The Economic Response of Religious Television Stations to Digital
Implementation
Dr. Brad Schultz
Department of Journalism
University of Mississippi
331 Farley Hall
University, MS 38677
662-915-7146
[log in to unmask]
Abstract
A theoretical model of organizational behavior (Oliver, 1991) was applied to
religious television stations in the U.S. to assess their economic
responses to the digital
television conversion. Results showed that religious stations are more
likely to abandon
or reduce operations, but have strong resistance toward selling and would
like to explore
new revenue opportunities. Because of this dilemma, religious
broadcasters viewed the
conversion as a burden, not a benefit.
The Economic Response of Religious Television Stations to Digital
Implementation
Background
The general manager and president of two religious television stations in
Florida has a serious problem. While one station is non-commercial and the
other is commercial, both must comply with federal mandates to convert to
digital broadcasting. The general manager estimated the cost of
full-power digital conversion at around six million dollars, a figure he
called "horrific." (Note: The names of managers and organizations have been
withheld at the request of the research participants. Interviews took
place in October 2001 and August 2002).
Because of high conversion costs, the stations will not go digital for at
least a year. And while the organization could go with low-power digital
conversion, it may still have to sell one station to pay for another. "We
feel we are being forced to sell a valuable asset to settle for a
non-commercial station," said the general manager. He added that his
stations need to create new economic models, such as leasing unused
spectrum space, but the financial reality of the situation has made that
unlikely. "This is a real problem for religious stations."
As the manager indicated, religious stations across the U.S. have
struggled with the issue of digital conversion. Unlike most media
technologies, which develop from market forces and entrepreneurial
ambition, digital television in the U.S. has the support of a government
mandate. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has ordered a general
phase-in of digital television, whereby almost all stations in the country
must have a digital signal on the air no later than 2003 (Thalheimer, 1998).
The Economic Response
If the FCC sticks to its timetable, digital television will enter into a
unique period in U.S. history. The American media landscape has changed
drastically in the generation leading up to digital
technology. Deregulation in the 1980s, which climaxed with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, relaxed rules on media ownership. The
result has been a tremendous increase in media mergers and consolidations,
as larger companies continue to swallow up smaller ones. At the turn of
the new century, the top 15 television operators accounted for 43% of total
industry revenue, with that number projected to change to 10 companies
controlling more than half of industry revenue within a few years
(Mermigas, 1998a).
As media companies combine, their audiences have split. An explosion in
program offerings and alternative channels has resulted in audience
fragmentation and the development of smaller 'niche' audiences. A 1998
survey by Statistical Research Incorporated showed that the percentage of
homes with more than 80 channels had doubled in just one year, while the
number of homes with Internet access had doubled just since 1996
(Lafayette, 1998).
Another issue for industry executives is the tremendous cost of digital
implementation. Depending on who crunches the numbers, digital conversion
can cost between one and eight million dollars per station. According to a
Forrester Research study, 24% of all stations will spend more than $6
million apiece on digital upgrades (Tedesco, 1997). The National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) says that by the end of the digital
transition, the industry will have invested approximately $16 billion in
equipment, design and manpower (Kapler, 1998).
The Economic Response
Consolidation, fragmentation and escalating costs have combined to cast
a shadow of doubt across the entire system of media
economics. Chan-Olmstead wrote, "As the media industry continues to
develop with sophisticated technologies … it renders current models of
competition in mass media obsolete" (1997, pp. 39-40). A study from
PricewatershouseCoopers revealed that digital television will require new
business models, new programming models and more efficient systems
(Mermigas, 1998b). But exactly what economic models and systems will
support the untested technology remains a mystery to most station owners
and industry executives. Said former FCC chairman William Kennard,
"Nobody—nobody—can predict, with any degree of certainty how it's all going
to work out" (West, 1998, p. S7).
That certainly could be said of religious broadcasters, who perhaps face even
greater conversion obstacles than their secular counterparts. Certainly,
financial
restraints and economic conditions will play a major role.. As
Armstrong (1979, p. 138)
noted, "Christian programs and stations operate on budgets that seem
impossibly low to
other communication professionals."
Religious broadcasting has developed an economic model based mainly on
viewer support, but with advertising growing in significance. Many
religious broadcasters say this model will not survive the digital
conversion, forcing many stations off the air or into consolidation
(Schultz, 2000a). In addition, many religious stations are by definition
non-commercial and non-profit. Executives at such stations are also
different socially, politically and managerially than their secular
counterparts. While economic realities are
The Economic Response
important to such broadcasters, evangelical and religious principles often
take priority (Schultz, 2000b). This could complicate their responses to
digital television.
A few years ago, FCC chairman Michael Powell called digital conversion "a
potential train wreck. The government-mandated schedule will force
broadcasters to spend billions before they have any inkling of what
consumers prefer" (McConnell, 1998, p. 14). This study attempted to
address this 'potential train wreck' and what religious broadcasters are
doing to avoid a derailment. Specifically, it approached the economic
future of U.S. religious television stations with this question: how will
such stations react to digital conversion?
Theory and Hypotheses
The study attempted to answer this question primarily through the
application of a theoretical model of organizational response (Oliver,
1991). It would be much simpler to make predictions based strictly on
financial resources, but that may not be the most comprehensive
method. Oliver argued that, "The likelihood that organizations will
conform to institutional pressures is not exclusively dependent on the
legitimacy or economic rationality anticipated by conformity (p. 165)."
Instead, Oliver described organizational behavior as a strategic response
to institutional changes (such as the government-mandated conversion to
digital television). In the face of change or institutional pressures,
organizations react based on a variety of factors. Oliver developed a
model that helped predict how organizations would handle and react to
outside pressures. Such outside pressures must be viewed in terms of what
is causing the pressure, which constituents are exerting the pressure, the
content of the
The Economic Response
norms to which the organization is being pressured to conform, the means by
which the pressure is exerted and the environmental context in which they
occur (see Table 1).
For example, Oliver defined the cause of institutional pressures as "the
rationale, set of expectations, or intended objectives that underlie
external pressures for conformity (p. 161)." This cause is generally
defined in terms of either legitimacy (social fitness) or efficiency
(economic fitness). In terms of the cause, outside pressures can make the
organization either more socially fit (such as laws regarding safety
conditions) or more economically fit (such as laws that promote business
efficiency).
In a similar vein, organizations depend on a variety of constituents. In
the case of multiplicity, such constituencies are multiple and
conflicting. The level of dependence organizations have on such
constituencies also varies. For example, public television stations are
highly dependent on both the government and private donors for funding. By
contrast, commercial stations are more dependent on advertisers and the
viewing public.
The content of the outside pressure is also important. Sometimes, such
content is compatible with the internal goals of the organization. It
could be argued that deregulation of ownership limits on television
stations is compatible with business goals at those stations. If the
organization believes the content is not compatible with internal goals,
there is a higher level of constraints and a lower level of
consistency. For example, many stations might view the legislative ban on
cigarette advertising as a constraint.
The institutional factor of control refers to the level of sanction or
coercion involved with the outside pressure. The threat of legal coercion
or enforcement can be
The Economic Response
quite high, as in the case of digital television. The FCC has mandated the
conversion, and stations that do not comply face the potential loss of
their operating licenses. In some cases, control can be voluntary and less
severe. This would apply to regulations and operating procedures of
stations that belong to the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB). The NRB
has rules and regulations for member stations, but compliance is mostly
voluntary.
Finally, the context of the outside pressure can influence organizational
behavior. There can be a high degree of environmental uncertainty in which
the pressure takes place. This would refer to a situation in which
business conditions cannot be accurately anticipated or predicted. There
is often a high degree of environmental uncertainty when new media
technologies emerge, such as the chaotic early days of radio and television.
Based on these conditions, Oliver theorized that organizations will make
specific strategic responses ranging from passivity to increasing active
resistance. These responses include acquiescence, compromise, avoidance,
defiance and manipulation. How the organization perceives the outside
pressure for change will determine how it reacts. For example, if an
organization feels like the outside pressure is socially legitimate and
economically efficient, it should respond with high acquiescence and avoid
strong resistance. However, if an organization has strong, conflicting,
multiple constituencies, and the content is viewed as constraining rather
than consistent, the reaction is more likely to be open defiance of the
outside pressure.
This predictive model has direct application to television stations and the
digital conversion. According to Oliver, acquiescence is defined as habit,
imitation or
The Economic Response
compliance, which includes "unconscious or blind adherence to preconscious
or taken-for-granted rules or values (p. 152)." This would correlate most
closely to a station maintaining the economic status quo or improving its
existing economic model.
But Oliver also noted, "Organizations may consider unqualified conformity
unpalatable or unworkable" (p. 153). In these cases, compromise is a
logical response. Oliver described compromise as "the thin wedge in
organizational resistance to institutional pressures (p. 153)," which could
be interpreted as developing new economic models or revenue
streams. Avoidance, defined by Oliver as escape or exit from the domain
within which the pressure is exerted, correlates most closely to selling
the station, consolidation, or getting out of the industry. Defiance and
manipulation are not plausible courses of action, given the coercive power
of the FCC and the threat of losing a station license for non-compliance.
Based on this model, it is possible to assign predictive factors to U.S.
religious television stations (see Table 2). It is also possible to
hypothesize how religious broadcasters will respond to digital conversion:
H1: Religious stations are more likely than other categories of stations to
abandon, or eliminate operations, including no planned changes or
selling the station, as a response to digital conversion.
H2: Religious stations are more likely than other categories of stations
to perceive a lack of benefit in the digital conversion process.
H3: Of those stations that perceive a lack of benefit in the digital
conversion process, religious stations are more likely to try and
avoid
abandonment compared to other categories of stations.
The Economic Response
There are stations that will undoubtedly view the digital conversion as
lacking any benefit, and perhaps even consider it a detriment. This would
seem a logical response of religious stations, given their limited
resources. Thus, religious stations should be more likely to respond to
digital conversion with active resistance.
These hypotheses reflected the current problems facing religious
broadcasters. It was believed that regulatory and financial burdens have
forced many religious broadcasters to considering selling, even though
making such a choice was involuntary and would be aggressively resisted.
Methodology
A questionnaire was developed to test the predictive model and gauge the
attitudes and behaviors of decision-making executives in the study. Most
names, addresses, stations and station information used in the
questionnaire sample were gathered from the 2001 Broadcasting & Cable
Yearbook. When necessary information was missing, gaps were filled from TV
station application information at the FCC, which keeps more detailed
records than the Broadcasting & Cable Yearbook. Using these sources, a
stratified sample of broadcasting executives was created. These executives
included owners, presidents, managers or anyone else with ultimate
decision-making power at the station. An nth-series method was used to
build the sample, taking every fifth station from the industry
listings. This method led to a total sample size of 330.
The hypotheses were tested with a postal questionnaire in the fall of
2001. Originally, the questionnaires were designed as an electronic mail
instrument, but a pilot test conducted in the spring of 2001 found low
response rate problems with this method.
The Economic Response
Response was much better for a postal version of the pilot test; therefore,
the researcher decided to conduct the survey by U.S. mail. The mailings
were conducted in October 2001, and based on Dilliman's (2001) total design
method, which emphasizes repeated contacts. Contacts included a
pre-notification letter, the questionnaire and cover letter, and finally
follow-ups by mail, phone and electronic mail.
It was decided to send questionnaires to executives at four major
categories of U.S. television stations: religious, low-power, commercial
and public. It was believed that this method would allow for a better
comparison of religious broadcasters with other station groups.
Of the 330 initial contacts made, a total of 11 were refused or returned as
undeliverable. This left 319 valid possible respondents, of which 104
actually returned a completed questionnaire, for a response rate of
32.6%. Response for the mailing may have suffered because of some
unfortunate circumstances. Shortly after the first questionnaires went
out, television newsrooms across the country began receiving the anthrax
bacteria in the mail. Three people died, and traces of the bacteria were
confirmed in mailings sent to NBC and CBS in New York. At least three
television station representatives called the researcher and said questions
about safety prompted them to have local law enforcement open the manila
envelopes in which the questionnaires were mailed.
These developments had obvious implications for response rate and potential
non-response error. As a result, the researcher conducted qualitative,
in-depth, phone interviews with broadcasters representing all four station
groups. These interviews were
The Economic Response
conducted in October 2001 and April 2002, and the results were used to
supplement the quantitative data of the study.
Results
Data from the study supported previous literature, in that compared to
other station groups, religious station respondents reported more obstacles
associated with digital conversion. All station groups were asked to
assess whether they could sustain revenue after the digital conversion (see
Table 3). On a scale from one to seven, with one representing 'definitely
will not sustain,' and seven representing 'definitely will sustain,' the
mean for the religious group (2.76) was lower than low-power (2.90), public
(3.39) and commercial (4.12) respondents. An analysis of variance (F =
2.85, df = 103,
p = .04) indicated that this difference was statistically significant at
the .05 level.
Similarly, when broadcasters were asked to make predictions about future
revenue, religious stations were the most pessimistic (see Table 4). On a
scale of one to
seven, with one representing 'will decrease substantially,' and seven
representing 'will
increase substantially,' religious (4.29) executives reported lower mean
scores than low-
power (4.33), public (4.92) and commercial (5.00) respondents. Although an
analysis of
variance did not indicate statistical significance at the .05 level (F =
2.42, df = 103,
p = .07), it still reflected the precarious financial position of many
religious broadcasters.
Revenue concerns have caused many religious broadcasters to delay the digital
conversion process (see Table 5). A higher percentage of religious
broadcasters (60%)
indicated plans to delay digital implementation longer than one year,
compared to low-
power (50%), public (48%) and commercial (21%) stations.
The Economic Response
Thus, support for H1 should not be surprising. Station executives were
asked what specific economic changes they planned to make as a result of
digital conversion (see Table 6). The proportion of religious stations
that indicated plans to sell (9%) was higher than commercial stations (4%),
public (0%) and low-power (0%) stations, leading to acceptance of H1.
Data also indicated support for H2, in that religious stations perceived a
very low benefit to the digital conversion (see Table 7). Based on scaled
responses, with one representing 'low benefits,' and seven representing
'high benefits,' religious stations (2.81) had lower mean responses than
commercial (3.00), low-power (3.10) and public (5.91) respondents. An
analysis of variance suggested this difference was statistically
significant at the .05 level (F = 30.24, df = 100, p < .001), especially
when comparing religious and public stations. This was further confirmed
through qualitative data, such as interviews and responses to open-ended
questions on the questionnaire. Some religious station respondents
remarked that the conversion only benefited the government. One remarked,
"Digital is being done only so the government can make more money."
According to the data, religious, low-power and commercial broadcasters
see little benefit from the digital television conversion (see Table
7). Of these groups, it was hypothesized that religious broadcasters would
be more willing to try and avoid abandonment, or selling the station
(H3). Respondents were asked the importance of maintaining control of the
station (see Table 8). On a scale with one representing 'no importance of
keeping control,' and seven representing 'extremely important to keep
The Economic Response
control,' religious broadcasters (6.05) expressed the highest desire to
maintain control, compared to commercial (5.79), public (5.92) and
low-power (4.11) respondents. Although an analysis of variance did not
suggest statistical significance at the .05 level
(F = 2.53, df = 89, p = .06), religious broadcasters were strongly inclined
to maintain station control and avoid selling.
The hypothesis was further examined through correlation. Attitudes toward
selling the station were correlated with those station groups that
perceived low benefits from digital conversion (religious, commercial and
low-power; see Table 9). The correlation indicated that religious
broadcasters had the lowest desire to sell (r = -.46), when compared with
commercial (r = -.19) and low-power (r = -.15) broadcasters, and that this
difference was statistically significant at the .05 level (r = -.46, r2 =
.21, p = .03). Based on these data, H3 was accepted.
Discussion
In that the data showed support for all three hypotheses, the Oliver model
seems to have appropriate application for religious television stations and
the digital conversion.
Religious broadcasters were more likely than other respondents to abandon
or reduce operations (H1), see no benefit from the digital conversion (H2),
and resist sale of the station (H3). However, many of these choices
appeared involuntary.
In terms of specific economic response to digital conversion, the majority
of religious broadcasters (53%) expressed a desire to explore new revenue
opportunities (see Table 6). But regulatory and financial constraints have
put them in a situation where
The Economic Response
they are forced to abandon or reduce operations. This was reflected in
several respondent comments. One religious station respondent said, "We
are a missionary station. We don't have the resources to go
digital." According to another, "We must pay more attention to things
proven to work and spend less time on speculation. We are not yet ready to
make changes."
This also fits Oliver's model in that organizations with low consistency
are less likely to acquiesce or compromise. According to Oliver (1991, p.
154), "Defiance and manipulation strategies are predicted to occur most
frequently when consistency is low. The organization may unilaterally
dismiss or challenge [outside requirements]."
Those stations that are not selling or reducing operations, still face
major obstacles in meeting conversion deadlines. The majority of religious
broadcasters (60%) said it will take a year or longer to convert, which was
a highest percentage of all responding groups (see Table 5). This type of
delay also fits in with the Oliver model. According to Oliver (1991), "The
lower the degree of social legitimacy [or] economic gain perceived to be
attainable from conformity, the greater the likelihood of organizational
resistance" (pp. 160-161).
Even if religious broadcasters had the resources to confront the digital
conversion, the issue is further complicated by questions over revenue
models. Many religious stations are still tied to the economic model of
viewer donations, which may not improve with the advent of digital
technology. A clearer picture or more program offerings does not
necessarily translate into increased viewer support. As one religious
station respondent wrote, "Viewer support and economic changes dictate our
revenue stream,
The Economic Response
[not digital technology]." Another religious station respondent agreed,
adding, "Today's younger generation is less likely to donate [than their
parents]."
All of this fits in with Oliver's model. Regarding inconsistency, she wrote,
"Organizations may also lack the capacity to conform when consistency is
low. Both the
willingness and ability of organizations to accept and conform to
institutional rules or
expectations may be circumscribed by a lack of consistency" (1991, p. 165).
Limitations
All of these findings must be considered within the context in which the
study took place. Specifically, respondent concerns about environmental
uncertainty, audience viewing patterns and worsening economy make their
responses extremely volatile.
There was an overwhelming feeling of uncertainty among the respondents
regarding the digital conversion. Typical of the responses was what one
public station executive wrote, "Things are very uncertain. We still lack
a successful [business] model." A commercial station responded added,
"There is more expense, but we don't see any additional income."
It is also important to consider the economic time frame in which the
study took place. The national economy showed consistent weakening
throughout 2001, and when it showed signs of recovery, the terrorist
attacks in September delivered another serious blow. "It will take [our
station] many years to recover from September 11," wrote one public station
respondent. The weak national economy had a trickle-down effect that
hindered growth for many stations on the local level.
The Economic Response
Thus, the results of this study could be considered only a "snapshot" of a
particular moment within the evolving digital landscape. It is possible
that changes in any of these factors could change the attitudes and
responses of station executives regarding digital television.
Future Research
The limitations of the study suggest the need for investigation over a
longer period of time. A useful approach might be investigating station
response during several distinct time periods. For example, response could
be measured before the digital conversion, shortly after the conversion,
and then a period of years after the conversion. This would allow the
researcher to account for volatility in the environment, such as the
economy or government activity. It could also measure how respondents'
attitudes and activities regarding digital television have changed over
time. This would give the researcher a greater breadth of information
regarding the actual impact of the digital conversion.
A more detailed study of individual stations groups might also provide
more insight as to motivations for economic actions. This particular study
focused more on the 'what' of specific economic response. A case study
approach would take the investigation to the next logical step: 'why' do
groups of stations (or even individual stations) make the economic
responses they do? That would certainly provide more depth to the current
study.
The Economic Response
Conclusions
The results of this study paint a pessimistic picture of the future of
religious television stations in the U.S. Most religious broadcasters do
not want to sell or reduce operations, but have been forced to do so
because of factors related to the digital conversion. Those stations that
do remain on the air face significant problems in regards to conversion
timetables and creating revenue.
Complicating these issues is the great uncertainty among broadcasters
surrounding digital conversion. Even as the conversion deadline
approaches, there is still confusion over programming options, technical
standards, consumer acceptance, and most importantly, revenue
opportunities. No one has yet advanced a proven model for recouping
conversion costs and creating profit in the digital age. This is
especially relevant for religious broadcasters, like the general manager of
the two stations in Florida. "We are really struggling with this
conversion," he said. There is no money to convert and I don't see any for
several years. Am I missing something?"
References
Armstrong, B. (1979). The electric church. Nashville: Thomas Nelson.
Chan-Olmstead, S. M. (1997). Theorizing multichannel media economics: an
explanation of a group-industry strategy competitive model. Journal of Media
Economics, 10 (1), 36-49.
Dillman, D. A. (2000). Mail and Internet surveys (2nd Ed.). New
York: John
Wiley & Sons.
Kapler, R. (1998, November 2). Forty-two stations ready for digital. TV
Technology, p. 22.
Lafayette, J. (1998, June 29). Viewer fragmentation on
rise. Electronic Media,
pp. 29-30.
McConnell, B. (1998, September 14). Powell raises red flag over DTV switch.
Broadcasting & Cable, p. 14.
Mermigas, D. (1998a, May 18). Buying stations while getting is
good. Electronic
Media, pp. 12-16.
__________. (1998b, November 23). New study has some good news for DTV.
Electronic Media, p. 28.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional
processes. Academy of
Management Review, 16 (1), 145-179.
Schultz, B. (2000a). The effect of digital environment on religious
television
stations. Journal of Communication and Religion 23 (1), 50-71.
________. (2000b, August). The effect of age and background of religious
broadcasting executives on digital television implementation. Paper
presented at
annual convention of Association of Educators of Journalism and Mass
Communication,
Phoenix, AZ.
Tedesco, R. (1997, November 17). Stations ready to spend for DTV.
Broadcasting &Cable, p. 10.
Thalheimer, M. (1998). Digital television/reinventing the
news. Washington,
DC: Radio and Television News Directors Foundation.
West, D. (1998, November 16). The medium they couldn't
kill. Broadcasting &
Cable, p. S17-S19.
Table 1: Antecedents of strategic responses
___________________________________________________________
Institutional Factor Predictive Dimensions
Cause Legitimacy or social fitness
Efficiency or economic fitness
Constituents Multiplicity of demands
Dependence on constituents
Content Consistency with group goals
Constraints imposed on group
Control Legal coercion or enforcement
Voluntary diffusion of norms
Context Environmental uncertainty
Environmental interconnection
____________________________________________________________
Source: Oliver, Christine. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional
process.
Academy of Management Review, 16, (1), 160.
Table 2: Strategic response model of U.S. television stations to digital
conversion
________________________________________________________________________
Type of station Predictive factors Strategic response
Commercial Low legitimacy Developing new
Low dependence economic models
Low consistency or revenue
High uncertainty streams
Public Moderate legitimacy Improving existing
Moderate dependence economic models
Moderate consistency
Moderate uncertainty
Religious Low legitimacy Reducing or
Low dependence eliminating
High inconsistency operations
High uncertainty
LPTV Low legitimacy Reducing or
Low dependence eliminating
High inconsistency operations
High uncertainty
________________________________________________________________________
Table 3: Whether stations can sustain revenue after the digital transfer
___________________________________________________________
Responding group N SD Mean_______
Religious 21 1.76 2.76
LPTV 10 1.66 2.90
Public 49 1.67 3.39
Commercial 24 1.57 4.12
Responding group Compared to Mean difference___
Religious Commercial -1.36
Low-power -0.14
Public -0.63
____________________________________________________________
Note: Although the ANOVA suggested a statistical difference, a Scheffe
test failed to identify statistical differences between the
means at the
.05 level.
N = 104
F = 2.85, df = 103, p = .04
Table 4: Station prediction of primary revenue source
_________________________________________________________
Responding group N SD Mean_____
Religious 21 1.52 4.29
Public 49 0.99 4.33
Commercial 24 0.97 4.92
LPTV 10 1.05 5.00
_________________________________________________________
Note: Responses ranged from 'one' meaning 'will decrease substantially'
to 'seven' meaning 'will increase substantially.'
N = 104
F = 2.42, df = 103, p = .07
Table 5: Timetables for stations to convert to digital technology
__________________________________________________________
Response Responding group by percentages
Commercial Religious LPTV Public Totals
Already digital 4 5 0 18 11
Within next 6 months 25 5 10 18 17
Up to one year 50 30 40 16 29
Longer than one year 21 60 50 48 43
Totals 100 100 100 100 100
__________________________________________________________
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number.
N = 103
Table 6: Planned economic changes as a result of digital conversion
_________________________________________________________________
Response Responding group by percentages
Commercial Religious LPTV Public Totals
Improve existing model 25 19 10 33 27
New revenue
choices 54 53 50 61
58
Sell station 4 9 0 0 3
No
changes 13 14 30 2
10
Other 4 5 10 4 5
Totals 100 100 100 100 100
________________________________________________________________
Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.
N = 103
Table 7: Station perception of digital benefit
__________________________________________________________
Responding group N SD Mean______
Public 47 1.19 5.91
LPTV 10 2.18 3.10
Commercial 23 1.57 3.00
Religious 21 1.94 2.81
Responding group Compared to Mean difference
Religious Public -3.10*
LPTV -0.29
Commercial -0.19
_________________________________________________________
Note: * indicates difference is significant at .05 level according to Scheffe
test. Responses ranged from 'one' representing low benefit to
'seven'
representing high benefit.
N = 101
F = 30.24, df = 100, p < .001
Table 8: Importance of maintaining station control
___________________________________________________________
Responding group N SD Mean______
Religious 20 1.50 6.05
Commercial 23 1.57 5.79
Public 38 2.03 5.92
LPTV 9 2.67 4.11
___________________________________________________________
Note: Responses ranged from 'one' representing no importance of keeping
control to 'seven' representing extremely important to keep control.
N = 90
F = 2.53, df = 89, p = .06
Table 9: Correlation between perception of benefit and attitude toward
selling among
stations that perceived low benefits
_____________________________________________________________________
Responding group N r r2 p__
Religious 21 -.46 .21 .03*
Commercial 23 -.19 .04 .36
Low-power 10 -.15 .02 .69
_____________________________________________________________________
Note: *indicates difference was statistically significant at the .05
level. Public stations
were not included because their perception was categorized as
'high benefit'
(see Table 7).
|
