|
Treading Through a Crisis:
Exploring How Bridgestone/Firestone and the Media
Framed an Issue and an Image
Betsy D. Neibergall
Please direct inquiries to:
Betsy D. Neibergall, APR
M.A. Student
University of Minnesota
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
206 Church Street SE
111 Murphy Hall
Minneapolis, MN 55455
651.226.9005
[log in to unmask]
For Submission to the 2003 Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication Convention,
Kansas City, MO
April 1, 2003
Abstract
Bridgestone/Firestone faced a nationally newsworthy crisis when vehicles
equipped with its tires were connected to at least 30 deaths. How media
frame such crises potentially impacts public opinion and future viability
of corporations. Therefore, stakes are high for public relations
strategists to effectively manage crisis messages. The purpose of this
study is to explore what roles Bridgestone/Firestone and the media played
in communicating complicated events, and to what extent
Bridgestone/Firestone's corporate image changed.
Treading Through a Crisis:
Exploring How Bridgestone/Firestone and the Media Framed an Issue and an Image
Introduction
Beginning in 2000, a nationally newsworthy story began to unfold that
eventually escalated into a full-blown crisis for tire-maker
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., a subsidiary of Bridgestone Corporation. A
Houston television station first broke the story in February 2000,
connecting Ford Explorer vehicles equipped with Bridgestone/Firestone tires
to at least 30 deaths. A series of lawsuits around the country alleged
that tire treads came apart without warning, often leading to sport utility
vehicle (SUV) roll-overs.[1] By May 2000, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) launched an official investigation after
having received 90 complaints describing 33 related crashes that resulted
in 27 injuries and 4 deaths.[2] Bridgestone/Firestone responded in August
2000 by recalling 6.5 million tires, limited mostly to tires produced in
its Decatur, Ill., plant.[3]
The "Ford-Firestone Scandal," as dubbed by a PBS Frontline report,
continued to evolve. NHTSA, Ford and Firestone each pursued its own
investigation into the cause of the problem. Ford announced in May 2001
that it was recalling all 13 million Firestone Wilderness ATX tires that
remained on its vehicles, at which point Bridgestone/Firestone ended a
relationship with Ford that had lasted for nearly a century.[4] The tire
company then publicly questioned the safety of the Ford
Explorer.[5] Firestone settled lawsuits with attorneys general in several
states and ended its recall in the fall of 2001. The situation continued
through the end of 2002, when conclusions were due regarding the NHTSA's
TREAD Act (legislation introduced after the Ford-Firestone crisis to
improve consumer protection and communication between auto and tire
manufacturers and the federal government).[6]
Although this research is specific to Bridgestone/Firestone, it remains
relevant to organizations beyond those directly involved in this
crisis. By definition, crisis situations endanger companies'
welfare. According to communications scholar Matthew W. Seeger and
co-researchers, a crisis can be defined as "a specific, unexpected, and
nonroutine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty
and threaten or are perceived to threaten an organization's high-priority
goals."[7] Therefore, most corporations place high importance on managing
such situations effectively so as to protect their businesses.
Recent events, including the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, scandals
at companies such as Enron and WorldCom, and lightening speed Internet
allegations – such as when an upset business traveler's e-mail sent Westin
Hotel reservations plummeting – have prompted companies to place increased
importance on their crisis communications plans. Because of the important
role the media can play in representing the company's image to their
audiences, public relations experts pay careful attention to media message
strategies during crisis situations. Therefore, a systematic analysis of
company as well as media messages – or frames – can help PR professionals
assess the effectiveness of their efforts, and indicate potential areas for
improvement in the crisis communication process.
The purpose of this study is to explore what role Bridgestone/Firestone
played in how the media communicated complicated events to the public, and
to what extent these events may have changed Bridgestone/Firestone's
corporate image. Specifically, this research asks: How was the
Bridgestone/Firestone tire recall issue framed? How was
Bridgestone/Firestone's image framed? Did Bridgestone/Firestone's
pre-crisis image change during the crisis? Conceptually, this research
seeks to explore whether the way a company 1) frames an issue, and 2)
frames its corporate image during a crisis is similar to the way the media
frame that company's image and the issue at hand. One underlying
assumption of this research is that the media play a powerful role in
shaping public perceptions of an organization during a crisis, underscoring
the importance for public relations practitioners to work toward creating
shared meanings of the crisis situation with the media in order to more
effectively represent its position to their organization's key publics.
Theoretical Framework
The assumption that meanings are socially constructed through interaction
and negotiation between sender and audience – rather than transmitted for
audience members to receive as is – provides one way to approach a study of
Bridgestone/Firestone's crisis communications. Looking specifically at how
public relations and news professionals choose to construct and frame
events often offers insight into the degree to which shared meaning has
occurred between the two parties. The meaning that is ultimately
constructed and represented in the media, in turn, offers cues to the
audience as to the intended meaning of the message.
The social construction of reality theory assumes that meanings are not
fixed, but can be negotiated.[8] As British cultural theorist Stuart Hall
puts it, "what we can know and say has to be produced in and through
discourse."[9] The social construction of reality can be defined simply as
the process of "actively constructing social meanings."[10] While John
Fiske maintains this theory "does not deny the existence of an external,
universal reality,"[11] it implies people cannot have "access to this
reality in an objective, universal, non-culturally-determined manner."[12]
Sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in their Treatise,
highlighted the role institutions play in shaping commonsense
reality.[13] Gaye Tuchman (1978) saw the theory's applicability for
explaining news as a social construction. Calling mass media powerful
socializing agents in today's culture,[14] Stuart Hall devoted significant
effort to mass media's role in representing and defining culture – and he
also developed a model to explain how the social construction of reality
takes place, which he called encoding-decoding. The model focuses on the
"encoding" of a message during the production process and then the
"decoding" of it by users when it is distributed.
In creating the text, a message producer is influenced by institutional
structures and the cultural context, which includes professional
ideologies, assumptions about the audience, previous knowledge about
routines of production, and other socio-cultural and political factors.[15]
At the other end of the process, the message receiver adds his/her own
"frameworks of knowledge" that have been influenced by past messages, as
well as social and economic structures.[16] The producer's meaning,
however, may differ from the meaning the receiver constructs, either due to
broad structural differences between producer and receiver, or because of a
lack of symmetry between the codes of the source and the audience at the
encoding-decoding level.[17] To elaborate, meaning is not constructed in a
deterministic way; nor completely open. This process is continuous: Each
time meaning is extracted, it is added to the framework of knowledge that
goes into encoding and decoding future messages. Certain patterns have
been noted to describe how meanings tend to be constructed, among them the
concepts of ideology and hegemony.
Ideology can be defined as, in the words of David Croteau and William
Hoynes, "a system of meaning that helps define and explain the world and
that makes value judgments about that world."[18] Meaning production
involves a social struggle over which kind of social accenting wins
credibility.[19] Dennis Mumby clearly articulates this process by stating
that "ideology provides the underlying logic which guides and constrains
discourse, while at the same time discourse is the means by which ideology
is continually produced and reproduced."[20]
Hegemony may be more powerful, however. Hall has said that, "in order for
one meaning to be regularly produced, it had to win a kind of credibility,
legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness for itself."[21] Gramsci, who referred
to this inventory of traditional ideas (of which more than one construction
may coexist, and ideas are collective over time) that we draw from as
"common sense,"[22] explained that hegemony occurs when something becomes
so ingrained in a culture that it becomes commonsense for most people in
that society.[23]
Review of Literature
Shortly after the 2000 Bridgestone/Firestone tire recall announcement, Mark
W. Sheffert, CEO of a financial and management advisory firm, stated in an
industry trade publication that, "Because of poor-quality product and
management's controversial handling of the crisis, the great company that
Harvey Firestone dreamed of and built – and its 100-year-old reputation –
is now tarnished."[24] This statement assumes that the way
Bridgestone/Firestone handled the tire recall situation is a major cause of
its damaged company reputation. Although this may seem to be a
common-sense, widely shared opinion regarding the Bridgestone/Firestone
situation, this paper will test this assumption through a systematic study
of factors at work in setting the frames within which these events might be
viewed.
Although media and industry trade publications have covered the
Bridgestone/Firestone events in detail, little scholarly work has been
published about this specific crisis. Most relevant to this research is a
case study written by communication scholars Joseph Blaney, William Benoit
and LeAnn Brazeal, which identifies the image restoration strategies
Bridgestone/Firestone used during the crisis.[25] Among the other few
examples are a brief mention of the tire recall as part of a broader trend
in litigation statutes in a legal journal article,[26] and an essay about
the recall written by an English professor and published in The North
American Review,[27] but these sources represent scholarly commentary and
do not come from comprehensive empirical study.
Much, though not all, of the crisis communications literature, assumes an
"effects" tradition rather than a constructionist perspective, where it is
assumed that organizations have the ability to control crises. A
constructionist perspective views communication as, in the words of John
Fiske, "a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained,
repaired and transformed."[28] This differs from the traditional SMCR view
of communication as a linear process; it instead views communication as the
generation of meaning.[29]
Some literature deals with the constraints that might be placed upon
organizations when responding to crises. Among scholars who have noted
tensions between communication and legal strategies, public relations
professor Kathy R. Fitzpatrick and co-researcher Maureen Shubow Rubin say
that "while most attorneys advocate a 'no comment' approach designed to
limit legal liability, most public relations practitioners recommend an
'open' policy."[30] Fitzpatrick and Rubin's analysis of words of defendant
spokespersons in news articles dealing with sexual harassment cases showed
that approximately two-thirds adopted legal strategies (deny or refuse
comment), while the remainder reflected either a traditional public
relations approach (explain policy or announce investigation), or a mix of
legal and public relations strategies.[31] While this analysis of just
one type of crisis situation cannot be generalized to all crisis
communication strategies, it does show, according to the authors, that
tensions and tradeoffs occur between "the risk of legal liability and the
need to protect the organization's reputation."[32]
English professor Lisa Tyler introduces a third complication for public
companies facing crises that may lead to legal suits and potential
bankruptcy. Tyler argues that "corporate executives are thus trapped,
because much as they might like to apologize, they cannot do so without
violating their fiduciary responsibility to stockholders."[33] These
situations often prompt communicators to use equivocal, ambiguous language
in their crisis responses, Tyler adds.
In literature showing a strong connection between crises and corporate
images, communications professor W. Timothy Coombs says "the repertoire of
crisis-response strategies is composed of messages designed to repair
organizational images."[34] Many scholars have avoided defining corporate
image altogether; others have described corporate identity
characteristics. Public relations scholar Larissa A. Grunig, for example,
says that, "Because no theory of image formation exists, description must
be relied on."[35] One scholar described corporate image as something
situated in both the production and consumption of an organization's
messages,[36] that is - "as the result of a dual process of corporate image
production by the organization and the audience consumption by the
populations and public that relate to the organization."[37] This scholar,
Mary Anne Moffitt, builds on a model articulated by British cultural
theorist Stuart Hall which holds that the receiver of a message does not
alone decide the meaning of a text, but that meaning is the result of
multiple factors.[38] She states that, "for public relations, the
articulation model of meaning suggests that the organization's messages,
the receiver's personal experiences, and related historical and cultural
factors all come together to articulate meaning(s) or image(s) to a
population member."[39] Moffitt adds that organizations may possess
multiple images at any given time, and, similarly, audience members may
perceive multiple images of a single organization. In a case study of
people's images of State Farm Insurance, Moffitt found that, "not only were
multiple images possible but that, at certain historical moments, one or
two images have the potential to determine other held images and emerge as
the dominant image."[40] For the State Farm study, Moffitt defined
corporate image as "any piece of knowledge, any attitude, and any action –
large or subtle, positive or negative – that a resident may have toward
[the] organization."[41] She paid particular attention to commonly held
images vs. exceptions, positive and negative images, and whether images
were relatively constant or more dynamic.
Other definitions of corporate image found in the literature include:
"the personality or character of the company projected to the public,"[42]
"a fluid process communicating both positive and negative, intended and
unintended, strong and weak, images and messages – often simultaneously –
to any given population and its members,"[43] and
"the impression of a person, company or institution that is held by one or
more publics…an image is not a picture, that is, it is not a detailed
representation; it is, rather, a few details softened with the fuzziness of
perception."[44]
The term corporate image can be contrasted with several similar labels,
including corporate identity and corporate reputation. Corporate identity
has traditionally referred to company logos, names, styles and other visual
identification, although the term has been expanded.[45] Summarizing a
review of corporate communications literature, business and corporate
communications Professor Cees B.M. van Riel defines corporate identity as
"the way in which a company presents itself through behaviour, as well as
through symbolism, to internal and external audiences."[46] More
precisely, according to van Riel, corporate identity is "the self
presentation of an organisation, rooted in the behaviour of individual
organizational members, expressing the organisation's 'sameness over time'
or continuity, 'distinctiveness,' [from other organizations] and
'centrality'"…which consists of "features that are perceived as the essence
of the organisation and that are spread over all organisational
units."[47] This definition suggests that corporate identity is more
stable than corporate images over time.
Corporate reputation is slightly different in that it refers to an overall
evaluation of corporate achievements rather than the essence of an
organization.[48] According to van Riel, "reputation assessments indicate
levels of esteem in the eyes of external stakeholders, based on the
combined evaluations of separate images attributed to firm activities in
areas including finance, human resources, social responsibility, or product
quality." This definition suggests that images are smaller units of the
larger concept of overall corporate reputation.
Some literature ties image and crisis communication together – image
restoration, which assumes that crises function as either opportunities or
threats to corporate image, depending upon the situation and organization's
response – includes such strategies as denial, evasion of responsibility,
reducing offensiveness of event, corrective action or mortification.[49]
Method
The importance of this research is to examine what role a company plays in
how the media covers a crisis that impacts the organization, and to explore
the extent to which a crisis situation changes the organization's corporate
image. Specifically, this research asks:
RQ1: How was the Bridgestone/Firestone tire recall issue framed?
How did Bridgestone/Firestone frame the tire recall issue in its
company-issued news releases during the crisis (2000-2002)?
How did the media frame the tire recall issue as it related to
Bridgestone/Firestone during the crisis (2000-2002)?
What were differences in the way the media framed the tire recall issue and
the way Bridgestone/Firestone framed the tire recall issue during the
crisis (2000-2002)?
RQ2: How was Bridgestone/Firestone's image framed?
How did Bridgestone/Firestone frame its own corporate image in
company-issued news releases during the crisis (2000-2002)?
How did the media portray Bridgestone/Firestone's corporate image in the
tire recall crisis (2000-2002)?
What were differences in the way the media framed Bridgestone/Firestone's
image and the way Bridgestone/Firestone framed its own image during the
crisis (2000-2002)?
How did Bridgestone/Firestone frame its corporate image in company-issued
news releases before the crisis (1991-1999)?
How did the media portray Bridgestone/Firestone's corporate image before
the crisis (1991-1999)?
What were the differences in the way the media framed
Bridgestone/Firestone's image and the way Bridgestone/Firestone framed its
own image before the crisis (1991-1999)?
RQ3: Did Bridgestone/Firestone's pre-crisis image change during the crisis?
Did the way Bridgestone/Firestone framed its own corporate image differ
during the tire recall (2000-2002) from the way it was framed before the
crisis (1991-1999)? If it changed, at what point?
Did the way the media frame Bridgestone/Firestone's corporate image differ
during the tire recall (2000 -2002) from the way it was framed before the
crisis (1991-1999)? If it changed, at what point?
If the company framed its own corporate image consistently before and
during the crisis, did the media also frame the company's corporate image
consistently during these periods?
Corporate image is defined here as a dominant representation of a
corporation found in descriptions of aspects or characteristics of a
corporation. This definition assumes a production view of framing –
looking at a communicator's use of images, rather than at how the audience
interprets such frames. Corporate image was operationalized here by
identifying patterns, or recurring frames, that describe an organization in
a particular way.
Corporate identity and reputation are described as differing in depth –
with image being closer to a surface impression, and identity and
reputation signifying deeply-rooted characteristics. Definitions found in
the literature imply that identity and reputation are more stable than
images: they are built over longer periods of time and more difficult to
change, while image is malleable and ever-changing, quickly established,
and quickly unseated. Because one goal of this research is to detect
whether a corporation's image changes over time, it was assumed that images
would be most sensitive of all of these to change. Additionally, corporate
image appears to be the most common term used in crisis communication research.
The term media here means the (U.S.) news media as a whole – as a social
institution that plays an important role in how audience members construct
and frame their interpretations of the event. The specific medium studied
is Business Week, one organization within a large and varied media industry.
Selection of Time Periods. News stories and public relations (PR) news
releases were analyzed both before and during the crisis, "pre-crisis"
(before) and "crisis" (during). Although Houston television station
KHOU-TV has been credited with breaking the Firestone news story in early
February 2000, precursors began appearing as Ford Explorer roll-overs were
reported. Deputy Secretary of Transportation Michael P. Jackson testified
before the U.S. House of Representatives that the NHTSA's May 2000
investigation began after the number of complaints concerning the Firestone
tires in question increased significantly in 2000.[50] Major developments
continued through completion of NHTSA's TREAD Act conclusions at the end of
2002. Although strict boundaries do not exist for when the crisis began
and ended, the "crisis" timeframe was chosen as 2000 to 2002.
The "pre-crisis" timeframe studied here was 1991 to 1999, rather than just
the two years prior to the crisis because it was assumed that Firestone
received less national news coverage in less turbulent times and because a
somewhat comparable number of news stories before the crisis and after was
sought. In addition, the news coverage and releases prior to the crisis
were more diverse – focusing on such routine events as product news,
corporate earnings, changes in management (new hires or departures),
etc. It was also assumed that study of nearly an entire decade would give
a more comprehensive sense of the company image frames prior to the
crisis. The study begins with 1991 because Ford introduced its Explorer
SUV, the vehicle that put Bridgestone/Firestone's tires in headlines that
year and because the Bridgestone-Firestone merger was newly
formed. Pre-merger images reflected the two companies separately rather
than combined.
Selection of Texts. One national news magazine, Business Week, was
studied for news articles about Firestone for several reasons: First, a
weekly news magazine generally covers stories in more depth than daily
newspapers. It was assumed that the longer articles likely in a weekly
magazine would also contain more news frames. Business Week, a national
news source, was chosen for study also because its high circulation reaches
many and the potential for influencing people is high, with its vast
audience of 5.1 million readers worldwide.[51] Further, because the space
for news in Business Week is devoted entirely to business, it was reasoned
that this type of publication would contain more news about a business like
Bridgestone/Firestone before the crisis than publications like USA Today or
the New York Times. Yet Business Week's audience still represents a
"general" readership. This was an important consideration, because this
research focuses on the influence of media coverage on the general public's
constructions of the meanings, as opposed to constructions by those in the
tire industry.
To find relevant articles, the search terms "Firestone" and "Bridgestone"
were entered into the LexisNexis Academic Universe database.[52] Only
Business Week stories written between 2000-2002 and 1991-1999 containing
both terms were included. The search yielded a total of 53 Business Week
news stories from 2000 and 2002, and 32 Business Week news stories from
1991 to 1999.
To answer the questions about how the company framed the issue and its
corporate identity, all 71 news releases were collected from the company's
Web site where archived tire news releases during 2000-2002 were
catalogued.[53]
The LexisNexis Academic Universe database was used to find a sample of 1991
to 1999 Bridgestone/Firestone news releases for comparison purposes. The
Bridgestone/Firestone Web site news release archive did not include
releases prior to 1996, so PR Newswire and BusinessWire, two wire services
commonly used by companies to distribute press releases, were searched
using the LexisNexis Academic Universe database. A preliminary total of
501 news releases were found on PR Newswire and BusinessWire between 1991
and 1999 using the search terms "Firestone" and "Bridgestone" in the full
text of press releases indexed by the LexisNexis Academic Universe
database. This list of 501 was then narrowed to 173 news releases to
include only those releases where Bridgestone/Firestone was listed as the
"source" or as a specific "contact." Eliminated releases included those
generated by other organizations Examples are: releases written about
Bridgestone/Firestone by an outside source like the United Steelworkers of
America; releases that mentioned Bridgestone/Firestone briefly as a client
or customer but were generated by, and were mainly about, other companies
and; releases that announced an agreement or sales arrangement with
Bridgestone/Firestone, but that were distributed by the partner
organization rather than by Bridgestone/Firestone. A small number of
similar partnership announcements were included because they were issued as
a joint announcement from the two companies and included both companies'
contact information (which fit the criteria for inclusion described above).
Method. Framing analysis was the method chosen to examine the messages in
Bridgestone/Firestone press releases, and in media reports. Framing is
often described as akin to taking a photograph or painting a picture within
a particular frame. The photographer, for example, has a panoramic view of
a scene but chooses to frame a particular portion of it for a
photograph. It is assumed that the photographer's decisions about how to
frame the photo (and about what not to include in the frame) influences the
way viewers of the photograph interpret it. Although many factors may
affect individuals' perceptions, the way a photo is framed offers cues that
help shape viewers' perceptions. This analogy can be extended to the way a
writer chooses to frame events of a story or to weave abstract ideas into a
comprehensible narrative.
Sociologist Irving Goffman, in a book published in 1974, explains that
individuals tend to respond to events through a particular framework, or a
schemata of interpretation that is primary to them. Goffman says that "a
primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be
a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful," and
that "each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify,
and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in
its terms."[54]
Among scholars who have applied Goffman's general notion of framing
analysis to the study of news, or media texts, specifically, journalism
and political communication scholar Robert Entman explains that "to frame
is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described."[55], [56] He describes four places
where frames are found in the communication process: through communicators,
the text, receivers, and the culture.
Of particular interest to this research are Entman's comments about
communicators and text. According to Entman, "communicators make conscious
or unconscious framing judgments in deciding what to say, guided by frames
(often called schemata) that organize their belief systems. The text
contains frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and
sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or
judgments."[57], [58]
Similarly, mass communication scholar Dietram A. Scheufele breaks down the
framing concept by explicating two dimensions – media frames and individual
frames. Drawing upon the work of William A. Gamson and Antonio Modigliani
to define a media frame as a central organizing idea or story line used by
journalists that provides meaning to unfolding events, Scheufele says, "The
frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the
issue."[59] Individual frames refer to audience interpretation. Scheufele
uses Entman's ideas to define individual frames as "mentally scored
clusters of ideas that guide individuals' processing of information."[60]
Research for this paper focused on identifying media frames rather than
individual frames. Although a study of media frames cannot predict how
individuals will interpret frames, messages can offer insight into the cues
audience members might use in shaping their individual
interpretations.[61] The definition of media frames here includes those
produced by public relations communicators as well as journalists – or, in
other words – those found in news release texts as well as media
texts. Entman's discussion of frames as located in the communications
process through communicators, text, receivers and culture offers some
support for this expansion of the definition.[62]
Public relations professor and former practitioner Kirk Hallahan supports
applying framing analysis to the study of public relations sources and
texts. According to Hallahan,
"It could be argued that framing is not merely useful but is essential to
public relations. In developing programs, public relations professionals
fundamentally operate as frame strategists, who strive to determine how
situations, attributes, choices, actions, issues, and responsibility should
be posed to achieve favorable outcomes for clients. Framing decisions are
perhaps the most important strategic choices made in a public relations
effort. It is out of strategic framing that public relations communicators
develop specific themes (i.e., key messages or arguments that might be
considered by publics in the discussion of topics of mutual concern)."[63]
Social constructions of competing discourses can be negotiated and
contested, Hallahan says. A hegemonic process is at work in the
relationship between public relations sources and how they are used in
media texts. "Because not all sources are not [sic] necessarily going to
frame a story in the same way, public relations professionals often find
themselves engaged in frame contests with other sources who are also
seeking their favored treatment of a story."[64], [65]
A model of framing analysis as articulated by communication and journalism
scholars Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki was used to identify
frames. Pan and Kosicki define a news media frame as "…a cognitive device
used in information encoding, interpreting, and retrieving; it is
communicable; and it is related to journalistic professional routines and
conventions. Framing, therefore, may be studied as a strategy of
constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic of the
discourse itself."[66]
Frames were identified using Pan and Kosicki's framing devices: syntactical
structure, script structure, thematic structure, rhetorical structure, and
lexical framing. These devices signaled the presence of frames within
parts of text. Briefly, syntactical structure refers to the macro-level
way that news stories (and PR texts) are arranged, and what this suggests
about the overall frame through which pieces of information are
organized. For example, the inverted pyramid style means important facts
are placed in a certain order in headline and lead paragraphs. Information
and story angles at the beginning of texts, then, add signifying power to
these particular ideas. Quoted sources and empirical data are used as part
of a story's overall structure. Script structure emphasizes that news
reports (and press releases) are often presented as stories, combining
pieces of information into a continuous flow of history, offering a
particular sequence of events, and drawing attention to particular
characters, actions, drama, and/or human emotions. Thematic structure
concerns how overall themes are supported within a story through evidence,
causal statements, reasoning cues, observations and quotations presented to
support the overall hypothesis or theme. Rhetorical structure refers to
stylistic choices communicators make, including metaphors, catch phrases,
depictions, etc., which can be used to invoke images, increasing the
salience or intensity of a particular point. Finally, lexical devices mean
word choices or labels.[67] The presence or absence of these five framing
devices was systematically noted in this research to uncover the larger
overall frames communicators used.
Framing analysis was used to explore the Bridgestone/Firestone role in how
the media reported these complicated events to the public, and whether
these events changed Bridgestone/Firestone's corporate image is framing
analysis because it allows one to study images and representations in the
media and in other texts.
Findings
The overall purpose of this study was to explore Bridgestone/Firestone's
role in how the media covered the tire recall crisis, and to what extent
the crisis changed Bridgestone/Firestone's corporate image.
The Issue
Bridgestone/Firestone 2000-2002 News Releases. Bridgestone/Firestone's
framing of the tire recall issue during the crisis was quite clear during
the summer of 2000 when the company announced the recall of 6.5 million
tires, due in part to the repetition of similar themes in multiple news
releases. The frames evident in the company's discourse include: Voluntary
Action Chosen by the Company, Safety Precaution, Immediate Attention to the
Problem, Shift Blame Frame, and Limited Nature of Crisis.
Bridgestone/Firestone framed its recall of 6.5 million tires as a voluntary
action, despite the fact that the company wasn't convinced the tires caused
the problem described in complaints the NHTSA had received.[68] Indicators
of the Voluntary Action frame are found in the syntactical structure of the
press releases – in headlines and lead paragraphs. For example, the
headline on August 9, 2000 was: "Bridgestone/Firestone Announces Voluntary
Recall of 3.85 Million RADIAL ATC and 2.7 Million Wilderness AT
Tires."[69] The voluntary nature of the company's decision to recall the
tires was emphasized in nearly all news releases issued that month, often
in the lead paragraph. For example, on August 18, 2000, the news release
lead began "Seven working days into its voluntary safety recall…"[70] and
on August 25, 2000, the lead sentence read "Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
announced today that it will retain a leading expert or experts to conduct
an independent analysis of incidents involving tires affected by a
nationwide voluntary, safety recall."[71] After declaring that
Bridgestone/Firestone's products (excepting the P235/75R 15 size tires
produced in the Decatur plant) are "good, quality tires with an excellent
record of safety," and that even the Decatur-produced tires have a low
incident rate, Vice President of Public Affairs Christine Karbowiak
stressed voluntary action to support the company's high
standards. According to Karbowiak, "We have taken an unprecedented step to
voluntarily recall the P235/75 R15 Radial ATX and Radial ATX II tires made
in North America and the P235/75 R15 Wilderness AT tires made in Decatur,
Ill. with the safety and confidence of our consumers as our number one
priority."[72] This sentiment was stated more directly in Karbowiak's
statement to Congress that was summarized in a September 6, 2000
announcement. "It is important to remember that we announced this recall
on a voluntary basis, before we knew what was causing the problem."[73]
Similarly, Bridgestone/Firestone positioned the recall as a Safety
Precaution, emphasizing the preventative nature of the recall rather than
framing it as a serious safety problem that had already affected a number
of drivers who owned these particular tires. "We felt we must take this
extraordinary step as a precaution to ensure consumer safety and consumer
confidence in our brand," a company spokesperson stated.[74] Another
release introduced the phrase "safely re-equip" to describe exchanging the
faulty tires for new ones, as in: "making it faster and more convenient for
consumers to safely re-equip their vehicles."[75] Following an NBC
Dateline report showing that several authorized tire dealers could not
correctly identify the recalled tires, Bridgestone/Firestone announced that
it would retrain its dealers, stating that "we are taking the precaution of
asking our dealers to repeat technician training," although (as reported
further in the release), "we don't believe the isolated cases reported
reflect a widespread problem."[76]
Bridgestone/Firestone also framed its recall news in terms of Immediate
Attention to the Problem. Several headlines offer a clear example of this
frame: "Up to 350,000 Tires Now Replaced Since Recall Began Seven Days
Ago,"[77] "Firestone Speeds Up Pace of Recall; Tires Being Airlifted From
Japan,"[78] and "Firestone Reaching One Million Mark in Drive to Replace
Recalled Tires."[79] This frame emphasizes the company's effort to recall
the tires as quickly as possible, suggesting a race-to-the-finish line
attitude. Lexical word choices, such as "quickly as possible," "doubled
production," "maximized imports," and "tires are being airlifted,"[80]
illustrate this frame. A November 28, 2000 press release states, "No major
automotive recall has achieved such significant results in so short a
period of time."[81] Omitted is the fact that the one million tires
recalled to date represent one million potentially unsafe tires.
The company used a Shift Blame frame to suggest causes of the problem
attributable to sources other than Bridgestone/Firestone. Beginning with
its first recall press release, causal statements suggest plausible outside
causes of the tire-related incidents (a thematic structure
feature). Company spokesperson Gary Crigger, executive vice president of
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., first casts doubt on Bridgestone/Firestone's
apparent guilt by saying, "While we have not determined what, if any,
[emphasis mine] problem there may be with these tires, our review of the
data suggests three things."[82] Crigger presents the idea that, because a
majority of the incidents occurred in four Southern states, there may be a
correlation between heat and tire performance, and then links that to a
potential cause outside of the company: "When under inflated, all radial
tires generate excessive heat. Driving on tires in this condition can lead
to tread separation. Maintaining proper inflation level will enhance the
performance and lifespan of these tires."[83] This news release, and
others to follow, further supports the alternative cause argument by
encouraging customers to check their tire pressure to ensure proper
performance. The Shift Blame frame is dynamic in that it shifts throughout
the crisis – different attributions of responsibility appear at different
points in time.
Following the shift of blame throughout August 2000 onto improper tire
pressure (and indirectly onto consumers) and hot weather conditions,
Bridgestone/Firestone dramatically shifts to "blaming" itself. In a joint
statement with its new public relations firm on September 11, 2000, the
company said "we know we have been slow in responding to public concerns,
that we underestimated the intensity of the situation, and that we have
been too focused on internal details…we are determined to change all
that."[84] This statement comes out of the blue from a company that has
spent the previous month framing the recall as quick and timely. The next
day, the company took "full responsibility." "In strongly-worded language,
an official of Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (BFS) told the Senate Commerce
Committee today that the company was taking full responsibility for the
failures that led to the recall of an estimated 6.5 million tires while at
the same time agreeing that government safety standards should address
updating tire standards and the relationship between the tire and the
vehicle."[85] However, this sentence suggests a tie between the tire and
the vehicle as cause, rather than just the tire, and it suggests some blame
be placed on insufficient government safety standards, a point further
emphasized in the next paragraph of the Bridgestone/Firestone release: "We
are not vehicle experts…there are still critical issues to be studied
regarding the interaction between tires and vehicles…these issues –
including rollovers, tire inflation, and overloading – 'may have made it
harder for us to see the [tire] problems that we have now recognized.'"[86]
Mixed assignments of responsibility continue throughout the crisis. For
example, Bridgestone/Firestone, after ending its 96-year business
relationship with Ford in May, 2001, said, "we take responsibility for our
tires. The tires Ford is replacing under this program are safe. But for
the Ford Explorer, the question of safety remains."[87]
Closely related to the Shift Blame frame, the Limited Nature of Crisis
frame served to downplay the severity of the problem and the extent of
Bridgestone/Firestone's responsibility. In addition to suggesting that low
tire inflation may be to blame, Bridgestone/Firestone frames the issue as a
problem limited mostly to tires produced in its Decatur, Ill. plant for its
August 9, 2000 news release.[88] Lexical word choice reinforces the
limit-the-severity-of-the-problem frame. For example, an August 10 release
reiterates that "This recall includes original equipment and replacement
tires of only [italics mine] that size and type."[89] Even after the
company's September 11, 2000, statement saying that "we underestimated the
intensity of the situation," Bridgestone/Firestone continued frame the
problem as limited in its severity. The rhetorical metaphor in the
following example illustrates this: "Because the number of tires involved
is so small, Lampe said Firestone's field engineers and other technical
experts have a difficult job. Answering the problem would not be unlike
'finding a needle in a haystack.'"[90]
2000-2002 News Stories. Judged by the words journalists used to describe
the tire recall crisis, the media framed the issue as it related to
Bridgestone Firestone as a fiasco, first and foremost. Rather than
describing the recall as a "situation," "development" or "issue," media
generally refer to it as "the Firestone tire fiasco"[91] "debacle,"[92] and
"a scandal with legs."[93] Other frames found in the media include:
Responsibility, Involuntary Recall, and Blown out of Proportion.
The Responsibility frame reflects how blame is assigned. Depending upon
the angle, news coverage frames Bridgestone/Firestone as guilty as charged,
pointing fingers, or creating confusion. Some news articles assign guilt
to Bridgestone/Firestone in the way they describe the company's tires. An
example is "More than 200 people have died traveling in the previous
generation Explorer when the vehicle's Firestones shredded and caused the
SUV to roll over."[94] This statement takes for granted that the Firestone
tires are the cause of the roll-overs. The portrayal of both companies as
blaming each other appears early. In a September 2000 article, under a
subhead, entitled "Pointing Fingers," the text begins:
"So what must Ford and Firestone do? For the sake of their brands and
consumer confidence, they should find a better way to work together. So
far the two have been squabbling, pointing fingers, and providing an
unclear picture of what is going on."[95]
This theme continues throughout the crisis coverage. A July 2, 2001 story,
for example, says that "bewildered SUV owners have watched as Ford Chief
Executive Jacques Nasser and John Lampe, his counterpart at
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., hurl accusations at each other." An article
that is critical of the NHTSA suggests that Ford, Firestone and the NHTSA
share responsibility for consumers' confusion about whether they are
"driving in a dangerously designed vehicle, on faulty tires, or
both?" According to the article, "Ford, Firestone, lawmakers and safety
groups have all been publicly manipulating NHTSA's own claims data while
the agency stands mute on the sidelines." Other stories refer to confusion
about who is responsible. For example, a September 11, 2000 article read
"And even Ford consultant Noel M. Tichy, a management professor at the
University of Michigan, acknowledges that the fact that two companies are
involved has dramatically complicated getting out a coherent explanation."[96]
Bridgestone/Firestone's action is framed as an Involuntary Recall rather
than as a company choice. Examples include: "On top of the 6.5 million
flawed tires Firestone was forced to recall last August…"[97]
and "Firestone, for its part, has resisted this recall every inch of the
way."[98]
Although the Blown out of Proportion frame was found in one article, it
suggests clues about what remains outside the frames of many other
stories. This article lists all of the organizations that have an interest
in keeping the "Ford-Firestone fiasco" in the headlines, including trial
lawyers, auto safety advocates, congressional liberals and conservatives,
NHTSA, and the media. The author says the organizations are "fashioning
their own image out of whatever facts are emerging" as support for a
particular viewpoint. To put many of these groups' assertions into
context, he points out that, "By NHTSA's count, Explorers with Firestones
were involved in 101 deaths, but the fatalities occurred over a decade." In
response to liberal politicians who are advocating more consumer safety
regulations, he says. "Many owners of Firestone-shod Explorers think
they're sitting on rolling time bombs. In fact, out of the 14.4 million
tires in the lines Firestone recalled, only about 80 have been involved in
fatal crashes."[99]
The media framed the Bridgestone/Firestone issue generally differently than
the company. One clear example is the Voluntary vs. Involuntary
frame. The company stressed that it took the recall action on its own
accord, while the media framed the recall as forced. Regarding the cause
of responsibility for the incident, Bridgestone/Firestone shifted blame
onto others, while the media framed Bridgestone/Firestone's responsibility
as a given. Only one news story was found that framed the problem as
limited in severity – the same frame Bridgestone/Firestone used. This was
the October 16, 2000 article that used the portrayal
blown-out-of-proportion theme.
Bridgestone/Firestone's Image
Bridgestone/Firestone 2000-2002 News Releases. The recurring
Bridgestone/Firestone frames were Concern for Customers, Open &
Cooperative, Reputation and Responsiveness.
The Concern for Customers frame dominated, with variations of this frame
found in almost every release. This frame included concern for customers'
safety, satisfaction with – and confidence in – Bridgestone/Firestone and
its products and level of service. Corporate officials justified the
extensive voluntary recall, in part, by framing it in terms of concern for
customers' safety. This frame first appeared in the lead of the first
recall press release on August 9: "Saying the safety of consumers is the
company's first concern, today Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., announced a
voluntary recall…" Months later, the frame persists: "Our customers have
been extremely supportive throughout this process and I want them to know
that we take seriously our responsibilities to every one of them. That's
why we initiated this recall."[100]
The Open & Cooperative frame reflected Bridgestone/Firestone as committed
to honest, straightforward communication and to working fully with
government and regulatory agencies and business partners. In a release
announcing Bridgestone/Firestone's commitment to work closely with a
recently formed group of state attorneys and consumer protection agencies,
a spokesperson noted that the company "will be open and fully cooperative
with the working group in sharing data and other background, just as we
have with the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA), Congress and others." Similarly, when asked to provide data to
plaintiffs' lawyers, among others, the company articulated its "policy of
being open and responsive to these requests."[101] When the company hired
outside experts to help determine the root cause of the tire problems, it
was committed to also "actively seek to develop an open, transparent review
process so that people can have confidence that the process was honest."[102]
The Bridgestone Reputation frame emphasized company history, stability,
industry leadership and tradition of quality products. For example, "Lampe
emphasized that the 100-year-old company was committed to restoring that
confidence. 'We make great tire products on which millions of customers
have driven billions of safe miles." Such statements as "We want to assure
our longstanding customers and business partners" frame the company as
having a rich history of relationships.[103] On December 10, 2000, CEO
John Lampe said, "the safety recall showed us a clear need to redouble our
efforts to become the recognized industry leader in tire safety. The
review team's efforts gave us the road map to changes and improvements to
achieve that goal."[104]
The company framed many of its actions during the crisis as a testament to
its Responsiveness to customers' needs and concern, emphasized through
discussion about getting things done quickly, taking action or taking
control of situations, and going above and beyond the call of duty. The
following statement is an example of the company's responsiveness frame:
"Our message in Washington today is that we won't stop here. We know there
are many challenges ahead and that we may have made some mistakes through
this process. But Bridgestone/Firestone will do everything we can to
protect the safety of our customers and to restore public confidence in our
brand."[105]
The company's responsiveness was the subject of an advertising campaign
with the slogan, "Making It Right," to raise awareness of the company's
action plan to enhance tire production procedures, continuously improve and
upgrade facilities and to implement an early warning system and a rapid
response structure to detect problems earlier and more quickly.[106]
2000-2002 News Stories. While the news releases devoted more space to
framing issues than images, the media coverage did the opposite. The news
stories framed Bridgestone/Firestone's corporate image during the tire
recall crisis as Damaged Image, Lack of Candor, Questionable Safety and
Quality, Troubled/Uncertain Future and Strong Leadership.
The Damaged Image frame appears in an April 30, 2001, Business Week
article, which stated that "the company's reputation remains seriously
damaged." The reporter gives the data from a Total Research Corp. survey
on brand reliability that shows Firestone's rating dropped 40% from the
previous year. The article then quotes an analyst from the survey research
company, who says "It was one of the worst reactions we've ever
seen."[107] One article stated that "both companies are in danger of
further damaging already smashed-up images,"[108] while another said,
"Indeed, Firestone's reputation may be damaged beyond repair. But Ford's
is still in the balance."[109]
The Lack of Candor frame is found in an October 2, 2000, article:
"…Congressional anger over what some representatives believe is a
consistent lack of forthrightness by both Ford and
Firestone…"[110] Labeling the tire problem a "classic corporate
potboiler," another story states that "both Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone
officials, documents show, had ample warnings of problems that may have led
to Explorer crashes and 88 U.S. deaths…House and Senate investigators are
seeking proof that management covered up dangerous product
defects."[111] In the article The Hidden Culprit: The U.S. Legal System,
the reporter says the legal protective orders Firestone and Ford won prior
to the recalls, which prevented related lawsuit information from becoming
public, delayed public awareness of the tire defect. The author quotes a
former NHTSA chief who was asked, 'did this acquiescence to secrecy delay
public awareness…" He responded "Absolutely – by a matter of years."[112]
Another frame found was Questionable Safety and Quality. A January 15,
2001 Business Week article references "the recall of 6.5 million faulty
Firestone tires,"[113] characterizing all 6.5 million as faulty, as opposed
to the small number claimed by Bridgestone/Firestone. In an April 30,
2001, profile of CEO John Lampe's ad campaign to restore consumer
confidence, the writer states, "But until Firestone has improved the
quality of its tires and established a safety record that auto makers and
consumers can rely on, it will be a hard sell. That's especially true
since Firestone competitors Michelin and Goodyear offer very good tires and
have strong reputations. Indeed, the Firestone brand may be well beyond
repair."[114] This statement assumes Bridgestone/Firestone's tires have
quality issues. The comparison with Bridgestone/ up Firestone's
competitors implies that, in contrast, Bridgestone/Firestone does not have
good tires or a strong reputation.
Additionally, Bridgestone/Firestone is framed as having a
Troubled/Uncertain Future. On October 16, 2000, Business Week reported
that, following the recall and NHTSA's announcement of an investigation
into the Ford-Firestone link, Ford's brand was immeasurably damaged and
"Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. is fighting to survive."[115] Shortly
thereafter, when John Lampe was promoted to CEO, a report characterized his
biggest challenge as: "persuading wary consumers and auto manufactures not
to abandon the tarnished brand."[116]
Despite the mostly negative frames of Bridgestone/Firestone's image, some
evidence supports a company frame of Strong Leadership. For example, CEO
John Lampe was listed as one of Business Week's Top 25 "Managers to Watch
in 2001."[117] One article stated that Lampe "made a much better
impression during congressional hearings than then CEO Masatoshi Ono, whose
defense of Firestone lost something in translation," and quoted a public
advocacy group spokesperson who commented on Lampe's leadership: "He went
after Ford relentlessly…that took some guts."[118] Of course, Lampe's
promotion to CEO affected company leadership frames. Before October 2000,
when Bridgestone's top executive Kaizaki was handling the crisis, the media
reported that although Kaizaki "is a star… credited with globalizing
operations and doubling profits"…"This is a huge crisis," and "Bridgestone
and Kaizaki are handling it terribly." The article ends with the analogy
of needing a general to lead the troops and states that "neither Ono nor
Yoichiro Kaizaki seem to fit the role."[119]
Again, the company and the media framed Bridgestone/Firestone's image quite
differently. While Bridgestone/Firestone emphasized its reputation, the
media focused on the damaged company image. The company continually framed
its commitment to openness, while the media frames raised questions about
the company's candor. As part of its Concern for Customers frame,
Bridgestone/Firestone expressed concern for consumer safety, while the
media frames questioned its ability to provide this.
1991-1999 News Stories. The Bridgestone/Firestone news stories in the
1990's mainly dealt with Bridgestone's purchase of Firestone, and labor
relations, including a long-term and high-profile strike. The frames
identified regarding the company's image were: Japanese-Owned, Unstable
Financial Performance, Secretive/Evasive, and Strained Relations.
Among articles stressing Firestone's new connection with Japan, an April
22, 1991, story described Bridgestone/Firestone as "the U.S. arm of Japan's
largest tiremaker."[120] Another reported that "a stream of high-ranking
Americans has left Bridgestone Corp. since it bought Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. in 1988, adding, "Indeed, the tire giant has had a Japanese
running its U.S. operations since the 1991 departure of CEO George W
Aucott."[121] This emphasis may be due to the differences in Japanese and
American management styles, as highlighted in the previously quoted
article, or it could be because of the very recent merger between the two
companies.
Unstable financial performance. Bridgestone's acquisition of Firestone,
framed as Firestone's roller-coaster financial performance, is evident in
such comments as "Logic doesn't always translate into profits,
however… "Strategically smart as the deal might have been, it is unlikely
to pay off financially for a long time."[122] On the other hand, a 1997
story about global consolidation states that "Bridgestone Corp. for one,
has mushroomed in the U.S. and Canada since buying Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. in 1989, doubling its production to 23 million tires a year."[123]
Bridgestone/Firestone was framed as Secretive and even Evasive in news
stories. During a trade negotiation standoff with the United Rubber
Workers (URW), for example, coverage described the organizations as
participating in "months of secret talks."[124] Examples of a frame of
Bridgestone/Firestone as regularly denying charges, which could be
construed as withholding information or being evasive, are, "The United
Rubber Workers charge Bridgestone with organizing other tire makers to
prepare for a strike, an assertion the company denies"[125] and the
response to the URW's accusation of Bridgestone/Firestone as being a
ringleader of three other international tiremakers. The company responded
that "Bridgestone denies any such alliance."[126]
Strained relations. A 1991 story referred to the "rancor that had marked
earlier relations between Firestone and the union."[127] One article
written during the mid-1990s stated that "Bridgestone has alienated other
U.S. policymakers" during its strike with URW.[128] Also during the
strike, an article reported that "the U.S. isn't pleased," with
Bridgestone/Firestone's tactics of refusing to back off its demands.[129]
Bridgestone/Firestone 1991-1999 News Releases. Bridgestone/Firestone's
press releases during the 1990's reflected typical news occurrences, such
as new product announcements, marketing promotions and earnings releases,
as well as comments on labor negotiations. Throughout this decade, the
company framed its image as Leadership, Technology Innovations, Quality and
Achievements & Milestones.
An example of the Leadership frame is in Bridgestone/Firestone's
announcement of CEO Ono being named executive of the year by Rubber and
Plastics News. Bridgestone/Firestone describes itself as "at the
forefront of run-flat tire technology," and as the "first" company to
market and sell this type of tire in the U.S.,[130] as well as the builder
of "world-class" manufacturing facilities.[131] Examples of the frame
Technical Innovations include the headline: "Bridgestone/Firestone
Introduces New 'Worn' Tire Technology,"[132] and a lead paragraph
announcing that the company had developed "a prototype 'active' computer
tag…a first for the tire industry."[133]
Quality frames appear in the announcement that the company has received
"ISO 9002 accreditation of its quality assurance system…,"[134] will
"introduce…a…tire and wheel system which significantly improves tire
safety…,"[135] and "Bridgestone's ultra high performance tire…came out on
top in a recent tire test by Performance Car magazine." The Achievements &
Milestones frame appears in such headlines as "Bridgestone/Firestone Breaks
Company Record for Plant Construction."[136] or leads such as "The first
green flag hasn't dropped in Bridgestone/Firestone's involvement in Indy
car racing and already the tire manufacturer is taking the lead."[137]
Bridgestone/Firestone framed its image in much more positive terms than did
the media. Company image frames were Leadership, Technology Innovations,
Quality and Immediate Attention, while the media framed tensions of
Japanese-American Management Styles, Unstable Financial Performance,
Secretive/Evasive, and Strained Relations.
Changes Over Time
Bridgestone/Firestone framed its image somewhat differently during the
2000-2002 crisis years by stressing qualities that related to the crisis
specifically. Frames in 2000-2002 were Concern for Customers, Open &
Cooperative, Reputation and Responsiveness, while frames in 1991-1999 were
Leadership, Technology Innovations, Quality and Achievements & Milestones.
The media consistently framed the company in terms of its challenges -
Damaged Image, Lack of Candor, Questionable Safety and Quality, and
Troubled/Uncertain Future in 2000, and Unstable Financial Performance,
Secretive/Evasive, and Strained Relations in the 1990's.
Overall, the media framed Bridgestone/Firestone consistently, but the
media's frames were not consistent with those by Bridgestone/Firestone of
its own image.
Discussion
The framing analysis results for this particular crisis indicate that
Bridgestone/Firestone had little success in affecting media framing of the
issue and its image– at least in terms of defining the situation in ways
that were similar to the company's own frames. The company's strategy of
Shifting Blame to different parties throughout the crisis, however, may
have contributed to the media's Responsibility frame charging
Bridgestone/Firestone with creating confusion, guilt and pointing
fingers. Reasons for the media's general lack of consistency with
Bridgestone/Firestone's frames could be due to the marketing tone of the
company's Immediate Attention to the Problem frame that promoted its
progress in the drive to replace tires, as well as the company's
inattention to issues left largely outside of its framing strategy, such as
not dealing with the human element of the issue or apologizing for the
fatalities that had occurred. Other factors for the media's chosen framing
may have included the number of parties involved, and the complicated
nature of the tire-vehicle equation.
Again, the company's framing of its own image was nearly opposite that of
the media during the crisis. This research also looked to media coverage
before the tire issue occurred to find out whether this incongruent framing
had been typical in the past. Company and media frame from 1991 to 1999
were not polarized in opposite directions as they were during the crisis as
much simply different. Company frames tended to focus on positive company
announcements, while media frames tended to focus on hard business news,
such as acquisition and management-related issues, financial performance
and trade negotiations. Interestingly, some of the same media frames did
emerge during the crisis as had been common from 1991 to 1999. Most
notably, the media description of Bridgestone/Firestone's Lack of Candor
during the crisis was similar to the Secretive/Evasive characterization of
the company prior to the crisis.
Although an analysis of company frames and media frames does not lead to a
direct prediction of how audience members will construct individual frames,
one can point to causal statements by the company and in the media to
discuss how the audience might interpret these frames and their potential
implications.[138]
Unexpected findings. An unexpected finding was the change in the
Bridgestone/Firestone frame of the issue during the crisis – especially the
blame frame. It was assumed that Bridgestone/Firestone would frame the
issue consistently throughout the crisis period. One possible explanation
for change is the high level of uncertainty when the company announced the
recall in August 2000. As more facts were uncovered, Bridgestone/Firestone
may have decided to adjust its crisis response strategy
accordingly. However, the company's framing not only evolved in response
to the crisis. It shifted dramatically. This shift occurred when the
company hired a new public relations firm, indicating the firm's influence
on the message strategy.
Frames were easily detected in press releases, and were more subtle in
news stories. This can be explained due to the differing professional
norms of public relations and journalism. Public relations professionals
seek to represent their companies in the best light and to repeat key
messages consistently, while journalists are expected to be "balanced" and
"objective."
Limitations. A limitation of this research is that one news magazine was
studied. Although a study of Business Week may offer important insights
about media tendencies more broadly, this research cannot be generalized to
the media as a whole. Further research should include other national U.S.
news magazines, national U.S. daily newspapers, the daily newspapers where
Ford (Detroit, Mich.) and Firestone (Nashville, Tenn.) are headquartered;
and/or a geographically representative sample of U.S. daily
newspapers. Due to its specialized coverage, Business Week is likely to be
more favorable to business as compared with more general news
publications. Including study of more media in this research would
increase validity and reliability.
Another limitation lies in the disproportionate amount of materials
available for study. Generally speaking, one would expect the amount of
news coverage about a company to greatly increase during a crisis, compared
to pre-crisis periods. Therefore, to gather enough pre-crisis material to
get necessary evidence, the timeframe of the "pre-crisis" news coverage
period may need to be extended. On the other hand, one would expect the
number of news releases issued specific to a crisis – although potentially
great – to be fewer than the number issued during an extended "pre-crisis"
period – especially if the subject of investigation is a large company. A
sample from the entire population of "crisis" period news releases rather
than just those related to the crisis potentially makes answering research
questions regarding the crisis more difficult, given the reduced amount of
crisis-related announcements relative to the number of company news
releases.
Directions for further research. Further research could compare the way
Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford framed image. Additionally, it would be
interesting to investigate whether the media framed Ford and
Bridgestone/Firestone. Bridgestone/Firestone was ranked at the absolute
bottom of the 2001 and 2002 Harris Interactive reputation quotient survey –
behind second-worst ranked Phillip Morris,[139] while Ford was ranked
higher. Perhaps a comparison of the framing of the two companies would
yield valuable insights.
Conclusion
In summary, Bridgestone/Firestone framed its image somewhat differently
before and after the crisis in the two periods studied, focusing on the
positives in both periods, but stressing qualities related to the crisis
specifically from 2000-2002. Frames in 2000-2002 were Concern for
Customers, Open & Cooperative, Reputation and Responsiveness, while frames
in 1991-1999 were Leadership, Technology Innovations, Quality and
Achievements & Milestones. The media consistently framed the company in
terms of its challenges - Damaged Image, Lack of Candor, Questionable
Safety and Quality, and Troubled/Uncertain Future in 2000, and Unstable
Financial Performance, Secretive/Evasive, and Strained Relations in the
1990's. Overall, the news articles framed Bridgestone/Firestone
consistently, but the image of the company in news articles was not
consistent with Bridgestone/Firestone frames of its own image.
Ti
Bibliography
Benoit, William L. "Hugh Grant's Image Restoration Discourse: An Actor
Apologizes." Communication Quarterly 45.3 (Summer 1997), 251-267.
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality:
A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, 1966.
Blaney, Joseph R., William L. Benoit and LeAnn M. Brazeal. "Blowout!
Firestone's Image Restoration Campaign." Public Relations Review 28.4
(October 2002), 379-392.
Carey, James W. "Reconceiving 'Mass' and 'Media.'" In Communication as
Culture. New York: Routledge, 1988.
Coombs, W. Timothy. "Choosing the Right Words: The Development of
Guidelines for the Selection of the 'Appropriate' Crisis-Response
Strategies." Management Communication Quarterly 8.4 (May 1995), 447-476.
Croteau, David and William Hoynes. Media Society: Industries, Images and
Audiences, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2000.
Dyer, Joyce. "Recalling Firestone." The North American Review 286.5
(September-October 2001): 3.
Entman, Robert M. "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm."
Journal of Communication 43.4 (1993): 51-58..
Fiske, John. Introduction to Communication Studies, 2nd ed. London and
New York: Routledge, 1990.
Fitzpatrick, Kathy R. and Maureen Shubow Rubin. "Public Relations vs. Legal
Strategies in Organizational Crisis Decisions." Public Relations Review
21.1 (Spring 1995), 21-33.
Gingras, Anne-Marie and Jean-Pierre Carrier. "Public Opinion: Construction
and Persuasion." Canadian Journal of Communication 21 (1996): 445-460.
Goffman, Irving. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of
Experience. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 21.
Grunig, Larissa A. "Image and Symbolic Leadership: Using Focus Group
Research to Bridge the Gaps." Journal of Public Relations Research 5.2
(1993), 95-125.
Hall, Stuart. "Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and
Problems." Chap. 1 in Culture, Media, Language, edited by Stuart Hall,
Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis. London and New York:
Routledge, 1980.
Hall, Stuart. "Encoding, Decoding." In The Cultural Studies Reader, edited
by Simon During. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
Hall, Stuart. "Introduction to Media Studies at the Centre." Chap. 8 in
Culture, Media, Language, edited by Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew
Lowe and Paul Willis. London and New York: Routledge, 1980.
Hall, Stuart. "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in
Media Studies." In Culture, Society and the Media, edited by James Curran,
Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woollacott. London and New York: Methuen, 1982.
Hallahan, Kirk. "Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public
Relations." Journal of Public Relations Research 11.3 (1999), 205-242.
Hood, Julia. "Charitable Efforts Impact Harris Reputation Rankings." PR
Week, 21 January 2002, 3.
Jensen, Klaus Bruhn. "Humanistic Scholarship as Qualitative Science:
Contributions to Mass Communication Research." In A Handbook of
Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communication Research, edited by Klaus
Bruhn Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski. London and New York: Routledge,
1991.
Moffitt, Mary Anne. "A Cultural Studies Perspective Toward Understanding
Corporate Image: A Case Study of State Farm Insurance." Journal of Public
Relations Research 6.1 (1994), 41-66.
Mumby, Dennis K. "Ideology & the Social Construction of Meaning: A
Communication Perspective." Communication Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1989): 291-304.
Pan, Zhongdang and Kosicki, Gerald M. "Framing Analysis: An Approach to
News Discourse." Political Communication 10 (1993), 55-75.
Scheufele, Dietram A. "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects." Journal of
Communication (Winter 1999), 103-122.
Seeger, Matthew W., Timothy L. Sellnow and Robert R. Ulmer, "Communication,
Organization and Crisis." Communication Yearbook 21 (1998), 233.
"Statement of Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Transportation,
before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer
Protection and Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce," U.S. House of Representatives. June 19, 2001, From:
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/hot/Firestone/DOTState.html
Sull, Donald N. "The Dynamics of Standing Still: Firestone Tire & Rubber
and the Radial Revolution." Business History Review 73.3 (Autumn 1999): 430+.
Tuchman, Gaye. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. New
York: The Free Press, 1978.
Tyler, Lisa. "Liability Means Never Being Able to Say You're Sorry:
Corporate Guilt, Legal Constraints, and Defensiveness in Corporate
Communication." Management Communication Quarterly 11.1 (August 1997), 51-73.
van Riel, Cees B.M. "Research in Corporate Communication." Management
Communication Quarterly, 11.2 (November 1997), 288-309.
Williams, Raymond. "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural
Theory." In Problems in Materialism and Culture, edited by Raymond
Williams. London: Verso, 1980.
Williams, Sheryl L. and Mary Anne Moffitt. "Corporate Image as an
Impression Formation Process: Prioritizing Personal, Organizational, and
Environmental Audience Factors." Journal of Public Relations Research 9.4
(1997), 239.
Womeldorf, Rebecca A. and William S.D. Cravens. "More Sunshine Laws
Proposed; After the Firestone Recalls, 10 States and the U.S. Senate
Introduced Bills to Limit Secret Orders Agreements." New Jersey Law
Journal,166.10 (3 December 2001): 6-7.
Ti
Notes
[1] Stan Crock with Nicole St. Pierre in Washington, "The Tire Flap:
Behind the Feeding Frenzy," Business Week, 16 October 2000, 126.
[2] "Chronology: A Regulatory Free Ride? NHTSA and the Hidden History of
the SUV," PBS Frontline, DATE, From
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rollover/unsafe/cron.html
[3] "Bridgestone/Firestone Announces Voluntary Recall of 3.85 million
RADIAL ATX and RADIAL ATX II Tires, and 2.7 million Wilderness AT Tires,"
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. press release, August 9, 2000.
[4] Joyce Dyer, "Recalling Firestone," The North American Review 286.8
(September-October 2001): 3+.
[5] "Statement by John Lampe Regarding Ford Press Conference,"
Bridgestone/Firestone press release, (Nashville, Tenn.: 22 May 2001).
[6] Chronology: A Free Regulatory Ride?" PBS Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rollover/unsafe/cron.html
[7] Matthew W. Seeger, Timothy L. Sellnow and Robert R. Ulmer,
"Communication, Organization and Crisis," Communication Yearbook 21 (1998),
233.
[8] David Croteau and William Hoynes, Media Society: Industries, Images
and Audiences, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2000), 7.
[9] Stuart Hall, "Encoding, Decoding," in The Cultural Studies Reader, ed.
Simon During (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 131.
[10] Gaye Tuchman, Making News: A Study in the Construction of
Reality. (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 184.
[11] Fiske, 115.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., 52.
[14] Crouteau and Hoynes, 15.
[15] Hall, "Encoding, Decoding," 129.
[16] Ibid., 130.
[17] Ibid., 131.
[18] Crouteau and Hoynes, 157.
[19] Hall, "Rediscovery of Ideology, 77.
[20] Dennis K Mumby, "Ideology & the Social Construction of Meaning: A
Communication Perspective," Communication Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1989): 302.
[21] Hall, "Rediscovery of Ideology," 67.
[22] Gramsci quoted in Hall, "Rediscovery of Ideology," 73-76.
[23] Gramsci quoted in Williams, "Base and Superstructure," 37.
[24] Mark W. Sheffert, "The High Cost of Low Ethics," Financial
Executive. 17.6 (Sept 2001): 56.
[25] Joseph R. Blaney, William L. Benoit and LeAnn M. Brazeal, "Blowout!
Firestone's Image Restoration Campaign," Public Relations Review, 28.4
(October 2002), 379-392.
[26] Rebecca A. Womeldorf and William S.D. Cravens, "More Sunshine Laws
Proposed; After the Firestone Recalls, 10 States and the U.S. Senate
Introduced Bills to Limit Secret Orders Agreements," New Jersey Law
Journal,166.10 (3 December 2001): 6-7.
[27] Dyer, "Recalling Firestone," 3.
[28] James W. Carey, "Reconceiving 'Mass' and 'Media,'" in Communication
as Culture, (New York: Routledge, 1988), 22.
[29] Fiske, Introduction to Communication Studies, 2nd ed (London and
New York: Routledge, 1990), 39..
[30] Kathy R. Fitzpatrick and Maureen Shubow Rubin, "Public Relations vs.
Legal Strategies in Organizational Crisis Decisions," Public Relations
Review 21.1 (Spring 1995), 21-22.
[31] Ibid, 25, 30-31.
[32] Ibid, 23.
[33] Lisa Tyler, "Liability Means Never Being Able to Say You're Sorry:
Corporate Guilt, Legal Constraints, and Defensiveness in Corporate
Communication," Management Communication Quarterly 11.1 (August 1997), 59-60.
[34] W. Timothy Coombs, "Choosing the Right Words: The Development of
Guidelines for the Selection of the 'Appropriate' Crisis-Response
Strategies," Management Communication Quarterly 8.4 (May 1995), 449.
[35] Larissa A. Grunig, "Image and Symbolic Leadership: Using Focus Group
Research to Bridge the Gaps," Journal of Public Relations Research 5.2
(1993), 99.
[36] Mary Anne Moffitt, "A Cultural Studies Perspective Toward
Understanding Corporate Image: A Case Study of State Farm Insurance,"
Journal of Public Relations Research 6.1 (1994), 42.
[37] Sheryl L. Williams and Mary Anne Moffitt, "Corporate Image as an
Impression Formation Process: Prioritizing Personal, Organizational, and
Environmental Audience Factors," Journal of Public Relations Research 9.4
(1997), 239.
[38] Moffitt, "A Cultural Studies Perspective Toward Understanding
Corporate Image: A Case Study of State Farm Insurance," 46-47.
[39] Ibid, 47.
[40] Williams and Moffitt, "Corporate Image as an Impression Formation
Process: Prioritizing Personal, Organizational, and Environmental Audience
Factors," 241; and Moffitt, "A Cultural Studies Perspective Toward
Understanding Corporate Image: A Case Study of State Farm Insurance," 61.
[41] Moffitt, "A Cultural Studies Perspective Toward Understanding
Corporate Image: A Case Study of State Farm Insurance," 51.
[42] Larissa A. Grunig, "Image and Symbolic Leadership: Using Focus Group
Research to Bridge the Gaps," 99.
[43] Moffitt, "A Cultural Studies Perspective Toward Understanding
Corporate Image: A Case Study of State Farm Insurance," 42.
[44] D. Newsom, A. Scott and J. Van Slyke Turk, This is PR: The Realities
of Public Relations, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989), 364 in Larissa
A. Grunig, "Image and Symbolic Leadership: Using Focus Group Research to
Bridge the Gaps," 100.
[45] Cees B.M. van Riel, "Research in Corporate Communication," Management
Communication Quarterly, 11.2 (November 1997), 290.
[46] Ibid, 290.
[47] Ibid, 290-291.
[48] C.J. Fombrun, Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image,
(Cambridge: Harvard Business School, 1996) in van Riel, "Research in
Corporate Communication," 295.
[49] William L. Benoit, "Hugh Grant's Image Restoration Discourse: An
Actor Apologizes," Communication Quarterly 45.3 (Summer 1997), 253.
[50] "Statement of Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Transportation,
before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer
Protection and Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce," U.S. House of Representatives. June 19, 2001, From:
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/hot/Firestone/DOTState.html
[51] "Media Kit," Business Week Web
site, http://mediakit.businessweek.com/a-m-aud.html
[52] Both Firestone and Bridgestone were used as search terms together
because they reflect the official name of the company
(Bridgestone/Firestone) and limit irrelevant articles (such as those
written about a person whose last name is Firestone, but has no relation to
the company).
[53] Specifically, the company's archive included news releases ranging
from August 9, 2000 to November 8, 2001. Although the company did not
issue any crisis-related news releases in 2002, an argument can be made
that the "crisis" time period chosen for the study is valid given that
media coverage of the tire situation began at the beginning of 2000 and
continued into late 2002. Although Bridgestone/Firestone did not choose to
continue to issue announcements related to the crisis in 2002, this does
not necessarily dictate the end of the crisis situation from the media's
(or the public's) perspective. The presence of media coverage in 2002
offers some justification that this crisis was still an important factor
after November 2001.
[54] Irving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of
Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 21.
[55] Entman's italics (see note 55 for full citation).
[56] Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured
Paradigm," Journal of Communication 43.4 (1993): 52.
[57] Entman's italics.
[58] Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," 52.
[59] Dietram A. Scheufele, "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects," Journal
of Communication (Winter 1999), 106.
[60] Ibid, 107, and Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured
Paradigm," 53.
[61] See for example, Kirk Hallahan, "Seven Models of Framing:
Implications for Public Relations," Journal of Public Relations Research
11.3 (1999), 208.
[62] Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," 52-53.
[63] Hallahan, "Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public
Relations," 224.
[64] Hallahan's italics.
[65] Hallahan, "Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public
Relations," 228.
[66] Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki, "Framing Analysis: An Approach
to News Discourse," Political Communication 10 (1993), 57.
[67] Pan and Kosicki, "Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse,"
59-63.
[68] "Frequently Asked Questions: Bridgestone/Firestone Voluntary Recall,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., August 9,
2000).
[69] "Bridgestone Firestone Announces Voluntary Recall of 3.85 Million
RADIAL ATX and RADIAL ATXII Tires, and 2.7 Million Wilderness AT Tires,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Washington, D.C., August 9,
2000), http://www.bridgestone-firestone.com/news/mediacenter
[70] "Up to 350,000 Tires Now Replaced Since Recall Began Seven Days Ago,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., August 18,
2000).
[71] "Bridgestone/Firestone To Retain Independent Tire Expert to
Participate in Review Surrounding Recalled Tires," Bridgestone/Firestone
company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., August 25, 2000).
[72] "Statement by Christine Karbowiak, Vice President, Public Affairs,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (August 14, 2000).
[73] "Regarding Testimony Before Congress on Firestone Tires"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (September 6, 2000).
[74] "Bridgestone Firestone Announces Voluntary Recall of 3.85 Million
RADIAL ATX and RADIAL ATXII Tires, and 2.7 Million Wilderness AT Tires,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Washington, D.C., August 9,
2000)
[75] "Firestone Extends Reimbursement Program to Meet Consumer Needs,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., August 17,
2000),
[76] "Bridgestone/Firestone Asks Dealers to Repeat Tire Recall Training,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., September
15, 2000).
[77] "Up to 350,000 Tires Now Replaced Since Recall Began Seven Days Ago,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., August 18,
2000).
[78] "Firestone Speeds Up Pace of Recall; Tires Being Airlifted From
Japan," Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn.,
August 22, 2000).
[79] "Firestone Reaching One Million Mark in Drive to Replace Recalled
Tires," Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn.,
August 26, 2000).
[80] "Recall Information Sheet: Bridgestone/Firestone Voluntary Recall,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (August 9, 2000)
[81] "Bridgestone/Firestone Recall Effort Reaches Important Milestone,
Waiting Lists Ending," Bridgestone/Firestone company press
release. (Nashville, Tenn., November 28, 2000).
[82] "Bridgestone Firestone Announces Voluntary Recall of 3.85 Million
RADIAL ATX and RADIAL ATXII Tires, and 2.7 Million Wilderness AT Tires,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Washington, D.C., August 9,
2000).
[83] Ibid.
[84] "Joint Firestone/Ketchum Statement," Bridgestone/Firestone company
press release. (September 11, 2000).
[85] "Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Testifies Before Senate Commerce
Committee: Company Reinstates Inspection and Replacement Program for Tires
Identified in NHTSA's Sept. 1 Consumer Advisory," Bridgestone/Firestone
company press release. (Washington D.C., September 12, 2000)
[86] "Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Testifies Before Senate Commerce
Committee: Company Reinstates Inspection and Replacement Program for Tires
Identified in NHTSA's Sept. 1 Consumer Advisory," Bridgestone/Firestone
company press release. (Washington D.C., September 12, 2000)
[87] "Bridgestone/Firestone Statement Regarding Data Submitted to
Congress," Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn.,
May 23, 2001)
[88] "Bridgestone Firestone Announces Voluntary Recall of 3.85 Million
RADIAL ATX and RADIAL ATXII Tires, and 2.7 Million Wilderness AT Tires,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Washington, D.C., August 9,
2000)
[89] "Not Involved in Recall: Current Vehicle Models Equipped with
Firestone Wilderness Tires Not Involved in Recall," Bridgestone/Firestone
company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., August 10, 2000)
[90] "Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Focuses Its Investigation,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., September
21, 2000).
[91] Joann Muller, "Ford: Jacques Nasser Can't Do It All," Business Week,
18 June 2001, 36.
[92] Welch, David, "John Lampe: A Mr. Fixit for Firestone?" Business Week,
23 October 2000, 56.
[93] Paul Magnusson and Lorraine Woellert, with Stan Crock,
"Ford/Firestone: An Election-Year Double Whammy," Business Week, 25
September 2000, 59.
[94] Welch, David. "GM's Envoy Vs. Ford's Explorer," Business Week, 23
July 2001, 90.
[95] Joann Muller and Jeff Green in Detroit, with Nicole St. Pierre in
Washington and Pamela Moore in Greenwich, Conn., "Firestone and Ford: The
Ride Gets Bumpier," Business Week, 11 September 2000, 42.
[96] Joann Muller and Jeff Green in Detroit, with Nicole St. Pierre in
Washington and Pamela Moore in Greenwich, Conn., "Firestone and Ford: The
Ride Gets Bumpier," Business Week, 11 September 2000, 42.
[97] Welch, David, "Firestone: Is This Brand Beyond Repair?" Business
Week, 11 June 2001, 48.
[98] "Lessons from the Tire Fiasco," Business Week, 18 September 2000, 178.
[99] Stan Crock with Nicole St. Pierre in Washington, "The Tire Flap:
Behind the Feeding Frenzy," Business Week, 16 October 2000, 122.
[100] "Bridgestone/Firestone Recall Effort Reaches Important Milestone,
Waiting Lists Ending," Bridgestone/Firestone company press
release. (Nashville, Tenn., November 28, 2000).
[101] "Statement by Saul Solomon, General Counsel Bridgestone/Firestone
Inc.," Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn.,
September 29, 2000).
[102] "Joint Firestone/Ketchum Statement," Bridgestone/Firestone company
press release. (September 11, 2000).
[103] "Bridgestone/Firestone Takes Steps to Boost Production of
Replacement Tires and Provide Consumers with Information on Recall,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., August 11,
2000).
[104] "Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Announces Changes and Improvements,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (December 19, 2000)
[105] "Regarding Testimony Before Congress on Firestone Tires,"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (September 6, 2000).
[106] "Firestone Announces New National Advertising Campaign Ads to Focus
on Company's Action Plan for the Future, 'Making It Right'"
Bridgestone/Firestone company press release. (Nashville, Tenn., April 5,
2001).
[107] Welch, David, "Meet the New Face of Firestone," Business Week, 30
April 2001, 64.
[108] Joann Muller with David Welch and Jeff Green in Detroit and Nicole
St. Pierre in Washington, "Ford's Gamble: Will it Backfire?" Business Week
(4 June 2001), 40.
[109] Joann Muller, David Welch and Jeff Green in Detroit, with Lorraine
Woellert and Nicole St. Pierre in Washington, "A Crisis of Confidence,"
Business Week, 18 September 2000, 40.
[110] Paula Dwyer and Dan Carney, with Joann Muller in Detroit, Business
Week, 2 October 2000, 50.
[111] Paul Magnusson and Lorraine Woellert, with Stan Crock,
"Ford/Firestone: An Election-Year Double Whammy," Business Week, 25
September 2000, 59.
[112] Mike France, "The Hidden Culprit: The U.S. Legal System," Business
Week, 18 September 2001.
[113] Monica Roman, "Ford: A Better Idea on Warranties," Business Week, 15
January 2001, 44.
[114] Welch, David, "Meet the New Face of Firestone," Business Week, 30
April 2001, 64.
[115] Stan Crock with Nicole St. Pierre in Washington, "The Tire Flap:
Behind the Feeding Frenzy," Business Week, 16 October 2000, 122.
[116] Welch, David. "John Lampe: A Mr. Fixit for Firestone?" Business
Week, 23 October 2000, 56.
[117] "Managers to Watch in 2001," Business Week, 8 January 2001, 63.
[118] Welch, David, "Meet the New Face of Firestone," Business Week, 30
April 2001, 64.
[119] Irene M. Kunil in Tokyo and Dean Foust in Atlanta, "The Just Don't
Have a Clue How to Handle This," Business Week, 18 September 2000, 43.
[120] Zachary Schiller, "Bridgestone is Nearing Some Hairpin Curves,"
Business Week, 22 April 1991, 32.
[121] Peter Coy in New York, with Neil Gross in Tokyo, "When the Going
Gets Tough, Yanks Get Yanked," Business Week, 26 April 1993, 30.
[122] Joan Warner, "The World is Not Always Your Oyster," Business Week,
30 October 1995, 132.
[123] Brian Bremner in Tokyo, with William Glasgall in New York and Peter
Galuszka in Cleveland, "Two Japans," Business Week 27 January 1997.
[124] Zachary Schiller in Cleveland, with Douglas Harbrecht in Washington,
"Blowup at Bridgestone," Business Week, 30 January 1995, 30.
[125] Zachary Schiller in Cleveland, with Douglas Harbrecht in Washington,
"Blowup at Bridgestone," Business Week, 30 January 1995, 30.
[126] Zachary Schiller, "Skid Marks at Bridgestone," Business Week, 22
August 1994, 30.
[127] Zachary Schiller, "Bridgestone is Nearing Some Hairpin Curves,"
Business Week, 22 April 1991, 32.
[128] Zachary Schiller in Cleveland, with Douglas Harbrecht in Washington,
"Blowup at Bridgestone," Business Week, 30 January 1995, 30.
[129] Keith H. Hammonds, "A Blowout for the Rubber Workers?" Business
Week, 23 January 1995. 50.
[130] "Bridgestone History in Run-Flat Technology," Business Wire
(Nashville, Tenn., 9 February, 1998).
[131] "Bridgestone/Firestone to Build $400 Million Passenger and Light
Truck Tire Plant in U.S." Business Wire (Nashville, Tenn., 14 July 1997).
[132] "Bridgestone/Firestone Introduces New 'Worn' Tire Technology,"
Business Wire (Detroit: 7 May 1998).
[133] "Bridgestone/Firestone Develops 'Active' Computer Tag That Can be
Incorporated Into a Tire" Business Wire (Nashville, Tenn., 13 March 1995).
[134] "Bridgestone's Hikone Plant Receives ISO 9002 Certification,"
Business Wire (Tokyo: 16 June 1994).
[135] "Bridgestone to Market Runflat Tire and Wheel in America," Business
Week, (Nashville, Tenn., 5 August 1992).
[136] "Bridgestone/Firestone Breaks Company Record for Plant
Construction," Business Wire, (Aiken County, S.C., 26 August 1998).
[137] "Firestone Says Bigger is Better," Business Wire, (Nashville, Tenn.:
9 July 1993).
[138] Pan and Kosicki, 61.
[139] Julia Hood, "Charitable Efforts Impact Harris Reputation Rankings,"
PR Week, 21 January 2002, 3.
|
