Propaganda v. Public Diplomacy:
How 9/11 Gave New Life to a Cold War Debate
Associate Professor David W. Guth, APR
William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communications,
University of Kansas
2071 Dole Center
1000 Sunnyside Road
Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7555
Telephone: (785) 864-0683
e-mail: [log in to unmask]
75-WORD ABSTRACT
Propaganda v. Public Diplomacy:
How 9/11 Gave New Life to a Cold War Debate
This paper explores the public debate over the use of U.S. propaganda
during both the Cold War and the War on Terrorism. While there is broad
consensus for communicating U.S. policies and values to foreign audiences,
differences of opinion in the role, scope and administration of overseas
information programs dominate the debate. The role the State Department
plays in administering these programs, first raised during the Cold War,
remains unresolved.
150-WORD ABSTRACT
Propaganda v. Public Diplomacy:
How 9/11 Gave New Life to a Cold War Debate
This paper explores public debates over the use of U.S. propaganda during
both the Cold War and the War on Terrorism. It relies heavily upon
previously classified documents from the Truman and Eisenhower presidential
libraries, as well as Bob Woodward's contemporary account based upon
classified materials in the Bush White House. It examines the 1953 debate
over the role of U.S. propaganda, and shows how many of the same issues
reemerged following the September 11 terror attacks. While there is broad
consensus for communicating U.S. policies and values to foreign audiences,
differences of opinion in the role, scope and administration of overseas
information programs dominate the debate. The role the State Department
plays in administering these programs, first raised during the Cold War,
remains unresolved. And in both debates, the president's closest
communications adviser appears to have exerted the greatest influence on
their outcome.
Propaganda v. Public Diplomacy:
How 9/11 Gave New Life to a Cold War Debate
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought new life to an old
debate. That the hostility of Islamic fundamentalist extremists could
result in approximately 3,000 deaths forced the people of the United States
to ask a fundamental question, Why do they hate us? It also resparked
interest in American overseas information programs, a topic that had lost
much of its luster since the end of the Cold War.
This paper looks at the ongoing debate over the role of U.S. government
overseas information programs in the War on Terrorism. It does so by
reviewing the last time the government and opinion leaders focused as much
attention on what many label as propaganda. That debate took place in
1953, in the middle of the Cold War. A new president, unhappy with what he
saw as the ineffective efforts of his predecessor, sought new approaches
for communicating American policies and values to the rest of the
world. That effort led to the creation of the United States Information
Agency, an independent government agency that essentially served as the
nation's public relations outlet. It remained in that role until 1998,
when its functions were consolidated within the State Department.
As this paper will demonstrate, many of the issues that surrounded the
decision to create the USIA are present in today's debate. Those issues
include the definition of propaganda, whether it has a role in democratic
societies, and what forms it should take. Then there is the question of
where within the government should such a program be housed. Prior to the
creation of the USIA, most overseas information functions resided under the
umbrella of the State Department. However, as this paper will chronicle,
State Department stewardship of these programs was an issue in 1953 and is
so again today. The paper also suggests that presidential communications
advisers have been and continue to be key players in framing this debate.
Propaganda versus Persuasion
There are few words in the English language that are as emotionally
charged and carry as many ethical intonations as propaganda. Among many
Americans, the very mention of the word conjures images of Nazi Propaganda
Minister Josef Goebbels, Pravda and the Cold War. How broadly the term is
defined creates a filter through which persuasive communication activities
are viewed.
The convergence of the Industrial Age, new mass communication
technologies, and tensions growing out of international competition brought
persuasive communication to the forefront in the early 20th
century. However, for as long as humans have organized themselves into
groups of shared values and concerns, communication has been used to
strategically advance self interests. Archaeologists have uncovered
evidence dating back to 1,800 BC of primitive agricultural extension agents
giving farmers advice on how to improve their crop yield. During the fifth
century BC in the city-state of Athens, new political freedoms gave rise to
the birth of rhetoric, the study of public opinion and how to influence
it. A philosophy of vox populi, the voice of the people, was embraced four
centuries later in the Roman Republic. The spread of Christianity during
the Middle Ages was also linked to strategic communication. The faith was
passed along by word of mouth through missionaries such as Francis of
Assisi, who spread his teachings of self-imposed poverty and service to the
poor across Europe and the Middle East during the 12th century. The
Catholic Church's efforts became more formalized in the 17th century with
the establishment of the Congregato de Propaganda Fide for the purpose of
spreading church doctrine.[1]
The history of the use of propaganda is somewhat confusing because its
very definition is a matter of dispute. Historian Brett Gray wrote,
"Propaganda as a label suffered (and suffers) from a certain imprecision;
it is not unlike Justice Potter Stewart's fabled definition of pornography:
'I don't know how to define it, but I know it when I see
it.'"[2] Webster's Dictionary defines propaganda in a broad context as
"the propagating of doctrines or principles; the opinions or beliefs thus
spread."[3] Linebarger wrote in a Cold War era publication that propaganda
is "the planned use of any form of public or mass-produced communication
designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific
purpose, whether military, economic, or political."[4] Jowett and O'Donnell
wrote that propaganda, "in its most neutral sense, means to disseminate or
promote particular ideas."[5]
Many scholars -- and laypersons -- embrace the paradigm of propaganda as
an umbrella covering all forms of persuasive communication, including
advertising and public relations. Mertz and Lieber lump persuasive
communications into two broad categories. One is revealed propaganda,
messages that are overt in their effort to persuade, such as those in
conventional advertising. The other is concealed propaganda, such as
publicity generated from the distribution of news releases. In their model,
the propaganda label can apply to almost any communication.[6] Noam
Chomsky, who also embraces the broad definition of propaganda, says it has
the effect of narrowing debate within democratic societies:
"Since the voice of the people is allowed to speak out, those in power
better control what that voice says -- in other words, control what people
think. One of the ways to do this is to create political debate that
appears to embrace many opinions, but actually within very narrow
margin. You have to make sure that both sides in the debate accept certain
assumptions -- and that those assumptions are the basis of the propaganda
system. As long as everyone accepts the propaganda system, the debate is
permissible."[7]
This broad definition of propaganda has created difficulties for the
public relations profession, which emerged in its modern form during the
early 1920s in no small measure due to public interest in propaganda. Using
the broader context, propaganda appears to be a kin to a public relations
approach known as press agentry. Todd Hunt and James E. Grunig described
this approach as being "public relations programs whose sole purpose is
getting favorable publicity for an organization in the mass media."[8] This
was the "I don't care what you print as long as you spell my name right"
approach popularized in the mid-19th century by master showman P.T.
Barnum. It is a philosophy that has, for many, defined and stained the
profession. Even the man considered the father of modern public relations,
Edward L. Bernays, gave credence to this interpretation when he defined
public relations -- the term he coined in his seminal book Crystallizing
Public Opinion -- as "the new propaganda."[9]
However, that interpretation draws criticism from many quarters,
especially public relations scholars and communication
professionals. Since its earliest days, modern practitioners have tried to
differentiate public relations from propaganda by placing it within an
ethical framework. That was certainly the intent of Ivy Ledbetter Lee,
whose Declaration of Principles in 1906 was the first attempt to articulate
such a framework. That is also why public relations historian Scott M.
Cutlip wrote that Bernays' efforts to further define public relations in
his 1928 book Propaganda served only to muddy the waters and "handed the
infant field's critics a club with which to bludgeon it."[10]
Gray argued that propaganda should not be confused with advertising and
public relations. He wrote, "For my part, I try to maintain that
distinction by defining propaganda as the organized manipulations of key
cultural symbols and images (and biases) for the purposes of persuading a
mass audience to take a position, or move to action, or remain inactive on
a controversial matter."[11] Historian Leo Bogart wrote that the propaganda
studies of the mid-1930s were "prompted by the assumption that the
statements of totalitarian governments represented cunning and deliberate
distortions of the truth to serve deeper strategic objectives."[12]
Jowett and O'Donnell prefer a narrower definition of propaganda, one that
makes it a sub-category of both persuasion and information. "Propaganda is
the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate
cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the
desired intent of the propagandist."[13] On the other hand, they say
persuasion "is interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both the
persuader and persuadee."[14] These tend to be in closer harmony with more
widely accepted definitions of public relations that stress two-way
communications, as well as the building and maintaining of mutually
beneficial relationships.
It is not just communication professionals who have sought to distance
themselves from the propaganda label. The United States government has
backed away from that terminology since an initial flirtation with it at
the outbreak of the First World War. In what is a common government
tactic, officials have attached the label "public diplomacy" to the effort
to influence foreign public opinion. However, few are fooled by the use of
creative language. USIA veteran Fitzhugh Green acknowledged in his 1988
book American Propaganda Abroad that public diplomacy is "a euphemism for
the word modern Americans abhor - propaganda."[15]
The same skittishness holds true for the more benign term "public
relations." Once again, this is largely because of the broad definition
many apply to propaganda. Although thousands of public relations
practitioners are employed in all levels of government, they tend to
operate under stealth job titles such as press secretary, public
information officer, public affairs officer, and communications
specialist. As early as 1913, Congress adopted the Gillett amendment,
which declared that "appropriated funds may not be used to pay a publicity
expert unless specifically appropriated for that purpose."[16]
Propaganda Techniques
The use of strategic communication in the United States predates the
founding of the nation. Placed in a 21st century context, some of this
activity can be characterized as propaganda. And as with modern-day
propaganda, these activities took different forms that were defined by
their source and accuracy.
According to Jowett and O'Donnell, white propaganda is that which comes
from a source that it identified correctly and accurately
reported.[17] Thomas Jefferson urged President James Monroe to use what
could be characterized as white propaganda to promote an American
perspective against what he saw as a negative and hostile British press:
"I hope that to preserve this weather gauge of public opinion, and to
counteract the slanders and falsehoods disseminated by British papers, the
government will make it a standing instruction to their ministers at
foreign courts to keep Europe truly informed of occurrences here, by
publishing in their papers the naked truth always, whether favorable or
unfavorable. For they will believe the good, if we candidly tell them the
bad also."[18]
In a modern-day context, the Voice of America overseas broadcast can be
said to fill this role.
Black propaganda is "that which is credited to a false source and spread
lies, fabrications and deceptions."[19] This is the form of propaganda
most widely associated with Josef Goebbels. However, far less sinister
figures have employed this technique to advance their causes. During the
Revolutionary War, Benjamin Franklin spread false stories about British
acquiescence in Seneca Indian atrocities against colonists. He did so to
undermine the British war effort and to bolster overseas public opinion in
favor of American independence.[20]
A third form identified by Jowell and O'Donnell is gray propaganda, where
the source "may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the
information is uncertain."[21] Exaggerated claims were often the basis for
encouraging settlement of the wilderness. At first they were aimed at
attracting Europeans to fledgling East Coast settlements. Later, the myth
of frontiersman Daniel Boone was created to woo settlers into the new
nation's interior.[22]
On some occasions, the form of the message is not as important a
consideration as its timing. President Abraham Lincoln delayed publication
of the Emancipation Proclamation until he could link it to a Union victory
in the battlefield. Lincoln did not want the abolition of slavery (limited
to just the Confederate states) to be seen as an act of desperation. When
Lincoln got a much-needed victory at the Battle of Antietam in September
1862, it gave the proclamation credibility and eliminated the threat of
European intervention into the American Civil War.[23] To hasten American.
intervention into World War I , the British government delayed release of
the infamous Zimmerman telegram -- an intercepted German diplomatic
communique that outlined a plot to draw Mexico into a war with the United
States -- until it would have a maximum effect on U.S. public opinion.[24]
Propaganda and the World Wars
The seeds for today's common conceptions of propaganda -- or
misconceptions, depending on your point of view -- grew out of the 20th
century's two world wars. For contextual purposes, it is important to
remember that the term did not hold the same meaning prior to the outbreak
of World War I. When the United States was drawn into global conflict in
1917, President Woodrow Wilson saw the creation of the Committee on Public
Information as a necessary counterweight against the propaganda of the
Central Powers. He appointed a long-time friend and political ally,
newspaperman George Creel, to head its operations. Creel saw the
application of American-style propaganda as being preferable to the wartime
censorship favored by some in the military. However well-intentioned, CPI
had its critics. As David M. Kennedy has written:
"According to historians critical of Creel's work, CPI propaganda
'frequently wore a benign face, and... its creators genuinely believed it
to be in the service of an altruistic cause,' but on the whole it showed an
'overbearing concern for correct opinion, for expression, for language
itself.' Creel's agency promoted jingoism, intolerance, and vigilantism, an
assessment that quickly became the reigning interpretation of both Creel's
legacy and, at war's end, of the powers of propaganda."[25]
As the public became disenchanted with the outcome of the so-called "war
to end all wars," propaganda became a source of widespread concern. One
postwar researcher wrote, "As writers for popular magazines reevaluated the
nation's experience with war propaganda, there was more shock and concern
about precisely this aspect of the propaganda than any other: the fact that
propaganda appeared to be a force of boundless power."[26]
The Office of War Information, created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
at the outset of the Second World War, had neither the authority or the
influence of the CPI.[27] The Voice of America, modeled after the BBC's
overseas broadcasts, was beamed to occupied Europe. As the Allies moved
into Europe, OWI served as media contacts and established a series of
Information Centers, or libraries. The agency engaged in white and gray
propaganda.[28] It was left up to the Office of Strategic Services to
conduct psychological warfare against the enemy, including the use of
"black propaganda."[29]
Bogart wrote that the differing missions of OWI and OSS led to a
philosophical split that influenced American overseas information programs
throughout the Cold War and into the post-Soviet era.[30] These differing
views were first articulated in a 1948 Brookings Institute study:
The struggle abounded in personalities, but was not fundamentally
personal. It rested on differences between those who believed that
propaganda should form part of the program of subversive operations, and
should consist of any action, true or false, responsible or irresponsible,
which would effectively hamper the enemy at any point; and those who
believed that propaganda should be a public, responsible government
operation to tell the truth about the war, about the United States and its
allies, as a means of describing democracy and freedom, our war aims, and
our determination to win both the war and the peace."[31]
In many ways, the Brookings study defined the two central questions of the
debate about the role of U.S. overseas information: Does propaganda work,
and do the ends justify the means?
Cold War Propaganda
At the start the Cold War era, the U.S government was uneasy about
embracing anything that smacked of Goebbels-like propaganda. Former
Senator William Fulbright (D-Ark.) echoed this sentiment when he said,
"there is something basically unwise and undemocratic about a system which
taxes the public to finance a propaganda campaign aimed at persuading the
same taxpayers that they must spend more tax dollars to subvert their
independent judgment."[32]
Nevertheless, there were others who felt the government should be doing
more to counter the communists. Allen M. Wilson, vice president of The
Advertising Council, told a New York gathering on March 22, 1949, "Is
propaganda an effective weapon? It must be. How else, since the
communists have nothing to offer France but promises, could the communist
leaders have captured control of great sections of the French labor
movement?"[33]
Harry Truman distanced the government from the use of overseas information
as a strategic tool during the early stages of his presidency. When Truman
signed an executive order abolishing the OWI on August 31, 1945, he said,
"This government will not attempt to outstrip the extensive and growing
information programs of other nations. Rather, it will endeavor to see to
it that other peoples receive a full and fair picture of American life and
the aims and policies of the United States government."[34] However,
Truman's view toward overseas information programs would evolve over the
next two years as a result of both foreign and domestic pressures.
The initial step in this evolution came on March 12, 1947, when the
president first articulated what would become known as the Truman Doctrine
in a nationally broadcast speech before a joint session of Congress. The
purpose of the speech was to announce a $400 million economic and military
aid package for Greece and Turkey. The fear was that British disengagement
because of post-war financial strains would leave that area of the world
open to Soviet domination.
Prior to the speech, Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton wrote in a
memorandum that "the United States will not take world leadership
effectively unless the people of the United States are shocked into doing
so."[35] Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.) told the president that he
would have to "scare the hell out of the country" to win approval of the
Greco-Turkish aid package.[36] The Truman Doctrine speech established the
philosophical and rhetorical tone for the announcement of the
administration's signature foreign aid program, the Marshall Plan, later
that same year.
Overseas information programs became a political battleground between the
President and his congressional critics. The administration consolidated
the State Department's Office of International Information and Cultural
Affairs (a direct descendent of OWI) into the new Office of International
Information and Educational Exchange in the fall of 1947.[37] However, the
Republican-controlled Congress, unhappy with what it saw as a timid
American response to Russian propaganda, trumped the White House with the
Smith-Mundt Act, which authorized the government to globally disseminate
information about the United States and its policies.[38] In turn, the
White House created an even larger, more aggressive overseas information
program, the Office of International Information.[39]
Truman fully embraced overseas information programs in an April 20, 1950,
speech before a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.
Truman told the editors that his administration would embark upon a
"Campaign of Truth:"
"The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world by the
forces of imperialistic communism. This is a struggle, above all else, for
the minds of man. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the
communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortion, and lies are
systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy. This
propaganda can be overcome by truth -- plain, simple, unvarnished truth --
presented by newspapers, radio, and other sources that the people trust."[40]
The debate over American overseas programs during the last two years of
the Truman presidency was shaped by two wars, a shooting war on the Korean
Peninsula and battles within the Washington bureaucracy. It could be
suggested that while the Korean War added a sense of urgency to his debate,
it was the in-fighting -- inner-agency and partisan -- that gave it its
intensity. This was not without precedent. As Campbell and Jamieson have
written, "Presidential war rhetoric is intimately related to an ongoing
struggle between the president and the Congress, refereed by the courts,
over what the Constitution permits the president to do."[41]
The United States International Information Administration was created in
January 1952 "for the conduct of the (State) Department's international
information and educational exchange programs."[42] This development
occurred, in part, because of a rift between the Economic Cooperation
Administration and the United States International Information and Exchange
Program. While there were other domestic and foreign influences on this
debate, this was, essentially, a turf battle. USIE was the operating
agency responsible for the State Department's foreign information and
exchange program. [43] In 1949, Congress also authorized ECA to publicize
its Marshall Plan programs in the participating countries.[44] It wasn't
long before the two public information staffs began stepping upon each
other's toes.
The creation of IIA did not quell the criticism of overseas information
programs. At the start of 1953, the agency was faced with four
congressional probes, including a McCarthy committee investigation into the
location and construction of two Voice of America transmitters. And even
before Truman vacated the Oval Office, Dwight Eisenhower was preparing
IIA's demise.
The Eisenhower Approach
Unlike his predecessor, Eisenhower embraced the strategic use of oversees
information from the outset of his administration. And different from many
political figures, Eisenhower's rhetorical approach was oriented more
toward outcomes than process:
"Eisenhower often appeared to be reticent about speaking, leading some
scholars to suggest that he disliked speaking, per se. It would be more
accurate to say that Eisenhower hated to waste time and found political
speaking to be just that - a waste of time. He always had his eye on the
goal to be achieved; he was not overly concerned with how it got done. In
fact, if the goal could be achieved quietly, without fanfare, that was
preferable."[45]
Eisenhower had made the nation's cold war "psychological strategy" a
campaign issue. "Many people think 'psychological warfare' means just the
use of propaganda like the controversial Voice of America," Eisenhower
said. "Certainly, the use of propaganda, of the written and spoken word,
of every means to transmit ideas, is an essential part of winning other
people to your side.
"But propaganda is not the most important part of this struggle,"
Eisenhower said. "The present Administration has never yet been able to
grasp the full import of a psychological effort put forth on a national
scale."[46]
Just six days after taking the oath of office, President Eisenhower
appointed the President's Committee on International Information
Activities. It became widely known as the "Jackson Committee" because of
its two most prominent members, William H. Jackson, the managing partner of
a New York investment firm, and the committee's chairman, and C.D. Jackson,
a Time-Life executive who had become one of Eisenhower's closest
advisers. It was C.D. Jackson, an adviser to General Eisenhower on
psychological warfare matters during the Second World War, who first
suggested the creation of the committee in a November 26, 1952, memorandum,
to the President-elect.[47]
Other members of the committee were New York advertising executive Sigurd
Larmon, University of North Carolina President Gordon Gray, New Jersey
businessman Barklie McKee Henry, and New York textile executive John C.
Hughes. General Mills executive Abbott Washburn served as the executive
secretary of the committee. All of the members, except Larmon, had
military experience in either intelligence or psychological warfare. Most
had media experience. The committee's final report was due no later than
June 30, 1953.[48]
In a letter to the executive secretary of the National Security Council,
Eisenhower said the purpose of the committee was "to make a survey and
evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the
Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and activities related
thereto with particular reference to the international relations and the
national security of this country." The President went on to say, "It has
long been my conviction that a unified and dynamic effort in this field is
essential to the security of the United States and of the peoples in the
community of free nations."[49]
The Debate of 1953
When the Jackson Committee met for the first time on January 30, 1953, it
was not the only panel in Washington discussing the future of U.S. overseas
information programs. Within a month, the Senate extended the life of a
special subcommittee investigating overseas information programs until June
30, the same day the Jackson Committee report was due. The Hickenlooper
Committee, chaired by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), held a
series of hearings March 6 through May 13.[50] There was the Advisory
Commission on Information, a five-member panel of specialists outside of
government created by President Truman to review the operations of the
IIA.[51] There was the aforementioned McCarthy committee, which was being
closely monitored -- as evidenced by the large volume of archived memoranda
and newspaper clippings in the Jackson Committee files. The Jackson
Committee also received indirect input from the President's Advisory
Committee on Government Organization, chaired by Nelson A. Rockefeller.
There was also intense interest in the Jackson Committee's deliberations
from outside government circles -- particularly among journalists, who were
generally opposed to anything that had the appearance of propaganda. The
tone of much of this commentary was along the lines of the editorial
opinion of The Washington Post, which said "Psychological warfare, in
addition to being contrary to the American way of doing things, is
antithetical to the American way of life."[52] Columnists Joseph and
Stewart Alsop wrote "Democracy cannot be peddled like soap
flakes."[53] Walter Lippmann, who wanted to abolish the Voice of America,
wrote, "In a society where opinions are free, a government propaganda,
which is a monopoly, is an inherent contradiction and practically
unworkable."[54]
Predictably, the deliberations also had the attention of the nation's
public relations practitioners. While generally supportive of an
aggressive program of overseas public information, they, too, shied away
from the "propaganda" label. "Psychological warfare must be an integral
part of our national policy, not a thing apart," said public relations
pioneer Edward L. Bernays. "The government should use social scientists
who understand our activities as they relate to other
countries."[55] Thomas J. Deegan, Jr., vice president and director of C&O
Railway Company, told participants in a public relations workshop that the
U.S. was "naive" in its counter propaganda and that the government had
"traded down" public relations by using inadequately trained "press-release
men."[56] Some of the most comprehensive recommendations came from Denny
Griswold, the publisher and editor of the weekly newsletter Public
Relations News.[57]
The debate on the role overseas information programs can be boiled down to
two questions: Should the nation use propaganda to advance its foreign
policy goals, and where in the government should overseas information
programs reside? Considering the political atmosphere of the times, it is
somewhat surprising that the Jackson Committee was able to reach a broad
consensus on both points.
As already noted, there was strong opposition to the use of
propaganda. The feeling in the Congress, within the media, and among
public relations practitioners was that the nation's initial flirtation
with propaganda, the Psychological Strategy Board, had been a
failure. President Truman created the PSB on April 4, 1951, "to authorize
and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct
within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological
operations." The PSB had been charged with reporting to the National
Security Council "on the Boards's activities on the evaluation of the
national psychological operations, including the implementation of approved
objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies
concerned." The PSB role was designed to be that of strictly
coordination. It did not conduct any operations of its own.[58]
The Jackson Committee heeded the voices of the board's many critics who
felt that the PSB had been established on a false premise. "It is founded
upon the misconception that 'psychological activities' and 'psychological
strategy' somehow exist apart from official policies and actions and can be
dealt with independently by experts in this field," the committee stated in
a July 8 press release timed announcing its recommendations. "In reality,
there is a 'psychological' aspect or implication to every diplomatic,
economic, or military policy and action."[59]
The committee also won praise from both reporters and public relations
practitioners for rejecting of the use of propaganda in pursuit of American
foreign policy goals. "American broadcasts and printed materials should
concentrate on objective, factual news reporting," the committee news
release said. "The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a
propagandist note should be avoided."[60] The Jackson Committee report
also objected to the use of terms such as "psychological warfare" and "Cold
War." The committee report said "they should be discarded in favor of
others which describe our true goals."[61]
There wasn't as much a consensus as to where in the government overseas
information efforts should reside as there was for where they
shouldn't. From the very beginning of this debate, an array of voices from
a variety of perspectives had advocated the removal of these programs from
the operational control of the State Department.
During the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower singled out the State
Department when criticizing the Truman administration for
compartmentalizing the nation's response to the Cold War. "We shall no
longer have a Department of State that deals with foreign policy in an
aloof cluster," Eisenhower said. "The Administration in power has failed
to bring into line its criss-crossing and overlapping and jealous
departments and bureaus and agencies."[62]
The State Department's stewardship of overseas information programs also
drew fire from the legislative branch Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.)
said the only way to save these programs from "certain death" was to
transfer them from the State Department to an new federal agency. Senator
Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.), a member of both the McCarthy and Hickenlooper
committees, predicted that the government's various overseas information
programs would be placed under one head.[63] In a 44-page memorandum,
Hickenlooper Committee staff concluded that "Congress and the American
people lack an accurate definition of what we are attempting to accomplish
with overseas information programs." The report stated that the program
had "strayed too far" from its original purpose and "has become
increasingly less effective as it has become more an instrument of
propaganda and less an instrument of information."[64]
There was less consensus on where the overseas information programs should
reside. The Hickenlooper Committee and the Advisory Committee on
Information proposed that these programs be consolidated into one
Cabinet-level agency. This drew support from public relations
practitioners such as Griswold, who wrote the White House and said, "Set up
an independent agency, free to operate a fast-moving, modern program where
timeliness takes precedence over protocol,"[65] However, there were also
critics to raising the profile of overseas information programs to the
Cabinet level. Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), the ranking minority
member on the McCarthy committee, said the proposal "doesn't make any
sense."[66] Jackson Committee staff member Lewis C. Mattison wrote in a
critique of Griswold's proposals that "Cabinet rank is newspaper talk."[67]
President Eisenhower effectively ended the debate when he sent Congress
Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953. The order created the United States
Information Agency. In many ways, it mirrored the Rockefeller Committee's
recommendations. USIA represented a consolidation of overseas information
programs administered by IIA, the Mutual Security Agency, the Technical
Cooperation Administration, and by programs financed in connection with
government in occupied areas. The president also agreed with the chorus of
those who favored abolishing the PSB. However, the Rockefeller Committee's
recommendation that the new agency be established under the control of the
NSC was rejected.
Oddly, the only voice in the debate that appeared to favor State
Department control of overseas information was President Eisenhower's own
hand-picked group, the Jackson Committee. However, Reorganization Plan No.
8 was sent to Congress on June 1, 1953, exactly one month before the
Jackson Committee report was due. Noting that the White House had already
sent its proposal to Capitol Hill, the Jackson Committee declined to make a
specific recommendation. But the report did say, "In our opinion, the most
satisfactory arrangement would be to retain within the Department of State
those functions now assigned the IIA and combine them with the information
activities handled by MSA and TCA."[68] In a strategic footnote, the
Jackson report stated that the committee had considered the recommendations
of the Hickenlooper and Rockefeller committees to remove overseas
information functions from the State Department. By declining to make a
recommendation, the Jackson report appears to have acknowledged the
political reality.[69]
There is an ironic historical footnote to this debate. Under the
direction of Vice President Al Gore, the Clinton administration embarked
upon a cost-cutting program in 1993, the National Performance Review. USIA
was one of the agencies targeted for fat-trimming. Gore said, "It is
imperative that both the State Department and USIA look for efficiencies
and economies that result from the elimination of redundant programs,
duplicative functions, and excess capacity in the infrastructure that
supports the conduct of foreign affairs."[70] In the context of the
Jackson Committee's deliberations 40 years earlier, this sounded a lot like
movement toward the consolidation of overseas information programs under a
State Department umbrella.
As late as February 15, 1995, the White House remained committed to an
independent USIA. "After a review under auspices of the Vice President's
National Performance Review, the Administration concluded that USIA, AID
and ACDA should continue to pursue their missions as independent agencies
under the foreign policy direction of the Secretary of State." However,
the same White House statement foreshadowed the future when it said, "The
review the Vice President directed also concluded that the State
Department, and each of the other agencies, should continue to conduct
thorough reinvention activities to attain greater efficiency and
effectiveness and eliminate activities that can no longer be justified."[71]
On December 30, 1998, the White House announced that USIA's functions
would be consolidated within the State Department. Because it came during
the holiday season and in the period immediately following President
Clinton's impeachment, the move received little attention. On October 1,
1999, USIA ceased to exist.[72] Ironically, the one Jackson Committee
recommendation ignored by President Eisenhower had finally been realized.
The Past Becomes Prologue
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States thrust the
debate over the role of overseas information programs in advancing American
foreign policy initiatives back to center stage. This would, in turn,
spark a public debate reminiscent of the overseas information debate nearly
a half-century earlier. Again, the two most prominent issues in this
debate were what kind of propaganda, if any, is appropriate, and where
within the government should it be practiced?
With what many assume was one eye on history and the other on reelection,
the Bush White House gave Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward
unprecedented access to the president, key administration and military
figures, and classified documents during 2002. The result was Bush At War,
a 376-page book detailing the administration's response during the first
100 days of the War on Terrorism. It gave the reader a rare, albeit
filtered, look at a major historical event as it is evolving. It also
showed that overseas information, often referred to as the politically more
palatable public diplomacy, was on President Bush's mind in the first hours
following the attacks.
According to Woodward, Bush met with Karen P. Hughes, counselor to the
president, on the morning after the attack. The president told Hughes to
develop a "plan, a strategy, even a vision...to educate the American people
to be prepared for another attack. Americans need to know that combating
terrorism would be the main focus of the administration -- and the
government -- from this moment forward."[73] The significance of this
exchange was its focus on framing message content. Bush was, in effect,
embracing the use of overseas information programs for strategic purposes.
A slightly different philosophy, one emphasizing the control of
information, was articulated by Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld. During a September 15 meeting of the Bush war cabinet at Camp
David, Rumsfeld outlined his vision for overseas information. The minutes
of that meeting indicated that the secretary of defense said, "Need tighter
control over public affairs. Treat it like a political campaign with daily
talking points."[74]
At the risk of reading too much into the nuances of the individual
speakers, these semantical differences foreshadowed the debate on the role
of overseas information in the war on terror. Using the term propaganda in
its broadest and least pejorative context, the U.S. would engage in white
and gray propaganda -- and flirt with the use of black propaganda -- in the
months that followed the attacks.
Hughes spearheaded the use of white propaganda with the creation of the
Coalition Information Center in October 2001. The CIC was set up in the
Indian Treaty Room in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building -- the site
of many of Ike's Cold War news conferences. (The irony of this will be
noted later.) There were also smaller CIC operations in London and
Islamabad. Within the CIC, staffers from the White House, other
administrative agencies, and the British Embassy engaged in what The New
York Times described as "the most ambitious wartime communications effort
since World War II."[75] The CIC's stated purpose was to more effectively
and quickly communicate U.S. foreign policy goals to the world --
especially a skeptical Muslim world. The CIC was also established to
counter the propaganda efforts of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda, and Osama
bin Laden. The New York Times also reported that its creation was "an
acknowledgment that propaganda is back in fashion after the Clinton
administration and Congress tried to cash in on the end of the Cold War by
cutting back public diplomacy overseas...to balance the budget."[76]
The creation of the CIC came at a time the administration was being
hammered in the media for targeting mistakes during the U.S. bombing
campaign in Afghanistan. Twice during the early weeks of the air campaign,
Red Cross facilities had been mistakenly struck by U.S. bombs. President
Bush told the National Security Council on October 29, 2001, "We need to
also highlight the fact that the Taliban are killing people and conducting
their own terror operations, so get a little more balance here about what
the situation is."[77] Just two days later, the President repeated his
frustration when he opened an NSC meeting by saying "We're losing the
public relations war."[78]
The first fruits of the CIC came within a few days of its creation. It
arranged an appearance by former American ambassador to Syria Christopher
Ross on the influential Arabic news channel Al-Jazeera. It was the first
time an American official had addressed the Arab world in its own language
since the attacks.[79] On November 17, First Lady Laura Bush presented the
White House's weekly radio address as part of a coordinated effort to draw
attention to the Taliban regime's brutality against women and
children.[80] Just a few days later, the CIC office in Islamabad released
a list of 22 atrocities it alleged were committed by al Qaeda and the
Taliban.[81]
At approximately the same time Hughes and the White House created the CIC,
the Pentagon established its own information outlet, the Office of
Strategic Influence. Defense officials would say after its existence was
revealed several months later that its objectives were not that much
different from those of the CIC. However, it also engaged in the use of
gray propaganda techniques, often associated with military and CIA PSYOPs,
psychological operations, against the Taliban and al Qaeda. In the early
stages of the war, the gray propaganda efforts included the dropping of
leaflets and the use of flying radio stations -- both carrying instructions
to the Taliban on how to surrender. One such broadcast began: "Attention
Taliban! You are condemned. Did you know that? The instant the terrorists
you support took over our planes, you sentenced yourselves to death."[82]
The speculation that OSI was planning to move into the area of black
propaganda spelled its early demise just three months later. When media
reports surfaced in February 2002 of OSI plans to spread disinformation to
foreign journalists,, White House aides reportedly "hit the ceiling," and,
in a rare show of disharmony within the administration, said they were
"furious" about the proposal. Hughes, who had been accompanying Bush on a
Asian trip at the time the news broke, called a Washington Post reporter to
ensure "that there be no change in the administration's strict policy of
providing reporters with the facts."[83] Although he characterized the
reporting as "inaccurate speculation and assertions," Rumsfeld announced
the office's closing one day later. He also said the Pentagon would not
deal in disinformation.[84]
As 2002 drew to a close, White House and Pentagon officials found
themselves still trying to avoid the stigma of black propaganda. The New
York Times reported in December the existence of a secret effort "to
discredit and undercut the influence of mosques and religious schools, as
well as planting news stories in newspapers and other periodicals in
foreign countries." White House spokesman Ari Fleischer told reporters,
"The president has the expectation that any program that is created in his
administration will be based on facts, and that's what he would expect to
be carried out in any program that is created in any entity of the
government."[85] In a Pentagon briefing, Rumsfeld said that the idea may
have been discussed "at the 50th level" of the bureaucracy, but that "we
don't intend to do things that are in any way inconsistent with the laws,
or our Constitution, or the principles and values of our country."[86]
As mentioned, there was another echo of the past in this debate: Where
within the government should overseas information programs be housed? As
was the case in 1953, there were a variety of opinions -- most of which
wanted to distance these programs from the State Department.
The White House announced July 30, 2002 -- the 49th anniversary of the
Jackson Committee Report -- that it was establishing a permanent Office of
Global Communications, an extension of the CIC, to coordinate the
administration's foreign policy message and to help shape the country's
image abroad. Spokesman Ari Fleischer said, "better coordination of
international communications will help America to explain what we do and
why we do it around the world. It's important to share the truth about
America and American values with other nations in the world." However, when
asked whether the new office would replace or supersede State Department
public diplomacy efforts, he said, "it's not above the Department of State.
The Department of State has the lead in public diplomacy around the world.
But it's a White House coordinating body, to work shoulder to shoulder with
the State Department on this."[87]
This approach won qualified praise from the United States Advisory
Commission on Public Diplomacy, a bipartisan panel created during the Cold
War to provide oversight on overseas information programs. In a report
released September 18, 2002, the five-member panel said "The Office of
Global Communications should provide strategic direction and themes to the
U.S. agencies that reach foreign audiences, while relying on the Secretary
of State to provide tactical and strategic coordination of the diplomats
overseas."[88] Translation: Let the State Department take the lead on
diplomacy, and let the OGC take the lead on overseas information.
That interpretation is supported by another commission recommendation,
that the 1998 consolidation of USIA within the State Department be
reviewed. The report noted that the State Department's public diplomacy
efforts had been strengthened since the consolidation, "much remains to be
done to ensure that public diplomacy is brought into all aspects of policy
decision making." It also favored integrating Congress into public
diplomacy efforts[89] It should be noted that a previous incarnation of the
commission had made similar recommendations 49 years earlier. The only
major difference was that in 1953 it had favored placing overseas
information programs in an independent Cabinet-level agency.[90]
There were others who wanted distance between the State Department and
overseas information programs. In a report released the same day the White
House made its announcement, the independent Council on Foreign Relations
recommended the creation of an independent Corporation for Public
Diplomacy, modeled after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, to
develop programs to communicate American messages overseas.[91] In a
recommendation that in some ways mirrors the creation of the OGC, the
Council on Foreign Relations also proposed the creation of a "Public
Diplomacy Coordinating Structure, whose chair would be the president's
principal advisor on public diplomacy."[92] The report also called for
increased funding of public diplomacy efforts -- which would be echoed six
weeks later in the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy's report.
Different Wars, Common Themes
In comparing the debate over the role and direction of U.S. overseas
information during the Cold War with the renewed debate brought on by the
War on Terrorism, one cannot help but be struck by the similarities. In
both cases, the United States was not as much at war with another nation as
it was at war with a philosophy. The rhetoric of communists and
fundamentalist Islamic extremists was inflammatory and hostile toward
Western values. In both cases, the influence -- and therefore, the threat
-- of the adversary appeared to be spreading. And in both instances,
Americans were left to ask themselves the question of "why don't they like us?"
Both debates occurred at a time when new media were emerging. In the case
of the Cold War, television was just starting to take its place as the
predominant mass medium. With the War on Terrorism, the Internet and forms
of wireless communication are the emerging media. Significantly, in both
debates the focus was more on the message than the media.
In terms of message content, the White House, the Congress, public
relations practitioners and the media struggled in 1953 to define the
appropriate role for overseas information when it came to advancing
national foreign policy objectives. That debate was revived on September
11, 2001. In both instances, there was broad consensus on the need to more
effectively communicate U.S. messages and values. However, when it came to
the specific nature of such communication, opinions diverged. Those
aligned with the military tended to take a more tactical approach to
overseas information. This, in turn, provided them with justification for
the use of gray and, occasionally, black propaganda
techniques. Journalists and public relations practitioners preferred a
more strategic approach. They favored the use of white propaganda --
although the practitioners distanced themselves from the term. The
political leadership in the White House and the Congress publicly embraced
the strategic approach while, at times, appearing the turn a blind eye to
the occasional necessity of the tactical approach.
Another striking similarity is the ambivalence toward State Department
leadership of overseas information programs. There appears to be a basic
mistrust of the State Department that transcends eras or political
parties. There was a broad-based consensus toward removing these programs
from State Department control during both the Cold War and the War on
Terrorism. Even the different versions of the same presidential advisory
panel made parallel recommendations some 49 years apart.
During both debates, there was intense Congressional interest in
oversight. However, if the 21st century war follows the pattern of the
20th century war, it will ultimately be the White House that determines the
question of how overseas information programs are administered. Only
during the early stages of the Truman presidency, before the Cold War had
reached its full intensity, and the later stages of the Clinton presidency,
as the Cold War faded into memory, was there White House support for State
Department control. History suggests that some public diplomacy functions
currently housed within the State Department may yet again be on the move.
There is one other significant point of comparison: the role of a key
presidential adviser in framing the debate. For Dwight Eisenhower, that
key adviser was C.D. Jackson, who had a relationship with the president
that pre-dated the White House and who had long served as an adviser on
communication matters. For George W. Bush, that person is Karen Hughes --
a trusted confident who has served as his chief adviser on communication
issues since his days as Texas governor. These were the first people the
two presidents turned to when it came to the critical question of how to
win the hearts and the minds of an overseas audience. Theirs are the
voices that appears to matter the most in this debate. It should be noted
that this has precedent: It was Woodrow Wilson's close friend and adviser
George Creel that convinced the White House to adopt create CPI in lieu of
military censorship at the outbreak of the First World War.
While these comparisons between the Cold War and the War on Terrorism may
be somewhat simplistic, they may provide some direction for future policies
and, therefore, merit further study.
Endnotes
[1] . David W. Guth and Charles Marsh, Public Relations: A Values-Driven
Approach (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), p. 55.
[2] . Brett Gray, The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War
I to the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 8.
[3] . New Webster's Dictionary and Roget's Thesaurus (New York: Ottenhiemer
Publishers, 1992, p. 301.
[4] . Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger. Psychological Warfare. (Washington:
Combat Forces Press, 1954), p. 39. As quoted by William A. Levinson. "An
Introduction to Propaganda." Published online:
http://www.stentorian.com/propagan.html##definition
[5] . Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell. Propaganda and Persuasion, 3
ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 2.
[6] . Gayle Mertz and Carol Miller Lieber. Conflict in Context:
Understanding Local to Global Security. (Educators for Social
Responsibility, 1991) Excerpted online at
http://www.esrnational.org/whatispropaganda.htm
[7] . Noam Chomsky. "Propaganda, American-style." Zpub.com. Web posted at
http://www.zpub.com/un/chomsky-htm
[8] . Todd Hunt and James E. Grunig, Public Relations Techniques (Fort
Worth, Tex.: Harcourt Brace, 1994), p. 8.
[9] . Cutlip, op. cit., pp. 182-183.
[10] . Cutlip, op. cit., p. 182.
[11] . Gray, op. cit., p. 8.
[12] . Leo Bogart. 1995. Cool Words, Cold War. The American University
Press. Washington. p. xii
[13] . Jowett and O'Donnell. op. cit., p. 6
[14] . Jowett and O'Donnell, op. cit., p. 1.
[15] . Fitzhugh, op. cit., p. 3.
[16] . Guth and Marsh, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
[17] . Jowell and O'Donnell. op. cit. p 12
[18] . Alvin A. Snyder. U.S. Foreign Affairs in the New Information Age:
Charting a Course for the 21st Century. (Annenberg Washington Program in
Communications Policy Studies, Northwestern University) Published online at
http://www.annenberg.nwu.edu/pubs/usfa/default.htm. Part 1, p 1.
[19] . Jowell and O'Donnell. op. cit. p 13
[20] . Fitzhugh, op. cit., p. 7.
[21] . Jowell and O'Donnell. op. cit. p 15
[22] . Scott M. Cutlip, The Unseen Power: Public Relations. A
History (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994), pp. xiv-xv.
[23] . Bruce Catton, Bruce Catton's Civil War (New York: Fairfax Press,
1984), pp. 191-192.
[24] . Guth and Marsh, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
[25] . David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American
Society. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 62.
[26] . Barry Alan Marks. "The Idea of Propaganda in America" Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1957. As cited in Gray, op. cit., p. 23.
[27] . Scott M. Cutlip, Allen H. Center and Glen M. Broom, Effective Public
Relations, Sixth Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp.
40-49.
[28] . Richard Alan Nelson, A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the
United States. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 274 (white
propaganda) and 176 (gray propaganda).
[29] . Ibid, p. 128.
[30] . Bogart, op.cit., p. xiii
[31] . Charles A.H. Thomson. 1948. Overseas Information Service of the
United States Government. The Brookings Institution. Washington. p.
19. (As cited in Bogart, op. cit. p. xiii)
[32] . Cutlip, Center and Broom, op. cit. p. 570.
[33] . Speech by Allen M. Wilson, vice president of The Advertising
Council, to a joint luncheon of the Export Advertising Association and
Export Managers Club, March 23, 1949. Charles W. Jackson Files, Assistant
to the President File 1948-52, Box 27, Harry S. Truman Library.
[34] . "Statement by the President." August 31, 1945. Official File,
Folder 37. Harry S. Truman Library.
[35] . Freeland. op. cit. p. 89.
[36] . Freeland. op. cit. p. 89.
[37] . Bogart. op. cit. pp. xviii-xiv.
[38] . Alvin A. Snyder. 1994. U.S. Foreign Affairs in the New Information
Age: Charting a Course for the 21st Century. The Annenberg Washington
Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern
University. Washington.
[39] . Bogart. op. cit. p. xiv.
[40] . Address by President Harry S. Truman to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1950, Files of Charles. Murphy, Presidential
Speech File, Box Number 6, Harry S. Truman Library.
[41] . Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. Deeds Done in
Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990), p 101.
[42] . Department of State Departmental Announcement No. 4. "Establishment
of the United States International Information Administration
(IIA)." January 16, 1952. As published in Foreign Relations of the United
States 1952-1954, Volume II, Part 2. United States Government Printing
Office. Washington. 1984. p 1591.
[43] . Foreign Relations of the United States 1951 Volume I. United States
Government Printing Office. Washington. 1959. p. 902. Footnote 3.
[44] . Ibid. p 903. Footnote 5.
[45] . Martin J. Medhurst. "Eisenhower, Little Rock, and the Rhetoric of
Crisis." The Modern President and Crisis Rhetoric. Amos Kiewe, ed.
(Westport, Conn.:Praeger, 1994), p 22.
[46] . James Reston. "Eisenhower Plans Key Staff To Guide 'Cold War'
Policy." The New York Times. January 11, 1953. p 53.
[47] . Scope and Content Note, Finder's Guide, U.S. Committee on
International Information Activities (Jackson Committee): Records, 1950-53.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. (In subsequent citations, documents from
this file will be referred to as "Jackson Committee Records.")
[48] . White House Press Release. January 26, 1953. Jackson Committee
Records. Box 14. Dwight David Eisenhower Library.
[49] . Eisenhower letter to James S. Lay, Jr. January 24, 1953. Jackson
Committee Records, 1950-53. Box 12. Dwight David Eisenhower Library.
[50] . Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954,
Volume II, Part 2. United States Government Printing
Office. Washington. 1984. p 1672.
[51] . Charles E. Egan. "Propaganda Post in Cabinet Urged." The New York
Times. February 21, 1953. p 1.
[52] . "Psychological War." The Washington Post. February 14,
1953. Clipping from Jackson Committee Records. Box 14. op. cit.
[53] . Joseph Alsop and Stewart Alsop. "'Selling' Democracy Like Soap
Flakes." The Washington Post. January 12, 1953. Clipping from the files
of U.S. President's Committee on International Information Activities
(Jackson Committee): Records, 1950-53. Box 14. Dwight David Eisenhower
Library.
[54] . Walter Lippmann. "Abolish the Voice of America." The New York
Herald Tribune. April 27, 1953. Clipping from Jackson Committee
Records. Box 14. op. cit.
[55] . "Eisenhower's 'cold war' committee to call on PR
men." Tide. February 28, 1953. Clipping from Jackson Committee
Records. Box 14. op. cit.
[56] . Ellis L. Phillips. Memorandum of notes and impressions of Workshop
Panel on U.S. International Public Relations, sponsored by the American
Public Relations Association, on March 3, 1953. Jackson Committee
Records. Box 13. op. cit.
[57] . Public Relations News. Letter No. 464. June 1, 1953. New York. p 1.
[58] . "Collection Description: The Psychological Strategy Board." Harry
S. Truman Library.
[59] . White House Press Release on the report of the President's Committee
on International Information. op. cit.
[60] . White House Press Release on the report of the President's Committee
on International Information. op. cit.
[61] . White House Press Release on the report of the President's Committee
on International Information. op. cit.
[62] . Ibid.
[63] . "Mundt Sees One Unit For U.S. Information." The New York
Times. February 23, 1953. Clipping from Jackson Committee Records. Box
14. op. cit.
[64] . Staff Memorandum No. 8. United States Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. April 10, 1953. Jackson Committee Records. Box 14. op cit.
[65] . Public Relations News. Letter No. 464. June 1, 1953. New York. p 1.
[66] . Ibid.
[67] . Memorandum from Lewis C. Mattison to Abbott Washburn. May 27,
1953. Jackson Committee Records. Box 11. op. cit.
[68] . Report to the President. op. cit. pp 101-102. Italics added for
emphasis.
[69] . Report to the President. op. cit. p 102.
[70] . "Accompanying Report of the National Performance Review." Office of
the Vice President. The White House. July 23, 1994.
[71] . Statement by the Press Secretary. The White House. February 15, 1995.
[72] . Fact Sheet: Foreign Affairs Reorganization. The White
House. December 30, 1998.
[73] . Bob Woodward. Bush at War. Simon & Schuster. New York. 2002. p 41.
[74] . Ibid. p 88.
[75] . Elizabeth Becker. "A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds." The New
York Times. November 11, 2001. Section 1A, p 1.
[76] . Ibid.
[77] . Woodward. op. cit. pp 272-273.
[78] . Woodward. op. cit. p 279.
[79] . Eric Boehlert. "A failure to communicate." Salon.com. Posted
November 8, 2001.
[80] . Radio Address by Laura Bush to the Nation. Office of Mrs. Bush, The
White House. Web posted November 17, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov
[81] . Dana Milbank. "U.S. Takes Offensive in Information War With List of
Enemy Crimes." The Washington Post. November 22, 2001. p A38.
[82] . Jamie McIntyre. "U.S. propaganda to Taliban: 'You are condemned.'"
CNN. Web posted October 17, 2001. http://www.cnn.com.
[83] . Mike Allen. "White House Angered at Plan For Pentagon
Misinformation." The Washington Post. February 25, 2002. p A17.
[84] . "Pentagon closes down controversial office." CNN. Web posted
February 26, 2002. http://www.cnn.com.
[85] . Eric Schmitt. "White House Plays Down Propaganda by Military." The
New York Times. Web posted December 17, 2002. http://www.nytimes.com
[86] . Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense News Briefing with Secretary
Rumsfeld and General Richard B. Meyers, chairman, Joints Chiefs of
Staff. U.S. Department of Defense. December 17, 2002.
[87] . Transcript. Ari Fleischer Press Briefing. The White House. July
30, 2002.
[88] . "Building America's Public Diplomacy." Report issued by the United
States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. September 18,
2002. Washington. p 6.
[89] . Ibid. pp 6-7.
[90] . Eagan. op cit.
[91] . James Dao. "Panel Urges U.S. to Revamp Efforts to Promote Image
Abroad." The New York Times. Web posted July 29, 2002. http://www.nytimes.com
[92] . News Release: "Council Task Force urges the Bush Administration to
upgrade public diplomacy." Council on Foreign Relations. Web posted July
30, 2002. http://www.cfr.org
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