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Failing Hegemony: A Comparative Content Analysis
of the Coverage of the Lead-up to the Attack on Iraq in 2003 in the World Media
Authors:
Erin Collins, Aalborg University, Denmark, email:
[log in to unmask]
Martin Jensen, Aalborg University, Denmark, email: [log in to unmask]
Peter Kanev, Aalborg University, Denmark, email: [log in to unmask]
Matt MacCalla, Aalborg University, Denmark, [log in to unmask]
Submitted to the AEJMC International Communication Division
(Markham Competition)
Abstract:
The media in a hegemonic system follow and reinforce the 'spin' of the
political elites. This ability of the powerful to enlist the media in their
campaigns against enemies, real or imagined, is an indicator of the elites'
power to convince and to define the limits and flow of the public discourse.
The US-led war against Iraq in the early 2003 was preceded by a media
debate, which demonstrated that global media are breaking new ground. News
outlets from around the world challenged the dominant news frame of the
United States. While in a similar conflict 12 years earlier the world, or
at least the Western media were generally united around the cause for
attacking Iraq, the news outlets of 2003 did not buy into the story of the
'Coalition of the Willing.' This implies a serious challenge of the global
hegemon's 'soft power' to convince and to conduct policy without resorting
to coercion.
Failing Hegemony: A Comparative Content Analysis
of the Coverage of the Lead-up to the Attack on Iraq in 2003 in the World Media
Submitted to the AEJMC International Communication Division
(Markham Competition)
Abstract:
The media in a hegemonic system follow and reinforce the 'spin' of the
political elites. This ability of the powerful to enlist the media in their
campaigns against enemies, real or imagined, is an indicator of the elites'
power to convince and to define the limits and flow of the public discourse.
The US-led war against Iraq in the early 2003 was preceded by a media
debate, which demonstrated that global media are breaking new ground. News
outlets from around the world challenged the dominant news frame of the
United States. While in a similar conflict 12 years earlier the world, or
at least the Western media were generally united around the cause for
attacking Iraq, the news outlets of 2003 did not buy into the story of the
'Coalition of the Willing.' This implies a serious challenge of the global
hegemon's 'soft power' to convince and to conduct policy without resorting
to coercion.
Failing Hegemony: A Comparative Content Analysis of the Coverage of the
Lead-up to the Attack on Iraq in 2003 in the World Media
Introduction
The present historic moment of a politically unipolar world naturally
invites research interest in the formation, existence and possible decline
of a global media hegemony. The nature of economic globalization, often
perceived as Americanization, makes the case for exploring the parameters
of hegemonic influences in the global media.
There can be little argument that today's world is one that is
effectively dominated by one massive superpower. The United States of
America is now responsible for more than a third of the global economy and
has an unrivaled military, spending more on its armed forces than the next
dozen countries combined ('The Economist' 2003, p.4). As Niall Ferguson
recently wrote in Newsweek, "The United States is now an empire in all but
name". (2003, p.8)
Most significant for the purposes of this paper is the US's dominance in
the realm of culture and specifically the institutions that govern the
global dissemination of information. American, along with British
companies, are the primary providers of films, music, television
programming and most importantly, news, for the entire world (Magder 2003,
p.31). In fact, in 2003 CNN alone reached more than 150 million homes in
212 countries around the world (Thussu 2003, p.118).
However, the preeminent position that the US now occupies, economically,
militarily and politically around the world has its origins in the collapse
of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. Since the demise of the
world's only other superpower and the US's main ideological rival, global
public opinion has shifted towards the inherent 'rightness' of the US
'worldview'.
"After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the
alliance of markets and foreign policy seemed triumphant. 'Globalization'
was on everyone's lips. The American vision would spread – though perhaps
slowly – everywhere as more nations fell under its sway." (Samuelson 2003,
p.44)
In reality, it is the fact that so much of the world gravitated towards
this US 'world view', that has largely given the world's only superpower
its strength over the last fifteen years. It was believed that by adopting
capitalist-market economies, liberal democracy and principles of free
trade, the 'have-nots' of the world would one day be able to join the
'haves' as developed nations (ibid). This 'Washington Consensus' was
largely believed to be the most fortuitous and expedient path to
development and in turn impacted the soft power that the US held.
It seems that the current role of the United States in international
relations, fits the classical Gramscian notion of hegemony. Gramsci defines
hegemony as the "process of moral, philosophical, and political leadership
that a social group attains only with the active consent of other important
social groups." (Artz & Murphy 2003, p.1) In this way, a hegemonic class,
(in this case the United States) by owning and controlling the means of
production and capital, including "production of symbolic goods," (Gans,
1979) are able to support their hegemonic position. Traditionally,
hegemonic classes are thought of as a part of the state level of analysis.
However, for the purposes of this study hegemony will be examined on the
macro or international level and in this scenario it is the US that
occupies the position of a hegemonic elite.
One of the ways that the US is able to create this shared worldview, and
maintain its status as a global hegemon, is through the use of the
Western-based global media system. Most of the world's information flows
from the US outward and this propagation of Western based ideas throughout
the world is one of the most powerful ways of Americanizing global public
opinion. (Magder 2003, p.31) This is a system which, when functioning
properly, can give the US the unprecedented power to make other global
actors think that their interests and those of the hegemon are one in the
same. This is hegemonic leadership as expressed by Lee Artz:
"Leadership only becomes hegemonic because they convince others to become
allies through persuasive political and cultural practices, which
necessarily require normalized interpretations best communicated to the
masses via the media. Hence, capitalist hegemony needs parallel media
hegemony as an institutionalized, systematic means of educating,
persuading, and representing subordinate classes to particular cultural
practices within the context of capitalist norms. If culture is the
ideological cement of society, then, to secure corporate interests,
capitalist globalization needs media hegemony to recruit, tame, and
popularize interpretations, information and cultural behavior complementary
to deregulation, privatization, and commercialization." (2003, p.16-17)
In other words, the global media system is one of the most powerful ways
that the US maintains its control of global power through the creation of
shared ideas and goals. It is this media system that serves as one of the
greatest tools inside the hegemonic process as outlined by Gramsci.
(Gramsci [translated by Hoare & Nowell-Smith] 1971, pp. 177-185)
However, some chinks may be starting to appear in this US-led global
hegemony. Politically, the world's only superpower appears to be becoming
less and less influential in the world's 'soft power' game, which simply
stated, is the ability to make people do what you want without using force
(Magder 2003, p.30-32). This apparent weakness can be seen in the US's
failure to convince the world that its recent invasion of Iraq was
justified and in its apparent inability to peacefully rebuild Iraq and
Afghanistan (Ferguson 2003, p.11). These difficulties point to a serious
weakness in the perceived supremacy of the US military while similar
failures in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process point to a possible
weakening of the US's ability to effectively use 'soft power' to achieve
their policy objectives. In addition to this, a seemingly softened US
stance when dealing with so called rogue states like North Korea, Syria and
Iran seems to be emerging, which could also point to a perceived loss of
power. (Hirsh 2003, p. 34)
This possible loss of strength for the American hegemon could be perceived
as a weakening of the persuasive power of the dominant US world view or as
Sardar put it, a weakening of the hegemon's 'power to define' (1999) and
therefore its hegemonic power inside global civil society[1]. This last
point is crucial since it is discourse within this civil society that
generates the consensus that gives the hegemon its strength. It seems at
least possible that certain segments of the world are beginning to reject
the US common sense that has dominated unchallenged for the last decade and
a half.
Further to this, since the media is one of the most important ways a
hegemon defines its worldview, it is reasonable to assume that a decline in
the relative power of the hegemon could be visible inside the global media
construct. It is with this in mind that the basis for this article was
conceived.
In short, if the United States is the dominant hegemonic force in the world
and the Western-based media helps to facilitate that hegemonic process and
strengthen it, then, if systemic change is going to occur, some change in
global media content should be identifiable. So, if the US is losing its
hegemonic control and it's globally accepted world view is beginning to be
questioned, then this shift should be reflected inside civil society and
therefore inside the media.
This problem is both interesting and relevant because the current US
hegemony has been defining what is talked about not only around the table
at the Security Council but also around dinner tables from Philadelphia to
New Delhi. That is because this dialogue is in some very significant ways
being shaped by the Western-based media from which it often emanates. So,
if this conversation, and the terms it is being discussed in, is created by
the West, it is likely leaving out the interests of those in the Eastern
and Southern reaches of the globe. This is particularly relevant given
world events following September 11th 2001, as the US and its "Coalition of
the Willing" have since effectively conducted diplomacy via the barrel of a
gun, despite a general global consensus that these actions were wrong.
Media and Hegemony
The media is a major player in the creation and dissemination of the
hegemon's worldview. Therefore, if the media is failing to adequately relay
the hegemon's message then this could provide an indication that the
hegemon's real power is in decline. This could then provide an indication
that the circumstances for the potential defection of 'historic blocs' and
the creation of a counterhegemonic movement are in fact in existence.
Antonio Gramsci spoke about the need for historical blocs to come together
in order to create a hegemonic or counterhegemonic force (although he never
specifically used the latter term). This article will analyze the role of
global media in this hegemonic process and see if there is in fact the
potential for a counterhegemony to emerge through opposing historic blocs.
This question will be addressed methodologically through an analysis of the
global media through the critical lens of hegemony theory.
Hegemonic theory argues that the media represent an institution used by
elites to exercise their hegemonic power. A number of scholars (Carragee,
Gitlin,) have made the case that the press in the United States and,
respectively, the Western world, is operating within a hegemonic system.
Under this system media would tend to transmit and amplify the dominant
classes' or elites' messages and ideology.
The analysis of differing forms of media and how they react to and report
on certain events, can provide a number of insights into how this
institution is manipulated by powerful elites, as they attempt to control
or 'spin' public perception. Ciaran McCullough expresses this relationship
between media and its reliance on ruling elites in his book Media Power:
"…certain groups in society are recognized by the media as accredited
sources, and as such they have privileged access to (and greater claims on)
media coverage. Their access comes from their institutional power, their
representative status, or their claims to expert knowledge." (2002, p.68)
In other words the media are constructed in such a way that they are more
apt to follow the lead of 'legitimate' elites than that of dissenting
voices. This is not to say that there is not debate within the elite class.
However, there are certain underlying principles that are consistent within
the elite class and it is these similarities that make up the core of the
elite's worldview. For example, there may be debate inside the elite class
about how best to spread liberal capitalism and democracy around the world,
but there is no debate about whether or not it should in fact be
disseminated. In other words, there is no 'macro' argument about the
validity of the liberal capitalist system, even if there is an ongoing
'micro' debate about how it is to be implemented. Thus the overriding
message that is transmitted to the media by the elite class remains the same.
While a significant number of US media scholars do not subscribe to the
notion of media hegemony itself, they have produced research which points
at the validity of the claim that media texts as a rule are carrying elite
and dominant ideology messages and frames. In "Deciding What's News" (1979)
Herbert Gans comes to the conclusion that journalism is producing "symbolic
goods" which are a function of the values and practices constantly applied
in the news producing process. Gans states that media do not only transmit
information, but by virtue of the conceptualization of this information it
is also engaged in making reality judgments. (p. 39)
News, according to Gans, is subject to the values of its producers. One
rule of thumb that he proposes for deciding what is really news is
"violation of values". Gans distinguishes between "topical" (or short-term)
and "enduring values." These form what Gans calls "the ideology of news"
which he compares to the "dominant paradigm" in science - a mainstream
which allows for few deviations.
In a later study Chang, Shoemaker and Bredlinger (1987) find that the
variables identified by Gans do predict international coverage by US media.
The most important predictors are normative deviance of the event,
relevance to the United States, potential for social change and
geographical distance. Gans interprets this selectivity as a way for news
to maintain feelings of American superiority and greater internal cohesion
in comparison to the rest of the world. Gans contends that American foreign
news follows American foreign policy "if not slavishly", but more closely
than domestic policy. At the same time he considers foreign news less
adhering to objectivity than domestic news (p. 36).
Gitlin goes further than Gans in elaborating on the ideological aspects of
US media. He states that mass media are "core systems for the distribution
of ideology... every day, directly or indirectly, by statement and
omission, in pictures and words, in entertainment and news and
advertisement, the mass media produce fields of definition and association,
symbol and rhetoric, through which ideology becomes manifest and concrete"
(p. 2). "The mass media are a significant social force in the forming and
delimiting of public assumptions, attitudes and moods - of ideology, in
short. They sometimes generate, sometimes amplify a field of legitimate
discourse that shapes the public's definitions of its situations" and they
work through selections and omissions, through emphases and tones, through
al their forms of treatment. Like Gans, Gitlin defines the function of
media's ideology as "central to the continuation of the established order"
Gitlin's definition of the modern US media system is one of a hegemony, in
which ruling classes emboss their view of the world on the rest of the
society.
Carragee (1991) states that the hegemony theory is one of a greater
complexity than proposed by its originators. In a study of the New York
Times coverage of the German Green Party, Carragee finds out that the
paper, which is the supposed paragon of journalistic standards, has
"denigrated and depoliticised the Greens... [T]his analysis suggests that
the hegemonic framing of foreign alternative political parties or movements
becomes most evident when these... directly challenge American foreign
policy interests" (p. 25). At the same time, the author contends that even
an ideologically hostile party or movement would draw less fire from US
media, provided it does not challenge US interests.
Like Gans and Gitlin, Berry (1990) points out at what he calls a "cultural
bias", which facilitates the adoption by the US media of Washington-created
consensus in foreign policy matters. Berry claims that the same patriotism,
which makes journalists rally around the flag in the initial stages of a
crisis, also provides for their criticism when (and if) the respective
policy does fail (p. 142). Berry concludes that US media are not a forum
for a comprehensive foreign policy debate, due to journalistic routine
(reliance on official sources).
In his study on the framing of the shooting of a South Korean airliner by a
Soviet fighter plane and the downing of an Iranian passenger jet over the
Persian Gulf by an American military ship, Robert Entman demonstrates how
the US media take a vastly different approach to similar events, which
differ in the direction of the diplomatic embarrassment caused. Entman
finds out that the US press loudly decries the Soviets as "murderers" and
monsters for shooting a plane, which had obviously violated their airspace.
A similar incident, in which a US Navy ship destroys an Iranian passenger
plane in international airspace is treated more as a mistake, caused by
technology, rather than a human error and human tragedy.
Similar findings are reported by Chang (1987) and Lowry and Wang (2000) who
examine the relation between US foreign policy towards China. By exploring
the direction of symbols used Chang documents editorial policy shifts in US
media outlets consistent with US government policy shifts on the "Two
China" policy. Depending on who is in greater favor with the US
administration, mainland China was named respectively Communist China, PRC
or, more neutrally, China. Chang goes as far as to suggest that due to the
heavy reliance of media on official sources for foreign policy information,
government officials have the possibility of planting symbols directing
attitude towards players on the international scene.
Lowry and Wang (2000) compare the US media coverage of the visits of
Chinese leaders in the United States and find out that direction of
symbols, controversial issues and use of labels are consistent with the US
China policy in the respective era.
In a study of the first Gulf War coverage, Page and Entman (1992) find out
that criticism, although well represented in news and editorials across the
US media, especially before the war, was given less salient positioning and
was more "procedural than substantive" (p. 86). Except for being supportive
of its own editorial stance, the range of opinions in The Times' Opinion
and Editorial pages also "indexes" the range of the official debate"(p.
33). Page finds that in newsgathering this could reflect journalistic
routines, like reliance on official sources for information. However in the
"freestyle" opinion and editorial pages the omission and highlighting of
certain aspects of a problem carry a definite slant towards the political
stand of the newspaper and its obvious adherence to the mainstream of the
debate, as dictated to the society by the government. Page concludes that
sometimes media can be not just passive transmitters of ideas and
interpretations, but may actively articulate policy views (p. 37).
In a study of the New York Times coverage of the negotiations leading to
the creation of NAFTA (The North-American Free Trade Agreement) Brian
Michael Goss (2001) reaches similar conclusions. The author demonstrates
the collusion between editorial policy and the government's foreign policy.
He attributes the phenomenon to the economics of news production, which on
one side helps "cheap" "informational subsidies" from official sources make
their way onto the newspaper pages, and provides for a long-term political
alliance between mainstream media and the government.
This relationship, arguably stemming from the economic and cultural
framework around the media (Herman & McChessney, 1997), makes the analysis
of media a key component when examining hegemony in the 21st century. It
suggests that media content can often reflect the ideas and positions of
hegemonic elites rather than of the many differing viewpoints inside global
civil society.
It is the ability of US news media to set the agenda of their counterparts
from around the world that makes the case for looking at the global media
system as a conveyor of the dominant view of the world hegemon.
Global Media and Global Hegemony
Understanding the way this international media system works now carries
even greater significance when attempting to understand power and hegemony
in a global context.
Pragmatically speaking, there can be no doubt that the majority of what we
call global media (media which has a significant reach outside state
borders [meaning readership or potential viewers in the millions]) are
based in the West and more specifically in the United States. "Western
countries predominate in the flow of news and information…and of the
Western countries, the United States is easily the most dominant entity in
every facet of the world communication system." (Magder 2003, p.31) The
truth of this statement is underlined by the fact that "the United States
exports more media products to more places globally than does any other
country." (Ekachai, Greer & Hinchcliff-Pelias 1999, p.146)
However, global media outlets are still controlled by the same elites who
hold this power in the case of a country level of analysis. So, in essence,
a small group of wealthy Westerners are controlling the flow of information
for the majority of the world. And for the most part they still operate
with the same fundamental goals in mind, simply carried over to the
international scene. In other words, they are market-driven businesses,
which must adhere to the demands of a fast-paced and competitive media
industry. Therefore, the global media provide a bridge between the
hegemonic state's local issues and the consciousness and worldview of the
rest of the planet (Silverstone 2002, p.107). Thus, it seems clear that
the entire non-Western world is receiving news that originates (at least
partly) outside of its state borders and is disseminated through the filter
of major Western media corporations. It can thereby be inferred that this
'news' arrives pre-packaged, accompanied by its own ideologies, assumptions
and views about the world.
An analysis of the content of certain players in the global media system
could shine a critical light on this hegemonic process. Comparing the
framing patters of media from around the world would make it possible to
look at how much did the world follow the 'spin' of the hegemon (the US
ruling elite). This study is also aimed to look at how the world perceives
this war as opposed to the very similar conflict which took place in 1991.
The two lines of comparison should eventually reveal some of the dynamics
of growing or shrinking of the hegemonic entity's power to define. (Sardar
1999, p.44; McCullagh 2002, p.15)
By doing this, this study intends to gain an insight into the relative
control that the world's primary hegemonic power, The United States of
America and its allies, have during these two periods.
Method
For the purposes of this study the week leading up to the opening of
military hostilities in the most recent conflict in Iraq was chosen. This
time line was selected for two primary reasons. First, it allowed for an
examination of a case where the world's primary hegemonic power was
attempting to set limits and define the context of global debate about a
single issue. Second, it allowed for comparisons between the literature on
the lead-up to the US-lead operation against Iraq in 1991.
17 daily newspapers from different regions of the globe as well as four
major broadcast news networks were analyzed (see appendix). A combination
of regional, political, and circulation/penetration considerations were
used to determine the sample, which included at least one paper from six of
the world's continents. The basic unit of analysis was the article in the
case of print media and the separate news story or interview in the case of
broadcast items. The majority of articles were retrieved through a
Lexis-Nexis search of the selected media in the target period for the terms
"Iraq" and "invasion."
The resulting sample was trimmed by leaving out letters to the editor and
small news items. The rationale was to select a sample, which, while being
limited to no more than 25 units per medium, would be still representative.
The final sample consisted of more than 500 units in five languages.
The concept of framing was central to our analysis of the content of these
media outlets and requires further explanation at this point. Our analysis
was based on the framing theory outlined by Robert Entman (1991). Entman
says frames construct meaning in communication messages through selective
highlighting or obscuring (omission) of certain sides of a story. Frames,
as units of meaning evaluating an event, a person or a process do so by
providing answers to four basic questions:
1) What is the problem that is being reported on?
2) What is the cause of the problem?
3) Who is to blame or praise?
4) What is to be done or what is going to happen?
Framing works by using language to send the reader or viewer a specific
message and "the use of particular words to describe events and issues
represents not merely the choice of a descriptive phrase but also the
choice of an attitude towards the event or issue." (McCullagh 2002, p.23)
Some examples of words or phrases found in this analysis that can be
considered frame markers are 'dictator' (in reference to President Saddam
Hussein), 'defiant' (in reference to actors) or 'collateral damage' as a
euphemism for civilian casualties. It is the inherent meaning of these
'loaded' terms that helps to send a specific message to the reader/viewer
of a story.
This message can often carry significantly different meaning based on the
language it uses. For example, the US administration would much rather see
a debate about the human costs of conflict framed in terms of 'collateral
damage' rather than in terms of the number of 'dead women and children'.
This is how the story is framed or in media-speak, it is the 'spin' that
the content has been given. Framing analysis allows the researcher to
evaluate the direction of this spin or bias, thus making it possible to
move from the Cohen's classical claim that the media do not tell people
precisely what to think but can tell them what to think about (1963) and
towards a deeper qualitative, yet sufficiently objective understanding of
how the media create and manipulate meaning.
The analysis consisted of a careful reading of the selected articles
covering the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, to identify
the frames they contain. The frames are identified through answering the
four questions outlined by Entman and listed above. For the purposes of
this study each answer to Entman's first question "what is the problem?"
was designated to one of ten categories. (see appendix) These categories
are consistent with the topics from Wilhelm Kempf's analysis of the media
during the first Gulf War, (Kempf 1996, p. 2-10). In this way the study
acquires a fairly consistent framework for a comparison and
cross-referencing of these two somewhat similar events.
The results of the analysis were recorded in Microsoft Excel-based coding
sheets (see appendix). Four coders, (the authors of this study) analyzed
the sample, dividing it between themselves in an outlate-based fashion.
Each medium's sample was coded once by a coder, each coder worked on five
to six outlets.
To establish the degree of reliability among the coders one random sample
of 10 items was independently coded by all coders. An alpha reliability
test turned a 93.42 percent reliability value.
Results
Initially, all 21 of our media sources were examined together to glean
macro results about how the war in Iraq was framed. Then they were broken
down in specific ways in order to discern micro results. Firstly, we wanted
to observe the way in which the US and, to a lesser extent, the other
countries in the "Coalition of the Willing"[2] tried to justify the
invasion of Iraq. Secondly, we wanted to examine the way the media of the
world presented their news stories and how they framed them.
These questions were primarily answered by examining the responses to the
two questions, what is the cause of the problem? and who is to blame?
However, prior to examining the specific results of this most recent study
it is useful to look at some of the findings from media studies of the
first US-led invasion of Iraq in 1991.
In Wilhelm Kempf 's 1996 study of media content during the first Gulf War
he finds that the US-led coalition is blamed 38.8% of the time, while Iraq
is blamed in 61.2% of the articles (pp. 4-5). Kempf finds that the media
primarily blamed Iraqi aggression as the cause of the war and that this
explanation was rarely or never questioned. Iraq's claim of having
historical rights over Kuwait's territory was often mentioned, but its
credibility was usually doubted or denied. The media spent very little time
trying to explore the possibility of the anti-Iraq coalition being
motivated by the same selfish interests ascribed to Iraq. On the contrary,
the press depicted the members of the coalition as acting with the main
purpose of liberating Kuwait and only rarely was the alliance suspected of
acting to secure a supply of oil and stabilize petroleum prices around the
world. So, from these results it can be inferred that the US hegemon had a
secure grip over the global public perception of the conflict.
A similar study by Nohrstedt and Ottosen found the following attitude
patterns towards main actors in the first Gulf War:
(row percentage of items):
________________________________Positive Negative Balanced
(neutral)__
George Bush 20 4 76
Saddam Hussein 4 34 62
Mikhail Gorbachev 12 4 84
UK Prime Minister [John Major] 13 0 87
Francois Mitterand 8 8 84
J. Perez de Cuellar 10 0 90
Norman Schwarzkopf 40 1 58
Bill Clinton 17 17 67____ ___
(Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000, p. 192)
A conversion of the above table leaves us with an overwhelmingly positive
attitude for the representatives of the 1991 anti-Iraqi coalition (total of
41 positive percentage points for its leaders, compared to just 12
negative), a positive attitude for the UN Secretary General (10 to 0), and
a decidedly negative depiction of Iraq's President (34 to 4). In general,
Nohrstedt and Ottosen find that media in the first Gulf War never actually
strayed too far away from the hegemon's propaganda line.
They suggest that "if the homeland of the media is involved in the
conflict, news reporting is expected to function as a propaganda channel of
the nation-state." (2000, p.250). However, there may be varying degrees of
support for a conflict (in the media) depending on the significance that
the conflict has for the nation in question. If the dominant superpower is
an actor in the conflict, its propaganda is likely to find its way into
news content, and, by virtue of the power of the hegemon's media, generally
set the agenda for media around the globe. Thus, the dominant power's
propaganda is reiterated, wittingly or not, by all the rest. Nohrstedt and
Ottosen also note that selective omission of events follows the same
pattern of dependency on the hegemon's interest (Ibid). The one thing that
both of these studies seems to point to is that the US was able to 'spin'
the perception of the conflict around the world in its own terms and that
the hegemon's power to define was alive and well.
These results are in stark contrast to those gathered from the study of
media content prior to the most recent conflict in Iraq. During the lead-up
to their recent invasion of Iraq the US government attempted to frame the
need for military action in two ways. One was the alleged possession and
concealment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
The other was the connection between Iraq and the "War on Terror,"
including implied links to Al-Quaeda, Osama Bin-Laden and the 9/11
terrorist attacks on the US.
The results in this study show that the media of the world (including the
United States and its allies) actually used those two ways to frame their
news very rarely, at 4% and 1% respectively. So, even though these two
aspects were the main reasons that the US president and the Western-based
"Coalition of the Willing" gave for the invasion of Iraq, they were almost
never discussed in the media in the week before the hostilities began.
Instead, the world media were more apt to see the invasion and ensuing
occupation linked to issues such as human rights abuses and United States
unilateralism. In this way it is obvious that the US were not able to use
their hegemonic power to convince the world to look at the conflict through
their lens. In fact, the hegemon was often framed as the aggressor and as
morally bankrupt.
This study also investigated whether there was a decline in the ability of
the US regime to both direct and deflect blame for the conflict away from
themselves and towards other actors. The findings show quite clearly that
while this was the case during the first Gulf War, it was certainly not the
case this time. In fact even inside the US's own media, 21 percent of the
stories blame the US and the 'Coalition of the Willing' for the conflict in
Iraq. This is more than the amount of blame (17 percent) put on the
non-helpers. (countries like France and Germany that opposed the war) 'The
Willing' fare just marginally better than Iraq and Saddam Hussein, who get
about 30 percent of the blame. What can be deduced from this is that the US
government was unable to set the agenda not only in the global media but
also in its own back yard.
The results of this blame game are even more illuminating when the entire
world's media is taken into account. The global media, including those from
the US and other coalition countries, blamed the US and the coalition in 45
percent of the stories, while Iraq was considered as the main culprit in
just 17 percent of the stories. Not surprisingly, the media from the
'unwilling' countries blamed the US in 56 percent of the stories and only
blamed Iraq in 12 percent of those.
The media from the 'Coalition of the Willing' countries put blame on the
US, in 40 percent of the articles, whereas Iraq is only blamed in 21
percent of the cases. The fact that Iraq is only blamed half as often as
the US suggests that the media from within the coalition is not convinced
by US attempts to frame Iraq as the problem. Secondly, it shows a trend in
global public opinion going against the US, again showing that US
credibility with the media and therefore inside civil society could be in
decline.
It is worth noting that the content of the dominant global broadcasters was
very much consistent with the general US media representation of the
conflict at that time, namely, restrained judgment of the 'willing,' focus
on technical detail rather than on the essence of the conflict, etc.. While
certain allowances should be made for the 'spectacle-centered' nature of
television, the impact of these media's allegiances should not be
discounted. These results, especially the observed shallowness of the TV
coverage, seem to be consistent with the findings of the Maryland
University Group that broadcast media have contributed more to the
thickening of the fog of war than to clarifying the picture for the
viewers. (PIPA, 2003)
One major conclusion is clear from the results of this examination of the
media. When compared to the studies of the last Iraq war an apparent
decline in the US's message credibility is observed. While in the lead-up
to the first Gulf War Iraq is primarily blamed for the conflict, this study
demonstrates that it is the US which are primarily cast in a negative
light. Also, and perhaps most importantly, the results suggest that there
is dissent inside the US coalition and perhaps within the hegemon itself.
Discussion
The general purpose of this article was to apply Gramsci's hegemonic theory
to an empirical analysis of media content leading up to the recent invasion
of Iraq. Because the media is an integral part of the public sphere, it was
believed that a better understanding of the current dialogue going on in
civil society could be achieved through this process. It was hoped that a
comparative analysis of the media prior to the recent invasion of Iraq
could allow for some speculation about the health of US global hegemony. In
theory, one would assume that an effective hegemon would be able to dictate
the parameters of a debate inside global civil society in terms that they
choose.
The general picture formed from this empirical study of the media, is that
there were and are several debates surrounding the war. In essence, the
fact that there was no global consensus suggests that the US was unable to
control the discourse leading up to the war and frame the situation to its
advantage. It is also significant to note that when compared to the first
conflict in Iraq the onus of blame allocated inside the global media has
shifted. Where in the first Gulf War it was Iraq who shouldered the
majority of the blame, during the recent invasion it was the US that was
primarily determined to be culpable. This fact alone suggests that the
credibility and therefore the hegemonic power of the US could be in decline.
In short, the debate in the world media is definitely not following the
agenda put forth by the US and its allies. The WMD debate, which the
'Coalition of the Willing' used as a pretext to invade Iraq, is a non-issue
even to the majority of the media from the coalition itself. Japan is the
sole exception, which might have to do with Tokyo's own WMD concerns about
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Surprisingly, the WMD issue
matters much more to Al-Jazeera and Arab News than to the rest of the
media, excluding the Japanese-based Daily Yomiuri. Proximity and
refutations could play a role in their concern with the topic. The alleged
links between Iraq and different terrorist groups, another key reason given
by the US for the invasion, are outright dismissed by the media, even in
the US The human cost of the eventual war ranks seventh among the ten
categories in the study. Despite the efforts of the Toronto Star, Arab News
and African News, the casualties of the coming war do not get much
attention in the media.
The topical analysis of the media in the scope of this study seems to give
credence to the hypothesis that the hegemon and its allies, despite
commanding an enviable media influence, were not able to swing the debate
towards 'their' issues. The results seem to pose the question, could this
be the beginning of the end of the hegemon's power to define?
The analysis of the blame assigned to the actors in the political drama
preceding the war seems to be consistent with such a view. The 'Coalition
of the Willing' is deplored in half of the articles. The articles that
either divide the blame more or less equally between all sides or remain
neutral come in second place. Iraq comes third in this order, being blamed
for the conflict only one third as many times the 'Coalition of the
Willing. The 'unwilling', that is Germany, France, Russia and company, are
the target of scorn in just one-tenth of the articles. The United Nations
seem to attract the least criticism (less than 4 percent, while being the
topic of nearly three times more stories), which seems to confirm the
hypothesis from the topical analysis: people around the world question the
global sheriff (the United States), more than the world city hall in the
form of the UN.
While it is not surprising to see Arab News as the primary carrier for
criticism of the 'willing,' it is worth noting that the coalition is
getting some of its toughest treatment from the American International
Herald Tribune the Danish Politiken, the Canadian Toronto Star and the
Australian Canberra Times. With Politiken and Canberra Times published in
member countries of the anti-Iraqi coalition, the results seem to point to
a significant fault line both between and within the countries comprising
the West. The results seem to say that the US-led coalition was unable to
convince its own media, let alone that of the world, of the rightness of
its invasion.
The defection of the majority of the West seems even more interesting given
the backdrop of the careful pronouncements in the media from Russia and
China. While generally disapproving of the US-U.K. push for war, Izvestia
and People's Daily, acknowledge, both tacitly and explicitly, that
confronting the US openly would be a mistake. Calculations of economic and
geopolitical factors color the debate in these media in pragmatic shades.
Given that both Russia and China had their own concerns, like issues of
terrorism, oil prices and trade relations, it is not surprising that the
media in those countries remained fairly balanced in their critique of the
situation.
When these empirical results are analyzed through the lens of hegemonic
theory, some intriguing assumptions and conclusions can be made. It can be
said that there has been a significant shift in global public opinion
against the US between the last Gulf War and the recent invasion of Iraq.
This finding is consistent ith the results of the Pew Center global opinion
poll (June 2003) showing a marked decline in the favorable views of the US
around the world.
It has also been shown that the US is the primary global hegemon. Next,
the way the US uses the media to disseminate its own worldview has been
explained. Furthermore, the appearance of dissenting global opinions inside
the world media has been shown to be a reflection of the discourse going on
inside global civil society.
If this is in fact the case, then one can assume that this dissent inside
global civil society could be an early sign of historic blocs underneath
the US hegemony beginning to defect. In other words, we could be witnessing
the decay of US hegemonic power. This does not mean that this decay is in
any way permanent or irreversible, but it does mean that more and more the
US is being framed as an unethical hegemon in Gramsci's classical rendition.
Gramsci describes an ethical hegemon as one that aspires and works to raise
the subservient historic blocs under its control to its level (Augelli &
Murphy 1988, pp.125-140). By this Gramsci means that the blocs that make up
the hegemon's power base must be lifted economically, politically and
culturally to that of the elites. An unethical hegemon, in essence, is one
that has failed to listen to the subservient blocs in global civil society.
Thus, the dialogue between the hegemon and the blocs is one-way and
top-down in nature. Gramsci says that if this happens, the blocs that have
submitted to the hegemon, through discourse and compromise in civil
society, begin to defect and reject the hegemon's worldview. It is at this
time that a hegemon can be considered to be unethical in nature (ibid). To
determine whether the US global hegemony is unethical or ethical is a
subjective task at best. However, the simple fact that the economic and
cultural disparity between the US and the majority of the world is growing,
leads one to believe that a case could be made for the position that the US
is in fact an unethical hegemon (McGrew, 2000).
It has been suggested by some academics that the most likely time for
change is during a time of crisis (Molotch & Lester 1974, pp.235-260). This
is because during a crisis, events unfold unexpectedly and at too quick of
a pace for the hegemon to adequately frame issues that are to be discussed
in civil society (ibid). The inability to adequately frame hegemonic
discourse then leads to the emergence of more opposing views, which in turn
diminishes the hegemon's power to define (Hallin 1994, p.55). If this is
the case, then this dissenting discourse should be observable inside the
media during a time of crisis or conflict. It could be argued that with the
current global situation, where there are a number of unpopular US-led
conflicts, we have reached this time of crisis.
This fact, combined with the knowledge that the media is one of the primary
tools for discourse inside civil society, links the emergence of dissent in
the media to the emergence of counterhegemony or at the very least, the
possible defection of historic blocs. The question then becomes whether or
not we are seeing signs inside the global media, and elsewhere, that this
defection is indeed beginning to take place.
So far we may be witnessing a deepening division between the views of
US-based media and media and civil society from most of the rest of the
world. With the existing divergence in how events are presented to and
perceived by the US public on one side and the audiences around the world
on the other, further erosion of the US hegemonic message credibility and
consequently, of US "soft power" seems inevitable.
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Failing Hegemony: A Comparative Content Analysis of the Coverage of the
Lead-up to the Attack on Iraq in 2003 in the World Media
Appendix 1
Results Interpretation Charts
Chart 1. Topical distribution of all units in the sample
Chart 2: Topical distribution in the media outside the United States.
Chart 3: Topical distribution of the news from US-based media.
Chart 4: Topical distribution of the stories in media from countries
opposing the US intervention plans.
Chart 5: Topical distribution of the stories from the four broadcasters in
the sample (CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera and Fox News)
Chart 6: Blame distribution from the total sample.
Charts 7, 8: Blame Distribution During Gulf War 1991.
Chart 9: Blame distribution in the stories from outside the United States
Chart 10: Blame distribution in the stories from US-based media.
Chart 11: Blame distribution in media from the 'Coalition of the Willing'
countries.
Chart 12: Blame distribution in the media from countries opposing the US
intervention in Iraq
Appendix 2
List of Media Sources
United States
USA Today (US) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
International Herald Tribune, The, (US) Stories used from the 13th to the
19th of
March 2003
CNN (Cable News Network), (US) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of
March 2003
Fox News (US) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
The United Kingdom
BBC Online (British broadcasting Corporation), (UK) Stories used from the
13th to the 19th of March 2003
Guardian, The, (UK) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
Independent, The, (UK) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
Australia
Australian, The, (Australia) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of
March 2003
Canberra Times, The, (Australia) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of
March 2003
Asian/African Broadcasters
Izvestia (Russia) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
Hindu, The, (India) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
People's Daily, The (China) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of
March 2003
Daily Yomiuri, The, (Japan) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March
2003
Arab News (Saudi Arabia) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
Al-Jazeera Network (Qatar) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
African Times, The, (South Africa) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th
of March 2003
Americas
Toronto Star, The (Canada) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
Buenos Aires Herald, The, (Argentina) Stories used from the 13th to the
19th of March 2003
Europe
Monde, Le (France) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
FAZ (Germany) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
Politiken (Denmark) Stories used from the 13th to the 19th of March 2003
Failing Hegemony: A Comparative Content Analysis of the Coverage of the
Lead-up to the Attack on Iraq in 2003 in the World Media
Appendix 3
Coding Categories (Coders' Instruction Sheet)
What is the Cause?
This section was divided into ten categories roughly based on the previous
study done by Kempf in 1996
1) WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction debate) - This category included all
articles or broadcasts that primarily discussed the issue of WMD in, or
leaving, Iraq
2) UN (United Nations) Relevancy/Effectiveness – This category was created
for articles that discuss the effectiveness of the UN its role in the
conflict or the nature of its future impact in international relations –
discussion which was confined to the specific nature of discussions in the
Security Council about a potential invasion of Iraq were grouped in
category 7, as coalition building articles.
3) US (United States) Unilateralism/Imperialism – Articles in this category
primarily discussed the role of the US as an actor that is able to act in
its own interests without the necessity of receiving international approval
or consensus for said actions. Also included in this category are articles
that discuss the imperialistic nature of US actions.
4) Global Economy – These were articles or broadcast stories that dealt
specifically with the impact of a potential conflict on the economy of the
entire world. Any economic discussion in articles that dealt primarily with
the impact on specific countries was put in category 5, Domestic Spin.
5) Domestic Spin Political/Economic – This category took in all articles
that dealt with the specific political or economic impacts that an invasion
of Iraq would have for individual states.
6) 9/11 /Terrorism/ Al-Queda – This category dealt with all articles that
focused primarily on the US-led 'War on Terror' and its relationship to
Iraq. Also included are articles that mentioned the 9/11 or Al-Queda link
to Iraq.
7) Coalition Building – This category included all articles that discussed
the political debate and wrangling over, either, A) acquiring a second
resolution inside the UN Security Council or B) presenting the general
validity/lack of validity of the case to invade Iraq. Also included were
articles on who would join the US and the UK in the potential invasion of Iraq.
8) Technical Aspects of War – This category dealt with articles that dealt
primarily with the logistics of war i.e. US troops move into position or
Iraqi defense forces and civilians brace for an invasion.
9) Human Rights/Costs – This category grouped all articles that dealt with
the possible suffering or 'collateral damage' that could result from an
invasion of Iraq.
10) Misc. – This was a little used category that essentially collected all
articles whose main themes did not fit into any of the above nine categories.
* It is important to note here that many of these categories could have
been mentioned inside any given article but that the cause was attributed
to the category that was referred to most prominently throughout the text.
Who is to Blame?
1) US/UK and the Coalition of the willing – this category included all
stories that mainly attributed blame to the countries that were in favor
(politically) of invading Iraq.
2) Iraq/Saddam Hussein – This category included all articles that primarily
blamed the Iraqi regime for the conflict
3) Unwilling/Non-helpers – This category included all of the countries that
were actively opposing the US invasion and who were then displayed in a
negative light (France, Russia, Germany, Canada etc.)
4) The UN – These articles blamed the ineffectiveness or the powerlessness
of the UN in handling the potential for conflict in Iraq
5) Neutral/miscellaneous – This category included all articles that were
either neutral in their views or blamed other nations or actors not listed
above.
Failing Hegemony: A Comparative Content Analysis of the Coverage of the
Lead-up to the Attack on Iraq in 2003 in the World Media
Appendix 4
Sample Coding Sheet (Izvestia Daily, March 13-18, 2003)
[1] Throughout this paper the notion of civil society will refer to
Gramsci's definition as it pertains to the hegemonic process. This is
defined as the area where common sense is developed through discourse
between institutions that are somewhat autonomous from the state (e.g.
media, education system, and churches) Global civil society will be
understood to be this arena taken outside state borders. (Baylis & Smith
2001, p.210)
[2] This study borrows this term from the rhetoric of the US President
George W. Bush to designate the countries joining the United States and
Great Britain in their campaign against Iraq despite the absence of a UN
Security Council mandate.
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