Aid Workers or Evangelists,
Charity or Conspiracy:
Framing of Missionary Activity
as a Function of International Political Alliances
Paper Submitted to the
Religion and Media Interest Group
Association for Education in Journalism
and Mass Communication
August 2003
David N. Dixon
Azusa Pacific University
Azusa, California
901 E. Alosta Ave.
Azusa, Calif. 91702
(626) 815-6000 x3376
[log in to unmask]
Abstract
In 2001, Christian aid workers were arrested by the Taliban in Afghanistan
on charges of proselytizing. A year later, Baptist hospital workers were
gunned down in Yemen. In one case, the country was an enemy of the United
States; in the other, an ally. The way in which the proselytizing and the
national government was portrayed changed from one set of coverage to the
other, suggesting that political interests, not religious ones, drive news
coverage.
Framing Missionary Activity—8
Aid Workers or Evangelists,
Charity or Conspiracy:
Framing of Missionary Activity
as a Function of International Political Alliances
Introduction
The 21st century began by confronting humanity once again in a horrific way
with the power of religion to shape and control societies and their
interactions. No history of the early century will be able to start
anywhere but New York City on September 11, 2001. The largest terrorist
attack in history had religious values at its core—values both inciting the
clash and being co-opted for other, nonreligious political purposes.
Much has already been written about the role and abuse of Islam in the
September 11 attacks and other terrorist activity in recent years. But such
analysis often overlooks the ways in which religion is invoked in American
society as an antidote to perceived Islamic aggression. This paper seeks to
examine one small part of that phenomenon. It examines how both Christian
and Islamic religious activity are cast in the press in light of changing
political contexts. In other words, the same religious activity may be cast
as positive or negative depending upon the political expedience of the
moment; it looks at how political alliances shade the coverage of events in
which religion plays a central role.
Specifically this paper looks at coverage of two events involving Christian
proselytizing in fundamentalist Islamic countries, first in Afghanistan and
then in Yemen. In one case, the country was a political enemy of the United
States; in the other, a political ally. The way in which the proselytizing
and the Islamic reaction was portrayed changed from one set of coverage to
the other, suggesting that political interests, not religious ones, drive
the values of the dominant hegemony, at least in the United States, and
that religion is legitimized or delegitimized relative to the dominant
political interests.
This paper seeks to explore the intersection of religion, state and media
using Antonio Gramsci's model of hegemony. It asks how religion plays into
contemporary struggles for power and how the media interacts with hegemonic
powers and religious counterhegemonies.
Gramsci's Hegemony and Religion
One important model for understanding the interaction of religion and
power in society comes from a logical extension of neomarxist critical
theory. As the 20th century progressed, Marx's prescription for the
collapse of capitalism clearly had not occurred as he had predicted.
Communist intellectuals, then, had to explain how the masses could be kept
in check in a system that did not function in their own best interest. One
of the most influential models in this vein came from Antonio Gramsci, an
Italian communist official eventually jailed by Mussolini's fascists.
Gramsci's concept of hegemony provided a useful analytical tool for
understanding the production of power in society.
Gramsci was particularly interested in political power, and he looked at
how various institutions in society allied themselves with the centers of
power. Religion is clearly an important source of power, and Gramsci dealt
with it to some extent. But his atheistic presuppositions may have gotten
the better of him. Like Marx, he generally assumed that religion was an
opiate of the masses that would eventually fall away as society was
"rationalized."
The current rise of fundamentalism as a religious and political force
worldwide—in all religions, not just Islam—raises interesting problems for
Gramsci's model. How can religion be a pacifying force, as in Durkheim's
civil religion, while also providing a mode of protest against the
institutions of state? Is religion to be identified with the dominant
hegemony? Or does it provide the means for an effective counterhegemony?
Gramsci briefly suggested that it functioned both ways, sometimes in
collusion with the government, sometimes in protest.
Gramsci's classic historical example was the Reformation. The Catholic
church was closely allied with the dominant political power—functionally it
was the political power of the Holy Roman Empire. The Reformation, then,
was a counterhegemonic movement, and the term "Protestant" was aptly
chosen. Catholic personalities such as Pope Leo X, were the traditional
intellectuals; Reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin were the
progressive organic intellectuals of their time.[1]
This more complex view of religion is outside classic Marxism, although it
finds some support in the writings of Engels. Otto Maduro suggests that
Gramsci and his commentators have thus created a new Marxist perspective
with four key elements:
1. Religion is not a mere passive effect of the social relations of
production; it is an active element of social dynamics, both conditioning
and conditioned by social processes.
2. Religion is not always a subordinate element within social processes; it
may often play an important role in the birth and consolidation of a
particular social structure.
3. Religion is not necessarily a functional, reproductive or conservative
factor in society; it is often one of the main (and sometimes the only)
available channel to bring about a social revolution.
4. The scientific study of religion is not an easy task; it requires a
many-sided empirical approach whose results cannot be either substituted or
anticipated by theoretical constructs.[2]
This framework has been used to explain the revolutionary character of
some forms of religion, such as liberation theology within the South
American Catholic church. This paper, on the other hand, uses this model
to explore the functioning of the dominant hegemonic powers when confronted
with a religious activity that challenges the dominant state ideology. It
examines how the view of religion varies in the press as the needs of the
state change. In other words, religion appears on both sides of the
struggle for legitimacy, but the media tend to give legitimacy to those
forms of religion that are conservative rather than radical in nature.
The Press and Hegemony
Most analyses of the press in a hegemonic framework closely identify the
press with the state and as a major manufacturer of hegemonic consensus.
Stuart Hall, for instance, writes that "the media become part and parcel of
that dialectical process of the 'production of consent'—shaping the
consensus while reflecting it—which orients them within the field of force
of the dominant social interests represented within the state."[3] The
press, like religion, finds itself on both sides of the hegemonic fence, as
Daniel Hallin points out clearly:
The media . . . play the role of maintaining the dominant political
ideology: they propagate it, celebrate it, interpret the world in its
terms, and, at times, alter it to adapt to the demands of legitimation in a
changing world. At the same time, the concept of hegemony is employed to
explain the 'behavior' of the media, the process of cultural production
itself. The media are themselves subject to the hegemonic process.[4]
If the press is most closely associated with the state, then it would be
expected to be supportive of traditional religious movements and critical
of religious movements that are counterhegemonic in nature. This theory
explains how the press (as well as state and culture) can accept freedom of
religion as a general principle while being antagonistic to particular
forms of religion, such as fundamentalism or cultism.
In the cases under consideration, religion is a central factor on both
sides of the conflict. But the press legitimizes—at least implicitly—some
forms of religion while delegitimizing others. A key determining factor
seems to be the stance of the state toward the religious elements in
question. By implication, the depiction of religion in the news reflects
the orientation of political elites; by contrast, political orientation is
not determined by religious orientation. In other words, politics is the
driving force in American news, not religion.
Methodology: Framing analysis
To explore how the coverage of religion changes as the political stance of
the state changes, this paper compares and contrasts newspaper coverage of
the 2001 incident involving foreign aid workers in Afghanistan and the 2002
killing of three Baptist hospital workers in Yemen. The cases are suitable
for comparison because in each one Christians were accused of proselytizing
in fundamentalist Islamic countries. While missionaries have been attacked
in other countries in recent years as well, these two particular cases are
especially comparable because of the predominance of conservative,
fundamentalist Islam in the countries. They also differ on a key variable:
In the Afghan case, the government was an enemy of United States
government; in the Yemeni case, the government was an ally of the United
States government. This provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis that
the framing of similar events will vary depending on the political environment.
This analysis uses articles from the New York Times as its basis. The Times
was chosen because it tends to provide more extensive international
coverage than most American newspapers and because it remains an
influential opinion leader among the national media. During the period from
August 7 to November 17, 2001, 33 articles appeared on the workers in
Afghanistan, though 10 of these were just brief updates. The case in Yemen
concluded much more quickly. In the period from December 31, 2002 to
January 9, 2003, eight articles appeared in the Times.
Framing analysis provides the interpretive technique to evaluate the
presentation of the cases. According to this approach, ideology is
communicated not only in the choice of subjects (agenda setting), but in
how those subjects are presented. Particular perspectives on stories
achieve persuasive power with the audience to the extent that they resonate
with other factors in the readers' environment—direct experience of the
subject, other media coverage, the views of opinion leaders.[5] This
qualitative method, a form of rhetorical analysis, attempts to expose the
bias in how stories are told by evaluating the themes and language used to
present them.
Two key sets of frames emerge from the stories, and this paper will
address each in turn. First, frames define the activity of the Christian
workers themselves. Second, frames define the character of the national
governments involved. Comparing and contrasting the ways in which these
frames relate to other exposes the flow of power and its influence on the
frames being used.
Case overview: Afghanistan
The first case erupted August 7, 2001 when Taliban officials in
Afghanistan announced that 24 aid workers associated with Shelter Now
International, a relief agency run by a German Christian aid agency called
Vision for Asia, had been arrested on charges of spreading Christianity.
Another 64 Afghan men were also arrested for having received religious
instruction from the aid workers. Eight of the workers were foreigners,
including two Americans, two Australians and four Germans. Over the next
month, their plight became an international political incident as the
Taliban insisted on trying the workers, not merely expelling them. Under
the Taliban's Sharia Islamic law, the eight could have been sentenced to death.
The workers' plight became even more uncertain when the events of September
11 unfolded. It was immediately evident that the United States would almost
certainly attack the Taliban. The Taliban specifically linked the treatment
of the prisoners to any military action that might be taken by the U.S.
Shortly after hostilities with Afghanistan began, however, anti-Taliban
forces successfully overran the location where the prisoners were being
kept, and American military helicopters whisked the eight to safety in
Pakistan.
The fate of the 16 Afghan workers who were arrested at the same time was
not reported. The 64 men arrested for having received instruction were sent
to Islamic religious schools.
Case overview: Yemen
The second case unfolded much more quickly. On December 30, 2002, a lone
gunman smuggled a semiautomatic rifle into a Baptist hospital in the remote
town of Jibla, Yemen. He killed three American hospital workers and
seriously injured a fourth before surrendering to Yemeni officials. The
Times immediately linked the case to several other attacks on Christian
missionaries in Muslim countries, including the arrest of the aid workers
in Afghanistan.[6] In the next few days, Yemeni officials arrested as many
as 30 suspected Islamic militants, linking the hospital killings to the
assassination of a prominent local politician a few days earlier. The
motive for the hospital attack was reportedly resentment of the fact that
the hospital workers were preaching Christianity.[7]
Ironically, the Southern Baptist hospital was about to be turned over to
Yemeni operation. The day after the shootings was to be the last day when
the Baptists would see patients until new local administrators would take over.
Contrasting frames: The missionaries
Perhaps the most striking difference in the framing of these two cases is
in the language used to refer to the Christian workers. From the very first
story, personnel of Shelter Now International were identified as "aid
workers."[8] Occasionally, usually in headlines, they were identified as
"Christian aid workers." By contrast, the hospital workers in Yemen were
referred to as "missionaries" throughout the coverage.
The choice of language reflected different frames being employed. The
first frame dissociated the workers from religious involvement, thereby
implying their innocence in the face of Taliban claims. The second frame
perhaps more accurately depicted the activity of the workers in Yemen.
The "aid workers" frame was not merely a media fiction. After the arrests,
a Vision for Asia spokesperson immediately denied that the workers had
engaged in proselytizing, and Times coverage seemed to support this view
long into the coverage, even after evidence appeared suggesting that the
workers had indeed engaged in evangelism. The coverage pursued the frame of
"aid workers, not proselytizers" by denigrating the evidence against them
and minimizing the importance of the charges.
Taliban evidence of proselytizing took two forms—materials gathered from
the Shelter Now compounds and confessions from the workers themselves—and
the Times coverage tended to discount both. First, the Taliban presented a
variety of books, videos, audiocassettes and computer software about the
life of Jesus. The books included Bibles in Farsi and Pashto, the local
languages, and a book titled Sharing Your Faith With a Muslim.[9] The
existence of these items was initially reported in a single sentence in a
1704-word article that focused much more attention on strictness of Islamic
law under the Taliban.
Second, confessions were taken from some of the workers, admitting to at
least some of the charges against them, reported in the Times in a way that
clearly minimized the significance of the confessions:
We gave two copies of one book about Jesus to one family. We have not given
anything else, no other books or material to anyone else. We sang alone one
song about God, not about Jesus. They did not sing with us. We drank green tea.
The women did show the family a CD-ROM about the life of Jesus. It went on
for about an hour, then suddenly stopped. "We had a problem with the
computer," the women explained.[10]
Eventually it became clear that while the workers may not have initiated
evangelistic conversations, they were quick to speak with Afghans who
expressed interest in their faith.[11]
The "aid workers" frame, however distorted, gained resonance because it
contrasted the "innocent" aid workers with "evil" Taliban. The frame used
to depict the Taliban will be considered in more detail later in this paper.
In contrast to the "aid workers" in Afghanistan, in the Yemen case the
hospital workers were consistently identified as "missionaries" and their
work as "charity." Interestingly, the workers' approach to evangelism was
essentially the same as that of the Afghan aid workers. The president of
the International Mission Board, which runs Southern Baptist missions, said
that the missionaries promoted Christianity by example, not actively
seeking to convert people in areas where that activity was prohibited by
government authorities.[12]
"Open evangelism to me is standing on the street corner selling Bibles,"
said Al Lindholm, the Baptists' chief representative in Yemen, who started
his career here as a maintenance supervisor at the hospital 21 years ago.
"Do we evangelize?" he said. "No. Are we asked questions about our faith
almost daily? Yes, and we answer them as honestly as we know how."[13]
In other words, there was no appreciable difference in the activities of
the Christian aid workers in Afghanistan and those of the Baptist hospital
workers in Yemen. And yet in one case the workers were clearly identified
as missionaries, while in the other the evangelistic nature of the work was
obscured.
The differences in the frames used to describe the workers do not derive
from the activities they engaged in, but from external factors. An
important clue to the determining factors can be found in the frames used
to describe the national governments in Afghanistan and Yemen, governments
that shared both important similarities and crucial differences.
Contrasting frames: The governments
The Taliban government in Afghanistan had a strong frame already applied
to it before the aid workers arrest case developed. The Taliban had already
been defined as extremist and violent, even evil. This fact is important
because it meant that the aid workers were presumed to be innocent, if only
because their accusers were illegitimate. Furthermore, the existing frame
provided resonance for readers as the aid workers case unfolded. Readers
could accept the workers as oppressed, unjustly accused and unfairly
treated because the Taliban had already been projected as engaging in those
sorts of behaviors.
The second sentence of the first story in the New York Times portrayed the
Taliban as radical and violent: "The Taliban . . . have decreed that
promoting any religion other than Islam is punishable by death, and say the
Afghans have implicated the aid workers."[14] Interestingly, the Taliban
had apparently made this decree prior to the arrest of the workers—no
official death threat was ever made against the workers. The frame was in
part a creation of the media, juxtaposing a threat that had not been
specifically applied by the Taliban.
The same article noted that even listening to evangelistic messages was
taboo for the Taliban: "The Taliban have also arrested 64 Afghan men who
they said had received instructions in Christianity from Shelter Now
workers. The men have been sent to Islamic religious schools after
confessing to their "crimes and anti-Islamic activities."[15] This aspect
of the frame described the Taliban as cruel even to its own people.
Throughout the coverage, news reports took every opportunity to depict the
Taliban as radical and illegitimate. The Taliban were shown as paranoid,
viewing the aid workers' activity as part of a "larger conspiracy by
Western aid groups to convert Afghan Muslims."[16] In another story, the
workers were reported to have been "under the surveillance of the Taliban's
whip-wielding religious police from the Department for the Promotion of
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice;" the same story reported that
"spectators at soccer matches had been ordered to restrict their cheers to
the chant 'God is great!'"[17]
Central to the delegitimization of the Taliban was a denigration of their
brand of Sharia, Islamic law. The law was depicted as a hodgepodge of
strict regulations, and the leader of the Taliban as a strange character at
best:
"There doesn't appear to be a well-defined legal system here, at least for
this case," said David T. Donahue, the exasperated American envoy. "We've
been told that once the investigation is complete, it will be turned over
to Mullah Omar, the supreme leader."
If the reclusive, one-eyed Mullah Muhammad Omar is indeed the last word, he
might consult his own Edict No. 14, a July 31 decree concerning the
behavior of foreign nationals. It regards "inviting Afghans to any religion
apart from Islam" as a less serious offense than "taking photographs of
living creatures" or "eating the meat of the pig." Punishment is 3 to 10
days in prison and then expulsion.[18]
The condition of the law was depicted as a relatively moot point in any
event, as its application was dependent upon decisions of the chief justice
of the Supreme Court, a mullah who "suggested in a sermon today that his
mind was made up and the verdict was guilty."[19] In any event, evidence
was apparently irrelevant, and the Taliban seemed unable to distinguish
religious and nonreligious evidence:
There were versions of the Holy Scriptures in English, Dari and Pashto.
"Bibles, Bibles, Bibles," Muhammad said, laying the books down on a carpeted
floor.
There were lesson plans for Christian teachings with chapters with heading
like Heaven, the Gates of Hell, Temptation and How to Recognize and Expel
Demons.
"Bibles, Bibles, Bibles," Muhammad repeated.
There was a book about the paintings of Raphael and a grammar text.
"Bibles, Bibles, Bibles," he said again.[20]
The courtroom itself was described in another article, emphasizing the
connection of religion and violence: "Behind him hung a framed prayer mat,
and above that the names Allah and Muhammad were written in ornate Arabic
script. Two long swords and a strap used for whippings also decorated the
pale yellow wall."[21]
Outside the courtroom and beyond the aid workers' case, the Taliban were
depicted as capricious and cruel. The laws were enforced by the Department
for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice:
This brigade of enforcers patrol the streets of Afghanistan's major cities
in Toyota pickup trucks, whipping women whose pantaloons fail to cover
their ankles or whose fingernails are decorated with forbidden polish. Men
are jailed for having hair too long or beards too short.[22]
An editorial further described the Taliban:
"The Taliban troops are like gangsters," a colleague told me when I first
arrived. "Tough guys." But there is often a particular dandyism in them;
many wear black eyeliner (part of the descendant-of-Muhammad costume), and
their hair is long and curly. I once saw one buying Prell shampoo at the
bazaar. They carry themselves like supermodels.[23]
Interestingly, another editorial on August 29 made the delegitimization of
the Taliban explicit. In an article titled "Teaching the Taliban About
Human Rights," Karl F. Inderfurth of the Institute for Global Engagement said:
"The Taliban of Afghanistan, whose name comes from talib, "religious
student," seem to have declared war on religion. . . . the Taliban continue
their war on other religions—which is a distortion of Islam. . . . Although
convincing the Taliban to become more tolerant and respectful of their own
people, including women and girls, would not answer all the concerns of the
international community about this movement, it would be a welcome
beginning.[24]
Not coincidentally, Inderfurth was assistant secretary of state for South
Asian affairs from 1997 to 2001. The connection between the press and the
American state also becomes explicit in this article.
In summary, then, the Taliban were consistently viewed as illegitimate,
unjust, irrational, even violent. In that context, the aid workers could
only be depicted as innocent victims, perhaps misguided, but nevertheless
good people with the best intentions, caught in a situation beyond their
control.
The framing of the Taliban is more interesting when compared to the
framing of the Yemeni government. While there were important differences
between the two governments, the differences in press coverage were more
striking when the less obvious similarities between the Taliban and the
Yemeni government were noted.
Like Afghanistan, Yemen has been a site of rising Islamic fundamentalism,
specifically with connections to Al Qaeda. In fact, the current President
Ali Abdullah Saleh made alliances with fundamentalists militants in a civil
war a decade ago. Until 2002, thousands of Yemenis went through religious
schools that were feeders for Al Qaeda training camps. Yemen was also the
site of attacks on the Aemrican destroyer Cole and a French supertanker,
both attacks linked to Al Qaeda.[25] Although the Yemen government has
cooperated with the United States in the war on terror since September 11,
some officials in Washington were reported as still being unsure of the
country's true commitment to fighting extremism.[26]
As in Afghanistan, it is officially illegal in Yemen to proselytize. Until
the mid-1980s, the Jibla hospital had its own chapel where Yemenis could
come to hear Bible stories and sing songs. But the missionaries opted to
close the chapel when they were told that they could continue it, but any
Yemenis who came would be arrested.[27]
The similarities between Afghanistan and Yemen end there, but they raise
the possibility that Yemen could be framed like Afghanistan: as an
oppressive, fundamentalist country with links to international terrorism.
But in contrast to the framing of the Taliban, the framing of the Yemeni
government during the case under study was overwhelmingly positive.
Some of the positive frame comes from genuine goodwill shown by the Yemeni
government and people toward the Baptist hospital and the missionaries.
Unlike the Taliban, the Yemeni government did not enforce its official ban
on proselytizing, as long as the evangelism occurred in informal settings.
Furthermore, the government actually provided guards for the hospital
compound, protecting it because of the ready availability of guns and the
high incidence of terrorist activity in the country.[28] A hospital
administrator reported after the attack that many in Jibla expressed their
anger and sorrow at the attack, even helping dig the graves of two
missionaries who were buried on the hospital grounds.[29]
But another key reason for the difference in framing can be traced to the
stance of the U.S. government toward Yemen. Unlike Afghanistan, which was
pariah, Yemen has publicly joined the war on terrorism. Perhaps the most
visible act was allowing an American unmanned Predator drone to carry out
an attack that killed two Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen.[30] The favorable
existing frame allowed the government of Yemen to be depicted in a positive
light, even when the circumstances might be framed differently. It also
allowed the missionaries to be depicted more accurately as missionaries,
since their "innocence" did not need to be established.
To maintain the positive framing of the government while explaining the
anti-Christian, anti-Western motives behind the killing, missionary sources
and newspaper stories depicted the gunman as more or less a loner,
connected at most to a small group of militants. The son-in-law of one of
the victims said, "We know this isn't something from the people that he
worked with. This wasn't the Yemenis. This was one man."[31] Yemeni
investigators drew the circle a bit larger, connecting the hospital gunman
to the killing of a prominent secular politician a few days earlier; both
killings were said to have been inspired by a 26-year-old mosque preacher,
Ahmed Ali Jarallah. Jarallah reportedly condemned the Baptist hospital for
spreading Christianity. He also reportedly criticized President Saleh "for
bringing democracy, a system he described as atheistic."[32]
To extend the frame a bit, as in Afghanistan, fundamentalist Muslims were
depicted as cruel, irrational people. The gunman killed the very doctor who
was treating his two-month pregnant wife, trying to figure out why she kept
miscarrying.[33] Jarallah was quoted as alleging that the hospital staff
"stuff the Holy Koran into toilets of mosques."[34]
In summary, the Taliban and the government of Yemen were framed in very
different ways. In part this was due to genuine differences in how the
governments treated the missionaries in their midst. But it was also due to
differences in their official stances toward the United States. Preexisting
frames made it possible for the missionary frames to gain resonance.
Conclusion
In summary, then two key sets of frames appear in these cases. In each a
frame is applied to Christian workers and a frame is applied to the
government. Although the activity of the Christian workers in Afghanistan
and Yemen were very similar, the frames used to describe them diverged
dramatically.
Some of this divergence—though not all—can be traced to the relationship
between the national governments and the United States. The enmity between
the Taliban and the United States made it easy for the press to depict the
aid workers as innocent and the Taliban as evil—the frames resonated with
other frames already current in the media. By contrast, the positive
relationship between the Yemeni government and the United States meant that
a much more sympathetic frame for the government was employed and a more
accurate—if potentially pejorative—frame was possible for the missionaries.
This suggests that the coverage of the religious issue— Christian
proselytizing in Islamic countries—was driven more by political
considerations than by the religious content of the stories.
Framing Missionary Activity—8
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[1] Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings, eds. David Forgacs
and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, trans. William Boelhower (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1985), 223.
[2] Otto Maduro, "New Marxist Approaches to the Relative Autonomy of
Religion," Sociological Analysis, 38:4 (1977): 366.
[3] Stuart Hall, "The Rediscover of `Ideology': Return of the Repressed in
Media Studies," in Culture, Society and the Media, ed. J. Curran (New York:
Methuen, 1982), 87.
[4] Daniel Hallin, We Keep America on Top of the World (New York:
Routledge, 1994), 59.
[5] David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and
Participant Mobilization," International Social Research, 1 (1988): 197-217.
[6] Susan Sachs, "Threats and Responses: Religion; With Missionaries
Spreading, Muslims' Anger Is Following," New York Times, 31 December 2002, A11.
[7] Neil MacFarquhar, "Threats and Responses: Terror; 3 U.S. Citizens
Slain in Yemen in Rifle Attack," New York Times, 31 December 2002, A1.
[8] Associated Press, "Afghans to Keep 24 Christian Aid Workers in Jail
During Inquiry," New York Times, 7 August 2001, A3.
[9] Barry Bearak, "Religious Arrests Cast a Pall Over Afghanistan Aid
Efforts," New York Times, 23 August 2001, A1.
[10] Barry Bearak, "Taliban Will Allow Access to Jailed Christian Aid
Workers," New York Times, 26 August 2001, Section 1, 12.
[11] Bearak, "Religious Arrests," A1.
[12] Sachs, "Missionaries Spreading," A11.
[13] Ian Fisher, "Threats and Responses: Victims; Nine Bullets That Ended
Baptists' Work in Yemen," New York Times, 16 January 2003, A15.
[14] Associated Press, "Afghans to Keep 24 Christian Aid Workers in Jail," A3.
[15] Associated Press, "Afghans to Keep 24 Christian Aid Workers in Jail," A3.
[16] Associated Press, "Taliban Suspect Christian Plot Among Western Aid
Workers," New York Times, 13 August 2001, A6.
[17] Bearak, "Religious Arrests," A1.
[18] Bearak, "Religious Arrests," A1.
[19] Barry Bearak, "Afghan Judge Denounces Aid Workers Now on Trial," New
York Times, 7 September 2001, A6.
[20] Barray Bearak, "Taliban Will Allow Access," Section 1, 12.
[21] Barry Bearak, "Accused Aid Workers Face Islamic Judges in
Afghanistan," New York Times, 9 September 2001, Section 1, 3.
[22] Bearak, "Taliban Will Allow Access," Section 1, 12.
[23] John Sifton, "Temporal Vertigo," New York Times, 30 September 2001,
Section 6, 48.
[24] Karl F. Inderfurth, "Teaching the Taliban About Human Rights," New
York Times, 29 August 2001, A23.
[25] MacFarquhar, "3 U.S. Citizens Slain," A1.
[26] Ian Fisher, "Threats and Responses: Terror; Hate of the West Finds
Fertile Soil in Yemen. But Does Al Qaeda?" New York Times, 9 January 2003, A14.
[27] Fisher, "Nine Bullets," A15.
[28] MacFarquhar, "3 U.S. Citizens Slain," A1.
[29] MacFarquhar, "Nine Bullets," A15.
[30] Ian Fisher, "Threats and Responses: The Militants; Recent Attacks in
Yemen Seen As Sign of Large Terror Cell," New York Times, 3 January 2003, A12.
[31]
Robert D. McFadden, "Threats and Responses: The Dead; Victims Shared
Affection for Yemenis, Families Say," New York Times, 31 December 2002, A11.
[32] Fisher, "Recent Attacks," A12.
[33] Fisher, "Nine Bullets," A15.
[34] Fisher, "Hate of the West," A14.
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