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Subject:

AEJ 03 CoeK MCS The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press

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Elliott Parker <[log in to unmask]>

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AEJMC Conference Papers <[log in to unmask]>

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Sat, 27 Sep 2003 08:46:37 -0400

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Beyond Good and Evil:
The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press

by

Kevin Coe, David Domke, Erica Graham, Sue John, and Victor Pickard

Address correspondence to:

Kevin Coe
University of Washington
Department of Communication
Box 353740
Seattle, WA 98195
(206) 543-2660
FAX: (206) 616-3762
[log in to unmask]










Paper submitted for presentation to the Mass Communication and Society Division
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication annual meeting,
Kansas City, MO, July 30-August 2, 2003
Beyond Good and Evil:
The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press

Abstract
Binary communications represent the world as a place of polar
opposites. Binaries are commonplace in Western thought, but take on a
heightened importance when they are used in political and media
environments. With this in mind, this research (a) examines the presence
of binary discourse by U.S. President George W. Bush in 15 national
addresses, from his inauguration in January 2000 to commencement of the war
with Iraq in March 2003; and (b) analyzes the response of editorials in 20
U.S. newspapers to the president's communications.






 Beyond Good and Evil:
The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press

In a remarkably short period of time after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush evolved from a politician
routinely mocked for his linguistic shortcomings to one hailed for his
"steel and eloquence" ("Bush exudes strength," 2001). This transformation
occurred in full view of U.S. society and much of the world, as Bush spoke
several times to national television audiences in the weeks following
September 11. Perhaps the most important of these communications was his
address before a joint session of Congress on the evening of September 20,
during which the president demanded that nations of the world make a
choice: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (Bush, 2001a). This
statement had clear rhetorical power at the time, and has subsequently
become something even more important — the foundational policy of the Bush
administration's "war on terrorism." As the president said in October
2002, "The doctrine that says, 'Either you're with us or with the enemy,'
still holds. It's an important doctrine. It's as important today as it
was 13 months ago" (Bush, 2002b).
This declaration by the president is notable for one other reason — it is
an archetypal example of an either/or construction of reality. As we will
discuss, such binary constructions in communication, under a variety of
headings, have been the focus of a large body of scholarship (e.g.,
Derrida, 1972/1981; King & Anderson, 1971; Raum & Measell, 1974). What
makes this type of communication so important is its capacity to create a
false dilemma; that is, binary constructions present a limited view of the
world and, often, force a decision between two options that, in actuality,
are not the only outcomes available. Further, a speaker typically makes
apparent the "desirable" outcome by selecting and presenting the options so
that they are not equally palatable; as a result, binary constructions in
communication tend to suggest — in a usually implicit yet powerful way —
that "if one position is right, then the other must be wrong" (Carr &
Zanetti, 1999, p. 324).
The president's use of choice-limiting communication is particularly
important given the weighty decisions facing a number of parties in the
aftermath of September 11. The administration had to decide on an
appropriate response and other nations had to decide whether or to what
extent they would support this response. Congress had to vote on the
U.S.A. Patriot Act and, in 2002, the formation of a cabinet-level
Department of Homeland Security and a resolution granting the president the
authority to disarm Iraq by force. Throughout, the president's public
discourse provided a constant presence — for example, Bush delivered 14
national addresses between the attacks of September 11 and the commencement
of war with Iraq in March 2003 — that could not be ignored by other
political actors, given the president's continually healthy public approval
ratings (Pew, 2003). With all of this in mind, in this research we analyze
the president's national addresses and editorials in 20 leading U.S.
newspapers for the presence of binary communications.

Binary Discourse
The tendency in Western thought to construct reality in binaried terms has
been a focus of considerable scholarship. Exploration of this cognitive
and linguistic phenomenon has taken place under a variety of headings,
including binary (Derrida, 1972/1981), dichotomy (Prokhovnik, 1999),
dualism (Cirksena & Cuklanz, 1992), dialectic (Burke, 1945/1969),
polarization (King & Anderson, 1971; Raum & Measell, 1974), and bipolar
assumptions (Dougherty & Krone, 2000). A common thread running through
these conceptions is that Western language and thought are rooted in
dichotomized absolutes in which antithetical terms and ideas consistently
are positioned as polar opposites with no middle ground. For purposes of
consistency, we use the term binary to refer to this general
practice. Further, we draw upon Burke (1945/1969) to define binary
communications: "The placement of one thought or thing in terms of its
opposite" (p. 403). This overarching definition encapsulates two types of
binary discourse. The first is what we might consider an explicit binary,
such as the false dilemma offered by President Bush, in which two
antithetical terms or ideas are explicitly placed in opposition to one
another (e.g., "us" versus "them"). The second type is what we might
consider an implicit binary — a more subtle communication approach in which
rhetorical emphasis is placed upon concepts that, as Burke (1945/1969)
notes, "derive their significance from their relation to opposite terms"
(p. 408). Emphasis by the president upon "freedom," for example, functions
in this way, because the power of this concept is tied substantially to an
often unstated opposite — in this case, slavery. We suggest that these two
kinds of binaries become most powerful when they are present together in a
communication; when this occurs, the explicit binaries give weight to the
implicit while the implicit undergird the explicit.
It is imperative to note that such binary constructions have
consequences. Prokhovnik (1999) claims, for example, that "dichotomous
thinking" has "pernicious and deep-seated impact on real social practices,
in the workplace, in the family, and in social and political life" (p. 19).
With a similar perspective, feminist scholars have critiqued binaries such
as male/female and virgin/whore (Bing & Bergvall, 1996; Wyman &
Dionisopoulos, 2000; see also Cirksena & Cuklanz, 1992), while Perea (1997)
has noted that much of the scholarship in ethnic and race studies has
worked from a binary black/white paradigm. One of the reasons binaries
have drawn such criticism is the inherent hierarchy they create. Derrida
(1972/1981) explains that binaries do not have a "peaceful coexistence,"
but rather exist as a "violent hierarchy" in which "one term governs the
other…or has the upper hand" (p. 41). Similarly, Carr and Zanetti (1999)
contend that binary communications, by definition, connote "a struggle for
predominance" (p. 324). Given the intrinsic hierarchical nature of
binaries, it is unsurprising that binary discourse can serve the function
of "unification by a foe shared in common" (Burke, 1945/1969, p.
408). Indeed, usage of binary communications as a means to unite groups
against an enemy or in favor of a policy has been a recurring strategy in
modern politics.

Binary Discourse as Political Strategy
        Political leaders often craft their public discourse in ways that serve
political goals, a process that Manheim (1991, 1994) has termed "strategic
political communication." For example, a growing body of scholarship
indicates that modern political leaders excel at controlling the political
and media environment (e.g., Domke, Watts, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Herman, 1993;
Pfestch, 1998; Watts, Domke, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Zaller, 1992). In
particular, strategic political communication becomes important during
times of crisis. Mueller's (1970) "rally 'round the flag" effect suggests
that during crises the U.S. public tends to unite in support of the
president. While some scholars (e.g. Brody, 1991) suggest that patriotism
spurs this rally effect, Baker and Oneal (2001) claim that the occurrence
and magnitude of the rally effect depends largely on "how effectively the
White House manages the presentation of the dispute through presidential
statements, prominent media coverage, and the garnering of bipartisan
support" (p. 682). Thus the communication strategies used by a president
during times of crisis well may be an important factor in determining the
public's support for the president and his proposed policies.
We suggest that binary communications are one potentially powerful strategy
available to political elites as they attempt to engender support for their
policies. Indeed, under the rubric of "polarization," binary discourse has
been identified as a regular feature of political communication (Smith &
Smith, 1994). The "rhetoric of polarization" was first articulated by King
and Anderson (1971), who argued that a strategy of "affirmation" of self
and "subversion" of an opponent can lead to an audience being "coalesced
into two or more highly contrasting, mutually exclusive groups sharing a
high degree of internal solidarity in those beliefs which the persuader
considers salient" (p. 244). Raum and Measell (1974) extended King and
Anderson's (1971) work, suggesting that several communicative devices are
used to polarize, the most important being "artificial dichotomies" and
"we/they" language. Both techniques clearly are included in our conception
of binary, and both have been used strategically in political communication
to limit the audience's choices. In particular, the good/evil binary was a
common part of Cold War communications. As Medhurst (2000, p. 465) explains:

The discourse of cold war pictured a Manichean world of light and darkness,
with no shades of gray. Communism was a demonic force unalterably opposed
to all that was good, true, right, and beautiful. With such a force, there
could be no compromise, no half way measures.
Notably, construction of warring bodies in such dramatic binary opposition
seems likely to facilitate the assuaging of inevitable guilt associated
with war. As Ivie (1990, p. 119) argues, "Americans traditionally have
exonerated themselves of any guilt for war…by decivilizing the image of
their adversaries. This 'victimage ritual,' enacted with generic
regularity, has…legitimized total victory over a foe who is totally
uncivilized and therefore perfectly evil." Further, binary discourse can
even be used to justify war. For example, an examination of President
Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam War discourse revealed three patterns of binary
oppositions — force/freedom, irrationality/rationality, and
aggression/defense — that ultimately served as a "crucial premise in the
overall justification for war" (Ivie, 1980, p. 283).
        This body of scholarship, then, suggests that strategically employed
binary communications — especially the good/evil binary — have been an
important component of previous U.S. wartime discourse. With this in mind,
we posit that President Bush, faced with terrorist attacks, then the
initiation of a "war on terrorism," and most recently a build-up to a war
with Iraq, would increase his use of the good/evil binary after September
11, 2001. Use of this binary by the president would seem likely to serve
three purposes. First, the polarization that the binary fosters would
likely function to help unify the U.S. public against a "common foe" —
initially terrorists, particularly Islamic extremist terrorists, and more
recently Saddam Hussein. Second, the demonization of the terrorists and
Saddam as evil may function to help assuage potential guilt among Americans
over U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in
2003. And third, the use of this language would help President Bush to tie
the September 11 attacks and subsequent military campaigns to previous
moments in U.S. history in which moral clarity was more certain (e.g.,
World War II); in the post-September 11 milieu, this third point seems most
relevant to the war in Iraq, which marked the administration's — and
nation's — first foray into a pre-emptive foreign policy. We offer, then,
our first hypothesis:

H1: President Bush will be more likely to use the good/evil binary in
addresses that follow the attacks of September 11, 2001, than in preceding
addresses.

Although clearly a valuable strategy in past (and current) political
discourse, the use of a good/evil binary in communication is not without
potential limitations. One is that "good" and "evil" language tends to be
morally loaded terminology that might not connect — in part because of its
clearly blatant approach — with a wide segment of the population. For
example, the president's well-known characterization of Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as an "axis of evil" in his 2002 State of the Union address
(Bush, 2002a) created a stir not just because he identified these nations
as a concern or because he linked them, but because he did so in such a
vivid and judgmental manner. Such a communication approach is not always
desirable in political discourse, because it draws the attention of news
media and the public, and consequently, their scrutiny. In some cases,
political elites might be better served by crafting language that attempts
to persuade in a more subtle fashion. With this in mind, we posit that
President Bush and his administration, aware of the heightened security
concerns among Americans post-September 11, have crafted a second strategic
binary.
        The administration's "war on terrorism" has differed from other recent
U.S. conflicts in that an unpredictable and often unidentifiable threat to
the continental United States is present. While the threat of terrorism
had been in the minds of some government officials prior to September 11
(Myers, 1999), the unprecedented attacks heightened concern among Americans
and within the Bush administration about the need to protect a vulnerable
"homeland." In the context of this heightened concern, we suggest, the
president also needed an appropriate binary — ideally one that would,
simultaneously, engender public confidence in the competence of the Bush
administration and serve the administration's political goals. We suggest
that the administration has utilized the binary of security/peril to serve
these dual purposes. Further, the binary of security/peril clearly has
great moral power, but less likelihood of rankling some members of the
public in the same way that good/evil communications might — in part
because it is so obviously relevant to the circumstances at hand and, in
part, because it does not have a blatant religious foundation. We offer,
then, our second hypothesis:

H2: President Bush will be more likely to use the security/peril binary in
addresses that follow the attacks of September 11, 2001, than in preceding
addresses.

Presidential Discourse and News Media
As Kiewe (1994) points out, modern presidents are "image makers" who "seek
the opportunity to define situations and to construct the reality they wish
the public to accept" (p. xvi). News media play an important role in this
image-making process, especially during times of national crisis when news
coverage and public opinion are especially attuned to the views of
political elites (Bloom, 1990; Calabrese & Burke, 1992; Deutsch & Merritt,
1965; Zaller, 1994a, 1994b). For example, research indicates that during
times of crisis, when there is a perceived threat to U.S. national
interests or national security, news media frequently align closely with
national themes emanating from political leaders (Bloom, 1990; Brookes,
1999). This is unsurprising given that most journalists at U.S. news
outlets are American citizens whose reporting and world views almost
inevitably reflect ethnocentric biases (Gans, 1979; Tuchman,
1978). Therefore, in covering the events of September 11, the subsequent
"war on terrorism," and the build-up to war with Iraq, journalists — like
many citizens — would seem likely to look to the president for a sense of
competence, vision, and leadership.
Further, if as Zaller (1994a, p. 267) argues, "national unity is good
politics," then it also may be good business for the news media. One way
in which the press might show "national unity" is through a close alignment
of perspectives with government leaders. For example, Fox News Channel,
which was accused by some (e.g., Rutenberg, 2001; Smith, 2001) of overly
patriotic coverage post-September 11, experienced significant ratings
increases during this period, consistently surpassing rival CNN. Fox was
able to maintain this increase, ending 2002 ahead of CNN and receiving
higher ratings in the first two days covering the war in Iraq (Beard &
Larsen, 2003). In a similar vein, many leading news organizations —
including national television networks — incorporated the colors of red,
white, and blue into their promotions and identifying logos during this
period. Further, in light of the unforeseen costs that news media faced
post-September 11 (Just, Levine, & Belt, 2001), industry economic pressures
and the need to maintain audience interest likely encouraged news outlets
to adopt a more-likely-to-sell patriotic tone in coverage of the "war on
terrorism" and looming Iraq conflict. In short, commercial media have
economic motivations to align closely with government leaders in times of
crisis. As Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux, and Garland (in press) put it,
"A commercial press, by definition, will always be a patriotic press when
the nation is threatened."
In combination, then, heightened nationalism and economic considerations
may have increased the likelihood of news media aligning closely with
President Bush's discourse after the attacks of September 11. Further,
editorial boards, as the institutional voices of the press, may have been
particularly likely to "feel" both the patriotic sentiment that arose
following the terrorist attacks and the heightened security concerns —
including the deaths of some U.S. journalists in covering the "war on
terrorism" — now present for the United States. With this in mind, we
expect that if President Bush did regularly employ the good/evil and
security/peril binaries, subsequent newspaper editorials would reflect and
amplify this usage. Thus, we offer our final two hypotheses:

H3: The good/evil binary is more likely to be present in newspaper
editorials that follow the attacks of September 11, 2001, than in preceding
editorials.

H4: The security/peril binary is more likely to be present in newspaper
editorials that follow the attacks of September 11, 2001, than in preceding
editorials.

Method
        To test these hypotheses, we first analyzed 15 major addresses by the
president, beginning chronologically with his inauguration on January 20,
2001, and ending with his March 17, 2003, ultimatum to Saddam Hussein as a
prelude to the U.S.-led war on Iraq. We then examined editorials from 20
major U.S. newspapers on the two days following each of these addresses to
determine whether and, if so, to what extent their use of binary
communications paralleled that of the president.
        The presidential texts were compiled in two steps. First, we retrieved
from the National Archives and Records Administration's Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents, a comprehensive collection of presidential
public communications, all texts listed as "addresses to the nation," with
one exception: the president's brief address given on the evening of the
space shuttle Columbia's explosion was excluded because of its brevity and
narrowness of scope. As a second step we added two more addresses: the
president's remarks at the National Cathedral on September 14, 2001 — the
designated national day of prayer shortly following the attacks — and his
address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002. The
former was included in the sample because it occurred close to the attacks,
its content ranged beyond a basic eulogy (which was not the case with the
Columbia address), and it was nationally televised by broadcast and cable
networks. The latter was included because of its significance in the
build-up to the U.S.-led war with Iraq — this address was the first time
that the president had publicly articulated his desire to gain
international support and remove Saddam Hussein — and because this message
clearly disseminated across the national media even though it was not
broadcast live to Americans.
        Editorials that ran during the two days following each address were
collected from 20 U.S. newspapers, which were selected because they are
leading news outlets and offer geographic diversity. Editorials, retrieved
from the Nexis database, were drawn from the following newspapers:
Albuquerque Journal, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Boston Globe,
Chicago Sun-Times, Columbus Dispatch, Daily News (New York), Denver Post,
Houston Chronicle, New York Times, Omaha World Herald, Oregonian
(Portland), Plain Dealer (Cleveland), San Diego Union Tribune, San
Francisco Chronicle, Seattle Times, Star Tribune (Minneapolis), St. Louis
Dispatch, Tampa Tribune, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), and Washington
Post. Editorials were retrieved using the search string of "editorial" and
"Bush" or "president" in the headline, lead paragraph, or key terms. After
discarding content that referred to presidents other than Bush, we were
left with 288 editorials.
        The unit of analysis for the addresses was the paragraph; that is, the
binary categories (discussed below) received one coding per paragraph. The
paragraph was chosen as the unit of analysis because we wanted to capture
not just the presence of the binaries but also their prevalence in each
address, so that we could track potential shifts over time. For the
editorials the unit of analysis was the entire editorial. This, rather
than the paragraph, was chosen due to the general brevity of newspaper
editorials as well as their common focus on specific topics or themes. In
addition, collection of editorials across 20 newspapers provided confidence
that we would capture any meaningful shifts in editorial discourse.
        Presidential addresses and editorials were coded for the presence or
absence of both sides of the good/evil and security/peril binaries, which
were operationalized as follows:
• Good: This concept was coded as present if the term itself appeared, or
if similar terms characterizing a moral goodness appeared, including right,
righteous, light, best, just, great, and honorable. Further, traditional
"American values" adapted from Hutcheson et al. (in press) were included in
this coding due to President Bush's usage of these values as synonymous
with good. These values include freedom, life, liberty, democracy,
justice, and innovation.
• Evil: This concept was coded as present if the term itself appeared, or
if other terms antithetical to good appeared, including wrong, dark, worst,
unjust, cruelty, wicked, ruthless, and barbaric. Contrasts to "American
values" also were coded, such as the phrase "enemies of freedom." A final
inclusion was the term "fear," which was included because the president so
vividly set it in opposition to the U.S. value of freedom in claims that
"freedom and fear are at war." It was clearly positioned as a contrast to
American values, which as noted above the president used synonymously with
good, and thus necessarily was coded as evil.
• Security: This concept was coded as present if the term itself appeared,
or if similar terms appeared, including safety, protection, and
safeguard. Notably, security was coded when it appeared in mention of the
Office or Department of Homeland Security, whereas other category terms
that appeared in institutional titles (e.g., Freedom Corps, United Nations
Security Council) were not coded. We made this exception for security
because this Office, then Cabinet-level Department emerged in specific
response to September 11, so these institutional titles must be viewed as
part of the security discourse.
• Peril: This concept was coded as present if the term itself appeared, or
if similar terms appeared, including threat, risk, danger, and
hazard. References to the possibility of future attacks also were coded as
peril, due to the inherent peril that exists within the possibility of
future attacks.
        One person analyzed the addresses and editorials. As a check of
inter-coder reliability, a second person coded approximately 10 percent of
presidential paragraphs and 10 percent of newspaper editorials. For the
presidential paragraphs, inter-coder reliability coefficients ranged from
.94 to .99, which were at least 88% greater than by chance (see Scott,
1955). For the newspaper editorials, inter-coder reliability coefficients
ranged from .97 to 1.0, which were at least 94% greater than by chance.

Results
        Our analysis focuses first on the good/evil binary and second on the
security/peril binary. Good/Evil Binary
Our first hypothesis predicted that President Bush would be more likely to
use the good/evil binary in addresses that followed the September 11
attacks than in preceding addresses. Tests of this hypothesis included
three presidential addresses prior to September 11 and 12 addresses during
the post-September 11 "war on terrorism." In a similar vein, because we
expected newspaper editorial discourse to align with the president's
communications, hypothesis three predicted that the good/evil binary was
more likely to be present in newspaper editorials that followed the events
of September 11 than in preceding editorials (see Table 1).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The results provide support for both hypotheses: President Bush's use of
the good/evil binary increased after the attacks and editorial discourse
followed that trend. Although the increases in "good" terminology in
Bush's speeches and the editorials were not statistically significant at p
< .05, the pattern did trend upward over time in both sets of texts. Much
more dramatic shifts were apparent with "evil" terminology: this discourse
increased markedly in both sets of texts, rising from 4% to 13% of
paragraphs in Bush's addresses and from 22% to 39% of the
editorials. These findings indicate that the administration, as in wars
past, invoked "evil" discourse to characterize the U.S. opposition and that
this language was closely paralleled by newspaper editorial boards, the
institutional voices of the press.
Notably, the relatively more dramatic increase of "evil" discourse in the
president's communications suggests that this terminology was the more
strategic entry of the good/evil binary in the "war on terrorism"
period. At the same time, subsequent analysis indicates that President
Bush consistently employed both sides of the binary in a related manner,
especially following the September 11 attacks. Figure 1 illustrates Bush's
use of both sides of the good/evil binary prior to September 11 and during
the "war on terrorism."

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

This graph shows the percentage of paragraphs in each presidential address
that included "good" or "evil" terminology. That both "good" and "evil"
move together so closely suggests that the president was indeed
strategically employing a binary setting "good" and "evil" in
opposition. Excerpts (a) from the president's addresses provide insight
into these strategic communications, and (b) from newspaper editorials are
suggestive of the press's adoption of this terminology.
        The president began employing "evil" discourse immediately following the
attacks. On the evening of September 11, Bush described the events of the
day: "Today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we
responded with the best of America" (Bush, 2001c). In subsequent
addresses, the president set good and evil in clear opposition. Speaking
to a joint session of Congress on September 20, Bush invoked religious
faith and war to discern good from evil: "Freedom and fear, justice and
cruelty have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral
between them" (Bush, 2001a). Over time, the president expressed confidence
that, although present, this evil would not eliminate good. On November 8,
he told the nation that "out of evil, can come great good" (Bush, 2001b).
        Some editorials adopted the president's good/evil discourse directly:

George W. Bush has cast the war against international terrorism as a fight
that pits "good vs. evil"…. There are times and issues when right and wrong
are colored in shades of gray, when men and women of good conscience may
differ. This is not one of them. (Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 16)
Other editorials picked up Bush's discourse without directly attributing it
to him. An editorial in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, for example,
recalled past evil as well as present:

Americans are ready now. Just as we were once before when attacked by an
evil unleashed on the world. And as the days bring us the ghastly actual
death toll, all but those who have lost the capacity to recognize evil and
be outraged will be more than eager to retaliate. (September 13)
These results, then, provide strong support for hypotheses one and three.
Security/Peril Binary
Hypotheses two and four focus on the security/peril binary. Specifically,
hypothesis two predicted that President Bush would be more likely to use
the security/peril binary in addresses that followed the September 11
attacks, while hypothesis four, based on the logic that newspaper
editorials would follow the president, predicted that the security/peril
binary would have a greater presence in editorials that followed the events
of September 11 than in preceding editorials (see Table 2).

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

The results provide strong support for both hypotheses: President Bush's
use of the security/evil binary increased after the attacks and editorial
discourse followed that trend.
Table 2 indicates that, as expected, the president significantly increased
his use of this binary, with "security" terminology rising from 2% to 19%
and "peril" language from 5% to 21%. Editorials showed a similarly large
upward shift in the usage of this binary after the September 11 events:
editorial discourse containing "security" terminology increased from 20% to
51% and "peril" language increased from 14% to 65%. The results across
hypotheses two and four, then, are suggestive of how a U.S. president can,
essentially, "count on" the press to help circulate his ideas and, in so
doing, create the communication climate that he desires.
In addition, as we found with the good/evil binary, subsequent analysis
indicates that President Bush consistently employed both sides of the
security/peril binary in a related manner, especially following the
September 11 attacks. Figure 2 illustrates Bush's use of both sides of the
security/peril binary prior to September 11 and during the "war on terrorism."

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

This graph shows the percentage of paragraphs in each presidential address
that included "security" or "peril" terminology. That both "security" and
"peril" move together so closely suggests that the president was
strategically employing these ideas as binary oppositions. Excerpts (a)
from the president's addresses provide insight into these strategic
communications, and (b) from newspaper editorials are suggestive of the
press's adoption of this terminology.
President Bush invoked security/peril language immediately following the
attacks, assuring the nation on the evening of September 11 that the
government was taking "every precaution to protect our citizens at home and
around the world from further attacks" (Bush, 2001c). Ten days later,
speaking to both houses of Congress, the president emphasized the peril
that had become manifest since September 11: he claimed the United States
was "a country awakened to danger" and a few paragraphs later said, "Our
nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack" (Bush,
2001a). Throughout, however, Bush also emphasized that security was a
priority. On November 8, he said "After September 11, our government
assumed new responsibilities to strengthen security," and noted also that,
"A lot of people are working really hard to protect America" (Bush, 2001b).
The security/peril language in editorials also pointed to a newly realized
terrorist threat. The New York Times on September 12, for example, noted
that, "Every routine, every habit this city knew was fractured
yesterday. If a flight full of commuters can be turned into a missile of
war, everything is dangerous." Similarly, the Boston Globe claimed that
since the attacks Americans were walking "an emotional tightrope over what
now feels like a canyon of risk in their daily lives" (September 22). As
with the president's discourse, this "peril" language was matched by
"security" language. Frequently, editorials adopted Bush's "security"
discourse verbatim. The San Diego Union-Tribune, for example, restated the
president's claim that "the government is doing all it can to safeguard the
public" (November 9). Others discussed security without referencing the
president. The Washington Post, for example, noted that a victory in the
"war on terrorism" would require a "strengthening and redesign of
intelligence and security systems" (September 16).
These results, then, provide strong support for hypotheses two and
four. Further, the pattern of evidence throughout indicates clearly that
the president regularly used binaries in his national addresses after the
September 11 terrorist attacks, and, the evidence shows just as clearly, a
large number of newspaper editorials adopted these binary communications.
Additional Analysis
Interestingly, examination of the over-time relationship of security and
peril in the president's addresses suggests two distinct periods of his
usage of this binary beginning with his 2002 State of the Union
address. The first three addresses of 2002, we posit, might be viewed as
the administration's "Homeland Security" policy campaign, beginning with
President Bush's claim in the State of the Union that "Our first priority
must always be the security of our Nation" (Bush, 2002a). The next
national presidential address came in June, when he announced a
reformulated version of the Department of Homeland Security. In the
one-year anniversary of September 11 Bush again emphasized security over
peril. The four following presidential addresses, in contrast, might be
viewed as the "War with Iraq" policy campaign. The first of the four was
the president's address to the United Nations Security Council on September
12, which voiced the administration's desire to disarm Iraq — by force if
necessary. The three subsequent addresses all focused largely on the "Iraq
threat," culminating with Bush's March 17, 2003, ultimatum issued to Saddam
Hussein two days prior to the commencement of the war with Iraq.
With these related, yet differing policy emphases seemingly tied to
strategic usage by the president of particular sides of the security/peril
binary, we grouped the presidential addresses and newspaper editorials into
two periods beginning with the 2002 State of the Union address — a
"Homeland Security" campaign period (first three addresses) and an "Iraq
war" campaign period (last four addresses). We then ran crosstabs for each
period that examined whether the emphasized binary was present in
significantly greater degree in both the presidential addresses and
newspaper editorials than in the other respective post-September 11 texts
(see Table 3).

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The results in Table 3 show remarkably similar patterns of discourse across
these two periods. Starting with "security" language, we see that it was
present in a much greater degree — in both presidential addresses and
newspaper editorials — during the "Homeland Security" campaign than in the
other texts of the period. Specifically, President Bush's use of
"security" terminology in "Homeland Security" addresses was more than
double (31% vs. 15%) his "security" usage in the other post-September 11
addresses. Newspaper editorials' usage of this language also significantly
increased in this period, as "security" discourse rose from 47% to 70%. In
a similar pattern, the results in Table 3 also show that "peril" language
was present to a much greater degree — in both presidential addresses and
newspaper editorials — during the "war with Iraq" campaign than in the
other periods. Specifically, President Bush's use of "peril" terminology
in the "war with Iraq" addresses was double (30% to 15%) his "peril" usage
in the other post-September 11 addresses. Newspaper editorials' usage of
this language also significantly increased in this period, as "peril"
discourse rose from 57% to 74%.
        These findings, then, strongly suggest that President Bush strategically
emphasized a particular side of the security/peril binary to fit a
particular context and administration policy goal. At the same time, we
again find newspaper editorials closely aligning with the president's
communications and outlook.

Discussion
        Collectively, these results provide significant insight into the usage by
President Bush of binary communications and the adoption by newspaper
editorials of this language following the terrorist attacks of September
11. As expected, after September 11 the president invoked the familiar
wartime binary of good/evil. This is important for several
reasons. First, given the past usefulness of this binary in assuaging
wartime guilt and justifying war (Ivie, 1980; 1990), Bush undoubtedly
expected that it would function in much the same manner during the "war on
terrorism." And indeed it has seemed to do so, considering the high public
support for the "war on terrorism" and the current war in Iraq (Pew,
2003). Second, Bush is a president who — it has now become clear — tends
to starkly delineate good and evil, based largely upon his religious
outlook. According to Commerce Secretary Don Evans, a close friend of
Bush, the president has drawn upon his devout Christian outlook to
formulate "a very clear sense of what is good and what is evil" (in
Fineman, 2003, p. 25). Bush himself makes his binary ideology quite clear:
"I don't believe there are many shades of gray in this war. You're either
with us or against us. You're either evil, or you're good" (in McManus,
2003). For Bush, constructing the "war on terrorism" as an epic battle
between good and evil was likely his first instinct, as well as a clear and
powerful communication strategy. The implications for a presidential
administration are substantial: a rigid view of those who are "with us" as
good and everyone else as "against us" and as evil engenders a sense of
moral certitude that can be used to justify war, suspension of civil
liberties, and a dismissal of United Nations conventions. And when leading
segments of the press so strongly echo such a view — between 40 and 50
percent of the editorials analyzed in this research included "good" or
"evil" discourse — the administration's outlook can only be solidified.
At the same time, the president's use of this good/evil discourse
undoubtedly has provided the American public — or at least certain segments
of the public — with a sense of certainty in uncertain times. Though in
the aftermath of the attacks people were undoubtedly more willing to accept
such good/evil distinctions, we posit that Bush also needed a binary with
broader appeal and more specific policy implications:
security/peril. Indeed, we suggest that while the binary of security/peril
clearly has great moral power, it is far less likely to upset some members
of the public in the same way that good/evil communications might — in part
because it is so clearly relevant to the current circumstances and, in
part, because it does not have such obvious religious
underpinnings. Further, this binary has the ideal characteristic of
simultaneously engendering public confidence in the competence of the Bush
administration while serving the administration's political goals. All of
these factors, then, help to explain why the president emphasized this
binary increasingly over time and why it was so clearly linked with
administration policy goals. Indeed, our results suggest that Bush
emphasized the security side of the binary at a time when the
administration's major policy objective was to establish the Department of
Homeland Security, and the peril side of the binary when the administration
was pushing for a war that would ostensibly remove the "Iraq
threat." These contexts clearly show strategic binary communications at
work, in a remarkably effective manner we might add.
        Bush's strategic employment of binaries becomes even more important in
light of the consistently parallel editorial discourse. The findings are
quite clear: The press — at least the institutional voices of the press —
aligned remarkably closely with the president's communications. That the
editorials consistently take cues from the president is no small matter and
is suggestive of the press's role in the encouraging the "rally 'round the
flag effect" common in crisis periods (see Baker & Oneal, 2001; Mueller,
1970). Particularly revealing is the president's and press's usage of the
good/evil binary following the attacks of September 11. These data are
particularly revealing because the editorials, like Bush, exhibited a much
greater increase in "evil" rather than "good" discourse. One might expect
that in a time of national crisis, newspaper editorials would show a strong
uptick in pro-American sentiment, thereby emphasizing the "good" side of
the binary. Indeed, scholars have shown that news media tend to reflect
national themes and swells in patriotism during such times (Bloom, 1990;
Brookes, 1999; Hutcheson et al., in press). In our findings, it is the
case nearly 30 percent of the editorials in the "war on terrorism" period
do extol the "good" of the United States; however, this percentage — as
with the president's use of this terminology — is not significantly greater
than during peacetime. In contrast, the language of "evil" goes up
dramatically for both the president and the press. All of these findings,
then, suggest that editorials rely heavily on the president's
communications as their model, at least in times of crisis. Indeed, our
findings clearly reveal an American press that, in their institutional
voices, have echoed the president's words for the past 18 months.

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Table 1
"Good" and "Evil" Discourse
by President George W. Bush and in Newspaper Editorials


"GOOD" DISCOURSE

Time period
Bush
Speeches
Newspaper
Editorials

Before September 11

19.2%
(n = 125)

27.1%
(n = 59)

"War on terrorism"

22.0%
(n = 440)

29.3%
(n = 229)

X2 = .47, n.s.

X2 = .11, n.s.



"EVIL" DISCOURSE

Time period
Bush
Speeches
Newspaper
Editorials

Before September 11

4.0%
(n = 125)

22.0%
(n = 59)

"War on terrorism"

13.4%
(n = 440)

38.9%
(n = 229)

X2 =8.6, d.f. = 1, p < .05

X2 = 5.8, d.f. = 1, p < .05




Numbers in table indicate, for the particular time period, the percent of
(a) paragraphs in the president's national addresses and (b) newspaper
editorials in two days following addresses, that contained "good" and
"evil" language

Table 2
"Security" and "Peril" Discourse
by President George W. Bush and in Newspaper Editorials


"SECURITY" DISCOURSE

Time period
Bush
Speeches
Newspaper
Editorials

Before September 11

2.4%
(n = 125)

20.3%
(n = 59)

"War on terrorism"

18.6%
(n = 440)

51.1%
(n = 229)

X2 = 20.1, d.f. = 1, p < .05

X2 = 17.9, d.f. = 1, p < .05



"PERIL" DISCOURSE

Time period
Bush
Speeches
Newspaper
Editorials

Before September 11

4.8%
(n = 125)

13.6%
(n = 59)

"War on terrorism"

21.4%
(n = 440)

64.6%
(n = 229)

X2 = 18.3, d.f. = 1, p < .05

X2 = 49.3, d.f. = 1, p < .05




Numbers in table indicate, for the particular time period, the percent of
(a) paragraphs in the president's national addresses and (b) newspaper
editorials in two days following addresses, that contained "security" and
"peril" language


Table 3
"Security" and "Peril" Discourse by President George W. Bush and in
Newspaper Editorials
broken out by "Homeland Security" and "War with Iraq" campaigns


"SECURITY" DISCOURSE

Time period
Bush
Speeches
Newspaper
Editorials

Rest of texts,
September 11 and after

15.0%
(n = 339)

46.8%
(n = 186)

"Homeland Security" campaign

30.7%
(n = 101)

69.8%
(n = 43)

X2 = 12.6, d.f. = 1, p < .05

X2 = 7.4, d.f. = 1, p < .05



"PERIL" DISCOURSE

Time period
Bush
Speeches
Newspaper
Editorials

Rest of texts,
September 11 and after

14.6%
(n = 246)

57.4%
(n = 129)

"War with Iraq" campaign

29.9%
(n = 194)

74.0%
(n = 100)

X2 = 15.04, d.f. = 1, p < .05

X2 = 6.8, d.f. = 1, p < .05




Numbers in table indicate, for the particular time period, the percent of
(a) paragraphs in President's national addresses and (b) newspaper
editorials in two days following addresses, that contained "security" and
"peril" language








Figure 1
"Good" and "Evil" Discourse by President George W. Bush

   [--- WMF Graphic Goes Here ---]



Figure 2
"Security" and "Peril" Discourse by President George W. Bush

   [--- WMF Graphic Goes Here ---]


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