Keep and Use It for the Nation's War Policy:
The Office of Facts and Figures and Its Uses of the Japanese-Language Press
From Pearl Harbor To Mass Internment
In the wake of World War II, the United States government was trying hard
to present itself as a champion of democracy as opposed to fascism. As a
part of this campaign, Washington declared openly that it would treat
aliens, immigrants, and other people of foreign-born on the same basis as
U.S.-born citizens. Most symbolically, on December 10, 1941, only three
days after Pearl Harbor, the Attorney General Francis Biddle announced:
"The defense of our country will be hurt, not helped, by any persecution of
our non-citizens. If we create the feeling among aliens and other
foreign-born that they are not wanted here, we shall endanger our national
unity. Such an impression could only give aid and comfort to those enemies
whose aim is to infect us with distrust of each other and turn aliens in
America against America."
In reality, however, the wartime federal government excepted at least one
particular ethnic minority group, the people of Japanese descent, from that
liberal, inclusive national principle. By President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
Executive Order 9066 of February 19, 1942, nearly 120,000 Japanese
immigrants and their offspring living on the West Coast were forcibly
removed from their long-lived homes without any court hearings or due
compensations. After mass evacuation, they were thrown into inland
"relocation centers," which were surrounded by barbed wire fences and
watched by the Army guard. About one-third of them were older
first-generation Japanese immigrants called the "Issei." They were
prevented from naturalization by the anti-Asian Immigration Act of 1924.
But the remaining two-thirds were the second-generation "Nisei," who were
born and educated in the United States and therefore possessed American
Although this infamous Japanese American mass incarceration policy has
received considerable attention from a number of historians and scholars,
little has been written about how the United States government treated the
press of Japanese Americans. When Tokyo bombed Pearl Harbor, more than a
dozen of Japanese-language general-interest newspapers were being published
on the West Coast. While uprooting all people of Japanese ancestry as
"enemy aliens," how did the federal government treat their "enemy language"
The present study attempts to answer this question by examining the policy
of the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), a federal agency that took
responsibility for the management and mobilization of the domestic foreign
language press during the first six months after Pearl Harbor. To briefly
summarize this study's findings, the OFF took a distinctively liberal but
realistic approach to the foreign language press in general. The Foreign
Language Division of the OFF, which took the initiative in this matter,
regarded the foreign language press as a symbol of American democracy and,
at the same time, as a useful instrument to facilitate the national war
policy. On this understanding, the OFF sought to preserve and utilize the
Japanese-language press rather than to ban it. The agency used the
Japanese-language press for mainly three purposes, as a messenger of
official news and views, morale builder, and shield against the Axis
This study depends heavily on the archival documents of the OFF. It also
draws on records of other federal agencies and departments, such as the
Office of War Information (OWI), Department of Justice, and War Relocation
Authority (WRA). Primary sources on the side of Japanese Americans, such as
back issues of Japanese-language newspapers, letters and memorandums of
Japanese publishers and editors, are also used. Most of these documents
were collected from the National Archives and Library of Congress and used
here for the first time.
II. Historical Backgrounds and a Review of Literature
The Evolution and Development of the Japanese-Language Press in the United
The Japanese-language press in the United States grew rather slowly,
silently, but steadily since the late nineteenth century, mainly on the
West Coast. Like other ethnic, immigrant press groups, Japanese-language
journalism was begun and developed by pioneering immigrants to help
themselves and their followers establish and advance their own communities
in the unaccustomed new nation. In the face of the deep-rooted anti-Asian
prejudice, the earliest newcomers from Japan tended to flock together,
staying away from the mainstream society. As a result, they came to rely
heavily on their native language newspapers to know important news and
events happening in the outside. In addition, as Lauren Kessler pointed
out, living in a country that was often hostile to their presence, the
Japanese in the United States "found a sense of community and a source of
unity in their native-language publications."
By the 1940s, almost every Japanese American community with a sizeable
number of population held at least one general-interest newspaper.
According to an intelligence report by the Special War Policies Unit of the
Department of Justice, there were about 17 general-interest
Japanese-language newspapers on the West Coast in the fall of 1941. Of
these, 10 were dailies, six were weeklies, and one was semi-weekly. The
report estimated that these papers as a whole had more than 60,000
subscribers. In some larger metropolitan cities such as San Francisco, Los
Angeles, and Seattle, more than two dailies vied for Japanese readership.
In addition to those broad-sheet papers, Japanese Americans had a number of
smaller publications, which were more casual and specialized in their
However, this modest heyday of the Japanese-language press in the United
States ended suddenly when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. Beginning from the
very day of December 7, 1941, the Federal Investigation Bureau (FBI)
embarked on large-scale round-ups of Japanese community leaders, including
many newspaper publishers and editors. This forced many newspapers to stop
publication. Several newspapers with larger staffs could barely continue or
resume publication after temporary discontinuation. Nevertheless, as the
Army began to carry out evacuation orders from March 1942, these remaining
papers, too, had to give up their business. Thus, Japanese-language
journalism by mid-May disappeared completely from the West Coast. The last
one, the San Francisco daily Nichi Bei, closed with the issue of May 16.
The situation was much different in inland states, however. A handful of
Japanese-language newspapers in Utah and Colorado could continue
publication throughout the war. This was made possible because evacuation
orders did not reach the intermountain states. They included the Utah Nippo
in Salt Lake City, and the Rocky Nippon (later Rocky Shimpo) and Kakushu
Jiji (Colorado Times) in Denver. The Utah Nippo was ordered by the FBI to
stop operation on December 10, 1941, but it resumed publication from
February 25, 1942 and continued throughout the war.
The Roosevelt Administration's Press Control Policy in Wartime
The Roosevelt Administration's wartime press control policy is a
relatively well-documented research subject, and studies show that the
administration was generally restrained in its handling of the domestic
news media. At the very least, it was less repressive than the Wilson
Administration during World War I and the subsequent Red Scare. This was in
part due to the cooperative attitude on the part of the press. For example,
the overwhelming majority of major newspapers and magazines at home readily
complied with the wartime self-censorship code to protect the national
interest. Reinforced by the intense anti-Axis public sentiments fueled by
Japan's "sneak" attack on Pearl Harbor, the press and public which had been
previously divided over the nation's involvement in the war became firmly
united under the relatively liberal leadership of President Roosevelt.
But there also exist some studies that shed light on the darker side of
the Roosevelt Administration's press control policy. They claim that the
administration showed stricter attitudes toward certain unpopular, radical
press groups. Scholars such as Athan Theoharis, Roger Daniels, and Richard
W. Steele pointed out that close surveillance was placed on publications of
Communists, fascists, anti-war black nationalists, or pro-Nazi extremists.
Indictments were brought to some of them. Patrick S. Washburn disclosed
that government officials had seriously considered to prosecute some
dissident African American publications for sedition, although they
eventually gave up to do so.
Despite this relatively rich previous literature on press controls during
World War II, little has been known about how the federal government
treated the Japanese-language press. One recent study demonstrated that
officials controlled the California Japanese press by "coercive
self-censorship," i.e., pressing Japanese American journalists to control
themselves without exercising outright censorship. However, this study
failed to clarify the larger framework of the federal government's policy.
An examination of how officials in Washington attempted to control the
Japanese "enemy language" press is necessary to understand more fully the
state of Japanese Americans and their press after Pearl Harbor, and more
broadly, the Roosevelt Administration's wartime press control policy.
III. The Establishment of the OFF and its Roles
The Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) was one of the federal agencies
engaged in the nation's information dissemination and press relations
policies in the earliest phase of war. The OFF was established by the
Presidential Executive Order of October 24, 1941 "for the purpose of
facilitating the dissemination of factual information to the citizens of
the country on the progress of the defense effort and on the defense
policies and activities of the Government." Under this broad mission, the
OFF distributed a variety of defense and war-related information to the
press and public, by way of press conferences, releases, and pamphlets.
President Roosevelt nominated Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress and
famed poet, for the Director. In the administrative map, the OFF was
located under the Office for Emergency Management within the Executive
Office of the President.
The sudden outbreak of war made the OFF's duty more delicate and complex.
According to the agency's internal report, the OFF's assigned task prior to
Pearl Harbor had been still relatively limited; however, as the nation
entered the war, "[its] objective had necessarily to be combined with that
of promoting the dissemination of information on the general war effort
while avoiding any publication which would give aid and comfort to the
enemy." Moreover, the OFF had to coordinate the often conflicting interests
of various governmental organizations and, at the same time, keep the press
and general public informed of the government's current views and
activities, accurately, timely, and promptly. In a conference with the
representatives of the domestic daily and weekly press in February 1942,
one principal OFF official declared that "[t]he OFF is the instrumentality
which sees that major policies and the decisions concerning [information
dissemination, public relations, and press relations] are carried out. When
the [federal government] has made a policy ... [and] if it is not carried
out, we definitely have authority to see that it is carried out."
Precisely, the OFF had no "definite authority" to compel other agencies to
adopt its decisions or policies. In fact, the OFF often had thorny
relationships with other agencies. However, in highly specialized areas
such as the handling of foreign language news media, the OFF took a leading
role within the federal government.
Although the OFF itself did not last long, a major portion of its
functions and roles, including its personnel, was taken over by the Office
of War Information (OWI), which was created by the President's Executive
Order of June 13, 1942. Since the nation entered the war, President
Roosevelt had been feeling a greater necessity to establish a central
agency that would integrate and coordinate the government's overall
information activities, which had previously been scattered over several
different agencies. The OWI was established to do just this. It
consolidated the powers, duties, and staffs of the OFF, the Office of
Government Reports, and a few other information service agencies. Roosevelt
named a popular radio commentator and journalist Elmer Davis as the
Director of this new wartime agency.
Not all policies of the OFF were inherited by the OWI, of course. But, as
this study will show, the handling of the foreign language press was one of
the areas in which the basic philosophy and tactics of the OFF continued to
be definitive. In addition, the Chief of the OFF Foreign Language Division
occupied the same post in the OWI, and the OFF Director MacLeish continued
to serve as an Assistant Director under Elmer Davis until January 1943.
Thus, the OFF's foreign language press policy conditioned that of the OWI.
IV. The OFF's Foreign Language Press Policy: Liberalism and Realism
In line with the nation's democratic cause of war, the OFF gave priority
to the development of mutual working relationships with the domestic press.
As the Director MacLeish expressly stated, the OFF "will not alter the
present relationship between newspaper and radio representatives and the
various departments and agencies. ... The job is one of coordination, not
of control or regulation." This necessitated the OFF to elicit voluntary
cooperation from the news media rather than to suppress or censor them.
Basically, the OFF took the same moderate approach to publications of
foreign tongues. Indeed, the OFF leadership assumed liberally that all
press groups, regardless of their languages or serving ethnic communities,
deserved the same First Amendment protection as the mainstream
English-language media did. The freedom of speech and the press was thought
to be a cornerstone of the nation's democratic system itself and therefore
a universal right. The Chief of the OFF Foreign Language Division, Alan
Cranston, presented this liberal view in his April 3 memorandum for
MacLeish. "The foreign language press is in a sense a symbol of the freedom
of speech for which we are fighting and it is doubtful whether the benefits
to be gained from the elimination of the bad 10% in any blanket suppression
of the foreign language press would counteract the positive benefits being
gained from the good 90%." This concept was later authorized by the
Department of Justice as a sort of national policy. On April 28, the
Department announced that "all newspapers loyal to the United States,
regardless of the language in which they are printed, need [to] fear no
interference by the Federal Government."
In his public address before the New England Foreign Language Newspapers
Association on May 3, Cranston stressed the above principle further. "It
would be apparent to anyone … that language is no test of loyalty." He also
stated that "all English language publications will not be suppressed
because a few English language publications are disloyal, nor will all
foreign language publications be suppressed because a few foreign language
publications are disloyal."
In this connection, it should be noted that the OFF's liberal, egalitarian
outlook set the general framework of the OWI's foreign language press
policy. One OWI policy memorandum provided:
There can clearly be no question of attempting to obtain the cooperation of
the foreign language press by any but purely voluntary methods. The use of
any other method, especially enforced insertion of Government statements,
imposition of any form of censorship, or suspension of these newspapers,
would mean abandonment of democratic process in a struggle which can only
be won by maintaining and strengthening them.
This liberal interpretation of the press freedom underlay the foreign
language press policies of both the OFF and OWI.
Within the OFF, it was the Foreign Language Division led by Alan Cranston
that took the immediate responsibility for planning, documenting, and
practicing the foreign language press policy. In a broader sense, the
division's duty was to "sell America's war" to those who did not understand
English or retained strong cultural ties with foreign nations. For more
specific descriptions of its task, Cranston explained that his division would:
Stimulate morale among the foreign born for the most efficient and
energetic prosecution of the war.
Inform the foreign born of the war-time resources and policies of
America and the United States.
Give aliens and the foreign born precise information regarding their
technical status in this country, and regarding such things as price
control and Selective Service.
Sell the war to the German, Italian, and other groups in this country.
Although Cranston did not mention in the above document, the people of
Japanese descent constituted one important segment of his division's target
audiences. Cranston kept serving as the Chief of the Foreign Language
Division after the OFF was integrated into the OWI.
Equally important, however, the OFF did not advocate the continuance of
the foreign language press on the ground of democratic idealism only. The
agency had some realistic considerations, too. For one, officials foresaw
that serious troubles would arise if the government arbitrarily banned
foreign language journalism. One possible trouble would be that dictatorial
press control would alienate the people of foreign backgrounds and in a
long term weaken the unity of the entire nation. About this concern,
Cranston stated that "the whole endeavor to gain support of the foreign
born groups in this country for the war cannot succeed if the native stock
Americans discriminate against the foreign born, and make them feel that
they do not belong here ...." He advanced this point in his April 3
memorandum for MacLeish. "Any blanket suppression of the foreign language
press would be a serious blow to the morale of some of our most loyal
Americans, just as the labeling of all German, Italian and Japanese aliens
as 'enemy aliens' has terribly wounded some of the world's most staunch
anti-Nazis and anti-Fascist." Cranston cautioned further that outright
elimination of foreign language news media would impair the credibility of
the United States abroad, too. "It would insult our allies," wrote he.
The Department of Justice had the same concern. On April 6, the OFF and
Department of Justice agreed on a joint policy statement, which read that
"[the loyal foreign language] press is, in a sense, a symbol of the freedom
of speech for which we are fighting. Aside from constitutional
difficulties, the elimination or serious curtailment of all or a
substantial proportion of the foreign language press as such would
undoubtedly have a tendency to create disaffection and to alienate the
sympathies of a substantial number of the foreign born."
Concomitantly, the OFF officials also feared that the banning of foreign
language journalism would give the Axis propagandists a better chance to
divide the United States. Cranston's aforementioned memo for MacLeish
called attention to this danger, stating that the deprivation of the
foreign language press "would make the foreign born easy targets for Axis
rumor-mongers. It would turn them to the Axis short-wave broadcasts for
Besides these concerns, the OFF also had a more positive reason for
supporting the preservation of foreign language publications, i.e., the
agency viewed them as ready-made ammunition to promote the national war
effort. This consideration can be seen in the aforementioned joint policy
statement with the Department of Justice, which bluntly stated that "it
should be borne in mind that the loyal foreign language press serves a very
useful purpose as a channel of communication through which the Government
can reach the foreign born." The OFF referred to this merit when it advised
President Roosevelt how he could more effectively publicize war programs to
the public. The OFF recommended that "every use … be made of the foreign
language press, the press in general, the radio, to bring home to the
citizens what the program would mean to each individual man and woman. …
[The OFF] proposes immediately to prepare a detailed and specified plan to
set in motion its machinery for the utilization of all principal media of
opinion and information (magazines, press, movies, etc.) to attain the
From such liberal but realistic standpoint, while acknowledging their
First Amendment freedom from governmental intervention, the OFF demanded
publishers and editors to exercise stricter self-control. In his May 3
address before the New England Foreign Language Newspapers Association,
Cranston stated: "It would be a great contribution to American unity, to
the foreign-language population in the United States, and to the foreign
language press itself, if the foreign language press would purge itself of
… traitors before the Government steps in." This "patriotic" act of
self-censorship, he furthered, "would prove to skeptics that the vast
majority of the foreign language press is loyal and pro-democratic and that
it is contributing by every means to the winning of the war. It is easy
enough to distinguish between friend and foe in this war, whether the enemy
packs a rifle or publishes a newspaper."
Parenthetically, Cranston cautioned that the federal government might have
to take stringent actions, if not wholesale suspension or censorship, if
they failed to act "responsibly" or "loyally." "Only when you fail to do
your job is the Government forced to step in. The Government prefers to let
you keep your own house in order." Later in the same address, he
reemphasized that strict self-control on the part of the press would be the
best and only means to protect its own freedom. "When no segment of the
foreign language press is playing the Nazi game, we who understand the
value of the foreign language press will be greatly strengthened in our
stand against those who would ruthlessly suppress all foreign language
publications because of the disloyal few among them." Cranston concluded
that "loyal Americans will do all within your power to prove that the
foreign language press can make a great and telling contribution to America
and to victory."
V. The OFF's Uses of the Japanese-Language Press After Pearl Harbor
The OFF took basically the same liberal, realistic approach to the
Japanese-language press. On the one hand, the OFF openly advocated its
First Amendment freedom. The agency made no distinction between the
Japanese "enemy language" press and other non-English press groups.
Symbolically, Cranston declared in the May 3 speech that "[t]he foreign
language press of America, publishing as it does in German, Italian,
Japanese, and 35 other languages, the languages of friend, foe and neutral
alike, is a symbol of the freedom for which we are fighting. It is a common
ground for all who struggle for the defeat of tyranny." MacLeish, too, held
that "there should be no sweeping suppression of the Japanese press because
much of it had the appearance of loyalty and sincerity."
On the other hand, the OFF took advantage of the Japanese ethnic press to
promote the national war effort, in particular the mass evacuation and
incarceration of Japanese Americans from the West Coast. As an agency
responsible for information dissemination and public relations, the OFF
utilized the Japanese-language press for mainly three objectives. First of
all, the agency used it as an information channel to relay official news
and views to the Japanese-speaking populace. The agency also used it to
maintain and promote the morale of Japanese Americans. Finally, although to
a lesser degree, the agency regarded it as a defense shield against the
The Japanese-Language Press as Information Disseminator
From the earliest stage of war, the OFF had an intention to use the
foreign language press in general as a vehicle to convey governmental
information to the people of foreign nationalities and parentage. As early
as February 6, 1942, Cranston wrote that "[w]e are already sending out a
steadily increasing volume of foreign language press releases." He added
that the Foreign Language Division was sending "a growing volume of
material to the foreign language press in 27 languages, carrying out
general O.F.F. policy and also carrying material specifically aimed for the
various foreign-born groups. We are also cooperating with other Government
agencies in dissemination of information to foreign groups." On another
occasion, Cranston asserted that his agency "feels that the foreign press
is a vital channel of information -- a channel that must be used in this
crisis. … Government agencies have often demonstrated their knowledge of
the value of the foreign language press, by using it as a means of
communication of vital Government information to new Americans."
The OFF used the Japanese-language press for the same purpose. Because
there was no luxury of time for both the Japanese-speaking people and
government officials to learn the other party's language, it was almost
inevitable that the existing Japanese-language press was mobilized to
mediate them. One internal memorandum of the OFF read:
Since late December , the OFF has been sending a series of releases
to the Japanese press in the United States explaining the regulations
affecting enemy aliens, telling the story of the defense program, etc. The
statements made by the President, the Attorney General and Undersecretary
[of War, Robert] Patterson warning against discrimination have been
translated in full.
The memo also noted that "[a]t the moment, in cooperation with the Treasury
Department, a special article explaining the freezing of Japanese funds is
under preparation." This kind of article was desired strongly by a number
of Japanese-speaking Issei merchants, farmers, or fishers, whose long-run
businesses were suddenly endangered by the outbreak of war.
As President Roosevelt decided on mass evacuation of Japanese Americans in
February 1942, the OFF came to depend more on the Japanese vernacular press
to spread necessary information. In order to carry out that enormous and
unprecedented scale of mass evacuation in an orderly manner, it was
essential to inform the subject people of a number of complicated orders,
regulations, and notices -- accurately, quickly, and thoroughly. This could
hardly be done without exploiting their native language press. A week after
the issuance of Executive Order of February 19, Cranston reported to the
Assistant Director of the OFF that "in cooperation with the Department of
Justice, we have sent releases to [the] Japanese press concerning
restrictions on enemy aliens, so that enemy aliens may at once obey the law
and maintain their rights."
As Cranston implied, the Department of Justice also found this method of
information dissemination highly efficient. When the military authorities
proposed blanket prohibition of the Japanese-language press, one Justice
Department official strongly opposed, saying that "[t]he extensive use
which O.F.F. has made of the loyal foreign language press (particularly the
Japanese press) as the only effective means of reaching the large groups of
foreign born argues strongly the desirability of not eliminating these
By way of the OFF, other governmental agencies and departments, too, took
advantage of the power of the Japanese-language press. They sent orders,
announcements, and releases for the Japanese-speaking people first to the
OFF, and the OFF collected, edited, translated, and packaged them in
certain styles and forms suitable for Japanese-language newspapers. The
OFF's activity report for the first quarter of 1942 stated that "[the
Foreign Language] Division has arranged to receive all Government releases
and information of any interest to the foreign groups and is cooperating
with them in the dissemination of such information to the foreign-born
through the foreign language press ...."
Of course, it must not be overlooked that many Japanese journalists
volunteered to assist this information dissemination system. For example,
Togo Tanaka and Joe Inoue, the editors of the Los Angeles daily Rafu
Generally, the Japanese dailies demonstrated their value as a medium of
information from federal agencies into homes of Japanese nationals. Dept of
Justice regulations could be realeased [sic] effectively. Recognition was
given to this useful role of the language papers. [A] press relations
officer of the Attorney-General's office dispatched telegrams to these
newspapers directly, on several occasions.
Likewise, the largest Japanese daily in San Francisco, the Nichi Bei, once
editorialized that "we should perform the public service of carrying out
our function of passing on to all of you the commands of the Government and
the wartime news …"
The Japanese-Language Press as Morale Builder
Besides information dissemination, the OFF also heeded the foreign
language media's usefulness in education, moralization, and mobilization of
the people of foreign backgrounds. In the aforementioned speech before the
New England Foreign Language Newspapers Association, Cranston repeatedly
stressed that it was the duty of foreign language journalism to entice its
audience to assist the United States government and its war policy.
For these hundreds of thousands of people, your publications have long been
the principal source of information about the world. It has now become your
war-time task to see that these people understand this great fight for
freedom in which we are now engaged. It is your task to eliminate their
doubts, where doubts exist, with hard, cold facts. It is your task to
develop among your readers a clearer understanding of the issues involved
in the war. It is your task to win their full cooperation in the war ….
Cranston added, somewhat exaggeratedly, that "[b]y doing your part you can
lay the foundation for a peace of justice and freedom for all …."
By the same token, the OFF used the Japanese-language press as an
instrument to boost the morale of Japanese Americans. In early June, the
Assistant Chief of the Foreign Language Division, Bradford Smith, wrote:
The work of our Division generally is concerned with morale and
establishing of effective means of communication with minority or foreign
language groups; also with providing the general public with appropriate
information about such groups. The Japanese situation, as the most acute
minority problem in the United States, interests us particularly.
Smith added that the OFF was currently sending interpretive news items to
"Japanese newspapers still in extant, and for the organ of the Japanese
American Citizens League." These papers were the Utah Nippo in Salt Lake
City, and Kakushu Jiji and Rocky Nippon in Denver. What Smith called the
JACL "organ" was the English-language monthly (later weekly) Pacific
Citizen, which kept publication throughout the war in Salt Lake City.
The OFF leadership had high expectations for the Japanese publications'
morale-building function on the assumption that they were the most
influential opinion leaders of the Japanese American community. Cranston
once remarked: "Because of the Immigration restrictions since 1924, it is
probable that the number of readers of the foreign language press is
substantially less than in the last war. However, this press has almost a
monopoly on its readers because their tendency is to rely upon it for
information." On another occasion, he related that "[t]hese people are
starved for reading matter in Japanese, to which they naturally respond
more readily than to English." One Justice Department official also
asserted that "[t]he Japanese press provides one of the most effective
channels for government sponsored pro-democratic propaganda …."
Their assumption was overall correct. One Issei recollected that during
the days following Pearl Harbor he and other Issei spent "hectic days. …
People would listen to anybody. They were hungry for news of any kind."
Another Issei added: "If the Government wants to influence the thinking of
the Issei, it should buy up the editors and the three [largest]
Japanese-language newspapers." In a confidential letter to the Attorney
General, Karl G. Yoneda, the San Francisco Correspondent of the Los Angeles
opinion paper Doho, wrote: "[I] wish to stress that the Japanese papers
have been and are the leading factors in shaping the opinions of the
Japanese nationals …."
To make use of the Japanese press for this purpose, the OFF designed
information releases so as to lessen Japanese Americans' anxieties, fears,
and disillusionment. For example, the agency often provided items featuring
statements of the President and other high-ranking officials showing
sympathy toward Japanese Americans. Quotations that seemed especially
catchy or moving were singled out and translated "in full" so that Japanese
newspapers could print them promptly and thoroughly. The OFF Director
Archibald MacLeish once wrote to a famed Nisei architect Isamu Noguchi that
his agency "is doing all we can, by press, radio, and other means, to make
the loyal Japanese in this country feel that they have a place here and
that they can contribute to the cause of democracy in this crisis. At the
same time, we are trying to prevent discrimination against the Japanese in
this country who are loyal."
As MacLeish implied, the OFF leadership perceived ironically that this
could turn to be a rather good opportunity to "Americanize" the people of
Japanese ancestry, who were generally thought to be inept at getting
assimilated into the mainstream society. On this, Cranston wrote: "They
have had nothing but Japanese-inspired material in their own language.
There is an excellent opportunity to furnish them with the truth about
their land and people in their own language." The OFF officials also
anticipated that the acute wartime duress could make Japanese Americans
more likely to throw away their nostalgic, sentimental attachment to their
old nation and instead bear a more exclusive sense of belonging to the
As the Army began to carry out mass evacuation and internment, the OFF
officials legitimately felt a greater necessity to convince Japanese
Americans of the fundamental cause of the policy as well as the nation's
war aim in general. Naturally, the agency began to pay more attention to
the morale-raising function of the Japanese-language press. The Foreign
Language Division's March 20 memo read:
The need for a vernacular on the West Coast which will reflect the
opinions of the pro-democratic element among the local Japanese becomes
more pressing daily. ...
The need cannot be stressed too strongly for a publication which will
carry on a program of education for the [I]ssei, as well as the [N]isei,
which will serve to maintain morale (especially necessary because many
[N]isei are losing faith in democracy because they are being kicked around
by our home-grown fascists), which will defend the rights of the [N]isei as
citizens against the powerful forces on the [W]est [C]oast which play the
fascist game of race hatred.
This points to another irony that the Japanese vernacular press was used by
the federal government to implant in the minds of Japanese Americans the
righteousness of American democracy, the very democracy that denied their
civil liberties and rights.
Equally important, the OFF continually used the Japanese-language press
for this objective even after evacuees entered the inland "relocation
centers" operated by the War Relocation Authority (WRA). On March 20, the
Executive Assistant of the OFF recommended the Assistant Director that the
OFF start an information service that would help the WRA develop favorable
relationships with camp inmates. For one example, it was recommended to
highlight humane aspects of the WRA's camp administration. The induction of
evacuees into the WRA camps began in March 1942 and continued until the end
After internal discussions, Bradford Smith on April 29 formally notified
the WRA's Information Service Chief Edwin Bates that the OFF was planning
to supply special information releases to the WRA. Smith wrote:
My particular function in the Office of Facts and Figures is to devise
and carry out a program for Japanese aliens and Japanese Americans. I
scarcely need to say that I am most eager to work in close cooperation with
the War Relocation Authority, to provide what material may be needed for
the Japanese and also to help clear up some of the misunderstandings which
have arisen throughout the country in regard to the Japanese problem.
This Office is equipped to provide scripts and releases in Japanese, as
well as in English for the Nisei population, and we wish to make available
to you every facility that is at our disposal.
Smith proposed that "if you agree with [the OFF] to render this service for
you, I should like to devise a regular system of releases for the
newspapers now being mimeographed at Manzanar [and] other projects as they
are set up. These releases would be in Japanese and/or English, and would
have in mind the over-all plan of breaking down undesirable loyalties and
gradually building up useful and effective allegiances." Manzanar was one
of the 10 relocation sites administered by the WRA, and at these camps
evacuees were permitted to publisher their own newspapers under the WRA's
By August 1942, the Foreign Language Division, now of the OWI, had
launched the proposed information service for evacuee newspapers at several
WRA camps. Smith boasted to the WAR that his agency's news releases were
designed specially to convince Japanese American evacuees of the importance
of "democracy" and to "prevent evacuees [and other Japanese Americans] from
feeling cut off from the rest of the world ...." Smith also noted that the
same releases were being sent to outside Japanese-language papers, such as
the Utah Nippo, Kakushu Jiji, and Rocky Nippon.
The Japanese-Language Press as Safeguard Against the Axis Propaganda
Finally, although to a lesser extent than the first two types of usage,
the OFF also viewed the Japanese and other foreign language press as a
defense shield against political propaganda from abroad. As shown
previously, the OFF was concerned particularly about the menace of the Axis
propaganda. About the necessity to defend the people of Japanese, German,
and Italian origins from it, Cranston wrote:
Today Axis short[-]wave broadcasts speaking to immigrant Americans in every
foreign language seek to start among them rumors damaging to our cause. …
For if the foreign language groups in this country are neglected, if they
are not reached by the United States Government in languages natural to
them, they become prey to those broadcasts, those rumors, those stories and
interpretations of events the Axis is constantly spreading. The Foreign
Language Division removes the danger.
Cranston wrote this memorandum on April 28 in order to define the duties
and significance of the Foreign Language Division.
The assumption underlying this concern was that the vernacular press of
immigrants and other foreign-born people, especially those from the Axis
nations, would be inherently susceptible to solicitation from their old
governments. Cranston pointed to this assumption in his April 3 memorandum
for MacLeish. "The foreign language press is subject to different treatment
from the American press because of [its] monopoly. It reaches a group that
is extremely sensitive to foreign propaganda, and it tends to purvey more
foreign propaganda and foreign news among such groups because of their
interest in their homeland." This viewpoint was reasserted in the
OFF-Justice Department joint policy statement. It read:
[T]he foreign language press is directed at and circulated among groups
many of which are more susceptible to foreign propaganda and ideologies.
Because of their readers' interest in the countries of their nativity or
nationality, the foreign language papers present more foreign news than is
the case of the English language press. Therefore, the approach that these
papers take toward the cause of the United Nations, their loyalty to our
democratic form of government and their attitude toward the enemy nations
is of considerable importance to our national unity. 
With this recognition, the OFF officials considered that foreign language
journalism by its own presence has some usefulness as a sort of barrier to
block the entrance of enemy propaganda. This idea was closely interrelated
with the first two types of usage. In other words, by feeding foreign
language media with governmental news and morale-boosting material, the OFF
could justifiably preoccupy their news space to preempt publication of
undesirable propaganda messages. In fact, this was another crucial reason
why the OFF persistently opposed the military authorities' proposal to
suppress all Japanese publications. Cranston summarized this view when he
maintained that "if the foreign language press were closed down, a vital
segment of the American public would be left in the dark. Countless new
Americans who depend upon the foreign language press for their war
information would become easy targets for Axis agents and rumor mongers."
Cranston also held that for this reason the federal government was
expanding its communication with the foreign language press to "a scale
untouched since the heights of the World War in 1918."
It was rational, therefore, that in this respect the OFF heeded the values
of the Japanese-, Italian-, and German-language press. In an internal
policy memorandum that outlined how the agency should deal with these
"enemy language" press groups, Cranston cited examples of some foreign
governments that outlawed them entirely and suggested that blanket
suppression would only backfire the government because it would end up with
inviting more propaganda from abroad. "Examples of the havoc that can be
caused by banning the use of a language is the present situation in Brazil
and other South American countries …; the Germans and Italians in Brazil no
longer have their own newspapers, and are now turning to the Berlin and
Rome broadcasts for their information." These Latin American governments
prohibited the Japanese-language press, too. MacLeish subscribed to this
advice of Cranston, and it became a fixed stance of the OFF, and later of
the OWI, that the existing Axis-language press should be kept alive to
preempt the Axis propaganda. One OWI policy memorandum asserted that the
agency's "[press release] service alone would make all the difference
between our foreign language groups being overwhelmed with totalitarian
propaganda from all sides and their getting a true picture of what our
Government is doing today."
The OFF's Japanese-language press policy during the first six months of
World War II can be characterized by the mixture of two distinct concepts
-- liberalism and realism. To begin with the former, the OFF policy makers
from the outset worked with a belief that the United States was fighting
for democracy and therefore the nation must wage the war without overtly
abridging the First Amendment freedom of the press. This reasonably led to
a thinking that the presence of diverse news media written in various
foreign languages, including the Japanese "enemy language," symbolized the
very thing that the United States and its Allies were fighting for.
Arguably, this liberal outlook makes a striking contrast with the federal
government's mass evacuation and incarceration policy itself, labeling all
individuals of Japanese origin "enemy aliens" and uprooting them en masse
from the West Coast.
The OFF policy makers were no naive idealists, however. They were liberal
thinkers, indeed, but were pragmatic and realistic government officials as
well. They suspected that blanket suppression of the Japanese-language
press would rather injure the national unity in a long term. Moreover, as
an agency to act as a clearinghouse of information about the war and
defense activities, the OFF regarded the Japanese-language press as a
ready-to-use instrument to promote the nation's war policy. Specifically,
the OFF used it for mainly three objectives. Firstly, while serving as a
point of contact for other agencies and departments, the OFF used the
Japanese-language press as a channel to acquaint Japanese Americans, many
of whom were illiterate in English, with vital governmental information.
Secondly, the OFF utilized it to maintain and raise the morale of Japanese
Americans. Finally, the agency deemed it as a defense shield against the
In order to fairly assess this liberal, realistic policy of the OFF,
however, it is necessary to bear in mind that the agency could always
secure a superior position over the Japanese-language press. Japan's
"sneak" attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the entire Japanese American
community into a total confusion in a single day. Given such lopsided
vulnerability of Japanese editors and publishers at the time, the OFF's
information service, no matter how "free" or "voluntary" it was, could have
enormous impacts on their editorial decisions. And yet, this method of
usage and control did not conflict with the OFF's liberal principle to
avoid outright suppression or censorship. Thus, the agency could
legitimately reconcile the nation's democratic cause of war with the
wartime requirement of greater press control.
In a broader sense, the OFF's usage of the Japanese-language press could
be compared with the War Relocation Authority's (WRA) "supervision without
censorship" policy. Taking advantage of its inherently superior position,
the WRA, too, controlled the in-camp evacuee newspapers by moderate
"supervision" without outright "censorship." In such quasi-democratic press
control tactics of the OFF and WRA, one might be able to see the
contradictory nature of the federal government's Japanese American policy
per se, that the nation waging a "good war" for "democracy" forcibly
uprooted and encamped innocent individuals on the basis on their ethnic
origin in the name of military necessity.
 . Department of Justice, Press Release, 10 December 1941, RG 208, Entry
5, Box 4, File 020, National Archives and Record Administration. Hereafter,
the National Archives and Record Administration is cited as "NA."
 . One of the most comprehensive and thorough studies of wartime mass
evacuation and incarceration of Japanese Americans is the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), Personal Justice
Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians (Washington, D.C.: The Government Printing Office, 1982).
 . Lauren Kessler, The Dissident Press: Alternative Journalism in
American History (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984), 107.
 . Elizabeth C. Ito, Analyst, Special War Policies Unit, Department of
Justice, to Lawrence M. C. Smith, Chief, Special War Policies Unit,
"Japanese Activities on the West Coast Prior to and Immediately After Pearl
Harbor," April 23, 1943, p.2, Papers of the U.S. Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Part 1: Numerical File Archive,
Reel: 8, Box: 9. Hereafter, this manuscript collection is cited as "Papers
of the CWRIC."
For the numerical data on the Japanese-language press prior to the war,
see also Robert Ezra Park, The Immigrant Press and its Control (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1922), 150-166; Kessler, The Dissident Press, 106-107;
J. Percy H. Johnson, ed., N. W. Ayer & Son's Directory of Newspapers and
Periodicals (Philadelphia, PA: N. W. Ayer & Son, 1942), 1228-1229; Togo
Tanaka, "The Vernacular Newspapers," Japanese American Evacuation and
Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14c, Reel 106, File W1.95, The Bancroft
Library, University of California, Berkeley.
 . About the FBI raids and arrests of Japanese Americans, see Bob
Kumamoto, "The Search for Spies: American Counterintelligence and the
Japanese American Community 1931-1942," Amerasia Journal 6 (Fall 1979):
45-75; Pedro A. Loureiro, "Japanese Espionage and American Countermeasures
in Pre-Pearl Harbor California," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 3
(Fall 1994): 197-210.
About the general plight of major Japanese American newspapers after the
war, see Akihiko Haruhara, "San Francisco Nikkeishi no Ayumi to Genkyo [The
Past and Present of San Francisco Japanese Americans]," and "Los Angeles
Nikkeishi no Ayumi to Genkyo [The Past and Present of Los Angeles Japanese
Americans]," in Nihon Shinbun Kyokai, ed., Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi
[Newspaper History By Oral Interviews] No.9 (October 1979): 11, 71.
 . "Newspapers," in Brian Niiya, ed., Japanese American History: An
A-to-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present (New York: Facts on File, 1993),
252. For published studies on intermountain Japanese newspapers, see Miiko
Kodama and Norio Tamura, "Colorado Nikkei Shinbun Shoshi [A Brief History
of the Japanese American Press in Colorado]," Tokyo Keizai Daigaku Jinbun
Shizen Kagaku Ronju No.64 (July 1983): 101-157; Norio Tamura and Haruo
Higashimoto, "Imin Shinbun to Doka [Assimilation of Immigrant Newspapers],"
Tokyo Keidai Gakkaishi No.138 (November 1984): 183-218; Fuyuko Kamisaka,
Obaachan no Utah Nippo [An Old Lady's Utah Nippo] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju,
1985); James Omura, "Japanese American Journalism During World War II," in
Gail M. Nomura, Russell Endo, Stephen H. Sumida, and Russell C. Leong,
eds., Frontiers of Asian American Studies: Writing, Research, and
Commentary (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1989), 71-77;
Harumichi Yamada, "Gaisetsu 'Utah Nippo' [A General Profile of the Utah
Nippo]," in Utah Nippo Fukkoku Matsumoto Shimin Iinkai [The Matsumoto
Civilians' Committee for the Utah Nippo's Compliance and Collection], ed.,
Utah Nippo Fukkokuban [The Collection of the Utah Nippo] Vol.1 (Matsumoto,
Nagano: Utah Nippo Fukkoku Matsumoto Shimin Iinkai, 1994), 431-435.
 . For major works on the press censorship and freedom during World War
II, see Betty Houchin Winfield, FDR and the News Media (Urbana and Chicago,
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Margaret A. Blanchard,
Revolutionary Sparks: Freedom of Expression in Modern America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992); Jeffery A. Smith, War & Press Freedom: The
Problem of Prerogative Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999);
Richard W. Steele, Free Speech in the Good War (New York: St. Martin's
Book, 1999); Michael S. Sweeney, Secret of Victory: The Office of
Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War II (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
 . Athan Theoharis, "The FBI, the Roosevelt Administration, and the
'Subversive' Press," Journalism History 19 (Spring 1993): 3-10; Roger
Daniels, "Bad News from the Good War: Democracy at Home During World War
II," in Kenneth Paul O'Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons, eds., The Home-Front
War: World War II and American Society (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1995), 159; Richard W. Steele, Free Speech in the Good War (New York: St.
Martin's Book, 1999), 1, 115-233; Richard W. Steele, "News of the 'Good
War': World War II News Management," Journalism Quarterly 62 (Winter 1985):
707-716, 783; Patrick S. Washburn, A Question of Sedition: The Federal
Government's Investigation of the Black Press During World War II (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
For the federal government's treatment of African American publications,
see also Fee Finkle, Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II
(Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1975); Patrick S. Washburn,
"FDR Versus His Own Attorney General: The Struggle over Sedition, 1941-42,"
Journalism Quarterly 62 (Winter 1985): 717-724; Patrick S. Washburn, "J.
Edgar Hoover and the Black Press in World War II," Journalism History 13
(Spring 1986): 26-33.
 . Takeya Mizuno, "Self-Censorship by Coercion: The Federal Government
and the California Japanese-Language Newspapers From Pearl Harbor to
Internment," American Journalism 17 (Summer 2000): 31-57.
 . Executive Order, 24 October 1941, Box 52, File Office of Facts and
Figures, Policies and Procedures, Archibald MacLeish Papers, Library of
Congress. Hereafter, the Library of Congress is cited as "LC."
 . OFF, "Description of the Organizational Breakdown and Function of
the Units Within the Office of Facts and Figures," March 11, 1942, p.2, RG
60, Entry Special War Policies Unit (SWPU), Box 60, File 148-209-1, NA;
OFF, "Relation of the Press With the Office of Facts and Figures," February
10, 1942, pp.4, 6, RG 208, Entry 3D, Box 7, File Press Committee, NA. For a
comprehensive description of the OFF's relationships with other agencies
and general English-language news media, see John Morton Blum, V Was For
Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 21-31.
 . Executive Order, 13 June 1942, Box 53, File Office of Facts and
Figures, Policies and Procedures, Archibald MacLeish Papers, LC.
 . For the genesis, organization, policy problems, and operations of
the OWI, see Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of
War Information 1942-1945 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978).
 . Archibald MacLeish, Director, OFF, October 27, 1941, RG 208, Entry
7, Box 12, File Organization Folder 2, NA.
 . Alan Cranston, Chief, Foreign Language Division, OFF, to MacLeish,
"Control of Foreign Language Press," April 3, 1942, p.2, RG 208, Entry 7,
Box 11, File Committee on War Information, NA; Press Release, Department of
Justice, April 28, 1942, RG 208, Entry 222, Box 1081, File Press Control, NA.
 . OFF, "Address by Mr. Alan Cranston, Chief of Foreign Language
Division, Office of Facts and Figures Before the New England Foreign
Language Newspapers Association," May 3, 1942, pp.4, 5, RG 208, Entry 6A,
Box 1, File Foreign Language Division, Memorandums 1942-1943, NA.
 . OWI, "A Foreign Language News Service for Federal Government
Releases," n.d., p.1, RG 208, Entry 1, Box 7, File Publications 3-1 Foreign
Press 1942-1944, NA.
 . Cranston to Raymond Rich, "Work of the Foreign Language Division,"
February 6, 1942, RG 208, Entry 222, Box 1079, File Foreign Language
 . Ibid; Cranston to MacLeish, "Control of Foreign Language Press," 2.
 . OFF and Department of Justice, "Control of Foreign Language Press,"
April 6, 1942, p.3, RG 208, Entry 7, Box 11, File Committee on War
 . Cranston to MacLeish, "Control of Foreign Language Press," 2.
 . OFF and Department of Justice, "Control of Foreign Language Press,"
3; OFF, "Information Project for Submission to the Committee on War
Information," n.d., pp.5-6, RG 60, Entry SWPU, Box 60, File 148-209-1, #2, NA.
 . OFF, "Address by Mr. Alan Cranston ...," 7.
 . Ibid., 9-10, 9, 10.
 . Ibid., 3; "Procedures of the Censorship Policy Board: Sub-Committee
Meeting," April 16, 1942, Box 52, File Office of Facts and Figures, Minutes
of Meetings, Archibald MacLeish Papers, LC.
 . Cranston to Rich, "Work of the Foreign Language Division"; OFF,
"Address by Mr. Alan Cranston ...," 2-3.
 . OFF, "CWI Agenda #2 [Meeting of January 19, 1942]: OFF Activities
Regarding Japanese," n.d., RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 11, File Minutes,
Committee on War Information, December 1941 - May 1942, NA. See also
Cranston to Abe Feller, "OFF and the Japanese," January 22, 1942, RG 208,
Entry 222, Box 1080, File Memos, NA.
 . Cranston to Ulric Bell, Assistant Director, OFF, "Accomplishments of
the Foreign Language Division to February 15, 1942," February 26, 1942, RG
208, NA. I wish to thank Greg Robinson for alerting me to this and other
important documents in this record group.
 . Ward P. Allen, Special Defense Unit, Department of Justice, "Note Re
Foreign Language Press and Its Control," April 3, 1942, RG 60, Entry SWPU,
Box 75, File 148-303-1, Section 2#1, NA.
 . OFF, "Bureau of Liaison: Cumulative Report, To March 1, 1942," n.d.,
RG 208, Entry 7, Box 20, File Monthly Reports, NA.
 . Joe Inoue, Managing Editor, and Togo Tanaka, Editor, Rafu Shimpo, "A
Report on the Japanese Language Daily Newspapers," March 2, 1942, p.3, RG
338, Entry 2, Box 2, File 000.7, NA; cited in Special Defense Unit,
"Memorandum for Mr. Frank W. Crocker, Assistant Chief, Special Defense
Unit: Japanese Press in the United States," April 30, 1942, p.2, RG 28,
Entry 41, Box 13, File E-86, Japanese Press Status in U.S., NA.
 . OFF, "Address by Mr. Alan Cranston ...," 1.
 . Bradford Smith, Assistant Chief, Foreign Language Division, OFF, to
John Provinse, WRA, June 4, 1942, RG 208, NA.
 . Cranston to MacLeish, "Control of Foreign Language Press," 1;
Cranston, "Americanism and the Evacuees: Aims and Methods," n.d., p.2, RG
208, NA; William E. Daugherty to Frank W. Crocker, Assistant Chief, Special
Defense Unit, Department of Justice, "'Japanese Problem' in the United
States," February 24, 1942, RG 60, Entry SWPU, Box 39, File 148-202-1,
Section 10#2, NA.
 . Community Analysis Section, Heart Mountain Relocation Center, WRA,
"Ryoichi Fujii's Program to Reorient Issei Thinking, with Added Comments on
the War as the Issei Now View It," November 14, 1945, pp.4, 3, Reel 18,
Community Analysis Reports and Community Analysis Trend Reports of the War
Relocation Authority 1942-1946, NA; Karl G. Yoneda, San Francisco
Correspondent, Doho, to Francis Biddle, Attorney General, January 3, 1942,
RG 60, Class 146-10, Box 1, File 146-10, Section 4, NA.
 . OFF, "CWI Agenda #2"; MacLeish to Isamu Noguchi, February 6, 1942,
RG 208, Entry 3A, Box 1, File "N" 1942, NA.
 . Cranston, "Americanism and the Evacuees."
 . "Memorandum," n.d., attached to the letter from Cranston to Randall
Gould, Starr, Park and Freeman, Inc., March 20, 1942, RG 208, Entry 3A, Box
1, File "G" 1942, NA.
 . Cornelius DuBois, Executive Assistant, OFF, to R. Keith Kane,
Assistant Director, Bureau of Intelligence, OFF, March 20, 1942, RG 208,
Entry 3D, Box 12, File War Relocation Project (Japanese Evacuation) 1942, NA.
 . Smith to Edwin Bates, Chief, Information Service, WRA, April 29,
1942, RG 208, Entry 3A, Box 1, File "G" 1942, NA.
 . Smith to John Baker, WRA, August 7, 1942, RG 208, NA.
 . Cranston to James Allen, "Importance of the Foreign Language
Division," April 28, 1942, RG 208, Entry 222, Box 1079, File Foreign
Language Division, NA.
 . Cranston to MacLeish, "Control of Foreign Language Press," 2; OFF
and Department of Justice, "Control of Foreign Language Press," 1.
 . OFF, "Address by Mr. Alan Cranston ...," 3.
 . Cranston to MacLeish, "Control of Foreign Language Press," 2-3; OWI,
"A Foreign Language News Service for Federal Government Releases," 7. About
the failure of Brazil's policy to ban foreign language journalism, see also
Jerzy Zubrzycki, "The Role of the Foreign-Language Press in Migrant
Integration," reprinted in Jean Folkerts, ed., Media Voices: An Historical
Perspective (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 274-282.
 . Takeya Mizuno, "The Creation of the 'Free' Press in Japanese
American Camps: The War Relocation Authority's Planning and Making of the
Camp Newspaper Policy," Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 78
(Autumn 2001): 503-518. For the "good war" analogy, see Studs Terkel, "The
Good War": An Oral History of World War II (New York: The New Press, 1984).