmonious relations, this would eventually give way to
accommodation. Three reasons are proffered on why the Chinese government
found accommodation towards WHO, foreign countries, and its general public
a better stance: (1) China was cooperating closely with WHO, a world body,
to find the antidote for the disease. When the hallmark of a relationship
is that of cooperation, accommodation almost always takes precedence over
advocacy; (2) An accommodative stance towards foreign countries and
businesses is consistent with China's well embedded policies on building
optimal international relations and encouraging foreign investment to
support the domestic economic development, based on political realism,
national and diplomatic interests; (3) The government needed to steer its
massive populace to follow its directions. While advocacy could galvanize
its people, it is accommodation that will sway them over to its side. For a
huge country like China, that would be important factor.
Compared to China, Singapore appeared to be advocate more. Jin, Pang, and
Cameron (2003) found that advocacy was evident particularly towards two
publics, the quarantined public and general public. The rationale for
advocacy for the quarantined public and general public appears to be thus:
The quarantined public has to be told what to do so that it does not infect
the general public, and the general public has to be told what to do so
that the virus is not spread any further. This may be due to overall
decision-making abilities of the government to make crisis-time policies
that required the adherence of the crucial publics. Proactive advocacy is a
hallmark of the Singapore government's style (Jin, Pang, & Cameron, 2003),
a trait that sees the government proactive in taking the lead and
advocating judgment calls when it is confronted with threats to the
country's survival.
Threat was found to be the dominant contingent factor under-girding both
the countries' governments' stances.  Threat, especially one as insidious
as SARS, bred fear. Fear can emerge as a dominant factor in the contingency
theory, as Choi and Cameron (2004) had found. Even though threat was an
underlying force affecting the organization's strategies, both countries
appear to respond differently. The most used strategy in the Chinese
government's arsenal was cooperation while that of the Singapore government
was attack.  Why? Chen (2003) argued that it could be because the new
generation of Chinese government officials, characteristically younger,
more energetic, better educated, and less ideology-driven, tend to back
away from the use of traditional political propaganda in dealing with their
publics, which pave way for a much more accommodating strategy. Singapore
used a mix of strategies, ranging from cooperation with some publics, like
WHO, and attack on others, like the quarantined public. Advocating
strategies like attack were softened with accommodating strategies like
cooperation. One reason is proffered: For a government that has built a
reputation for "reliability, integrity, and efficacy…in the management for
survival" (Chong, 2001, p. 37), the government does whatever it takes to
work. That was no need to prove anything to anything, except oneself.
Publics' perception and emotional responses toward the organizations: Same
perceptions, different motivations

The multiple publics in both countries appeared to agree with their
respective governments in the perception and attribution of the crisis.
There were no significant differences in the levels of emotions displayed,
or the emotional temperature. One can surmise that the publics are
generally supportive of the stances and strategies employed, as reflected
in the media coverage. Between the two countries, foreign countries and
businesses in China, were however, most notably most supportive of the
government's efforts. This could be the result of the accommodative stance
taken by the Chinese government in reaching out to them; or it could be the
perception the Chinese government wished to project in its media after all
the allegations of the initial cover-ups of SARS. Studying the People's
Daily, the other dominant, vernacular Chinese media, Wu (1994) likened the
politics of editorial formulation as "command communication," in which the
government sets the overall tone and gives concrete directives for news
creation as well as directives as to how news will be interpreted and
disseminated.
        Again, threats seemed to be the predominant motivations among the publics
in the two countries. But that is also where the similarities end.
Singaporeans' response to the government seemed to be additionally driven
by the general political/social/cultural environment inflicted by SARS, as
well as the external public, i.e., the government. What this may mean is:
SARS is an irritant that needs to be eradicated quickly because it is
affecting the livelihoods and lifestyles of Singaporeans. This is
reinforced by the government through the media, and because, as Hao (1996)
argued, Singaporeans generally trust the government and what it tells them
through the media, they shaped this collective view that to successfully
eradicate SARS, the best way is to rally behind the government because it
has demonstrated tremendous leadership in promising to alleviate the
hardships and inconveniences caused as a result of this untimely crisis.
Tan, Hao, & Chen (1998) had argued that the media had served as a mediator
between the government and the people. In this case, its role as a mediator
could not be any more vital.
Lessons from crisis communications: Dynamic interaction of Contingency
theory factors and the emergence of culture as a key factor
One of the enduring themes in crisis communication and resolution
reinforced ever so often by scholars is managing strategic relationships
(see Ulmer, 2001; Coombs, 1999: Benoit, 1997; Ulmer and Sellnow, 2000).
Different scholars have advocated different models in resolving crises (see
Mitroff, 1988; Gonzalez-Herrero, 1996; Burnett, 1998); but the crux of the
matter involves managing the claims, demands, and requests of each public.
This appears to be the key to resolving any crisis (Plowman et al, 1995).
Incidentally, it was the major point of discussion in China's postmortem of
the crisis, that one of the lessons it should learn, among instituting
effective crisis management systems, was relating to the different publics
("SARS lesson: How to address crises," 2004).
But what constitutes effective management of publics? May we suggest two
conditions? Firstly, crisis is dynamic, and the stance and strategies must
be equally dynamic. Based upon the contingency theory and crisis
literature, the stances of an organization and its publics are not static,
but rather moving from advocacy to accommodation (Cameron et al., 2001;
Cancel et al., 1997; Shin et al., 2003a, 2003b) and possibly back to
advocacy and so on. An organization may begin with a predisposing stance of
advocacy, but the collective demands of the public and the situation may be
"powerful enough" (Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 1999, p. 191) to force the
organization to assume a position of accommodation as a means to an end of
resolving the crisis.
As the Chinese government, which assumed an initial stance of obstinate
advocacy by covering up the extent of damage SARS had inflicted,
backpedaled to salvage the situation, it embarked on accommodative
strategies to manage its varied publics aimed at regaining their trust.
Comparatively, this, however, did not mean that the Singapore government
was less accommodating. It displayed traces of advocacy, as a reflection of
the threat and urgency of situation. As the contingency theory addresses,
threat is a powerful factor that may cause oscillation on the continuum
(Yarbrough, Cameron, Sallot, & McWilliams, 1998; Cancel, Mitrook, &
Cameron, 1999; Cameron, Cropp, & Reber, 2001).
        Secondly, the stance and strategies, as a reflection of the
differentiation of cultures and political circumstances, is accentuated in
an examination of comparative approaches like this study, even if both the
Singaporean and Chinese cultures, right down to media systems, may appear
to be similar. Both governments, reflecting their cultures, conservative
collectivists (Schwartz, 1994) as they are, appeared to start off on the
same footing: It's a collective problem, let's solve it together; and the
media can help. The Singapore government appeared to come clean with the
problem right from the start, and it used the media to reflect its battles
of ups and downs. In many ways, the motivation is very much self-generated.
Using Volkan's (1997) imagery of a "chosen trauma," (p. 48) where a
singular traumatic event can unify a people, the government's approach
seemed to be, "Whatever other people might think, we'll do it the way we
know how."
The Chinese government, however, needed a little more plodding from the
international community before it agreed to come to terms with the crisis.
That is why as much as one of its key motivations was to eradicate the
threats, it was also driven by the approvals of its foreign publics,
namely, WHO and foreign countries and businesses – the international
community – to help it strategize.
In a setting where the organization is the government, and comparisons are
made between cultures, the role culture plays should be elevated and
further elucidated. In terms of theory building in the contingency theory,
culture, which was not a major factor of consideration in the movement of
the organization's stance in previous studies of the theory, should be
incorporated as a predisposing variable.
Implications
Overall, this study suggests both practical and theoretical implications
for public relations practitioners and crisis management experts by
integrating the contingency theory model with the strategy and
publics-related concerns and propositions provided in the crisis
communication and management literature. Public relations practitioners,
particularly those on the governmental levels, can understand the
opportunities and challenges of crisis management practice by identifying
the contingent factors associated with the stances of its different
publics, and using appropriate strategies to maintain the
organization-public relationship and working together with the publics to
resolve the crisis. A key strength of the contingency theory is that it
allows us to understand the dynamic nature of the crisis and to make
judgments of what stances and strategies are appropriate at every juncture.
At the heart of the matter is that it is not so simple to know what works
and what doesn't. It is the authors' hope that this initial effort to
analyze how different countries deal with the similar types of crisis, and
assess the overlapping and unique contingent factors that influence the
stance or strategies of each organization and its publics.  Our findings
might provide better conceptual understanding of the operationalizations of
those key aspects in crisis management.
Because in this study our data are drawn from only one newspaper for each
country, the possible diversity of media coverage in either China or
Singapore might need to be explored by further study using other media
sources.  At the same time, the authors are aware that we are studying the
actions and reactions of the two governments based solely on content
analyses of media coverage, which may not truly reflect what may be in
actuality the true motivations of the governments. Multiple method
triangulations (e.g. survey and depth interview) are necessary to move our
understanding of government-level organization's crisis management in a
deeper sense by understanding the interaction of social and psychological
factors when publics are involved in a given crisis.
Future studies can also focus on how the crisis life cycle of a crisis can
correlate with the stance and strategy movement of the organization-public
relationship along the continuum.  Additional research can also be
conducted to understand the role of the news media as a third party in
organization-public relationship development across the crisis life cycle,
by examining how the media systems function in different social as well as
situational contexts of the crisis communication process.
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Perception of Crisis
  Publics
  Organization
Strategy
Stance
Perception of Crisis
Chinese Government
Chinese Government
Singapore Government
Singapore Government
External
Public
External
Public
Threat
Threat
         Attack                            Cooperation
         Advocating             Accommodating
Severe and
Internally Controllable