Following the Party line:
Xinhua News Agency's coverage of the Falun Gong movement


By
Chiung Hwang Chen
Assistant Professor
International Cultural Studies
Brigham Young University-Hawaii
55-220 Kulanui St. Box 1940
Laie, HI 96762
Email:[log in to unmask]
Phone: (808) 293-3696
Fax: (808) 293-3698


Submitted to
Religion and Media Interest Group
AEJMC 2003 Conference
April 1, 2003



Following the party line:
Xinhua News Agency's coverage of the Falun Gong movement
Falun Gong caught the eyes of the Chinese leadership when over 10,000 of
its practitioners gathered at the Zhongnanhai government compound in
Beijing on April 25, 1999; it then attracted the attention of the world
when the Communist Party started cracking down the group three months
later. Through its propaganda organ, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), the
Chinese government announced that the Falun Gong movement is "the most
serious political incident" since the student uprising at Tianamen Square
on June 4, 1989. Scholars have attempted to contextualize the cultural,
political, and economic climate in contemporary China that allowed this
group to rise in a relatively short period of time and to assess the causes
of the Chinese Communist Party's nationwide campaign to oppress the group.
Many cite media coverage to understand the issue; some uncritically use
government-owned media for sources of information. None, however, has
analyzed media in any systematic way to provide an account of how the
campaign was covered. This study examines the relationship between
government and news media in China through analyzing the media's coverage
of the government's crackdown against Falun Gong.  I argue that although
the economic reforms since the 1980s might have financially disrupted the
news media's reliance on the government, the press, especially
government-owned news organizations, still functions as propaganda agents
for the Chinese Communist Party as journalists uncritically follow the
party line in reporting on the Falun Gong movement.

Religious culture in contemporary China
        Mao Zedong established an atheist Communist state in 1949 after defeating
Chiang Kai Shek's Republic of China during the Chinese civil war. To build
a new China, Mao unleashed the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to break the
"Four Olds." Religion was at this time catastrophically affected; all
churches, mosques, and temples were desecrated or closed.
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism became the only ideology/religion allowed in China.
After Mao died in 1976, his successor Deng Xiaoping took a "major U-turn,"
as Lambert (2001) puts it, shifting the state emphasis from ideological
struggle to economic reform. Deng opened the door to the Western world in
1979 and allowed a rebirth of religion in China. The Constitution of 1982
recognized Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism as
lawful religions in China.
        The new constitution seemingly asserts people's rights to religious
freedom; it however defines such rights in a very narrow scope. First, by
naming specific denominations, the constitution excludes all other forms of
belief systems and categorizes them as "cults." Second, even with the "Five
Great Religions," the attitude of the state is simply tolerant; it by no
means encourages the growth of any religious groups. Believers are allowed
to assembly, but prohibited from proselytizing. Third, practice of the
religion is strictly subordinate to the party line. Official regulations
require religious bodies to register with the government and only those
that accept state ideology, or "patriotic" religious groups, are permitted
to register; others are deemed illegal. Christian and Catholic dominations
are required to break their ties with overseas churches and headquarters
and accept orders from the state (Lambert 2001; Leung 2001). Many groups
have refused such institutional and ideological control and simply have
gone underground.
The rise of Falun Gong
        Falun Gong is a relatively new movement in the social landscape of China.
Li Hongzhi, a forty-year-old clerk from Jilin Province in Northeast China,
combined traditional Chinese thought and physical exercises into Falun Gong
in 1992. The literal translation of the term "Falun Gong"[1] is "Law Wheel
Practice/Exercise." Law refers to Buddhist doctrine or truth, or Dharma.
"The Wheel of Law" can be translated as "Wheel of the Dharma," meaning
teaching Buddhism. In Chuen Falun (Turning the Wheel of Law), the group's
most important publication, Li (1997) explains that Falun Gong is a
combination of Buddhist and Taoist philosophies and meditative traditions,
together with Chinese breathing exercises (qigong) and martial arts. Li
makes the Buddhist ideals of "truthfulness, benevolence and forbearance"
the central doctrine of the movement. To Ying (2001), Falun Gong
encompasses every feature of religion, such as a charismatic leader,
well-installed doctrines, organizational structure and rituals (see also
Leung 2002). Li, however, does not see or try to make Falun Gong into a
religion because in an atheist state, religion is viewed as the synonym of
superstition. Until 1994 Li registered the group under Qigong Research
Association. Li left China in 1995 and obtained a U.S. green card in 1996,
but continued to monitor the growth of the movement in China. At the time
of the government's crackdown on the group in 1999, Falun Gong claimed 100
million followers[2], with 70 million in China and 30 million overseas.
        The political, economic, and social environment in China provided
opportunity for Falun Gong to grow in such short period of time.
Politically, contemporary China faces an ideological crisis as many people
no longer believe in Marxism and Maoism and need something to fill the
void. Although the Communist Party hoped that religion would eventually die
out in China when the older generation passed away, it did not happen. In
fact, in the struggle of "Marxist atheism vs. vulgar theism," as Xiao
(2001, p. 124) puts it, God has overcome man. All religious groups, legal
or illegal, are experiencing revitalization, attracting tremendous amounts
of conversion after 50 years of Communist rule. According to the 1997 White
Paper on the Freedom of Religious Belief in China, the five legal religious
denominations together claim over 100 million believers[3] (Wong 1999).
Even the Chinese government has declared the decade of 1990s a "golden
period" for religious expansion in China (quoted in Wong 1999, p. 12). Or
as Lowe (2001) describes it, the success of Falun Gong demonstrates the
spiritual awakening of Chinese people. Xiao points out that such
dissatisfaction with ruling party ideology results from economic reform
during the leadership of both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Mass layoffs
from state-owned enterprises, official corruption, and the gap between rich
and poor all drive people toward religion for comfort. Leung (2002) asserts
that it is hard, as a result, for the Communist Party to retain credibility
as a party of the proletarians, when it suddenly becomes one for bourgeois
interests.
Some argue that the growth of Falun Gong derives from the popularity of
qigong in a time of medical reform, which shifted the heavy burden of
medical expense from the state to citizens. The public, especially the
elderly, therefore turned to traditional physical exercises to avoid costly
medical care (Lowe 2001; Leung 2002). Ying (2001) takes a more subtle
approach, looking at the issue from a sociological perspective. He utilizes
Emile Durkheim's notion of anomie to explain the new religious movements in
China, claiming that when a society is experiencing dramatic change, such
as the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 70s and the economic reform
after the 80s, social ills result and moral standards suffer. Falun Gong
and other religious groups provide guidelines in a time of social crisis.
Leung (2002) agrees with this view, asserting that Falun Gong fulfills
human needs in a time of turmoil.
The growth of the group poses a potential threat to the Beijing regime in
both numerical and ideological terms. The non-religious claim makes Falun
Gong attractive not only to ordinary citizens, but also to the 30 million
Communist Party members[4] who utlized Falun Gong but are not supposed to
affiliate with any religious belief. If the account of Falun Gong
membership is close to accurate, the organization has exceeded the 55 to 60
million Party members in China. It is reported that many high-ranking Party
officials have lobbied for the state to legitimize Falun Gong and the
People's Liberation Navy was found to be the publisher of Li's book. Ching
(2001) argues that in the mind of the government, Falun Gong was "competing
for popularity with the party" and that is "an unpardonable crime" (p. 13).
Ideologically, as Xiao (2001) asserts, Falun Gong's unorthodox message
about the supremacy of divine power over human agency poses a political
challenge to atheist Marxism/Maoism. In an age of declining faith toward
the political system, even Communists pay more loyalty to Falun Gong than
to the Party (Ying 2001). In this sense, the "Falun Gong triggers a
struggle between dialectic idealism plus materialism and religious
idealism" (Leung 2001, p. 774; see also Perry 2001). Historian David Ownby
thus claims that the reason Falun Gong is threatening to the Chinese
government is that the movement "denies [the Communist Party] the sole
right to define the meaning of Chineseness" (quoted in Sanghvi 2001, p. 8).
Seeing the potential replacement of the old ideology, orthodox Communist
leaders condemn the movement as "more … treason than heresy" (Lowe 2001, p.
214; see also Leung 2001; Perry 2001).
Some argue that is it not the number of Falun Gong members, but the
efficiency of the organization that frightens the regime. The peaceful
Zhongnanhai sit-in demonstrated the group's ability to effectively mobilize
people from all layers in society and stage large-scale concerted actions
in a short period of time (Kindopp 2002; Perry 2001; Tong 2002; Xiao 2001).
Between April 25 and July 22 in 1999, the organization mounted 307 protest
demonstrations against various government branches and media organizations.
This scheme ironically mimics Mao Zedong's revolutionary style during the
Communist Party's infancy against the Nationalists and also during the
Cultural Revolution (Sanghvi 2001; Perry 2001). However, such
mass-mobilizing ability has been lost in the contemporary Communist Party.
The Falun Gong protest shames the Chinese leaders that the organization is,
as Xiao sees it, "more efficient, more combative, and more appealing" to
the Chinese people than the CCP, and this "was enough [for the government]
to condemn the sect" (2001, p. 128).
Perry (2001) adds historical perspective to explain the reaction of the
Chinese government toward seemingly harmless Falun Gong appeals, claiming
that the timing of the protest is not ideal to the Communist government.
She points out the historical significance of the year 1999: It was the
eightieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the fiftieth
anniversary of the birth of People's Republic in 1949, the fortieth
anniversary of the Tibetan Revolt of 1959, the thirtieth anniversary of the
ending of the mass mobilization stage of the Cultural Revolution in 1969,
the twentieth anniversary of the Democracy Wall movement of 1979, the tenth
anniversary of the Tiananmen uprising of 1989, and the last year of the old
millennium. The massive protest by Falun Gong thus hit a raw nerve of the
Communist Party while the government was preparing for the celebration of
the nation's fiftieth birthday on October 1.
Perry (2001) also points to China's rich traditions of resistance and
revolution. She argues that religious groups often established relations
with the people's rebellions against (and in some cases actually
overthrowing) the existing government, and the Confucian/Mencian concept of
a Tianming, or "Mandate of Heaven," was often installed in such uprisings.
Two Taoist groups, Yellow Turbans and the Five Pecks of Rice, rose in
revolt against the declining Han Dynasty within five years in the late
second century; the later group managed to establish a theocratic state in
the Southwest of China. Zu Yuangzhang, a Buddhist monk, and his followers
brought down the Tang Empire and built the Sung Dynasty. Taiping rebels, a
pseudo-Christian group, almost overthrew the Manchu government during the
mid-nineteenth century. White Lotus, a Tao associated society, also posed
as a serious threat to the Qing regime. In 1911, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, a devoted
Christian who claimed "Three Principles of the People," finally brought
down the Qing Dynasty. Mao used the same strategy,  provoking a "People's
War" to expel Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist army from China (see Ching
2001; Lambert 2001; Lowe 2001; Ownby 2001; Perry 2001; Xiao 2001). Perry
argues that the Chinese government is very much aware of this history and
deeply fears Falun Gong's ability to engage "diverse membership [which]
exhibits remarkable commitment and enthusiasm, has the capacity to mobilize
on a nationwide scale, and maintains secure international communication,"
especially in a time when the Communist leaders "find themselves
ideologically adrift and presiding over an increasingly moribund party
apparatus" (2001, p. 171). To the Beijing leadership, an effective
crackdown on Falun Gong thus is urgently necessary to prevent the
reoccurrence of history and prove that the "Mandate of Heaven" is still on
its side.
Has marketization changed the Party journalism?
In examining the contemporary press system in China, many scholars point
out that since the 1980s, media organizations in China have reflected the
ideological shifts implicit in economic reform and tried to define a "new"
role for themselves in society. Chang et al. (1993) question the
traditional way of conceiving the press system in Communist China as a
propaganda machine for the government. Chang et al. (1994) then call for an
understanding of Chinese journalism as "a major stock of social knowledge,"
which reflects how the general public thinks about social issues, instead
of being seen as a mouthpiece for the government (p. 52). Zhao Bin (1999)
views the Chinese press as living a "double life," being both a
"mouthpiece" and "money-spinner" at the same time. In analyzing the
commercialization of the Party-owned Chinese Central Television (CCTV), he
concludes that Chinese news media's "political role as the Party's
mouthpiece has been increasingly eroded by ever more powerful pressures for
commercial success" (p. 292; see also Su 1994). Yuezhi Zhao (1994),
however, takes a more critical view of this Party-line vs. bottom-line
dichotomy. While recognizing such tension, he nevertheless points out that
although Chinese media organizations have become more independent in
financial aspects, they are still very much circumscribed by Communist
ideology and thus practice what he terms "Party journalism." In examining
the content of Beijing Youth News, one of the fastest growing newspapers in
China, Zhao identifies the formula for the paper's success economically and
ideologically. He points out that the paper, on one hand, emphasizes
entertainment and sensationalism, which attracts the public's attention and
advertising revenue.  On the other hand, it downplays narrow political news
and upbeat "positive propaganda." Zhao quotes Chen Ji, former
editor-in-chief of the newspaper, to show this point.
Strengthening positive propaganda at the present time is not only not out
of date, but precisely very timely. Otherwise, our dominant ideology will
collapse. No rulers of a society will support those who destroy its
dominant ideology. This is the class nature of the dominant ideology. In
China, we also will not allow the destruction of the dominant ideology,
especially not by the media themselves" (quoted in Zhao 1994, p. 151).
Following this line of thought, Lee (2000) argues that although the power
of market has influenced the nature of "command journalism . . . the
existence of a market economy does not guarantee press freedom" (p. 561).
He points out that "politically safe but socially useful news genres" have
been packaged as commodities for profit.  He (2000a) calls such a
contradictory market-Party-oriented media system a "socialist face" with a
"capitalist body" or simply "Party Publicity Inc." Investigative journalism
in China serves both the regime and mammon. Zhou (2000) suggests that after
commercialization, investigative reporters, under pressure to sell, focused
on exposing official corruption and often presented stories in tabloid
style. Such reports, in his view, actually strengthen the Party's hegemony
because they help to correct capitalist ills, which potentially threaten
Communist ideology. He, referring to what Chan (1993) calls
"commercialization without independence," thus argues that the
commercialization has never been intended and is also not very likely to
replace Party journalism.
Yu (1996), although approaching the issue from a different angle, makes the
same argument. In analyzing the content of news information sent by China's
CCTV to CNN World Report before and after the 1989 Tianamen Square
massacre, she finds that (1) political news increased dramatically after
the student movement, (2) much of these news items dealt with meetings of
Chinese and foreign high-ranking political leaders, and (3) much less
negative and more positive news about Chinese government was sent during
this period. Yu claims that in order to show a stable and strong China,
news media, and in this case reporters and editors at CCTV, serve as a
mouthpiece of the Chinese government.
He (2002b) provides an insightful view on why Chinese journalists,
confronting Western standards of professionalism, are willing to be lapdogs
for the state. From his interviews with Chinese journalists, He finds that
while some strive to live up to Communist ideology, most Chinese
journalists feel strong "dissonance," a social psychological term
describing the gap between what one really believes and what he/she is
compelled to do. According to He, some journalists, for career advancement
and preserving the benefits of being reporters [5], see news reporting as a
routine task and thus uncritically carry out their work according to
conventional discourse defined by the Communist Party. Some keep their
opinions secret or only share with those who they trust; others express
their personal views only in private settings.
This study examines the relationship between the news media and government
in China through the lens of the press's coverage of the government's
crackdown on Falun Gong. This paper argues that although Chinese media's
financial wellbeing may have been blessed by economic reform since late
1980s, they still uphold the government ideology and reflect a lapdog
theory of press systems, especially when the issues concern what the
government defines as "political struggle."
Methodology
I chose Xinhua News Agency as the primary source for this analysis because
of its importance in providing wire services to media organizations in both
China and the world. It is the only news agency in China and is also a
government-owned entity. In fact, all the more important, more established,
and widely circulated media remain under the direct control of the
government. To provide a better understanding of the coverage from the
Zhongnanhai protest in Beijing to the government's decision to crack down
on Falun Gong, this study explores news from April 1 to December 31, 1999.
The reason to start a few weeks before the protest was to see whether Falun
Gong was newsworthy then. I used the Lexis/Nexis database to locate stories
about Falun Gong during this time period and obtained a total of 388 news
items. I excluded news highlights and photo lists because these items do
not make the discussion of Falun Gong the central point of the news item. I
also excluded repeated stories. As a result, a total of 309 news items are
incorporated in the study.
I utilize two research methods in this study. I use content analysis to
show an overall pattern of the coverage and employ textual analysis to
provide more fine-grained insight on how journalists tell the story of
Falun Gong and the government crackdown. The combination of the two methods
make possible a better understand of the role of the government-owned news
media in the CCP's campaign against the group.
Whose story is told?
        John Hersey once said that "there is no such thing as objective reportage"
(quoted in Frus, 1994, p.114). Other scholars also claim that journalistic
practices perpetuate dominant power relations and ideologies (Herman &
Chomsky 1988; van Dijk 1998; 1991; Fowler 1991; Frus 1994). This is certain
true in the case of Xinhua's coverage of the Falun Gong movement. Table One
provides a timeline of the important events during the period of study.
Table One
Important dates in the Chinese government's crackdown of Falun Gong in 1999
April 25        10,000 Falun Gong practitioners sit in at the Zhongnanhai
government compound in Beijing.
July 22 The Chinese government officially bans Falun Gong
July 29 The Chinese government issues a nationwide wanted circular to
arrest Li Hongzhi, the leader of Falun Gong
Aug. 18 The Chinese government defines "cult"
Sept. 9 The U.S. State Department denounces China's ban on Falun Gong
Oct. 30 New law pass to ban all cults
Dec. 7  U.S. president Bill Clinton criticizes China's violation of human
rights in oppressing Falun Gong
Dec. 26 Four Falun Gong leaders sentenced

        Figure One
Even though the mass protest occurred in late April, the Chinese government
did not take action for two months. Figure One indicates that, parallel to
the government's action, Xinhua produced only two stories between the
protest and the ban. Yet as soon as the CCP proclaimed Falun Gong illegal
on July 22, the news agency exploded with news coverage about the group and
the ban, producing 100 news items during the last nine days of July and 91
articles the next month. The coverage of the crackdown was disrupted half a
month before and after the fiftieth anniversary of the People's Republic of
China on October 1. After that, the amount of the coverage remained
significant--although not as dramatic as at the beginning of the
campaign--until the end the year.

    Figure Two
In terms of whose voice is heard, Figure Two shows that government
officials and experts[6] are the two major news sources, followed by the
media[7] and former Falun Gong practitioners. Media self-reference includes
not only reference to other news organizations' publications, but also
Xinhua's own articles in support of government action. Editorials in the
government-owned People's Daily are the most cited news source, followed by
Xinhua's own
commentaries. Among sources used, none expressed any disagreements with the
government. As Frus (1994, p. 114) point out, "all decisions [relating to
how to tell a story] are political ones." Omissions are as important as
inclusions for a story in supporting and creating a certain reality and
viewpoint. As Figure Two indicates, the fact that there are no current
Falun Gong practitioners quoted or any opposing comments presented shows a
clear picture of the relationship between Xinhua and the Chinese
government. The agency functions as a governmental mouthpiece instead of
responding to [Western] journalistic professional standards of objectivity,
fairness, and balance.
The calm before the storm
Xinhua's coverage of Falun Gong changed dramatically before and after the
government's decision to ban the group. As mentioned earlier, over 10,000
Falun Gong practitioners gathered in front of the Zongnanhai central
government compound in Beijing on April 25, 1999. For some reason, the
story was not run until April 27. Xinhua provides some background on an
earlier Falun Gong protest in Tianjin City, in which practitioners
protested a magazine article that accused Falun Gong of being harmful,
especially to young people. The article reported that Falun Gong
practitioners in Tianjin and other areas, "upon hearing some rumors," came
to gather around the Zongnanhai compound. Xinhua then described the
reaction of Chinese authorities in dealing with the protest:
[They] listened to [the protesters] patiently, and did some persuasion . .
. [and] issued an announcement, calling on the practitioners not to believe
in rumors, but to observe related regulations and jointly maintain the
capital's public order. The gathering disappeared after persuasion work on
the evening [of] the same day ("Chinese official" April 27).
Citing an unidentified official, Xinhua reported that the government "[has]
never prohibited any health fitness activities" and that "different views
and opinions are allowable, and can also be reported through normal
channels according to law." Such mass protest, the article continued, "is
completely wrong" and will "jeopardize social stability" and the "hard-won"
"political, economic and social situation" ("Chinese official" April 27).
The article presents only the official's view of the story, without giving
Falun Gong practitioners, onlookers, or even frontline law enforcement
personnel any chance to voice their opinions. Other than that, however, the
article is rather a straightforward description of how the government
handled the protest. Although it transmits the view that mass protest is
not a preferred way to express different viewpoints, the article (as well
as the government) does not deem Falun Gong illegal or harmful. Rather, it
is simply a type of health fitness activity.
Xinhua did not run another story on Falun Gong until June 14. This might
indicate that neither the government nor the news agency considered the
April 25 protest a big deal. The purpose of the second article is to
clarify rumors that the Chinese government is about to crack down on Falun
Gong and that Communist Party members who practice Falun Gong will be
expelled from their positions. The article quotes an unnamed CCP official.
"The rumors are completely baseless and were made to confuse people," said
the official. "The purpose for spreading the rumors was to incite large
gatherings, create chaos and disrupt social stability." He said most Falun
Gong practitioners cited their disbelief in and refrained from spreading
the rumors . . .
He reaffirmed that governments at all levels have never prohibited physical
fitness activities. The Chinese people are totally free in selecting any
form of exercises, adding that different opinions are normal in this
respect ("Official on" June 14).
The article ends by upholding the government's ideals by calling for social
stability and avoiding mass protest. It again upholds the perspective that
Falun Gong is a form of physical exercise and does not mention the illegal
status of Falun Gong in any way.
News coverage changed significantly after the Chinese government announced
its ban on Falun Gong on July 22. Xinhua suddenly paid an extraordinary
attention to the event, producing, for example, 15 news items on the same
day, 20 the next day, 11 on the third day, and at least one or two news
items almost every day for the following months. The tone of the articles
also noticeably changed from relatively neutral to completely negative.
Corresponding to and helping to legitimize the government's ban, Xinhua
repeatedly employs certain narrative strategies to persuade readers that
Falun Gong should indeed be subject to outlaw. The following analysis
discusses these modes of persuasion.
A political struggle between materialism and idealism
        As mentioned earlier, the ideological crisis subsequent to economic reform
creates a vacuum in China's belief system. The sudden rise of Falun Gong,
in the eyes of Chinese leaders, poses a threat to the regime; it thus makes
ideological combat one of the central issues in curbing the Falun Gong
movement. The coverage in Xinhua reflects this strategy, calling the
campaign against Falun Gong "a serious political struggle" that the CCP has
to win. Xinhua cited government officials in article after article to posit
a binary opposition between materialism and idealism, Marxism/Maoism and
Falun Gong, atheism and theism, the orthodoxy and heresy, or as we might
say, the One and the Other. One article, for example, cited an official
circular:
The circular says that Marxist dialectic materialism and historical
materialism represent the world outlook and methodology of the proletariat,
and that the scientific theories of Marxism established on the basis of
this worldview should serve as the spiritual pillar of communists. Falun
Dafa as created by Li Hongzhi preaches idealism and theism and denies all
scientific truth, and thus is absolutely contradictory to the fundamental
theories and principles of Marxism ("Urgent eds" July 22; see also
"People's Daily" July 22; "Non-Communist parties" July 23; "Communist
youth" July 23; "Major mass" July 24; "Chinese military" July 23; "People's
Daily" July 25).
Therefore, the articles continued, Chinese people and especially Communist
Party members, should be educated "in Marxist materialism and atheism [to
enhance] their political sensitivity and their political capabilities to
differentiate right from wrong in order to consolidate a correct world
outlook and concept of values, and [reinforce] their belief in Communism to
strengthen the cohesiveness and combat strength of Party organizations"
("Urgent eds" July 22; see also "Communist youth" July 23; "PLA, armed"
July 24). Xinhua interpreted this war as one in which "the two sides are
fighting for the occupation of the ideological front and for public
support" ("Official, employees" July 23); it quoted an official from the
qigong society saying that the government must win "a victory of Marxism
over pseudoscience and theism, and a victory of materialism over
metaphysics" ("Chinese people" July 23).
        Some articles spell out the CCP's fear toward a heretical Falun Gong,
pointing out that Li's "doomsday" theory is not only "a set of ridiculous
ideas," but evidence of treason. Citing an article by the Policy, Law and
Regulation Department, Xinhua reported that Li claims that "doomsday is
coming, that human beings will be extinct soon, that modern science can do
nothing to prevent the catastrophe, that only Falun Gong can save mankind,
and that Li Hongzhi is the sole 'savior'" ("Analysis of" July 23; see also
"Urgent eds" July 22; "China bans" July 23). It is exactly such claims of
supernatural power that irritates and threatens the Communist Party
because, as the article asserted, it seizes power of the established and
"overruns the government and the law," and suggests that "[Li] should be
the rightful ruler" ("Analysis of" July 23). In other words, according to
the article, "Li's doomsday idea denies the truth of the existing world and
it has created strong anti-government and anti-social sentiments. Its true
purpose is to win public support for his wicked political ambitions
("Analysis of" July 23; see also "People's Daily" July 22). Another article
expressed this fear more bluntly by citing a People's Daily commentary:
Falun Gong has propagated fallacious ideas such as a "doomsday theory" and
a "way to heaven" which go against the party's doctrines and discipline. If
Li Hongzhi's heretical theories spread, the party's foundation will be
shaken, and the great cause will be undermined ("People's Daily" July 25).
For the survival of the party, one government official argued, party
members must "hold high the great banner of Marxism, Mao Zedong thought and
Deng Xiaoping theory" and "guard against the erosion of theism" ("Party
members" July 26; see also "Chinese scientists" July 26; "People's Daily"
August 8). A People's Daily editorial echoed this view, calling party
members to be educated "in Marxist materialism and atheism extensively . .
. to infuse them with Communist ideals and a firm belief in the cause of
building socialism with Chinese characteristics" ("People's Daily" July 22)
because, as the People's Liberation Army put it, "only Marxism can save
China and only the Chinese Communist Party can lead us to accomplish the
great cause of reinvigorating the Chinese nation" ("PLA" July 24).
        This reasoning, however, did not last long. As Perry (2001) points out,
the Chinese government might have realized that by employing such rhetoric,
the CCP actually exaggerated the importance of Falun Gong and put the group
on the equal footing with the Party itself. As a result, the narratives of
the ban as a crusade for party survival generally disappeared by the end of
July. Instead, a war between "science" and "feudal superstition" became the
thread of the campaign. Many articles thus attempted to expose the group's
unscientific and superstitious nature. Xinhua's reports created a logic:
Marxism = materialism = atheism = science; on the other hand, Falun Gong =
idealism = theism = superstition. Xinhua utilized numerous scientists,
astronomers, and even athletes to show the folly of Falun Gong's worldview.
One article, for example, quoted an astronomer who said that "an explosion
of earth is sheer nonsense, for the earth has no nuclear burning process"
("Noted scientists" July 24). Another article, citing a new political
magazine Qiushi (Truth Seeking), pointed out that Li "can't hide his nature
of ignorance and superstition, despite being spread under the guise of
supreme science." The article claimed that even though Li piled up terms of
astronomy in his speeches, "actually he knows nothing about astronomy;" he
used the term "light year" "as a time measurement unit, confused unclear
fusion with nuclear fission, and blindly assumed that the surface
temperature on Mars (whose Chinese name literally means "planet of fire")
is much higher than that on the earth" ("Falun Gong" July 28).
Following this line of thought, one article asserted that "Li usually
belittles great scientists like Charles Darwin and Issac Newton, although
he himself is just a junior middle school graduate who doesn't know the
difference between an organism and minerals" ("Analysis of" July 22).
Others argued that Falun Gong's doomsday predictions are merely an
imitation of "some Western cults" ("Chinese physicist" July 26). Similarly,
the People's Daily argued that leaders of such "cultist organizations . . .
often disguise themselves as 'prophets' or even 'gods' to deceive the
public," and Li is "just one such person" ("People's Daily" July 27a).
Xinhua thus advised people to use science as a "mirror" to "expose any
monster," or more precisely, "the fallacies of Falun Gong" ("Chinese
scientist" July 26). Many articles echoed this view, calling for more
science education to "wipe out feudal superstition and safeguard the
dignity of science" ("Cross-straits" July 23; also see, for example, "China
intensifies" July 28; "Using scientific" July 31; "PLA technical" August 9).
One article, however, revealed perhaps the real worry of government
authorities, claiming that Li's doomsday theory and positioning himself as
the savior of the world
fundamentally deny the progressive tendency of human history, deny the
tremendous accomplishments China has attained in the two decades of reform
and opening-up, and deny the significant changes and progress of the
Chinese people's ideological and mental outlook ("People's Daily" July 27b).
Therefore, scientific research is given a political mission as "the
ideological weapon" not only "to strip the mask from all pseudo-sciences
and any other idealistic trickery" ("Non-communist parties" July 23; see
also "People's Daily" July 27b), but also to promote "socialist
modernization construction," according to the Minister of Science and
Technology ("Noted scientists" July 24). As the People's Daily argued, such
a "powerful ideological weapon" in fact resides in "dialectic and
historical materialism" which "will help us triumph over all mistakes and
superstitious ideas" ("People's Daily" July 27b). In this sense, what China
really needs is not science per se, but a representation of science, or
more precisely, Marxism alone.


Li as malicious fallacy
        To legitimize the ban, the CCP employed some schemes to destroy the
credibility of Falun Gong's leader Li Hongzhi. One of these schemes, as
reflected in Xinhua's coverage, is to demystify Li by showing readers that
he is merely a common person who possesses no supernatural power. On the
first day of the ban, one article provided a time line of Li's life: he was
born in 1952, went to school between 1960 and 1969, worked on a Liberation
Army stud farm and played trumpet in a band. He was discharged from
military service in 1982 and found a job in a cereals and oil company. He
quit his job and began practicing qigong in 1991; one year later, he
started teaching Falun Gong ("Life and" July 22). Without proper
attribution, one article suggested that "Li's family members, relatives,
neighbors, former schoolmates, teachers, leaders, and fellow servicemen say
that they believe Li is just an ordinary person and that his so-called
qigong learning and miraculous abilities were 'nonsense' or 'impossible' or
something they'd never seen." The article pointed out that Li's "only
talent in childhood, many said, was the ability to play the trumpet"
("Urgent Life" July 22). Another article quoted a midwife who helped with a
complicated delivery of Li, saying that "without my help, Li and his mother
would have been in danger 47 years ago ("Li Longzhi's" July 28). Because Li
is only a common man, Xinhua reasoned that his Falun Gong is nothing
extraordinary, but merely a combination of two qigong forms and some Thai
dance movements ("Urgent eds" July 22; "Urgent life" July 22).
Many news stories "exposed" Li's "dark secrets," arguing that the Falun
Gong leader is "a braggart, a liar and a swindler" ("Person in" July 30).
One article, for example, asserted that "Li cast himself up as the 'highest
Buddha' who has transcended all secular desires. But, in real life he
displays an enormous greed" ("Urgent life" July 22). Xinhua argued that Li
took advantage of those who desire to rid themselves of illness and achieve
physical fitness. It pointed out that Li used Falun Gong to make "a
breath-taking sum" of money "on which he has not paid taxes," and that
"investigators have found Li has several luxury houses and limousines" ("Li
Hongzhi" August 12; "Urgent life" July 22; see also, for example, "True
face" July 22; "New evidence" August 5; "Li Hongzhi" August 6).  Some
stories put this into numbers, estimating how much money Li has earned from
Falun Gong books, CDs, video tapes, speeches, seminars, and even
photographs ("Urgent life" July 22; "Li Hongzhi" August 11). To prove Li's
deceptive scheme, some articles presented Li as ridiculous, self-serving
person. One, for example, poked fun at Li's exaggerations in claiming
himself as the reincarnation of various ancient figures such as Yue Fei, a
Song Dynasty hero, Li Shimin, a Tang Dynasty emperor, Bian Que and Li
Shizhen, both prestigious ancient Chinese doctors ("Chinese people" August
9). Others, however, took accusations of Li's hypocrisy seriously. One
story pointed to Li's medical invoices, asking why Li, as the Falun Gong
master who claims that the exercise can prevent and cure illness, still got
sick. It also suggested that while Li told practitioners not to take
medicine, he went to doctors for cures ("Falun Gong" July 27).
Some articles tried to use the master's tools to dismantle his own house,
arguing that Li's behaviors do not measure up his teaching of truthfulness,
benevolence, and tolerance. Quoting a physicist, who wrote the article that
led to a Falun Gong protest in Tainjin City, Xinhua reported that Li
fabricated his birthday "to coincide [with] the birthday of Sakyamuni, the
founder of Buddhism, fully demonstrat[ing] his untruthfulness." Li incited
Falun Gong practitioners, the article continued, "to attack the government
and media departments in no way can be called tolerant" ("Chinese
scientists" July 26; see also "Truth defender" July 24; "China's
theoretical" July 26; "Chinese magazine" July 30). On article added that
"16 cases examples [sic] given by the Xinhua News Agency provide a bloody
lessons about Li doing evil instead of spreading benevolence and of harming
people instead of saving them" ("People's Daily" July 28). It is not clear
what the "16 cases" referred to in this article; however, another article
reported that "according to incomplete statistics from 30 provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities, up to July 28, 743 persons have died
as a result of practicing Falun Gong[8] ("Public security" July 29).
As the Chinese government viewed the Zongnanhai protest "the most serious
political incident since the 1989 political turmoil" ("Li Hongzhi's" August
12), Li's involvement with the sit-in became a crucial element in deciding
his crime. Quoting a People's Daily commentary, Xinhua pronounced that "the
truth has come out," detailing Li's schedule between April 19 and 25 to
make the connection that he actually orchestrated the protest ("The truth"
August 12; see also "Urgent life" July 22; "True face" July 22;
"Behind-scene" August 12). Another story cited a former Falun Gong leader
to verify Li's direct involvement in the demonstration. The article
concluded that "Li's return to Beijing was well planned . . . he not only
aimed at Tianjin [referring to a previous protest], but at Beijing as well.
What he deliberately planned was to cause social unrest on a larger scale"
("Li Hongzhi's" August 12; see also "Falun Gong" August 8; "Li Hongzhi's"
August 12; "Falun Gong" August 15). A People's Daily's commentary thus
argued that the incident provides a "glimpse of the true face of Li and the
sect's ulterior political motives" ("The truth" August 12). Truth Seeking
magazine added that Li "created a mystical and horrible atmosphere in an
attempt to erode the minds of his followers, disturb public order, and
sabotage social stability" ("Falun Gong" July 28). Xinhua thus suggested in
a lead of a story that Li "is not the 'highest Buddha' who brings salvation
to suffering people, but an evil person who has had an extremely disastrous
effect on society" ("Life and" July 22). Citing the People's Daily, it
asserted that "continuous efforts are needed to carry the struggle against
the illegal Falun Gong cult through to the end" ("The truth" August 12).
An "evil cult" with tight organization

        Besides portraying the "malicious fallacy" of the Falun Gong leader,
Xinhua also tried to convince readers that Falun Gong is indeed a cult and
destructive. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government recognizes only
five specific religious denominations, others are deemed illegal. Most
articles signify the illegal status of Falun Gong and try to prove that
this unlawful group in fact is a "highly organized, fully functional . . .
organization" ("True face" July 22). One article, citing a report by the
Public Security Bureau, pointed out that Falun Gong is a five-layer entity:
from top to bottom are the general station, sub-branches, first-level and
second-level instruction centers, and exercising centers. Another article
claimed that there are more than 1,900 instruction centers and over 28,000
exercising centers in China ("Falun Gong" July 30; "Urgent life" July 22).
Xinhua also used the group's handwritten instructions, appointment letters
and insider informants to show evidence of Falun Gong organization
("Handwritten instructions" July 31; "Appointment letter" August 3; "Falun
Gong" August 10; "Former Falun" August 10).
The rhetorical strategy employed in news coverage often, if not always,
ties the organizational structure of Falun Gong to the argument concerning
legal and stability issues. One article, citing a deputy editor-in-chief of
a news organization in Hebei Province, argued that Falun Gong "was strictly
organized and had ulterior political motives" ("Communist Party" August 8;
see also "Li Hongzhi's" August 11). Another article highlighted past major
Falun Gong protests and concluded that the "plotted act" by "the Falun Gong
cult" "aimed at disrupting social stability" ("Truth of" August 6). Later
in the year, Xinhua added reports on Falun Gong spying, suggesting that the
group "has provided at least ten classified state documents to overseas
individuals or organizations" ("Police" October 25; "Falun Gong" October
26). Without any further explanation or follow-up reports, these articles
reinforce the belief that the group is out to get the government.
Tong (2002) points out that the question of whether Falun Gong was a formal
organization determines political and legal legitimacy of the government's
crackdown. If the CCP could prove that Falun Gong was indeed well
organized, it would be easier to argue that the group's protest rallies
were orchestrated, rather than spontaneous acts as Falun Gong members
claimed they were. Therefore it would be easier for the CCP to claim the
malicious political ambition by Li in challenging the regime's authority
and disrupting social order, and in the end, easier to justify the
government's oppression of the group. Legally, Tong explains, if Falun Gong
were not organized, there is no need for the group to register with the
government. On the other hand, if Falun Gong is organized, by law the group
is required to register as a social organization before it can engage in
collective activities and other functions. Because Falun Gong is not
officially registered, the CCP charged that both its status and activities
were illegal and thus subject to an official ban. Perry (2001) argues that
the CCP has put Falun Gong in an impossible situation. Falun Gong has been
protesting to ask for legal status. Yet, since it does not belong to any of
the legal religions and is repeatedly denied registration as a social
organization, it cannot be protected by the law. As a result, their sit-in
demonstrations are seen as illegal and disturbing of social stability.
Another narrative strategy used in Xinhua stories to condemn Falun Gong as
a cult is to suggest how harmful the group is. Some articles argued that
Falun Gong "deceived many innocent people and inflicted enormous harm on
their physical and mental health" ("Officials, employees" July 23; see
also, for example, "Ministries urge" July 25; "Chinese physicist" July 26);
some compiled statistics to show the effect. One article, for example, was
headlined "59 cases of injury and death related to Falun Gong, reported in
founder's home province" ("59 cases" July 26). One reported that "many
[Falun Gong followers] have become psychopathic. In 1997 and 1998, a fifth
of the patients in the psychopath ward of a hospital were Falun Gong
practitioners" ("Analysis of" July 22; see also "Falun Gong" August 2).
Another story claimed that between two Beijing hospitals, "Falun Gong
followers now accounted for 42 percent of all mental patients, compared
with only 10.1 percent in 1996" ("Medical scientists" July 24). Some
articles told horrible stories about how practitioners killed themselves
and others, or died because they refused to seek medical help. One passage
typifies such news coverage.
Ma Jianmin, a retired worker from the Huabei oilfield in North China, was
often in a trance and became distraught after two years of practicing Falun
Gong. Ma insisted that he had a "wheel of law" in his stomach. The, one day
in 1998, Ma died at home after he cut his abdomen with a par of scissors to
look for the so-called wheel of law.
        Official Gao Encheng, who became a leader of a Falun Gong practicing group
in Kaixian county of Chongqing municipality in Southwest China, got the
idea that he had become an "immortal." Gao killed himself by jumping off a
building while holding his son in his arms.
Bai Changyu, a section chief geologist at a coal mine in Northeast China's
Fushun City, refused to see doctor or take any medicine when he was sick
after he began practicing Falun Gong in 1997. Bai became seriously ill in
April 1999, but still refused medical treatment until he finally died,
still holding the belief that Li Hongzhi would come to help him ("Falun
Gong" July 22; see also, for example, "Tragic stories" July 23; "Chinese
magazine" July 30;).
Similar stories (and often times the same stories) appeared in news
coverage over and over again during the time period of this study. These
tales might have some truth, but the way they are told raises credibility
concerns. Because Xinhua reporters often do not include attributions to
their sources, one wonders whether these journalists talked to the people
involved or just reported the rumors they heard. Sometimes even if sources
are put in quotes, some sound fishy and some simply repeat the official
line. One article, for example, quoted a former follower as saying, "[Li]
pushed us into direct opposition to the government, and hurt us greatly"
("The awakening" July 30). Another quote goes like this: "Li Hongzhi has
advocated truthfulness, benevolence and tolerance among his followers,
actually he was only using these banners to disguise his ulterior political
motives" ("Insiders criticize" August 8). Perhaps when it comes to
propaganda, the accuracy of the quotes is not as crucial as the message
itself. Many articles present the death toll caused by Falun Gong[9] to
show how deadly the harm is. However, such reports present an irony.
According to Perry (2001), the harm Falun Gong brings through suicide,
starvation, and mental illness can hardly compare to the devastation of
Land Reform, the Great leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and even the
June Fourth massacre mobilized by the Chinese government itself.
        Xinhua did not use the term "cult" to describe Falun Gong until July 30.
After that, the term was occasionally used. On August 9, Xinhua cited an
article in Wenru magazine and suggested that "a cult is not religion, but a
kind of evil force in the disguise of religion." The story used the
People's Temple and David Koresh's group as examples, claiming that the
"Falun Gong is an illegal organization with every feature of a cult"
("Falun Gong" August 9). Nine days later, Ye Xiaowen, director of State
Administration of Religious Affairs, officially defined the term in a
popular political TV talk show. Xinhua quoted Ye that "a cult is
characterized by cheating, madness, fallacy, secretive organizations and
activities, and anti-government and anti-social motivations" and again
emphasized that Falun Gong "has all the features of a cult" ("Top
religious" August 18). Quoting the head of the Buddhist Association of
China, Xinhua thus reported that "it is highly necessary for the [Chinese
Communist] Party to get rid of this 'big disaster' for the people and
remove this 'big cancer' for [sic] the society" ("Head of" August 1).
  The success of the campaign
        From the day after the crackdown, Xinhua has continuously reported on the
effect of the campaign against Falun Gong. In a physical sense, stories on
the government's confiscation and destroying of the group's publications
appear regularly (see, for example, "China cracks" July 27; "China
confiscates" July 28; "Beijing destroys" July 28; "China destroys" July
29). Xinhua also reported that the ban has resulted in the boom of science
book sales and science research (see, for example, "Falun Gong" July 28).
Philosophically, support for the government action, according to Xinhua,
flooded in not only from the CCP organs, military, civil servants, and
media, but also from non-Communist parties in China, academic and science
circles, health and legal professionals, ordinary people, or virtually, as
the agency tirelessly puts it, people from "all walks of life."  These
groups applaud the ban as "timely and absolutely correct" ("Taiwan affairs"
July 25) and wish to eradicate Falun Gong as superstitious, evil, cultish,
anti-government, and anti-social. The "support" for the ban from two
particular groups, I think, deserves special attention. One is the critique
of Falun Gong from other religious organizations. Unlike other
organizations who voiced their support for the government immediately after
the ban, the attitude of religious organizations in China was not reported
until August 2 (see "Tibetan living" August 2; "Chinese religious" August
2). The reason for this was not clear from Xinhua articles or any
literature that I have found to this point. I am interested in knowing
whether there was a "consulting process" going on between the government
and religious groups during this time. The fact that all five officially
recognized religions in China agreed to voice their support for
government's crackdown on Falun Gong shows the relationship between the
church and the state in China. As mentioned earlier, although the Chinese
constitution protects religious freedom, the government tightly controls
religious groups and requires religious doctrines to be in harmony with
Communist ideology. It is thus not very surprising that the government
eventually gained support from the lawful religious groups and had them
pronounce that "the ban will not affect the country's freedom of religious
belief" (China's Christian" August 3; "China's Catholics" August 3;
"Chinese Buddhists" August 3). Moreover, as also indicated earlier, the
spiritual vacuum resulting from increasingly ignoring of political ideology
and from the economic reform has created a religious boom in China. As
religious organizations view China a field ready for harvest, competition
among religious denominations for believers is probably unavoidable. The
dramatic growth of Falun Gong might have aroused some jealousy from other
religious groups. Therefore, it might be possible that the five religions
came together to condemn the "heretical" Falun Gong in contrast to the
"orthodoxy" that they see themselves espousing.
Another aspect of the successful campaign that deserves attention is the
report on practitioners' breaking ties with Falun Gong. Again, article
after article show that people "have awakened" because of the media's
exposure of the "true face" of the group. One article typifies such cases.
Wang Shengli, a retired cadre in the city of Fuyang in East China's Anhui
Province, was a Falun Gong practitioner and a local leader in the illegal
organization, but he has given his support to the ban. He says that, after
watching the CCTV special report on Li Hongzhi, he got a clearer
understanding of Falun Gong and its evil political purposes. Wang has
helped local governments teach people to break away from Falun Gong. Wang
is just one of the thousands of former Falun Gong practitioners who have
changed their minds. . .  ("Falun Gong" August 3; see also, for example,
"Falun Gong" August 4; "Insiders criticize" August 8; "Falun Gong" August
9; "Falun Gong" August 11).
This is a selective, one-sided story with a happy ending. Wong (1999)
points out that during this "well-orchestrated nation-wide crackdown,"
about 50,000 Falun Gong followers were rounded up by the policy, including
1,200 Party cadres (see also Ching 2001). Although most of them were later
released, Perry (2001) claims that thousands were sent to labor camps,
hundreds to prison, dozens may have died in conjunction with the crackdown.
The Falun Gong website also provides cases of how the Chinese police
tortured followers and forced them to "confess" and sign repentance papers
("Falun Gong" 1999).
        The coverage of the Chinese government's response to the international
backlash on the crackdown is also interesting. As Western news media
reported, human rights supporters mobilized demonstrations against the
Chinese government's handling of Falun Gong in many parts of the world.
Xinhua, however, never mentioned any of these protests. In an article about
Jiang Zemin's interview with a French press, Xinhua evaded human rights
issues, but concentrated on Jiang's statement about Falun Gong's cultish
characteristics and its "anti-social, anti-government, and anti-human
nature." The article emphasized that the Chinese government is in fact in
line with world governments, arguing that China is doing the same thing as
the U.S. government did to the Davidan group, Japan did to Aum Shinrikyo
and European countries did to the Solar Temple ("Jiang comments" October
25; see also "Jiang's visit" September 16).
        News coverage also reflects the CCP's sensitivity toward U.S.'s criticism
on the issue. Quoting Chinese Foreign Ministry personnel, Xinhua reported
that the U.S.'s accusation of China's persecution of religious groups "is
groundless and wantonly interferes in China's internal affairs" ("U.S.
report" September 9; see also "U.S. charges" October 28; "U.S. Senate"
November 4; "Spokeswoman on" November 8). Some articles claim that Falun
Gong "is not a religious organization" ("U.S. report" September 9), but "a
conspiratorial political organization" ("Evildoing of" November 6); others
decried the group as "anti-science, anti-humanity and anti-society cult"
("China's stance" October 28; see also "Spokeswoman on" November 8;
"Chinese embassy" November 19). Despite the inconsistency on whether Falun
Gong is religious or not, the CCP argued that, either way, the U.S.'s
criticism "is a gratuitous attack on China's religious policy" ("U.S.
report" September 9). These articles suggested that the ban exists
"strictly on the basis of law" and is not only supported by the Chinese
people, but also by "most countries," without specifically naming any
("China's stance" October 28; "U.S. Senate" November 4). Xinhua also
accused the United States of holding a "double standard" in dealing with
cults ("Evildoing of" November 6; "China strongly" November 19; "Chinese
ambassador" November 29). Quoting Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman
Zhang Qiyue, the news agency reported that "being merciful to an evil cult
means tramping on the human rights of all citizens" ("China's stance"
October 28) and that the U.S.'s continuing criticism of the ban or granting
of political asylum to Falun Gong practitioners "will do harm to the normal
development of Sino-U.S. relations" ("Evildoing of" November 6; see also
"Spokeswoman on" November 8; "Chinese embassy" November 19).
Conclusion
        The sentence of the four Falun Gong leaders and the public "support" for
the legal decision closed the chapter of the campaign against the group in
the old millennium. However, the campaign has continued into the new
millennium, although not as vigorously as in its early stages. Even though
some scholars suggest that the Chinese press has enjoyed more freedom since
economic reform, this study, however, provides evidence for a contrary
interpretation. While news media might be more financially independent than
before the reform, politically, the press in China still functions in some
ways as it did during the Cold War era. In this case, it served as a lapdog
to the government, uncritically carrying out the anti-Falun Gong campaign
for the government. The crackdown, as Perry (2001, p. 173) puts it, has
been "something of a public embarrassment" and shows "a deeply frightened
and insecure central leadership." Some scholars suggest that public opinion
in China in general is sympathetic to the persecuted, or some said at least
it was until the self-immolation of five reportedly Falun Gong members on
January 23, 2001 (Perry 2001; Ching 2001). With the continuous persecution,
Falun Gong has dramatically dwindled on Chinese soil. Yet, its influence
has spread overseas, with rapidly growing numbers in Hong Kong, Japan,
Taiwan, Malaysia, Canada, the United States, and Europe. In other words, it
is experiencing diaspora, instead of extinction. The case of Falun Gong
contradicts reports of press freedom in China. With it uncritical echoing
its master's call, what does the future of the Chinese press hold?

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Falun Gong is well organized: insiders. (August 10, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0810008; 0810257.
Falun Gong's leak of state secrets condemned. (October 25, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 1026213.
Falun Gong members bare more sect secrets. (August 15, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0815076.
Falun Gong member denounces Falun Gong cult. (August 8, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0808149.
Falun Gong practice causes health problems and death. (July 22, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0722120.
Falun Gong practitioners break away from cult. (August 3, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 0803188.
Falun Gong practitioners changing their minds. (August 2, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 0802128.
Falun Gong: The true story. (1999). Falun Gong website
hrreports.faluninfo.net/book1e/eb1p3.html. Downloaded on February 20, 2003.
Former Falun Gong station heads exposing Li Hongzhi. (August 10, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0810129.
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press. London, Routledge.
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timely and the timeless. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Handwritten instructions show evidence of Falun Gong orgaization. (July 31,
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economy analysis of the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily. In C.C. Lee (Ed.),
Power, Money and Media: Communication patterns and bureaucratic control in
cultural China. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, pp. 112-151.
He, Z. (2000b). Working with a dying ideology: Dissonance and its reduction
in Chinese journalism. Journalism Studies 1 (4): 599-616.
Head of China's Buddhist Association refutes Falun Gong. (August 1, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0801146.
Herman, E. & Chomsky, No. (1988). Manufacturing consent: The political
economy of the mass media. New York: Pantheon.
Insiders criticize Falun Gong sect. (August 8, 1999). Xinhua News Agency,
Item No. 0808090.
Jiang comments on Falun Gong's harms. (October25, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 1025153.
Jiang's visit enhances understand, friendship: deputy fm. (September 16,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0916323.
Kindopp, J. (2001). China's war on "cults." Current History 101
(September): 259-167.
Lambert, T. (2001). The present religious policy of the Chinese Communist
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Lee, C. (2000). China's journalism: The emancipatory potential of social
theory. Journalism Studies 1 (4): 559-675.
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church leaders in China. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40
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modern ear. Journal of Contemporary China 11 (33): 761-784.
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Li Hongzhi defrauds people of money. (August 6, 1999). Xinhua News Agency,
Item No. 0806155.
Li Hongzhi evades over 10,000 yuan in taxes. (August 12, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0812320.
Li Hongzhi made a fortune out of Falun Gong. (August 11, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0811238.
Li Hongzhi's mother's midwife says Li is a swindler. (July 28, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0728206.
Li Hongzhi's political motive and serious mischief: commentary. (August 11,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0811012; 0811264.
Li Hongzhi's role in illegal gathering at Zhongnanhai. (August 12, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0812216; 0812039.
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No. 0722122.
Lowe, S. (2001). China and new religious movements. Nova Religio 4 (2):
213-224.
Major mass orgainzations support Falun Gong ban. (July 24, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 0724136.
Medical scientists refute Falun Gong fallacies. (July 24, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 0724161.
Ministries urge eradication of Falun Gong's heretical ideas. (July 25,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0725124.
New evidence of Falun Gong leader's fraudulent behavior found. (August 5,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0805083.
Non-communist parties, figures support Falun Gong ban. (July 23, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0723450.
Noted scientists urge fight against pseudoscience. (July 24, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 0724009.
Officials, employees of central organs support Falun Gong ban. (July 23,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0723428.
Official on rumors concerning Falun Gong practitioners. (June 14, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0614213.
Ownby, D. (2001). Imperial fantasies: The Chinese Communists and peasant
rebellions. Comparative Studies in Society & History 43 (1): 65-91.
Perry, E. J. (2001). Challenging the mandate of heaven: Popular protest in
modern China. Critical Asian Studies 33 (2): 163-180.
Party members organized to study CPC decision on Falun Gong ban. (July 26,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0726228.
People's Daily article calls for strengthening party discipline. (July 25,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0725119.
People's Daily editorial on Falun Gong ban. (July 22, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0722159.
People's Daily on increasing fight against Falun Gong cult. (August 8,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0808178.
People's Daily on struggle between materialism idealism. (July 27a, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0727215.
People's Daily on struggle between materialism idealism. (July 27b, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0727010.
People's Daily says Li Hongzhi's fallacies reflect dangerous political
aims. (July 28, 1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0728097.
Person in Changchun accuses Falun Gong founder of fraud. (July 30, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0730147.
PLA, armed police support government ban on Falun Gong. (July 24, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0724127.
PLA technical officers criticize Falun Gong. (August 9, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0809215.
Police: Falun Gong followers leak state secrets. (October 25, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 1025170.
Public security ministry spokesman on arrest of Li Hongzhi. (July 29,
1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0729185.
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Taiwan affairs office supports ban on Falun Gong. (July 25, 1999). Xinhua
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Tibetan living Buddha criticises [sic] Falun Gong. (August 2, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 0802226.
Tragic stories of Falun Gong practitioners. (July 23, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0723441.
The truth has come out: People's Daily. (August 12, 1999). Xinhua News
Agency, Item No. 0812331.
Truth of Falun Gong's besieging of Chongqing paper. (August 6, 1999).
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True face of Li Hongzhi exposed. (July 22, 1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item
No. 0722005.
Truth defender exposes fallacies of Falun Gong. (July 24, 1999). Xinhua
News Agency, Item No. 0724008.
Sanghvi, S. (2001). Crouching tiger: Falun Gong rising. Harvard
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Spokeswoman on asylum for Falun Gong practitioner. (November 8, 1999).
Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 1108228.
Urgent life and times of Li Hongzhi. (July 22, 1999). Xinhua News Agency,
Item No. 0722007.
Urgent eds-with details CPC central committee forbids party members to
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U.S. charges against China's dealing with Falun Gong station slammed.
(October 28, 1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 1028219.
U.S. report on religious persecution in China groundless: fm spokesman.
(September 9, 1999). Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 0909194.
U.S. Senate urged to stop interfering in China's interal affairs. (November
4, 1999). Xinhua News Agency.
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China. Gazett 58 (3): 147-157.
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investigative journalism in post-Deng China. Journalism Studies 1 (2): 577-597.
[1]  Falun Gong is also called Falun Dafa, meaning Great Law of the Wheel.
[2]  The Chinese government disputes this figure, arguing that there are
only 20 million Falun Gong practitioners in China.
[3]  This number includes 18 million Moslems, 10 million Protestants, and 4
million Catholics, with the rest being predominantly Buddhists and Taoists
(see Wong 1999; "Religious Affairs" 1997).
[4]  This figure is an estimate of Li Hongzhi and is cited in Sanghvi's
article.
[5]  Journalists are among the best paid professions in China. According to
He (2000, p. 607), the monthly salary of a mid-level managing editor in a
big city is about RMB 10,000 (US $ 1,200). On top of it are subsidized
housing, free medical insurance, subsidized cars and other benefits. Some
journalists also get hidden income from freebies, payola, and profit made
on the stock market from insider trading or cheap stocks from companies. A
journalist claims that "he could not possibly spend all that money he was
making." Therefore, it is not worth risking such benefits for press freedom.
[6]  The category of "experts" includes professors/academics, with 41
citations; legal professionals, 29; scientists, 24; medical professionals,
9; astronomers, 7; psychiatrists, 4, athletes, 3; qigong master, 1;
unspecified expert, 1.
[7]  A breakdown of this category is: The People's Daily, 37; Xinhua News
Agency, 13; books, 13; individual journalists/editors, 9; other newspapers,
8; Truth Seeking magazine, 7; The Central China TV, 2; Websites, 1.
[8]  This number is an early count of the followers who died because of
practicing Falun Gong. The Chinese government did not settle with this
number. It gave a much higher number toward the end of the year. See next note.
[9]  According to a Xinhua article on October 25, 1999, Chinese president
Jiang Zemin told a French newspaper, La Figaro, that Falun Gong has claimed
the lives of more than 1,400 practitioners ("Jiang comments" October 25).
2

Following the party line:
Xinhua News Agency's coverage of the Falun Gong movement
Falun Gong caught the eyes of the Chinese leadership when over 10,000 of
its practitioners gathered at the Zhongnanhai government compound in
Beijing on April 25, 1999; it then attracted the attention of the world
when the Communist Party started cracking down the group three months
later. Through its propaganda organ, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), the
Chinese government announced that the Falun Gong movement is "the most
serious political incident" since the student uprising at Tianamen Square
on June 4, 1989. Scholars have attempted to contextualize the cultural,
political, and economic climate in contemporary China that allowed this
group to rise in a relatively short period of time and to assess the causes
of the Chinese Communist Party's nationwide campaign to oppress the group.
Many cite media coverage to understand the issue; some uncritically use
government-owned media for sources of information. None, however, has
analyzed media in any systematic way to provide an account of how the
campaign was covered. This study examines the relationship between
government and news media in China through analyzing the media's coverage
of the government's crackdown against Falun Gong.  I argue that although
the economic reforms since the 1980s might have financially disrupted the
news media's reliance on the government, the press, especially
government-owned news organizations, still functions as propaganda agents
for the Chinese Communist Party as journalists uncritically follow the
party line in reporting on the Falun Gong movement.

Religious culture in contemporary China
        Mao Zedong established an atheist Communist state in 1949 after defeating
Chiang Kai Shek's Republic of China during the Chinese civil war. To build
a new China, Mao unleashed the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to break the
"Four Olds." Religion was at this time catastrophically affected; all
churches, mosques, and temples were desecrated or closed.
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism became the only ideology/religion allowed in China.
After Mao died in 1976, his successor Deng Xiaoping took a "major U-turn,"
as Lambert (2001) puts it, shifting the state emphasis from ideological
struggle to economic reform. Deng opened the door to the Western world in
1979 and allowed a rebirth of religion in China. The Constitution of 1982
recognized Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism as
lawful religions in China.
        The new constitution seemingly asserts people's rights to religious
freedom; it however defines such rights in a very narrow scope. First, by
naming specific denominations, the constitution excludes all other forms of
belief systems and categorizes them as "cults." Second, even with the "Five
Great Religions," the attitude of the state is simply tolerant; it by no
means encourages the growth of any religious groups. Believers are allowed
to assembly, but prohibited from proselytizing. Third, practice of the
religion is strictly subordinate to the party line. Official regulations
require religious bodies to register with the government and only those
that accept state ideology, or "patriotic" religious groups, are permitted
to register; others are deemed illegal. Christian and Catholic dominations
are required to break their ties with overseas churches and headquarters
and accept orders from the state (Lambert 2001; Leung 2001). Many groups
have refused such institutional and ideological control and simply have
gone underground.
The rise of Falun Gong
        Falun Gong is a relatively new movement in the social landscape of China.
Li Hongzhi, a forty-year-old clerk from Jilin Province in Northeast China,
combined traditional Chinese thought and physical exercises into Falun Gong
in 1992. The literal translation of the term "Falun Gong"[1] is "Law Wheel
Practice/Exercise." Law refers to Buddhist doctrine or truth, or Dharma.
"The Wheel of Law" can be translated as "Wheel of the Dharma," meaning
teaching Buddhism. In Chuen Falun (Turning the Wheel of Law), the group's
most important publication, Li (1997) explains that Falun Gong is a
combination of Buddhist and Taoist philosophies and meditative traditions,
together with Chinese breathing exercises (qigong) and martial arts. Li
makes the Buddhist ideals of "truthfulness, benevolence and forbearance"
the central doctrine of the movement. To Ying (2001), Falun Gong
encompasses every feature of religion, such as a charismatic leader,
well-installed doctrines, organizational structure and rituals (see also
Leung 2002). Li, however, does not see or try to make Falun Gong into a
religion because in an atheist state, religion is viewed as the synonym of
superstition. Until 1994 Li registered the group under Qigong Research
Association. Li left China in 1995 and obtained a U.S. green card in 1996,
but continued to monitor the growth of the movement in China. At the time
of the government's crackdown on the group in 1999, Falun Gong claimed 100
million followers[2], with 70 million in China and 30 million overseas.
        The political, economic, and social environment in China provided
opportunity for Falun Gong to grow in such short period of time.
Politically, contemporary China faces an ideological crisis as many people
no longer believe in Marxism and Maoism and need something to fill the
void. Although the Communist Party hoped that religion would eventually die
out in China when the older generation passed away, it did not happen. In
fact, in the struggle of "Marxist atheism vs. vulgar theism," as Xiao
(2001, p. 124) puts it, God has overcome man. All religious groups, legal
or illegal, are experiencing revitalization, attracting tremendous amounts
of conversion after 50 years of Communist rule. According to the 1997 White
Paper on the Freedom of Religious Belief in China, the five legal religious
denominations together claim over 100 million believers[3] (Wong 1999).
Even the Chinese government has declared the decade of 1990s a "golden
period" for religious expansion in China (quoted in Wong 1999, p. 12). Or
as Lowe (2001) describes it, the success of Falun Gong demonstrates the
spiritual awakening of Chinese people. Xiao points out that such
dissatisfaction with ruling party ideology results from economic reform
during the leadership of both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Mass layoffs
from state-owned enterprises, official corruption, and the gap between rich
and poor all drive people toward religion for comfort. Leung (2002) asserts
that it is hard, as a result, for the Communist Party to retain credibility
as a party of the proletarians, when it suddenly becomes one for bourgeois
interests.
Some argue that the growth of Falun Gong derives from the popularity of
qigong in a time of medical reform, which shifted the heavy burden of
medical expense from the state to citizens. The public, especially the
elderly, therefore turned to traditional physical exercises to avoid costly
medical care (Lowe 2001; Leung 2002). Ying (2001) takes a more subtle
approach, looking at the issue from a sociological perspective. He utilizes
Emile Durkheim's notion of anomie to explain the new religious movements in
China, claiming that when a society is experiencing dramatic change, such
as the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 70s and the economic reform
after the 80s, social ills result and moral standards suffer. Falun Gong
and other religious groups provide guidelines in a time of social crisis.
Leung (2002) agrees with this view, asserting that Falun Gong fulfills
human needs in a time of turmoil.
The growth of the group poses a potential threat to the Beijing regime in
both numerical and ideological terms. The non-religious claim makes Falun
Gong attractive not only to ordinary citizens, but also to the 30 million
Communist Party members[4] who utlized Falun Gong but are not supposed to
affiliate with any religious belief. If the account of Falun Gong
membership is close to accurate, the organization has exceeded the 55 to 60
million Party members in China. It is reported that many high-ranking Party
officials have lobbied for the state to legitimize Falun Gong and the
People's Liberation Navy was found to be the publisher of Li's book. Ching
(2001) argues that in the mind of the government, Falun Gong was "competing
for popularity with the party" and that is "an unpardonable crime" (p. 13).
Ideologically, as Xiao (2001) asserts, Falun Gong's unorthodox message
about the supremacy of divine power over human agency poses a political
challenge to atheist Marxism/Maoism. In an age of declining faith toward
the political system, even Communists pay more loyalty to Falun Gong than
to the Party (Ying 2001). In this sense, the "Falun Gong triggers a
struggle between dialectic idealism plus materialism and religious
idealism" (Leung 2001, p. 774; see also Perry 2001). Historian David Ownby
thus claims that the reason Falun Gong is threatening to the Chinese
government is that the movement "denies [the Communist Party] the sole
right to define the meaning of Chineseness" (quoted in Sanghvi 2001, p. 8).
Seeing the potential replacement of the old ideology, orthodox Communist
leaders condemn the movement as "more … treason than heresy" (Lowe 2001, p.
214; see also Leung 2001; Perry 2001).
Some argue that is it not the number of Falun Gong members, but the
efficiency of the organization that frightens the regime. The peaceful
Zhongnanhai sit-in demonstrated the group's ability to effectively mobilize
people from all layers in society and stage large-scale concerted actions
in a short period of time (Kindopp 2002; Perry 2001; Tong 2002; Xiao 2001).
Between April 25 and July 22 in 1999, the organization mounted 307 protest
demonstrations against various government branches and media organizations.
This scheme ironically mimics Mao Zedong's revolutionary style during the
Communist Party's infancy against the Nationalists and also during the
Cultural Revolution (Sanghvi 2001; Perry 2001). However, such
mass-mobilizing ability has been lost in the contemporary Communist Party.
The Falun Gong protest shames the Chinese leaders that the organization is,
as Xiao sees it, "more efficient, more combative, and more appealing" to
the Chinese people than the CCP, and this "was enough [for the government]
to condemn the sect" (2001, p. 128).
Perry (2001) adds historical perspective to explain the reaction of the
Chinese government toward seemingly harmless Falun Gong appeals, claiming
that the timing of the protest is not ideal to the Communist government.
She points out the historical significance of the year 1999: It was the
eightieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the fiftieth
anniversary of the birth of People's Republic in 1949, the fortieth
anniversary of the Tibetan Revolt of 1959, the thirtieth anniversary of the
ending of the mass mobilization stage of the Cultural Revolution in 1969,
the twentieth anniversary of the Democracy Wall movement of 1979, the tenth
anniversary of the Tiananmen uprising of 1989, and the last year of the old
millennium. The massive protest by Falun Gong thus hit a raw nerve of the
Communist Party while the government was preparing for the celebration of
the nation's fiftieth birthday on October 1.
Perry (2001) also points to China's rich traditions of resistance and
revolution. She argues that religious groups often established relations
with the people's rebellions against (and in some cases actually
overthrowing) the existing government, and the Confucian/Mencian concept of
a Tianming, or "Mandate of Heaven," was often installed in such uprisings.
Two Taoist groups, Yellow Turbans and the Five Pecks of Rice, rose in
revolt against the declining Han Dynasty within five years in the late
second century; the later group managed to establish a theocratic state in
the Southwest of China. Zu Yuangzhang, a Buddhist monk, and his followers
brought down the Tang Empire and built the Sung Dynasty. Taiping rebels, a
pseudo-Christian group, almost overthrew the Manchu government during the
mid-nineteenth century. White Lotus, a Tao associated society, also posed
as a serious threat to the Qing regime. In 1911, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, a devoted
Christian who claimed "Three Principles of the People," finally brought
down the Qing Dynasty. Mao used the same strategy,  provoking a "People's
War" to expel Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist army from China (see Ching
2001; Lambert 2001; Lowe 2001; Ownby 2001; Perry 2001; Xiao 2001). Perry
argues that the Chinese government is very much aware of this history and
deeply fears Falun Gong's ability to engage "diverse membership [which]
exhibits remarkable commitment and enthusiasm, has the capacity to mobilize
on a nationwide scale, and maintains secure international communication,"
especially in a time when the Communist leaders "find themselves
ideologically adrift and presiding over an increasingly moribund party
apparatus" (2001, p. 171). To the Beijing leadership, an effective
crackdown on Falun Gong thus is urgently necessary to prevent the
reoccurrence of history and prove that the "Mandate of Heaven" is still on
its side.
Has marketization changed the Party journalism?
In examining the contemporary press system in China, many scholars point
out that since the 1980s, media organizations in China have reflected the
ideological shifts implicit in economic reform and tried to define a "new"
role for themselves in society. Chang et al. (1993) question the
traditional way of conceiving the press system in Communist China as a
propaganda machine for the government. Chang et al. (1994) then call for an
understanding of Chinese journalism as "a major stock of social knowledge,"
which reflects how the general public thinks about social issues, instead
of being seen as a mouthpiece for the government (p. 52). Zhao Bin (1999)
views the Chinese press as living a "double life," being both a
"mouthpiece" and "money-spinner" at the same time. In analyzing the
commercialization of the Party-owned Chinese Central Television (CCTV), he
concludes that Chinese news media's "political role as the Party's
mouthpiece has been increasingly eroded by ever more powerful pressures for
commercial success" (p. 292; see also Su 1994). Yuezhi Zhao (1994),
however, takes a more critical view of this Party-line vs. bottom-line
dichotomy. While recognizing such tension, he nevertheless points out that
although Chinese media organizations have become more independent in
financial aspects, they are still very much circumscribed by Communist
ideology and thus practice what he terms "Party journalism." In examining
the content of Beijing Youth News, one of the fastest growing newspapers in
China, Zhao identifies the formula for the paper's success economically and
ideologically. He points out that the paper, on one hand, emphasizes
entertainment and sensationalism, which attracts the public's attention and
advertising revenue.  On the other hand, it downplays narrow political news
and upbeat "positive propaganda." Zhao quotes Chen Ji, former
editor-in-chief of the newspaper, to show this point.
Strengthening positive propaganda at the present time is not only not out
of date, but precisely very timely. Otherwise, our dominant ideology will
collapse. No rulers of a society will support those who destroy its
dominant ideology. This is the class nature of the dominant ideology. In
China, we also will not allow the destruction of the dominant ideology,
especially not by the media themselves" (quoted in Zhao 1994, p. 151).
Following this line of thought, Lee (2000) argues that although the power
of market has influenced the nature of "command journalism . . . the
existence of a market economy does not guarantee press freedom" (p. 561).
He points out that "politically safe but socially useful news genres" have
been packaged as commodities for profit.  He (2000a) calls such a
contradictory market-Party-oriented media system a "socialist face" with a
"capitalist body" or simply "Party Publicity Inc." Investigative journalism
in China serves both the regime and mammon. Zhou (2000) suggests that after
commercialization, investigative reporters, under pressure to sell, focused
on exposing official corruption and often presented stories in tabloid
style. Such reports, in his view, actually strengthen the Party's hegemony
because they help to correct capitalist ills, which potentially threaten
Communist ideology. He, referring to what Chan (1993) calls
"commercialization without independence," thus argues that the
commercialization has never been intended and is also not very likely to
replace Party journalism.
Yu (1996), although approaching the issue from a different angle, makes the
same argument. In analyzing the content of news information sent by China's
CCTV to CNN World Report before and after the 1989 Tianamen Square
massacre, she finds that (1) political news increased dramatically after
the student movement, (2) much of these news items dealt with meetings of
Chinese and foreign high-ranking political leaders, and (3) much less
negative and more positive news about Chinese government was sent during
this period. Yu claims that in order to show a stable and strong China,
news media, and in this case reporters and editors at CCTV, serve as a
mouthpiece of the Chinese government.
He (2002b) provides an insightful view on why Chinese journalists,
confronting Western standards of professionalism, are willing to be lapdogs
for the state. From his interviews with Chinese journalists, He finds that
while some strive to live up to Communist ideology, most Chinese
journalists feel strong "dissonance," a social psychological term
describing the gap between what one really believes and what he/she is
compelled to do. According to He, some journalists, for career advancement
and preserving the benefits of being reporters [5], see news reporting as a
routine task and thus uncritically carry out their work according to
conventional discourse defined by the Communist Party. Some keep their
opinions secret or only share with those who they trust; others express
their personal views only in private settings.
This study examines the relationship between the news media and government
in China through the lens of the press's coverage of the government's
crackdown on Falun Gong. This paper argues that although Chinese media's
financial wellbeing may have been blessed by economic reform since late
1980s, they still uphold the government ideology and reflect a lapdog
theory of press systems, especially when the issues concern what the
government defines as "political struggle."
Methodology
I chose Xinhua News Agency as the primary source for this analysis because
of its importance in providing wire services to media organizations in both
China and the world. It is the only news agency in China and is also a
government-owned entity. In fact, all the more important, more established,
and widely circulated media remain under the direct control of the
government. To provide a better understanding of the coverage from the
Zhongnanhai protest in Beijing to the government's decision to crack down
on Falun Gong, this study explores news from April 1 to December 31, 1999.
The reason to start a few weeks before the protest was to see whether Falun
Gong was newsworthy then. I used the Lexis/Nexis database to locate stories
about Falun Gong during this time period and obtained a total of 388 news
items. I excluded news highlights and photo lists because these items do
not make the discussion of Falun Gong the central point of the news item. I
also excluded repeated stories. As a result, a total of 309 news items are
incorporated in the study.
I utilize two research methods in this study. I use content analysis to
show an overall pattern of the coverage and employ textual analysis to
provide more fine-grained insight on how journalists tell the story of
Falun Gong and the government crackdown. The combination of the two methods
make possible a better understand of the role of the government-owned news
media in the CCP's campaign against the group.
Whose story is told?
        John Hersey once said that "there is no such thing as objective reportage"
(quoted in Frus, 1994, p.114). Other scholars also claim that journalistic
practices perpetuate dominant power relations and ideologies (Herman &
Chomsky 1988; van Dijk 1998; 1991; Fowler 1991; Frus 1994). This is certain
true in the case of Xinhua's coverage of the Falun Gong movement. Table One
provides a timeline of the important events during the period of study.
Table One
Important dates in the Chinese government's crackdown of Falun Gong in 1999
April 25        10,000 Falun Gong practitioners sit in at the Zhongnanhai
government compound in Beijing.
July 22 The Chinese government officially bans Falun Gong
July 29 The Chinese government issues a nationwide wanted circular to
arrest Li Hongzhi, the leader of Falun Gong
Aug. 18 The Chinese government defines "cult"
Sept. 9 The U.S. State Department denounces China's ban on Falun Gong
Oct. 30 New law pass to ban all cults
Dec. 7  U.S. president Bill Clinton criticizes China's violation of human
rights in oppressing Falun Gong
Dec. 26 Four Falun Gong leaders sentenced

        Figure One
Even though the mass protest occurred in late April, the Chinese government
did not take action for two months. Figure One indicates that, parallel to
the government's action, Xinhua produced only two stories between the
protest and the ban. Yet as soon as the CCP proclaimed Falun Gong illegal
on July 22, the news agency exploded with news coverage about the group and
the ban, producing 100 news items during the last nine days of July and 91
articles the next month. The coverage of the crackdown was disrupted half a
month before and after the fiftieth anniversary of the People's Republic of
China on October 1. After that, the amount of the coverage remained
significant--although not as dramatic as at the beginning of the
campaign--until the end the year.

    Figure Two
In terms of whose voice is heard, Figure Two shows that government
officials and experts[6] are the two major news sources, followed by the
media[7] and former Falun Gong practitioners. Media self-reference includes
not only reference to other news organizations' publications, but also
Xinhua's own articles in support of government action. Editorials in the
government-owned People's Daily are the most cited news source, followed by
Xinhua's own
commentaries. Among sources used, none expressed any disagreements with the
government. As Frus (1994, p. 114) point out, "all decisions [relating to
how to tell a story] are political ones." Omissions are as important as
inclusions for a story in supporting and creating a certain reality and
viewpoint. As Figure Two indicates, the fact that there are no current
Falun Gong practitioners quoted or any opposing comments presented shows a
clear picture of the relationship between Xinhua and the Chinese
government. The agency functions as a governmental mouthpiece instead of
responding to [Western] journalistic professional standards of objectivity,
fairness, and balance.
The calm before the storm
Xinhua's coverage of Falun Gong changed dramatically before and after the
government's decision to ban the group. As mentioned earlier, over 10,000
Falun Gong practitioners gathered in front of the Zongnanhai central
government compound in Beijing on April 25, 1999. For some reason, the
story was not run until April 27. Xinhua provides some background on an
earlier Falun Gong protest in Tianjin City, in which practitioners
protested a magazine article that accused Falun Gong of being harmful,
especially to young people. The article reported that Falun Gong
practitioners in Tianjin and other areas, "upon hearing some rumors," came
to gather around the Zongnanhai compound. Xinhua then described the
reaction of Chinese authorities in dealing with the protest:
[They] listened to [the protesters] patiently, and did some persuasion . .
. [and] issued an announcement, calling on the practitioners not to believe
in rumors, but to observe related regulations and jointly maintain the
capital's public order. The gathering disappeared after persuasion work on
the evening [of] the same day ("Chinese official" April 27).
Citing an unidentified official, Xinhua reported that the government "[has]
never prohibited any health fitness activities" and that "different views
and opinions are allowable, and can also be reported through normal
channels according to law." Such mass protest, the article continued, "is
completely wrong" and will "jeopardize social stability" and the "hard-won"
"political, economic and social situation" ("Chinese official" April 27).
The article presents only the official's view of the story, without giving
Falun Gong practitioners, onlookers, or even frontline law enforcement
personnel any chance to voice their opinions. Other than that, however, the
article is rather a straightforward description of how the government
handled the protest. Although it transmits the view that mass protest is
not a preferred way to express different viewpoints, the article (as well
as the government) does not deem Falun Gong illegal or harmful. Rather, it
is simply a type of health fitness activity.
Xinhua did not run another story on Falun Gong until June 14. This might
indicate that neither the government nor the news agency considered the
April 25 protest a big deal. The purpose of the second article is to
clarify rumors that the Chinese government is about to crack down on Falun
Gong and that Communist Party members who practice Falun Gong will be
expelled from their positions. The article quotes an unnamed CCP official.
"The rumors are completely baseless and were made to confuse people," said
the official. "The purpose for spreading the rumors was to incite large
gatherings, create chaos and disrupt social stability." He said most Falun
Gong practitioners cited their disbelief in and refrained from spreading
the rumors . . .
He reaffirmed that governments at all levels have never prohibited physical
fitness activities. The Chinese people are totally free in selecting any
form of exercises, adding that different opinions are normal in this
respect ("Official on" June 14).
The article ends by upholding the government's ideals by calling for social
stability and avoiding mass protest. It again upholds the perspective that
Falun Gong is a form of physical exercise and does not mention the illegal
status of Falun Gong in any way.
News coverage changed significantly after the Chinese government announced
its ban on Falun Gong on July 22. Xinhua suddenly paid an extraordinary
attention to the event, producing, for example, 15 news items on the same
day, 20 the next day, 11 on the third day, and at least one or two news
items almost every day for the following months. The tone of the articles
also noticeably changed from relatively neutral to completely negative.
Corresponding to and helping to legitimize the government's ban, Xinhua
repeatedly employs certain narrative strategies to persuade readers that
Falun Gong should indeed be subject to outlaw. The following analysis
discusses these modes of persuasion.
A political struggle between materialism and idealism
        As mentioned earlier, the ideological crisis subsequent to economic reform
creates a vacuum in China's belief system. The sudden rise of Falun Gong,
in the eyes of Chinese leaders, poses a threat to the regime; it thus makes
ideological combat one of the central issues in curbing the Falun Gong
movement. The coverage in Xinhua reflects this strategy, calling the
campaign against Falun Gong "a serious political struggle" that the CCP has
to win. Xinhua cited government officials in article after article to posit
a binary opposition between materialism and idealism, Marxism/Maoism and
Falun Gong, atheism and theism, the orthodoxy and heresy, or as we might
say, the One and the Other. One article, for example, cited an official
circular:
The circular says that Marxist dialectic materialism and historical
materialism represent the world outlook and methodology of the proletariat,
and that the scientific theories of Marxism established on the basis of
this worldview should serve as the spiritual pillar of communists. Falun
Dafa as created by Li Hongzhi preaches idealism and theism and denies all
scientific truth, and thus is absolutely contradictory to the fundamental
theories and principles of Marxism ("Urgent eds" July 22; see also
"People's Daily" July 22; "Non-Communist parties" July 23; "Communist
youth" July 23; "Major mass" July 24; "Chinese military" July 23; "People's
Daily" July 25).
Therefore, the articles continued, Chinese people and especially Communist
Party members, should be educated "in Marxist materialism and atheism [to
enhance] their political sensitivity and their political capabilities to
differentiate right from wrong in order to consolidate a correct world
outlook and concept of values, and [reinforce] their belief in Communism to
strengthen the cohesiveness and combat strength of Party organizations"
("Urgent eds" July 22; see also "Communist youth" July 23; "PLA, armed"
July 24). Xinhua interpreted this war as one in which "the two sides are
fighting for the occupation of the ideological front and for public
support" ("Official, employees" July 23); it quoted an official from the
qigong society saying that the government must win "a victory of Marxism
over pseudoscience and theism, and a victory of materialism over
metaphysics" ("Chinese people" July 23).
        Some articles spell out the CCP's fear toward a heretical Falun Gong,
pointing out that Li's "doomsday" theory is not only "a set of ridiculous
ideas," but evidence of treason. Citing an article by the Policy, Law and
Regulation Department, Xinhua reported that Li claims that "doomsday is
coming, that human beings will be extinct soon, that modern science can do
nothing to prevent the catastrophe, that only Falun Gong can save mankind,
and that Li Hongzhi is the sole 'savior'" ("Analysis of" July 23; see also
"Urgent eds" July 22; "China bans" July 23). It is exactly such claims of
supernatural power that irritates and threatens the Communist Party
because, as the article asserted, it seizes power of the established and
"overruns the government and the law," and suggests that "[Li] should be
the rightful ruler" ("Analysis of" July 23). In other words, according to
the article, "Li's doomsday idea denies the truth of the existing world and
it has created strong anti-government and anti-social sentiments. Its true
purpose is to win public support for his wicked political ambitions
("Analysis of" July 23; see also "People's Daily" July 22). Another article
expressed this fear more bluntly by citing a People's Daily commentary:
Falun Gong has propagated fallacious ideas such as a "doomsday theory" and
a "way to heaven" which go against the party's doctrines and discipline. If
Li Hongzhi's heretical theories spread, the party's foundation will be
shaken, and the great cause will be undermined ("People's Daily" July 25).
For the survival of the party, one government official argued, party
members must "hold high the great banner of Marxism, Mao Zedong thought and
Deng Xiaoping theory" and "guard against the erosion of theism" ("Party
members" July 26; see also "Chinese scientists" July 26; "People's Daily"
August 8). A People's Daily editorial echoed this view, calling party
members to be educated "in Marxist materialism and atheism extensively . .
. to infuse them with Communist ideals and a firm belief in the cause of
building socialism with Chinese characteristics" ("People's Daily" July 22)
because, as the People's Liberation Army put it, "only Marxism can save
China and only the Chinese Communist Party can lead us to accomplish the
great cause of reinvigorating the Chinese nation" ("PLA" July 24).
        This reasoning, however, did not last long. As Perry (2001) points out,
the Chinese government might have realized that by employing such rhetoric,
the CCP actually exaggerated the importance of Falun Gong and put the group
on the equal footing with the Party itself. As a result, the narratives of
the ban as a crusade for party survival generally disappeared by the end of
July. Instead, a war between "science" and "feudal superstition" became the
thread of the campaign. Many articles thus attempted to expose the group's
unscientific and superstitious nature. Xinhua's reports created a logic:
Marxism = materialism = atheism = science; on the other hand, Falun Gong =
idealism = theism = superstition. Xinhua utilized numerous scientists,
astronomers, and even athletes to show the folly of Falun Gong's worldview.
One article, for example, quoted an astronomer who said that "an explosion
of earth is sheer nonsense, for the earth has no nuclear burning process"
("Noted scientists" July 24). Another article, citing a new political
magazine Qiushi (Truth Seeking), pointed out that Li "can't hide his nature
of ignorance and superstition, despite being spread under the guise of
supreme science." The article claimed that even though Li piled up terms of
astronomy in his speeches, "actually he knows nothing about astronomy;" he
used the term "light year" "as a time measurement unit, confused unclear
fusion with nuclear fission, and blindly assumed that the surface
temperature on Mars (whose Chinese name literally means "planet of fire")
is much higher than that on the earth" ("Falun Gong" July 28).
Following this line of thought, one article asserted that "Li usually
belittles great scientists like Charles Darwin and Issac Newton, although
he himself is just a junior middle school graduate who doesn't know the
difference between an organism and minerals" ("Analysis of" July 22).
Others argued that Falun Gong's doomsday predictions are merely an
imitation of "some Western cults" ("Chinese physicist" July 26). Similarly,
the People's Daily argued that leaders of such "cultist organizations . . .
often disguise themselves as 'prophets' or even 'gods' to deceive the
public," and Li is "just one such person" ("People's Daily" July 27a).
Xinhua thus advised people to use science as a "mirror" to "expose any
monster," or more precisely, "the fallacies of Falun Gong" ("Chinese
scientist" July 26). Many articles echoed this view, calling for more
science education to "wipe out feudal superstition and safeguard the
dignity of science" ("Cross-straits" July 23; also see, for example, "China
intensifies" July 28; "Using scientific" July 31; "PLA technical" August 9).
One article, however, revealed perhaps the real worry of government
authorities, claiming that Li's doomsday theory and positioning himself as
the savior of the world
fundamentally deny the progressive tendency of human history, deny the
tremendous accomplishments China has attained in the two decades of reform
and opening-up, and deny the significant changes and progress of the
Chinese people's ideological and mental outlook ("People's Daily" July 27b).
Therefore, scientific research is given a political mission as "the
ideological weapon" not only "to strip the mask from all pseudo-sciences
and any other idealistic trickery" ("Non-communist parties" July 23; see
also "People's Daily" July 27b), but also to promote "socialist
modernization construction," according to the Minister of Science and
Technology ("Noted scientists" July 24). As the People's Daily argued, such
a "powerful ideological weapon" in fact resides in "dialectic and
historical materialism" which "will help us triumph over all mistakes and
superstitious ideas" ("People's Daily" July 27b). In this sense, what China
really needs is not science per se, but a representation of science, or
more precisely, Marxism alone.


Li as malicious fallacy
        To legitimize the ban, the CCP employed some schemes to destroy the
credibility of Falun Gong's leader Li Hongzhi. One of these schemes, as
reflected in Xinhua's coverage, is to demystify Li by showing readers that
he is merely a common person who possesses no supernatural power. On the
first day of the ban, one article provided a time line of Li's life: he was
born in 1952, went to school between 1960 and 1969, worked on a Liberation
Army stud farm and played trumpet in a band. He was discharged from
military service in 1982 and found a job in a cereals and oil company. He
quit his job and began practicing qigong in 1991; one year later, he
started teaching Falun Gong ("Life and" July 22). Without proper
attribution, one article suggested that "Li's family members, relatives,
neighbors, former schoolmates, teachers, leaders, and fellow servicemen say
that they believe Li is just an ordinary person and that his so-called
qigong learning and miraculous abilities were 'nonsense' or 'impossible' or
something they'd never seen." The article pointed out that Li's "only
talent in childhood, many said, was the ability to play the trumpet"
("Urgent Life" July 22). Another article quoted a midwife who helped with a
complicated delivery of Li, saying that "without my help, Li and his mother
would have been in danger 47 years ago ("Li Longzhi's" July 28). Because Li
is only a common man, Xinhua reasoned that his Falun Gong is nothing
extraordinary, but merely a combination of two qigong forms and some Thai
dance movements ("Urgent eds" July 22; "Urgent life" July 22).
Many news stories "exposed" Li's "dark secrets," arguing that the Falun
Gong leader is "a braggart, a liar and a swindler" ("Person in" July 30).
One article, for example, asserted that "Li cast himself up as the 'highest
Buddha' who has transcended all secular desires. But, in real life he
displays an enormous greed" ("Urgent life" July 22). Xinhua argued that Li
took advantage of those who desire to rid themselves of illness and achieve
physical fitness. It pointed out that Li used Falun Gong to make "a
breath-taking sum" of money "on which he has not paid taxes," and that
"investigators have found Li has several luxury houses and limousines" ("Li
Hongzhi" August 12; "Urgent life" July 22; see also, for example, "True
face" July 22; "New evidence" August 5; "Li Hongzhi" August 6).  Some
stories put this into numbers, estimating how much money Li has earned from
Falun Gong books, CDs, video tapes, speeches, seminars, and even
photographs ("Urgent life" July 22; "Li Hongzhi" August 11). To prove Li's
deceptive scheme, some articles presented Li as ridiculous, self-serving
person. One, for example, poked fun at Li's exaggerations in claiming
himself as the reincarnation of various ancient figures such as Yue Fei, a
Song Dynasty hero, Li Shimin, a Tang Dynasty emperor, Bian Que and Li
Shizhen, both prestigious ancient Chinese doctors ("Chinese people" August
9). Others, however, took accusations of Li's hypocrisy seriously. One
story pointed to Li's medical invoices, asking why Li, as the Falun Gong
master who claims that the exercise can prevent and cure illness, still got
sick. It also suggested that while Li told practitioners not to take
medicine, he went to doctors for cures ("Falun Gong" July 27).
Some articles tried to use the master's tools to dismantle his own house,
arguing that Li's behaviors do not measure up his teaching of truthfulness,
benevolence, and tolerance. Quoting a physicist, who wrote the article that
led to a Falun Gong protest in Tainjin City, Xinhua reported that Li
fabricated his birthday "to coincide [with] the birthday of Sakyamuni, the
founder of Buddhism, fully demonstrat[ing] his untruthfulness." Li incited
Falun Gong practitioners, the article continued, "to attack the government
and media departments in no way can be called tolerant" ("Chinese
scientists" July 26; see also "Truth defender" July 24; "China's
theoretical" July 26; "Chinese magazine" July 30). On article added that
"16 cases examples [sic] given by the Xinhua News Agency provide a bloody
lessons about Li doing evil instead of spreading benevolence and of harming
people instead of saving them" ("People's Daily" July 28). It is not clear
what the "16 cases" referred to in this article; however, another article
reported that "according to incomplete statistics from 30 provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities, up to July 28, 743 persons have died
as a result of practicing Falun Gong[8] ("Public security" July 29).
As the Chinese government viewed the Zongnanhai protest "the most serious
political incident since the 1989 political turmoil" ("Li Hongzhi's" August
12), Li's involvement with the sit-in became a crucial element in deciding
his crime. Quoting a People's Daily commentary, Xinhua pronounced that "the
truth has come out," detailing Li's schedule between April 19 and 25 to
make the connection that he actually orchestrated the protest ("The truth"
August 12; see also "Urgent life" July 22; "True face" July 22;
"Behind-scene" August 12). Another story cited a former Falun Gong leader
to verify Li's direct involvement in the demonstration. The article
concluded that "Li's return to Beijing was well planned . . . he not only
aimed at Tianjin [referring to a previous protest], but at Beijing as well.
What he deliberately planned was to cause social unrest on a larger scale"
("Li Hongzhi's" August 12; see also "Falun Gong" August 8; "Li Hongzhi's"
August 12; "Falun Gong" August 15). A People's Daily's commentary thus
argued that the incident provides a "glimpse of the true face of Li and the
sect's ulterior political motives" ("The truth" August 12). Truth Seeking
magazine added that Li "created a mystical and horrible atmosphere in an
attempt to erode the minds of his followers, disturb public order, and
sabotage social stability" ("Falun Gong" July 28). Xinhua thus suggested in
a lead of a story that Li "is not the 'highest Buddha' who brings salvation
to suffering people, but an evil person who has had an extremely disastrous
effect on society" ("Life and" July 22). Citing the People's Daily, it
asserted that "continuous efforts are needed to carry the struggle against
the illegal Falun Gong cult through to the end" ("The truth" August 12).
An "evil cult" with tight organization

        Besides portraying the "malicious fallacy" of the Falun Gong leader,
Xinhua also tried to convince readers that Falun Gong is indeed a cult and
destructive. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government recognizes only
five specific religious denominations, others are deemed illegal. Most
articles signify the illegal status of Falun Gong and try to prove that
this unlawful group in fact is a "highly organized, fully functional . . .
organization" ("True face" July 22). One article, citing a report by the
Public Security Bureau, pointed out that Falun Gong is a five-layer entity:
from top to bottom are the general station, sub-branches, first-level and
second-level instruction centers, and exercising centers. Another article
claimed that there are more than 1,900 instruction centers and over 28,000
exercising centers in China ("Falun Gong" July 30; "Urgent life" July 22).
Xinhua also used the group's handwritten instructions, appointment letters
and insider informants to show evidence of Falun Gong organization
("Handwritten instructions" July 31; "Appointment letter" August 3; "Falun
Gong" August 10; "Former Falun" August 10).
The rhetorical strategy employed in news coverage often, if not always,
ties the organizational structure of Falun Gong to the argument concerning
legal and stability issues. One article, citing a deputy editor-in-chief of
a news organization in Hebei Province, argued that Falun Gong "was strictly
organized and had ulterior political motives" ("Communist Party" August 8;
see also "Li Hongzhi's" August 11). Another article highlighted past major
Falun Gong protests and concluded that the "plotted act" by "the Falun Gong
cult" "aimed at disrupting social stability" ("Truth of" August 6). Later
in the year, Xinhua added reports on Falun Gong spying, suggesting that the
group "has provided at least ten classified state documents to overseas
individuals or organizations" ("Police" October 25; "Falun Gong" October
26). Without any further explanation or follow-up reports, these articles
reinforce the belief that the group is out to get the government.
Tong (2002) points out that the question of whether Falun Gong was a formal
organization determines political and legal legitimacy of the government's
crackdown. If the CCP could prove that Falun Gong was indeed well
organized, it would be easier to argue that the group's protest rallies
were orchestrated, rather than spontaneous acts as Falun Gong members
claimed they were. Therefore it would be easier for the CCP to claim the
malicious political ambition by Li in challenging the regime's authority
and disrupting social order, and in the end, easier to justify the
government's oppression of the group. Legally, Tong explains, if Falun Gong
were not organized, there is no need for the group to register with the
government. On the other hand, if Falun Gong is organized, by law the group
is required to register as a social organization before it can engage in
collective activities and other functions. Because Falun Gong is not
officially registered, the CCP charged that both its status and activities
were illegal and thus subject to an official ban. Perry (2001) argues that
the CCP has put Falun Gong in an impossible situation. Falun Gong has been
protesting to ask for legal status. Yet, since it does not belong to any of
the legal religions and is repeatedly denied registration as a social
organization, it cannot be protected by the law. As a result, their sit-in
demonstrations are seen as illegal and disturbing of social stability.
Another narrative strategy used in Xinhua stories to condemn Falun Gong as
a cult is to suggest how harmful the group is. Some articles argued that
Falun Gong "deceived many innocent people and inflicted enormous harm on
their physical and mental health" ("Officials, employees" July 23; see
also, for example, "Ministries urge" July 25; "Chinese physicist" July 26);
some compiled statistics to show the effect. One article, for example, was
headlined "59 cases of injury and death related to Falun Gong, reported in
founder's home province" ("59 cases" July 26). One reported that "many
[Falun Gong followers] have become psychopathic. In 1997 and 1998, a fifth
of the patients in the psychopath ward of a hospital were Falun Gong
practitioners" ("Analysis of" July 22; see also "Falun Gong" August 2).
Another story claimed that between two Beijing hospitals, "Falun Gong
followers now accounted for 42 percent of all mental patients, compared
with only 10.1 percent in 1996" ("Medical scientists" July 24). Some
articles told horrible stories about how practitioners killed themselves
and others, or died because they refused to seek medical help. One passage
typifies such news coverage.
Ma Jianmin, a retired worker from the Huabei oilfield in North China, was
often in a trance and became distraught after two years of practicing Falun
Gong. Ma insisted that he had a "wheel of law" in his stomach. The, one day
in 1998, Ma died at home after he cut his abdomen with a par of scissors to
look for the so-called wheel of law.
        Official Gao Encheng, who became a leader of a Falun Gong practicing group
in Kaixian county of Chongqing municipality in Southwest China, got the
idea that he had become an "immortal." Gao killed himself by jumping off a
building while holding his son in his arms.
Bai Changyu, a section chief geologist at a coal mine in Northeast China's
Fushun City, refused to see doctor or take any medicine when he was sick
after he began practicing Falun Gong in 1997. Bai became seriously ill in
April 1999, but still refused medical treatment until he finally died,
still holding the belief that Li Hongzhi would come to help him ("Falun
Gong" July 22; see also, for example, "Tragic stories" July 23; "Chinese
magazine" July 30;).
Similar stories (and often times the same stories) appeared in news
coverage over and over again during the time period of this study. These
tales might have some truth, but the way they are told raises credibility
concerns. Because Xinhua reporters often do not include attributions to
their sources, one wonders whether these journalists talked to the people
involved or just reported the rumors they heard. Sometimes even if sources
are put in quotes, some sound fishy and some simply repeat the official
line. One article, for example, quoted a former follower as saying, "[Li]
pushed us into direct opposition to the government, and hurt us greatly"
("The awakening" July 30). Another quote goes like this: "Li Hongzhi has
advocated truthfulness, benevolence and tolerance among his followers,
actually he was only using these banners to disguise his ulterior political
motives" ("Insiders criticize" August 8). Perhaps when it comes to
propaganda, the accuracy of the quotes is not as crucial as the message
itself. Many articles present the death toll caused by Falun Gong[9] to
show how deadly the harm is. However, such reports present an irony.
According to Perry (2001), the harm Falun Gong brings through suicide,
starvation, and mental illness can hardly compare to the devastation of
Land Reform, the Great leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and even the
June Fourth massacre mobilized by the Chinese government itself.
        Xinhua did not use the term "cult" to describe Falun Gong until July 30.
After that, the term was occasionally used. On August 9, Xinhua cited an
article in Wenru magazine and suggested that "a cult is not religion, but a
kind of evil force in the disguise of religion." The story used the
People's Temple and David Koresh's group as examples, claiming that the
"Falun Gong is an illegal organization with every feature of a cult"
("Falun Gong" August 9). Nine days later, Ye Xiaowen, director of State
Administration of Religious Affairs, officially defined the term in a
popular political TV talk show. Xinhua quoted Ye that "a cult is
characterized by cheating, madness, fallacy, secretive organizations and
activities, and anti-government and anti-social motivations" and again
emphasized that Falun Gong "has all the features of a cult" ("Top
religious" August 18). Quoting the head of the Buddhist Association of
China, Xinhua thus reported that "it is highly necessary for the [Chinese
Communist] Party to get rid of this 'big disaster' for the people and
remove this 'big cancer' for [sic] the society" ("Head of" August 1).
  The success of the campaign
        From the day after the crackdown, Xinhua has continuously reported on the
effect of the campaign against Falun Gong. In a physical sense, stories on
the government's confiscation and destroying of the group's publications
appear regularly (see, for example, "China cracks" July 27; "China
confiscates" July 28; "Beijing destroys" July 28; "China destroys" July
29). Xinhua also reported that the ban has resulted in the boom of science
book sales and science research (see, for example, "Falun Gong" July 28).
Philosophically, support for the government action, according to Xinhua,
flooded in not only from the CCP organs, military, civil servants, and
media, but also from non-Communist parties in China, academic and science
circles, health and legal professionals, ordinary people, or virtually, as
the agency tirelessly puts it, people from "all walks of life."  These
groups applaud the ban as "timely and absolutely correct" ("Taiwan affairs"
July 25) and wish to eradicate Falun Gong as superstitious, evil, cultish,
anti-government, and anti-social. The "support" for the ban from two
particular groups, I think, deserves special attention. One is the critique
of Falun Gong from other religious organizations. Unlike other
organizations who voiced their support for the government immediately after
the ban, the attitude of religious organizations in China was not reported
until August 2 (see "Tibetan living" August 2; "Chinese religious" August
2). The reason for this was not clear from Xinhua articles or any
literature that I have found to this point. I am interested in knowing
whether there was a "consulting process" going on between the government
and religious groups during this time. The fact that all five officially
recognized religions in China agreed to voice their support for
government's crackdown on Falun Gong shows the relationship between the
church and the state in China. As mentioned earlier, although the Chinese
constitution protects religious freedom, the government tightly controls
religious groups and requires religious doctrines to be in harmony with
Communist ideology. It is thus not very surprising that the government
eventually gained support from the lawful religious groups and had them
pronounce that "the ban will not affect the country's freedom of religious
belief" (China's Christian" August 3; "China's Catholics" August 3;
"Chinese Buddhists" August 3). Moreover, as also indicated earlier, the
spiritual vacuum resulting from increasingly ignoring of political ideology
and from the economic reform has created a religious boom in China. As
religious organizations view China a field ready for harvest, competition
among religious denominations for believers is probably unavoidable. The
dramatic growth of Falun Gong might have aroused some jealousy from other
religious groups. Therefore, it might be possible that the five religions
came together to condemn the "heretical" Falun Gong in contrast to the
"orthodoxy" that they see themselves espousing.
Another aspect of the successful campaign that deserves attention is the
report on practitioners' breaking ties with Falun Gong. Again, article
after article show that people "have awakened" because of the media's
exposure of the "true face" of the group. One article typifies such cases.
Wang Shengli, a retired cadre in the city of Fuyang in East China's Anhui
Province, was a Falun Gong practitioner and a local leader in the illegal
organization, but he has given his support to the ban. He says that, after
watching the CCTV special report on Li Hongzhi, he got a clearer
understanding of Falun Gong and its evil political purposes. Wang has
helped local governments teach people to break away from Falun Gong. Wang
is just one of the thousands of former Falun Gong practitioners who have
changed their minds. . .  ("Falun Gong" August 3; see also, for example,
"Falun Gong" August 4; "Insiders criticize" August 8; "Falun Gong" August
9; "Falun Gong" August 11).
This is a selective, one-sided story with a happy ending. Wong (1999)
points out that during this "well-orchestrated nation-wide crackdown,"
about 50,000 Falun Gong followers were rounded up by the policy, including
1,200 Party cadres (see also Ching 2001). Although most of them were later
released, Perry (2001) claims that thousands were sent to labor camps,
hundreds to prison, dozens may have died in conjunction with the crackdown.
The Falun Gong website also provides cases of how the Chinese police
tortured followers and forced them to "confess" and sign repentance papers
("Falun Gong" 1999).
        The coverage of the Chinese government's response to the international
backlash on the crackdown is also interesting. As Western news media
reported, human rights supporters mobilized demonstrations against the
Chinese government's handling of Falun Gong in many parts of the world.
Xinhua, however, never mentioned any of these protests. In an article about
Jiang Zemin's interview with a French press, Xinhua evaded human rights
issues, but concentrated on Jiang's statement about Falun Gong's cultish
characteristics and its "anti-social, anti-government, and anti-human
nature." The article emphasized that the Chinese government is in fact in
line with world governments, arguing that China is doing the same thing as
the U.S. government did to the Davidan group, Japan did to Aum Shinrikyo
and European countries did to the Solar Temple ("Jiang comments" October
25; see also "Jiang's visit" September 16).
        News coverage also reflects the CCP's sensitivity toward U.S.'s criticism
on the issue. Quoting Chinese Foreign Ministry personnel, Xinhua reported
that the U.S.'s accusation of China's persecution of religious groups "is
groundless and wantonly interferes in China's internal affairs" ("U.S.
report" September 9; see also "U.S. charges" October 28; "U.S. Senate"
November 4; "Spokeswoman on" November 8). Some articles claim that Falun
Gong "is not a religious organization" ("U.S. report" September 9), but "a
conspiratorial political organization" ("Evildoing of" November 6); others
decried the group as "anti-science, anti-humanity and anti-society cult"
("China's stance" October 28; see also "Spokeswoman on" November 8;
"Chinese embassy" November 19). Despite the inconsistency on whether Falun
Gong is religious or not, the CCP argued that, either way, the U.S.'s
criticism "is a gratuitous attack on China's religious policy" ("U.S.
report" September 9). These articles suggested that the ban exists
"strictly on the basis of law" and is not only supported by the Chinese
people, but also by "most countries," without specifically naming any
("China's stance" October 28; "U.S. Senate" November 4). Xinhua also
accused the United States of holding a "double standard" in dealing with
cults ("Evildoing of" November 6; "China strongly" November 19; "Chinese
ambassador" November 29). Quoting Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman
Zhang Qiyue, the news agency reported that "being merciful to an evil cult
means tramping on the human rights of all citizens" ("China's stance"
October 28) and that the U.S.'s continuing criticism of the ban or granting
of political asylum to Falun Gong practitioners "will do harm to the normal
development of Sino-U.S. relations" ("Evildoing of" November 6; see also
"Spokeswoman on" November 8; "Chinese embassy" November 19).
Conclusion
        The sentence of the four Falun Gong leaders and the public "support" for
the legal decision closed the chapter of the campaign against the group in
the old millennium. However, the campaign has continued into the new
millennium, although not as vigorously as in its early stages. Even though
some scholars suggest that the Chinese press has enjoyed more freedom since
economic reform, this study, however, provides evidence for a contrary
interpretation. While news media might be more financially independent than
before the reform, politically, the press in China still functions in some
ways as it did during the Cold War era. In this case, it served as a lapdog
to the government, uncritically carrying out the anti-Falun Gong campaign
for the government. The crackdown, as Perry (2001, p. 173) puts it, has
been "something of a public embarrassment" and shows "a deeply frightened
and insecure central leadership." Some scholars suggest that public opinion
in China in general is sympathetic to the persecuted, or some said at least
it was until the self-immolation of five reportedly Falun Gong members on
January 23, 2001 (Perry 2001; Ching 2001). With the continuous persecution,
Falun Gong has dramatically dwindled on Chinese soil. Yet, its influence
has spread overseas, with rapidly growing numbers in Hong Kong, Japan,
Taiwan, Malaysia, Canada, the United States, and Europe. In other words, it
is experiencing diaspora, instead of extinction. The case of Falun Gong
contradicts reports of press freedom in China. With it uncritical echoing
its master's call, what does the future of the Chinese press hold?

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[1]  Falun Gong is also called Falun Dafa, meaning Great Law of the Wheel.
[2]  The Chinese government disputes this figure, arguing that there are
only 20 million Falun Gong practitioners in China.
[3]  This number includes 18 million Moslems, 10 million Protestants, and 4
million Catholics, with the rest being predominantly Buddhists and Taoists
(see Wong 1999; "Religious Affairs" 1997).
[4]  This figure is an estimate of Li Hongzhi and is cited in Sanghvi's
article.
[5]  Journalists are among the best paid professions in China. According to
He (2000, p. 607), the monthly salary of a mid-level managing editor in a
big city is about RMB 10,000 (US $ 1,200). On top of it are subsidized
housing, free medical insurance, subsidized cars and other benefits. Some
journalists also get hidden income from freebies, payola, and profit made
on the stock market from insider trading or cheap stocks from companies. A
journalist claims that "he could not possibly spend all that money he was
making." Therefore, it is not worth risking such benefits for press freedom.
[6]  The category of "experts" includes professors/academics, with 41
citations; legal professionals, 29; scientists, 24; medical professionals,
9; astronomers, 7; psychiatrists, 4, athletes, 3; qigong master, 1;
unspecified expert, 1.
[7]  A breakdown of this category is: The People's Daily, 37; Xinhua News
Agency, 13; books, 13; individual journalists/editors, 9; other newspapers,
8; Truth Seeking magazine, 7; The Central China TV, 2; Websites, 1.
[8]  This number is an early count of the followers who died because of
practicing Falun Gong. The Chinese government did not settle with this
number. It gave a much higher number toward the end of the year. See next note.
[9]  According to a Xinhua article on October 25, 1999, Chinese president
Jiang Zemin told a French newspaper, La Figaro, that Falun Gong has claimed
the lives of more than 1,400 practitioners ("Jiang comments" October 25).